CIAO DATE: 02/02

The Persian Gulf

Shahram Chubin
Director of Research, GCSP

GCSP-RAND Workshop Papers: "NATO's New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East"
Geneva, July 15-16, 1999

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Introduction

In the past fifty years five US President's from Truman to Clinton have directly or indirectly, affirmed US interests in the Middle East. The 'doctrines' in the case of Carter (1979) and Reagan (1981) specifically addressed the security of the Persian Gulf. The same period has seen the withdrawal of imperial powers. Three decades ago Britain managed the security of the Persian Gulf. Two decades ago France had the largest naval force in the Indian Ocean. The contraction of these commitments was encouraged by the US, which was unwilling to be associated with colonialism and its evils. Yet since Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf which occasioned the Nixon doctrine, the US has been grappling with how best to assure security. Reliance on regional states ("twin pillars") was upset by the Iranian revolution. In the 1980's the long Iran-Iraq war underscored the need for a Western role, but neither its shape nor its duration were clear. Local forces were reluctant to envisage any thing beyond an "over the horizon presence."

This was changed by the clear and palpable threat represented by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states entered into agreements enabling the US to use their territories for basing its military assets. "Forward presence" replaced "over the horizon". But for how long? Strategically justifiable, these agreements were politically unpopular and therefore always conditional. They could be made more palatable if the US "delivered" a just conclusion to the peace process involving the Palestinian rights. They also depended on a regional appreciation that Iraq (or Iran) were urgent threats and that the US and more broadly Western presence were the only practical means of dealing with them. But if Iraq were to behave as the victim (and the US the bully) and Iran were to rebuild confidence with its Arab neighbours, then the Western embrace might itself feel a little too suffocating.

There was also the question of the US itself. Forward deployment was fine but a commitment of some 30 ships, 200 aircraft and 30,000 men was not infinitely sustainable in the event of other contingencies. Forces were needed to maintain the regional balance, implement dual containment and enforce UN resolutions notably Iraq's UNSCOM commitments. Inevitably, as in the 1980's, the US raised the question of burden and risk sharing. This time around the issue appeared more acute. In the absence of a central front or defined threat in Europe, and in light of Europe's growing integration and relative prosperity, it was not clear why the US' continuing commitment to Europe's security could not be reciprocated by greater commitment and efforts by European states to the general security, notably in the Persian Gulf. Europe's direct dependence on Gulf oil was greater than that of the US. It would be affected at least as much by oil spikes or cut-offs, hence Europe had a clear shared interest in assuring access to Persian Gulf oil supplies and to preventing the domination of the region by any (unfriendly) power(s).

Connected to this was the question of the role of NATO. As it expanded and began to deal with new threats, or threats that were transnational and hence not easily dealt with "in area", the question of its future role and utility were raised. Within the alliance this was often a debate both about the geographic scope of its role and about its actual concerns —-traditional tasks like those of Article 5 and border defence, or newer missions like its peacekeeping role, or dealing with more distant, indirect 'risks' which could either spillover from the shrinking 'periphery' or affect the alliances interests more indirectly. More generally though there was the question of the alliance's relevance beyond a relatively peaceful Europe. If it could not be a "global policeman" did it nonetheless have a role to play beyond Europe where European security interests were involved, or in stabilizing the periphery which might otherwise creep closer?

Broadly speaking while European alliance members supported ideas to revitalize NATO, they were skeptical about any formalization of commitments beyond the treaty area. While supporting US policies in their broadest sense and recognizing the need for military force to maintain a regional balance, they differed with the US on some of the political approaches; more rather than less engagement of Iran; more emphasis on the politics of WMD proliferation and less hype about its consequences, more sensitivity to the human costs of indiscriminate sanctions, more effort at even -handedness on the peace process etc... The key difference remains in my view one of perceptions. Broadly speaking, where security is concerned, Europeans do not look much beyond Europe— the Europe of the EU, that is. The fact that NATO through Turkey, an alliance member, is already "in" the Persian Gulf, is often ignored.

In this paper I make the following points:

• The West broadly conceived has been the security manager of the region for the past century and a half;
• The pre-requisites for the management of the security of the region by local states still does not exist;
• The 'demand' for Western involvement will continue to persist;
• NATO is already committed to the region through Turkey; and Turkey through its link with Israel (and the corresponding Syria-Iran link) could be involved to a greater extent;
• Whether as an alliance, or through 'coalitions of the willing', the preferred course so far, the European states will be needed to act in concert with the US.

The alliance mechanism for planning and joint operations and even for legitimation, would appear to be preferable to ad hoc responses. Whether this will be forthcoming is not the subject of this paper. Nor does it address the Western debate about burden and risk sharing and geographical or issue)coverage as it relates to the Persian Gulf. ₁

In summary form the paper focuses

1. on the recent record of activity by Western powers in dealing with security issues, and
2. assesses the likely 'demand' for continuing Western involvement.

The central conclusions are first, that a number of security issues will require the continuing involvement of the West for the region's security, but that some political initiatives are needed to supplement the purely military measures envisaged or so far in place. ₂ That is, the equivalent to a 'Gulf peace process' is necessary if periodic intervention is not to become a permanent burden. Second, that recent experience reveals a considerable variety of ways the outside powers have been involved using diverse means under different aegis or umbrellas. As long as efficiency is not totally compromised (a major proviso) the diversity of contributions to security continues to be a useful asset. As long as capabilities and coordination are maintained and upgraded to a high standard, the 'coalitions' approach has its advantages. ₃

The Background to Western involvement in the Persian Gulf

US involvement in the Persian Gulf has been slow, deliberate and not always enthusiastic. In the 1940's the US established a Middle East command which was disbanded after the war. (A small naval force of three ships based in Bahrain and known optimistically as Mideastfor survived) A strategic air base in Dhahran was terminated in 1962. Commercial involvement on the Arabian peninsula in oil affairs was the primary consideration in the 1950's. Still it was the US that had to impress on an enraged Britain that differences with Iran on oil nationalization should not lead to policies that made Soviet subversion easier. This did not stop British gunboats at Abadan.

In retrospect Britain's contribution to Gulf security was considerable. ₄   When it ended in November 1971 the British presence consisted of 6000 men costing 12 million pounds sterling /year. This presence was not acknowledged as an alliance contribution until it had ended. What had it achieved? Britain, by its presence resting on the political arrangements with the smaller sheikhdoms, recognizing its paramountcy,

• Insulated the region from Soviet involvement, (the first Soviet naval visit occurring shortly after the announcement of intended withdrawal);
• Froze regional conflicts or the implementation of irridenta (Iraq vs Kuwait) and
• Managed change, sometimes by pre-emptive coupd'etats (as in Abu Dhabi in 1966 or Oman in 1970).

Parallel to this the US maintained its small symbolic naval presence in Bahrain. A larger periodic naval presence was started in the autumn of 1963, in part to participate in the annual Midlink naval exercises among the Cento partners, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan.

Nonetheless, the US chose not to seek to replace Britain after its departure and announced with the Nixon doctrine (June 1969) a policy of relying on regional powers for the maintenance of security while supplying them with arms as necessary. Instead the US began to modernize facilities at Diego Garcia , operational by March 1973 and to upgrade somewhat its Mideast Command by the assignment of a more capable flagship (La Salle) and the rotation of modern destroyers to the Gulf .This was still more a symbolic than effective force. ₅

How far security had devolved into the hands of regional states was indicated when Iraq revived its claim to Kuwait in 1973, This time it was Iran that faced Iraq down not the UK as in 1961. Iran in concert with Britain (SAS forces) provided military assistance also to Oman to combat its troubles in Dhofar province(1973-75).

The 1973 war threatened the US' only naval facility at Bahrain. Defense Secretary Schlesinger announced a return to more frequent and regular naval deployments in the region, while the up-grading of Diego Garcia continued. In 1974 a decision was taken to maintain a contingency naval presence in the form of periodic deployments from the Pacific fleet. In practice this meant 3 deployments a year with every task force to include an aircraft carrier. (Use of the Bahrain facility for Mideast Command was renewed in 1975). Also in 1975 Oman offered use of Masirah island in the Gulf of Oman to the US.

Britain maintained its periodic presence. ₆ In 1978 this consisted of a helicopter-cruiser, 5 frigates and 4 support ships .In 1979, a helicopter cruiser, a nuclear powered submarine, a type 42 destroyer, 4 frigates and 3 support ships.

France established an Indian Ocean command including a major naval presence at Djibouti and Mayotte. The standard composition was 14 ships and troops were specifically marked for intervention.

This was the situation in 1979 which was marked by great instability. The revolution in Iran was followed by steep oil price rises, and general uncertainty about the security of the region. Iran's intentions were now unclear. Saudi Arabia felt menaced by Yemen. This prompted a series of responses by the US.

• The dispatch of (unarmed) F-15s to the kingdom for reassurance purposes.
• A carrier task force from the Pacific to Arabian seas, establishing a new baseline of constant American military presence for the remainder of the year;
• Emergency military aid to Yemen;
• The deployment of AWACs E/W aircraft for joint training and to bolster the Saudi air defences;

• The visit of Defense Secretary Brown to initiate a "security dialogue" and take soundings about access to facilities for the US military.

In November 1979 France secretly dispatched special forces to Saudi Arabia to clear the Grand Mosque at Mecca seized by Islamic extremists.

Meanwhile the US identified US forces for a rapid deployment force and commenced its operational planning for an increased military presence .Preliminary discussions were started for the use of facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. An additional carrier and two destroyers were added to the Middle East Command.

The year ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The US response was to accelerate plans to increase its ability to deploy troops in the region. Reflecting a view that was emerging among strategists that competition in this area could not be decoupled in its consequences from the central competition between the two blocs, Brzezinski depicted this area as the "third strategic zone". President Carter announced his doctrine January 23 1980: "any attempt by any outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the US , and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

This threat was made more credible the creation of a rapid deployment force (and command); 7 pre-positioned ships; 300 jet transports and 500 turbo-prop for airlift; 8 roll-on-roll-off or 'ro-ro' ships; more exercises and quicker (i.e. reduced) deployment times . US reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean by B-52s were started and access agreements completed.

Thus by 1980 the US was for the first time beginning to gear up to play a major role in the security of the Persian Gulf. The withdrawal of Britain and now the collapse of Iran, left it with little choice. At the same time Britain and France remained important contributors, whether in selling arms or through bilateral security agreements or by virtue of their naval presence.

The Iran-Iraq war in September 1980 elicited an(other) urgent Saudi request for US support. The US deployed 4 AWACs and support elements and a guided missile cruiser was positioned in the Gulf with additional air defence capability. US warships maintained a more active patrol posture in the vicinity of the straits of Hormuz.

These were soon joined by an allied naval patrol in the Gulf of Oman, comprising ships from Britain, France, Holland, Germany and Australia.

The US took its commitment further when President Reagan in October 1991 announced that the US would "not permit" Saudi Arabia to become an Iran, presumably indicating a willingness to intervene to counter domestic instability.

As the Iran-Iraq war continued in the 1980's the US was distracted by other events including Lebanon. France took the lead in buttressing Iraq through arms sales from 1983.TheUS sought to reopen its channels with Iran in the Iran-contra episode (1986) but was generally content to impose an arms embargo on Tehran (Operation Staunch) and to avoid involvement as long as the war was contained.

By 1987 this was no longer the case. The tanker war was expanding hostilities. The US was asked by Kuwait to reflag its tankers to assure their protection. The US, without consulting its allies, agreed and in effect entered the war. ₇   From March 1987 the war took a new turn with the US attacking Iranian oil platforms or ships in response to attacks on Kuwaiti shipping. The allies France and Britain were reluctant to accede to the US request to pursue a joint policy. Neither wanted to get involved any further than their presence required and both wanted to avoid any escalation and maintain an autonomous policy. Once mines were found in the Gulf's waters and a US ship (Bridgeton) was disabled, this reluctance ended. This did not mean the establishment of joint naval force but rather parallel actions by a number of European states. France was the first, sending a carrier to the Gulf in July. France and Britain also sent minesweepers. Britain lobbied hard and the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy followed suit. Others picked up the slack in European waters.

The naval escort and minesweeping operations in the Gulf 1987/88 were a "remarkable example of alliance cooperation". US resources for minesweeping had been shown to be inadequate and required cooperation. The allies had demonstrated a willingness to lay their role supporting the US. Despite the recriminations and criticisms, "at its peak level the Western presence in and around the Gulf amounted to 63 ships with the numbers (though not the firepower) split equally between the US and west European navies." ₈

The European powers while cautious were willing to deploy naval forces to protect their oil interests. Escort and naval operations encouraged Iraq and the GCC and by underscoring the isolation of Tehran, increased pressure on it. The net result was to reinforce incentives for terminating the conflict while limiting its spillover into the region.

With the termination of the war, the US devised no new plans for assuring the security of the region. It was assumed that exhaustion and the need for reconstruction would occupy the energies of Iran and Iraq. An over-the-horizon naval presence was still all that appeared politically feasible. Up until 1990 US involvement in the Persian Gulf had been reluctant and incremental in response to crises or the failure of other means for assuring security. Allies were called upon only during crises and then to follow the US line. The days of the periodic deployment of small scale forces were numbered by the recurrence of crises. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait saw for the first time the designation of a Fifth fleet for full time deployment to the area and the presence of US forces in the region in forward deployment.

Future 'demand' for Western intervention

Desert Storm indicated how far things had changed in the Persian Gulf. Now regional disturbances required more than symbolic forces to quell them. The acquisition of basing rights, however qualified or couched, brought outside forces back into the Gulf. The forward deployment of forces testified to the absence of a regional balance of power and to the need for continuing Western involvement in the region to assure the twin goals of access the region and the prevention of hegemony by unfriendly powers. This military presence (200 aircraft, 30 ships and 30,000 men) created its own difficulties.

• It is geared to the containment of Iran (and Iraq) and thus to interstate wars and threats, not to the kinds of domestic disturbances that seem likely in the future. ₉

• Deterring and punishing Iraq is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for maintaining order in the Gulf. Iraq under Saddam Hussein can choose its provocations, play for time and seek to divide the coalition.

• Containment cannot be sustained indefinitely. It is too costly, stretching needed forces ₁₀ and in any case makes demands on the host countries of the GCC which they cannot contemplate long-term.

• The reassurance function to the GCC of the Western presence (together with arms sales) is itself of limited utility if it increases domestic criticisms of the regimes, estranged them from their powerful neighbours and makes them more than ever dependent on outside powers for their security. (The willingness of Saudi Arabia to enter into a dialogue with Tehran after 1998 reflected a desire to seize the initiative for a rapprochement reducing this dependence).

Western policy in the wake of two wars has been based on the need to maintain military forces to deter future aggression(or attempted intimidation) from the northern Gulf. The military presence, costly and politically demanding has had several functions other than deterrence and reassurance. It has been used as the muscle to ensure compliance with UN resolutions including sanctions and UNSCOM missions, and for purposes of retaliation and punishment. Sea control to ensure no mining or interference with shipping, has been another mission. The US has not been alone in this. Britain has been the most conspicuous ally at the US side, but France has enforced the no-fly zone and Operation Southern Watch and Germany has furnished equipment and experts for UNSCOM. (Less remarked has been Turkey's contribution to which we return).

Thus despite its undoubted limitations, the primarily US presence clearly serves several key functions: why could it not therefore continue indefinitely?

The problem stems from its stop-gap or makeshift quality of policy: containment buys time but there is no policy how to use that time. This suggests that the time will be squandered. This "minimalist" approach can be contrasted to a more comprehensive policy. This would involve an attempt to woo Iran, encourage a security dialogue among all the Gulf states and to anchor the achievements of arms control in Iraq in a regional setting that would be more sustainable. While more politically demanding, requiring greater involvement as a mediator, guarantor and possibly investor in the region, such an approach might promise more than simply a military strategy detached from political realities. ₁₁ In brief, the West cannot be content with simply keeping an artificial military balance. It needs to encourage a peace process that might create the conditions for security in the region.

A pressing reason to do so stems from the situation in the Persian Gulf at the end of the 1990's. Two wars ended only by outside power intervention, have not been settled definitively. The stakes, the legacy of the wars and vengeance might see a resumption of conflict in the future. In this section I briefly address the categories of problem or scenarios requiring Western involvement, which could arise in the future.

Iran-Iraq

The frontier, which was the ostensible cause of the eight-year war, has not been settled. There has been no peace agreement. Each side appears also to have drawn different conclusions about the war. ₁₂ Each regime harbours opposition forces seeking to overthrow the other, ( the MKO in Iraq and the SCIRI in Iran). Periodically there are assassinations in each capital attributed to these groups. Over the past five years Iran has launched limited strikes and incursions against the MKO camps in Iraq. The latest exchanges have seen the use by Iran of Scud missiles against Iraqi territory, leading to Iraqi complaints that its disarmament has stripped it of its ability to 'protect its security and sovereignty against the aggression threatening it." ₁₃

Small-scale exchanges could escalate. Conflict between Iran and Iraq might be unlikely today but that is no guarantee against the future resumption of hostilities. Political calculations, such as the intent to sabotage improved relations between Tehran and the GCC, which could further isolate Baghdad, could encourage Saddam to 'play the Arab card.' More important is the retention by Iraq of WMD. These are more likely intended against Iran than the Western coalition. Uncertainty over the future of Iraq under Saddam is one concern. Another is the uncertain future of Iraq after Saddam. Will Iraq stay united? What kind of regime, what sorts of policies? War between Iran and Iraq might not remain limited either in geographical scope or in use of weapons. The use of WMD cannot be excluded given the past record. The development by each state of missile forces could see an effort by each to exploit surprise once a crisis unfolds by striking first.

WMD presence and use

The possible use of WMD has already given rise to a US offer to develop and share a missile defence capability with the GCC. US forces are anxious that the proliferation of WMD could see their employment against US forces deployed in the Gulf. At the least all US forces in the region will have to act in the knowledge that such weapons could be used against them. Discussion of 'asymmetric' threats may amplify this expectation. This could affect willingness to get involved in some situations. Equally, it could lead to hasty or precipitate actions tending toward escalation.

Iraq and Kuwait

Iraq has periodically revived its threat against Kuwait since 1991. The Iraqi claim however spurious is not new or even regime dependent. (It will be recalled that Iraq took actions in 1961 and 1973.) Whatever the nature of the regime that eventually emerges in Baghdad, the issue of Iraq's limited access to the Gulf's waters will be revived. Kuwait for its part has to consider that given the geography Iraq will be in a position to renew military pressure on it, almost at will.

These considerations raise questions about Western and US involvement. Since it cannot be open-ended, it needs to build conditions that will make security sustainable. In both Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Kuwait there is ample scope for measures of demilitarization, confidence -building and arms control, which could help stabilize these potential zones of conflict. This implies strategic dialogue between past adversaries. It might also need peacekeeping forces. Arms control for WMD may require the extension of security guarantee; pledges to defend victims and not to use WMD first. The possibility of arms control package deals should also be considered; neither Iran nor Iraq will consider limits that do not apply to the rapidly arming GCC. This implies complicated sets of trade-offs across different weapons systems, e.g. aircraft for missiles. A simpler approach looking to a freeze will be no easier given the 'un-natural' advantage currently enjoyed by the GCC.

Turkey, Israel and "in area"

Turkey is very much "in area" for the alliance and at the same time a key player in the Persian Gulf. Most of the air operations (and Provide Comfort) attributed to the US and Britain have involved in one way or another Turkey and its base at Incirklik. Since these operations have not been alliance-approved they have depended on the bilateral agreement between Turkey and the US. ₁₄ Turkey has sought to ensure that it provides cooperation only on a case-by case basis. In the Turkish view Turkey has been transformed by the geopolitical changes of the past decade from a flank state to a front line state. Differences with the EU have made the US connection more important. Perhaps reflecting this, Turkey's strategic cooperation with Israel has itself created new elements in the region. Some Americans see Israel as a strategic asset in the region, ₁₅ a view not shared by the GCC or Europe. For our purposes it is sufficient to note the possibility that this new alignment risks reinforcing the Iran-Syria axis. This in turn could tie Iran into a conflict between Syria and Turkey (over water for example). Conflict between Iran and Israel also could involve

Turkey as well and vice versa if Ankara accuses Tehran of helping the PKK. Whether the new axes deter threats or embolden allies is not clear. However instabilities in two regions have thus been linked in a new way.

This raises the question of NATO's response to a conflict involving Turkey unrelated to its central mission.

Saudi Arabia

The linch-pin of US and Western policy is the Desert Kingdom which is undergoing the strains of readjustment to declining oil revenues, a rising population, and a succession transition. While not threatened militarily by any one state, Saudi Arabia remains fragile, militarily weak, disliked by Yemen and Oman and not especially respected by the GCC states. Kuwait, Qatar and Oman moving toward more democratic experimentation are seen as bad examples by the Kingdom. The regime is simultaneously torn between pressures for modernisation and for traditionalism, a difficult balancing act that may not be sustained. Western defence of the Kingdom is straight-forward. More difficult is the maintenance of domestic peace. Striking the right balance between reassuring the Kingdom and stigmatizing it as a puppet of the West is less easy. A long-haul policy that encourages regional dialogue and defuses external pressures on the Kingdom will need to include Iran and eventually Iraq.

Treating the Kingdom as more than a milk cow and the GCC as more than simply Saudi Arabia would be advisable.

These cases suggest a continuing demand for external contributions to regional security. They also imply more and a different kind of involvement by outside powers. Threats to shipping or to key states may continue to arise. Responses to these will need effective military capabilities inside and outside of the region. Beyond that, invitations whether bilaterally by local states or by regional institutions, will politically facilitate appropriate responses. The existence of arms control measures and a regional strategic dialogue could supplement the Western presence by creating the conditions to make it less necessary. A political process could make it easier to deal with threats that might arise, for example the transgression of a code of conduct elaborated regionally would be a marker branding behaviour unacceptable and assistance to prevent or reverse it, that much more legitimate. While Alliance members will draw different lessons from Kosovo, inter alia about the extent to which the alliance should extend its operations from its core concerns, and appropriate burden and risk sharing, there can be little doubt about the extent of Western interests in the Gulf and the need to secure them. The debate here is about how best to do so in a manner that is politically feasible within the alliance, militarily effective and acceptable regionally. We focus on the last of these.

Auspices, Mandates and Agencies

It is worth recalling that NATO as such has not figured in Persian Gulf politics. The reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers was a UN and bilateral affair, the de-mining was coordinated by and through the WEU; allied naval patrols throughout the 1980's were largely operations conducted in parallel and coordinated informally. Even Desert Storm was mandated by the UN and implemented by a coalition of the willing (and able). Here NATO training and experience certainly counted (as the French found out), but it was far from being a NATO operation.

Since 1991 the US and UK have occasionally interpreted UN resolutions differently from other states, especially in the continuing authority to enforce resolutions against Iraq and the conditions which have to be met before sanctions are lifted. As a result, France has declined to participate in some actions and distanced itself from the "Anglo-Saxons" denying especially that Britain's participation reflected a "European" stance. Despite differences on policy toward Saddam's regime and on how much reliance can be put on even the most intrusive form of arms control, there is little space between the views of the allies on the necessity to disarm and contain Saddam, or on the need for a robust military capability to achieve this.

The question is sometimes asked : "Can the European allies expect the US to take risks alone in the Gulf for collective interests, while also being asked to take the lead in European contingencies?" This implies a need for a "European" contribution.

The question may be the wrong one. Key European states, notably Britain and France and to some extent Germany, are developing the means to contribute to such contingencies. Political constraints will condition their use. ₁₆ The question for our purposes is not under what circumstances Europeans will be able to act (or be constrained from doing so) but rather in what local contingencies could the European states, individually or collectively, make a useful contribution?

This depends a little on the alternatives. Kosovo showed that coalitions, for all their political advantages, make wars badly; slow to act and militarily inefficient.

It is notable that the US solicits European participation in the Persian Gulf unlike the other part of the Middle East. (It does so having earlier urged its allies to shed their colonies and their responsibilities.)

Such involvement need not be collective; in the Middle East (and Asia) bilateral relations count for more than 'Europe'. ₁₇ Ironically historical ties and local knowledge

make the ex-colonial European powers the preferred interlocuter on some issues. The European states can act more discreetly. They are less obsessed with the military side and more understanding of local politics and sensitivities. They are less associated with Israel, with all its local connotations. From the regional standpoint there are cases in which European involvement would be desirable. By multi-lateralising issues their presence can dilute (perceived) dependence on the US. Hence it is easier for the GCC to invite a military presence that includes European states than to rely exclusively on the US. (Kuwait and the GCC were reluctant ask for US assistance in the run-up to Iraq's aggression, because it would be 'provocative'.) Kuwait has diversified its arms purchases since 1991 in trying to get all the Security Council members associated to some extent with its security.

NATO still carries considerable Cold war baggage and from a regional viewpoint is not necessarily the best vehicle for Western policy toward the region. Unlike the other part of the Middle East, the Gulf states (with the important exceptions of Iran and Iraq) do not seek to play the Europeans off against the US. They recognize that in extremis they will be dependent on US military power. In lesser cases there is no reason to deny themselves the option of inviting bilateral assistance from other powers. In the more serious cases, they would prefer that where necessary that power is wielded multilaterally and with a mandate. This is because this is how the US

would find it easier to act . Multilateral actions seem to have more legitimacy than unilateral actions. There is a related consideration. Regionally there is better cover for actions undertaken multilaterally, preferably with an international mandate. The UN may be the optimum agency in this regard but it is not the only one. The Arab League's position mid-1990 made it much easier for the US to get a UN mandate and the participation of local states notably Egypt and Syria, which in turn made it easier for Saudi Arabia to accept the exposure going with its hosting half a million foreign troops. (Britain in 1961 found it easier to hand over to an Arab League force when withdrawing from Kuwait).

Without a functioning regional organization, e.g. a more inclusive GCC, a more vibrant Arab League, the local sponsoring agency part of international operations will remain defective. This will put more burdens on the intervening power to get an appropriate mandate from its own sources, whether an alliance like NATO or ideally the UN. This can be expected when the stakes and the threats are clear, direct and overwhelming as in June 1990. In normal circumstances the practice will range from bilateral measures (through invitations), through to the kinds of coordination that has served the allies well in low level but continuing periods of tension. In extreme cases—- those that involve direct threats and substantial stakes—- the European allies of the US will want to make a contribution, with or in parallel to that of the US. Political differences on approaches to Iran and Iraq and even on the relative emphasis to put on political structures in the region ₁₈ will continue to hamper formal, integrated day-to-day military cooperation among the allies. This will not stop the European states from a continuing contribution to Gulf security or to making a contribution, whether through the alliance or otherwise, to the defence of Western interests when directly and clearly threatened. The interesting cases however will be those which are less clear and direct, on which consensus may be harder to reach, certainly in advance.

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Selected cases of Western intervention in the Persian Gulf

Britain intervenes to stop Iraqi threats to Kuwait ; gives way to Arab League force 1961.

US sends aircraft to S.Arabia to reassure the rulers and warn Nasir's Egypt about intervention(1963)

Britain replaces arch conservative Sheikh Shahkbut in Abu Dhabi . . . 1966

Britain replaces conservative ruler Sultan Teimour of Oman with his son, Qabous. 1970

Britain and Iran assist Oman in its fight against the Dhofar Liberation Front supported by China, . . . . 1973-75.

US deploys AWACs to demonstrate support for S.Arabia, . . . February 1979

France deploys gendarmes to assist Saudi authorities clear Grand Mosque . . . Nov. 1979

Allied naval force in Gulf of Oman to indicate concern re. Iran-Iraq war . . . 1980-84.

(Informal coordination of deployments)

UK Armilla patrol, occasional deployments to Gulf waters. (1980-1987)

US re-flagging of Kuwaiti tankers . . . . . . March 1987

Allied patrols and minesweeping operations in parallel in Persian Gulf . . . . July 1987-88-

Desert Storm, UN mandated support for Kuwait and embargo enforced against Iraq . . . July 1990 . . . . . . (involving US,-UK, France, Italy Germany and other European allies).

Enforcement, deterrence, punishment of Iraq by US actions . . . . 1993, 1995

Enforcement and punishment of Iraq by US and UK in December 1998/Jan.99.

 

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Endnotes

Note 1: See Philip Gordon (1998); Gompert and Larrabee (1997); Blackwill and Sturmer (1997); s.Serfaty (1998); R.Hunter and M.Brown (1999). Back.

Note 2: See this author's monograph with Charles Tripp, "Iran-Saudi Relations and Regional Order" Adelphi Paper 304, (London, IISS: Oxford 1996) and Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, "Persian Gulf Myths", Foreign Affairs (May/June 1997) pp. 42-52. Back.

Note 3: Of course diplomatic coordination, threat assessment, joint planning should be more integrated to ensure that parallel policies are mutually supportive. Back.

Note 4: See this author's, The Role of the Outside Powers in the Persian Gulf (London, IISS, 1980). Back.

Note 5: For the background to the US presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, see Gary Sick, "The Evolution of US Strategy" in Alvin Rubinstein (ed.) The Great Game, (Praeger, 1983), Ch. 3.   This section of the paper leans heavily on this source for the discussion of the US presence. Back.

Note 6: For Britain and France and more generally the European states views and policies, see this author's, "Western European perceptions of Europe's stake in the Persian Gulf - Indian Ocean security", in Rubinstein (1983), Ch. 5. Back.

Note 7: For this episode, see Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, (London: Tauris, 1988); see also Hans Maull "Alliance Cooperation" in Hans Maull and Otto Pick, (eds) The Gulf War, (London: Pinter, 1988), Ch. 5. Back.

Note 8: Maull, pp. 163-164. Back.

Note 9: For example those arising from new sources of instability due to demographic and political pressures.  See for example, Gary Sick, "The Coming Crisis in the Persian Gulf", Washington Quarterly, Spring 1998. pp. 195-212. Back.

Note 10: Indicative of this was the unannounced de facto reduction of these forces in January 1999 with a cut in 30-50% of the ships, 30% of the personnel and 50% of the carriers. Back.

Note 11: For discussion of this see Maull (1988); Chubin and Tripp (1996); and Fuller and Lesser (1997).  See also more recently, William R.Polk, "Iraq: A New Leaf", New York Review of Books, February 18, 1999, pp 34-36; and Brian Urquhart, "How not to fight a Dictator", New York Review of Books, May 6, 1999, pp. 25-29. Back.

Note 12: Iranians believe the war followed a "green light" from Washington and ended with its involvement; Saddam is convinced that he won a spectacular victory, Qadissiyah, on his own. Back.

Note 13: Iraqi News Agency, Baghdad, June 11, in BBCME/3560MED/6-7 June 14, 1999.  See especially the Foreign Minister, Sahhaf's, call to the UN Secretary General to condemn "Iraq's aggression" which he compared to "the stupid actions the Iranian regime perpetrated 19 years ago". INA, June 14, in ME3562MED/5-6, June 16, 1999. Back.

Note 14: On the background to the Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy (DECA), see Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkish perspectives on Turkish-US relations concerning Persian Gulf security in the Post-Cold War Era", Middle East Journal, Summer 1996 (Vol. 50, No. 3), pp. 344-358. Back.

Note 15: See the discussion by Philip Gordon, (1998). Back.

Note 16: See the papers by François Heisbourg and Karl Baecher prepared for this workshop. Back.

Note 17: "The EU did not come into it", see the discussion by Sir John Coles, former Head of the UK Diplomatic Services, "Our influence will be greater outside the Euro", Sunday Telegraph, June 27, 1999, p. 30. Back.

Note 18: Consider for example the forward looking proposal by Malcolm Rifkind, UK Defense Minister in November 1997 for a Gulf OSCE type organization which would include Turkey. Back.