CIAO DATE: 04/01

Strategic Stability and U.S.—Russian Relations

In early June 1999 a delegation from the Center for International Security and Cooperation traveled to Moscow for three days of meetings with active and retired Russian military officials and leading scholars and analysts to discuss key issues in the U.S.—Russian security relationship. The Committee of Scientists for Global Security, led by Lieutenant General (ret.) Mikhail S. Vinogradov, hosted the meetings, which were the twelfth in a series between CISAC and the Committee that began in 1990. These conferences have come to be known as the “Protocol Meetings” in reference to the Protocol Agreement originally signed by the Committee and CISAC (and initially authorized by the Soviet Politburo) to conduct joint research and discussions on “Strategic Stability to the Year 2000.” Over the years this dialogue has proven to be a valuable forum for Russian and U.S. military officials, scholars, policymakers, and members of the business community to exchange views and develop separate and joint recommendations primarily on nuclear security and issues related to strategic stability.

The June meetings took place at a time when the U.S.—Russian security relationship had reached its lowest point since the end of the Cold War. The war in Kosovo had brought U.S.—Russian cooperation in the security realm virtually to a dead halt. Almost every leading figure in Russian politics and the Russian population at large strongly opposed NATO intervention in Kosovo. General (ret.) Vladimir Belous expressed deep dismay at the deterioration in U.S.—Russian relations that has taken place in the last seven to eight years and compared it to the period 1945-49, when the U.S.—Soviet relationship rapidly disintegrated from postwar partnership to Cold War hostility. While Kosovo was a watershed, our Russian hosts emphatically made the point that an accumulation of grievances had been building over a number of years. The leaderships of CISAC and the Committee agreed that these circumstances made it that much more important that our meetings take place as scheduled and not be postponed. During moments of unusual tension in bilateral or multilateral relationships, track—two dialogues can be especially helpful in providing a forum for discussion of sensitive issues that cannot be broached, at least temporarily, in official discussions.

There was unanimous agreement among conference participants that Moscow and Washington needed to resolve and move beyond Kosovo as quickly as possible in order to restore cooperative efforts on a number of issues. But many conference participants acknowledged that restoring trust in the bilateral relationship would be very challenging. General (ret.) Eugene Habiger, who until June 1998 was commander in chief of U.S. strategic forces, described his efforts to build relationships with his Russian counterparts, including current Russian minister of defense and former head of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces Marshal Igor Sergeev. These bilateral exchanges brought about unprecedented transparency between U.S. and Russian strategic forces, but Habiger expressed concern that a good deal of momentum in this area has been lost, in part due to Kosovo. Both Habiger and General Vladimir Dvorkin agreed that U.S.—Russian cooperation on nuclear security was exceedingly important, and that potentially much more could be done. In an interesting exchange, they also agreed that if it were left to the respective militaries without other institutional and political interference, there would be far more transparency on nuclear issues between the United States and Russia.

Not surprisingly, the issues of possible U.S. deployment of a national missile defense system and the future of the ABM Treaty emerged in the discussions as a very contentious topic in U.S.—Russian relations. Dvorkin agreed with Dean Wilkening’s assessment that U.S. deployment of a “thin” system would not present a threat to Russian strategic forces. Still, Russians are very concerned that the technological advances achieved in efforts to deploy a thin defense could contribute to a more extensive national missile defense system that might have the potential to counter the effectiveness of Russian forces in the future. General Viktor Koltunov noted that the deployment options the United States will be considering next year would all require some modification of the ABM Treaty. Given the current political climate in Russia, Koltunov thought Russian agreement to treaty modification was very unlikely. The Russians were unanimous in the view that a U.S. unilateral decision to defect from the treaty in order to deploy a national missile defense system would strike a hard blow to an already gravely weakened U.S.—Russia bilateral relationship. Wilkening offered avenues whereby the United States and Russia might cooperate on missile defense, and Habiger went further by calling for the United States not to think in terms of a “national” missile defense, but rather in terms of a global missile defense that would not be perceived as threatening by the Russians and others. Both Geoff Forden and Aleksandr Menshikov discussed the status of the Russian early—warning system. While their assessments differed somewhat, both agreed that further cooperation between the United States and Russia would be very beneficial.

Viktor Koltunov expressed a skepticism shared by many Russian strategic analysts concerning the official U.S. rationale for deploying a national missile defense system to counter the “rogue state” threat (North Korea, Iraq, etc.) or the danger of an accidental or inadvertent launch. Russians do not view the threat from missile and WMD proliferators nearly as seriously as U.S. assessments (the Rumsfeld Report, for example), despite the fact that most of the likely proliferators are located far closer to Russia than the United States. Many in the meeting, both Americans and Russians, noted that Russian strategic analysts and planners continue to place great faith in the power of deterrence, while in the United States faith in deterrence has eroded. Mikhail Vinogradov also commented that on issues of proliferation and regional conflict, Russians are more likely to rely on diplomatic and political measures while Americans are more inclined to technological and military approaches. These fundamental differences between the United States and Russia on threat assessment and the most effective means to defuse threats have emerged in recent years as a major obstacle to bilateral cooperation on security. This could be a fruitful topic for future collaborative research and dialogue.

The Stanford delegation came away from these meetings even more concerned about the deep differences between the United States and Russia on issues concerning missile defense and the future of the ABM Treaty. Although President Yeltsin and President Clinton agreed about a week after our meetings to discuss on a bilateral basis possible modifications of the ABM Treaty and a START III Treaty on further nuclear arms reductions, these discussions will undoubtedly be protracted and difficult. It is hard to imagine the two sides making a significant breakthrough before presidential elections in each country in 2000, but the United States is scheduled to make important decisions in June 2000 about deployment of a national missile defense system. These decisions will have a large impact on the U.S.—Russian security relationship as well as the future of nuclear arms reductions and the nonproliferation regime. A number of CISAC research staff and faculty are now considering how to most effectively contribute to this important policy debate in the coming year.

I would like to thank Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation for their generous support to make these meetings possible. Thanks are also in order to the Committee of Scientists for Global Security, especially Mikhail Vinogradov and Leonid Ryabikhin, for organizing the conference and so graciously hosting the group from Stanford. I especially want to thank Geoff Forden, Gene Habiger, and Taira Koybaeva, who served as rapporteur and the editor of this report, for joining us and making their valuable contributions.

ANDREW KUCHINS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
Center for International Security and Cooperation
September 1999

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