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2. How non-state armed groups engage in environmental protection
- Author:
- Jairo Munive and Finn Stepputant
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Non-state Armed Groups have a mixed - and mostly negative - impact on the environment, but there are ways in which NSAG’s engagement can have positive effects on the environment during and after armed conflict. The adoption of the UN principles for the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict can provide an avenue for constructive engagement.
- Topic:
- Environment, United Nations, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Armed Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
3. Fact Sheet: Crisis in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region
- Author:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- Violence is escalating in Amhara region, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency Nearly 30 clashes between government forces and Fano militias were recorded in Amhara last week, with most concentrated in North Wello and West Gojam zones, though fighting has been spread throughout the region. This marks an almost eightfold increase in armed clashes in the region relative to the weekly average since the start of the crisis in April. While Amhara was among the least volatile regions in the country prior to the start of the northern Ethiopia conflict in 2021, it is now one of the most unstable. Persistent insecurity in Amhara poses a significant threat to the federal government, the Abiy administration, and Ethiopia’s stability at large.
- Topic:
- Security, Political Violence, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Instability
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Ethiopia, and Amhara
4. Shades of grey: The evolving links between the Houthi and Iran
- Author:
- Mona Saif
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- The Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing Tehran’s bidding, voluntarily or under pressure. Yet, the movement can be viewed as an informal partner of Tehran. Their relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more strategic one. Despite this evolution, the Houthi have remained autonomous with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy and battlefield operations. For the purpose of peacemaking in Yemen today, as well as subsequent efforts to maintain any peace, this suggests that the Houthi should be considered an autonomous, domestically legitimate (in part) and capable actor, but that Iran also needs to be consulted behind the scenes due to the growth of its relation with the Houthi.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Houthis, and Peacebuilding
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Yemen
5. Armed group opportunism in the face of recent crises: COVID-19 and climate change
- Author:
- Siobhan O'Neil
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United Nations University
- Abstract:
- Terrorist and other types of armed groups often exploit natural and human-made disasters and emergencies to advance their causes. This paper studies how some armed groups have responded to two recent global emergencies—climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. It examines the messaging and actions of the Boko Haram in Nigeria and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) dissident groups in Colombia in response to COVID and climatic shifts. The paper uses assessment methodology to look into unique survey evidence from each country in order to determine the public impact of armed group decision-making and responses to these emergencies. It also considers the potential policy implications of the findings presented herein.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, COVID-19, and Decision-Making
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
6. Armed groups’ modes of local engagement and post-conflict (in)stability: Insights from the Ethiopian and Somali civil wars
- Author:
- Marine Gassier
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United Nations University
- Abstract:
- What distinguishes post-war governments that succeed in establishing a stable political order and prevent recurring conflict from those that do not? This comparative study considers the specific threats that typically lead to the collapse of the post-conflict political order to offer new hypotheses on the conditions that affect post-war governments’ ability to sustainably restore stability. The threats considered include (i) fragmentation of the main actors in the conflict, (ii) inadequate demobilization, and (iii) enduring dependence of the post-war government on local brokers. Post-war regimes are more vulnerable to such risks after wars in which the dominant armed groups have established themselves by co-opting local power structures and drawing on existing socio-political networks, as this process redistributes power from the central to the local level. Empirically, this paper uses a novel dataset documenting the practices through which rebel groups may alter local power structures to highlight the connection between this wartime process of transformation and patterns of conflict recurrence. In addition, it contrasts the transition of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front from rebellion to government in Ethiopia in the 1990s with the trajectory of the armed movements in Somalia that also overthrew the incumbent military regime but then failed to establish a viable state.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Armed Forces, Conflict, Post-Conflict, and Instability
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Ethiopia, and Somalia
7. Ending the War in Sudan will be Difficult
- Author:
- Jędrzej Czerep
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Fighting in Sudan between the regular army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been ongoing since 15 April. The clashes are mainly taking place in the capital, Khartoum, and in the Darfur region, causing the destruction of infrastructure, a humanitarian disaster, and the displacement of the population. Although neither side has achieved military superiority or the support of the population, they are determined to continue fighting until the opponent is eliminated, which makes efforts to achieve a permanent ceasefire difficult. In the longer term, international support for a political solution to the crisis should aim to restore civilian control of the state.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, War, Armed Forces, and Humanitarian Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Sudan
8. Forced Marriage by Non-state Armed Groups: Frequency, Forms, and Impact
- Author:
- Phoebe Donnelly and Emily Myers
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Peace Institute
- Abstract:
- Many non-state armed groups use forced marriage during armed conflict. This practice has been documented across all geographic regions, in every decade since the 1940s, and across armed groups with many different ideologies. Yet while policymakers, scholars, and practitioners recognize forced marriage as an important form of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), there are no frameworks for conceptualizing the frequency and range of forms of forced marriage that occur in conflict. To fill that gap, this paper introduces an original dataset tracking forced marriage in armed conflict and uses the data and illustrative examples to divide forced marriage in armed conflict into three types: member–member forced marriage, member–civilian forced marriage, and civilian–civilian forced marriage. This dataset can be a tool for policymakers and practitioners to understand the impacts of forced marriage in armed conflict and better design prevention strategies and survivor-centered responses. The report concludes with an overview of existing policy, legal, and programmatic responses to forced marriage in conflict settings, including by non-state armed groups, and provides recommendations for how these responses can better address this complex phenomenon: Data collection: Disaggregate data on CRSV by the form of violence (when possible), avoid linking sexual slavery and forced marriage, and gather more data on the unique needs of survivors of forced marriage. Criminal accountability: Continue prosecuting forced marriage as a distinct crime against humanity and promote the inclusion of forced marriage as a distinct crime against humanity during negotiations on the treaty on crimes against humanity. Sanctions: Continue to include information on CRSV in the reports of sanctions monitoring committees, ensure that sanctions listing criteria are applied against perpetrators of forced marriage, and ensure that every panel of experts includes at least one member with expertise on gender issues or CRSV. Reintegration: Factor the different types of forced marriage into the design of reintegration programs and provide support that considers the unique needs of individuals exiting forced marriage.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Women, Peace, Armed Conflict, and Forced Marriage
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
9. Abrogating the Visiting Forces Agreement: Its Effects on Philippines’ Security and Stability in Southeast Asia
- Author:
- Renato Acosta
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- During much of 2022, the defense and security alliance between the United States of America and the Philippines, anchored on and reinforced by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, teetered on the brink of collapse. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte brought relations to the brink through attempts to scuttle the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This move would only embolden Chinese challenges to Manila’s territorial integrity and its aspirations to dominate Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. While the Duterte administration recited parochial reasons to terminate the VFA, pundits from the security and diplomatic sectors viewed Duterte’s attempts as a pretext to steer the Philippines towards China under his own brand and definition of an independent foreign policy. During his term, Duterte reiterated that President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials were his friends. He also publicly declared that the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), a northeastern section of the Spratly Islands, was already in physical control and possession of Beijing due to the unchallenged presence of its military and maritime militia vessels there. Given these statements, Duterte has constantly received criticism over his defeatist stance towards China.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Politics, Armed Forces, and Instability
- Political Geography:
- China, Philippines, Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
10. China Maritime Report No. 27: PLA Navy Submarine Leadership - Factors Affecting Operational Performance
- Author:
- Roderick Lee
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- The way the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) selects and manages its submarine officers increases the likelihood of human performance errors onboard a PLAN submarine. First, PLAN submarine officers are selected from applicants with among the lowest college entrance examinations of any PLA educational institution, suggesting that PLAN submariners are among the service’s least talented officers. Second, the Party Committee system at the apex of decision-making aboard PLAN submarines may be less agile than other approaches to command, at least in certain circumstances. Lastly, while the policy of embarking flotilla leaders senior to the submarine captain may reduce some of the negative effects associated with the first two conditions, it could lead to reduced performance when senior leaders are not present. If external events during wartime stressed these factors, the likelihood of human-induced error events in the PLAN submarine force could increase substantially.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
11. China Maritime Report No. 28: Bitterness Ends, Sweetness Begins: Organizational Changes to the PLAN Submarine Force Since 2015
- Author:
- J. Michael Dahm and Alison Zhao
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- “Above-the-neck” reforms in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that began in 2015 directed the development of a new joint operational command system that resulted in commensurate changes to PLA Navy submarine force command and control. Additional changes to tactical submarine command and control were driven by the evolution and expansion of PLA Navy surface and airborne capabilities and the introduction of new longer-range submarine weapons. Follow-on “below-theneck” reforms inspired significant organizational change across most of China’s military services. However, the PLA Navy submarine force, for its part, did not reorganize its command structure but instead focused on significant improvements to the composition and quality of its force. Between 2017 and 2023, the PLA Navy submarine force engaged in a notable transformation, shuffling personnel and crews among twenty-six submarines—eleven newly commissioned and fifteen since retired—relocating in-service submarines to ensure an equitable distribution of newer, more capable submarines across the fleet. Observations of infrastructure improvements at PLA Navy submarine bases portend even more changes to submarine force structure in the coming years.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Reform, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
12. China Maritime Report No. 29: PLAN Mine Countermeasures: Platforms, Training, and Civil-Military Integration
- Author:
- Brian Waidelich and George Pollitt
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has made incremental progress in its mine countermeasures (MCM) program in recent years. The PLAN’s current inventory of about 60 MCM ships and craft includes classes of minehunters and minesweepers mostly commissioned in the past decade as well as unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and remotely operated vehicles with demonstrated explosive neutralization capability. Despite the addition of these advanced MCM platforms and equipment, experts affiliated with the PLAN and China’s mine warfare development laboratory have serious reservations about the PLAN’s current ability to respond to the full range of likely threats posed by naval mines in future contingencies. The PLAN’s MCM forces are currently organized for operations near China’s coastline, but writings by Chinese military and civilian experts contend that to safeguard Beijing’s expanding overseas interests, the PLAN must develop MCM capabilities for operations far beyond the First Island Chain. PLAN and civilian mine warfare experts have proposed various solutions for offsetting perceived shortcomings in the PLAN’s MCM program, including the development of autonomous USVs and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), deployment of modularized MCM mission packages on ships such as destroyers and frigates, and mobilization of civilian assets such as ships and helicopters in support of MCM operations. Although there appears to have been little to no adoption of these proposed solutions to date, the PLAN recognizes MCM as one of its biggest challenges, and one can expect the PLAN to continue making measured progress in its MCM program in the years ahead.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Integration, Landmines, Civil-Military Relations, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
13. China Maritime Report No. 30: A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines
- Author:
- Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could approach Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with a pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18 vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096 would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
14. The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea
- Author:
- Scott Bentley
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Book
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.
- Topic:
- Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, Commerce, and Expansion
- Political Geography:
- China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea
15. A Conversation with Azovstal Defender Illia Samoilenko (2/24/23)
- Author:
- Illia Samoilenko and Elise Giuliano
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- The Harriman Institute
- Abstract:
- 28 year-old Ukrainian Lieutenant Illia Samoilenko was the deputy commander of the National Guards of Azov. Days before the Azovstal surrender in May, Lieutenant Samoilenko held a news conference broadcast live from a bunker beneath the steelworks. At this press conference, he described for two hours the desperate conditions that wounded soldiers faced. He also said that he and all the others saw themselves as “dead men.” Samoilenko was held in solitary confinement as a prisoner of war by the Russian Federation for 120 days before he was released in a prisoner swap last month.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Azovstal
- Political Geography:
- Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Mariupol
16. Russia after the Wagner mutiny: Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin’s gamble with the monopoly on violence
- Author:
- Jussi Lassila and Margarita Zavadskaya
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Vladimir Putin’s system is built on risk-averse loyalty and needs informal actors who can compensate for the inefficiency of official actors and partially satisfy the regime’s ambitious geopolitical visions. In Prigozhin’s mutiny, the same factors that had protected the regime’s integrity and deepening autocracy turned out to be vulnerabilities. The elimination of Prigozhin does not resolve this structural weakness but only shifts the problem elsewhere. Private military company (PMC) Wagner operated in Ukraine as an autonomous unit of the Russian army with more discretion on the ground and certain organizational advantages. However, PMCs should not be seen as private armies, but as extensions of the bureaucratic army or attempts to produce “pockets of efficiency”. The decentralization of armed groups weakens their ability to act against the political leadership. At the same time, this can be a ticking time bomb that critically weakens the state’s monopoly on violence.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Conflict, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
17. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation
- Author:
- Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States
18. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Critical Vulnerabilities to Russia’s Military Operations and Systems
- Author:
- Rob Lee and Philip Wasielewski
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- Some of the critical vulnerabilities to Russia’s military operations and systems—revealed during the war in Ukraine—are due to its military culture and poor strategic choices at the beginning of the war including overly ambitious strategic aims. Deficiencies in Russian military culture include a highly centralized decision-making process, a disregard for the welfare of its soldiers, and flagrant dishonesty. Certain aspects of Russia’s military culture, especially the disconnect between front-line soldiers and senior officers, complicate the Russian military’s ability to adapt, develop solutions to obvious deficiencies, and institutionalize lessons learned from the battlefield. Other critical Russian military vulnerabilities are not inherent to its military culture but to Russia’s national demographic and industrial capabilities. Limits in these areas make it difficult for Russia to regenerate military power by either increasing the size of its military or increasing the quality of its weapons systems. Even if Russia’s military culture experiences a post-war military renaissance, its ability to regenerate military power lost in Ukraine will be limited by its declining population and industrial bases as well as Western sanctions on high technology.
- Topic:
- Sanctions, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine
19. Raising AUKUS’s Second Pillar: Integrating Uncrewed and Other Emerging Technologies into the Australian Defence Forces
- Author:
- Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is aggressively pursuing a diverse array of uncrewed air, surface, and undersea systems to address capability gaps in today’s force and exploit emerging opportunities in new technology. Thus far, these efforts have yielded a few programs that have transitioned into operational use, consisting predominantly of uncrewed air vehicles (UAV) that support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. ADF concepts tend to constrain uncrewed system use cases by treating them as extensions of crewed platforms or units, such as the Royal Australia Air Force (RAAF) Ghost Bat program.1 These manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) concepts generally exploit the systems-level characteristics of uncrewed vehicles to provide crewed units with greater reach or persistence, as figure 1 summarizes. Because they do not carry human operators, strategists can consider even relatively expensive uncrewed vehicles attritable, and forces may lose these vehicles to combat or other exigencies with little regret.2 Uncrewed systems can operate for extended periods in severe environments or circumstances, such as space. And without human operators, uncrewed vehicles can be less expensive than their manned counterparts due to fewer requirements for life support, protection, live training, or multi-mission capability.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, Alliance, and AUKUS
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Australia, and United States of America
20. Fighting into the Bastions: Getting Noisier to Sustain the US Undersea Advantage
- Author:
- Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Airpower enthusiasts concluded after World War I that “the bomber will always get through.”1 Fast, high-flying aircraft seemed to hold a decisive edge over air defenses and offered commanders the assurance they could attack targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. But airpower advocates’ spirits were quickly dampened during World War II by the advent of interceptor fighters, radar-guided artillery, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), which together demonstrated that bombers could be stopped—often with devastating results. Air forces adapted, adding escort fighters, radar jammers and decoys, and higher-altitude bombers to sustain their ability to strike behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, this move-countermove competition continued. New surface- and air-launched missiles targeted bombers, and countries developed specialized aircraft and weapons to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses or use stealth to avoid detection and targeting altogether. Today, the US submarine force faces a similar challenge. The US fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has long been considered an asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which lacked robust and effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Relying on this advantage, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on SSNs to compensate for the impact of improved air defenses on the ability of bombers and strike fighters to execute attacks.2 However, the unfailing ability of US SSNs to reach their targets is eroding as emerging technologies and weapons proliferation combine in new approaches to ASW that could neutralize America’s undersea advantage. During the last decade, the PRC and Russian Federation began fortifying their undersea defenses in the South and East China Seas and Arctic Ocean, respectively. Leveraging geographic constraints, US adversaries have instrumented these bastions with networks of fixed and mobile acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, complemented by aircraft and ships capable of pouncing on contacts or deploying dense mine barriers.3 Improved adversary defenses could degrade or defeat US undersea operations, preventing US submarines from conducting critical missions such as sinking a Chinese invasion fleet or tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To sustain its offensive undersea advantage, the US Navy will need to take some lessons from air warfare and begin supporting submarines with systems designed to suppress or destroy enemy undersea defenses. This imperative will fundamentally shift the paradigm for US submarine operations from “alone and unafraid” to “it’s all about team.” Moreover, the emergence of new generations of capable long-range active sonars will demand that the US undersea force increasingly rely on jamming and deception to counter enemy sensors, much as their counterparts already do above the water. The US submarine force will need to learn how to use noise, rather than avoid it. The Navy should pursue four lines of effort, outlined below, to sustain its offensive undersea advantage. Except for features to be incorporated into the next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, the SSN(X), the concepts and capabilities proposed in this report leverage mature or maturing technologies and can be fielded within five years. Implementing these recommendations will require the US Navy to refine its use cases for offensive undersea warfare to use available uncrewed vehicle technologies, rather than continue pursuing purpose-built systems that may take a decade or more to be fielded.4
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
21. Unalone and Unafraid: A Plan for Integrating Uncrewed and Other Emerging Technologies into US Military Forces
- Author:
- Dan Patt and Bryan Clark
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- During the Cold War, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) led global research and development (R&D) and in the process created what are now commonplace technologies, including the internet, precision weapons, and the global positioning system. However, since then the DoD has struggled to incorporate new advancements as initiatives to transform the force or implement a new offset strategy have failed to substantially change the US military’s design or capability development processes. In large part, the DoD’s adoption difficulties result from the center of technological innovation shifting from governments to the private sector, increasingly making the military a technology customer rather than a creator. This is the case with artificial intelligence (AI) and uncrewed systems, which are already upending long-standing approaches to modern warfare. The challenge of integrating these new technologies, many of which are commercially derived, therefore provides a good case study for how the DoD could reform its processes and organizations for innovation. To that end, this study evaluates how the US military could realize more timely development, deployment, and integration of relevant uncrewed systems, and illustrates its proposed methods using examples from the US Navy. The Navy and DoD will need the operational advantages that AI-enabled uncrewed vehicles could offer. Against a resident major power like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the US military cannot continue to rely on its historical dominance to deter and defeat aggression. Instead, the DoD will need to attack the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy of system destruction warfare by fielding a force that is less predictable, more adaptable, and increasingly resilient. Uncrewed systems could enable such an approach by unlocking the operational innovation of US servicemembers, who could—like their counterparts in Ukraine today—use uncrewed systems to grow the variety of tactics and effects chains that they can employ, which could undermine PLA planning and concepts and afford US forces the capacity to sustain a protracted conflict. The ability of uncrewed systems to provide resilience and adaptability depends on scale. A small fleet of vehicles cannot be simultaneously applied against multiple mission threads or effects chains and will lack the capacity to support extended operations. Uncrewed systems can enable scale by foregoing robust self-defense and focusing on a narrow set of functions to lower their cost and complexity. These limitations will require that uncrewed systems be combined with other uncrewed systems and crewed platforms in systems of systems (SoS), which could exacerbate the US military’s long-standing struggles to integrate forces between and within each service branch. Realizing the benefits of uncrewed systems will therefore demand that the DoD establish routinized processes for integrating new mission threads and SoS. Otherwise, the US military services will only be able to field individual uncrewed systems that replace crewed platforms in existing use cases. US military services are already attempting to improve their ability to integrate SoS through initiatives in experimentation, rapid acquisition, digital interoperability, and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). However, as this report describes for the US Navy, these efforts tend to focus on long-term service objectives rather than near-term operational problems and use a top-down process of systems engineering to guide requirements for future capabilities. This traditional approach assumes that the US military has the time to develop new systems and retains a substantial technological edge over its rivals, but neither condition is likely to endure in the context of the US-PRC competition. To bring uncrewed systems into the force more quickly and gain the resulting operational advantages, the DoD will need to flip its traditional acquisition approach and adapt US military tactics or mission threads so they can integrate uncrewed systems that are available today. This bottom-up method of “mission integration” contrasts with the DoD’s predominant approach of systems engineering and reflects best practices emerging in commercial manufacturing or distribution, where the fastest and most effective way to assimilate robotics is to adjust the organization’s workflow as opposed to developing robots that replace humans in existing workflows.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Emerging Technology, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America
22. Reset U.S.-Syria Policy
- Author:
- Daniel Depetris
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- After 12 years of civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government has consolidated its power and defeated credible threats to its rule. The anti-Assad armed opposition, which once controlled half of Syria, is relegated to the northwestern province of Idlib. While the Biden administration recognizes that Assad will likely remain in office, U.S. policy remains punitive, maintaining comprehensive sanctions on Syria until Assad negotiates political reforms with his opponents and agrees to free and fair elections. This policy will not produce the desired results. Assad is firmly entrenched, benefits from the help of security partners in Iran and Russia, who prefer that he stays in power, and remains highly unlikely to comply with U.S. demands. The status quo amounts to collective punishment of the Syrian population. Approximately 900 U.S. troops remain in eastern Syria, allegedly to train and advise the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS. But ISIS lost its territorial caliphate more than four years ago. The risk of keeping U.S. forces there in perpetuity which includes sporadic attacks on U.S. positions and escalation risks with various actors, outweighs any rewards. Neither the sanctions nor the occupation of eastern Syria serves U.S. security interests. The former does no good, and the latter risks embroiling the United States in a mission without an end date. The United States should withdraw its remaining forces and offload what is left of the counter-ISIS mission to local actors. The United States should also reduce if not end its failing sanctions regime.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Armed Forces, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America
23. A Conversation with ELN Commander and Peace Negotiator Aureliano Carbonell
- Author:
- Jerano Abraham
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
- Abstract:
- National Liberation Army Commander Aureliano Carbonell speaks about prospects for peace in the guerrilla organization’s second round of dialogues with the Colombian government.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Peace, and Guerrillas
- Political Geography:
- Colombia and South America
24. Actor Profile: The March 23 Movement (M23)
- Author:
- Ladd Serwat
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- The March 23 Movement (M23) — Mouvement du 23 Mars in French — is an armed group operating in Nord Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with alleged backing from the Rwandan government. The roots of the M23 go back to the disrupted integration process of Rwandophone militants following the Congo Wars, splitting those willing to return to Rwanda and others desiring to stay in DRC.1 Many fighters remained in Nord Kivu province to form the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) under the leadership of a former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) militant, Laurent Nkunda. A precursor to the M23, the CNDP claimed to protect Congolese Tutsi and received Rwandan support.2 The M23’s name comes from the failed negotiation process between the CNDP and the Congolese government on 23 March 2009.3
- Topic:
- Political Violence, Non State Actors, and Armed Forces
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo
25. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?
- Author:
- Emile Roy
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Yemen
26. The Muqawama and Its Enemies: Shifting Patterns in Iran-Backed Shiite Militia Activity in Iraq
- Author:
- Luca Nevola and Miran Feyli
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- The post-2003 security landscape in Iraq has seen the proliferation of dozens of militias identifying with Shiite Islam. Many of these actors are integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – a paramilitary group established in 2014 to counter the Islamic State and later incorporated into the Iraqi state forces – and have strong relations with the Iranian regime and its security apparatus.1 These Iran-backed groups include prominent militias such as Kataib Hizbullah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and Haraka Hizbullah al-Nujaba (HHN), as well as a number of recently formed ‘facade groups’ like Ashab al-Kahf and Qasim al-Jabarin. Such facade groups are generally assumed to operate on behalf of KH, AAH, and HHN (see graph below). These groups are notable for portraying themselves as the Muqawama, or the ‘resistance’ against the United States and other foreign forces.
- Topic:
- Security, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Militias
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, and Middle East
27. The Shell and the Seed: Lessons from the Negotiation with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
- Author:
- Marta Ruiz
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
- Abstract:
- The achievement of total peace is not a new goal for Colombia. For the better part of the last 30 years, most government administrations have attempted to negotiate or subdue all existing armed groups either simultaneously or sequentially. However, the results so far have been partial and insufficient to address the structural causes and persistent factors behind a 60-year internal armed conflict. The product of a collaboration between ICTJ and the researcher, journalist, and former commissioner of the Colombian Truth Commission, Marta Ruiz, this study presents new points of view and reflections on the negotiations with the paramilitary forces in the first years of 2000. These reflections can be useful not only to inform public debate but also as input for decisionmakers and those who design strategies for negotiation and the pursuit of total peace underway today in Colombia. The first part explains the genesis of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and describes their transition from drug traffickers to political and military actors. It presents evidence that since the 1980s the Colombian state has attempted to negotiate with drug traffickers using different narratives about their nature. The second part describes what happened at the Santafé Ralito negotiation table, the discussion’s agenda, and how the political context affected the process. It also shows how political timing, in particular President Uribe's reelection, affected the process’s outcome. The big question it asks, one with no single answer, is why, if negotiations were being held with drug traffickers, there was no real talk of dismantling drug trafficking. The third part assesses the consequences of the process, both in terms of justice and reintegration. It attempts to explain how the demobilized armed groups were reactivated in the territories.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Armed Forces, Negotiation, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Colombia and South America
28. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: One Year On
- Author:
- LSE Ideas
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- This Strategic Update summarises a roundtable discussion held at LSE IDEAS in July 2023. Contributors to the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Stuart Austin, Professor Gordon Barrass, Professor Christopher Coker, Tom McKane, Hugh Sandeman, Susan Scholefield, and Peter Watkins. None of the content of the Strategic Update is attributable to any one individual. One year on from NATO’s Madrid 2022 summit, this Strategic Update address the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and its implications for the future, especially regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. The paper addresses the misalignment between preparations for defence and the real state of its armed forces, the UK’s symbolic support for Ukraine versus its capability, the concepts of resilience and deterrence, and finally the future of NATO’s relationship with Russia.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
29. Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
- Topic:
- NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
30. The Lebanon Human Rights Report: Punting on Accountability?
- Author:
- David Schenker
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- When the U.S. State Department issued its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices last week, the document’s assessment of Lebanon’s track record in 2022 stood out for its significant elisions. Although the comprehensive nature of these reports generally makes them a valuable tool for accountability, their diplomatically sensitive content is sometimes colored by an administration’s perceived exigencies regarding a given bilateral relationship. The fact that Lebanon’s report largely avoids some of the country’s more controversial human rights issues therefore seems more than coincidental. Whatever the case, the omissions are a missed opportunity for facilitating just the type of accountability Lebanon needs to pry itself out of its current morass.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Armed Forces, Economy, and Accountability
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Lebanon
31. PLA Air Force Increases Flexibility of Combat Support Units
- Author:
- Derek Solen
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In early November, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) published photographs of army helicopters taking off from an “air force station” of the Eastern Theater Command during a “trans-regional operation” in late October (China Military Online, November 10). “Air force station” likely refers to the “field station” or combat support unit that services the airbase from which the helicopters took off. The photographs visually substantiate an article from June in which it was reported that all the field stations of an unspecified air defense base of the Eastern Theater Air Force had developed the capability to conduct joint combat support. The report mentioned that the field stations were servicing aircraft of various types from different services, even including a vignette of one field station conducting “combat sustainment” for an army helicopter in addition to servicing fighters and special mission aircraft (PLA Daily, June 16). The field stations’ actual joint combat support capability is likely to be nascent, but it rests on a foundation of greater flexibility that the field stations have achieved over the past decade to operate outside their routines and to service various types of aircraft. That foundation should also make the combat support units of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) a more resilient force that is better able to support agile aviation units.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Air Force, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
32. PLA Airborne Capabilities and Paratrooper Doctrine for Taiwan
- Author:
- Daniel Fu
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In the event of a Taiwan contingency, PLA airborne troops are likely to assume a substantial role. Decapitation strike scenarios and the prospects of an airborne invasion are widely discussed by analysts, scholars, and policy practitioners in both the US and Taiwan. Despite PLA ambitions to rapidly expand their airborne capabilities, there are a growing number voices that downplay the threat or likelihood of an airborne assault across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese security analysts such as Liu Tai-ying (劉泰英), founder of the Taiwan Research Institute, have stated that “if paratroopers were used, the losses for China would be very high” and minimized their threat by stating that there are few landing spots available to PLA airborne forces (Taipei Times, September 26, 2022). Notably, many of these conclusions revolve around the viewpoint held by a growing number of military experts, who contend that “mass airborne operations are a thing of the past” (Modern War Institute, December 10, 2016). These views, however, fail to consider the robust drive on part of the PLA to improve the combat readiness and capabilities of its airborne troops. They also ignore substantial progress the PLA has already made towards that goal, both in terms of the training and preparation of its paratroopers and in decisive factors such as heavy airlift. In short, documenting the progress of PLA airborne troops’ capabilities may play a crucial role in assessing Chinese deployment strategies during a potential Taiwan invasion scenario.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Military, and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
33. Assessing the Role of the PLA Southern Theater Command in a China-India Contingency
- Author:
- Suyash Desai
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Soon after Xi Jinping assumed charge as the Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman in November 2012, he set the stage for a sweeping military restructuring. On February 1, 2016, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved away from the old Soviet-inspired Military Regions (MR) system to the U.S.-inspired Theater Command (TC) model. Under this new model, the seven Military Regions—Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Lanzhou—were reorganized into five geographic TCs, each with a specific “strategic direction” (战略方向). [1] Following the force restructuring, the three TCs that concern India are the Western Theater Command (WTC) along with Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts (TMD and XMD), the Southern Theater Command (STC) and the Central Theater Command (CTC). WTC’s 76th and 77th Group Armies (GA) under the PLA Army’s (PLAA) jurisdiction are mandated to ensure the security of China’s land boundaries with Central Asian states, India, Nepal, and Bhutan. The TMD and XMD were retained to oversee security on the Chinese border with the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Union Territory of Ladakh, respectively. In addition to the PLAA, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the PLA Logistic Support Force (JLSF) are also significant services under the WTC command, while the PLA Navy (PLAN) plays a minor role at Pangong Tso in the Aksai Chin region. Elsewhere, PLAN forces under the STC’s jurisdiction are responsible for securing Chinese interests not only in the South China Sea but also possibly in the Indian Ocean Region and the Western Pacific Ocean. The CTC is mandated to protect the capital but also acts as an anchor to provide additional troops to other theaters in case of a contingency, including WTC. This is an important division of responsibilities for the Chinese armed forces after Xi’s recent military reforms. [2] However, recent developments have highlighted that the STC’s 75th Group Army could also play an important role in securing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial integrity in Tibet, especially in the eastern sector bordering the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Furthermore, the troops from the STC’s 75th Group Army could be used for rotation in the Tibetan theater, and the 75th GA’s artillery could be mobilized during a contingency with India. The four major reasons that the STC’s 75th GA could play such a role are improving connectivity between Tibet and the Southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan, minor changes to the 75th GA’s force composition, recent military exercises by STC’s 75th GA in Tibet and historical precedent.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, South Asia, India, and Asia
34. The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition
- Author:
- Bonnie L. Rushing and Kyleanne Hunter
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- Russia’s experience in Ukraine highlights the importance of the human weapon system in next generation warfare. They show that despite technological superiority and investment in sophisticated weapons and equipment, such as hypersonic missiles, people are the core of a successful military strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in kinetic and largely conventional warfare, the human weapon system is essential across the range of military operations, particularly in gray zone operations. There may be no place where the human weapon system is more important; strategic and meaningful management of the human weapon system for use in countering gray zone activities may prevent escalation into kinetic operations.
- Topic:
- National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Employment, Diversity, Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, Hybrid Warfare, and Inclusion
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Asia
35. Future Bioterror and Biowarfare Threats for NATO's Armed Forces until 2030
- Author:
- Dominik Juling
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- The article argues that advances in biotechnology and other transformations of the threat environment will increase the risk for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces of being confronted with a biological, particularly a genetically modified, weapon by 2030.
- Topic:
- NATO, Armed Forces, Biological Weapons, Bioterrorism, and Biowarfare
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
36. Neo-Weberian Reading of Violent Non-State Actors: The Case of Hezbollah
- Author:
- Mustafa Yetim
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
- Institution:
- Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
- Abstract:
- Multiple-actor reality and the impact of different units, except the states in stratified structural relations, have become more apparent in recent international relations. Specifically, the rising role of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) in regions like the Middle East and North Africa, and their challenges to the sole and central position of states, reinforced this idea. Hence, comprehending the possible actorhood of these groups within the structural relations consisting of internal and external realms necessitates alternative concepts and challenging arguments. The Neo-Weberian approach, inspired by historical sociology, offers a grounded and balanced analysis of actors. This approach puts state-society at the center of attention and, thus, looks at all dimensions (both actor and structure) of social relations as ingrained in the theory of structuration. In this way, it seems to capture the complex interactions between actors and structural dynamics, as well as the dynamic transformation of both ontological realities. Along this line, this study intends to illuminate the intriguing aspects and certain advantages of the structuration approach by scrutinizing Hezbollah’s agency, which is a critical VNSA in the Middle East, and its impact on structural relations, as well as its evolution over time. In other words, as a modest contribution to the structuration literature, the mutual interaction between agent and structure is explored via a unique case. This study argues that Hezbollah emerged as a result of the preexisting structural realities and, during the process, it proved its agency and influential role on these stratified structural dynamics. To substantiate these theoretical arguments, the permissive structural conditions in the region and in Lebanon will be explained, and then Hezbollah’s impact as an actor on these structural realities will be surveyed with a special emphasis on Hezbollah’s role over two regional dynamics: Arab uprisings, particularly the Syrian internal war, and its now hegemonic position in Lebanese politics.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Hezbollah
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Lebanon
37. The Invasion of Southern Gaza
- Author:
- Michael K. Nagata and Mick Mulroy
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss the IDF’s movements across southern Gaza, Israel’s current military objectives, and how combat today differs from that of previous weeks.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
38. The attack-reconnaissance squadron as a new formula and a new quality of the attack helicopter squadron of the Polish Armed Forces
- Author:
- Sylwester Lubiejewski
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- This paper takes a comprehensive look at the current state of army aviation attack helicopter squadrons of the Polish Armed Forces. The aim of the article is to present a concept for the functioning of the attack reconnaissance squadrons of the Polish Armed Forces, which takes into account the identified requirements of the Land Forces of the Polish Armed Forces in relation to army aviation on the battlefield and the current limitations in the functioning of the attack helicopter squadrons of the Polish Armed Forces. To meet this aim, qualitative research included interviewing, observation and the collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents. The study revealed that it is necessary to organise attack-reconnaissance squadrons with a modular organisational structure including: a headquarters, a command company, three attack-reconnaissance companies, an aviation maintenance company and a supply company, capable of conducting autonomous operations in independent directions (areas). The squadrons should be equipped with new attack-reconnaissance helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles as well as equipment for their technical and logistical support that will be part of their individual subunits. The results of the research are the basis for further, in-depth research on the issue of improving the functioning of attack helicopter squadrons, so that they are fully capable of supporting the land forces of the Polish Armed Forces in large scale combat operations.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Aviation
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Poland
39. Logistics outsourcing for armed forces: The mobilisation of civilian transportation vehicles
- Author:
- Nebojsa V. Nikolic
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- One aspect of the total defence concept involves the temporary requisition of civilian transportation vehicles to meet the increased logistical demands of a wartime army. These vehicles are selected and managed in peacetime, mobilised at the onset of the war, used by military units throughout the war, and returned to their original owners afterwards. This paper presents a model for the reception process of such civilian vehicles during mobilisation. In practice, however, reception processes are not without challenges. Under the time constraints of mobilisation, issues may arise, including inappropriate reception, missed deadlines, and compromised operational readiness. To investigate these issues, the study employs conceptual modelling, supplemented by insights from professional experience. The main contributions of this paper include a conceptual model of the mobilisation process, a framework for maintaining records of mobilised assets, and a focus on previously underexplored mobilisation issues. Proper reception of mobilised vehicles significantly affects the transportation capability and operational readiness of military units as well as the accuracy of the post-conflict return process. Implementation of the proposed solutions requires careful consideration due to interdependencies with other aspects of the mobilisation process, such as doctrinal arrangements, administrative systems, mobilisation procedures as well as the quality and regularity of both professional and reservist military training.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Service, Logistics, Outsourcing, and Mobilization
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
40. Is a compulsory military service feasible for Kosovo?
- Author:
- Gramos Sejdiu
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
- Abstract:
- During the general elections of February, 2021 in Kosovo, one of the commitments of the “Vetëvendosje!” (VV) party was to introduce a national conscription model based on 3+3 months of service. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, coupled with increasing tension with Serbia, who maintains very close ties with Russia, has brought the conscription model into spotlight in Kosovo. However, as the country aspires membership in NATO, the transition from a professional military force into the conscription model could potentially undermine that process. Currently, there are 13 countries in Europe that apply the conscription-based model for the armed forces, each facing different challenges with the system. According to the media reportings, it seems that Kosovo’s approach is based on the models of Switzerland, Israel and Norway. However, it is clear that while Kosovo can learn a lot from other countries, it needs to develop its own approach and model to conscription, and in this context certain social, political and economic aspects should be considered. In order to accommodate changing mission profiles and lowering military expenditures, European armies have been reduced in size, lessening the need for recruits. Despite the war in Ukraine, armies across Europe have focused on modernization and international cooperation such as NATO for national security guarantees. Due to the evolving modernization of army equipment, armed forces “require increasingly higher training standards”. As a result, several nations have shifted towards professional armies in an effort to standardize their militaries and improve overall operational preparedness.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Conscription, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Eastern Europe and Kosovo
41. Green Defence: the defence and military implications of climate change for Europe
- Author:
- Ben Barry and Shiloh Fetzek
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Climate change is a national security threat to Europe. It is an accelerator of conflict and requires European forces to adapt accordingly. Concurrently, armed forces can help mitigate climate change by reducing their greenhouse-gas emissions. For states that plan to reduce carbon emissions, decarbonisation of armed forces without disarming will be a challenge. This new report assesses not only the implications for European armed forces of operating in climate changed worlds, but also the opportunities for reducing carbon footprint from new technologies. It assesses the challenges of implementing the necessary changes to military operations, training and capability and identifies success factors for this essential transformation.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Environment, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, and Green Technology
- Political Geography:
- Europe
42. Our climate future depends on conflict dynamics in Congo
- Author:
- Peer Schouten, Judith Verweijen, and Fergus Simpson
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The Congo Basin rainforest – the second largest on earth – absorbs four percent of global CO2 emissions and constitutes a crucial line of defense against cataclysmic climate change. However, a complex mix of illegal resource exploitation and conflict is currently threatening the rainforest. To curb these threats and their global consequenses, we need to understand the interplay between resources, conflict and environmental protection in Congo.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Armed Forces, Conflict, Carbon Emissions, Forest, and Deforestation
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Democratic Republic of the Congo
43. Our climate future depends on conflict dynamics in Congo
- Author:
- Peer Schouten, Judith Verweijen, and Fergus Simpson
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The Congo Basin rainforest – the second largest on earth – absorbs four percent of global CO2 emissions and constitutes a crucial line of defense against cataclysmic climate change. However, a complex mix of illegal resource exploitation and conflict is currently threatening the rainforest. To curb these threats and their global consequenses, we need to understand the interplay between resources, conflict and environmental protection in Congo.
- Topic:
- Agriculture, Climate Change, Development, Environment, Poverty, Food, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Inequality, Fragile States, Violence, Police, and Justice
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Democratic Republic of the Congo
44. Berlin’s Hesitation: Implications of German Foreign Minister’s tour to Mali and Niger
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, on April 12 and 13, made an important visit to Mali and Niger that is set to determine the future of Germany’s military presence in Mali. The German government is divided into those who support a continued presence in Mali and those who push for complete withdrawal of the German troops from the African country.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Forces, European Union, and Counter-terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, Germany, Mali, and Niger
45. Policing the police: The EU’s struggle to strengthen the Libyan security sector
- Author:
- Matteo Colombo and Nienke van Heukelingen
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- More than ten years after the ousting of Gaddafi, the Libyan police under the Ministry of Interior are still struggling to effectively carry out their duties across the country. Drawing from 25 interviews conducted with experts, Libyan police officers, civil servants of the Ministry of Interior, and EU officers between June and August 20221, our research found four main obstacles facing the Libyan police force in Western Libya. These are: i) the proliferation of armed groups; ii) divisions within the ruling elite; iii) administrative mismanagement in the security system; and iv) the presence of alternative conflict-resolution mechanisms. It also emerged that each area comes with its own challenges. Against that background, this policy brief calls for a change in EU policies. We suggest that EU member states align on specific and measurable goals and take a more adaptive and incremental approach. More specifically, the EU could consider identifying a set of measurable and achievable objectives and adapting its policies to the different contexts in which it operates, tailoring its priorities and timescales to different locations.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, European Union, and Police
- Political Geography:
- Libya and North Africa
46. Framing the Future of the US Military Profession
- Author:
- Richard A. Lacquement Jr. and Thomas P. Galvin
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- The military profession needs to be redefined by examination of its expertise and jurisdictions of practice, whereas previously the focus was on securing its professional identity. Twenty years ago, the original Future of the Army Profession research project responded to growing concerns among officers that the Army was no longer a profession in light of the post–Cold War drawdown and the onset of global operations including Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the profession faces recurrent challenges raised by the changing character of war, the renewal of great-power competition, crises surrounding issues of sexual harassment and assault, the effects of a major global pandemic and associated social and political unrest, and the growing societal distrust toward professions in general. Richard Lacquement and Thomas Galvin propose that the questions of professional identity, while still important, are now less salient than those about the professions’ jurisdictions of practice and domains of expert knowledge. Clarifying them will help better prepare US military professionals to exercise discretionary judgment effectively. They also propose a new Future of the US Military Profession research effort that addresses these jurisdictions across service, joint, and defense enterprises to clarify the divisions of professional work and responsibilities. This is a must-read for any steward of the military profession.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Sexual Violence, Army, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
47. A WIDENING RIFT BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE SAHEL
- Author:
- Silvia D'Amato
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- Two weeks ago, the Malian military junta, in power after a coup in May 2021, proposed to hold elections in December 2025 instead of this month as promised. The move was widely condemned. West Africa’s main regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), immediately imposed new sanctions while the French Minister of Defense Florence Parly floated the possibility of reviewing the French and European military engagement in the country. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves Le Drian openly called the junta “illegitimate”. In response, on January 31 Malian authorities gave 72 hours to the French Ambassador in Bamako to leave the country, an unprecedented diplomatic decision. The European Union (EU) also took a firm stance by imposing targeted sanctions against 5 members of the junta, including Prime Minister Choguel Maïga. The current querelle is arguably only the latest in an ongoing dynamic of political fragmentation in the cooperation between European and regional actors in the Sahel.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Counterinsurgency, Armed Forces, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Africa, and Sahel
48. Retain, Restructure, or Divest? Policy Options for Egypt’s Military Economy
- Author:
- Yezid Sayigh
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The Egyptian military has been on a dramatic expansionary trajectory since seizing power in July 2013. Having previously been an economic backwater, the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and other military agencies have spearheaded the enormous state-led investment strategy that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has pursued since he came to office in 2014. The military controls a vast economic portfolio. It manages a significant share of the overall volume of publicly contracted infrastructure and housing. It builds industrial zones and produces capital goods, consumer durables, transport and heavy goods vehicles and parts, and information technology equipment. It undertakes associated retail, owns commercial media companies and hotels, and is rapidly increasing its stake in agriculture, fisheries, and mineral extraction. As of September 2021, the military even has a monopoly on the production of school meals. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has formally controlled the use of state land by any civilian individual or entity, whether private or public, since 2001. The Ministry of Military Production (MOMP) is now one of two bodies that approves the import of foreign goods or services by government agencies. Military representatives sit on national boards, including for planning and sustainable development; feed into policy direction in several sectors, including the manufacturing industry, telecommunications, digital transformation, market development for electric vehicles, and rural development; and head major presidential initiatives, including the Long Live Egypt (Tahya Misr) development fund and the company responsible for constructing Egypt’s new administrative capital. Plans are underway to increase the capitalization of military companies by inviting private investment through the Egyptian sovereign wealth fund. What I have called an “officers’ republic”—comprising thousands of senior EAF retirees embedded in government ministries and agencies, regulatory and operational economic authorities, local government, and state-owned enterprises—complements the formal military economy. Military agencies and companies provide significant economic benefits. Military-managed public investment in transport infrastructure, for example, facilitates the movement of people and goods and expands access to external markets and investment opportunities. The construction of social housing for low-income groups addresses a serious shortage and assists government efforts to regenerate the informal settlements and slums where approximately one in seven Egyptians live. New industrial zones and extensive agricultural greenhouse projects attract investors, both domestic and foreign, contributing to economic growth and employment. And lower middle–class customers benefit from the expanding range of locally made consumer goods at affordable prices, alongside cheap meat and poultry imports, subsidized health services, and free food baskets for the poor. Why, then, should Egypt reconsider the military’s role in the economy?
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Economy, Business, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt
49. From Warlords to Statelords: Armed Groups and Power Trajectories in Libya and Yemen
- Author:
- Eleanore Ardemagni and Federica Saini Fasanotti
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
- Abstract:
- Armed groups play a central role in Libya and Yemen. Pervading weak and contested institutions, they have gradually brought their survival, profit and governance strategies under the state umbrella: warlords have become the new lords of the state. Armed groups control most of the energy revenues, critical infrastructure, smuggling and illicit trafficking. Their leaders are multifaceted: they are simultaneously military commanders, tribal chiefs, politicians and businessmen. Combining comparative analysis and case studies, this Report sheds light on the “economic face” of the armed groups and their power trajectories. How do armed groups build networks of profit and loyalty in the territories they hold? How does clientelism mark a continuity trend with former authoritarian regimes?
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Governance, Armed Forces, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- Libya, Yemen, and North Africa
50. The Periphery Cannot Hold: Upper Nile since the Signing of the R-ARCSS
- Author:
- Joshua Craze
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Small Arms Survey
- Abstract:
- Upper Nile is in chaos. A once durable alliance between the national government in Juba and the Padang Dinka in Malakal has given way to a much more uncertain situation, in which the regime of South Sudanese President Salva Kiir sets feuding elites against each other. Disorder has proved an effective tool of rule. In Upper Nile, Kiir's regime has successfully peeled off Eastern Nuer commanders once loyal to Riek Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO). Following a brutal dry season campaign against the SPLA-IO waged by these commanders, Machar's opposition suffered an almost total collapse of support in Upper Nile. The rump of the SPLA-IO fighting forces had already split from Machar in 2021, and formed the Kitgwang faction, which hoped to acquire materiel and money in Khartoum to fund a renewed war. However, thanks to a regional realignment that means Sudan and South Sudan are allies, the Kitgwang found no succour in Khartoum, and was easily divided by Kiir's regime. The current fighting in Upper Nile is the fallout from the two parts of the Kitgwang being set against each other by the government. Clashes have displaced more than 10,000 people, and taken on a worryingly ethnic dimension that Kiir's regime will struggle to control.
- Topic:
- Politics, Armed Forces, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Sudan, South Sudan, and Upper Nile
51. China Maritime Report No. 24: Incubators of Sea Power: Vessel Training Centers and the Modernization of the PLAN Surface Fleet
- Author:
- Ryan D. Martinson
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is building modern surface combatants faster than any other navy in the world. Before these new ships can be deployed, however, their crews must learn how to effectively operate them across the range of missions for which they were designed. In the PLAN, this “basic training” largely occurs at specialized organizations called Vessel Training Centers (VTCs). Since their creation in 1980, VTCs have played a key role in generating combat power for the fleet. But as China’s naval ambitions have grown, the VTCs have been forced to adapt. Since the early 2000s, and especially since 2012, they have faced tremendous pressure to keep pace with the rapid expansion and modernization of the PLAN surface fleet and its growing mission set, improve the standards and quality of vessel training, and uphold the integrity of training evaluations. This report argues that the PLAN’s VTCs have generally risen to the challenge, ensuring that new and recently-repaired ships can quickly reach operational units in a fairly high state of readiness.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Maritime, Seapower, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
52. “Don’t Abandon Us”: Preventing Mass Atrocities in Papua, Indonesia
- Author:
- Made Supriatma
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
- Abstract:
- This report assesses the risk of mass atrocities (large-scale, systematic violence against civilian populations) in Papua, Indonesia, over the next 12–18 months. Since its integration into Indonesia in 1969, Papua has seen ongoing political resistance and armed rebellion in favor of independence, and government repression in response. The region is home to Indigenous Papuans and a growing population of migrants from other parts of Indonesia, layering intercommunal tensions on top of the conflict over the region’s governance. An upward trend in the frequency of violent incidents prompted this analysis of the potential for mass atrocities. This report is based on field research in Indonesia, including in Papua, from March to August 2021, as well as on expert consultations and a literature review. The report’s conceptual framework and research questions draw from the atrocity assessment framework developed by the US government.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Indigenous, Industry, Atrocity Prevention, and Risk Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Papua
53. The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force
- Author:
- Eric Bissonette, Thomas Bruscino, Kelvin Mote, Matthew Powell, and Marc Sanborn
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- The US military must create standing, numbered, and regionally aligned Joint warfighting headquarters— American Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)—around a command council and a staff organized into Joint centers and cells. Calls for standing Joint force headquarters are not new, but the demonstrated military effectiveness of the Joint Task Force (JTF) model coupled with increasing service-specific resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints have resulted in little evolution in joint force headquarters construction since the end of World War II. Analysis of the historical record has shown that joint warfighting is best conducted with a Joint warfighting command subordinate to the geographic combatant commands. However, the Joint Task Force model is problematic because the ad-hoc, post-crisis activation of JTFs, along with their antiquated command and control structure, inherently puts the United States at a strategic and operational disadvantage. In the future, the US military will primarily maintain its competitive advantage, especially in great-power competition, by being a superior and sustainable joint force sooner than its adversaries. The proposed AEFs draw on generations of hard-earned experience to maintain and grow American supremacy in Joint warfighting in an increasingly dangerous world.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Army, and Joint Operations
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
54. Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA – 2020 PLA Conference Papers
- Author:
- Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, David Brewster, Christopher Cairns, Roger Cliff, and R. Evan Ellis
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- Although the People’s Liberation Army is not yet a global expeditionary force on par with the US military, the former has nevertheless significantly expanded its ability to operate abroad. Through enhanced technological capabilities, robust relationships with foreign militaries, increased access to overseas military bases and dual-use facilities, and the implementation of major structural reforms, the People’s Liberation Army has built a more integrated joint force capable of conducting a wider and more complex array of missions. This volume advances the understanding of the People’s Liberation Army’s capability to conduct overseas missions by examining China’s military relations with Europe, Africa, and Latin America; the country’s military activities in the Indian Ocean, polar regions, and Pacific Island countries; and the emerging roles of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force. This volume finds the People’s Liberation Army is engaged in a wide range of activities throughout the world, including port calls, joint exercises, seminars, and personnel exchanges. China sells weapons to some parts of the world and seeks to acquire military and dual-use technology from others. In addition, the People’s Liberation Army seeks to increase its capability to operate in parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean, Pacific Island countries, and polar regions, where the organization has only had a minimal presence in the past.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
55. WILL NANCY PELOSI’S VISIT TO TAIWAN TRIGGER A CRISIS?
- Author:
- James Lee and Jackie Wong
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- The controversy surrounding Nancy Pelosi’s (D-CA) potential visit to Taiwan centers on what it implies about United States’ relations with Taiwan. When the United States normalized relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, it said it would continue relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis. The Normalization Communique said that “the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” Beijing has interpreted this statement as a commitment, and it has warned Washington that closer government-to-government interactions with Taipei would violate that commitment and have dire, though unspecified, consequences. But there’s no formula for determining what “unofficial” means. The canonical statements of the United States’ One-China policy—the Shanghai Communiqué, the Normalization Communiqué, the Arms Sales Communiqué, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances—are written at a high level of abstraction. There is no communiqué in which the United States said that the Speaker of the House would never visit Taiwan; those kinds of details are left to diplomatic protocols (such as the “contact guidelines”) that the United States has defined on its own. It is an act of interpretation—an art rather than a science—and the question now is whether a visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan would be outside the bounds of a reasonable interpretation of “unofficial” relations.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Nancy Pelosi
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
56. What Strategic Posture Should France Adopt in the Middle East?
- Author:
- Héloïse Fayet
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- France has a historical presence in the Middle East, where it has many interests to defend: the fight against terrorism, the promotion of the arms industry, the dissemination of humanitarian values, etc. To this end, it has a number of resources at its disposal, notably military: French forces are deployed in Iraq, Syria and Jordan as part of Operation Chammal, in Lebanon for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in the United Arab Emirates. This strategic posture, inherited from the history and "Arab policy" of the 20th century, is now being called into question by the geopolitical upheavals in the region. The resizing of the American presence in the Middle East, initiated by the withdrawal from Afghanistan, is accompanied by a growing assumption of responsibility for their own security by local actors. This evolution is embodied, for example, in the signing of the Abraham Accords, which redefine the place of Israel. The American pulling out also allows extra-regional powers such as China and Russia to become progressively involved in the area. These transformations require an adaptation of the French posture in order to position itself as a credible actor in the strategic competition. It is therefore necessary to move away from the sole focus on counterterrorism, which no longer gathers partners, and more broadly to redefine the partnership strategy and the mechanism deployed on the ground. A strengthened interministerial, or even European, dynamic also seems essential in order to mobilize all the levers available to France.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, France, and Syria
57. Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mal
- Author:
- Ladd Serwat, Heni Nsaibia, Vincenzo Carbone, and Timothy Lay
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- On 30 March 2022, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament launched an inquiry into states’ use of private military contractors (PMC), drawing particular attention to the prominent Russian PMC known as the Wagner Group (UK Parliament, 30 March 2022). The decision to launch the inquiry came as Wagner Group forces deployed to Ukraine, and a series of reports emerged implicating Wagner mercenaries in human rights violations in Mali. This was only one of the latest efforts to investigate the Wagner Group’s activities. Past initiatives came amid heightened international concern over Wagner Group operations in the Central African Republic (CAR). Multiple UN bodies have previously tabled concerns or opened investigations into alleged abuses perpetrated by Wagner mercenaries (UN Security Council, 25 June 2021; UN Info, 31 March 2021). In June 2021, the UN Panel of Experts on CAR tabled reports of “indiscriminate killings” and violence against civilians at the hands of “Russian instructors” to the UN Security Council (UN Security Council, 25 June 2021). The UN peacekeeping mission in CAR (MINUSCA) and Rwandan special forces have also expressed concerns about joint operations with Wagner over alleged human rights violations (UN Info, 31 March 2021; Corbeau News, 13 June 2021). Moreover, the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on the Wagner Group and Wagner-linked individuals in December 2021 (European Council, 13 December 2021). In light of growing concerns about Wagner’s activities in Mali and their deployment in Ukraine, this report analyzes ACLED data on the group’s engagement in political violence in recent years. It focuses on civilian targeting by the Wagner Group in CAR and Mali, where they have operated alongside state forces since 2018 and 2021, respectively. Analysis of the data reveals several clear trends:
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Armed Forces, Civilians, Wagner Group, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Mali, and Central African Republic
58. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Large-Scale War and NATO
- Author:
- Martin Hurt
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- In the fourth brief of the series, Martin Hurt analyses the achievements of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and compares them with the NATO’s existing forces and capabilities. Martin Hurt, Research Fellow at the ICDS, briefly compares Ukraine’s military capabilities with those of some Allies and cautions against making any hasty conclusions about NATO’s ability to rapidly reinforce and defend its smaller member states in a potential war. He concludes that NATO should deploy its forces and capabilities along the borders of Russia, ready to defend Alliance territory as well as providing all necessary support to Ukraine, enabling it to significantly degrade the Russian forces.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States
59. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days
- Author:
- Philip Wasielewski
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
- Topic:
- Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine
60. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis
- Author:
- Daniel L. Davis
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine
61. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade
- Author:
- Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
62. One-Size-Fits-None: Overhauling JADC2 to Prioritize the Warfighter and Exploit Adversaries’ Weaknesses
- Author:
- Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Amazon founder Jeff Bezos famously attributes his company’s success to its customer obsession, which drove initiatives ranging from the creation of a cloud infrastructure and processing orders at unprecedented scale to establishing an entirely new logistics network that rapidly moves purchases to destinations. Amazon’s focus on shoppers is understandable, as it only makes about 1 percent of the merchandise it sells. Unlike a product-aligned business model like Apple’s, which seeks to anticipate or shape customer demand, Amazon’s bottom line depends on it being able to understand and respond to consumers better and faster than competitors. Given the urgent challenges China and Russia pose to US allies, the US Department of Defense (DoD) should adopt a fulfillment model like that of Amazon. Although analysts often treat the DoD as a single customer in a monopsonistic relationship with its thousands of suppliers across the defense industrial base, the DoD more closely resembles a market where military services, combat support agencies, and defense contractors collaborate to deliver capabilities to their ultimate customers—combatant commands such as US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and US European Command (EUCOM). Viewing the DoD as a market rather than a customer suggests that services and agencies should focus their efforts on understanding and meeting combatant commanders’ needs. This would reverse the Pentagon’s longstanding practice, codified in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), in which services and agencies predict future operational requirements and task government labs or contractors with developing solutions that will fill anticipated capability gaps. JCIDS harkens back to the 20th century’s industrial model of product development exemplified by Henry Ford, who famously said that purchasers of his Model-T could have it in any color they wanted, as long as it was black. The DoD’s customers are similarly disenfranchised. The US Joint Staff, which administers JCIDS and acts as the combatant commanders’ representative in Pentagon decision fora, lacks acquisition authorities and funding and thus can impact defense programs only by defining requirements for future systems. Because requirements are predictive, they attempt to capture the full range of use cases for a new product, leading JCIDS to produce comprehensive, generalized solutions rather than customized capabilities designed to meet combatant commanders’ operational challenges. The argument for military services “pushing” new systems to customers instead of letting end-users “pull” what they need centers on the perception that combatant commanders are focused on near-term capacity rather than next-generation capability. This assessment may have been valid in 2003 when JCIDS was first implemented. Emerging systems like the F-35 strike-fighter and DDG-1000 each took nearly two decades to reach fruition, and combatant commanders lacked the analytic processes and far-term perspective to determine what would be useful or feasible 10 to 20 years in the future. Moreover, the US military in 2003 was by far the world’s most capable force, and threats requiring substantially different US capabilities would take a decade or more to materialize. However, the assumptions underlying the DoD’s industrial model of capability development are no longer valid. INDOPACOM assesses that China could mount a successful invasion of Taiwan during the 2020s, and Russia continues to threaten imminent action against Ukraine and NATO’s eastern members. Combatant commanders’ perspectives on capability requirements should therefore be a top priority for services, agencies, and the defense industry. At the same time, in the commercial sector, computing, manufacturing, and materials technologies are delivering new products within months or several years rather than decades. New defense industrial base entrants that leverage commercial advancements and software-centric innovation could quickly provide relevant capabilities by responding directly to combatant commander’s current and emerging operational challenges. Unfortunately, the DoD’s pursuit of efficiency and centralized decision-making hinder the direct connections between combatant commander customers and commercial or government suppliers that foster innovation. The results will therefore continue to be one-size-fits-all solutions that take longer and are more expensive than concepts and capabilities tailored to meet specific needs. In addition to furthering the Pentagon’s well-documented problems delivering new systems and concepts on cost and schedule, universal solutions will be less likely to target the specific threats posed by such peer adversaries as China or Russia. Without restoring combatant commander customers to the center of the DoD’s capability development efforts, US forces will not be able to keep up with the challenges posed by peer adversaries like China or Russia and may even find themselves behind regional powers with geographic advantages and little to lose. The US military cannot afford another failed and ponderous attempt to “boil the ocean” with universal solutions and should take a page from Amazon by focusing on customer needs first.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and United States of America
63. Can the U.S. Regain Battlefield Superiority against China? Applying New Metrics to Build an Adaptable and Resilient Military
- Author:
- Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Organizational behavior is driven by metrics and measurements, which can compel change more effectively than a flurry of management directives from the C-suite. With Pentagon leaders calling for new ways of building and fighting the force, the time has come to re-examine some of the US military’s fundamental metrics and assess how they could better incentivize the characteristics needed for future combat.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
64. Regaining Decision Advantage: Revising JADC2 to Buttress Deterrence in Our Window of Greatest Need
- Author:
- Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle, Scott Swift, and Eric Wesley
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- We believe that Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is a critical priority for the Department of Defense (DoD) as it represents the best path towards deterring potential People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression and addressing the other military challenges of our time. To the DoD, JADC2 represents the capability to sense and make sense of information at all levels, in all phases of war, across all domains, and with all partners, thereby ensuring information advantage at the speed of relevance.1 JADC2 is therefore the US military’s essential technical enabler to leverage joint and coalition capabilities in complex military operations. Practically speaking, this means choosing important operational problems and wiring together the right sensors and decision aids to deliver the right effects to solve them. The result will create operational dilemmas for our adversaries, and new options for US commanders.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, and United States of America
65. Building a Team for Next Generation Air Dominance
- Author:
- Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- US air and naval forces face contested environments over wider areas than ever before. Opponents fighting near their home territory can use long-range surface-to-surface missiles and air defense systems—enabled by a combination of commercial or military satellites and airborne sensors—to threaten US or allied airfields, ships, and aircraft thousands of miles away, as depicted in Figure 1.1 By showing they can slow or prevent US intervention in their regions, aggressors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and Iran hope they can convince neighbors to accept their demands for access, influence, or territory. And if coercion proves unsuccessful, these revisionist powers could employ long-range precision weapons as part of a military offensive to achieve their objectives. Although formidable, long-range weapon and sensor complexes like that of the PRC would not be impenetrable. For example, countermeasures and stealth capabilities could degrade the ability of enemy sensors to target and communicate the location of US ships or aircraft, and self-defense systems could prevent small attacks from being successful. As Figure 1 suggests, against the larger strikes likely to be mounted during war, US ships, aircraft, and bases could also be positioned farther from enemy missile batteries to shrink weapon salvos to within US units’ defensive capacities.3 However, reducing their detectability and attacking from longer ranges would reduce the number and intensity of effects US ships or aircraft could generate. Consequently, adversary leaders may have greater confidence in their ability to win a war on acceptable terms.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Air Force
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
66. Chinese Political Warfare: The PLA’s Information and Influence Operations
- Author:
- John Lee
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Material power is relatively easy to understand and quantify. Much less attention is given to nonmaterial power, which is admittedly more nebulous and difficult to assess. Even so, if power is broadly defined as the capacity to exercise or impose one’s will over another, then nonmaterial forms of power need to be taken seriously. This means understanding them, increasing one’s capacity to operationalize and exercise them, and institutionalizing their use to achieve national and security interests. The issue of nonmaterial power (especially information and influence operations, which will fall under the term political warfare) is arising because these forms of power have been taken for granted or have been largely ignored by the advanced democracies. Beijing is exploiting our complacency. There is already a rich and growing body of literature on the various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This brief does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already out there
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Politics, Armed Forces, and Information Warfare
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
67. US Has an Opportunity to Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan
- Author:
- Luke Coffey
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Just over one year ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan. Leading up to this takeover, in February 2020 President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2021, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued the fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. While the US does not have many good policy options in Afghanistan because of the Biden administration’s actions, the US and international community need to consider how to support the NRF at this perilous time. This assistance can include establishing formal contact with the NRF leadership and inviting Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC; refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; providing the NRF with winter gear; allocating a certain percentage of all frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing, and consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnic Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Taliban
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America
68. Achieving qualitative superiority: Greek conscription and the Turkish threat
- Author:
- Antonis Kamaras and Nikos Stournaras
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- This policy paper argues that, by emulating its peer countries, wealthy, small to medium sized democracies facing national security threats, in Northern Europe and the Middle East (namely Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Israel), Greece can modernize its conscript component and thus attain qualitative superiority over the Turkish Army. Turkey’s conscript model is riven by deep-seated class, geographical and ethnic cleavages, giving to Greek political and military leaders the opportunity to gain a qualitative military edge through judicious modernization of the Greek conscript model. Such a modernization is eminently feasible today as Greece’s economic crisis has created the political space to overcome resistance to the reform of conscription. By contrast, Greece’s main national security threat, Turkey, belongs to that group of authoritarian or illiberal countries which have suboptimal conscription models, featuring evasion of conscript service by the well-educated, inefficient training and harsh, counterproductive treatment of those conscripts who do serve. Greece, also due to its post WWII illiberalism or authoritarianism, and not unlike Taiwan which has a similar legacy, has not infused its conscript component with demanding training and operational standards, roles and missions. The time is ripe, due to the resurgence of the Turkish threat and Greece’s economic crisis, which has removed many of the country’s outdated shibboleths, to modernise Greek conscription, as its peer countries have done, and thus acquire an Army qualitatively superior to that of Turkey. By doing so, Greek policy-makers will decisively strengthen Greece’s deterrence and produce positive externalities for the consripts themselves . Indeed, the more effective conscription becomes in operational terms for the Greek Armed Forces, the greater the benefits to be reaped in civilian life.
- Topic:
- Security, National Security, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Conscription
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Greece
69. French Special Operations What Is Their Role in the Context of Great-Power Competition?
- Author:
- Laurent Bansept
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The year 2022 marks thirty years since the creation of the Commandement des operations spéciales (COS, Special Operations Command). Those three decades have been dominated by missions carried out in volatile environments, most often against irregular adversaries, primarily terrorist groups. Special operations are distinguished from clandestine and conventional operations by the specific nature of their mission, more than by the means used to carry it out. Built according to an indirect approach and under political-military control, French special operations can complement as well as support conventional operations or offer an alternative. While counter-network operations continue to be an important part of special forces’ activities, the return of major engagement assumptions requires a return to their original practices and the integration of gray zone requirements. Increasing stealth and developing partnerships and the piloting capabilities of relay-actors are all avenues that will enable French special forces to adapt to the new constraints they face.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Military Intervention, Strategic Competition, Hybrid Warfare, and Special Forces
- Political Geography:
- Europe and France
70. Debunking the Korean Peninsula "Arms Race": What's Behind South Korea's Military Force Development?
- Author:
- Markus Garlauskas and Axel Catellier
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- Following a record number of North Korean missile launches, as well as tests by South Korea, assertions have been widely and uncritically made that Seoul is participating in an inter-Korean arms race. This paper challenges that paradigm by arguing that South Korea’s military acquisitions, displays, and testing of new weapons are better explained as proactive efforts to build military capabilities to support national security priorities in a broader context, rather than reactions to the threat from North Korea. While North Korea’s reasons for weapons testing are well-documented, South Korea’s military buildup in recent years has received far less attention. This paper examines drivers behind South Korea’s military investments and makes recommendations for how the Republic of Korea (ROK)-United States alliance could incorporate these capabilities into alliance military operations beyond simply deterring or defeating North Korea. To do so, it examines how broader drivers affect ROK strategic thinking, the demands this puts on the ROK military, and how those demands translate to specific defense acquisitions. With the start of a new ROK presidential administration, it is an opportune time for Seoul and Washington to coordinate approaches on capabilities development in ways that would benefit both countries in the years to come.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Arms Race, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
71. THE DAY AFTER: Anticipating trouble in the event of a US withdrawal from Syria
- Author:
- Jomana Qaddour
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- With approximately nine hundred troops in northeastern and southeastern Syria, the United States ostensibly aims to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State group (IS). The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, initiated by the Trump administration and completed by the Biden administration, was followed by the rapid collapse of the pro-Western government of Afghanistan and its replacement by the Taliban. This has led to questions about what will happen if and when US forces withdraw from northeastern Syria. A new issue brief by Atlantic Council’s Senior Fellow Jomana Qaddour examines the social, political, and economic implications and the challenges to US presence in Syria. While the US military presence remains limited in number, this report also underscores how aggregate US influence is much more potent than a force number of nine hundred suggests. US troop presence has enhanced counterterrorism operations, obstructed IS and Iranian smuggling routes, and facilitated humanitarian aid and economic benefits to a population in Syria that would be languishing under even more dire conditions. It can be argued that it has also limited local violence and halted a resurgence of public IS activities. According to the most recent Syria policy review, US presence is limited to the goal of counterterrorism operations, which implies that it is a conditions-based, not calendar-based deployment. Those conditions should include local Syrian forces that can reasonably deny IS a safe haven from which to plot terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. It is well known that the Assad regime is not likely to provide the necessary capability to assure the United States and its allies that it can prevent IS’s return. In reality, there is little room to positively read the reassertion of Syrian government control over northeastern Syria; and withdrawal from Syria would be a serious gamble for US national security concerns in Syria and the region.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Islamic State, and Syrian War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, and United States of America
72. Toward a Framework for Transatlantic Cooperation on Non-State Armed Groups
- Author:
- Lauren Mooney and Patrick Quirk
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) pose a thorny policy dilemma for US and European officials trying to stabilize fragile states. NSAGs are far from homogenous in their motivations, tactics, and structure, resulting in highly varied roles in either perpetrating or mitigating violence, with many playing a part in both. On one side, NSAGs can create instability by using violence to advance a range of interests, from political influence and financial gain to challenging a central government’s legitimacy or territorial control. Many NSAGs are directly responsible for civilian harm, including perpetrating targeted violence, persecuting, killing and committing brutal abuses against citizens.2 There is no shortage of examples of NSAGs that fit this mold. From Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria to Katibat Macina in Mali, armed groups have wreaked havoc on the lives of civilians as well as US and European security interests.
- Topic:
- Security, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Violence, Boko Haram, and Katibat Macina
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, Nigeria, Mali, and United States of America
73. Before the Invasion: The Russian-Belarusian Allied Resolve Exercises
- Author:
- Anna Maria Dyner
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- On 10-20 February, Belarus hosted the active phase of the Belarusian-Russian manoeuvres Allied Resolve, after which Russian troops remained in the country. The drills preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on 24 February. The scenario was an extension of last year’s Zapad exercises and simulated actions against the countries of NATO’s Eastern Flank and Ukraine. The manoeuvres showed Russia’s ability to deploy units over long distances (more than 10,000 km) and the high interoperability of the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. The growing military integration of Belarus and Russia, along with the decision to leave Russian military units in Belarus, is a challenge for NATO in the context of defending its Eastern Flank and its policy towards Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Conflict, and Military Exercises
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus
74. Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the Impact of the Terrorist Designation
- Author:
- Agathe Sarfati and Phoebe Donnelly
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Peace Institute
- Abstract:
- The concept and implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) have evolved as DDR-related activities have increasingly occurred in environments where armed conflict is ongoing, no peace agreement has been signed, and armed groups designated as terrorist organizations (AGDTOs) are operating. In parallel, reintegration has increasingly been discussed in the UN counterterrorism architecture through the concept of prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration (PRR). The changing context has raised challenges related to reintegration, especially reintegration of former members of AGDTOs. This policy paper analyzes the risks faced by individuals taking part in reintegration processes and by the communities they are reintegrating into. In particular, it analyzes how the designation of an armed group as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council or by a state impacts these risks while acknowledging that these risks largely depend on the broader context. The paper examines three case studies of current reintegration processes: (1) the process for reincorporating former combatants from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP); (2) the defector program for former members of al-Shabaab in Somalia; and (3) the reintegration process for individuals associated with Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. The paper concludes by recommending several steps the UN could take to help ensure that reintegration processes address protection risks, especially for former members of AGDTOs: Tailor reintegration programs to the context, not to whether a group is labeled as a terrorist organization; Design reintegration programs to be gender-sensitive and human rights–compliant; Ensure that PRR and DDR programs are complementary and adopt the Integrated DDR Standards module on AGDTOs; and Keep reintegration and counterterrorism goals distinct.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Civilians, and Protection
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Colombia
75. The Hunter frigate: an assessment
- Author:
- David Shackleton
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Powerful and survivable large surface combatants, in numbers commensurate with the expected threat and national budgetary limitations, remain central in the order of battle of any navy of a middle-power such as Australia, but they need to be fit for purpose. Australia’s government policy has acknowledged deteriorating geostrategic circumstances since 2009, culminating in its 2020 Strategic Update where we are not left in any doubt of the concern over China’s intentions and a stretched United States. The warships Australia acquires should be suitable for the circumstances it finds itself in. Doctrine describes how the fighting will be done; policy determines which fight to prepare for. This report explores the disconnect between doctrine and policy, which has led Australia to building a warship that is unsuited for its purposes. It offers better alternatives, and suggestions to prevent being in a similar situation in the future, including using AUKUS to form a relationship with the USN to participate in its forthcoming new large destroyer program.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Navy
- Political Geography:
- Australia
76. Building genuine trust: A framework and strategy for Indigenous STEM and cyber pathways
- Author:
- Huon Curtis, Dion Devow, Khwezi Nkwanyana, Matthew Page, and Meg Thompson
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Indigenous recruitment and retention in the Australian Defence organisation is defined by a high target of 5% participation in the armed services and 3% in the Australian Public Service component of the Defence Department by 2025. The participation target is a point of pride and a source of clear goodwill and has provided momentum in several areas of Defence for Indigenous employment and pathways. However, the individual areas of success and effort are yet to translate into an effective whole-of-Defence framework with cohesive lines of effort. This policy report suggests how that can change. It provides a framework and strategy for Defence to support science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) recruitment and retention and cybersecurity careers, particularly through engagement with the vocational education and training system and through targeted relationship building with university- and school-based Indigenous STEM initiatives. We propose that Defence should enact a wider set of supporting measures—particularly in data and reporting to track professional development—that’s more likely to create more sustainable success that delivers organisational improvements and outcomes for Defence. That should include mechanisms to enhance the achievements of the Indigenous Procurement Policy. Defence must ensure that it meets its immediate skills shortfalls as well as its long-term obligations under the Closing the Gap initiative and the Defence Reconciliation Action Plan to foster genuine and meaningful relationships built upon trust with Indigenous peoples. We suggest how that’s possible through a framework and 56 recommendations focusing on 12 areas of activity: data, reporting and user-experience web design; career pathways; defence and technology contractors; community engagement; procurement and business development; veterans’ employment and procurement; the vocational education sector; universities; recruitment; retention; coordination with other public agencies; and international partnerships. Action on those recommendations will ensure that Defence is an employer of choice and fosters genuine and meaningful trust with Australia’s Indigenous peoples. And it will also build Defence’s capability to keep our nation safe and secure in a more dangerous world.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Cybersecurity, Indigenous, Recruitment, and STEM
- Political Geography:
- Australia
77. Foreign fighters in the Russia-Ukraine war
- Author:
- Aleksandre Kvakhadze
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- Since the beginning of the large-scale phase of the Russia-Ukraine war, hundreds and possibly thousands of volunteers from all over the world have expressed their desire to fight on the side of Ukraine. Although foreign volunteers also helped the armed forces of Ukraine in the 2014 Donbas conflict, the current war has further increased the mobilization of foreign fighters. Foreign fighters were participants in many conflicts of the 20th century. According to Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, foreign fighters differ from mercenaries in that their main motivation is ideology, religion, and/or ethnicity, rather than material benefit. Along with the development of information technologies and the simplification of movement between countries, the number of foreign fighters and the scale of their mobilization have increased in the world. This article aims to review the major groups of foreign volunteers fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
78. Russian Military Aggression in Ukraine and Georgia's National Security System
- Author:
- Giorgio Bilanishvili
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- In the modern era, due to the increased and diversified variety of threats which are mostly intertwined, the security system of any country faces serious new challenges. These threats can arise as a result of the actions of specific countries or different groups as well as through various events. Against this background, it is quite natural that the terms "hybrid threats" and "hybrid warfare" have become established in our daily lives. Russia's military aggression in Ukraine which, unfortunately, takes civilian lives, is still ongoing and it is too early to draw any in-depth conclusions. However, the Ukrainian example has already vividly illustrated the importance of a proper planning and implementation of a national security policy. Already at this stage, military experts give a high assessment to the effectiveness of the territorial and civil defense conducted by the Ukrainian military and special forces. At the same time, Ukraine is successfully operating on the diplomatic as well as informational and psychological warfare front lines. The actions of the Ukrainian intelligence services deserve special attention.
- Topic:
- Intelligence, National Security, Armed Forces, Hybrid Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia
79. US-Korea Military-to-Military Relations: Past, Present, and Future
- Author:
- In-Bum Chun
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- In-Bum Chun, a retired lieutenant-general and former Commander of ROK Special Warfare Command, explains how the "South Korean Constabulary, the forerunner to the ROK [South Korean] Army, was established under the United States Army Military Government in Korea..." and how the ROK Army evolved to the present day in close cooperation with its US counterpart.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
80. Estrategia militar de la OTAN: doctrinas y conceptos estratégicos. Recepción en España
- Author:
- José Luis Calvo Albero
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
- Institution:
- International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
- Abstract:
- La estrategia y la doctrina militar de la OTAN se han convertido en una de las referencias principales para el pensamiento estratégico occidental y también para el desarrollo de la estrategia y doctrina militar en España. La estrategia de la Alianza partióde un escenario muy específico en la Guerra Fría para ampliarse después de ella hacia un papel de estabilización fuera de Europa, y retornar paradójicamente al punto de partida debido al renacimiento de la amenaza rusa. En ese camino se desarrollaron conceptos clave sobre el empleo del poder militar convencional, de las armas nucleares y de las nuevas formas de conflicto asimétrico o híbrido. Pese a que España ingresó en la OTAN tarde y de una manera muy peculiar, la estrategia y la doctrina OTAN resultaron esenciales para modernizar tanto las fuerzas armadas como el propio pensamiento estratégico denuestro país.
- Topic:
- NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Destabilization
- Political Geography:
- Europe
81. China Maritime Report No. 23: The Type 075 LHD: Development, Missions, and Capabilities
- Author:
- Conor M. Kennedy and Daniel Caldwell
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- When the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned its first Type 075 class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) in April 2021, it represented an important advance in power projection capability for China’s maritime forces. For the first time, the PLAN had an amphibious warship capable of hosting significant rotary wing forces while acting as the flagship for an amphibious task force. Now with three Type 075 class ships either in or soon to be in service, the PLAN has expanded its amphibious capability even further. The Type 075’s dedicated aviation support capability, ability to conduct wet well operations, and expanded command and control and medical facilities reflect capabilities that previously did not exist within the PLAN amphibious fleet. With the Type 075 LHD, the PLAN clearly intends to bolster its ability to project power from the sea in order to protect China’s overseas interests, but will require time for amphibious task forces to become fully proficient.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Navy, Maritime, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
82. China Maritime Report No. 22: Logistics Support for a Cross-Strait Invasion: The View from Beijing
- Author:
- Kevin McCauley
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes that logistics support is one of the key determinants of a successful large-scale invasion of Taiwan. Logistics support includes transport, materiel and oil supply, medical care, search and rescue, logistics infrastructure protection, and maintenance of war materiel reserves. Despite the recognized importance of logistics support, it is likely the PLA does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan and a possible protracted conflict involving the United States and allies. Key deficits include a lack of amphibious ships (both military and civilian), transport aircraft, and war reserves. The PLA also continues to face difficulties with landing the requisite logistics supplies during the critical beach assault phase, constructing maritime transfer platforms or temporary wharves to sustain resupply if intact ports are not rapidly captured, establishing a landing base for logistics operations, maintaining the flow of logistics during on-island combat, and establishing strategic war reserves to support the large-scale operation and possibly prolonged conflict. These problem areas might be resolved with several years of sustained effort and complex training.
- Topic:
- Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Conflict, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
83. China Maritime Report No. 21: Civilian Shipping and Maritime Militia: The Logistics Backbone of a Taiwan Invasion
- Author:
- Lonnie D. Henley
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- Most analysts looking at the Chinese military threat to Taiwan conclude that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is incapable of invading the island because it lacks the landing ships to transport adequate quantities of troops and equipment across the Taiwan Strait. This report challenges that conventional wisdom, arguing that the PLA intends to meet these requirements by requisitioning civilian vessels operated by members of China’s maritime militia (海上民兵). Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government and military have taken steps to strengthen the national defense mobilization system to ensure the military has ample quantities of trained militia forces to support a cross-strait invasion. Despite ongoing challenges—including poor data management, inconsistent training quality, and gaps in the regulatory system—and uncertainties associated with foreign-flagged Chinese ships, this concept of operations could prove good enough to enable a large-scale amphibious assault.
- Topic:
- Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Militias, Logistics, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
84. China Maritime Report No. 20: The PLA Army Amphibious Force
- Author:
- Dennis J. Blasko
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- The PLA Army’s (PLAA) amphibious units would serve as the core of any joint force charged with invading Taiwan. As a result of the 2017 reforms, the PLAA now possesses six amphibious combined arms brigades distributed across three group armies (the 72nd, 73rd, and 74th). During a cross-strait invasion, these brigades would likely receive support from other elements of the group armies to which they belong. This could include fire support, air defense, air transport, aerial fire support, and electronic warfare/cyber-attack.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Maritime, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
85. China Maritime Report No. 19: The PLA Airborne Corps in a Joint Island Landing Campaign
- Author:
- Cristina L. Garafola
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Airborne Corps would likely play an important role in a cross-strait invasion through operations behind enemy lines. During the landing campaign, the Corps would conduct paradrops or landing operations onto Taiwan, facilitated by PLA Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft. Once on island, airborne forces would seize and hold terrain and conduct a variety of operations to support the broader invasion. In recent years, the Corps has reorganized to improve its capability for mechanized maneuver and assault, leveraging the PLAAF’s larger inventories of transport aircraft, particularly the Y-20; improved the sophistication of its training at home; and gleaned insights from abroad via training with foreign militaries. Nevertheless, it is uncertain to what extent the Corps is able to overcome key challenges relevant to a cross-strait campaign. These include ensuring effective integration with similar ground force and marine units; carrying out operations in complex or degraded environments; transcending the Corps’ lack of relevant combat experience; and obtaining adequate air support.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Air Force, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
86. China Maritime Report No. 18: Chinese Special Operations in a Large-Scale Island Landing
- Author:
- John Chen and Joel Wuthnow
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- PLA special operations forces (SOF) would likely play important supporting roles in an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Their capabilities and training are geared towards several missions undertaken during the preparatory and main assault phases of the landing, including infiltration via special mission craft and helicopter, reconnaissance and targeting, obstacle clearance, strikes and raids, and extraction missions. While PLA SOF have made progress in recent years, several longstanding challenges could affect their performance in an island landing: integrating advanced special mission equipment for complex and dangerous missions, coordinating their operations with non-SOF supporting and supported forces, and overcoming the Chinese military’s penchant for centralized command. Even if PLA SOF are only partially effective, however, their support to the main assault force could diminish Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from a large-scale invasion.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Maritime, Special Operations, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
87. Gay in the PLA: Chinese Military Views on Homosexuals Serving in the Armed Forces
- Author:
- Brian Waidelich
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Chinese President Xi Jinping has identified the recruitment and retention of top-notch human capital as key to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) transformation into a “world-class military” by mid-century. In late January 2022, under Xi’s guidance as chairman, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) issued its “Decision on Strengthening Military Talent Work in the New Era” (关于加强新时代军队人才工作的决定, Guanyu jiaqiang xin shidai jundui rencai gongzuo jueding), which calls human talent “a key element driving the Chinese military’s high-quality development and for winning the initiative in military competition and future warfare.” The decision calls on the PLA to develop high quality, professional talent in key areas—joint operations command, new-type combat forces, science and technology innovation, and strategic management—and for these individuals to provide “firm support” for achieving the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military-strengthening goal and building the PLA into a world-class military (Xinhua, January 26). The CMC’s decision echoes similar past statements by Chinese leaders who have emphasized the need for the “right” kind of people to lead and support China’s armed forces (US Army War College, July 23, 2021). A common thread is the requirement for PLA personnel to fill increasingly specialized billets as the force receives and operates new, high-tech information systems, weapons, and equipment (China Brief, January 14). Apart from pronouncements of desired education and experience levels for incoming servicemembers, the PLA also publicizes certain exclusion criteria. The PLA’s official conscription and recruitment website, for example, specifies several physical requirements including minimum height and passable body mass index (Zhongguo Zhengbing Wang, January 14, 2021). However, evidence indicates other potential exclusion criteria for Chinese service members that are less clearly stated. This article offers a preliminary analysis of PLA views on homosexuals—in most cases, gay men specifically—serving in China’s armed forces. [1] The analysis draws upon 12 academic papers published by PLA-affiliated authors between 2009 and 2019 whose research focused on issues related to homosexuality and/or homosexuals serving in China’s armed forces. Ten of the 12 studies involved test subjects. This topic was difficult to explore due to the paucity of primary source material (PLA authorities may deem content on sexual minorities sensitive and unfit for public consumption). Yet it remains an important issue, as it has implications for the talent pool the PLA can draw from and for homosexual servicemembers’ ability to survive, thrive, and contribute to China’s objective of developing a world-class military force.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Military Affairs, LGBT+, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
88. Staying First to Fight: Reaffirming the Marine Corps’ Role in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Missions
- Author:
- Eric S. Hovey
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- The U.S. Marine Corps’ 2019 Commandant’s Planning Guidance placed a dominant focus on modernizing the force to contest China within the Indo-Pacific region but deemphasized support to foreign humanitarian assistance missions. This article challenges the current framing of the Marine Corps’ role in disaster response missions, specifically the notion that they are not a part of the organization’s identity and that they detract from warfighting readiness. The case is made that U.S. military support to foreign humanitarian assistance missions will only grow, that the Marine Corps has and will have a role to play in these missions, and that participation in disaster relief operations improves their warfighting readiness.
- Topic:
- Disaster Relief, Humanitarian Aid, Natural Disasters, Armed Forces, Foreign Assistance, and Marine Corps
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus and Indo-Pacific
89. Guided by Experience: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Military Responses to Natural Disasters in Haiti (2010 and 2021)
- Author:
- Christopher Davis
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- In 2010 and 2021, Haiti was struck by a massive earthquake and both times it left the nation in the grips of a humanitarian crisis. The U.S. military responded to both events with a large-scale, interorganizational relief effort to provide aid to the affected areas. Though the disaster in 2010 created unprecedented challenges, the U.S. Southern Command met those challenges and applied their lessons to its response to the 2021 earthquake 11 years later.
- Topic:
- Disaster Relief, Humanitarian Aid, Natural Disasters, Armed Forces, and Earthquake
- Political Geography:
- Caribbean and Haiti
90. Implications from the Guard's Extensive Use: A Cautionary Tale of 2020
- Author:
- Michael G. Anderson
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- From 2020–22, the National Guard saw extensive use domestically to respond to a wide variety of crises, including natural disasters, civil unrest, pandemics, and border security in addition to overseas deployments. As these emergencies perpetuate, balancing the National Guard’s use domestically and overseas is critical to preserving a sustainable and capable force. It is important for a broader understanding across local, state, and federal governments of the sustainability of these cumulative effects on this force.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Border Control, COVID-19, Civil Unrest, and National Guard
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
91. ISIS in Syria and Iraq
- Author:
- Charles Lister and Mick Mulroy
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- Charles Lister and Mick Mulroy discuss discuss the dramatic Feb. 3rd U.S. special operations raid that killed ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, the group’s late January attack on the al-Sina prison, and ISIS’s broader trajectory in both Syria and Iraq.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and Syria
92. The performance of the Portuguese Armed Forces and the relevance of military capabilities in 21st century: The different perspectives of citizens and militaries
- Author:
- Paulo Jorge Gomes
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- A high performance level in a public organisation is fundamental. The Portuguese Armed Forces can influence the environment, both external and internal, and should therefore have a high performance level and adequate development of military capabilities. For that, it is fundamental to understand the importance of military capabilities for combatting the threats of the 21st century. This paper aims to analyse the influence of military capabilities for combating the current threats and risks in fulfilling the various operations, and for optimising the performance of the Portuguese Armed Forces. A quantitative analysis was carried out from citizen and military convenience samples through correlations between variables, as well as measures of central tendency like mean and standard deviation. The results show that the development of military capabilities has a positive effect on the performance of the Portuguese Armed Forces, combatting conventional threats and risks, as well as threats to civil protection. This capabilities performance is related with the execution of military operations (external and internal). Therefore, a proper development of military capabilities (output) with a special focus on human resources and privilege and the efficiency and quality of the missions (outcomes) are essential to combat the threats of the 21st century.
- Topic:
- History, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Economic Security, and Perception
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Portugal
93. The evolution of the Hungarian Defence Forces’ volunteer reserve component after the Cold War
- Author:
- László Ujházy
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- When Hungary transformed to an all-volunteer force in 2004, most attention was given to the regular component and very little mention was made of reservists. The main goal of this study is to draw attention to the importance of, and the potential, in the reserve component using historical research to produce an overview of how the reserve component of the Hungarian Defence Forces has evolved since the end of the Cold War. Information was collected and analysed from the discussed time period and interpretations were made of the collected evidence through systematic methods appraising all available studies to synthesise the findings. Similarly to other countries in the region, more than a century of conscription and the Warsaw Pact legacy still haunts the Hungarian Defence Forces. Fortunately, Hungary’s NATO membership spearheaded the drive for qualitative change within the armed forces and more attention was paid to a volunteer reserve system. Hungary’s NATO membership has ushered in a new era of security guarantees and obligations which, among other things, brought with it the realisation that the time for qualitative change in the armed forces had come. Among other changes, an initial shift of emphasis towards a reserve system – followed by the adoption of the all-volunteer force model – made it clear that a new basis had to be provided upon which to address the reserve issue in Hungary.
- Topic:
- Security, Cold War, History, and Armed Forces
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Hungary
94. Analysis of strategic stakeholders in the Western Balkans
- Author:
- Michael Minev Dimitrov
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- The purpose of this paper is to generate a model of the interplay between the main actors in the Western Balkans region in order to try to highlight major switch-factors and pathways for future evolution of the system. The study was carried out using MACTOR software developed by Laboratoire d’Investigation en Prospective, Stratégie et Organisation and École Pour l’Informatique et les Techniques Avancées. This computer-assisted method creates a hierarchy of objectives based on the mobilisation rates and gives some insight into what is at stake and the interested parties. The paper calculates the competitiveness index of each actor included in the model and the weighted valued position matrix showing both valence and mobilisation rate of actor-objective pairs. Valued convergence and divergence matrices (with graphic representation) outline the structure of the region. The results obtained can be used to develop possible scenarios. The structure of the Western Balkans region is subordinated to a single major divergence which is translated to the internal actors. Insulator states are losing relative weight with a narrowing field of manoeuvres. Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a focal point of polarity with a distinct vulnerability to the future line of behaviour of the Croatian element in the country
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, and Stakeholders
- Political Geography:
- Eastern Europe, Balkans, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
95. High power wireless power transfer for the future of the battlefield challenges
- Author:
- Mohamed Zied Chaari, Rashid Al-Rahimi, and Otman Aghzout
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- A significant challenge for the military lab is to reduce the weight of a combatant’s battery on the battlefield. Soldiers use electronic devices powered by wearable batteries in landings, operational combat with the enemy, and defensive exercises. Soldiers should always fully charge their wearable batteries before carrying them. The average weight of the battery is approximately 20 kilograms. During military operations, fighters have numerous electronic devices, such as night-vision goggles, headphones, LMR, navigation systems, VHF radios, and sensors. There is a high probability that fighters will lose their lives if the battery they take is uncharged or empty. Many research studies have tried to increase fighting time and maintain soldier life and links based on these devices. In this work, a wireless power transmission system with an RF microwave station and RF/DC converter circuit incorporated into a bulletproof vest will be designed. This system can harvest RF microwave energy to recharge or energize the wearable battery during a military operation. The challenge here is to develop a compact device that can capture the maximum RF strength to charge batteries carried by soldiers. The proposed device therefore considers all parameters to provide sufficient energy to power a computer at 13 watts. The strength of the RF power varies with the distance between the microwave power station Pin = 100 W and the receiver circuit.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
96. Early Warning Brief: Introducing the “New, New” China Coast Guard
- Author:
- Ryan D. Martinson
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In the past decade, the China Coast Guard (CCG, 中国海警, zhongguo haijing) has experienced two major reforms. The first, which began in 2013, uprooted the service from the Ministry of Public Security—where it was organized as an element of the People’s Armed Police (PAP)—and placed it under the control of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), a civilian agency. In the process, the CCG was combined with three other maritime law enforcement forces: China Marine Surveillance (CMS), China Fisheries Law Enforcement (CFLE), and the maritime anti-smuggling units of the General Administration of Customs. The resulting conglomerate was colloquially called the “new” CCG, differentiating it from the “old” CCG of the Ministry of Public Security years. The second reform began in 2018, when the “new” CCG, now swollen with the ranks of four different forces, was stripped from the SOA and transferred to the PAP, which itself had just been reorganized and placed under the Central Military Commission (CMC) (China Brief, April 24, 2018). While much research has been done on the first reform, little is known about the second, at least in the English-speaking world. This article seeks to answer basic questions about the “new, new” CCG. What are its roles/missions, organization, and force structure? How does it differ from the CCG of the SOA years? How is it similar? What progress has been made two years after the second reform began?
- Topic:
- Law Enforcement, Armed Forces, Reform, and Borders
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
97. China’s Use of U.S. Satellite Communications Technology in the South China Sea
- Author:
- Zachary Haver
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In recent years, the maritime law enforcement (MLE) forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have dominated the contested waters of the South China Sea (AMTI, December 4, 2020). While the exponential growth and increasing assertiveness of the China Coast Guard (CCG) have captured headlines, the evolving role of technology in China’s MLE operations has received less attention. New communications infrastructure and monitoring systems, for example, help Chinese MLE forces monitor and control contested maritime space in the South China Sea (CMSI, January 2021). These investments align with China’s broader pursuit of information superiority in the South China Sea, which involves building up electronic intelligence, counter-stealth radar, and other capabilities (JHU APL, July 2020).
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Communications, Armed Forces, and Satellite
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea
98. Transforming Military Technology Through Aquisition Policy
- Author:
- Rabia Altaf
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- The Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasized the need for continued technological modernization of the U.S. Armed Forces.324 This notion, first brought to light by the Obama administration, is underlined by the military’s inability to adapt and modernize at the pace necessary to restore the United States’ military dominance. At the root of this issue is the relationship between the Pentagon and the defense industry, which currently operates with an inadequate military technology acquisition process. Acquisition allows the Department of Defense (DoD) to communicate its strategic vision and shape the military to meet current and future threats. As it stands, this deficient process results in the mis-regulation of the defense industry. Improving the acquisition process by clearing hurdles, creating policy with innovation in mind, and carefully crafting regulation is critical for the United States to regain its competitive military advantage to tackle the global security issues of the coming decades. The Pentagon must also rethink its relationship with the private sector to induce more companies to join its supply chain and provide fresh solutions and perspectives to problems the United States has never faced before. As a notoriously difficult customer, the Pentagon must remove unnecessary roadblocks to attract a more diverse group of companies to supplement the defense industrial base.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, and Supply Chains
- Political Geography:
- United States of America and north amer
99. The Siren's Song of Coast Guard Behavioral Norms in the Western Pacific
- Author:
- Marc Zlomek
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- Since 2014, naval forces operating in the Western Pacific have agreed on the need to moderate operational assertiveness against the risk that a miscalculation on the water could lead to wider confrontation. Increased activity by coast guards in these waters dictates that the same considerations should apply to white hull vessels. In 2015, President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China committed to developing behavioral norms for coast guards. The fact that six years later no such coast guard norms have materialized even though the naval services provide a readily adaptable blueprint is curious, to put it diplomatically. In April 2014, the 21 member-navies of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium approved the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to promote communication and operational safety when their vessels met. In November 2014, the United States Secretary of Defense and the Chinese Minister of Defense signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on The Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters (The Rules or Rules of Behavior). The Rules, which took root during the 2013 Sunnylands Summit between President Obama and President Xi, are meant to reduce the risk of an incident at sea and to promote confidence building between the United States and Chinese military. CUES and The Rules are similar in many respects and share the same fundamental purpose of reducing the risk of an incident at sea. During the 2015 Sunnylands Summit, President Obama and President Xi committed to developing similar measures for coast guards. At the time, China took the position that the China Coast Guard was not covered by the existing instruments. While no such coast guard version of The Rules exists, the China Coast Guard’s astounding growth and militarization, combined with the United States Coast Guard’s increased regional presence, serve to underscore the need. As detailed in this article, the very bureaucratic reorganization that transformed the China Coast Guard into a military service now make the existing Rules of Behavior easily applicable. The two sides do not need a new coast guard specific agreement but could voluntarily apply the existing Rules of Behavior to white-hulled vessels as they do to gray-hulled vessels. The solution of adapting the Rules of Behavior used by the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) and the United States Navy (USN) to the United States and China Coast Guards is so simple that its failure to materialize begs the question of whether China wants shared expectations for coast guards or if it believes that operational unpredictability better serves its strategic interests.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Navy, Norms, and Coast Guard
- Political Geography:
- Asia-Pacific
100. Grievance in Space and Time: The State, Militias, and the Irredentist Temptation
- Author:
- Bradford McGuinn
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- The armed militia is an emblem of political decay. With the weakening of institutions designed to regulate the ambitions and anxieties of those inhabiting a state, and with the erosion of a political culture meant to confer legitimacy upon the rituals of governance, martial energy once held to constitutional prescription in the service of impersonal public rule can be redirected toward private purpose. Dissenting factions within a governmental structure, groups seeking its overthrow, or militias fighting within society itself challenge the viability of states, stability in their regions, and international order. This essay will consider ways in which narratives of grievance play dangerously upon the triangular system of mutual obligation that ideally orders interaction between a state, society, and the military. In this configuration of civil-military relations, the state exercises a “legitimate monopoly” on the production of violence, binding militaries to civilian control. Acting as an acid upon the alloy of this triangle, allowing leakage of “privatized” violence, is a dissatisfaction with a configuration of geography, politics, and culture of such intensity that reality can be considered oppressive.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, State, and Militias
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus