CIAO DATE: 02/02

Kosovo's Evolving Contest: Security, Policy and Sovereignty

Charles H. Norchi
Senior Fellow, ISS, Yale University and  Visiting Professor, Department of History, Sarah Lawrence College

Joint Workshop on Europe and Transatlantic Security: Issues and Perspectives
Kandersteg, Switzerland
August 25-27 2000

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Kosovo in Historical Context

It will be recalled that Yugoslavia was created in 1918 in the wake of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The new state was peopled by religiously distinct ethnic groups of Serbs, Croats, Slovenians and Muslims. After World War II and German occupation, Josip Broz Tito, the Croat leader of the Yugoslav resistance, reunited the country as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Member Republics of the SFRY were Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the autonomous provinces of Voyvodina and Kosovo.

Kosovo had been incorporated into Yugoslavia in 1945, but unlike the five federal units of Yugoslavia, it did not have the constitutional right to secede from the federation. With its majority Albanian population, it held the same status of Vojvadina with its majority Hungarian population. Tito's rule was harsh. His aim was to establish a public order straddling capitalism and communism in a multi-ethnic society. His foreign policy direction was non-aligned. Tito died in 1980 and SFRY leadership was assumed by a Presidential Council intended to represent the republics and autonomous territories with council chairmanship rotating among members.

Within the SFRY, the largest ethnic group was the Serbian community. Serbian nationalist leader Slodoban Milosevic played on aspirations of a "greater Serbia" via inciting political rhetoric. This included an account, supported by the Serbian Academy of Sciences, of injustices committed against the Serbs dating to the battle of Kosovo in 1389. In May 1991, Council representatives of Serbia, Montenegro and the two autonomous provinces blocked the Croat member, Stipe Mesic, from assuming the role of President, due to him by constitutional provision. Serbia then eliminated the autonomy of the province of Voyvodina and limited the autonomy of Kosovo.

A series of independence moves than occurred. On September 27, 1990 the Slovenian parliament adopted a declaration that federal law would no longer be applied within the Republic. On December 23, 1990 88.5% of Slovenians voted for independence in a referendum. Croatia followed suit on May 19,1991 by a majority of 93.24%. Declarations of independence ensued on June 25,1991. Next, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia declared their independence. Serbia and Montenegro remained the sole members of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The European Union put forward critical criteria as a condition for recognition by its member states. These included democratic governance, respect of human rights and the protection of minorities. Slovenia and Croatia accepted the criteria and received recognition by the EU on January 16,1999, as did Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were admitted to the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Serbia and Montenegro were urged by the UN, European regional organizations and other external elites to become part of a larger federation with the newly independent states, rather than continuing as the former SFRY.

The Serbian Government engaged in the support of the Bosnian-Serb uprising against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Armed conflict ensued. The United Nations Security Council, in May 1992, ordered an embargo of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the FRY delegation was denied automatic succession to the membership of the SFRY seat in the UN.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic fighting claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. Attempted mediations by the UN and the EU failed. In 1996 the Dayton Accords sponsored by the United States provided a legal framework for a political solution in the form of a Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation linked with a Bosnian Serb entity within a state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. An international police force separated factions on the ground.

Kosovo was not mentioned in the Dayton Accords. However, Kosovo was the price the West paid to get Milosevic to the bargaining table. It was left off the agenda. Had it not, the West calculated, Milosevic would not have come to Dayton. In the wake of the Accords, the Albanian population in Kosovo became the target of widespread human rights violations. By 1998, the Serbs were committing violations of humanitarian law and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) counterattacked. As the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova became ineffective, support for the KLA swelled.

The United Nations Security Council on September 23, 1998 passed Resolution 1199 demanding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population" and indicated the possibility of "further action" if it did not comply. Whether Resolution 1199 authorized the NATO military intervention as a matter of international law, remains a debated issue.

A cease-fire was brokered by U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on October 16, 1998. By its terms, unarmed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors entered Kosovo. Fighting continued. By January 1999, 20,000 Albanians were forced to flee twenty-three villages, according to United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reports. Forty-five ethnic Albanians in the village of Racak were massacred. The victims included children, women and elderly men.

Talks were undertaken outside Paris at Chateau Rambouillet, co-chaired by France and the United Kingdom, including the participation of other "Contact Group" members Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States. Russia did not become seriously engaged in the negotiations. Western powers demanded an armed NATO presence to enforce the peace. Neither the Serbs nor the Kosovar Albanians would agree. President Clinton announced that the United States would deploy 4,000 U.S. ground forces as part of a 28,000 NATO peacekeeping force, provided that a peace agreement could be reached.

The Rambouillet Talks were suspended in February 1999 and resumed on March 14 in Paris. Kosovar Albanians signed the proposed peace agreement, but the FRY representatives refused. Instead, they deployed an estimated 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo. The Talks finally broke down on March 19,1999. An estimated 400,000 people had fled their homes by this time. On March 20, OSCE monitors were withdrawn.

Beginning on March 24, 1999, NATO attacked a sovereign country for the first time in its fifty- year history. Thirteen of nineteen NATO members participated in the air strike. German planes flew in combat for the first time since World War II. The war continued for seventy-eight days. The bombing resulted in nearly a million people fleeing Kosovo and an additional half million becoming internally displaced.

Russia withdrew its Ambassador to NATO and condemned the attacks. Russia, Belarus, China, Cuba, India and Ukraine argued that regional alliances could act to restore peace and security only upon specific authorization by the Security Council. Although he had criticized NATO for acting without Security Council authorization, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan implicitly endorsed the operation, saying, "...it is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace."

It is useful to reconsider the question, "who was fighting for what?". The Kosovar Albanians were fighting for independence based on the principle of self-determination. The Serbs fought to keep Kosovo within Yugoslavia based on the principle of the inviolability of international borders. The international community and its agent, NATO, fought to protect the human rights of the minority population, and to bring Milosevic back to the bargaining table. Paradoxically, the international community also demanded an autonomous Kosovo, which would yet remain part of the new rump Yugoslavia.

On June 10, bombing was suspended, and finally halted on the 20th when Milosevic accepted NATO terms. These were incorporated into the crucial UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (see addendum). It is the critical policy instrument expressing the goals of the international community. Resolution 1244 has become what Judge Richard Goldstone called "the constitution of the UN protectorate for Kosovo." Under the terms of the Resolution and its clarifying annex, the protectorate would be run by the United Nations on behalf of the international community, and the Russian Federation would participate in the peacekeeping operation.

Security, Sovereignty and National Borders

Resolution 1244 was an explicit recognition that Kosovo would continue as an integral part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It echoed earlier instruments by calling "for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo." The Resolution also affirmed "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other states of the region." There was unanimity in principle regarding the intangibility of borders, even within a context which most of the delegations regarded as internal. Yet, how lines are drawn on a map is a matter of international and internal human security.

Resolution 1244 confirmed the applicability of the international law principle uti possidetis juris outside the colonial context, by protecting former provincial or federal borders from forcible change. The principle was also invoked in separate CSCE and EC statements. This was the application of a long settled international legal policy, and is a significant issue of international security.

The principle of uti possidetis juris is used to answer a policy question pertaining to elites at the helm of newly independent states: who gets what, when, how?

This principle has shaped decolonized states in South America, Africa and South Asia. Uti possidetis is a presumption: - as states decolonize, they inherit the colonial borders they had at the time of independence. Borders are then not open to dispute. The rule entrenches territorial stability at the moment of transition to independence. Absent evidence to the contrary, defined units within one sovereignty come to independence within that territorially defined unit. In the traditional view, aspirations of self-determination and the protection of human rights are treated separately from the issue of the territorial framework of the transitional process to independence.

The majority opinion in the International Court of Justice case concerning the frontier dispute between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali (December 22, 1986 I.C.J. 554) observed that uti possidetis juris is "a general principle of international law which is logically connected to the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power." But as Judge George Abi-Saab wrote in a separate opinion in that case, "this principle, like any other, is not to be conceived in the absolute; it has always to be interpreted in the light of its function within the international legal order."

The Commission chaired by Judge Robert Badinter advised the European Community on legal questions associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia. The Badinter Commission applied uti possidetis asserting that the new entities, in order to be recognized by the European Community, had to be co-extensive with the territorial boundaries that had separated the component parts of the SFRY, that is, its former republics. Relevant elites endorsed the applicability of the rule from the outset. This meant there was no debate over the adjustment of borders.

There are two arguments against the application of uti possidetis in the post-Cold War international system. One is human rights and the other is international security. A new state defined by an old border may lack a commitment to the human dignity of certain groups. Anyone found on the wrong side of a border risks, someday in the future, the prospect of ethnic cleansing. Patterns of human rights abuses eventually become security crises. As affected populations simmer, seethe and rebel, states and regions destabilize.

The application of uti possidetis juris to Kosovo ignores the history of enmity between Kosovo Serbs and the ethnic Albanians they oppressed, along with the differences in language, religion and political allegiance. How lines are drawn on the map should not be the goal. Maps have implications for sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights, nationhood and the collective memory. The goal should be the creation of a tolerant multi-ethnic society. Revered juridical principles of cartography must be instruments in the service of that goal. Using international law to keep the lid on people who want to reorganize themselves serves neither human rights nor international security.

Peace-building and the International Civil Presence

The UN has authorized not just a military mission, but a "multifunctional mission with a complex agenda and strong civilian, political and humanitarian components", as Fred Tanner has described what is now a trend in his article, "Peacekeeping and Human Rights: A Crucial But Uneasy Relationship." The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established June 13, 1999, to handle the interim civil administration of Kosovo. UNMIK is working with other important actors towards the rebuilding of civil society. These are UNHCR, working on refugee matters, the OSCE, which is tasked with institution building, and the European Union, which is handling economic reconstruction.

Dr. Bernard Kouchner, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and head of UNMIK, is responsible for activities carried out by UNMIK, including facilitating the policy process which will shape Kosovo's future status. The deep animosities among Kosovo's communities is unlikely to abate with the current generation, and the legal status of the province is likely to remain unresolved for some time. Hence, UNMIK has the complex task of guiding the transition to a civil society in which previously warring factions may coexist. This will require mechanisms to protect minorities and insure human rights generally. That will require the re-establishment of the rule of law including an independent judiciary and an effective police force. It is a massive undertaking, but critical for future regional and international security.

The Security Council decided that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence would include " Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo." Specifically, UNMIK's central responsibilities are:

• Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

• Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

• Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;

• Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status; ultimately overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

• Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

• Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

• Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

• Protecting and promoting human rights; and

• Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

 

This is a wide-ranging and difficult mandate, and UNMIK has encountered some rough spots. A number of NGOs and independent humanitarian organizations on the ground have offered both criticisms and suggestions. One of the most effective of the NGOs, Refugees International, has made urgent recommendations which reveal the complexity of Kosovo peacebuilding problems.

Refugees International and other NGOs recommend that UNMIK make periodic supplemental wage payments to Kosovo's police, judicial staff and other civil servants, enabling the development of civil society by insuring that critical promoters and functionaries receive livable wages. Another important recommendation is that the OSCE and UNMIK prepare and distribute a uniform code of procedure for police and investigators. In any society, particularly a war-torn one, civil rights so often depend on civil procedures. The current problem is that international and Kosovar police use a mix of procedures borrowed from other countries during arrest and investigation. One outcome is that Kosovo's judges have been forced to dismiss cases where procedure did not comply with Kosovo's civil law statutes and criminals got released. This trend will produce unfortunate long-term consequences. Another problem has been the unavailability of administrative regulations and laws in the requisite languages. Regulations must be disseminated in Albanian, Serbo-Croatian, Turkish and English to all police stations, municipal offices and sub-offices, courts and judicial offices, and should be displayed in publicly accessible locations. Rebuilding a war- torn society requires available information and in Kosovo critical information has been scarce. A strategy in reversing this condition is supporting an independent press, and forging press partnerships to disseminate humanitarian information.

Among appliers of the law at many levels in Kosovo, there is confusion as to what the applicable law is. This is a difficult but important task for UNMIK, which should clarify all applicable law. In any polity, if the law to be applied is not clearly signaled by relevant elites, the application function of legal decision is frustrated. Prosecutors, judges, municipal magistrates and police will not know what to enforce. Governments should second legal experts to UNMIK with the task of resolving inconsistencies and amending laws. Also, increased security for the courts, judges, prosecutors and judicial personnel is needed. In this connection, the UN should accord enhanced priority to the quality of the police force highlighting training.

A key goal for peace-building is enabling Kosovar justice officials to fulfill their tasks independently, and to ensure just adjudication of cases that might be subject to ethnic bias, intimidation or other pressures. Public perception is a key factor, because the efficacy of a legal system depends upon the population's expectation of authority and justice. This is not only the root of legal legitimacy, it is a fundamental step in reconstituting social order.

With the popular ousting of Slobodan Milosevic and the democratically elected Vojislav Kostunica in office, resolving the Kosovo problem may become even trickier. The presence of a recalcitrant Milosevic provided a measure of credibility to Albanian Kosovar claims to independence. From this perspective, the 42,000 NATO troops in the province were viewed as protection from Milosevic. Now, they may be viewed as an impediment to achieving independence, and more than 700 Albanians from Kosovo still languish in Serbian prisons. The delicacy of the situation has been enhanced by the prospect of the first post-war elections in Kosovo, scheduled for later in October 2000.

Resolution 1244 leaves fundamental questions of power and government in Kosovo open. Questions of partition and independence are unsettled. In such conditions, the tasks of peace-building are rendered more complex. The relevant actors, including Dr. Kouchner and UNMIK, are attempting to guide a society toward an undefined future. In peace-building, the operational target is a future approximating human dignity. However, to be achieved that future must at least be mapped, if not defined.

Law, Policy and Humanitarian Intervention

The international community still grapples over whether NATO action was legitimate under international law. The debate continues because international law is an important instrument of international security policy and the answer has implications for future operations in similar contexts. Here, there are different perspectives: one is of the strict constructionist and the other is that of a policy-orientation that places human dignity before formalistic legal procedures.

Some have argued that NATO military intervention in Kosovo constituted a breach of the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Exceptions are admitted when a nation acts in self-defense and when force is authorized by the Security Council under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. That is the strict constructionist view.

Clearly, NATO's action did not accord with the design of the UN Charter and this causes disquiet among lawyers. The integrity of procedures, particularly where the application of military force is concerned, is at the heart of authority and the prevention of abuse. A military operation taken in the common interest in the absence of formal authority can yield unintended consequences. But sometimes procedures do not work and as the American Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "a constitution is not a suicide pact." In other words, given the massive human rights abuses, a paralyzed Security Council and the failure of economic sanctions and diplomacy, was the international community so constrained by the United Nations Charter that for vast numbers of human beings that central constitution of our international system was a "suicide pact"?

As one scholar has framed the issue, "The question is whether Kosovo comes under the 'suicide pact' rule, the exceptio for that very small group of events that warrant or even require unilateral action when the legally designated institutions or procedures proves unable to operate." Why might the action have been warranted outside the UN procedure? Because the human rights picture in Kosovo, arose to the level of international concern. The military instrument was used because all other policy instruments had failed, and the action was undertaken without Security Council authorization because it could not be obtained. The question now is whether the intervention in Kosovo set an unwelcome precedent for the use of force, in absence of a Security Council authorization. But that potential precedent must be weighed against another precedent - the precedent that no one may effectively act to prevent the destruction and expulsion of future Kosovars, if the Security Council is again unable to act.

The human rights codex, as it has evolved since the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal following World War II, includes the peremptory standard that no government can do anything it chooses to its own people even when acting within its own borders. The remedy for sub-standard government behavior that results in massive human rights abuses is humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is the application of military force in support of shared values authoritatively expressed as prescriptions of international law, although that aim in support of military action is rarely articulated. Kosovo now seems to be a departure. An old international norm, the prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign states, has been fraying since Nuremberg, and with globalization, that fraying has accelerated.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan observed:

Kosovo has cast in stark relief the dilemma of what has been called humanitarian intervention: on the one side, the question of the legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization without a UN mandate; on the other, the universally recognized imperative of effectively halting violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences. The inability in the case of Kosovo to unify these two equally compelling interests of the international community - universal legitimacy and the effectiveness in defense of human rights - can only be viewed as a tragedy.

Yet, an emerging operational code of humanitarian intervention may now place the defense of human rights ahead of universal legitimacy. As Michael Reisman has observed, "When human rights enforcement by military means is required it should, indeed, be the responsibility of the Security Council acting under the Charter. But when the Council cannot act, the legal requirement continues to be to save lives, however one can and as quickly as one can, for each passing day, each passing hour, means more murders, rapes, mutilations and dismemberments - violations of human beings that no prosecution will expunge nor remedy repair."

Open Questions

Many questions remain unsettled. One set involves Kosovo and the region; the other set pertains to the international system. The world community must now face new issues specific to Kosovo and the region, old vexing ones left purposefully latent by Cold War imperatives and post-Cold War denial.

The new Serbian leader, Vojislav Kostunica, is a constitutional lawyer who could put that juridical background to critically needed use. Will he use his training to unravel the cumbersome Yugoslav Constitution with multiple federal and republican parliaments, which had been previously applied to insure Milosevic's power position? Will he resolve continuing tensions between Serbia and Montenegro, the two parts of the federal Yugoslavia? What signals will Kostunica send about justice and the protection of minorities? Will he insure a truly independent judiciary? Will Kostunica allow and enable the extradition of Milosevic to the Hague War Crimes Tribunal? What will happen to the more than 700 Albanians from Kosovar in Serbian prisons? Kostunica is also a committed nationalist. He may see fit to incorporate ideological rhetoric to consolidate his base. And the danger of unchecked rhetoric is that it can shape decision-making and then outcomes. The higher the rhetorical pitch, the greater will be the tensions in Kosovo. Many outcomes in Kosovo will be shaped by how questions on Kostunica's watch are answered and left unanswered.

The European Union moved quickly to remove sanctions on Yugoslavia and has promised $2 billion in aid. It remains to be seen if that full amount will be delivered. But there is a larger question for Europe and its Union. Will Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, be Europe or Europe's periphery? The question is about more than money and aid. It is about shared institutions, legal mechanisms for the protection of human dignity, and an often divisive collective memory. Achieving a more complete European union is to undertake the monumental task of shaping identifications and expectations. The challenge is twofold: confronting, and then overcoming, history.

With the end of the war in Kosovo, fundamental questions at the heart of the international system also remain unsettled. The reconfiguration of territorial communities presents difficult choices which implicate the increasingly seamless webs of global and personal security. Has self-determination in Kosovo been thwarted in favor of state sovereignty by applying as fixed, customary international law? Will the international legal principle of uti possidetis juris provoke a future humanitarian disaster and an international security crisis? If the model of Kosovo as a United Nations protectorate actually secures a measure of human dignity, will it be applied elsewhere? Why only in Europe and not, for example, in Afghanistan? What does the Kosovo action mean for humanitarian intervention? Is humanitarian intervention the emerging operational code of the international system? Does such action require explicit Security Council authorization? Finally, where do these unsettled questions leave state sovereignty, once the reserved domain of the sovereign and increasingly the domain of the people, at the beginning of the 21st Century?

Addendum

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, 10 June 1999

 

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

 

Annex 1

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;

- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;

- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;

- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;

- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;

- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;

Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

 

Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.

2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.

3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.

5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:

- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;

- Marking/clearing minefields;

- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;

- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements. A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;

- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;

- Timetable for their return;

- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;

- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.