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2. Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia
- Author:
- Tom Connolly
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.
- Topic:
- National Security, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific
3. Twilight Institutions: Land conflict and hybrid authorities in Benin’s Borgou department
- Author:
- Kars de Bruijne
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- The Borgou Department is a large administrative area with eight communes and 43 districts spanning over 25,856 square kilometers. The department primarily comprises the Bariba, Dendi, Boo (about 40%) and Fulani ethnic groups (about 33%). The majority of the first three groups are farmers, and the Fulani are primarily nomadic or semi-nomadic cattle and sheepherders. The Borgou Department in Northern Benin has seen communal conflict over the past few years. There are escalating tensions between farmers and herders, even though there has also been more violence between the supporters of the former president Boni Yayi and those of the sitting President Patrice Talon (particularly in 2019 and 2020). Communal conflicts between farmers and herders in Borgou have multiple driving forces. This report explores one of these: changing land management systems. It is argued that recent changes in land management are in any event likely to become a stronger driver of tensions in Borgou in the near future. Exploring land management systems and their impact on the Borgou is relevant for two reasons. First, there is simply very little literature on changing land management systems in Benin. For example, in August 2017 Benin’s authorities modified the 2013 Land Code to limit land conflicts and to modernize the institutional framework governing land acquisition and management. But exactly what the impact of this change has been has not been fully explored. Second, Northern Benin has experienced the problem of increasing violent extremist activity. While this activity is concentrated in the Alibori and Atacora regions, it is conceivable that once it has become established it might further escalate, with Borgou being a possible area of expansion. Being able to focus on vulnerabilities with the aim of addressing them is important for Benin’s stability. Research and media reports point to an increase in both the number and intensity of farmer-herder confrontations in the Borgou Department over the past five years. From the literature, it is apparent that this shift is driven by two factors. On the one hand, it is the effect of the demographic growth of and the increase in the cattle population which results in more competition for land. On the other hand, the introduction of land reforms by successive governments has tended to reinforce the feeling of insecurity among essentially illiterate farmers and herders.
- Topic:
- Violent Extremism, Conflict, Institutions, and Land Rights
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Benin
4. Actor Profile: The Islamic State Sahel Province
- Author:
- Heni Nsaibia
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- The Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) is a salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of the transnational Islamic State (IS) organization. It is primarily active in the border areas between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — known as the tri-state border area, or Liptako-Gourma — but it has also engaged in sporadic activity in Algeria, Benin, and Nigeria. The group’s composition reflects the social fabric in the areas where it is active. Its members belong to the Fulani, Arab, Tuareg, Dawsahak, Songhai, and Djerma ethnic groups, although its core leadership was historically composed of Western Saharan militants.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
- Political Geography:
- North Africa and Sahel
5. Seven Questions to Consider in Designing, Implementing, and Supporting Effective Nationally Led Violence Prevention Strategies
- Author:
- Céline Monnier
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation
- Abstract:
- The New Agenda for Peace (NAfP) calls for a shift to focus more attention on national prevention strategies, with a universal and more upstream approach to preventing all forms of violence. This is good news. By calling for all member states to create these strategies, the secretary-general is assuaging member states’ fears that prevention may be used to meddle into their internal affairs or that the need for prevention can be stigmatizing. Member states are now in the driver’s seat of this agenda. The upcoming Summit of the Future is an opportunity to establish a coherent vision for the role and the relevance of the UN in prevention—aligning approaches across different parts of the UN system—and to provide tailored-made packages and expertise for “member states seeking to establish or strengthen national infrastructures for peace,” as promised in the New Agenda for Peace. As the first in a new series of policy briefs on “Operationalizing the New Agenda for Peace,” this piece is a conversation starter on the conditions to consider in designing, implementing, and supporting effective nationally led violence prevention strategies and it calls on member states to lead on the development of an evidence-based framework for nationally led prevention strategies, and for experts, practitioners, and UN staff to feed into this discussion based on research and past experiences. This brief is based on research on violence and on violence prevention strategies—particularly crime prevention, prevention of violent extremism, and infrastructures for peace—and interviews of experts and practitioners.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, United Nations, Violent Extremism, Violence, and Peacebuilding
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
6. Is Iran Looking to Inspire Shia Homegrown Violent Extremist Attacks?
- Author:
- Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- An October 2018 report by the National Counterterrorism Center defined Shia homegrown violent extremists as “individuals who are inspired or influenced by state actors such as Iran, foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or Shia militant groups but who do not belong to these groups and are not directed by them.” At the time, the prospect of such Shia violence was largely theoretical, and officials could identify no tangible threats on American soil. But the January 2020 targeted killing of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani changed the picture, and U.S. officials could now point to a “catalyzing event,” as envisioned in the NCTC brief. Last year’s attack against writer Salman Rushdie and another at a Las Vegas hotel exemplified how Iran-inspired individuals were motivated to act. In this Policy Note, experts Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt explore lone-offender Shia violence largely through the lens of social media. Closer tracking of online networks, they argue, could illuminate this flourishing virtual activity and how it might lead to real-world harm.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Shia
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, and Middle East
7. Countering “ISIS at Large” in Syria
- Author:
- Devorah Margolin
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- In U.S. Central Command’s 2022 “year in review” statement on the current status of the fight against the Islamic State, commanding general Michael Kurilla highlighted three categories: (1) “ISIS in detention,” meaning the thousands of men and boys affiliated with the group and held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons; (2) the “potential next generation of ISIS,” meaning the approximately 55,000 women and minors held in camps; and (3) “ISIS at large,” meaning the leaders and operatives that the United States and its partners “are currently fighting in Iraq and Syria.” Although Gen. Kurilla praised the ongoing effort to militarily degrade ISIS, he also noted that the group’s ideology persists, and that “partnered operations” are needed to keep up the pressure. This view aligns with the pivot in U.S. strategy in Syria over the past year and a half, from a military mission to “advising, assisting, and enabling” local partners. At the same time, however, U.S. forces have continued launching unilateral strikes against ISIS leaders in Syria as recently as this month.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
8. Including Africa Threat Analysis in Force Design 2030
- Author:
- Glen Segell
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- This article examines the threat analysis across Africa that should be included in Force Design 2030 for the United States Marine Corps to be deployed landward to Africa or seaward of the continent. It is a strategic guidance document examined from a threat analysis of China, Russia, Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations. Africa is not mentioned, and this is a notable omission given that high level interventions in the past to Africa have not been overtly successful. Given geostrategic significances and hot spots it is inevitable that the Marines will be deployed there again. This article examines lessons learned from failures in Somalia, Libya, and Lebanon and successes in Syria and Iraq as well as the experiences of others—France in Mali and Burkina Faso and United States Africa Command. Great power competition, violent extremist organizations, and the gray zone phenomena across Africa are examined as are security, intelligence, counterintelligence, and hybrid warfare.
- Topic:
- Security, Intelligence, Counterinsurgency, Violent Extremism, Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, and US Marine Corps
- Political Geography:
- Africa and United States of America
9. What should the EU do about violent extremism?
- Author:
- Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Tatjana Stankovic, Pernille Rieker, and Steven Blockmans
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
- Abstract:
- Despite a recent spike in concern about a resurgence in great power conflict, addressing terrorism and violent extremism has driven the foreign policy debate in the collective West for the better part of two decades since 9/11. In the European Union, these concerns most prominently emerged in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) that identified terrorism and “violent religious extremism” originating in the EU’s neighbourhood and caused by weak institutions, conflict, and state failure as a primary concern. The crux of the matter, however, is how this increased attention translates in policy terms. In other words, is the EU’s chosen CT-P/CVE policy mix balanced and fit for purpose? First, the EU’s CT-P/CVE action can hardly be framed according to a binary security versus democracy logic because of the significant emphasis placed by the EU on socio-economic development to address the structural causes of violent extremism. Second, despite the EU’s developmental focus, the language of good governance and peacebuilding, as well as funding for these areas, are key elements missing from the EU’s engagement. In order to remedy the many upstream and downstream diplomatic trade-offs that EU policymakers face in tackling violent extremism, the EU must begin to frame CT-P/CVE as part of its wider endeavour to support sustainable peace. It can do this by formulating an EU Agenda for Peace that once again underlines the EU’s commitment to promoting inclusive governance, community resilience, and social justice.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe
10. The EU and CT-P/CVE in its external action
- Author:
- Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Tatjana Stankovic, Pernille Rieker, and Steven Blockmans
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
- Abstract:
- This article re-frames the ongoing democracy versus security debate surrounding the European Union’s (EU) policies to counter terrorism and prevent/counter violent extremism (CT-P/CVE). Indeed, extant literature has primarily focused on how the EU’s CTP/CVE-specific emphasis on security concerns has come at the expense of attention towards good governance and social justice, thereby undermining the effectiveness of its approach. After reviewing general concepts discerned from previous research on the EU’s CT-P/CVE policy, tracing its approach over time, analysing key documents, and conducting interviews with policymakers, this analysis finds that the EU – in its words, funding, and policy implementation – also pays significant CT-P/CVE-relevant attention to the structural causes of radicalisation to violent extremism and terrorism by mobilising significant developmentoriented resources and diplomatic energy. By doing so, the EU’s CT-P/CVE policies balance an emphasis on security concerns and broader socio-economic and diplomatic engagement. However, the EU simultaneously de-emphasises good governance and peacebuilding, which must be reinforced and mainstreamed across its primary developmental engagement for the EU’s CT-P/CVE approach to be considered fully fit-for-purpose.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Governance, Violent Extremism, European Union, Democracy, and Peacebuilding
- Political Geography:
- Europe