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1. The Polish Economy 2023 and Beyond: How to Mend Home Loans

Author:
Andrzej Reich, Dariusz Filar, and Michal Polasik
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
The subject of this publication, reflecting the discussion held between experts on 30 March 2023, is that of housing loans in Poland. The publication focuses primarily on discussing the state of mortgages (at the end of the first quarter of 2023). This state is the effect of (a) legislation, (b) institutional solutions, (c) past processes in the financing of housing loans, and recently also (d) the high level of inflation dampening both lending by the banks and the level of interest among bank customers. The publication's second purpose is to present recommendations which, once put into effect, could rectify today’s lamentable situation. All of the proposals presented in this publication lead to one general recommendation: the answer to the current shortcomings lies not in isolated, single changes; what is essential is a new system for the market. This new system should be (a) flexible, (b) free of legal risk while at the same time (c) better protected against market risk, and (d) it should also contain a more comprehensive range of products; on this market (e) the state, as the regulator, should intervene ex-ante and not only ex-post (as has been the case in Poland for the last 20 years), while (f) customers should have the essential minimum of financial knowledge, first and foremost regarding awareness of the risk related to, which by their very nature are long-term loans.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Interest Rates, Risk, Mortgages, Banking, Loans, and Financial Education
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

2. How Safe is Eastern Mediterranean Gas?

Author:
Colby Connelly, Gregory Brew, and Karen Young
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss the security of offshore gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the state of the international gas market given the ongoing tension and conflict in the Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Markets, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean

3. The Pathway to an Effective ETS and Power Market Interaction: The Case of the Korean ETS

Author:
Alistair Ritchie
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The power sector is one of the most important areas to cover in any emissions trading system (ETS), due to the scale and abatement potential of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in that sector. However, some critical challenges need to be overcome before an ETS can fulfil its emissions-reduction potential by driving fuel switching away from coal and toward renewables and low-carbon fuels. This is one of the most important topics for ETS development in Asia given the tight controls on power markets. The case of the Korean ETS (K-ETS) provides valuable insights for the pathway to an effective interaction between an ETS and the power market to support power sector decarbonization, based on recent developments and potential next steps. The Pathway to an Effective ETS and Power Market Interaction: The Case of the Korean ETS describes the details of recent developments in Korea's power market and the emission trading system to address insufficient emission reductions in the power sector, key future developments required, and learning points for ETSs in other Asian jurisdictions.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Markets, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

4. Indian Carbon Market Simulation Training Exercise Report

Author:
Josh Margolis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) in partnership with Josh Margolis and the Council of Environment, Energy and Water (CEEW), conducted carbon market simulation training exercises in Delhi, Ahmedabad, and Mumbai, India. This training — conducted in February 2023 — was aimed at equipping stakeholders from enterprises, government, and civil society with core knowledge and skills relating to emissions trading systems (ETSs). The workshops significantly improved the ETS literacy of the participants, laid the foundation for future engagements, and increased the number of participants who believe that an ETS would be "very useful" or "indispensable" for India to achieve its Nationally Determined Contribution. This Indian Carbon Market Simulation Training Exercise Report summarizes the details and results of the workshops. The report includes participant demographics, how the training was conducted, ETS knowledge gained as a result of the exercise, as well as the outcomes of the training, lessons learned, and next steps for consideration.
Topic:
Markets, Carbon Emissions, and Simulation
Political Geography:
India and Asia

5. Green Hydrogen Industrial Value Chains: Geopolitical and Market Implications

Author:
Nicola De Blasio and Laima Eicke
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The global transition to a low-carbon economy and adopting the needed clean energy technologies at scale will significantly impact existing value chains1 and transform production-to-consumption lifecycles. Regulatory and business models will need to rapidly evolve to manage the resulting substantial cost challenges and dramatic shifts in stakeholder interactions while continuing to create value. Green hydrogen2 is likely to play a pivotal role in a carbon-free future, as its adoption will enable the decarbonization of energy-intensive industrial processes whose emissions are hard to abate through simple electrification—such as steel and cement production. However, to take advantage of the economic opportunities created by its adoption at scale, countries will need to rethink the roles they could play in a new energy landscape and define strategic industrial policies accordingly. Our research3 shows how successful industrial policies must reflect a country’s potential value chain positioning in future green hydrogen markets and elucidates macro geopolitical trends that could reshape international relations as countries compete for industrial leadership, market shares, and opportunities for job creation.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Carbon Emissions, Value Chains, Hydrogen, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. How strategic tech cooperation can reinvigorate relations between the EU and India

Author:
Vera Kranenburg and Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In an era of multipolarity, India – expected to become the world’s most populous nation soon – will be a significant geopolitical player. This necessitates European Union (EU) member states to shift their policies to engage one of the world’s largest consumer and industrial markets.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, European Union, Industry, Multipolarity, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, South Asia, and India

7. Energy investment in a time of inflation

Author:
Charles Lichfield and Joseph Webster
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
High rates of inflation across the world are forcing central banks to reluctantly tighten monetary policy despite accompanying recession risks. Moreover, restricted credit access could jeopardize energy investments, particularly for capital-intensive clean energy projects, potentially rendering the world more vulnera­ble energy to price shocks, which are a significant contributor to the current crisis. This paper briefly considers the macroeconomic drivers of inflation in late 2022, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and uncertainties around energy supply, supply-chain resets, and lingering COVID-19 disruptions, before examining the persistent energy underinvestment of the past decade and how this has left markets exposed to varying degrees. As such, this paper also considers how private capital can accelerate cleaner energy adoption, suited to different markets’ unique conditions and needs. Bor­rowing costs will rise, but this doesn’t have to bring the transition to a standstill. With the Great Moderation of low volatility, interest rates, and inflation perhaps a relic of the past, assets offering inflation protection, such as infrastructure, may become increas­ingly attractive to investors. There is a fear that global inflation will sharply curtail energy investment into emerging markets. The fear is justified. Higher interest rates in developed markets mean higher rates of return which will lure emerging markets investors back to the US and Europe. Still, it’s not all bad news for emerging markets. Quasi-state actors like Pension and Sovereign Welfare funds are interested in very long term, high-yield projects—two criteria to which emerging market energy infrastructure correspond. Disruptions to interest rates and inflation, triggered in part by energy underinvestment, will cause disparate impacts in different markets. Inflation is not, perhaps, everywhere and always a mone­tary phenomenon. Energy investment faltered from 2014 to 2020, despite low interest rates. Meanwhile, aggre­gate supply shocks—first due to COVID, then from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine—have pressured energy production and prices, raising inflation and necessitating interest rate hikes. The consequences of persistent energy underinvest­ment are now becoming apparent. The need for new energy infrastructure cannot be met without private investment. This was the case when infla­tion was lower; it is even more important now.
Topic:
Environment, Markets, Oil, Governance, Gas, Economy, Investment, Inflation, and Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. Building Resilience? The Cybersecurity, Economic & Trade Impacts of Cloud Immunity Requirements

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU Member States should call on the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and the European Commission to abandon immunity requirements in the proposed EU Cloud Certification Scheme (EUCS). With immunity requirements in the EUCS, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box, paving the way for data localisation, foreign ownership restrictions, and local establishment requirements in digital industries globally leading to rising trade tensions. ENISA’s current proposal could increase policymakers’ appetite for data localisation in the EU. It would empower the European Commission and Member State authorities to exclude foreign businesses from domestic cloud services markets and set a dangerous precedent for any data-intensive sector. The list of “sectors of high criticality” could be logically extended to both existing services (e.g., financial services) and to new technologies and business models, such as IoT in the energy and healthcare sectors, and autonomous driving in the transport sector. Non-EU jurisdictions would be pressured to respond in kind. EUCS immunity requirements would increase cloud adopters’ exposure to cybersecurity risks. Data localisation often creates obstacles to an integrated management approach towards cybersecurity risks. Country of headquarter and foreign ownership restrictions in the proposed EUCS risk removing global frontier cybersecurity technologies from Member State markets. Excluding these and other EU and non-EU companies from EU Member States could result in a long-lasting security deficit of EU cloud adopters vis-à-vis organisations that are still able to use reliable and often best-practice cloud services offered by providers from outside EU Member States. Immunity requirements in the EUCS are discriminatory by design. They could provoke retaliatory measures by EU trading partners, either unilaterally or through WTO or bilateral FTA (e.g., UK-EU) Dispute Settlement. Local establishment requirements and foreign ownership restrictions would by design discriminate against foreign cloud providers. US-headquartered companies, which currently serve more than 75% of the EU market, would be most affected by EU immunity requirements.[1] Depending on US preferences and the scope of the proposed EUCS, the EU could be subject to retaliatory tariffs of up to USD 12 billion worth of EU goods exports or equivalent restrictions for EU services exports to the US. Other governments could lodge complaints via the WTO as well (e.g., Singapore, Japan, Canada and others, where cloud development is advancing rapidly). EU suppliers are currently in no position to manage a broad-based transition to cloud, and thus such requirements would delay significant efficiency and security gains that current foreign suppliers could offer. A blanket exclusion of non-EU cloud vendors would also likely undermine Europe’s objective to achieve a 75% cloud adoption rate for EU enterprises. Sensitive European businesses and public sector organisations would have to delay migration and make do with legacy systems for a very long time. Contrary to large countries, these negative impacts would be much more pronounced for smaller EU Member States, which lack the presence of large domestic incumbents and generally rely much more on an open international trading regime for digital services. ENISA’s cloud certification scheme should be limited to technical and transparency requirements. Immunity requirements for non-personal data should be addressed in bilateral initiatives such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) or agreements requiring a company that sought to offer services of the highest level of sensitivity to be headquartered in a country granted adequacy with EU data protection rules, or a country that is an adherent to the OECD’s Trusted Government Access principles, or (concerning the US) a participant in the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework. Excluding foreign companies from operating in the EU would have far-reaching consequences. If that is the intent, it should require a sound legal analysis and the decision should be taken through a formal legislative procedure at the EU level.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe

9. In Support of Market-Driven Standards

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU published its new Standardisation Strategy in 2022. The strategy contains some good ideas to improve the way European standards are set. However, in its attempt to gain more control over technical standards, the EU risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The primary motivation behind the strategy is the belief that the process governing the way CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI – the three European Standardisation Organisations – take decisions over EU standards favours non-EU multinationals. To address this perceived imbalance, EU National Standardisation Bodies will have the exclusive power to accept standardisation requests, and adopt, revise and withdraw European technical standards. These changes are particularly significant for ETSI, Europe’s Standardisation Body in charge of telecommunication standards and one of Europe’s most successful organisations. ETSI is a prime example of EU normative power since it hosts companies from more than 60 countries, while retaining a large membership of EU firms. The regulatory changes included in the strategy are not risk-free. There could be unintended consequences that may undermine a standardisation system that has delivered significant economic benefits for the EU and the world. First, giving more responsibility to EU’s National Standardisation Organisations will turn a European discussion into 30 (EU and EEA) national debates. As a consequence, small companies will not be able to contribute to each and every one of the National Standardisation Organisations, diluting their contribution, while multinational companies, with the resources needed to cooperate with a larger number of bodies, will benefit from an expanding role in the EU standard setting process. Second, if standards are fragmented along national borders and companies must multiply their efforts to take part in several Standardisation Development Organisations, there will be less resources for Research and Development spending. Finally, if each and every National Standardisation Organisation needs to have a position with regards to the acceptance of a standardisation request, or adoption, revision and withdrawal of European technical standards, the time period required to adopt a technical standard may be extended rather than shortened, which is the exact opposite of what the European Commission wants to achieve. The regulatory changes included in the EU Standardisation Strategy are akin to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. If the European Commission is concerned about the influence of non-EU companies in European Standardisation Bodies, it does not need to overhaul their governance systems. Supporting greater participation of European firms in the European standard system will ease EU’s concerns without the downside risks associated with changing the rules of the game that govern Europe’s Standardisation Bodies. The success of the European standardisation system, which is market-driven and based on consensus, has had significant economic benefits in the development of specific industries, like the European Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Technical standards in ICT have shaped a European industry that is not only dynamic and international but also enjoys some of the highest levels of wages and Research and Development spending. Moreover, if technical standards are not developed through an open, consensus-based, and industry-led voluntary process, they will be developed in different ways. For instance, governments and private companies can develop standards by themselves. Both solutions are inferior to the current market-driven approach that governs European standards. However, the European market-driven approach to set standards is voluntary, and its success and continuation must not be assumed. European policymakers should be worried about tinkering with a European standardisation system which has produced economic specialisation and innovation to the benefits of EU firms and consumers.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, and Standardization
Political Geography:
Europe

10. What is Wrong with Europe’s Shattered Single Market? – Lessons from Policy Fragmentation and Misdirected Approaches to EU Competition Policy

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
What is wrong with Europe’s Single Market? The brief answer to that question is that it does not really exist – it is unsingle. The Single Market is in many ways a political illusion. It exists only nominally. Any company doing business in Europe faces significant barriers to cross-border exchanges within the EU, and it is these barriers that hamper companies’ ability to scale and compete internationally on the back of innovation and economic integration. We outline that Brussels and national governments need to beat the drum for eliminating policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market and at the same time change course in competition policy to sufficiently support investments in innovation, business growth, and the adoption of advanced technologies across industries. Major economic indicators show that Europe is caught in a protracted corporate and technology crisis. The EU has for a very long time now been tailing US corporate and innovation leadership. At the same time, competition with technology-intensive imports from China is getting increasingly intense. Europe’s underperformance is rooted in a legally fragmented internal market which is disincentivising business growth and innovation. On top of that, an outdated approach to competition policy is discouraging businesses from adopting innovation and scaling across national borders, risking that EU companies continue to lose clout and international competitiveness. 30 years have passed since the formal establishment of Europe’s Single Market. Data reveals that regulatory convergence has reversed or come to a halt in most policy areas. Recent policies for technologies and digital business models, which are key sources of cross-industry competitiveness, created new layers of regulation and legal uncertainty in EU and Member State law. Overall, EU policies have not significantly helped European companies, large and small, to do business in another Member State or use advanced technology-enabled services. EU competition policy does not live up to its promise to “enable the proper functioning of the EU’s internal market”. Europe’s competition policy is still fragmented along national borders and largely ignorant to dynamic effects of competition, especially investments in innovation. Due to mixed legal competences, competition rules are often enforced differently by Member States’ national authorities and can be appropriated to support protectionist industrial policy ambitions. The recently enacted Digital Market Act (DMA) demonstrates that the European Commission and Member State authorities favour protection and discretionary enforcement over innovation and economic disruption, without providing solid evidence of abusive business behaviour and consumer harm. With the DMA, the EU introduced legislation with serious ambiguities in objectives, concepts, and rules, and explicitly allows national Member States to regulate competition at their own discretion. A recent attempt by Germany’s competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, to enforce its own rulebook for large digital companies (Section 19a of the German Competition Act) risks creating a patchwork of competition rules for large providers of advanced digital services across the EU. Local adopters of advanced digital services, particularly small businesses, that use advanced technology services to compete in their markets would be confronted with less choice and quality. Recently imposed policies under the umbrella of European Strategic Autonomy will hardly help policymakers in their ambition to achieve “innovation and technology leadership”. The paramount task for the EU and national governments is to eliminate policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market, accompanied by an approach to competition policy that embraces investments in innovation and business growth while accounting for the substantial value created through the adoption of innovative technologies and disruptive business models across industries in the EU.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe