CIAO DATE: 02/02

Security Issues for Russia in the New International Context

Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin

GCSP - ISS at Yale University Workshop Papers: "Old and New Security Issues: Research and Policy Ramifications"
August 1998

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy

1. Introduction

The starting point for this paper is the National Security Blueprint of the Russian Federation approved by Presidential Decree No. 1300 dated 17 December 1997. As the Blueprint itself clarifies, it is "a political document reflecting the aggregate of officially accepted views regarding goals and state strategy in the sphere of ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state from external and internal threats of a political, economic, social, military, man-made (technogennyy), ecological, information or other nature, in the light of existing resources and potential." It is a conceptual document of a general nature which is intended to be the basis for the elaboration of specific programmes and organisational documents in the sphere of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation.

The Blueprint identifies the basic national interests of Russia and major threats to them; however, due to its general nature, it suffers from lack of specificity in its analysis of the security situation in Russia. In some cases, when sensitive political matters are involved, the Blueprint is deliberately vague, evasive and reticent. Being an official document, it avoids points which might be taken as criticism against the existing regime. It also diplomatically passes over in silence some security issues relating to relations with other states. Finally, one should keep in mind that the Blueprint was elaborated as the result of the efforts of various ministries, governmental agencies, parliamentarians and academicians; this was further done under the impact of public discussions. Conflicting political interests and the different positions of the various ministries and agencies greatly complicated the elaboration of the document. It took six years to arrive at a result. Compromises reached during the elaboration process contributed to the vagueness and reticence of the Blueprint.

With due respect to the efforts contributed to the elaboration of the Blueprint, the author of this paper intends to fill some major gaps and to highlight the vague points which he sees in the Presidential document and which, in his opinion, are the most appropriate and relevant in the context of the subject of the Geneva & Leukerbad meeting "Old and New Security Issues: Research and Policy Ramifications." It is the hope of the author that the comments made in this paper, together with the Blueprint, might contribute to the discussion on the subject "Old Security in the New International Context." He proceeds from the assumption that the security issues which Russia faces at present have deep roots in the past and, as a matter of fact, they are old ones with new dimensions.

2. The National Security Blueprint of the Russian Federation and the Russian Realities

The Blueprint proceeds from the assessment that the main threats right now and in the foreseeable future do not have a military orientation but are of a predominantly internal nature and are concentrated in the domestic political, economic, social, environmental, information and other spheres. It emphasises that the critical state of the economy, the deterioration in interethnic relations and the social polarisation of Russian society create a direct threat to the country's national security. This assessment looks realistic but is not complete.

A very important source of threats to Russia is the long-lasting political crisis in the country. The main characteristic of this crisis is confrontation in various spheres of its political life: confrontation between the President and the Parliament, between the Duma and the Federation Council, between the federal centre and regions, between various political groupings, and so forth.

The confrontation between the President and the Parliament reached its peak in 1993 and resulted in the bloodshed of October 1993, when government forces bombarded the Parliament and it ceased to exist. The dissolution of the Parliament, to say nothing of the bloodshed, was a gross, flagrant violation of the Constitution and of democratic freedoms. The new Constitution adopted within two months of that tragedy gave the President strong powers over the new Parliament (the Duma) and provided him with reliable means to thwart attempts to deprive him of power.

Under the present Constitution, the President appoints, with the consent of the Duma, the Prime Minister, and takes decisions about the resignation of the Government. He appoints vice-premiers and ministers. This means that the President can have the Government he wishes to have. It is he who has the decisive voice on the composition of the Government; not the Duma or the Prime-Minister. The President also presents to the Federation Council his candidates for the Constitutional and Supreme Courts.

The President has the right to dissolve the Duma in two cases: (1) if the Duma rejects three candidates suggested by the President for the Prime Minister; (2) if the Duma adopts a decision on non-confidence for the Government but the President does not agree with this decision.

On the other hand, the Duma, though it formally has the right to impeach the President, cannot do this in practice, due to the combination of procedures provided for by the Constitution. The requirements for impeachment are:

1. One-third of the members of the Duma must initiate an accusation against the President on the grounds of high treason or another grave crime.

2. A Special Commission appointed by the Duma must confirm the juridical validity of the accusation.

3. Two-thirds of the Duma delegates must vote in favour of the impeachment motion.

4. The Supreme Court must confirm that corpus delicti is present and the Constitutional Court must confirm that the established procedures of putting forward the accusation have been complied with .

5. Two-thirds of the members of the Federation Council must adopt a motion of impeachment within three months after the Duma adopts the accusation. This decision must be taken within tree months after the Duma puts forward an accusation against the President. If this is not the case, the accusation is regarded as rejected.

Given the domination of opposition forces in the Duma, the first two requirements are easily reached (the impeachment motion initiated against Boris Yeltsin by the Communist faction was under consideration by a Duma Special Commission when the Parliament went into its 1998 summer recess). It is feasible to reach the third requirement by some additional efforts. However, it is practically impossible to overcome the fourth one, because the Supreme and Constitutional Courts are under the President's control (the nomination of the judges depend upon the President, who presents his proposals to the Federation Council). Even if the impossible happens and the two Courts support an impeachment motion, there is another safety device: the Federation Council, where the President has a much stronger position than in the Duma. If this body does not take a direct decision to reject the decision adopted by the Duma, the bureaucratic procrastination over three months is enough to stop the impeachment.

However, the new Constitution, though it has made a strong shift in favour of Presidential power, has not succeeded in banishing all confrontation between the President and the Parliament.

It should be noted that the Presidential Administration and the Government are also divided into numerous groupings and "teams" which reflect the split across the whole of Russian society. This split is a result of the appearance on the Russian political scene of various political forces with conflicting interests.

Considering confrontation in Russia in broader terms, one might think first of all of the fault line between the communist past and the democratic future. This would be a very simplistic approach. Naturally, the Communist Party capitalises on the increase of the proportion of the population living below the poverty line, on the stratification of society into a small group of rich citizens and the vast majority of needy citizens, and on the escalation of social tension. But the existing party has no future, and its leaders have no chances of being elected to the Presidency. Its social base is narrowing, and the party has lost its ideology and is transforming into an "group of influence" preoccupied with remaining on the political surface through compromises with the Establishment. On the other hand, there is no united democratic front. Instead, there are a number of "parties," "organisations," "movements," and so forth which call themselves "democratic." In reality these do not represent social groupings with their specific ideologies, but rather are based on the interests of certain groups and the personal ambitions of their leaders. Furthermore, they conflict with one another.

Who are major players on the Russian political scene now?

As a result of privatisation, the bulk of former state property was bought up by a few private banks and financial-industrial groupings. These are headed by tycoons who are very wealthy even by Western standards and who play, or want to play, a policy-making role, and who fight each other for influence in the Russian "corridors of power" in order to obtain more and more sources of enrichment. The term "oligarchs" is rightly applied to them by the Russian mass media. Their major sources of enrichment are the further privatisation of state property, the redistribution of already privatised property, access to economic privileges (preferential duties, reduced taxation, state credits on favourable terms, etc.). Their means are direct penetration into high state posts (gas and oil tycoon Chernomyrdin was the Prime Minister for about six years; the head of one of the biggest financial-industrial groupings, V. Potanin was a Deputy Premier; and another tycoon B. Berezovsky was a deputy head of the Security Council and now is the Executive Secretary of the CIS, etc.), the use of the mass media (which are divided among the oligarchs), blackmail, compromising materials, backstage intrigues, lobbying, bribery, buying off parliamentarians, and assassination.

Constantly fighting one another, the oligarchs conclude temporary alliances when their mutual interests require it. During the presidential campaign in 1996, the owners of the seven biggest banks agreed to support B. Yeltsin financially and politically through the mass media they owned, in order to prevent Communist G. Zhuganov's victory. Afterwards their ways parted again. V. Potanin, one of those seven, concluded an alliance with the gas and oil monopoly Gazprom, which helped him to establish control over the state media and telecommunications conglomerate Sviazinvest. This deal put him into conflict with his former allies who also had designs on this large company. Recently, soon after the retirement of Chernomyrdin, a strong campaign was organised against Gazprom, which was accused of tax evasion. Indeed, Gazprom's debt to the state exceeds US$12 billion. But Gazprom executives claim that the debt owed it by the state-owned enterprises for using gas is in excess of US$13 billion. The conflict continues.

The Russian oligarchs are trying to capitalise on a transitional period of Russian history to gain as much profit as possible. They gamble and are not prepared to play a less risky but less profitable game under strict rules established by the state, which would be a tough and fair moderator for them all. Perhaps this is a basic explanation of the confrontation in the Russian society to be found nowadays.

The domination of the Russian economy by large monopolies hinders the development of middle-sized enterprises in Russia. Legislation, taxation, and lack of state incentives impede the consolidation of the middle class, which could provide strong support to the state and diminish its dependence upon big banks and monopolies.

A paradox of the present political situation in Russia is that due to a number of factors the office of President, though very strong on paper, is rather weak and ineffective in practice. In reality, it appears paralysed by a lack of political will and by its inability to transform its decisions into actions.

The first explanation of this weakness is that the Russian tycoons who dominate the country's political and economic life are not interested in a strong state power at this time. Occasionally, while facing each critical situation in turn, they give their support to the state, but as soon as the danger passes, they continue the same egocentric course.

The central power is weak because of its lack of financial resources. It goes without saying that reforms in various areas require large sums of money. These and other enormous expenditures should be covered first of all with income from taxation. Poor tax collection is one of the weakest points of the Russian federal budget. Of course, lack of experience in collecting taxes under free-market conditions is a valid explanation. Nevertheless, another more substantial reason for the wide spread of tax evasion is unwise tax legislation, which provides for such unreasonably high taxes that in many cases, taxpayers face an alternative: to pay and to be ruined or to conceal income, avoid taxation and remain solvent. It is needless to say which option they prefer.

Tax legislation is not the only element of legislation which is not complied with. Non-compliance with laws is a widespread vice in Russia, and the central authorities themselves are susceptible to it. To be fair, non-compliance with laws is typical not only for the present regime. A famous Russian historian of the nineteenth century said: "Russia has always suffered from bad laws, but she invariably survived because they were never complied with." Perhaps, the only exception was Stalin's period, when due to cruel enforcement, even bad laws were strictly complied with.

The weak executive power cannot increase the effectiveness of tax collection, and lack of resources is an obstacle to raising the efficiency of the executive power.

Another weakness of state power in Russia is the lack of an efficient "vertical" executive power structure. After the strong (perhaps overly strong) administrative command hierarchy created by the combination of Communist party hegemony and the Soviet system was destroyed, no other effective power structure emerged in Russia. Chapter 8 of the Russian Constitution (Articles 130-133, "Local Government") is remarkably short and vague. Additionally, Article 12 proclaims that "local government is self-dependent, within its competence."

Local Soviets existed until the end of 1993. Then they were abolished and the President appointed heads of local administrations who were responsible for managing everyday problems at the local level. He further appointed special representatives authorised to coordinate the work of the local branches of the Federal ministries. Even at that time, when the heads of the local administrations still depended on the President, they were more oriented, by definition, toward local interests. After they were elected in 1996-97 they have become practically independent of the Federal power structure. As for the special representatives of the President, they have never had real power.

The Blueprint rightly says that "the negative processes in the economy exacerbate the centrifugal tendencies among constituent parts of the Russian Federation and lead to a growth in the threat of violation of the country's territorial integrity and of the unity of its legal area. The ethnic egotism, ethnocentrism and chauvinism that are displayed in the activities of ethnic social formations help to increase national separatism and create favourable conditions for the emergence of conflicts in this sphere. Apart from increasing political instability, this leads to the weakening of Russia's single economic area and its most important components—manufacturing, technological and transportation links, and the financial, banking, credit and tax systems."

National separatism is definitely the biggest threat to the Russian security, even to the very existence of the Russian Federation. But it is a part of a wider problem of regional separatism.

Russia consists of 89 regions. Among them there are 21 national republics and 11 smaller national districts. The rest are six krais, 49 oblasts and 2 "cities of federal significance" with the status of regions—Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The 21 national republics have their own Constitutions.

Separatism in the national republics is based on ethnic and religious factors. The majority of them, with the exception of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chanty-Mansiysky national district and Yamalo-Nenetzky national district, are economically dependent on the federal centre (80-90% of the expenditures of the Caucasian republics are covered by the federal budget). However, the trend to secessionism, inspired by the example of Chechnya, is rather strong in some of them, particularly in Dagestan.

Chechnya remains formally a region of the Russian Federation, though Chechen leaders regard it as independent and the federal centre practically has no power there. On the other hand, it cannot be regarded as a sovereign state, even de facto, because the Chechen leader Maskhadov's administration has no power there either. A struggle for power between moderate nationalists like Maskhadov and extremist Islamic fanatics (Yandarbiev and others), internecine clashes, internal terrorism, complete disorder and economical chaos prevail in Chechnya now. Maskhadov and other reasonable people in Chechnya understand and recognise that everything in Chechnya depends on Russia. But Russia cannot help them due to lack of resources and of political will.

Nationalist separatism has forced the federal centre to grant a high degree of autonomy to the national republics. The first was Tatarstan, which was followed by Bashkortostan: they received full rights in oil producing and oil refining, as well as to conduct economic relations with other countries. Saha-Yakutiay, on whose territory lie 98% of the diamonds in Russia, has the right independently to produce and sell diamonds. The federal centre receives only an infinitesimal fraction of the profits made by the Russia -Saha diamond company.

The national regions have adopted Constitutions which contradict the Federal Constitution. The Constitution of Tatarstan has declared the region a "subject of international law." The constitutions of Bashkortostan, Komi and Yakutia provide for the possibility of independent foreign policies. The Constitution of Tyva provides for the right of secession from the Russian Federation. The federal centre practically closes its eyes to the fact that these provisions contradict the Federal Constitution.

Encouraged by such passivity from the centre, some krais and oblasts have also adopted regulations which contradict the federal line. Thus, the Governor of the Saratov oblast, without waiting for the completion of federal legislation on land ownership, declared the right of private ownership of land. While from the point of view of substance he may be right, this is nonetheless an evident violation of Federal legislation.

The economic privileges given to national republics have inspired resentment in the ethnic Russian regions, particularly of those which are donors, that is those who pay more to the federal budget than they receive (these are Moscow, Krasnodar kray, Lipetzk, Nizhnenovgorod, Samara and Sverdlov oblasts). These areas claim that some regions which receive financial support live better than do the donors.

Sometimes the discontent of the donor regions takes extreme forms. A few years ago the Sverdlov oblast, which is regarded as a Yeltsin stronghold, proclaimed its independence. This was taken as a political move to challenge the trend towards the granting of more rights to the national republics, but it was equally an indication of the preparedness of some ethnic Russian regions to defend their regional rights.

More serious is a problem with two other regions—Moscow, where more than 60% of Russia's assets are concentrated, and Krasnoyarskiy krai, which is extremely rich in various natural resources. These areas are headed, respectively, by Y. Louzhkov and A. Lebed, both strong and ambitious personalities and evident candidates in the forthcoming presidential race. Defending the rights of their respective regions, each of them demonstrates a definite inclination to regionalism. But on the other hand, if either of them becomes President, he will face the problem of regionalism from the opposite side. Both should remember Yeltsin's mistake: while fighting against M.Gorbachev, he incited national separatism in Chechnya, Tatarstan and some other national republics, and now is reaping the fruits of that short-sighted policy.

There are a number of regions in Russia whose trend to disintegration from the federal centre is stimulated by their geographical positions. For Amur and Sakhalin oblasts, and Primorskiy and Khabarovskiy krais, industrial and other goods transported from the European part of Russia become very expensive, due to the high costs of transportation over long distances. Though the federal government grants reduced prices for the transportation of certain goods to the Far Eastern regions, they prefer to buy many goods in Japan and even in China (though the quality of Chinese goods is usually rather poor). Their increasingly external economic orientation stimulates a desire to be more independent from the federal centre. The issue of their secession is not presently on the political agenda, though there was a precedent in early 1920s when the Far Eastern Republic existed independently of Moscow.

There is a similar problem with Kaliningrad oblast, which is an exclave separated from the rest of Russia by three other countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus). Though it is not far from Moscow, difficulties related to transportation through the territories of those states and the close economic ties of Kaliningrad oblast with Germany (it was a part of the German territory before the Second World War and German economic and cultural influence is rather strong there) and Poland also stimulates its disintegration from the federal centre.

The trend of some regions to obtain more autonomy, even if their decisions and actions are at variance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and other Federal legislation, and, on the other hand, the inability oof the federal centre to withstand this trend are becoming increasingly dangerous factors and constitute a patent threat to the federal structure of the Russian Federation.

The weakness of the Federal power structure contributes to regionalism and the process of disintegration. On the other hand, the trend of many regions ("subjects of the Federation") to strive for more autonomy further weakens the Presidential structure of power.

To conclude the characterisation of the present political crisis in Russia, the author of the paper cannot avoid the fact that the real cause of future confrontation is the growth of social tension, due to the deterioration of the standard of living for the major part of the population, above all of those who live on salaries received from the state. The numerous strikes by miners, transport workers, teachers and others are caused by the non-payment of their salaries over many months. In turn, strikes in the fields connected with the production of material values further aggravate further the economic situation in Russia. The devaluation of the ruble by 34% last Monday (17 August 1998) caused corresponding rise in prices and, thus, resulted in yet another abrupt deterioration of the living standard of the bulk of the population in Russia.

3. External security issues

External security issues, with one exception, are considered in the Blueprint in a very general way, without mentioning specific countries. The exception is NATO enlargement, which is a hot topic in Russian politics nowadays. The Blueprint says: "The prospect of NATO expansion to the East is unacceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security.... NATO's eastward expansion and its transformation into a dominant military-political force in Europe create the threat of a new split in the continent which could be extremely dangerous given the preservation in Europe of mobile strike groupings of troops and nuclear weapons and also inadequate effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace."

If the United States and some other Western countries, though not mentioned, can be seen (between the lines) as constituting external threats, two very big issues—China and "a threat from the South"-go practically unmentioned in the Blueprint. It is important to fill these gaps.

It is no exaggeration to assert that Russian-Chinese relations are developing quite well in various areas—political, economic and military. This is why it would appear that there are no difficult problems with China. Unfortunately, this is not the case. A very serious issue is the so-called peaceful infiltration by Chinese into Russian territory. According to some assessments there are about 2 million Chinese living permanently in the Far Eastern and Siberian regions adjacent to China. More precise figures are not available, due to the fact that the majority of them are illegal immigrants. Lack of labour power in those underpopulated areas has induced local authorities to invite some Chinese there on the basis of labour contracts. The Chinese are known as a very industrious people. On the other hand, the high level of unemployment in China, with its gigantic population, forces many Chinese to go north. But what is wrong with these mutually beneficial contracts? They lace the cornerstone for a well-organised infrastructure for the illegal penetration of much bigger numbers of Chinese into Russia. The Chinese settle on Russian territory in closed compounds ("Chinatowns") with their own Mafia-type organisation, which to a large extent evade Russian jurisdiction. The Russian authorities can neither control the Chinese compounds nor prevent Chinese infiltration. Of course this is a problem on the Russian side. One can hardly blame the Chinese Government. However, this infiltration poses serious threats to Russian security.

The Chinese Diaspora on Russian territory is involved in the injurious exploitation of natural resources; the smuggling of precious furs, rare medicinal plants and other costly products of the rich Siberian and Far Eastern regions of Russia into China; and drug-trafficking into Russia. In addition, relations between the Chinese and local populations are rather explosive, and clashes between them are frequent. These phenomena are immediate threats. But if the Chinese infiltration is not stopped, in the future whole areas in Siberia and the Far East will be populated by Chinese, which could create the danger of their tearing away, at least de facto, from Russia. In addition to the argument of the preservation of Russian territorial integrity and the richness of these regions, they can be used for settling the large numbers of ethnic Russians coming to Russia from CIS countries. Over the last five years, 1.65 million people left Kazakhstan alone (Nezavisimaya Gazeta 5 August 1998); almost all of the Russian-speaking population left Tajikistan, and many Russians left Azerbaijan and other Muslim CIS countries.

Another problem relates to the fact that Russia has among its population a considerable percentage of people traditionally belonging to Islam. They live as compact entities in a number of national republics and are quite susceptible to the influence of their co-religionists living in other countries. If this influence remained within a purely religious framework, there would not be any problem for the security of Russia. But some Islamic organisations of extremist orientation with roots in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and some other Middle East countries do not restrain their activities to the religious field. They support not only national separatism but also its terrorist forms in Chechnya and some other Muslim republics in the Caucasus.

A special case is Turkey. Since the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when the Ottoman Empire and the Moscow State were formed, Turkey and Russia have had problems in their relations, with the exception of the short period of rule by Ataturk in Turkey (revolutionary changes brought them together). Both are Eurasian countries, and both developed as a result of conquest: the Ottoman Empire conquered territories to the West, and the Russian Empire to the East. Each claimed to be a political and religious leader in Muslim and Orthodox worlds, respectively. The main grounds for their conflicts were, however, of a geopolitical nature. They clashed many times in Russian-Turkish wars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, mainly for control over the Black Sea, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Danube region.

The key issue has always been the "problem of the Straits," which are the only maritime exit for Russia from the Black Sea. Even now as globalisation is changing old geopolitical notions and the two states have normal relations, the problem of the Straits remains a sensitive point, due to the restraints introduced by Turkey on passage. Whatever reasons are given - ecological or any other - such restraints touch upon Russian interests. There is a smell of oil to the whole affair: the question of which way oil and gas pipelines will flow from the Caspian region—through Turkey or another way—is a painful issue.

As was said above, national separatism is one of the major security threats for Russia. Turkey, as one of the most developed predominantly Muslim countries, is a very attractive model of an Islamic state for Russian republics with Muslim population. Thus, Turkish influence, exerted in economic, religious and cultural affairs, is objectively a very efficient stimulator for the separatist trend.

During his recent visit to Turkey (late July/early August 1998) Chechen president Aslan Moskhadov praised Turkey for its "biggest support to the Chechen people in the course of the military conflict with Russia." He also placed blame on the Arab countries which, according to Maskhadov, in the post-war period tried to cause confusion in Chechnya and "to teach Chechens Islam." (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 August 1998). In 1997 representatives of Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Yakutia, Tatarstan,, Tyva, Khakassia and Chuvashia participated in the "Assembly of Turk Peoples" held in Turkey and expressed support for Turkish policy regarding the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."

The Blueprint, following a pattern of presenting Russian security problems in a general, abstract way, mentions "actions aimed at destroying the Russian Federation's territorial integrity, including actions involving the use of interethnic, religious and other internal contradictions, and also in territorial claims involving allusions in individual cases to the lack of precise registration of state boarders in treaties." The first part of this formulation can be applied to the case of national separatism. The second one might be regarded in particular as a vague hint at "the problem of the Northern Territories" (the Kuril islands). This issue has not lost its importance for Russian-Japanese relations, though in contrast to NATO enlargement, it is not the focus of Russian domestic politics as it was a few years ago. The wise policy of Japan of not pressing this issue facilitates the establishment of more favourable conditions for its solution, which would be in the interests of both sides.

There is another gap in the Blueprint's examination of external threats which should be filled. Describing the critical state of the Russian economy, the document mentions rather vaguely, among other negative phenomena, "the growth of the state debt" which implies both internal and external debts. It is well known that the external part of this debt has reached already unprecedented dimensions and continues to grow. Some Russian observers compare this process with drug addiction. No doubt, foreign financial assistance to Russia in a transitional period of its history is helpful and necessary. However, the continuation of this process means an increase in Russian dependency on foreign creditors, and is fraught with the danger of surpassing the critical level admissible for a sovereign state.

4. Safeguarding the Russian Federation's National Security

The Blueprint contains a section with the title: "Safeguarding the Russian Federation's National Security," which comprises half of the document. It sets out tasks which appear thoughtful and correctly oriented, but it has gaps which are, naturally enough, the continuation of the gaps described above.

This paper does not pretend to present a broad programme for curing Russia's ills. Here are just a few thoughts what should be done in Russia with a view of strengthening its security on a democratic basis.

The primary task is the accelerated creation of the middle class. Politically the middle class usually provides the strongest support for a normal democratic state. For this purpose all measures—legislative, economic and educational—should be undertaken for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. This sector of the economy would ensure stable economic development based on normal and constructive competition in the industrial, agricultural and service sectors. It would make a solid and reliable contribution to the state budget. Without state support, small and medium-sized enterprises cannot stand up to the domination of the monopolies and gigantic financial-industrial groupings. Preferential taxation and legislative protection are the most effective means for this purpose.

State power should be strong enough to prevent abuses by big monopolies and financial-industrial groupings. The legislative, economic and political preconditions should be brought about to make them interested in strengthening state power. Of course, it is not possible to prevent clashes between them, but they should interact in a civilised manner, under certain rules, without damaging the interests of the state. Such behaviour should be in their own interests, and should be profitable for them. Normal business competition, not criminal battles, should predominate in the economic life of the country.

An important requirement for the maintenance of the Federation is a strict and clear distribution of rights and responsibilities between the federal centre and the "subjects of the Federation." Given different local conditions, a unified standard cannot be applied to all the regions. Local conditions—economic, geographic and ethnic—should be taken into account. The basis for distribution should be an optimum balance of federal and regional interests. A limit for widening regional rights and responsibilities should be established, fixed in the Constitution (for this purpose some provisions of the present Constitution would need to be reconsidered) and strictly observed.

The whole sphere of social protection should be reformed.

The state should adopt a programme of migration and settlement, primarily immigrants from CIS countries, to the underpopulated regions of Siberia and the Far East.

As for the future challenges from China and from the South mentioned in section 3, these should be handled on the basis of developing good relations with the respective countries, as is the case now.

These ideas, as well as the tasks set forth in the Blueprint, can be implemented only if there are radical changes in the present political regime in Russia. If there is no violation of the Constitution and the presidential election takes place no later than in the year 2000, the result might open the way for such changes.

5. Conclusions

Despite all its gaps the Blueprint is a good effort to elaborate, on the basis of various views (though certainly not a consensus), waypoints for the future in Russia.

This paper may appear excessively gloomy and pessimistic. The author is inclined to regard it as a realistic attachment to the half-realistic Blueprint. He does not close his eyes to some positive signs in Russia though the recent events in the economic sphere undermine his attempts in this respect. Improvements in the economic field are important for solving security issues in the long run. Attempts to solve them on the basis of purely administrative methods would revert the country to its past. However, it is a long way to real improvements both in economics and in security conditions.

Security issues for Russia have definite implications for other countries and for international security as a whole. The author of this paper has not intended to analyse these implications, in the hope that the joint efforts of the workshop participants could effect this task, with his modest contribution.