CIAO DATE: 02/02

Russian Perception of European Security

Yuri Nazarkin
Faculty Member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Joint Workshop on Europe and Transatlantic Security: Issues and Perspectives
Kandersteg, Switzerland
August 25-27 2000

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy

European Security in the Context of Russia's Geopolitical Situation

Historically, Russia was always threatened from three sides: from the West it was threatened and invaded at different periods of its history by Poland, Sweden, France and Germany; from the South, its traditional rival and enemy was the Ottoman empire; from the East, China and Japan. Throughout its history Russia had to be on the alert along all its borders. Though at present there are no direct military threats from any of the three directions, the current Russian security planning takes into account all the three directions. However, the problem of European security is the highest priority in Russian foreign and security policy. There are a number of reasons for this.

For three centuries Europe was a major arena of tough rivalry and wars for spheres of influence between Russia, on one hand, and European powers, the Ottoman empire and, later, the United States - on the other.

The two biggest wars of the XXth century, which brought tremendous devastation and suffering for Russians, came to Russia from Europe. This devastation and suffering definitely overshadow, in Russians´ eyes, misfortunes that the Soviet Union brought to Europe as a result of its expansion to the West before and after the Second Word War. During the Cold War Europe was the major area of confrontation; this fact has left a very deep trace in the Russian perception of Europe.

On the other hand, historically and culturally, Russia has been always linked with Europe. Christianity played a very important role in this process. Though Muslims constituted 25% of the population of the Russian empire and later, of the Soviet Union, they did not have much impact upon Russian mentality and the political and cultural traditions of the Russian population. On the contrary, they were always objects of russification. Russians have been always more inclined to cooperate and even to be integrated with Europeans than with the Chinese, Turks or other Southern and Eastern peoples. Throughout the whole history of the Russian state there were debates which way Russia should go in its development - towards the West (and integrate with Europe) or its own way. It is important to note that in the latter case nobody raised the question that Russia should go from Europe to Asia. It is assumed that it should remain between Europe and Asia.

Thus, the combination of the trend towards Europe with clashes with the West has produce a particular sensitivity of European security issues for Russians.

We can add to this that 85% of the Russian population live in the European part of the country (though 80% of the Russian territory is situated in Asia). No wonder that the situation in Europe is of the highest importance for Russia.

New Geopolitical Realities, Cold War Mentality and Russian Domestic Politics

Europeans have been used to regarding Russia as a giant possessing tremendous military power. Now it remains a giant only in terms of its territory. Since the early 90s, the balance of power in Europe has changed radically. The Russian GDP reduced drastically and now is less than that any of the larger European nation. It is 12 times less than aggregate GDP of the EU.

As a result of the tremendous debts and of the need to obtain more credits, Russia depends strongly on the United States and other Western powers.

A decade ago the Warsaw Treaty Organization outnumbered NATO, in Europe, three-fold on main categories of conventional armaments. The Soviet Union alone outnumbered NATO two-fold on such armaments. Now, NATO has four times advantage over Russian armed forces. European powers alone (without the U.S., Canada and Turkey) outnumber Russian conventional forces in Europe by two-and-a-half times.

Eastern and Central European countries not only left the alliance with Russia but have taken an anti-Russian stand and some of them have joined already NATO.

For seventy years Russia was separated from Europe ideologically. The iron curtain, in combination with Soviet anti-Western propaganda, has produced a very strong psychological effect, which cannot disappear soon after the end of the Cold War. Of course, older generations are the main bearers of this Cold War mentality. But younger generations are also susceptible to this syndrome. Partly they inherited it from previous generations but their anti-Western (mainly anti-American feelings) have flourished now mainly due to new cold winds from the West. This phenomenon deserves some further explanation.

Why, after a short period of euphoria in Russian-Western relations that followed the downfall of communism, have dark clouds appeared again on the world horizon?

When ideological barriers were eliminated, new Russian leaders of the early 90s rushed to the West seeking its support and aid. They naively believed that the West could help them quickly to transform Russia into a prosperous democratic country. The West welcomed them and provided their new friends with advice on how to reform the economy.

Quite soon, the Russian people discovered that the economic reforms supported and stimulated by the West brought an economic catastroph and tremendous suffering for the overwelming majority of the population. As far as the West was associated with those disastrous reforms their failure contributed to anti-Western feelings.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, deep economic crisis, financial dependence on the West, military weakness and overall decline as well as a loss of allies who have taken a strong anti-Russian stand have created an inferiority complex in Russia. It is being aggravated by the fact that the US has become the only superpower and does not hesitate to use its muscles to gain political aims.

Russian politicians are used to repeating that Russia is a great power. Not a single Russian official document avoids such a prayer. It looks like a display of the inferiority complex. Due to this complex, the military danger of NATO enlargement might be exaggerated in Russia. However, politically it is really dangerous because it complicates her relations with the West, incites Russia to develop military strength, creates difficulties in economic recovery and diminishes the prospects for democratic development.

The inferiority complex explains some extreme political moves and statements by Russian politicians as well as the Russian public's high level of sensitivity towards European security issues. At the same time it should be understood that the Russian position on European security has been dictated by real national interests.

Russian Perception of External Threats and a Russian Model of European Security

The Russian National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (adopted on January 10, 21 April and 28 June 2000 accordingly) mention the following external threats relating to European dimension:

A growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the United States. In solving principal questions of international security, the stakes are being placed on western institutions and forums of limited composition, and on weakening the role of the UN Security Council and the OSCE;

The strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO's eastward expansion;

The possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders; and

The utilization of military-force actions as a means of 'humanitarian intervention' without the sanction of the UN Security Council, in circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of international law.

Elaborating principled approach to these threats, the Foreign Policy Concept reads:

The strategy of unilateral actions can destabilize the international situation, provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate contradictions, and cause national and religious strife. The use of power methods bypassing existing international legal mechanisms cannot remove the deep socio-economic, inter-ethnic and other contradictions that underlie conflicts, and can only undermine the foundations of law and order;

Russia shall seek to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations that really reflects the diversity of the modern world with its great variety of interests;

Taking into account mutual interests is the guarantee of effectiveness and reliability of such a world order. The world order of the XXIst century must be based on mechanisms of collective resolution of key problems, on the priority of law and broad democratization of international relations;

Russia calls for support for a further decrease of the role of the power factor in international relations, along with the simultaneous enhancement of strategic and regional stability. It proceeds from the premise that the use of force in violation of the UN Charter is unlawful and poses a threat to the stabilization of the entire system of international relations. Attempts to introduce into the international parlance such concepts as "humanitarian intervention" and "limited sovereignty" in order to justify unilateral power actions bypassing the UN Security Council are not acceptable; and

Being prepared for a constructive dialogue on upgrading the legal aspects of employing force in international relations in conditions of globalization, the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that the search for concrete forms of response on the part of the international community in different acute situations, including humanitarian crises, must be conducted collectively on the basis of strict observance of the norms of international law and the UN Charter.

A model that Russia suggests for European Security is logically based on the conceptual principles mentioned above.

Without diminishing the significance of the role of NATO in European security, Russia insists that all-European models of security should encompass all of the European states as well as the U.S. and Canada. NATO and the European Union as well as other European organizations and institutions are important elements of European security structure but under the auspices of the OSCE. It does not mean that they should be subordinated to the OSCE.

Russia rejects any formal or informal subordination of one European organization to another. Instead there should be basic agreements, on the basis of which partnership relations of these organizations would be built for the solution of problems in the OSCE region. Russia regards the OSCE as a forum for exchange of views and decision-making, a forum capable to act efficiently on behalf of the whole of Europe in the sphere of preventive diplomacy. It should coordinate the efforts of other organizations in Europe.

It is noteworthy that official Russian documents elaborating the conceptual approach of Russia to European security usually refrain from mentioning the Western European Union (WEU). The only exception, perhaps, was the Strategy of the Development of Relations of the Russian Federation with the European Union that mentioned the possibility of the inclusion of the WEU into the EU and of 'the development of political and military contacts with WEU as a constituent part of the EU'. It was a reflection of the view that the EU is an organization backed by real political will and momentum in contrast to the eternally moribund WEU.

Proceeding from its own requirements for the building of a civic society, Russia intends to continue its participation in the activities of the Council of Europe. By this participation it has recognized and adopted European values of human rights and democracy.

Russia joined the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), but in early 2000, as a result of the deterioration of relations with NATO, it suspended its participation.

With all this said, Russia attributes a prime significance to the OSCE, NATO and EU as current or potential major players in the realm of European security.

The OSCE in the Russian Model of European Security

Russia attaches a great importance to the OSCE, which in its view, should contribute to equal and guaranteed security of all the European states irrespective of their membership in military-political alliances and other closed groupings.

Russia believes that the OSCE as the successor of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has gained an invaluable experience in preventive diplomacy, in efforts aimed at crisis settlement and post-conflict rehabilitation. A large set of instruments for prompt actions has been devised. In spite of the difficulties, the OSCE has retained its potential as a forum for dialogue and the finding of solutions to the most difficult problems in European politics. This was confirmed by the success of the Istanbul Summit (November 18-19, 1999), which adopted truly historic documents - the Charter for European Security, and the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Welcoming the Charter, the same Statement said: 'The leaders of 54 OSCE participating states declared in the Charter their firm commitment to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area where participating States are at peace with each other, and people live in freedom, prosperity and security. They stressed the importance of preventing an outbreak of violent conflicts. The Charter set the tone for the entire work of the OSCE on the threshold of the 21st century. Its faithful implementation by the participating states is a guarantee of peace and stability on the continent in the future.'

Referring to the experience amassed over 25 years by CSCE/OSCE, Russia believes that this experience confirms the need to pay equal attention to all the dimensions and aspects of security: military-political, economic and humanitarian. Attempts to turn it exclusively into an instrument of "democratizing" individual states will only lead the OSCE into an impasse. Such a development would bring the danger of a retreat from the Helsinki principles and, in the end, the degradation of the Organization.

Recognizing that, at present, the OSCE is living through a crucial period of restructuring, taking into account the new international realities, Russia accepts the need for organized OSCE improvements. This should find reflection, above all, in giving it powers: in developing procedural rules for its agencies and institutions, including missions; in acceding to the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations; and in other measures aimed at turning it into a full-fledged international organization as envisaged by Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

On various ocasions Russian officials suggested to elaborate detailed rules of procedure and to define precise spheres of competence for OSCE bodies and institutions, particularly a code of activities of missions and other peace-keeping mechanisms of the OSCE, and to establish a link between the OSCE Secretariat and the UN Security Council in order to strengthen the responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of peace in Europe.

Elaborating its views on the restructuring of the OSCE, Russia makes the following points:

Relations with European states are Russia's traditional foreign policy priority. The main aim of Russian foreign policy in Europe is the creation of a stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation. Russia is interested in the further balanced development of the multi-functional character of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and will make efforts in this direction;

The OSCE's activities must be evenly carried out across the entire space of this Organization. Only in this way will it be able to react promptly and expeditiously to problems and crises; Russia opposes attempts to the narrowing down functions of the Organization, specifically the attempts to redirect its specialized activities to the post-Soviet space and the Balkans and to make it an instrument of 'humanitarian interventions' ;

The OSCE should not become a mechanism for interference in the internal affairs of participating states, and even less so an instrument of 'humanitarian interventions.' Of course, there should be no place for double standards in the Organization, for attempts to use it for the narrow benefit of individual states or groups of states; Russia insists on 'paying equal attention to all dimensions and aspects of security: military-political, economic and humanitarian' contrary to 'attempts to turn it exclusively into an instrument of democratizing individual states'; and

Russia will strongly oppose the narrowing down of the OSCE functions, specifically the attempts to redirect its specialized activities to the post-Soviet space and the Balkans.

An important part of the Russian position is that the rule of consensus should be kept in the OSCE.

As it is seen from above, Russia seeks to keep a decisive role in European security matters. That is why Russia sticks to the OSCE as "a forum for dialogue and the finding of solutions to most difficult problems in European politics", where it shares a veto power with the others. Russia welcomes the Charter for European Security because it sees in the Charter an instrument to strengthen the OSCE.

Blaming Russia for violating certain commonly accepted OSCE rules in Chechnya, some Western scholars raise the question why Russia nevertheless allowed the OSCE during the first Chechen war to become a legitimate party in conflict management in its own territory in the form of long-term permanent missions.

Trying to answer this question, Crister Pursiainen, a research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, makes a number of pertinent points as well as references to other scholars´ points of view. I suggest below a short summary of these points with my comments.

Pursiainen asserts that 'Russia's noncompliance with OSCE rules is not an exception but a rule' because 'Russia does not care about any international norms and rules that limit its autonomy when it defends its vital interests, at least if there is no power to compel it to do so.' If this assertion is correct, Russia's behavior is far from being an exception. Suffice it to refer to the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia in violation of all international norms and rules, including the UN Charter.

Further Pursiainen suggests that Russian leaders 'never thought that they violated the rules.' I agree with this, but I am sure that at the same time they took into account the existence of the opposite point of view in the West.

However, for the purposes of this paper more relevant is the question why Russia accepted the OSCE involvement into the conflict on its own territory, which is its internal affair.

As for the latter here are explanations:

Following its general line towards security matters in Europe based on the OSCE structures as an alternative to NATO enlargement, Russia could not simply ignore the demands of the OSCE with regard to Chechnya. Russian leaders might have concluded that if someone should be allowed to interfere in Russia's internal affairs, it should be the OSCE, because Russia could also win some benefits with its compliance in strengthening the Organization;

By accepting the OSCE involvement in Chechnya, Russian leaders wanted to calm down international reaction over violations of human rights by Russian armed forces. Particularly their intention was to transmit to the world community their message that the cruelty and uncompromising line of Dudayev´s troops justify the use of Russian armed forces;

By playing this tactic, Russia did not lose anything: its real autonomy of decision and behavior was not constrained by the presence of the OSCE mission; and

The OSCE was more acceptable for Russia, in comparison with other international organizations, including the UN, because it could not undertake any punishment against Russia, that is because of its weakness.

I am sure that all these arguments were used by those in the Russian establishment who supported the OSCE involvement. However, as further developments showed, they turned out to be of different validity. Only the first one stands more or less solidly. The other three arguments look rather shaky in retrospect. The international community was not calmed down. Russian military had to behave more cautiously in Chechnya because other European actors (the EU, the CE, individual countries), as well as some domestic anti-war groups in Russia, gained a legal basis of reference in their efforts to exert pressure on Russian generals. As a result, the OSCE proved to be not as weak as it had looked before.

But what is really missing from the analysis of the OSCE involvement in Chechnya is an impact of the domestic situation in Russia upon its leadership's decision to invite the OSCE. Pursiainen notes divergences on this issue between the Russian foreign policy elite and Russian military. Actually it was only a part of domestic dimension of the problem.

It is worthwhile to recall now the approach taken by the Soviet Union towards the 1975 Helsinki Act: despite a very high sensitivity of human rights issues it accepted 'the third basket' part of the Act as a payment for benefits from the first (political) and second (economic) 'baskets'. This Act was approved by the Politburo after a considerable political fight between "hawks" and "doves" and became a compromise for Russia not only internationally but also domestically.

Similarly, twenty years later when Russia accepted the OSCE involvement in Chechnya, it took into account all the aspects of this all-European Organization.

The first Chechen war was extremely unpopular in Russia. Big losses in casualties, President Yeltsin´s unwise politics and Dudayev´s clever line caused strong protests against the war. Once again, like 1975, the acceptance of the OSCE humanitarian dimension and its application to domestic problems was a step towards an internal political compromise that was finally achieved (unfortunately not for a long time) in 1996 ("Hasavyurt peace agreement").

The Russian public unanimously supported the second Chechen war (1999) in contrast to the first one. If, in 1995, the OSCE did not reach agreement with Russia to send its mission to Chechnya, it would not be able to do it during the second war. But, on the other hand, as far as the OSCE Assistance Group had been already stationed there, Russian authorities viewed it as a fait accompli. This Group continues to play a useful role there.

The OSCE missions and groups function in other former Soviet republics (with the exception of Lithuania). Without a generally positive attitude of Moscow to the OSCE their activities there would be less productive and in some cases impossible.

It would be important to keep this possibility for the sake of the democratic development in the post-Soviet space. It can be done if OSCE improvements are made with due account of Russian views.

Russia - NATO

Realistically assessing the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia proceeds from the importance of cooperation with it in the interests of maintaining security and stability on the continent and declares that it is open to constructive interaction. But on the other hand, Russia understands that on a number of parameters, NATO's present-day political and military guidelines do not coincide with security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally directly contradict them.

These contradictions were seen already at the first stage of the Balkan drama when in 1993-95 Russia was permitted to play just a symbolic role in the settlement of the Bosnian conflict and when her protests against NATO bombardments of Serbs in 1995 were disregarded. The preparation for the enlargement of the Alliance aggravated significantly relations between Russia and NATO.

Discussions about the possibility of the transformation of the NATO, which were prevalent in the early 90s, did not reassure Russia because it was clear that the Alliance kept its character as a defence military block opposing Russia. Further developments as well as NATO official statements confirmed, in Russian eyes, this assessment of the current NATO character.

In 1997, both sides made an attempt to establish a formal basis for their relations by signing the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security and establishing under this Act the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). As then President Yeltsin said at the signing ceremony 27 May 1997, 'we have agreed not to damage security interests of each other.' Russia also proceeded from the assumption that the Permanent Council would be a forum for a constructive dialogue and give the possibility to both sides to take into account positions of each other. The disappointment came soon.

As former US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, admitted recently, in the view of the U.S. 'the symbolism of the Founding Act - Russia's acquiescence in NATO's involvement in Central Europe in exchange for some Russian role in discussing security issues at NATO - was more important than the substance; so too was the role of the PJC, at least so far in its history.'

The NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, which started 24 March 1999, were regarded by Russia as an act of aggression, a gross violation of the UN Charter and the 1975 Helsinki Act. Russia froze its relations with NATO. Only after Secretary General Robertson's visit to Moscow in February 2000 have they begun to thaw.

However, the adoption of NATO's New Strategic Concept, which implies the conduct of use-of-force operations outside of the zone of application of the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN Security Council, caused 'primary concerns' to Russia. This position was reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia, which proclaims that the intensity of cooperation with NATO will depend on the non-use or threat of use of force, and non-deployment of conventional armed forces groupings, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in the territories of the new members.

Putting the Kosovo crisis and NATO's New Strategic Concept into one package, Russian Foreign Minister I. Ivanov gave the following assessment on the occasion of the first anniversary of the beginning of the NATO bombardment against Yugoslavia: 'This long-suffering region was just chosen as a kind of a test-site for trying the NATO-centrist concept of world order, where a group of states would misappropriate the right to dictate by force its will to the world community. NATO's New Strategic Concept, as well as the so-called theories of "limited sovereignty" and "humanitarian intervention", were designed to justify such actions.'

Russia strongly emphasizes its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO. The official position is unanimously supported by Russian public opinion. This issue is probably the only one in a wide specter of foreign policy and security problems, on which national consensus exists. Indeed, it is a rare occasion in the modern Russia when various parts of the Russian elite support, though by different reasons, an official stand. Communists, nationalists and conservatives take the NATO enlargement as the preparation of a future aggression of the West against Russia, while westernizers and liberals regard it as a trend to isolate Russia from the West and feel themselves betrayed by their Western allies.

Reflecting the latter view Aleksey Arbatov, a deputy belonging to the Yabloko party (a liberal pro-western party in opposition) writes: 'Nowadays the overwhelming majority of Russian democrats have a bitter feeling that many of their former like-minded companions in the United States, Western and Central Europe betrayed them because they have become enthusiastic proponents of NATO enlargement.'

The main reason for this feeling is that NATO enlargement has contributed to such a political climate in Russia that hampers and even threatens the process of democratization there and, thus, undermines positions of democratic reformers.

Having lost its battle against the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO, Russian leaders now concentrate their efforts against further enlargement. The matter of primary concern for Russia are the applications from former Soviet republics, particularly from the Baltic States, for whom admission into NATO has become idée fixe. However, the applications of former Russian allies to NATO also causes Russian concerns.

The next stage of NATO expansion can detonate a number of conflicts.

If the Baltic states accede NATO, Russia will build up its armed forces in the Leningrad military district, Kaliningradskay oblast and, possibly, in Belarus, including the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons there. Lines of communication with Kaliningrad through Lithuania might become a fuse for a direct conflict. The problem of a Russian speaking minority in Latvia and Estonia is another highly explosive material that could cause a clash.

One can easily imagine what will happen in the Caucasus that is already a real powder keg, if Georgia and/or Azerbaijan join NATO.

The inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria into NATO would provoke Russia to enforce and put on the alert its navy and air forces in the Black Sea, which would become an arena of dangerous confrontation between Russia and NATO. In case of Rumania's accession, the Russian stand on the Transdnistrian problem would become much tougher, with a probable military build up there.

Military threats from NATO enlargement might be exaggerated in Russia. This exaggeration is a result of the inferiority complex mentioned before. But this complex, whether it is irrational or has some grounds, is an important political factor, which could have implications for security outside Russia and for developments inside pushing Russia towards an arms race, a nationalistic and anti-Western stand and preventing democratic reforms.

The trend to make NATO a major tool of European security is regarded by Russia as a serious threat to its national interests because it means that in solving principal questions of international and European security Russia will be ignored.

Many Western observers as well as mass media widely use an argument that Russia has no right to insist on a veto power in NATO. This point belongs to the sphere of political polemics and unfair propaganda but not to serious discussions. Of course, Russia has no veto and it does not claim to have one in NATO. If NATO (and not the OSCE) is the backbone of European security, it would mean that Luxembourg, as a NATO member having a veto power, would have de jure much more influence in European security than Russia. That is why Russia strongly disagrees with this approach. On the other hand, as far as Russia participates in the Permanent Council NATO-Russia, it regards this body as a forum for their productive dialogue but not as a discussion club.

Russia was greatly concerned with the adoption of NATO's New Strategic Concept that was viewed in Russia as legitimating the use of military power outside of the NATO zone without the authorization by the UN Security Council.

Russian Policy towards the European Union

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation proclaims relations with the European Union (EU) as having 'key importance' for Russia. According to the Concept, Russia views the EU 'as one of its major political and economic partners and will strive to develop with it an intensive, stable and long-term cooperation devoid of expediency fluctuations.' There is a solid basis for this statement: the EU consumes 32% of Russia's exports; Russia receives 35% of its imports from the EU; and Western Europe gets 40% of its energy supplies from Russia.

The character of relations with the EU is determined by the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (June 24, 1994). In the Russian view, this Agreement 'has yet to achieve its full effectiveness'. Pursuing this Agreement, the EU and Russia conduct a dialogue not only on a trade and economic agenda but also on a wide range of European and global security issues.

The process of the EU expansion and reform is being watched closely by Russia. Concrete problems relating primarily to the problem of an adequate respect for the interests of the Russian side in the process of the EU expansion and reform, are to be dealt with on the basis of The Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union, approved in 1999 in Cologne.

The two sides regularly exchange views on such issues during their contacts, particularly at regular Summits (the fifth meeting took place 29 May 2000, in Moscow) and meetings of the Russia-EU Cooperation Council (on the ministerial level).

For the decade Russia intends to develop its relations with the EU on the basis of agreements, without pursuing the aim of joining or associating with the EU. Russia sees its partnership and cooperation with the EU as joint efforts aimed at the establishment of an effective system of collective security in Europe on the basis of equality without dividing lines, as active interaction of all sides in solving important all-European as well as global issues, in strengthening positive elements of European self-dependency and originality in political and economic areas.

Seeking to develop its relations with the EU, Russia recognizes the necessity of the US involvement in European affairs. For this purpose a Russia - EU - US mechanism was established and, on 3 March 2000, the first trilateral ministerial meeting was held in Lisbon. It decided, in particular, to convene such trilateral meetings on a regular basis.

Russia regards the EU expansion, transition to a common currency, the institutional reform, and emergence of a joint foreign policy and a policy in the area of security, as well as a defense identity, as 'an objective component of European development'. The process of the emergence of the EU's military-political dimension is regarded in Russia not as a threat but as an object of 'particular attention'.

Russian official statements on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), despite their diplomatic caution, contain a definite positive undertone.

The most outspoken is the document Strategy for Development of Relations Between Russia and the EU on Medium-Term Perspective adopted by Russia in October 1999. It calls to cooperate with the EU to ensure pan-European security by the Europeans themselves without isolation of the United States and NATO and their dominance on the continent.' The document also envisions 'practical cooperation [between Russia and the EU] in the area of security (peacemaking, crisis management, various aspects of arms limitation and reduction, etc.) which could counterbalance, inter alia, the NATO-centrism in Europe.'

Russia's positive stand on ESDP is in line with its proposal on European non-strategic ABM. According to ideas presented by President Putin last June and elaborated afterwards by Defense Minister Sergeev the EU and NATO are invited to cooperate with Russia in order to elaborate concepts of European non-strategic ABM and to work jointly on its development and deployment. President Putin also invited the EU to be the third party to the Joint Data Exchange Center, on the establishment of which Russia and the U.S. agreed at the Moscow Summit last June. Marshal Sergeev stressed that the Russian proposal provided for all-European ABM system. A limited West European system 'would raise suspicions and mistrust.'

It can be seen from these moves that Russia is interested in developing the military dimension of the EU and recognizes that it has to deal with the NATO factor.

There are a number of reasons why Russia views so differently the enlargement of NATO and of the EU.

First, NATO remains for the Russian public opinion an incarnation of evil directed against Russia, while the EU is perceived as an organization mainly for economic cooperation, which has good and mutually beneficial relations with Russia.

Second, the EU military-political dimension is just emerging. It is not based on the inertia of the Cold War and has a broader and more comprehensive character than the classic defense alliance of NATO. Russia believes that it will be oriented towards threats and challenges emerging in Europe and not against Russia. On the other hand, NATO was born as a major instrument of the Cold War and, in Russia's eyes, keeps its anti-Russian character.

Third. The strengthening of the EU is in line with the Russian policy at seeking to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations, while Russia regards NATO as a tool of the US domination in a unipolar world.

Conclusions

European security is a top priority in the Russian foreign policy and security agenda.

Russia realistically assesses European security issues from the point of view of her own national security interests. The domestic political situation and public feelings influence Russian policy on these issues.

Russia proclaims as its main political goal in Europe ensuring the all-European security by Europeans themselves in cooperation with the U.S. and NATO but without US monopoly on the continent. It insists on its full rights to participate in the European security system.

Russia wants to see the OSCE and EU as the main pillars of such a system. Despite its suspicions towards NATO, it recognizes the inevitability of the Alliance's involvement in the system as well as the necessity of cooperation between Russia and NATO. Russia puts forward a number of conditions for such cooperation aimed at securing its interests.

Russia positively watches the EU enlargement and the development of the ESDP in contrast to NATO's eastward expansion, which is assessed by Russia as dangerous for its interests and for European security.

Russia's position on European security should be studied and can be understood only on the basis of domestic developments in Russia, through the prism of Russian history and geopolitical situation. Of course, this conclusion is attributable to any other important foreign policy and security issue. But as far as Europe takes a special place in Russians´ perception of Russian security, it is of particular importance for understanding Russian policy in Europe.

It is commonplace to say that European security is not possible without the full-fledged participation of Russia. But it is important to keep in mind that Russian contribution to European security depends very much on Russia's internal development, on its choice between democracy and totalitarianism. In turn, this development depends not only on domestic but also on external factors. As Russian history shows, treatment of Russia from the position of strength stimulates efforts of political forces aimed at making Russia "a mighty world Empire" or "a stronghold of communism in the world".

As for my conclusions on specific elements of European security, they go in the same direction as recommendations elaborated by Roland Dannreuther in the concluding part of his article "Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations" and largely coincide with them, namely:

The development of EU-Russia dialogue on a wide range of issues - political, military, economic, trade and humanitarian - would contribute to healing divisions between eastern and western Europe and to strengthening security "from the Atlantic to the Urals";

The ESDP should become an important part of European security;

If NATO stops its eastward enlargement and the EU takes the initiative from NATO in driving this process, all sides will benefit in the long run particularly because Russia will be with Europe and not against it. It is important, however, that candidates to the NATO would reconsider their aspirations in a more rational way; and

The role of the OSCE in European security should be strengthened because this Organization (together with the UN, of course) can encourage Russian cooperation in Europe in the interests of security and to the benefit of all players.