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1701. Sustainable finance: the road to greater energy security in the Visegrad region

Author:
Linda Zeilina
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
Linda Zeilina wrote a policy paper as a part of the Think Visegrad platform on the topic of sustainable finance and energy security of the Visegrád group countries. The coronavirus outbreak has made the unthinkable happen, with major economies grinding to a halt and international travel coming to a standstill. Now, it is time to think what is often seen as unthinkable: to reimagine economic models and energy systems, and to position the Visegrad countries well for the economic models of the future. By doing so, the region will also make itself much more secure and prosperous.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Finance, Coronavirus, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

1702. EU MONITOR: Czech Perception of the EU Defence Policy

Author:
Vít Havelka
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On May 28th 2017, the German Chancellor surprised the world with a statement calling on Europe to ‘take its fate into own hand’, adding “the era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent”. Pundits perceived her speech as a landmark change in a long-term European defence paradigm. Since the end of the WWII, the European security depended on the United States, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American defence shield was further broadened to former soviet satellites in Central Europe. However, the last years were marked by a growing rift between the EU and the US. The departure of the UK from the European Union underlined the crisis of European defence structures as the EU would lose a member state with the strongest European army, a seat in Security Council, and large part of its nuclear arsenal. As a result, the European leaders gathered shortly after the Brexit vote in Bratislava and decided they would launch PESCO, a voluntary defence cooperation on project basis. The aim was not only to renew the integrational process after the Brexit blow, but also to strengthen European defence research and provide the EU with missing hard power.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Migration, Public Opinion, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Czech Republic

1703. EU MONITOR: Brexit, now what? Examining the future of Central and Eastern European security post-Brexit

Author:
Danielle Piatkiewicz
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
In her latest EU monitor, Danielle Piatkiewicz explores the future of Central and Eastern European security after Brexit. January 31st will begin the long-awaited legal withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. As the UK disengages politically, Europe’s existing security structure will undergo reconstruction as EU Member States reevaluate their future without the UK as active members established security including CSDP, NATO, PESCO, among others. As the UK seeks bilateral partnerships post-Brexit, steadfast security consumers like Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) should gauge how Brexit will affect their security region. With external threats mounting in the East, the CEE region relies heavily on the existing security blanket that Europe and NATO have provided. As one of the strongest European militaries, an engaged or disengaged UK will certainly affect the security environment, but it will be up to how the EU and CEE countries react and adapt, that will impact the future security of their region once Brexit takes effect.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Czech Republic, and Central Europe

1704. AI & Machine Learning for the Indian Navy

Author:
Amrut Godbole
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
The Indian Navy needs to develop and assimilate new Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies that are being used by the Indian military and industry. The Navy's goals of transforming into a 200-ship force and maintaining optimal combat capability, are being put to test by diminishing capital and manpower shortages. It needs to leverage the benefits of AI and Machine Learning (ML) to improve organisational efficiencies at various levels. This paper focuses on four Use Cases, viz., Inventory Management, Training, Prescriptive Maintenance, and Security & Surveillance, for implementation in the Indian Navy.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Navy, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

1705. Devising an Indian policy on Sanctions for Pakistan

Author:
Ambika Khanna
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
India must consider new strategies that can be put in place to manage Pakistan's ongoing military aggression and security threat. One policy tool that has been used effectively by many countries but remains unexplored by India is the imposition of sanctions. This paper analyses the feasibility of imposing sanctions on Pakistan and the strategies India should consider to execute this effectively. It makes recommendations on how to establish a legal framework, amend existing laws, include Indian stakeholders with business interests in Pakistan, get government departments to collaborate on implementation, and considers diplomatic measures India can undertake.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, and India

1706. COVID-19 and the defence policies of European states

Author:
Alice Billon-Galland
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
At the time of writing, the COVID-19 pandemic still wreaks havoc around the world. Its scale and duration, as well as the full social and economic impact of lockdowns and social distancing measures, are yet to be seen. Exactly how the pandemic and its aftermath will impact the defence policies of European states in the long-term remains uncertain for a while yet. However, some Europe-wide trends--economic strategic, and geopolitical--are already visible. These will impact how Europeans (re)think their security after the pandemic, and therefore have implications for defence planners, decision-makers and armed forces throughout the continent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

1707. Catalyst or crisis? COVID-19 and European Security

Author:
Claudia Major
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The COVID-19 crisis is teaching European countries that a pandemic can destabilize societies, the economy and political institutions to the same extent that military or hybrid threats do. However, while the pandemic's impact on European security seems massive, it is difficult to isolate the COVID-19 factor: what is uniquely pandemic-driven, and what is the result of other elements, such as the lack of US leadership, is not always easy to determine.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Institutions, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

1708. NATO’s strategic redirection to the South

Author:
Stephen J. Mariano
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO created the Strategic Direction South--the "Hub"--in 2017, in response to illegal migration into Europe from war-torn Libya, Syria, and Iraq, highlighting humanitarian and internal security concerns. As evidence began to emerge that criminal organizations and terrorist groups were leveraging migration flows, these fears coalesced with other security concerns, not only disrupting the stability of European societies but also threatening the security of European societies but also threatening the security of the Alliance. Eventually, NATO recognized that the situation was connected to deeper sources of instability and that solutions would require a comprehensive approach to the southernmost parts of "the South".
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Migration
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

1709. Time for a NATO strategy on North Korea?

Author:
Tina J. Park
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg puts it, North Korea remains a "global threat that requires a global rsponse". The threats posed by North Korea are arguably imminent, with the potential to cause serious harm to the security of NATO member states. Since 2006, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests, in clear defiance of the Treaty on Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that the regime withdrew from in 2003. To date, the international community has failed to tame North Korea's nuclear ambitions, despite various diplomatic and political efforts. In addition to its nuclear capabilities, Pyongyang has made significant advances with conventional weapons, both chemical and biological, as well as with its cyber capabilities. North Korea's substantive linkages to China and Russia, and non-state terror groups like Hezbollah and Hamas in the Middle East, amplify their threats beyond the borders of the Asia-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Diplomacy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

1710. Scoping NATO's environmental security agenda

Author:
Michael Ruhle
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Environmental change is increasingly recognized as one of the major factors that will shape the global security environment. According to most experts, rising global temperatures will lead to rising sea levels and cause more extreme weather events, such as storms, flooding, droughts and wildfires. The firestorms that engulfed parts of Australia in late 2019 and early 2020, burning an area the size of Belgium and Denmark combined, and severely decimating that continent's wildlife, were a stark reminder of the force of these changes.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Climate Change, and Environment
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1711. It’s that time of the decade again: some considerations for NATO’s eighth Strategic Concept

Author:
Jeffrey H. Michaels
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In the Declaration that emerged from teh December 2019 London Leaders Meeting, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was tasked to present Foreign Ministers with "a forward-looking reflection process under his auspices, drawing on relevant expertise, to further strengthen NATO's political dimension including consultation.". This new tasking has been largely attributed to French President Emmanuel Macron's remark the previous month that the Alliance was suffering from "brain death". Speaking at a press conference alongside Stoltenberg, Macron elaborated on his comment, complaining the Alliance was overly focused on "cost-sharing or burden-sharing" whereas too little attention was being placed on major policy issues such as "peace in Europe, the post-INF, the relationship with Russia, the issue of Turkey, who is the enemy?"
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

1712. Volunteers in Estonia’s Security Sector: Opportunities for Enhancing Societal Resilience

Author:
Ramon Loik
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This policy paper assesses the involvement of volunteers acting in the public interest under Estonian law in the development of key characteristics of a broad security concept and reflects the main ongoing discussion points for widening their potential for ensuring collective security and public safety.
Topic:
Security, National Security, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Estonia

1713. Nothing New Under the Sun? Continuity and Change in Russian Policy Towards Ukraine

Author:
James Sherr
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The aims of this report are to explain Ukraine’s consolidation, resilience and determination to make its own decisions despite great asymmetries of power and Russia’s exploitation of its vulnerabilities and divisions; to describe why President Volodymyr Zelensky represents an opportunity as well as a challenge to Russia; and to set out necessary and realistic goals for the West.
Topic:
Security, History, Resilience, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

1714. Between the Chinese Dragon and American Eagle: 5G Development in the Baltic States

Author:
Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the course of 2018-20, development of Fifth Generation (5G) communication networks has been increasingly influenced by the considerations of national security and geopolitics. The largest provider of 5G equipment, the Chinese mobile telecom giant Huawei, has come under fire from the U.S., Czechia, Poland, and other nations in recent years for attempted espionage, theft of intellectual property and other nefarious activities; in the past month, UK decided to ban Huawei technology from its networks. All this comes into sharp focus as the geopolitical confrontation between Washington and Beijing reaches new heights. However, China is one of the EU’s largest trading partners and has worked to establish its economic, political, and cultural influence in various Member States. The EU and NATO have both released standards for member states must use when gauging the security of potential 5G networks. Yet, the EU in particular has not enacted a blanket ban or sweeping restrictions on the Chinese 5G equipment providers, leaving the tradeoffs between national security, technological progress and cost-efficiency to individual states. Although the Baltic states are well-versed in dealing with cybersecurity challenges, their road to 5G development is going to be complex. Whole-of-society awareness, political diligence, technical competence, regional cooperation, and resilience to Beijing’s influence operations are needed in forging a clear path to 5G that is aligned with their key geopolitical interest—maintaining their close strategic alliance with the United States. This brief aims to explore the geopolitical factors at play in determining the Baltic states’ 5G policy and regulations, with a particular focus on the EU, U.S., and China’s influence. It also provides a short of overview of the state of current 5G networks and regulations in the Baltic states while identifying challenges that the region will face in the coming years.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Resilience, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States

1715. The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007: Revisiting an Early Case of Hybrid Conflict

Author:
Ivo Juurvee and Anna-Mariita Mattiisen
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report revisits the spring 2007 crisis in Estonia, centred on the World War II memorial known as the Bronze Soldier statue. The crisis is well-known both in Estonia and abroad. It was one of the first wake-up calls to the cooling of relations between Russia and the West. It also involved the first use of wide-ranging cyber-attacks against a state.
Topic:
Security, History, Cybersecurity, Resilience, Hybrid Warfare, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Estonia

1716. China’s Influence Activities in Estonia

Author:
Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China’s influence activities aim to create a positive image of China and to counter any kind of criticism. Influence activities in countries with big Chinese communities can mobilise the Chinese diaspora for the party’s benefit—there are plenty of examples from Finland and Sweden. But where this is not possible, propaganda work may fall to the CPC Central Committee’s International Liaison Department, which is responsible for exchanges with foreign parties. The International Liaison Department has been active in its interactions with Estonian politicians. Today, three former government ministers work for Powerhouse, which offers lobbying services for the Chinese company, Huawei. To a large extent, China’s influence activities in Estonia have so far gone unnoticed. This article aims to fill this gap.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Estonia, and Baltic States

1717. Strengthening NATO’s Cohesion Through Consultation

Author:
Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the first of a new series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation and their possible impacts in the Baltic region, Wojciech Lorenz of the Polish Institute of International Affairs examines how NATO’s mechanisms for consultation among Allies have evolved in response to shifts in the security environment, and offers suggestions as to how these mechanisms might be strengthened as a means of mitigating tensions in NATO today.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Social Cohesion
Political Geography:
Baltic States

1718. China in Europe and Transatlantic Security

Author:
Andrew A. Michta
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Andrew A. Michta argues that the governments of Central and Eastern European countries will need to weigh the benefit to them of continued economic engagement with China, especially in the area of 5G.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economy, Transatlantic Relations, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1719. Capability and Resolve: Deterrence, Security and Stability in the Baltic Region

Author:
Heinrich Brauss, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO has revitalised its core business of deterrence and defence and adapted it to today’s political and geostrategic circumstances. In the Baltic region, the most visible expression of this effort has been the deployment of the enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in Poland and the three Baltic states. These are, in turn, backed up by a readiness and reinforcement strategy, which NATO has also strengthened through the adoption of a number of measures agreed by the Allies. But deterrence is a complex matter that involves political, diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, information-related, and other aspects. In the Baltic region, the constraints of geography coupled with the proximity of the region to Russia pose particular challenges to NATO’s approach. The region remains a focus of tensions between Russia and the West and the three Baltic states are still NATO’s most vulnerable members. Moscow, meanwhile, pretends that it is particularly threatened in the Baltic region, where it regards the territory of the Baltic states as a potential bridgehead of American power projection and presents NATO’s deterrence measures as a deliberate, unprovoked and unjustified build-up of forces around its periphery. Two interdependent developments in the period since 2014 have pointed to a particular need to re-examine the credibility of NATO’s posture as it pertains to the Baltic region: first, Russia’s continued programme to achieve conventional military superiority in its western direction; and second, its recent deployment of new mobile, land-based, intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles. The former has given Russia has a substantial numerical advantage in ground forces in the Baltic region which give Moscow the option of executing a rapid land-grab attack before NATO could react. The latter could be used to try to decouple Europe from the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US, paralysing NATO decision making and undermining the Allies’ resolve. Full and expeditious implementation of all decisions taken at Warsaw and Brussels to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is therefore imperative. In this policy paper, we recommend some steps that NATO should take in order to strengthen the deterrent effect of NATO forces and to ensure that timely reinforcement of its peripheries is feasible. In the light of a US Congressional request for a detailed assessment from the Pentagon on whether to expand US military presence in the Baltic states, we pay particular attention to the role of US forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Political stability, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Baltic States

1720. Preparing for Crises in Estonia: Improvement Options for Civilian Food and Emergency Goods Supplies

Author:
Ivo Juurvee and Ramon Loik
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Estonian Ministry of Rural Affairs commissioned the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) to compile a list of civilian food and emergency goods supplies, estimated average amounts of supplies at home and in stores, and calculations for the price of national emergency goods supplies and logistics. In addition to the quantities of food and industrial goods, the contracting authorities were interested in the legal issues of stockpiling and the possibilities of storage and distribution. Water, fuel, and drug supplies were not covered by the studies. In the course of the research, the experts also reviewed the solutions of Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Lithuania and other countries and took into account the recommendations of international organisations. The experience of other countries suggests that involving businesses and maintaining the operation of trading networks in the event of a crisis are of key importance. It is reasonable to organise logistics centrally, as crisis transport cannot be ordered separately by ministries and local authorities. Recommendations for the division of tasks between the state and local governments: State-level tasks: Ensure that the goods required in a crisis situation exist through purchases or pre-contracts. Ensure the timely delivery of required food products and emergency goods to distribution points in municipalities (e.g. through pre-contracts with logistics companies). Support local authorities in planning the distribution of goods and test their preparedness by organising special exercises. Local government-level tasks (preparations for distribution of goods): Have an overview of the population and where people are. Coordinate with the state-level to identify the locations of existing and potential additional distribution points that should be situated in the vicinity of shopping centres or other locations people are familiar with visiting. Plan the local distribution of supplies and find relevant partners.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Food, Crisis Management, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Estonia and Baltic States

1721. Winds of Change, or More of the Same?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Priit Mändmaa, Emma Hakala, Tomas Janeliūnas, Juris Ozoliņš, and Krystian Kowalewski
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
By coincidence perhaps more than design, the ‘winds of change’ in the twelve months between autumn 2018 and 2019 ushered in new governments—whether through national elections or through coalition reshuffling—in five Baltic Sea littoral states: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Yet, amidst sometimes rather turbulent domestic political debates, one key cluster of topics was virtually absent: energy security and climate policy. With the vital exception of Finland—a state with a relatively strong Green movement and long tradition of climate and environmental activism—no country saw climate or energy security targets raised as key campaign issues. To the extent that energy security and climate topics were mentioned at all, they either were minimized due to parties’ fear of alienating key voting blocs (as with the coal mining sector in Poland), confined to energy stakeholders and technical audiences due their complexity (as with electricity desynchronisation in the Baltic countries) or completely assimilated into a cross-party foreign policy consensus (as in the universal opposition in Lithuania to the Astravyets nuclear power plant project in Belarus). While domestic factors—including perceived national interests in ensuring energy self-sufficiency—contributed to a serious case of policy inertia, small and interconnected countries do not of course exist in a vacuum. Accordingly, international factors—from the continuing use of energy policy as an instrument of geopolitical power by Russia, to the growing consensus in the EU in favor of more ambitious climate targets—have done more to raise the salience of these issues, especially after the von der Leyen Commission took office in Brussels at the end of 2019 and put forward the so-called European Green Deal. These exogenous factors have finally, for instance, triggered a broader reassessment in Estonia of that country’s rather leisurely planned phase-out of oil shale power generation, while pushing political leaders in all five countries at least rhetorically to embrace the goal of a carbon-neutral future (albeit with considerable differences in timelines and methodology). Amidst a volatile international economic and geopolitical context that—since the time work began on this report—now includes a major global pandemic and a dramatic fall in fossil fuel demand and prices, the region’s political and economic leaders clearly cannot count on being able to make their policy selections in a vacuum. While the goal of an integrated regional energy market is closer than ever to being achieved, regional cooperation still has much to be desired; differing attitudes to issues both technical (e.g. harmonising natural gas regulations, which has left Lithuania outside a new regional market) or fundamental (importing third-country electricity generated without regard to EU climate or pollution standards) leave all five countries less able to respond to challenges ahead. While the region’s countries have largely relied on Brussels to broker compromises (often with the help of considerable funding), in a post-pandemic world, both the political bandwidth and financial resources will likely be constrained. In its country sections, this report captures a valuable snapshot of the relative inertia as well as the degree of evolution of the energy and climate policies of the five countries in the face of that year’s fairly calm international context. Given the significant economic, human, and political changes underway as a result of the pandemic, however, it is an open question to what extent the region can weather the far more turbulent times ahead. The political and societal willingness to pursue the energy transition to a carbon-neutral future through new—more ambitious and certainly more expensive—energy and climate policies as a response to the climate emergency will very much depend on how the impact of the pandemic plays out globally, in Europe and in the Baltic area. It will also require strong leadership from a new generation of political, business and societal leaders able to see green recovery as a major opportunity for their nations in terms of economic development, social welfare and national security.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Environment, Politics, Governance, European Union, Economy, Sustainability, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, and Baltic States

1722. Estonia’s Partners in the EU Coalition Machinery: Maximising Influence in the EU through Coalition-building

Author:
Kristi Raik and Josef Janning
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This policy paper examines Estonia’s partners in the European Union with the aim of identifying ways to enhance its influence on policy-making. Effective coalition-building is also important for the EU as a whole, since it can improve the Union’s capacity to take decisions and act. The paper highlights that: Estonia has a relatively strong position in the EU, considering its small size and limited resources. It is particularly well-connected with the Nordic-Baltic partners and should seek ways to use this grouping more effectively as a means to reach out to larger member states and shape decisions in the Union. The main challenge is to build stronger links with France and Germany, something that has become all the more important due to Brexit. Teaming up with other countries that are better connected to Berlin and Paris, such as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, is one way to pursue this goal. It is too early to draw conclusions about the impact of the latest change of government in Estonia on the country’s influence and image among partners in the EU. However, the research interviews show some indications of a weakened position. Estonia should avoid losing its reputation as a results-oriented member state that takes into consideration the priorities of others while pursuing its own interests in a constructive manner.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

1723. Economic Interests, Political Conflicts, and External Interferences: The Complex Interlocking of the Libyan Crisis

Author:
Karim Mezran and Alessia Melcangi
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In the last days of September 2020, Libya’s oil industry seemed to be on the verge of restarting its production after Gen. Khalifa Haftar announced the reopening of the oil fields and terminals that he had occupied and closed in the course of his offensive against Tripoli. The main damage caused by Haftar’s blockade is the dramatic plummet of oil production to less than 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) from the previous 1.2 million. The importance of the oil and gas industry in Libya cannot be underestimated since it is the main driver of the Libyan economy and accounts for about 60% of the country’s GDP. Oil production revenues and the dividends from oil sales are one of the main causes of the conflict that has been continuously ravaging the country since the fall of Muammar Qadhafi in 2011. The announced reopening represents good news that bodes well not only for a real resumption of political talks between the warring parties, but also for a more general improvement of the economic and social condition in the country, which is now on the verge of collapse. After the January 2020 blockade, the quick shutdown of oil sales led to a budget collapse: In April 2020, oil production data showed a drop of more than 80% with a loss of more than $10 billion in oil revenues. The economic impact of this stoppage directly hit the Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation (NOC), preventing the company from fulfilling contracts with international oil companies. After so many years of civil war, it has become evident that competition among various actors is principally over the country’s resources and control of its financial institutions. According to the 2015 UN-backed Libyan Political Agreement, the Tripoli government headed by Fayez Sarraj retains control of the Tripoli-based NOC and oversees the allocation of state funds deposited in the Tripoli-based Central Bank — these are the two channels through which oil revenues can flow legally and the only two institutions recognized by the UN Security Council. Haftar and the Eastern government accuse Tripoli of mismanaging hydrocarbon revenues and state funds, using them to fund militias backing the Government of National Accord (GNA), and failing to carry out reforms to stabilize the economy. For this reason, the Eastern authorities demand a change of leadership in both institutions: The Central Bank and the NOC. Indeed, the problem for Haftar has always been that he controlled oil production, but not oil revenues. After almost a year locked in a stalemate, the situation on the battlefield was reversed in April 2020. Thanks to Turkey’s military support, the GNA was able to counterattack and defeat the Haftar-controlled Libyan National Army (LNA) and push them back to the gates of the city of Sirte near the “oil crescent,” a coastal area home to most of Libya’s oil export terminals. The ceasefire proposed by the GNA at the end of August 2020 and accepted by the Tobruk parliament and its spokesman, Aguila Saleh, has restarted the political dialogue between the conflicting parties. Meanwhile, the malcontent of the population in both Tripoli and Benghazi, due to the deterioration of living conditions and lack of economic reforms, led to protests and demonstrations in both cities.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Economy, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

1724. Hard security dynamics in the Baltic Sea region: From turbulence to tense stability

Author:
Matti Pesu
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This Briefing Paper looks into the fundamentals of the Baltic Sea security landscape in the early 2020s. It argues that three interconnected security dynamics shape the present, ‘post-2014’ security environment in Northeastern Europe. That is to say, Russia’s assertive behaviour in the region and in Europe more broadly, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures in the area, and Finland’s and Sweden’s closer integration into the Western defence network all affect hard se- curity dynamics in the Baltic Sea region. These three dynamics underlie the tense regional stability that emerged after a period of alarmism and turbulence in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s ac- tions in Ukraine. Fundamentally, the stability is the product of the interplay between the three dynamics. In other words, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures accompanied by Finland’s and Sweden’s in- tegration into the Western security and defence system act as a counterweight to Russia’s actions in the region, creating a balance of power holding Russia’s ambitions in check. Investigating the sources of regional balance is rele- vant for multiple reasons. The region remains a poten- tial hotspot between Russia and the West and, thus, it merits close and continuous attention. Moreover, the word ‘stability’ frequently features in foreign policy parlance in Northern Europe, particularly in Finland and Sweden. Given this rhetorical proclivity, attention needs to be paid to the factors that actually constitute stability and the state of hard security in the Baltic Sea area. The paper consists of three analytical parts. First, it provides a brief historical overview of the twists and turns in the regional security landscape from the early post-Cold War era to today. The second part introduces the three dynamics in detail, followed by an analysis of how they are interconnected. The paper concludes by contemplating how regional stability could best be preserved in the 2020s.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Baltic Sea

1725. Final Week Cybersecurity Considerations: Top Takeaways

Author:
Belfer Center
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
This election has already faced threats from cyber adversaries seeking to influence its outcome. The joint CISA-FBI alert confirming Russian state-sponsored activity targeting government networks on October 22 builds on other advisories around potential cyberattacks on election systems ahead of the election, including advisories of DDOS attacks against election infrastructure. Making unplanned or last-minute changes ahead of election day can introduce serious risks, especially given the short window to test changes. Here are some considerations as you work to address and prepare to counter potential cyber threats.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Elections, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

1726. An Intelligence Agenda for a New Administration

Author:
Belfer Center
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
America’s Intelligence Community (IC) faces a daunting array of traditional national security challenges. Terrorism remains a persistent global problem in form of Islamic extremism as well as far-right nationalism. Russia, China and other nation state threats have become a higher priority after a long period of neglect. Regional conflicts simmer and occasionally boil over, reminding us that our agencies must provide global coverage. And we are now engaged in perpetual cyber conflict, with ambient digital espionage and conflict raging across global networks. At the same time, the Covid-19 pandemic has shown us that there are other threats to national security which require our intelligence agencies to broaden their focus beyond the familiar threats that have defined their missions since inception. America’s intelligence agencies must be able to support our national response to the existential challenges of our time - pandemic and biothreats, climate change, and nuclear insecurity. Each represents a high probability and high consequence set of risks for the nation and the world. As a President-Elect Biden’s team prepares to assume power, it should examine: Independence: Has political interference degraded the IC’s capability to collect and protect intelligence, and has the IC’s independence and objectivity eroded? How can we ensure that political interference never degrades IC capabilities and objectives? Priorities: How well prepared is our Intelligence Community (IC) to play its role of providing warning, perspective and options in a new world of disinformation, pandemic and climate change? Keeping Pace: Has the IC’s ability to provide intelligence needed to keep America safe kept pace with the rapid changes in technology and society?
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
North America

1727. Technology Factsheet: Quantum Computing

Author:
Akhil Iyer
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Quantum computing refers to the use of quantum properties—the properties of nature on an atomic scale—to solve complex problems much faster than conventional, or classical, computers. Quantum computers are not simply faster versions of conventional computers, though they are a fundamentally different computing paradigm due to their ability to leverage quantum mechanics. Harnessing quantum properties, namely the ability for the quantum computer bits (called “qubits”) to exist in multiple and interconnected states at one time, opens the door for highly parallel information processing with unprecedented new opportunities. Quantum computing could potentially be applied to solve important problems in fields such as cryptography, chemistry, medicine, material science, and machine learning that are computationally hard for conventional computers. Although it is still unclear which specific tasks can benefit from parallelized quantum processing, known as quantum parallelism, it is expected that solutions to a number of problems, especially those related to optimization, can be greatly accelerated by using a quantum computer. Though the field is still in its early stages, the anticipated opportunities offered by the unique computational power of quantum computers have attracted investment from not only research universities, but also startups, technology giants like Google, IBM and Microsoft, and directed investment by governments around the world. This cross-sectoral ecosystem has supported recent progress in underlying hardware, software, and algorithms necessary to make the computers work. The field has seen rapid advancement, however systems that can accomplish various kinds of computation, and especially those that can be commercially viable, are still likely to be decades away. There are expected to be some near- term applications on the horizon though, making quantum computing as relevant as ever. Currently, U.S. governance and regulation regarding quantum computing—a subset of the broader field of quantum information science, which also encompasses quantum communication and quantum sensing—focus on investments in the technical knowhow, collaborative research ecosystem, and human capital required to advance the technology. Given quantum computing’s potential for impact, especially in the fields of digital security, healthcare, energy, and machine learning and artificial intelligence, it is important for policymakers to understand the likely trajectories of the technology over the coming decades, as well as the pace of development both within the U.S. and abroad. Furthermore, policymakers must consider how to effectively promote the development, application and implementation of general-purpose quantum technologies to realize their larger economic and social benefits, while simultaneously mitigating foreseeable risks to privacy, safety, security, and inclusion.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, Privacy, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
United States of America

1728. The European Defence Fund and Norway

Author:
Karsten Friis
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF) represents an important step towards a more coherent European security architecture. It is broadly recognised that Europe needs to reduce duplication between, as well as the number of, weapons systems and platforms. The EU recently opened up for associated countries to participate in the Fund, but the Norwegian government has failed to set aside money for the EDF, despite official policy to participate.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe and Norway

1729. Russia’s view of Georgia: a NATO proxy yet again?

Author:
Julie Wilhelmsen
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
After the crises in Ukraine, and despite the Georgian government’s allegedly more pragmatic attitude towards Russia, official statements from Moscow increasingly project Georgia as hostile. This may be the result of the Kremlin stepping up a propaganda campaign to put pressure on Georgia, but it is also linked to growing perceptions of Georgia as becoming an agent of NATO. Moreover, Russia’s increasingly insistent rhetorical and practical support for the independent status of the two Georgian breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is still framed with reference to Kosovo as a tit-for-tat in a conflict with the West. In parallel with this hardening in Russian views, there is hardly any diplomatic contact between Russia and Georgia. The regional multilateral frameworks have become dysfunctional, obstructed by polarization. Further Georgian NATO integration could entail an increasing risk of war, unless frank discussions and engagement with Russia can be promoted.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Georgia

1730. Preventing Organized Crime. The Need for a Context-Sensitive, System-Wide Approach.

Author:
Kari M. Osland and Arthur Boutellis
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Recent years have seen important developments regarding the UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat. The Security Council, which has increasingly recognized organized crime as a serious threat to international peace and security—especially in relation to terrorism—has begun using sanctions to deal with organized crime and trafficking in Mali and Libya. Further, serious and organized crime (SOC) police units have been established in several UN field operations, including in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali. However, there is still no UN-wide policy on organized crime, and the issue has been conspicuously absent from recent strategic documents such as the Action for Peacekeeping Declaration (A4P). This report argues that there is need for a UN system-wide approach to peace operations for preventing and addressing organized crime, and its links to terrorism. To achieve this, UN member states and the UN Secretariat should seek to consolidate and broaden its nascent law enforcement capacity- building police approach into a context sensitive, system-wide approach. Six specific recommendations for the way forward are offered.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, International Organization, United Nations, Peace, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1731. The Impact of Covid-19 on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

Author:
Kari M. Osland, Maria Gilen Røysamb, and Jenny Nortvedt
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Summary: • Women appear to be disproportionately affected by Covid-19 • Pushback on global commitment to gender equality • Gender equality and human development are correlated: focussing on gender equality will have a catalytic effect on the SDGs • The increasing strain on peace operations is likely to have a negative effect on the WPS agenda.
Topic:
Security, International Organization, United Nations, Women, Peace, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1732. Conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula: The current state and prospects

Author:
Yong-Sup Han
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
At the end of 2017, the Korean Peninsula reached the brink of a nuclear war, as the US president Donald Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un exchanged words of nuclear threats each other. A tug of war as to whose nuclear button is bigger and stronger exacerbated the nuclear crisis. However, the South Korean President Moon Jae-in intervened to resolve the crisis by taking advantage of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. In doing so, President Moon intended to pursue denuclearisation and peace-building on the Korean Peninsula at the same time. North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un responded positively to the South Korean call to hold the inter-Korean summit and the Trump-Kim summit. In order to end the Korean war and promote peace-building on the Korean Peninsula including termination of hostile acts on inter-Korean relations, the two Koreas adopted the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration, the September 19th Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the Inter-Korean Military Agreement at their summit in 2018. The Military Agreement is aimed at reducing tension and building trust between the two Koreas through conventional arms control, while the North Korean nuclear issue is being resolved through the US-DPRK summit. The September 19th Military Agreement is a modest but remarkable success in arms control history when compared with a long-term stalemate or even retreat in the contemporary international arms control arena. Indeed, arms control is at its lowest point in history, so dim are its prospects. Nevertheless, heated debates are taking place, both at home inside South Korea and abroad, over the legitimacy and rationality of the Sept. 19th Military Agreement. With little progress on the denuclearisation issue at the Kim-Trump summit and no sign of easing economic sanctions on Pyongyang, North Korea has test-fired short-range missiles ten times to exert pressure on the United States, undermining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Against this backdrop, this policy brief intends to analyse the true meaning of the September 19 Military Agreement between the two Koreas, to identify its problems and policy implications in order to draw up supplementary measures to implement it successfully. Furthermore, the paper will draw some implications for the relationship between progress on North Korea’s denuclearisation issue and further conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

1733. Measuring Russia’s attention to Europe and the world

Author:
Kristian Lundby Gjerde
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Based on a mapping of mentions of country names in more than 30,000 Russian official speeches, press conferences, meeting transcripts, and official statements, this brief provides insights into changes to Russia’s engagement with the world during the 21st century. Without disentangling the subtleties of relations – such as their security, economic, or cultural dimensions and their benign or adversarial features – this approach allows the brief to sketch answers to questions that would otherwise be left to guesswork.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Economics, and Culture
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

1734. National Security Strategy of Armenia

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The National Security Council of the Republic of Armenia approved a new national security strategy on July 10, 2020. The work on this document has been going on for almost a year. By the order of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, on July 17, 2019, an interagency commission was set up under the leadership of the Secretary of the National Security Council. It was instructed to develop a working version of the new national security strategy within one year. The previous National Security Strategy was approved by the National Security Council of Armenia a while ago on January 26, 2007. Thirteen years is quite a long period and the renewal of the national security strategy, in principal, should have happened earlier. Such a long pause indirectly indicates that the process of national security policy planning in the Republic of Armenia is not going appropriately. The purpose of this publication is to juxtapose and highlight the main differences between Armenia's national security strategies for 2007 and 2020 and also assess Armenia's external security environment based on the 2020 strategy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Armenia

1735. Turkey-Greece Confrontation and Georgia: Threats and Challenges

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Relations between Turkey and Greece have never been easy but since the summer of 2020, tensions between them rose sharply. If during June and July of 2020 the parties were arguing over the conversion of the Hagia Sophia Museum into a mosque, in August-September the center of controversy shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. Many unresolved issues have accumulated over the decades in this "space" - the problem of Cyprus, the problem of the separation of maritime economic zones (hence, the natural resources located there), the issue of 12 islands and airspace, the matter of ownership of uninhabited small islands and more. In addition, recently, one can observe increasingly aggressive rhetoric in both countries which creates the danger of small incidents escalating into a major military confrontation that, in turn, createsseriousthreats and challenges to regionalsecurity (including Georgia).
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Security, Economics, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Turkey, Caucasus, Greece, and Georgia

1736. Security Review: Nagorno-Karabakh War Consequences

Author:
David Batashvili, Giorgio Bilanishvili, and Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The Security Review section of the Rondeli Foundation regularly covers topics analyzing the threats facing Georgia, the changes in Georgia's external security environment and the challenges to Georgia's national security policy. Recently, the developments around Karabakh have seriously changed the previous status quo in our region, precipitating new and very significant circumstances, and have brought about a new reality to the countries of the South Caucasus as well as various important players with an interest in the region. Accordingly, the Rondeli Foundation pays special attention to a complex analysis of the new reality created in the context of Georgia's national security environment. To this end, a discussion series, entitled "New Reality in the South Caucasus," was organized in a webinar format providing the interested public with the opportunity to hear the assessments of experts from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Iran and Russia (the discussion series is available on the Rondeli Foundation's YouTube channel and Facebook page. The current issue of the Rondeli Foundation Security Review is also entirely dedicated to the new reality created in our region. It brings together the publications of the Foundation’s researchers that look at and evaluate the current situation from different angles.
Topic:
Security, National Security, War, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

1737. COVID-19: The Pandemic and its Impact on Security Policy

Author:
Matthias Rogg
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The world is caught up in an existential struggle. The opponent is intangible; it spares neither state nor social group and does not stop at any border. For many of us, this struggle feels like war. Indeed, with the growing use of war-like language in the fight against COVID-19, also called coronavirus, a rapidly rising number of victims, and last but not least the economic consequences which are becoming increasingly clear, we seem to be experiencing a war-like situation.
Topic:
Security, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1738. No Such Thing as a Perfect Partner: The Challenges of “By, With, and Through”

Author:
Emily Knowles
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Taking a peacebuilding approach to working with local militaries and armed groups means using assistance to fragmented security sectors to increase cooperation between various formal and informal elites in a weak state. This approach places less emphasis on developing conventional military power and more emphasis on facilitating and improving relations between the different factions within the security sector and between the security sector and the civilian population. If international providers help local partners perform better at military tasks without ensuring that the forces have local legitimacy and strong accountability, progress is likely to be fleeting and could actually exacerbate civilian harm and the underlying drivers of violent conflict.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Local
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1739. Elite Incentives and Power Dynamics in Fragile States

Author:
Sarah Rose
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
By 2030, it is estimated that half of the world’s poor will be concentrated in fragile states. These are countries where the social contract between the government and its people is weak or absent—a breakdown which both creates a heightened risk of shocks from conflict, violence, pandemic illness, and/or natural disasters, and limits the country’s resilience to them. The increasing interlinkage between global development and state fragility, the potential cross-border nature of some of the risks, and the deeply mixed track record of successful international intervention to date, have prompted many donor organizations—including the United States—to reorient their policies and approaches to better support fragile states’ pathways to peace, stability, and resilience.
Topic:
Security, Poverty, Inequality, Fragile States, Borders, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1740. The Essence of the Strategic Competition with China

Author:
Michael J. Mazarr
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
U.S. national security strategy and defense policy have come to focus on China as the primary emphasis in the “strategic competition” outlined by recent U.S. strategy documents. Outside government, an avalanche of recent reports and essays lays out the China challenge in sometimes fervent terms, depicting an ideologically threatening revisionist state with malign intentions. As the Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf put it recently, “Across-the-board rivalry with China is becoming an organizing principle of U.S. economic, foreign and security policies.
Topic:
Security, Economics, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1741. Quantum Computing’s Cyber-Threat to National Security

Author:
Steve Grobman
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Quantum computing has the potential to bring tremendous advancements to science, including biology, chemistry, physics, and many other disciplines. The practical application will empower a stronger defense against future pandemics similar to COVID-19, not only in the acceleration of the development of vaccines and treatments, but also in optimizing currently unsolvable logistics problems such as how to deliver and route vaccines. In computer science, the “traveling salesman problem” shows it is impractical to find the optimal shortest path to visit cities once the list grows to even a few dozen. This same challenge in delivering vaccines to rural areas during a pandemic is exactly the type of problem that quantum computing will be well suited to solve.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1742. COVID-19 and European Defense: Voices from the Capitals

Author:
Christian Mölling, Sophia Becker, and Torben Schütz
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic poses unprecedented challenges to decisionmakers across the globe. It certainly affects European and transatlantic defense cooperation. DGAP aims to generate valuable insights into the pandemic’s effects on European defense. Therefore, we have asked leading experts from key EU and NATO partner countries for their views. ​ Together, the contributions provide an overview that reveals trends and tendencies in European defense in a changing security environment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

1743. Stronger Together: A Strategy to Revitalize Transatlantic Power

Author:
Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, Daniela Schwarzer, Christian Mölling, and Sophia Becker
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) convened a strategy group of experts and former government officials from the United States and Europe over the past year to discuss the crisis in the transatlantic relationship and to propose a strategy to revive and strengthen it.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Energy Policy, Government, Science and Technology, Partnerships, Democracy, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, North Africa, North America, and United States of America

1744. The End of German Ostpolitik: What a Change in Germany’s Russia Strategy Might Look Like

Author:
Stefan Meister
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia have hit a new low after the attempted poisoning of Alexei Navalny and the Kremlin’s continued support for Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko, despite massive electoral fraud in that country. A new Russia policy in Berlin will require a paradigm shift, using incentives and leverage to improve Germany’s negotiating position with Moscow. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline project should be under intense scrutiny. If Moscow shows itself unwilling to cooperate, construction should be stopped.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Leadership, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Libya, Germany, and Syria

1745. Upgrading Europe’s Civilian Crisis Management: A Strategic Planning Process in Ten Steps

Author:
Florence Schimmel and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The European Union sees civilian CSDP missions as a hallmark of its foreign policy. But these missions are implemented ad hoc, without any kind of systematic or strategic planning. As a result, the EU does not have the right capabilities to address essential challenges. Capability-based planning organized into a ten-step process offers a much better way. Existing EU initiatives can be used to kick-start a new approach.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, European Union, Crisis Management, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe

1746. Protests and Regime Suppression in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Author:
Saeid Golkar
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Since its formation in 1979, the Islamic Republic has seen multiple cycles of unrest, from ethnic movements in the early 1980s to urban riots in the early 1990s, student protests spanning 1999-2003, the Green Movement response to the 2009 election, and the December 2017-January 2018 upheaval in smaller cities and urban fringes. The most recent instance, sparked in November 2019 by a gas tax hike, spread to as many as one hundred municipalities and still reverberates today. The hardline Iranian regime has successfully put down all challenges to its authority thus far, causing numerous injuries and deaths in the process. State agents are also known to have perpetrated torture in prisons. But as Saeid Golkar contends in this prescient Policy Note, a climate of coercion has undermined Tehran’s legitimacy and its ability to coopt various social classes. Future protests, if they continue to grow in volume and violence, could exhaust even the regime’s multilayered security forces.
Topic:
Security, History, Social Movement, Protests, and Revolution
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

1747. A Paris Reset on Hezbollah? Implications for French Interests and Regional Security

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In this study, counterterrorism expert Matthew Levitt explores the history and current status of Hezbollah operations against French interests, and details how a change in Paris's longstanding opposition to designating the group could bolster French efforts to stabilize Lebanon. Lebanon’s corrupt political system needs major reforms, but Hezbollah has indicated, unsurprisingly, that it will reject any changes that diminish its political status. Specifically, the group insisted in late September that it maintain control of key ministries in any future government. This demand cut against the work of French authorities seeking to help stabilize the country following the devastating port blast in early August. In his response, President Emmanuel Macron signaled a break from typical French passivity toward Hezbollah. He denounced the group’s attempts to pose as a legitimate political party while engaging in militant activity independent of the Lebanese state. In this Policy Note, counterterrorism expert Matthew Levitt shares the little-known story of Hezbollah’s targeting of French interests, dating to the early 1980s. He then shows how the group poses a unique and growing set of challenges to France, both at home and abroad, and argues that Paris should reconsider its longtime opposition to designating Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization. Such a policy change, he contends, would bolster Macron’s efforts to stabilize Lebanon while mitigating threats within French territory.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, France, and Lebanon

1748. Caught in the Crossfire: Challenges to Migrant Protection in the Yemeni and Libyan Conflicts

Author:
Danielle Flanagan
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
In spite of the prevailing security dynamics in Yemen and Libya, both states continue to serve as areas of transit along some of the world’s largest mixed migration routes, leaving migrants caught in the crossfire of the two conflicts. This article examines the legal framework governing the protection of migrants in armed conflict under international humanitarian and human rights law. It also identifies two adverse incentives produced by the conflict situations that impede the exercise of these legal protections: (1) profits derived from migrant smuggling and trafficking, and (2) the use of migrants to support armed groups. In the absence of stable conditions in Yemen and Libya, individuals have little reason to respect international legal protections and discontinue migrant abuse connected with the lucrative businesses of smuggling and trafficking. The intractable nature of the two conflicts has also led to the strategic use of migrants as armed support, and more specifically as combatants, weapons transports, and human shields. Given these realities, the article outlines several recommendations to address the issue of migrant abuse in conflict. It recommends that states, particularly those neighboring Yemen and Libya, strengthen regular migration pathways to help reduce the number of migrants transiting through active conflict zones. It further advises that the international community increase the cost of non-compliance to international humanitarian law through the use of accountability mechanisms and through strategic measures, including grants of reciprocal respect to armed groups that observe protections accorded to migrants in conflict situations.
Topic:
Security, Migration, Human Trafficking, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, and Yemen

1749. Why the United States Should Remain Engaged on Nuclear Power: Geopolitical and National Security Considerations

Author:
Matt Bowen
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Nuclear energy has shown much promise and faced considerable challenges since its origins in the mid-20th century. While the United States drove the early charge for safe nuclear power around the globe, its leadership has waned in recent decades. US reactors now under construction—following no orders for such plants in the United States for several decades—have gone well over planned budgets and schedules. And while the United States was once the leading international supplier of reactors, other countries have since stepped forward to fill that role. Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, as part of its wider work on nuclear energy, is examining the impact of potential American disengagement from nuclear power’s development and where opportunities exist to step back in and shape its future. The program also will assess the US nuclear waste management program and efforts to collaborate with other countries on advanced reactor development as well as options for improvement on both fronts. This effort includes a two-part commentary on some of the benefits the United States might derive from increasing its engagement on nuclear power. The first in the series explored the important role nuclear energy can play in lowering air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst potential outcomes of climate change. The second part of the series, this piece, examines the geopolitical and national security implications of the United States and its traditional allies effectively ceding the international nuclear energy marketplace to the Chinese and Russians. The nuclear program’s ultimate goal is to inform readers—policy makers, industry leaders, academics, and others—with objective, research-based analysis. It will strive in the months and years ahead to contribute constructively to a necessary dialogue on the future of nuclear power.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, National Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1750. How Germany and France Could Play a Leading Role in International Donor Coordination

Author:
Lennart Kaplan
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
In the framework of the Agenda 2030 for sustainable development, France and Germany face common challenges, ranging from security to global health. Against this background, this paper discusses opportunities and barriers for a French-German leadership in international donor coordination.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, International Cooperation, Trade, and Donors
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany