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16341. Harnessing Public Accountability in the Public Service for Better Governance in Cameroon

Author:
Tazoacha Francis
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The failure of governance in Cameroon is a result of the acute lack of public accountability. Public administration is a major preoccupation in all contemporary democracies in the world today, even though there are disparities in the benchmarks, means, and agents of such culpability based on the nature of the polity ranging from traditional to modern, conservative to liberal, capitalist to socialist [1]. Public accountability is the major concern of contemporary democratic governance in every society today. Democratic consensus will remain abstract if those in leadership cannot be held responsible by the community for their deeds and oversights, for their judgments, their policies, and their expectancies. Therefore, there is a dire need in every public office be it government or private to make sure that this exercise is carried out in order to make checks and balances in these services for effective management of resources, proper accountability, and sustainable development.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Accountability, and Public Sector
Political Geography:
Cameroon

16342. Armed Conflict and COVID 19: the Ramifications on the Educational Sector in the NW/SW Regions of Cameroon

Author:
Tazoacha Francis
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
In late 2016, the social and political forces in the now restive South West and North West (NW/SW) regions of Cameroon erupted as a crisis and quickly mutated into a human disaster with a rising human and property destruction that has been going on unabated. The impact of this lingers given that disasters, be they natural or anthropogenic have always had immense ramifications on human lives in the area they occur and even beyond. The NW/SW regions have unfortunately become the theatre of such a ravaging disaster since four years ago triggered by accumulated layers of grievances meted on the consciousness of the Anglophone population in these regions of the country in tandem with marginalization particularly in the educational and legal systems by the Francophone-dominated government which led to widespread protests in September and October 2017. The conflict escalated from a peaceful demonstration that was met with a heavy crackdown from the government security forces. This has resulted in the majority of schools in these two regions to be shot down because of security reasons. This situation has further been worsened with the emergence of the coronavirus (COVID 19) pandemic that was first identified in Cameroon in February 2020 [1]. The COVID 19 situation in Cameroon has been evolving rapidly, with dozens of new cases reported each day. Adding to the current challenges of the armed conflict, the COVID 19 put the educational sector in Cameroon to a halt in March 2020 with far-reaching ramifications on the lives of the children of school-going ages, especially in the war-torn area.
Topic:
Security, Education, War, Children, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Cameroon

16343. The Role of the Youth in Mitigating the Armed Conflict in Anglophone Cameroon

Author:
Tazoacha Francis
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The youths of any nation can be both a productive or destructive force depending on which side of the spectrum that society optimizes. They are the epitome of hope and the future of a nation and deserve to be encouraged and streamlined towards galvanizing their role in nation-building and sustainable development through an integrated approach. Youth would play very important roles in the advancement of their societies if they are given the least opportunity to do so and could ruin a society if they are alienated. Policymakers around the world have not yet attuned themselves to this compelling rhetoric which demands investing increasing attention to the youth as a way of engineering their role in shaping their societies. Almost half of the world’s population has been estimated to fall into the youth bracket. And with unemployment figures remaining extremely high, frustrating young people represent a ticking time bomb in the developing world [1]. Saddled with this reality, we can see the young generation playing a major role in the on-going conflict in the South West and North West regions of Cameroon. This is because the productive side of the spectrum has not been properly harnessed compelling them to pick up arms to fight and against the state of Cameroon to facilitate the restoration of the statehood of Southern Cameroon.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Youth, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Cameroon

16344. Report On The Effects Of BEAC’s Monetary Policy In Cameroon

Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
With an estimated population of about 26,709,663 in 2020, Cameroon is a Central African country bordering Nigeria, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Gulf of Guinea. The country has 10 Regions, 58 Divisions and is populated by 283 ethnic groups. Because of its great climatological, mining, geographical, cultural, and human diversity, Cameroon is described as Africa in miniature. The economy of Cameroon accounts for more than 40% of CEMAC’s GDP and is the most diversified in the region. It is essentially based on the exploitation of various export products – oil, tropical woods, Arabica and Robusta coffee, cocoa, rubber, cotton, bananas, aluminum, palm oil, etc. Oil revenues represent, on an annual average, about 12% of the country’s total revenues (LFR, 2020). However, since 2009, the country has been facing a major security crisis caused by incursions by the Boko Haram terrorist sect in the Far North. They have also been facing socio-political unrest in the English-speaking regions of the North West and South West, whose security situation has deteriorated since the end of 2016. The situation remains volatile in these regions despite the holding of the first-ever regional elections. After a deceleration phase following the 2014 commodity crisis, growth in the economy of Cameroon slightly strengthened in 2018 (4.1 percent compared to 3.5 percent in 2017) before decreasing in 2019 (3.7 percent).
Topic:
Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Monetary Policy, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

16345. What Tax Policy In Cameroon After 2020?

Author:
William Hermann ARREY
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has imposed unprecedented negative consequences on the Cameroonian economy. To reduce the spread of the virus, the government imposed a range of measures such as social distancing and border closures to protect its citizens. While the social costs leave little to be desired, the pandemic equally took a toll on a majority of sectors across the economy, impacting wages, consumer spending, and profitability for businesses. This fiscal policy letter analyzes the amended budget, delving into aspects related to the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the structural factors that could determine the viability and sustainability of public finances in the coming decades. The first article looks at the implications of the pandemic for domestic revenue tax mobilization with the aim of improving the personal income and non-oil tax in the business sector. It recommends that the government consolidates public sector spending, reduces taxes on businesses in the non-oil sector, and suspend tax payments on businesses as the pandemic abates.
Topic:
Economics, Tax Systems, Fiscal Policy, Consumerism, and Wage Growth
Political Geography:
Cameroon

16346. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study

Author:
Predrag Petrovic and Jelena Pejic Nikic
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Report on state capture in Serbia is BCSP genuine and pioneering work aiming to document and deconstruct ongoing process of state capture in the security sector through presentation of mechanisms, actors and consequences of this process. For several years now, various international indexes have been measuring the stagnation and decline of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms in Serbia. Although the country is still formally in the process of European integration, the European Commission noticed back in 2018 that there are elements of state capture in the entire Western Balkans region. Due to the significance and ubiquity of this phenomenon in Serbia, the BCSP has embarked upon a pilot research project that aims to establish the main factors and conditions, as well as the mechanisms and actors, involved in state capture in the security sector. The capturing of the police, the security services and the defence sector in Serbia is analysed in this early study. Furthermore, it was necessary to situate the analysis in the country’s political context, and special chapters cover parliamentary oversight and control and the security sector financing. The research was conducted from May 2019 to April 2020 and is based on insights gleaned from both primary and secondary sources.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Democracy, Rule of Law, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

16347. Many Faces of Serbian Foreign Policy Public Opinion and Geopolitical Balancing

Author:
Maja Bjelos, Vuk Vuksanovic, and Luka Steric
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
According to a public opinion survey Serbian citizens identify Russia and China as their greatest friends. As the country's most important foreign policy priorities, citizens recognize preserving Kosovo as part of Serbia, strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries and strengthening cooperation with Russia. More than half of the citizens do not support Serbia's membership in the EU. Most respondents (40%) perceive Russia as Serbia’s best friend, and 72% believe that Russia’s influence in the country is positive, which is an increase of 11% compared to the results of the survey from 2017. Only two percent of people believe that Russia’s attitude towards Serbia is hostile. After Russia, second place on the list of friends is reserved for China (16 percent of respondents). The growth of positive attitudes towards China is especially visible after the beginning of the pandemic, which is proved by the fact that 75% of respondents believe that China provided the most assistance to Serbia in the fight against the pandemic, although there are no official data on the amount of Chinese aid. According to available data, the largest donor was the European Union (EU), and only 3% of Serbian citizens recognize that. In addition, almost 90% of respondents believe that the Chinese influence in the country is positive, which is an increase of over 30 percent compared to the survey from 2017. Although EU membership has been a strategic goal of Serbia since 2005, only 9% of respondents believe that it is the main foreign policy priority of Serbia. Citizens recognize the preservation of Kosovo as part of Serbia, strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries and strengthening cooperation with Russia as the three most important foreign policy priorities. Although Serbia is a candidate for EU membership, only 20% of respondents believe that the state should harmonize its foreign policy with Brussels. The results of the survey show that the majority of 51% do not support Serbia’s membership in the EU, compared to 46% of respondents who would opt for membership. This result indicates that the number of opponents of European integration has increased since 2017, when only 35% of citizens voted against EU membership. The number of respondents who believe that Serbia is surrounded by mostly friends in the region has almost doubled compared to 2017 and now is over 40%, but there is a slight increase in the opinion that Serbia has more enemies in the neighborhood, which now think a little less than 50% of citizens. When asked who Serbia’s biggest enemy is, 30% of respondents identified Croatia, 20% Albania and 13% the United States. Slightly more than 70% of the respondents believe that there will be no outbreak of armed conflict in the Balkans in the next five years, which is an increase of 20 percent compared to 2017. The powerful emotional pull of the Kosovo dispute is also demonstrated by the fact that 52% of respondents believe that Serbia should intervene militarily in Kosovo in the case of a conflict and 47% of respondents would personally join their compatriots in the case of conflict. In contrast, 69% of respondents said that Serbia should not intervene if the same situation occurred in Montenegro, and 58% if the conflict broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the majority of citizens would not get involved in those conflicts. It is encouraging that two thirds of those interviewed believe that lasting peace between Serbs and Albanians is possible, and half of all respondents think that it is possible to achieve this only in the case of a peaceful settlement of the dispute over the status of Kosovo. Public opinion survey was conducted by CeSID for the needs of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in the period from September 15 to October 5, 2020, on a representative sample of 1,200 citizens of Serbia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, Public Opinion, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

16348. Boosting Armament to Fight Demographic Decline, Crime and Corruption – Public Opinion on Security

Author:
Marija Pavlovic
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The main finding of this study is that the Serbian public have conflicting views on national and personal security and their relationship with the country’s institutions. On the one hand, people instinctively recognise that the main security threats are internal and are related to poor governance – such as organised crime and corruption and low levels of trust in institutions that serve the interests of politicians – which is why they rely on themselves and their own good conduct, from which they derive a sense of personal security. On the other hand, under the influence of media messaging and dominant narratives about threats to national security, presenting a maelstrom of great power rivalry and adversarial actors in the region, they continue to believe that hard power is the best response to security issues. Therefore, they see solutions mainly in the continued strengthening of the country and investment in the security sector. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that public opinion is diametrically opposed to the threats and risks defined by the official National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy adopted last year. Both documents place (the relatively unlikely events of) armed aggression and separatist tendencies within the country in first place on the list of threats to Serbia’s security – threats that only appear in the lower half on the list of priorities in the eyes of the public, who see human security issues as the priority problems. This discord between public perception and the strategic documents is a consequence of the almost complete lack of public debate during the adoption process of these documents. At the same time, it is testimony to the wrongheaded priorities of Serbia’s security policy, which is clearly at odds with the needs of the public, even though the National Security Strategy cites their subjective feelings in defining national security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Corruption, Crime, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

16349. Serbia in the Jaws of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Srdan Hercigonja
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The public opinion poll conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in October 2020 shows that the society is divided, both when it comes to measures taken in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and regarding the reaction of the competent institutions to the health crisis. Although no less than a third of the Serbian citizens do not believe in or have serious doubts about the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the vast majority of them are of the opinion that the health crisis will have serious economic consequences, while a third are convinced that it has affected the level of democracy in Serbia. Most people see the pandemic as a threat to human and national security, but they are divided over how this crisis has affected their everyday lives. Polarisation was identified in relation to the level of trust in state institutions. Citizens trust the health care system the most, which is not surprising since the health care system commonly occupies a very high position in general surveys conducted to measure trust in all institutions. The reason for the high level of trust in the health system is the fact that it is the entire health system – not just the specialised COVID departments – that is bearing the brunt of the pandemic. As for other institutions, the percentage of trust in the President of the Republic and the Crisis Task Force for the Protection of the Population from the Infectious Disease COVID-19 stands at almost fifty-fifty, which again reflects the broader picture of citizens’ (dis)trust in these permanent and temporary institutions. One of the reasons for the division in the perception of disease as a threat to the personal safety of citizens is poor informing and reporting on the course and consequences of the pandemic (frequent contradictory messages provided by the Crisis Task Force and the authorities), which has been identified in the survey as one of the biggest problems of pandemic management. An enormous number of citizens perceive China as the largest financial and humanitarian donor during the period of the pandemic, which also influences – in the general survey – positive opinions about foreign countries, where China ranks first. Despite the fact that it was in fact the European Union that helped Serbia the most in the fight against the Coronavirus, in both financial and humanitarian terms, in the eyes of the citizens China still convincingly holds the first place.
Topic:
Security, Public Opinion, Health Care Policy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

16350. Flattening the Pandemic and Recession Curves

Author:
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
In the short run, the capacity of any country’s health system is finite (capacity of Intensive Care Units, number of hospital beds, number of skilled health professionals, ventilators….). This puts an upper bound on the number of patients that can be properly treated, at any given point in time and is represented by the flat line in the Figure. Unchecked, and given what we know of the transmission rate of the coronavirus, the pandemic would quickly overwhelm any health system, leaving many infected patients with deteriorating pulmonary conditions without any treatment. The fatality rate would surge. The threat is almost beyond comprehension. With a 2% case fatality rate baseline for overwhelmed health systems, and 50% of the world population infected, 1% of the world population -76 million people- would die. This scenario corresponds to the red curve in Figure 1. The part of the curve above the capacity of the health care system faces a sharply higher mortality risk (shaded red area).
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Health Care Policy, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Global Health
Political Geography:
United States