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4251. The Examination of the Identities Defining Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Başak Özoral
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Social constructivism theory, one of the theories of the field of international relations, deals with the current problems of modern life and offers solutions to them. Identity structuring in the nation-building process and the elements that make up identity constitute one of the main working subjects of social constructionists. In this study, Islam, Wahhabism, Bedouinism, regional leadership, energy geopolitics, which are effective in the foreign policy determination process of Saudi Arabia, will be tried to be explained through the constructivism theory as the main factors that determine the Saudi identity. Along with the semantic changes that Saudi identity has expressed for Saudi Arabia from the past, its effect on current politics is determined, and the geopolitical position of Saudi Arabia and the strategic orientations caused by this position are discussed. In addition, the policies that Saudi Arabia started to follow in the post-Arab Spring period are examined, especially with an emphasis on its relationship with the Islamic identity. A holistic framework for Saudi Arabia's foreign policy will be drawn by listing various approaches to the identities mentioned in the article. It will also focus on the internal dynamics that are important in the formation of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy identities.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Nation-State, Identity, and Social Constructivism
Political Geography:: Middle East and Saudi Arabia

4252. Lebanese-Turkish Relations after the 2000s and the Neo-Ottomanist Discourse in Lebanon

Author:: Tuba Yıldız
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Lebanon, had non-visible relationships with Turkey after its independence and the post-civil war period. Although it lost the balance of political stability at times, the political affinity that emerged with the participation of Lebanon in the close relations, which Turkey sought to establish with Arab countries in the 2000s, continued with mutual negotiations at the point of cooperation. After the Lebanon-Israel war in 2006, which caused political and economic destruction in the country, Turkey increased its support for Lebanon. Accordingly, the crises appeared after the Arab Spring in the region led Turkey to follow the sensitive policy over the sectarian groups in the country. However, some reactions arose in Lebanon’s political arena against Turkey’s increasing regional activism, bringing several ideological questions on Turkey’s approach towards Lebanon. Regarding the relationship between Turkey and Lebanon, “Does Turkey desire to establish a new Ottoman administration in the Middle East?” was one of the questions asked. Moreover, a negative environment was created and used occasionally as a trump card against Turkey’s approach toward Lebanon, saying that even the Ottoman Empire did not play an active role in the Lebanon region. This study examines whether there are traces of Neo-Ottomanism and sectarianism in the political roadmap followed by the Turkish Government in its Lebanon policy. It discusses, the diplomatic response of Turkey to the anti-Ottoman rhetoric in Lebanese politics and its effect on bilateral relations. Accordingly, the study analyzes Turkey’s effort to maintain the balance against sectarian discourse that shapes Lebanon’s policy.
Topic:: Politics, Sectarianism, Neo-Ottomanism, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Lebanon

4253. Analysis of Foreign Trade Between Türkiye and Africa

Author:: Şükrü Cicioğlu and Ryan Hafiz Ahmed İbrahim
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: While enhancing our economic relations with African countries was positioned as a target within Türkiye’s vision, especially after the Cold War, this could only come true in the first decade of the 21st century. As a result, there have been significant trade volume developments. Although Türkiye had a trade deficit with Africa from the mid-90s to the early 2000s, it became a surplus party in the subsequent period due to stagnation and the impacts of various crises. The trade with Africa is primarily with North African countries due to geographical proximity and historical ties. While Africa's share in Türkiye's total foreign trade volume has been gradually increasing, it remains significantly lower compared to Asia and Europe. Relations between the continent and Türkiye haven’t grown stronger yet, mainly because most African countries were former colonies. On the other hand, Türkiye's geographical proximity to Africa offers a significant opportunity to meet African countries' agricultural and food needs. In this context, this study aims to analyze Türkiye’s trade with the African continent and to reveal the opportunities, threats, strengths, and weaknesses this trade offers for both actors. Furthermore, the study provides recommendations to enhance these relations in this framework.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, History, and Trade
Political Geography:: Africa, Turkey, and Middle East

4254. Çocuk Yoksulluğunun Genel Görünümü ve Türkiye’de Çocuk Yoksulluğunun Son Hali

Author:: Ruhal Samanlı
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Amaç Bu çalışmada bir ağ gibi insanlığı sarmış olan yoksulluk ve yoksulluğun boyutları, çocuk yoksulluğunun görünümü, çocuk yoksulluğunun etkileyenleri, çocuk yoksulların yaşam alanlarındaki halleri, çocuk yoksulluğunu azaltmaya yönelik yatırım teorileri ve Türkiye’de çocuk yoksulların durumu anlatılacaktır. Yöntem/Metodoloji/Dizayn-. Çocuklar neden yoksuldur? Sorusuna cevap bulmak için çalışmada öncelikle konu ile ilişkili dokümanlar analiz edilecektir. Amaçları ve sonuçları bağlamında incelenen dokümanlardan bir değerlendirmeye varılacaktır. Sonuçlar-- Bu çalışmada çocuk yoksulluğunun ailenin yoksulluğu ile ilişkili olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. İyi eğitim almış çocukların yetişkinlikte yoksulluk içinde olmayacakları ve onların çocuklarının da yoksul olmayacağını söylemek gerekmektedir. Katkı/Farklılıklar- Bu çalışmada çocuk yoksulluğuna çok boyutlu yoksulluk yaklaşımı ile bakılarak bütünsel bir bakış sağlanacaktır.
Topic:: Children, Inequality, and Child Poverty
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

4255. İş Sağlığı ve Güvenliği Profesyonellerinin Temel Sorunları

Author:: Esra Kaya Erdoğan and Kemal Gökmen Genç
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Amaç- Bu çalışmanın amacı; iş sağlığı ve güvenliği (İSG) profesyonellerinin ana sorunlarını tespit etmek ve çözüm önerileri sunmaktır. Yöntem/Metodoloji/Dizayn- Çalışmada bu sorunları tespit etmek amacıyla 50 İSG profesyoneli ile mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Elde edilen veriler betimsel olarak analiz edilmiştir. Sonuçlar- Çalışma sonucunda; iletişim, iş birliği, denetim, mevzuat, farkındalık, güvenlik kültürü, güvenlik liderliği ile işveren ve yönetim eksenli problemlerin yaşandığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Katkı/Farklılıklar- Literatürde saha araştırmaları İSG profesyonellerinden çoğunlukla iş güvenliği uzmanlarına dönüktür. Bu çalışmada tüm İSG profesyonellerinin görüşleri analiz edilmiştir.
Topic:: Legislation, Survey, Professions, and Occupational Health and Safety
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

4256. Millet Partisi'nin Doğuş Teorileri ve Parti Tipolojileri Bağlamında Değerlendirilmesi

Author:: Muttaki Ünlü
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Türkiye'nin çok partili hayata geçmesiyle Türk siyasi hayatında sahneye çıkan partilerden biri olan Millet Partisi (MP) kısa ömrüne ve sönük geçen siyasi macerasına rağmen incelenmeye değer önemli yönlere sahiptir. II. Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından oluşan uluslararası atmosfer ülkeleri yeni dünya düzeninde kendi yerlerini alma çabasına itmiştir. Bu bakımdan Türkiye'de çok partili hayata geçilmesi dikkat çekicidir. Çok partili hayatın yeni başladığı yıllarda Demokrat Parti (DP) ile birlikte mecliste muhalefet sıralarını işgal eden MP Cumhuriyet’in ilk siyasi partilerinden olmasının yanında kısa ömrüne rağmen, kapatıldıktan sonra da etkisi devam eden bir parti olmaklığıyla önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı MP'yi siyasi partiler hakkında ileri sürülen doğuş teorileri ve parti tipolojileri bağlamında analiz etmektir. Çalışmada esasen "MP doğuş teorileri çerçevesinde nasıl açıklanabilir? Parti tipolojileri bakımından hangi tipe uymakta yahut yakın düşmektedir?" sorularına cevap aranmaktadır. Elde edilen başlıca sonuç olarak MP'nin doğuş teorileri bakımından parlamento içi parti kategorisine dâhil edilebileceği, katılma krizi ve modernleşme teorisi ile de ortaya çıkışının açıklanabileceği hususları gösterilecektir. Tipolojik değerlendirmesi yapıldığında da MP'nin bir yaklaşıma göre kadro partisi özellikleri gösterirken bir başka yaklaşıma göre bireysel temsil partisi özellikleri taşıdığı anlaşılmıştır.
Topic:: History, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Nation Party (NP)
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

4257. Türkiye’de Milliyetçi Siyasetçilerin Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Bakışlarının Nefret Söylemi Bağlamında İncelenmesi

Author:: Muhammet Sait Pınarbaşi
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Türkiye ve dünyada nefret söylemi çalışmaları incelendiğinde, çoğunlukla sosyal medya üzerinden yapılan çalışmalarla toplumdaki nefret söyleminin ölçüldüğü, siyasi parti liderleri özelinde, siyasal iletişimde nefret söylemi çalışmalarının sayıca çok az olduğu söylenebilir. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de resmi rakamlara göre sayıları 3,5 milyon civarında olan geçici koruma kapsamında bulunan Suriyelilere ilişkin Türkiye’deki milliyetçi siyasal parti liderlerinin nefret söylemini kullanıp kullanmadığını ortaya çıkarma amacındadır. 2011 yılından itibaren Suriyelilerin Türkiye’ye göçü ile birçok şehirde demografik yapının bozulduğu ve çok çeşitli toplumsal sorunların ortaya çıktığı söylenebilir. Ancak nefret söyleminin, toplumda daha derin yaralara yol açılmasına sebep olabilecek olan “nefret suçlarını” ortaya çıkarma potansiyeli bulunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda önem arz eden çalışmada, Devlet Bahçeli, Meral Akşener ve Ümit Özdağ’ın açıklamaları söylem analizi yöntemi ile incelenmiştir. Bu incelemelerin sonucunda, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi lideri Bahçeli’nin, geçici koruma kapsamında bulunan Suriyeliler ile ilgili söylemlerinde önyargılı aktarımlar ve ayrımcılık yaratıcı unsurlara rastlanmamakla beraber geçici koruma kapsamında bulunan Suriyelilere dostane şekilde yaklaştığı; İyi Parti lideri Akşener’in de ayrımcılık, ötekileştirme veya önyargılı söylemlerden uzak durduğu gözükmektedir. Buna karşın, Zafer Partisi lideri Özdağ’ın, toplumda meydana gelen neredeyse bütün olumsuzlukları geçici koruma kapsamında bulunan Suriyeliler ile ilişkilendirdiği ve yine neredeyse her zaman ayrıştırıcı ve ötekileştirici söylemler kullandığı görülmektedir. Zafer Partisi’nin kuruluşundan sonra söylemleri keskinleşmiş olup, önyargılı aktarımlara da çokça başvurmaktadır. Bu durum da, Özdağ’ın söylemlerinin nefret içerikli oluşu sonucunu beraberinde getirmektedir.
Topic:: Nationalism, Elections, Refugees, Domestic Politics, Syrian War, and Hate Speech
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

4258. Türkiye’de 1950-2014 Yılları Arasında Sağ Muhafazakâr Siyasette Yaşanan Değişim

Author:: İsmail Kıran
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: 14 Mayıs 1950’de yapılan seçimle “geleneksel kesim” ile “Anadolu köylüsü”nün birlikte hareket etmesi sonucu Demokrat Parti’nin (DP) meydana getirdiği “sessiz yığın”ların başlatmış olduğu iktidar yürüyüşü büyük bir başarı ile kazanılmıştır. Bu başarı “beyaz ihtilal” olarak tanımlanmıştır. Buna halkın Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin (CHP) politikalarına duyduğu tepki neden olmuştur. Böylece “Yeter Söz Milletindir” yaklaşımı halk tarafından karşılık bulmuş ve DP’nin seçimi kazanması ile Türkiye’de iktidar değişikliği beraberinde elit değişimini de getirmiştir. Bu sonuç Şerif Mardin’in ifadesiyle çevrenin merkez üzerindeki zaferidir. Buna karşı çıkanlar ise bunu “karşı devrim” olarak nitelendirmişlerdir. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) ise 3 Kasım 2002’de “Yeter Karar Milletindir” söylemi ile yola çıkmış ve “geleneksel dindar” kesim ile “Anadolu kaplanları”nın yaptığı güç birliği sonucu “sessiz devrim” yaparak iktidara gelmiştir. AKP’yi 2014 yılına kadar iktidarda tutan kadrolar elitist değillerdi bu nedenle de kimlik siyaseti yapmamışlardır. Kendilerini Türkiye’nin kültür birikimini korumaları anlamında “muhafazakâr”, modern kurum ve değerleri savunma anlamında ise “demokrat” olarak tanımlanmışlardır. “Muhafazakâr demokrat” kimliğin kabul görmesi bu nedenle olmuştur. Nitel araştırma yöntemi kullanılarak yazılan makale Türkiye’de 1950- 2014 yılları arasında sağ muhafazakâr siyasette yaşanan değişimi açıklamaktadır. 1950 yılında iktidara gelen Demokrat Parti ile birlikte Türkiye’de büyük bir değişim başlatılmıştır. Başlatılan bu değişim Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi iktidarı ile birlikte sağ muhafazakâr siyasette cumhurbaşkanının doğrudan halk tarafından seçildiği 10 Ağustos 2014 tarihine kadar devam etmiştir.
Topic:: History, Domestic Politics, Conservatism, and Political Change
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

4259. Mali Suçlarla Mücadelede Mali İstihbaratın Rolünün Değerlendirilmesi

Author:: Hüseyin Akkaya
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Günümüzde mali suçların önlenmesi ve tespit edilmesi, ülkelerin en önemli konularının başında yer almaktadır. Bu konu aynı zamanda mali istihbarat birimlerinin de temel mücadele mekanizmasını oluşturmaktadır. Mali suçların doğası gereği sınıraşan nitelikte olması beraberinde bu suçlarla mücadele açısından bir takım zorluklar ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu zorluklardan bir tanesi mali suçların ekonomik olarak ölçülmesinin imkânsız olmasıdır. Bu zorlukların ortadan kaldırılmasında en önemli etkenlerin başında mali istihbarat ve uluslararası işbirliği gelmektedir. Mali istihbarat, mali suçlarla mücadele edilmesinde ve suçun önlenmesinde etkili ve verimli bir şekilde mali istihbarat birimlerine yardımcı olmaktadır. Mali istihbarat, mali suçlarla mücadelede mali istihbarat birimlerinin verilerden yola çıkarak oluşturduğu analiz ve tipolojilerden meydana gelmektedir. Mali suçlarla mücadelede mali istihbaratın doğruluğu ve ortaya çıkacak olan finansal zekâ, suçun önlenmesi ve işlenmesi durumunda çözüme kavuşturulması için gereken en önemli olgu olarak kabul edilmektedir. Mali suçlarla mücadele eden pek çok uluslararası kurum bulunmaktadır. Başta FATF ve EGMONT Grup genel çerçevede mali suç faaliyetlerine ve mali istihbarat birimlerine yönelik çalışmalar sürdürmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra yerel olarak faaliyet gösteren ülke mali istihbarat birimleri tarafından da mali suçlarla mücadele edilmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, mali suç türlerinin nelerden oluştuğunu belirtmek, mali istihbarat birimi kavramının üzerinde durmak ve mali istihbaratın mali suçlarla mücadeledeki rolünü incelemektir. Mali suçlarla mücadele edilirken mali istihbaratın rolünün değerlendirilmesi üzerine oluşturulan bu çalışma ile mali suçların durumu değerlendirilecektir.
Topic:: Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Financial Crimes, and Transnational Actors
Political Geography:: Global Focus

4260. BlackRock ve ABD Hegemonyası

Author:: Muhammet Sait Pınarbaşi
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: 1980’lerde başlayan uluslararası ekonomi politik gelişmeler kurumsal yönetişim rejimini de etkileyerek, varlık yöneticisi kapitalizmi olarak adlandırılan bir sürece girilmesine ve bu sürecin sonunda yeni ekonomi politik aktörler olan dev varlık yöneticisi şirketlerinin önemli ölçüde büyümesine sebep olmuştur. Ekonomik sistemde hâkimiyetin, rızaya dayalı tahakküm biçimi olarak hegemonyanın ön koşullarından birisi olarak sayılması, bu şirketlerin en büyüğü olan BlackRock’ın ABD hegemonyasındaki konumunun değerlendirilmesinin önünü açmıştır. Konuyla ilgili eserlerin incelendiği literatür taramasının yanında yorumsamacı yaklaşımdan yararlanılarak yapılan çalışmada BlackRock’ı ABD hegemonyası perspektifinden araştırmak hedeflenmiştir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda yapılan araştırmanın sonucunda, yönetimi altındaki varlıkların 10 trilyon dolara ulaştığı BlackRock’ın; ABD ile yakın ilişkisi, ekonomik kriz dönemlerindeki kurtarıcı rolü, dünyanın en büyük finans kuruluşlarına (merkez bankaları dahil) danışmanlık yapması, hissedar olduğu binlerce şirketin genel kurulunda oylama hakkı bulunması ve 2012’den itibaren her yıl yayınlanan mektuplar aracılığıyla küresel ekonomik sisteme önemli ölçüde etki etme kabiliyeti bir bütün olarak değerlendirildiğinde ABD hegemonyası lehine konumlandığı gözükmektedir.
Topic:: Political Economy, Hegemony, Capitalism, and BlackRock
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

4261. Kadın Maden Mühendisliği Bölümü Öğrencilerinin Gözünden Maden Mühendisliği Mesleğinin Toplumsal Cinsiyet Algısına Dayalı Olarak Değerlendirilmesi

Author:: Tuğba Deniz Tombal
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Bu çalışmada, Dünya’da ve Türkiye’de halen erkek egemen bir alan olarak kabul edilen maden mühendisliği mesleğine kadın maden mühendisliği öğrencilerinin perspektifinden bakarak mesleğin toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği yönünden irdelenmesi hedeflenmiştir. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de maden mühendisliği eğitimi alan kadın öğrencilerin, eğitim hayatlarında cinsiyetçi rollere dayalı olarak karşılaştıkları sorunları tespit etmeyi ve çözüm önerileri sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, 76 katılımcının görüşlerine dayalı olarak bir saha çalışması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışmada katılımcılara iki kısımdan oluşan bir dijital anket dağıtılmıştır. Anketin ilk kısmında demografik bilgiler, ikinci kısmında ise katılımcıların mesleklerini toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı olarak değerlendirmelerine ilişkin sorular sorulmuştur. Çalışmadan elde edilen veriler değerlendirilerek ve yorumlanarak çözüm önerileri sunulmuştur.
Topic:: Inequality, Mining, Students, Engineering, Gender, and Perception
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

4262. Türkiye’de Yoksulluğun Görünümü ve Yoksullukla Mücadelede Aile ve Sosyal Hizmetler Bakanlığının Rolü

Author:: Cihan Selek Öz and Murat Erusta
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Küresel bir sorun olan yoksulluk her ülkede farklı şekillerde görülmektedir. Özellikle 1980’lerden sonra uygulanmaya başlayan neo-liberal ekonomi politikaları tüm dünyada olduğu gibi Türkiye’de de gelir dağılımındaki adaleti bozmuş, yoksulluğu daha görünür hale getirmiştir. Bugün Gini katsayısının 0,415 olarak ölçüldüğü Türkiye’de, en zengin yüzde yirmilik kesim ile en yoksul yüzde yirmilik kesim arasındaki gelir farkı 7,9 kata ulaşmıştır. Bu tablodan yola çıkarak çalışmada Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu’nun güncel Gelir Dağılımı ile Yoksulluk ve Yaşam Koşulları İstatistiklerinden yararlanılarak Türkiye’de yoksulluğun görünümü hakkında bilgi verilmiş ve yoksullukla mücadele konusunda temel aktör olan Aile ve Sosyal Hizmetler Bakanlığı’nın uygulamaları incelenmiştir. Çalışma sonucunda Bakanlığın yoksullukla mücadele politikalarının sosyal hizmetler ve sosyal yardımlar (özellikle nakdi sosyal yardımlar) etrafında şekillendiği tespit edilmiş, yoksullukla mücadelede insanların işlevselliğini artıran, onları yapabilir kılan eğitim, sağlık, istihdam bağlantılı etkin sosyal politikaların önemi vurgulanmıştır.
Topic:: Poverty, Inequality, Neoliberalism, Social Services, and Social Assistance
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

4263. Dijital Ekonomi ve Türkiye’nin Dijital Ekonomi Göstergelerinin Seçilmiş AB Ülkeleri ile Karşılaştırmalı Analizi

Author:: E. Murat Özgür
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Amaç - Çalışmanın temel amacı, Türkiye’nin dijital ekonomiye adaptasyon sürecinin incelenmesidir. Türkiye AB adayı bir ülkedir. Bu nedenle birlik üyesi ülkeler ile karşılaştırma yapılmış, Türkiye’nin bu ül-keler karşısında hangi yönlerini geliştirmesi gerektiği tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Eksik yönler belirlenerek bu eksiklikleri giderecek politikalar oluşturulursa Türkiye’nin dijital ekonomiye daha hızlı ve kolay adapte olması sağlanabilir. Yöntem/Metodoloji/Dizayn- Çalışmada, nitel analiz yöntemi kullanılmıştır. 2023 yılında yayınlanan en güncel Küresel İnovasyon Endeksi raporundaki göstergeler incelenmiştir. 2023 yılı raporuna göre genel endeks puanı en yüksek ve en düşük olan AB ülkeleri ile Türki-ye arasında karşılaştırma yapılmıştır. En yüksek puan İsveç’e, en düşük puan ise Romanya’ya aittir. Sonuçlar- Türkiye’nin dijital ekonomiye adaptasyon sürecinde özel-likle kurumsal kaliteyi artırması gerektiği ifade edilebilir Politik ve operasyonel istikrar, işten çıkarma maliyeti, iş yapma politikaları Türkiye’nin kurumlar boyutundaki zayıf yönlerini oluşturmaktadır. Ayrıca Türkiye’nin ekolojik sürdürülebilirlik konusunda AB ülkelerinin geri-sinde kaldığı, çevreye duyarlı bir ekonomik yapı oluşturma konusunda daha somut adımlar atması gerektiği görülmektedir. Katkı/Farklılıklar- Küresel İnovasyon Endeksi, ele alınan göstergelerin çeşitliliği ve inceleme yapılan ülke sayısı ile dijital ekonomiyi bütünsel olarak yansıtan ölçüm yöntemlerinden biridir. Bu endekste yer alan bütün boyut ve göstergeleri ayrıntılı olarak incelemesi, Türki-ye’nin AB ülkeleri karşısındaki durumu hakkında bilgi vermesi açısından çalışmanın önemli olduğu ifade edilebilir.
Topic:: Communications, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

4264. Examining China’s Grand Strategy For RISC-V

Author:: Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On November 24, 2023, DAMO Academy (達摩院; literally “Dharma”), Alibaba’s research division, unveiled three ground-breaking processors rooted in the open-source RISC-V architecture. The Xuantie (玄铁) C920, Xuantie C907, and Xuantie R910 processors promise to accelerate application of RISC-V technology into diverse sectors, from autonomous vehicles and artificial intelligence (AI) to enterprise hard drives and network communications (Mydrivers News, November 24). These processors signify a strategic attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to break out of the technological containment led by the United States through leveraging open-source hardware (OSHW). RISC-V products are proliferating around the world at a compound annual growth rate of 40 percent. Projections suggest that by 2030, RISC-V chips could attain a 25 percent market share in the system-on-chip (SoC) sector (WSJ, December 14). RISC-V therefore has a pivotal role in shaping the future of the industry. The Chinese government’s rapid, focused, and coordinated investment in RISC-V suggests that a closer examination of this understudied and emerging technology is warranted, especially in light of the limited policy coordination and discussions around RISC-V in other countries, particularly the United States.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Grand Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Research and Development
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4265. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 1: The PRC’s New “Patriotic Education Law”

Author:: John Dotson
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On October 24, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee (全国人民代表大会常务委) officially codified the country’s existing initiatives for “patriotic education (PE; 爱国主义教育)” by promulgating the People’s Republic of China Patriotic Education Law (中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法). This mandates indoctrination in state-directed ideological content throughout all sectors of society (PRC Government, October 25). While CCP policy documents are always more important than formal PRC law, the Party-state does use formal laws passed by the National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会) to codify and emphasize Party policies. This law appears to be no exception. [1] The unveiling of the new Patriotic Education Law has been accompanied by a campaign of predictably laudatory coverage in PRC state media. For example, the CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily ran a flowery editorial that quoted a professor from the China University of Political Science and Law as stating that “implementing the patriotic education law will enhance the daily practice of patriotic spirit” among the Chinese people. The editorial itself opined that the NPC had, “on the basis of the rule of law, promoted and guaranteed New Era patriotic education, inspiring the nation’s spirit, concentrating the people’s strength, advancing the building of a strong country [and] national revival with extremely significant and profound meaning” (People’s Daily, November 23). Such coverage has appeared alongside other official messaging emphasizing the need for enhanced focus on ideological instruction. For example, the mid-October issue of the CCP’s official journal Qiushi (求实) was a themed issue focused on ideology. It featured a lead article under Xi’s name titled “Open New Frontiers for the Sinicization and Modernization of Marxism.” It also included a list of articles on supporting themes, such as a Central Party School article titled “In the New Era and New Journey, Unceasingly Advance the Party’s Innovations in Theory” (Qiushi, October 16).
Topic:: Education, Law, Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4266. PLA Air Force Increases Flexibility of Combat Support Units

Author:: Derek Solen
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early November, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) published photographs of army helicopters taking off from an “air force station” of the Eastern Theater Command during a “trans-regional operation” in late October (China Military Online, November 10). “Air force station” likely refers to the “field station” or combat support unit that services the airbase from which the helicopters took off. The photographs visually substantiate an article from June in which it was reported that all the field stations of an unspecified air defense base of the Eastern Theater Air Force had developed the capability to conduct joint combat support. The report mentioned that the field stations were servicing aircraft of various types from different services, even including a vignette of one field station conducting “combat sustainment” for an army helicopter in addition to servicing fighters and special mission aircraft (PLA Daily, June 16). The field stations’ actual joint combat support capability is likely to be nascent, but it rests on a foundation of greater flexibility that the field stations have achieved over the past decade to operate outside their routines and to service various types of aircraft. That foundation should also make the combat support units of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) a more resilient force that is better able to support agile aviation units.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Air Force, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4267. Contradictions Within The PRC’s Climate Strategy

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The 28th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) drew to a close earlier this week (UNEP, December 13). The COP meetings always produce a mixture of successes and disappointments, and only constitute a portion of the myriad processes that impact the global energy transition and race to stabilize the planetary system. This year’s conference was no different. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was actively engaged throughout, hosting a variety of events at their pavilion reflecting the breadth and depth of the country’s critical engagement with the issues (National Climate Strategy Center, November 28). However, the PRC’s is still appraised as falling far short of what is required to meet the Paris climate goals and is not commensurate with its position in the international system (Climate Action Tracker, November 22). This year, the PRC ranks first in the world for total annual emissions, and second in both cumulative (historical) emissions and GDP. Meanwhile, it has failed to advance its ambitions or provide leadership to match its rhetoric of being—to use Xi Jinping’s words from his Party Congress speech—an “important participant, contributor, and torchbearer” in addressing climate change (Xinhua, November 3, 2017). The PRC delegation constituted the joint-third largest at the conference, and was led by Zhao Yingmin (赵英民), vice-minister at the Ministry of Environment and Ecology (MEE). Also present were minister Huang Runqiu (黄润秋), special climate envoy Xie Zhenhua (解振华), and UN under-secretary-general for economic and social affairs Liu Zhenmin (刘振民), who is expected to replace Xie as he steps down after 25 years as the PRC’s top climate negotiator. Crucially, Executive Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), a Politburo Standing Committee member who holds real power over China’s climate policy (in a way that the MEE officials do not), also attended.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4268. The Sino-French Relationship At 60: China’s Losing Bet On A Reset

Author:: Juliana Bouchard
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Against a background of increasingly fraught relations with the European Commission, China has been doubling down on its outreach to member states, with France chief among them. The two countries have been gearing up to the 60th anniversary of their bilateral relationship in January 2024 with a flurry of diplomatic exchanges. These have included high-level visits by President Emmanuel Macron in April, Economic Minister Bruno Le Maire in July, diplomatic adviser Emmanuel Bonne in late October, and most recently Foreign Affairs Minister Catherine Colonna (FMPRC, November 22). On the Chinese side, Premier Li Qiang traveled to Paris in June to take part in the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact. However, this year also saw Paris deal some blows to China’s economic ambitions, with Macron being one of the driving forces behind Brussels’ ongoing anti-subsidy investigation into China-made electric vehicles and revamping its own EV purchase credits to exclude Chinese-made models (Service Public, October 10). During Bonne’s visit, Wang Yi framed his expectations for the anniversary in no uncertain terms, calling on China and France to “revisit the original intention (重温建交初衷)” of their bilateral ties and “consolidate and reset (巩固和再出发) the relationship” (FMPRC, October 30). Paris’ appetite for meeting Beijing halfway in “resetting” the relationship is far less certain. Most likely, China’s lofty ambitions for a reset will be met with more ambiguity from France, continuing its diplomatic outreach to safeguard economic opportunities in China, all the while pushing for more assertive policies within Brussels to achieve its vision of “strategic autonomy.” While some scholars are not entirely immune to the “dual-faced (两面性)” nature of French diplomacy (Fudan Development Institute, March 2), a prevalent view—or hope—among officials in Beijing is that Macron’s vision of strategic autonomy is primarily about asserting an independent foreign policy from the United States. However, in reality, strategic autonomy also informs France’s own de-risking agenda toward China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and France

4269. Decoding China’s Dilemma: The Difficulties Of Economic Reform

Author:: Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On November 27, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) unveiled a new policy, titled “Notice on Strengthening Financial Support Measures for the Private Economy (关于强化金融支持举措助力民营经济发展壮大的通知)” (People’s Bank of China, November 27). The notice introduces a set of 25 measures crafted to reinvigorate the private sector. These prioritize key areas such as technological innovation, green initiatives, and primary support for small to medium-sized enterprises. The package includes increasing financial assistance and gradually enhancing the proportion of loans to private businesses. It underscores the importance of facilitating credit, lowering interest rates, issuing bonds, and other kinds of financial instruments to meet the varied financing needs of private enterprises. This policy measure echoes mandates put forth during the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 and Central Financial Work Conference held at the end of October 2023 in response to China’s deepening economic woes (Xinhua, November 1). This backdrop has prompted policies aimed at addressing the challenges facing the Chinese economy. In October, the PRC National Bureau of Statistics announced that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell by 0.2 percent year-on-year—worse than expected and marking a contraction since July (RTHK, November 9). This ominous data, which includes price deflation for both July and October this year, is indicative of significant weakness in domestic demand, particularly due to the underperforming real estate market, which affects citizens’ expectations for asset prices. The ongoing economic downturn in China also refutes the notion that economic chaos would clear up after the abandonment of the Zero-Covid policy. This situation is also similar to the Japan-style recession in the 90s in which consumption and investment are further repressed in favor of paying down debt. China’s recent response has been to implement a series of economic stimulus measures in an attempt to revive its weakening national economy.
Topic:: Economics, Reform, Business, and Banking
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4270. Moonshot vs. Long March: Contrasting the United States’s and China’s Space Programs

Author:: Katherine Kurata and David Lin
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On the morning of November 2, 2023, the Gobi Desert’s silence was shattered: From a remote launchpad at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (中国酒泉卫星发射中心), the Hyperbola-2 (双曲线二号), a slender rocket bearing the iSpace emblem (星际荣耀), surged upwards, before gracefully alighting back on Earth (iSpace WeChat, November 2; CNSA, November 2). This suborbital hop marked a major achievement for iSpace as the company progresses towards developing reusable medium-lift rockets. The test demonstrated key technologies like the methalox engine and landing capabilities that will enable iSpace’s larger reusable rocket plans with Hyperbola-3. In China’s rapidly growing commercial space industry, iSpace, alongside other ambitious startups like Galactic Energy (星河动力), CAS Space (中科宇航探索技术), and Deep Blue Aerospace (深蓝航天), are striving to replicate the success of American pioneers such as SpaceX (Galactic Energy WeChat, July 24; CAS Space WeChat, April 4; Deep Blue Aerospace WeChat, May 7, 2022). Their goal: to revolutionize orbital access with reusable rocket technology. The success on November 2 was more than an engineering accomplishment; it was a testament to China’s emerging “innovation power”—its capacity to create, adopt, and seamlessly integrate new technologies (Foreign Affairs, February 28; US House of Representatives, May 17). This successful launch marks not just a step forward in technological capability but also a strategic shift in the global space race. With a unique mix of state guidance and entrepreneurial zeal, China is charting an alternate path in space exploration, contrasting sharply with the United States’s focus on private sector innovation. As the United States and China advance their respective space programs, their differing approaches are reshaping the landscape of space leadership. While America champions private sector innovation, China exerts centralized state control. Yet amidst an increasingly congested orbital environment, it is clear that the future trajectory of space exploration hinges not solely on innovation itself, but specifically on the capacity for nations to effectively combine government direction with commercial dynamism. The country that strikes this balance will harness the strengths of both its public and private sectors to accelerate advancement, and will be positioned to spearhead humanity’s future in the final frontier.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Space, Innovation, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4271. China and Nicaragua’s Deepening Embrace

Author:: Scott B. MacDonald
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In October 2023, Nicaragua signed an agreement with China’s CAMC Engineering Company (中工国际工程) for the reconstruction, expansion, and upgrading of the Punta Huete International Airport (Yicai, October 18). The company is a subsidiary of the conglomerate China National Machinery Industry Corporation (国际集团), also known as Sinomach (Sinomach, accessed November 15). Local and Chinese officials are touting the $492 million project as part of China’s Bridge and Road Initiative (BRI), reflecting a deepening of Daniel Ortega’s regime’s ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Global Times, October 18). Closer links between Beijing and Managua demonstrate that China’s economic statecraft remains central to its strategy to further penetrate Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of significant geopolitical importance to the United States. The sustainability of China’s economic statecraft, and BRI in particular, have come into question in recent months due to the country’s domestic economic problems. However, the Nicaraguan airport announcement signals that the PRC remains economically active in the region, and its ambitions have not wavered. This is something of which the remaining handful of countries that officially recognize Taiwan are well aware: Beijing’s attention to regional infrastructure continues, if more selectively than before, but only to those countries who have decided to forgo relations with Taiwan. Beijing is further extending its reach into the strategic underbelly of the United States. For Nicaragua, the restoration of diplomatic ties with China serves the geopolitical needs of President Daniel Ortega in distancing his regime from the United States and softening the blow of sanctions (imposed due to fraudulent elections and gross human rights violations), while providing a source of non-Western funds to finance infrastructure projects.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Central America, and Nicaragua

4272. The Cross-Strait Intelligence Contest Continues Without Quarter

Author:: Peter Mattis and Zoë Moore
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Last week, the Taiwan High Court found retired air force Colonel Liu Sheng-shu (劉聖恕) and five serving military officers guilty of espionage for China. The court sentenced Colonel Liu and two of his co-conspirators to approximately 20 years in prison, marking some of the harshest sentencing for espionage in recent years (Taipei Times, October 26). Liu’s spy ring is one of at least 11 rings Taiwanese authorities have broken up over the last two years. These Chinese spies targeted Taiwan’s military, civilian government, industry, and the overseas communities of Chinese minorities. In some cases they were able to operate for years. Although it is tempting to read these cases as simply more examples of Beijing’s relentless intelligence operations against Taiwan, these cases and the tradecraft employed suggest some positive developments—or the relative absence of dangerous trends—in the cross-strait intelligence contest. The cost in trust of Chinese intelligence operations, the requirements of deterrence, and the potential costs of a cross-strait conflict combine to suggest that a wider international effort to counter Chinese intelligence operations is warranted.
Topic:: Intelligence, Espionage, Regional Security, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

4273. Money Alone Is Not Enough: The Future Of The China-Argentina Relationship

Author:: Román D. Ortiz
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Observers assessed the outcome of the first round of Argentina’s presidential elections held on October 22 as good news for the Chinese government (VOA, October 26). Against the odds, Sergio Massa, the Peronist candidate and current minister of economy, emerged on top, despite his overseeing an annual inflation rate of almost 140 percent. Meanwhile, Javier Milei, the libertarian opposition candidate, took the second place (Yahoo Noticias, October 23). These two politicians will compete for the presidency in the second round of the election scheduled for November 19. At first glance, the victory of Massa should be an encouraging sign for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since it keeps open the possibility that the China-friendly Peronist party remains in government. However, a more granular analysis suggests two alternative outcomes: First, Milei is likely to be the eventual winner after the second round of voting, which would make the new occupant of the Casa Rosada (the Argentinian presidential palace) a politician who has called the PRC an “assassin” and who plans to freeze relations with Beijing. Second, if Massa wins the presidency, his more moderate Peronism is far from the Third-World foreign policy promoted by the outgoing president, Alberto Fernandez, and his vice-president and former president, Cristina Fernandez. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election, Beijing’s desires to increase political influence over Buenos Aires, which have focused particularly on its defense policy, are likely to be curtailed. A decrease in political influence with Buenos Aires would deal a serious blow to the Chinese strategy in Latin America, in which Argentina plays a critical role. Argentina is the only large country in the region to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It also exports food, minerals, and oil needed by the Chinese industrial sector. Argentina’s expansive territory represents a natural platform to project power within South America and to the South Atlantic. Buenos Aires’s geopolitics makes it particularly attractive for Beijing, which is exploring opportunities to secure rights for a naval base on the west coast of Africa in order to gain access to the Atlantic. Argentina also forms a key part of PRC efforts to consolidate its hegemony over the Global South. Specifically, the PRC views Argentina as a counterbalance to Brazilian regional hegemony, which motivated China’s interest in Argentina joining the BRICS grouping of countries, against Brazilian opposition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Industry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Argentina, and South America

4274. Hong Kong: The Keystone in China’s Economic Statecraft

Author:: Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The recent decision by Hong Kong to join China in banning Japanese seafood took many observers by surprise (Reuters, August 23). At first glance, the ban seemed an overblown reaction to Japan’s handling of nuclear wastewater, which many international bodies have deemed safe and compliant with established procedures. And while it is commonly understood that Hong Kong’s government is politically influenced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), many still believe in its economic autonomy. Considering the significant economic reliance of Japan on Hong Kong for its seafood trade, among other sectors, the ban startled numerous stakeholders (Nikkei Asia, August 25). However, the move is less shocking when Hong Kong is viewed as an integral cog in China’s economic statecraft machine. Traditionally, Western governments lack strategic foresight regarding Hong Kong’s long-term position. Often, this oversight stems from an inadequate comprehension of Hong Kong’s pivotal financial role relative to China, as well as an underestimation of its potential as a node for strategic leverage, both for and against China. China’s rise as a global superpower is inextricably linked to its adept use of economic statecraft, a fusion of economic might and strategic prowess. Its pressure on South Korea to stop the production of Taiwanese military submarines provides a recent example (Reuters, October 16). Hong Kong is a pulsating metropolis at the heart of this strategy. It not only exemplifies China’s ambitions but also acts as a crucial conduit for realizing them. There are two key strands of Hong Kong’s centrality to Beijing: its function as an economic lifeline to the global financial system and its role in the clandestine acquisition of technology and intellectual assets for China from overseas. The US and its allies must focus more on Beijing’s overt and covert leveraging of Hong Kong and think harder about what the city’s function should be in an era of de-risking, geoeconomic competition, and weaponized interdependence.
Topic:: Economy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Superpower
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Hong Kong

4275. Chinese National Security Laws Hinder Foreign Companies’ Operations in China

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Investigations into alleged misconduct and criminality by companies are to be expected, and welcomed, in any country. However, the problems facing foreign companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) depart from normal legal checks and balances. The lack of separation between the judiciary and the state, and the uncertainty around China’s interpretation of the “rule of law,” is a risk factor for companies doing business there (See: China Brief, September 8). In addition, “state secrets” in the PRC are defined widely in relation to national interest. Consequently, a foreign company can inadvertently breach the law by obtaining and using commercial data. This week the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced updated export controls on advanced computing semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and supercomputing items to the PRC (BIS, October 17). Foreign companies doing business in the PRC are likely to face continued uncertainty as a consequence. The response from the PRC was swift, stating that the United States has constantly “overstretched the concept of national security” and resorted to “unilateral bullying” (China Daily, October 18), which suggests that there is a risk the PRC will take retaliatory measures against foreign companies. Western companies involved in the PRC have long understood that when investing in China they must lose a little bit of money in the short term to win a lot of money in the long term. Doing business in China has always been complex, but with the continued expansive approach to national security, it may now be increasingly untenable (See: China Brief, September 22). After three decades of huge investment in the PRC by international companies, there are growing concerns that the growing emphasis on national security is harming the confidence of overseas investors. As the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China reports, “the politicisation of business, and ambiguous laws and regulations…increases risk for companies operating in Chinas” (EU Chamber, September 20). In recent weeks, this ambiguity has been exacerbated by the growing number of “exit bans,” whereby PRC authorities forbid specific business executives at international companies, such as Kroll and Nomura, from leaving the country (Stratfor, September 29).
Topic:: National Security, Law, and Business
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4276. Characterizing China’s Rule of Law

Author:: Ben Lowsen
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping is working in earnest to develop for China what his government calls “rule by law” (法治). It is sometimes translated into English as “rule of law,” though this is misleading, as Chinese law cannot restrict arbitrary exercise of power at the highest levels: the Party leads everything. As such, an awareness of the term’s precise meaning in the PRC’s legal-political context is crucial for understanding Xi’s intent. The Chinese president has stated that “the rule of law is an important component of the country’s core competitiveness” (People’s Daily, November 22, 2020). In light of this, the recently promulgated Foreign Relations Law (对外关系法), which emphasizes China’s competitiveness, provides an opportunity to interrogate Xi’s conception of the rule of law. [1] The Foreign Relations Law (henceforth, the Law) is timely. The head of the powerful Legislative Affairs Committee said in an interview that out of the PRC’s 297 national laws, 52 were dedicated to foreign relations and 150 more had provisions relating to foreign relations. [2] The Law is therefore an important addition, “consolidating and describing the major policies and principles of China’s foreign affairs,” in the words of current (and former) foreign minister Wang Yi. [3] Moreover, it comes at a moment in which China is at once increasingly emboldened on the international stage, and whose relations with many developed countries are increasingly fraught. Support from abroad could be helpful for China as it attempts to navigate out of a mismanaged end to the Covid-19 pandemic, but there is little to reassure foreign partners that their investments in the country will be protected by its laws.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4277. Coalitions of the Week: BRICS, ASEAN, the G20

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Supreme leader Xi Jinping’s failure to attend the G20 summit in New Delhi this weekend (September 9-10) — thus nullifying the possibility of a meeting with top Western leaders including American counterpart President Joe Biden — is symptomatic of the isolation that China is facing on the international stage. Instead, Xi is sending Premier Li Qiang, not only to New Delhi but also to a series of meetings between Western and Asian powerhouses, including between the United States, Japan, and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Jakarta, Indonesia. ASEAN members seem eager to seize the opportunity to promote free trade and high-tech cooperation with the United States and its Western allies, agreeing this week to inject more funds into projects under the U.S.—ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (InvestASEAN.org, September 7; The White House, September 5). By contrast, China’s recent business ties with ASEAN nations has been dominated by a continuous exodus of multinational corporations moving production bases from China and into countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. Xi’s absence has raised eyebrows, particularly due to the fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary has pulled out all the stops when it comes to expanding the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) clout on the global stage, even while ignoring worsening socio-economic conditions at home, such as rising youth unemployment, declining exports and consumer spending, and disappointing new home sales. Deemed a crypto-Maoist by China’s critics, the CCP chief remains convinced that, in the words of both Mao and himself, “the East is rising and the West is declining,” conditions which would allow the PRC to seize the geopolitical high ground given “opportunities that only come once in a century” (Gov.cn, June 23 ; Xinhua, March 23).
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, G20, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and BRICS
Political Geography:: Asia

4278. The Chinese Debate on Economic Reform

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: A steady drumbeat of ominous data and troubling commentary on the state of China’s economy has punctuated the summer months. Reports from the commentariat in the anglosphere have provided diagnostic analysis and detailed potential policy solutions that the Chinese government might pursue. However, China’s central decision makers in the Politburo or in the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), are more likely to take their cues from internal advisors and domestic experts within the PRC than from those outside. As such, one fruitful exercise is to take the temperature of voices within the system to determine the extent to which their perceptions align or diverge from those in the West, and to ascertain which views carry weight with the final arbiters of economic policy in Beijing. By doing so, analysts outside of China may better comprehend the future (mis)steps that China will take as it struggles to achieve its aim of “basically realizing socialist modernization.” In July, the Chinese government held several meetings and released documents pertaining the economy. On July 24 the Politburo met to discuss the economy as it usually does this time of year. But on the same day, a 17-point plan was issued by the NDRC, following on from a 31-point plan co-issued by the State Council and the Central Committee ten days prior. These send a clear message about the concern in government over China’s straitened circumstances. Indeed, just this week, the NDRC announced a new “private economy development bureau” to further support private industry (NDRC, September 4). The assessment of the situation is put bluntly in the Politburo readout: “the current economic system is facing new challenges… insufficient domestic demand, difficulties in some enterprise’s operations, multiple risks in key areas, and a complex and severe external environment.”
Topic:: Development, Economics, and Reform
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4279. A Belt and Road to Nowhere? Italy on the Frontlines of Europe’s Changing Strategy Toward China

Author:: Andrew R. Novo
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: During her tenure as Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni has been far more active on the international scene than most observers predicted. Within the first ten months of her tenure, she has traveled to capitals across Europe, Asia, and North Africa and has hosted numerous foreign leaders on official visits. In July, Meloni visited Washington, D.C. where she and President Biden affirmed their commitment to deepening collaboration across various areas of shared interests. Meloni’s foreign policy agenda has touched on a range of issues including, but not limited to, European security, migration, energy policy, and international trade. It is on this last issue that Italy’s decision-making might be most impactful. As the Meloni administration reassesses its economic partnerships around the world, Italy’s relations—and by extension the European Union’s (EU) overarching position—towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could witness lasting changes. At the heart of the new government’s economic policy lies its choice of whether to withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Meloni—along with many members of her cabinet—have voiced skepticism towards the agreement. As such, everything is on the table in the run-up to the decision at the end of the year.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

4280. The No Limits Partnership: PRC Weapons Support for Russia

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, there is growing concern about the possible involvement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in supplying Russia with weapons, munitions, and various other technology that could have dual-use applications. Notably, no significant provision of large-scale military hardware from the PRC to Russia is evident, as such equipment would have been easily identified on the battlefield amongst the major equipment losses suffered by Russian forces. There are, however, consistent reports substantiating the claim that Chinese companies are providing military and dual-use equipment to Russia. In the PRC’s political system, this type of transaction would be difficult to conduct without the government’s tacit approval or—at the very least—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities turning a blind eye. In February 2022, following a meeting ahead of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the dimensions of their two countries’ strategic partnership (Global Times, February 5, 2022). Xi and Putin reiterated that “friendship between the two states has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation, [and the] strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries” (The Kremlin, February 4, 2022). The closing ceremony for the Beijing Winter Olympics was held on February 20. Four days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, there has been widespread speculation that the PRC leadership knew about the Russian invasion. Additionally, there have been heightened concerns regarding the extent of Chinese support for Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine. In July, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported on the “Support Provided by the People’s Republic of China to Russia”, with indications of increased Russian reliance on the PRC (ODNI, July 2023). In 2022 total Russian imports from the PRC increased by 13 percent to $76 billion. In the same year, PRC chip exports to Russia increased by 19 percent. Many of these transactions were facilitated by shell companies in Hong Kong acting as agents of secondary sales from international suppliers via the PRC to Russia. The ODNI report stated that “the PRC is providing some dual-use technology that Moscow’s military uses to continue the war in Ukraine, despite an international cordon of sanctions and export controls. The customs records show PRC state-owned defense companies shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology, and fighter jet parts to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies” (ODNI, July 2023). French diplomats further corroborated this report, notifying the public of intelligence indicating that the PRC has been supplying Russia with dual-use technologies as well as non-lethal assistance equipment, such as helmets and body armor (SCMP, July 22). When asked if the PRC is assisting Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, French presidential advisor Emmanuel Bonne responded by saying “there are indications that they are doing things we would prefer them not to do” (SCMP, July 22). The PRC government has emphatically denied allegations that it has provided any weapons or military assistance to Russia. Former PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang was reported by his own ministry as saying that “China does not sell weapons to parties involved in the Ukraine crisis and prudently handles the export of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations. Normal exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and Russian enterprises should not be affected” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 10). The second part of Qin Gang’s statement is significant, as he clearly states that exchanges between Chinese and Russian enterprises—such as commercial ties—are not be impacted by the war in Ukraine. Upon closer examination, his comments appear to suggest that dual-use technologies and equipment could be subject to the PRC government turning a blind eye.
Topic:: Partnerships, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

4281. China’s Floods and Party Priorities

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Typhoon Doksuri (杜苏芮) crashed onto the Chinese mainland over Fujian Province on Friday, July 28. From there it pushed northward, where a constellation of meteorological factors led it to slow down over North China, where it unleashed huge volumes of rain over the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Over 1600 weather stations in Hebei Province, which surrounds Beijing, recorded rainfall in excess of 250 mm across a 72 hour period, with one station in Xingtai City recording a maximum of over 1003 mm. Beijing saw the highest rainfall since its meteorological records began in 1860 (Xinhua, August 9). The storm was the proximate cause for severe flooding. Already by Tuesday, August 1, state media was reporting that 20 people had been killed in the floods, and 127,000 had already been evacuated from the capital (Global Times, August 1). However, the full-scale of the human impact is unlikely to be clarified by the government any time soon: much information about the floods has already been censored or deleted from China’s internet, and official statistics, when they have been released, are almost certainly underplaying the costs. [1] Perhaps most unhelpfully, the website for China’s Ministry of Water Resources, has been inaccessible all week (水利部, Ministry of Water Resources). Nevertheless, drawing on the information that has been forthcoming from China’s central and regional governments, as well as firsthand accounts posting on Chinese social media and Twitter (X), we can make a preliminary assessment of the potential political and economic consequences of this event.
Topic:: Natural Disasters, Crisis Management, and Flood
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4282. The Demise of Diplomatic Ambiguity: Parsing South Korea’s Estrangement From China

Author:: Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In July, the US Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) visited South Korea for the first time since 1981. Not one, but two of the 560-foot-long warships—which carried a payload of 24 long-range Trident ballistic missiles—surfaced in South Korean waters (Korea JoongAn Daily, July 24, 2023). From Washington and Seoul’s perspective, the SSBN deployment was a pointed reminder to the mercurial North Korean regime to exercise restraint, but the symbolism of the SSBN visit was not lost on China—Pyongyang’s closest ally. For all its military modernization efforts, Beijing has no effective defense against the Ohio-class sub. That South Korea would support the deployment of the SSBNs to its territory illustrates both its concern about rising North Korean brinkmanship and newfound willingness to risk Beijing’s ire. Indeed, after three decades of stable ties anchored in economic interdependence, major changes are afoot in the South Korea-China relationship. Compared to Japan, which also counts China as its largest trading partner, South Korea has historically been less willing to stand its ground in the face of political pressure from Beijing. On the one hand, Seoul and Beijing have no major territorial disputes, but more importantly, South Korea had previously calculated that its political deference—especially on China’s “core interests” like Taiwan—would encourage Beijing to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) top foreign policy objective. For many years, South Korea handled Beijing with kid gloves, irrespective of who was in the Blue House. While the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is traditionally more China-friendly, it was the conservative President Park Geun-hye who attended China’s jingoistic September 2015 military parade. After a summit between Xi Jinping and Park, both leaders made a commitment to oppose any unilateral actions that could lead to tension on the Korean Peninsula. The following day, President Park joined Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in China’s military parade. South Korea was the only US ally to attend the event (The Korea Herald, September 3, 2015). Since then, however, the two countries have drifted apart. The catalyst for this change was Seoul’s decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in 2017, which China views as a security threat and South Korea deems essential for self-defense. China has repeatedly demanded that South Korea dismantle its THAAD system (Xinhua, September 21, 2017). When those demands failed to bear fruit, it resorted to sanctions against South Korea (The Korea Herald, March 8, 2017). Furthermore, both China’s imposition of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong and its mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic have hurt its reputation in South Korea (The South China Morning Post, October 20, 2020). It is against this backdrop that the ROK’s anti-China sentiment has surged to an all-time high—a development that will inevitably spill over into Seoul’s foreign policy. According to a 2021 survey conducted by SisaIN, for the first time since the ROK and the PRC normalized relations in 1992, South Koreans view China even more negatively than they do Japan (SisaIN, November 29, 2021). China’s ruling Communist Party seems oblivious to the existential threat that South Korea feels in the face of surging missile tests by North Korea. The JoongAng Daily noted in June that it takes just two minutes for a North Korean missile to hit Seoul. According to the editorial, “South Korea is technically still at war with North Korea. The government and people must not forget that” (Yonhap News Agency, June 1, 2023). Concluding that political appeasement and economic engagement with China have failed to pay off, South Korea is taking two significant steps: strengthening its ties with its top security partner, the US, and mending fences with its former rival, Japan. The implications of Seoul’s estrangement from Beijing could have far-reaching implications for geopolitics in the broader Indo Pacific region.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

4283. Water Warriors: How China’s River Chiefs Aim to Tackle Water Pollution

Author:: Genevieve Donnellon-May
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In many ways, China’s history is one of water management. As Chinese historiographers often remark, the unique hydrological conditions within China led to the creation of three historical miracles: China, Chinese civilisation, and the Chinese people. In both ancient and modern times, Chinese rulers have acknowledged the importance of water for its role in maintaining social stability as well securing their legitimacy. Beijing’s leaders are acutely aware of the importance of water in maintaining social stability and ensuring the regime’s survival. The government has focused on engineering its way to water security, an approach traceable in part to Mao Zedong’s idea that man must conquer nature. This is reflected in the Chinese state’s construction of large-scale hydroengineering projects, encompassing numerous dams and inter-basin water-transfer projects. More recently, water governance was explicitly tied to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “ecological civilization” (生态文明) concept (China Brief, June 23) and his published book titled “The In-depth Learning and Implementation of Xi Jinping’s Important Discourse on Water Governance” (People’s Daily, July 19). In May, China announced new plans to improve water quality. According to the “Guideline on Water Ecology and Environmental Protection in Major River Basins”, by 2025 China’s water governance aims to accomplish two main objectives: first, eliminate surface water below Grade V quality, and second, raise the proportion of “fairly good quality” surface water to 85 percent—an increase of 1.6 percentage points from 2020 (Ministry of Ecology and the Environment, May 5; State Council, May 5). China has a six-tier water quality system, with water below Grade V classified as the worst quality. At Grade III or above, surface water is considered to be of “fairly good quality”. As a core convention of the central government, guidelines on the water management of major river basins are typically issued once every five years. In contrast to older guidelines, the most recent guidelines explicitly specificizes the improvement of surface water quality as an obligatory target and includes projected targets for the conservation of water resources and ecosystems. By 2025, for instance, China has set ambitious plans to recover waters levels in 53 dried-up water bodies and restore native fish species to a stable population in 107 major water bodies. China also aims to create an additional 213 square kilometers of wetlands by 2025.
Topic:: Water, Governance, Pollution, and Rivers
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4284. The PRC Eyes Vietnam: Chinese Assessments of Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy

Author:: Nathan Waechter
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In July, the Barbie movie––an ostensibly apolitical and innocuous film––was banned by the Vietnamese Department of Cinema over real-world tensions between Vietnam and China. According to the state film council, the new Barbie movie was barred from the Vietnamese market over its inclusion of a map purportedly showing China’s preferred territorial “Nine-Dash” line in the South China Sea (Vietnam News, July 7). As the head of the national film evaluation council stated, “Vietnam’s stance has been clear. It does not accept movies that are ambiguous in matters related to territorial sovereignty” (Vietnam News, July 7). The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the incident by asserting that “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests are solidly grounded in history and law” (Global Times, July 7). Accusing the Vietnamese government of overstating the issue, the Chinese state media outlet Global Times urged all “relevant parties to control domestic hype and nationalist sentiment” (Global Times, July 7). Viewed within a broader context, the Barbie movie incident is only the most recent expression of the historical baggage between Vietnam and China. Many PRC military officials and academics largely perceive Southeast Asia as China’s proverbial “backyard” that should rightfully remain in its sphere of influence. Within Southeast Asia, Vietnam occupies an important position directly on China’s periphery. Publicly, China considers Vietnam’s governing regime to be close “comrades and brothers” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 28). However, Vietnam has a long, acrimonious history with China. Vietnam has been invaded by China numerous times and subjugated to Chinese rule and the exaction of tribute for thousands of years. The “Vietnam Military Museum in Hanoi … lists 13 “Vietnamese Resistance Wars Against Invaders,” with the majority fought against the Chinese. To some extent, Vietnam has also benefited from its contact with China. The Chinese written script, ideas of ethics and governance, and even chopsticks were absorbed from China. [1] During America’s war in Vietnam, China provided Vietnam with vast amounts of material support. From 1965-1969, a total of 320,000 Chinese troops covertly served in North Vietnam. [2] Despite this, China invaded Vietnam in 1979 in a war that the PRC refers to as the “Self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam” (对越自卫还击保卫边疆作战) (Baidu Encyclopedia). In more recent years, Vietnam and China have clashed rhetorically over islands in the South China Sea and had a tense standoff over a Chinese oil exploration rig in Vietnamese-claimed waters in 2014 (CSIS, December 23, 2014). With its historical domination by China and its position as a small, weak, and still developing country, Vietnam has pursued a strategy of hedging. Research by Thi Bich Tran and Yoichiro Sato, Le Hong Hiep, and Tuan Uy Tran provide robust definitions of Vietnam’s hedging strategy from Vietnamese and Western perspectives (Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 2013; Asian Politics and Policy, January 2018; Naval Post-Graduate School Monterey, March 1, 2018). However, it is important to understand how China views Vietnam’s strategy as well. Further analysis is needed to examine primary Chinese sources and understand Chinese elite perceptions, their conclusions, and what “countermeasures” they believe China should take against Vietnam’s approach. On balance, while Chinese security analysts have a clear understanding of Vietnam’s hedging strategy, they exhibit a modern version of historical Chinese paternalism towards Vietnam. Many contemporary Chinese analysts believe that Vietnam, as a developing country, will inevitably fall into China’s sphere of influence as it remains dependent on Chinese economic ties for growth. While Vietnam does benefit from its economic relations with China, however, the Chinese analyses fail to fully recognize Hanoi’s fundamental apprehensions and insecurity caused by the historical enmity between the two countries, as well as China’s modern-day rise and its aggressive actions in the South China Sea. To a certain degree, China is guilty of exhibiting a degree of the same imperial hubris towards Vietnam as it has often accused the US of in the latter’s relations with other countries. While PRC strategists appear to have concluded that time is on their side, Beijing’s paternalistic complex may ultimately handicap China’s ability to pull Vietnam closer into its orbit.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hedging, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Vietnam

4285. Illegal Fishing in Southeast Asia: Scope, Dimensions, Impacts, and Multilateral Response

Author:: Peter Chalk
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) has surfaced as an increasingly salient offshore threat in Southeast Asia that is leading to huge losses in government revenue, adversely impacting food security, contributing to widespread environmental damage, destabilizing inter-state relations, and spurring other transnational crimes. It is an enduring challenge that affects much of the region, though it finds particular expression in the South China Sea (SCS), the Gulf of Thailand, and the territorial waters of the Indonesian archipelago. This article will analyze the scope and dimensions of IUUF in Southeast Asia, assessing its primary drivers, levels of activity, and principal impacts. It will also give an overview of the operations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s distant water fishing (DWF), which several international bodies have decried as not only the single most egregious violator of sovereign fishing rights and laws in the region, but also as a de facto deniable militia that Beijing is using to enforce its self-defined territorial rights in the SCS. Finally, it will look at the “Quad” as a potential multilateral forum for addressing illegal trawling in the wider Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: Crime, Territorial Disputes, Fishing, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China and Southeast Asia

4286. Xi Jinping’s Hidden Goals for the PRC Law on Foreign Relations

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping has promulgated a new law on foreign affairs to legitimize tough measures that Beijing is taking against the “bullying” of the “hegemonic West.” The statute, “The Law on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” which takes effect on July 1, will also anchor the supreme leader’s long-standing aspiration to build a China-centric global order that will challenge the framework established by the US-led Western Alliance since the end of World War II. The law also codifies the total control that Xi, who is Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Chairman of its Central Military Commission (CMC), exercises on all policies regarding diplomacy and national security (People’s Daily, June 30; Xinhua, June 28). The law states that the PRC “stays true to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable global security, and endeavors to strengthen international security cooperation and its participation in mechanisms of global security governance.” It stresses Beijing’s right to “take corresponding countermeasures and restrictive measures” against acts that violate international law and norms and that “endanger China’s sovereignty, security and development interests.” The official Global Times said the statute was a response to “new challenges in foreign relations, especially when China has been facing frequent external interference in its internal affairs under the western hegemony with unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction” (The Global Times, June 28). The legislation legalizes measures such as counter-sanctions and blacklisting of foreign nationals and institutions in retaliation against similar measures that the US and other Western countries have taken against PRC firms (New York Times Chinese Edition, December 16, 2022).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Law, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4287. China’s Collaboration with the Myanmar Junta: A Case of Strategic Hedging?

Author:: Sudhan Rmachandran
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On June 27, in Kachin State, northern Myanmar, a convoy of vehicles carrying a Chinese delegation, including a consul, came under fire. The convoy was being guarded by Myanmar military and police personnel. While local media blamed the Lisu National Development Party, a military-aligned militia, the Myanmar junta held the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) — an ethnic armed organization (EAO) aligned with the anti-junta resistance— responsible for the attack (The Irrawaddy, June 30). Attacks on Chinese targets have grown in recent months in Myanmar. On May 7, the anti-junta Natogyi Guerrilla Force (NGF) attacked an off-take station in the Mandalay Region’s Natogyi Township due to its China-affiliated oil and gas pipeline. The attack came amid a surge in mass protests on the streets of Yangon, and the townships of Yinmabin, Salingyi and Letpadaung in Sagaing Region. Angry online campaigns criticizing Beijing’s support of “fascist criminals” — referring to the Myanmar generals — gained widespread public backing (Economic Times, May 15). On May 2, the surge in anti-China protests and violence came close on the heels of a meeting in Naypyidaw between Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Myanmar junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Qin is the highest Chinese official to meet Min Aung Hlaing since the 2021 military coup, which overthrew the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government (Frontier Myanmar, May 3). Since the junta’s rise to power, public ire in Myanmar has been directed not only at the military regime but also at China, the junta’s principal foreign backer. In the early days of the coup, crowds gathered outside the Chinese embassy in Yangon to protest against the alleged Chinese role in the insurrection (Times of India, February 14, 2021). Chinese-owned factories in Myanmar were damaged and burned, and Chinese workers were attacked (CGTN, March 14, 2021). With visible collaboration between the PRC and the junta growing, the targeting of Chinese projects and properties in Myanmar has grown in frequency and intensity. To cite one such instance, last April resistance groups fired missiles at factories manufacturing long-range rockets and surface-to-air missiles, specifically when Chinese and Russian military officials were visiting the facilities (Burma News International, April 8). As anti-China sentiment surges in Myanmar, it is likely that resistance groups will continue to deliberately target Chinese interests in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Coup, Strategic Interests, and Junta
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Myanmar

4288. PLA Airborne Capabilities and Paratrooper Doctrine for Taiwan

Author:: Daniel Fu
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In the event of a Taiwan contingency, PLA airborne troops are likely to assume a substantial role. Decapitation strike scenarios and the prospects of an airborne invasion are widely discussed by analysts, scholars, and policy practitioners in both the US and Taiwan. Despite PLA ambitions to rapidly expand their airborne capabilities, there are a growing number voices that downplay the threat or likelihood of an airborne assault across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese security analysts such as Liu Tai-ying (劉泰英), founder of the Taiwan Research Institute, have stated that “if paratroopers were used, the losses for China would be very high” and minimized their threat by stating that there are few landing spots available to PLA airborne forces (Taipei Times, September 26, 2022). Notably, many of these conclusions revolve around the viewpoint held by a growing number of military experts, who contend that “mass airborne operations are a thing of the past” (Modern War Institute, December 10, 2016). These views, however, fail to consider the robust drive on part of the PLA to improve the combat readiness and capabilities of its airborne troops. They also ignore substantial progress the PLA has already made towards that goal, both in terms of the training and preparation of its paratroopers and in decisive factors such as heavy airlift. In short, documenting the progress of PLA airborne troops’ capabilities may play a crucial role in assessing Chinese deployment strategies during a potential Taiwan invasion scenario.
Topic:: Security, Armed Forces, Military, and Invasion
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

4289. The Long Arm of the Law(less): The PRC’s Overseas Police Stations

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In April, the FBI charged two Chinese-Americans, both U.S. citizens, with conspiring to act as agents of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by establishing an “overseas police station” on behalf of the Fujian Public Security Bureau in New York. The defendants allegedly organized counter-protests against the Falun Gong, harassed a Chinese fugitive to return to the PRC and hassled a pro-democracy activist living in California. On June 6, the UK Government Minister of State for Security, Tom Tugendhat, made a statement with an update on Chinese “Overseas Police Service Stations” reportedly located in Croydon, Glasgow and Hendon (UK Parliament, June 6). He stated that “the Police have visited each of the locations identified by Safeguard Defenders [the NGO that reported the locations], and carefully looked into these allegations to consider whether any laws have been broken and whether any further action should be taken. I can confirm that they have not, to date, identified any evidence of illegal activity on behalf of the Chinese state across these sites.” The reactive approach in the UK is notably different from the US, where proactive intelligence led investigations by the FBI have led to multiple arrests. International concern regarding the extent of law enforcement activity by Chinese agencies outside of their home country jurisdiction has recently increased. Such activity has been reported as “Chinese Overseas Police Service Centers” (Safeguard Defenders, September 2022), “Chinese Assistance Centers” (China Brief, January 5, 2019), joint patrols in Italy with local police, structured training to local police such as in the Solomon Islands, harassment and intimidation of Chinese dissidents, and extra-judicial action to return fugitives from overseas that effectively constitutes extraordinary rendition. These activities are characterized by their diversity and, as a result, should not be considered part of a single strategy. Rather, the multiple purposes served by Chinese police forces’ expanding overseas activities can be better understood by tracing how these efforts have evolved over the past decade.
Topic:: Security, Law Enforcement, Law, and Police
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4290. Missile Defense in South Korea: Will President Yoon Heed China’s Concerns?

Author:: Debalina Ghoshal
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Earlier this week, some residents of Seoul, South Korea, received an emergency alert to prepare for a potential evacuation following military reports that North Korea had fired a projectile southward (Yonhap, May 31). The alerts, which stemmed from an errant North Korean satellite launch that sparked grave but fleeting alarm, underscore the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) growing apprehensions regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) ballistic and cruise missile development and testing, coupled with its expanding nuclear arsenal (NK News, January 1). In addition, North Korea’s long-range artillery systems remain a persistent threat, which not only endanger counter-force targets in South Korea, but also threaten counter-value targets, in particular Seoul, the nation’s capital and largest metropolis.
Topic:: Weapons, Missile Defense, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

4291. China’s Role in the Modernization of Malawi’s Agriculture Sector

Author:: Raphael Mweninguwe
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China has assumed a key role in the modernization of Malawi’s agriculture sector, which has made recent progress in enabling smallholder farmers to produce higher crop yields. The introduction of agricultural technologies used in vegetable, fruit, maize and rice production through the China Aid Project for Agricultural Technical Cooperation has not only created employment opportunities for the local population, but has also strengthened the economic situation of small farmers in Malawi. In February, at the opening of a training for senior agricultural workers, the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Malawi pledged increased support for the development of the country’s agricultural sector “under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and the Global Development Initiative” (Xinhua, February 17). The creation of the FOCAC coincided with the new strategy of the Chinese government in the 2000s, when Beijing sought to utilize development assistance, particularly in the agricultural sector, in order to strengthen overall Sino-African relations. At that time, many African countries were desperately looking for technical assistance in order to achieve a high level of agricultural growth and to solve their persistent food insecurity problems. [1] Malawi is one of the countries on the continent that has suffered longtime food insecurity, where PRC agricultural aid and training has benefited many smallholder farmers, who have expressed their appreciation for the assistance rendered. While some farmers and extension workers express satisfaction with China’s support for Malawi’s agricultural modernization efforts, others are worried about the impacts of climate change, which threaten the full adoption of the technologies offered by the PRC. Already an estimated 3.8 million people, about 20 percent of the country’s population, are facing a food crisis due to drought and floods that hit the country during the last growing season (World Bank, April 7). But China’s technologies aim to mitigate climate change impacts through simple, low-cost, and innovative farming technologies, such as furrow and bucket irrigation.
Topic:: Agriculture, Climate Change, Development, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Modernization
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Malawi

4292. Party Ties: Vietnam, Cuba and China’s Relations with Other Marxist-Leninist States

Author:: John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Last month, on the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership (中越全面战略合作伙伴关系), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping met with Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Politburo Member and Head of the Central Committee Organization Commission Truong Thi Mai and asked her to convey his greetings to General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], April 26). [1] The visit to Beijing by Mai, who has headed the VCP’s powerful organization commission since 2021 and was appointed to the Secretariat in March, occurred days after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Vietnam (NhanDan, April 15; VN Express, March 6). As the maritime dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea has intensified over the past fifteen years, Washington has deepened its ties with Hanoi based on overlapping geostrategic interests. Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s ability to achieve its goal of upgrading the U.S. relationship with Vietnam to a “strategic partnership” this year to mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the U.S.-Vietnam “comprehensive partnership” remains in question (Fulcrum.sg, April 20). Vietnam undoubtedly perceives the PRC’s drive to consolidate control over the South China Sea as its main geopolitical challenge. Moreover, Vietnam’s relationship with its larger northern neighbor is colored by mistrust derived from historical memories of Chinese occupation and a long legacy of conflict, including the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the subsequent series of border and naval clashes in the 1980s. However, the VCP, particularly the conservative faction, now views the U.S. as posing its primary ideological threat and is fearful that Washington aims to undermine its grip on power (Nikkei Asia, May 11, 2022). As two scholars at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences note in a recent analysis, Hanoi’s reluctance to upgrade ties with the U.S. stems not only from fear of angering China but also from concern with “Washington’s excessive focus on press freedom, religious freedom, and human rights as an internal intrusion and potential threat to Vietnam’s political security.” [2] Hence, Beijing is able to arrest Hanoi from drifting towards closer alignment with Washington by leveraging their shared Communist systems and mutual concerns about Western efforts to facilitate the “peaceful evolution” of communist states into liberal democracies. During his meeting with VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in Beijing last October, Xi spoke to both Party leaderships’ mutual concern with regime security. He stressed that each side “should stay committed to the socialist orientation” and called for increased party-party exchanges to facilitate “mutual learning in party governance and state administration, maintain high-level communication and strategic dialogue between the two militaries, achieve more outcomes in cooperation on law enforcement and security, and safeguard the political security and social stability of respective countries” (FMPRC, October 31). Party-to-party ties are a key element of the PRC’s relationships with the other three states with ruling Communist Parties: Vietnam, Cuba and Laos. [3] As with the CCP, the Vietnamese, Cuban and Laotian Communist Parties have each adapted and modified Marxist-Leninism to suit their national conditions, regional situations and elite political preferences. Despite their considerable differences, these states’ mutual Marxist-Leninist ideological orientations and systems foster shared interests, including maintaining regime security and “stability,” opposing perceived external attempts to define and impose Western conceptions of democracy and human rights, advancing a state-led model of economic development and promoting a more multipolar world.
Topic:: International Relations, Socialism/Marxism, Partnerships, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Vietnam, and Cuba

4293. Can the Belt and Road Initiative Succeed in Afghanistan?

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At a trilateral meeting in Islamabad on May 9, the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan and reaffirmed their support for multilateral infrastructure projects already underway, including the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) power project and the Trans-Afghan Railways (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], May 9). Earlier on January 5, the Taliban regime signed an agreement with the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC), a subsidiary of the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), for the extraction of oil from the Amu Darya basin, under which China will invest $150 million annually for three years and increase it thereafter to $540 million for the contract’s 25-year duration (Kabul Now, January 5). Then on April 13, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum announced that the Chinese company Gochin had expressed interest in investing $10 billion in Afghanistan’s lithium reserves (Kabul Now, April 13). Meanwhile, China is reported to be in talks with the Taliban regime over renegotiating the terms of a 2008 contract to mine copper from the Mes Aynak reserves in Logar province (The Print, June 8, 2022). The agreements, including plans to extend CPEC—a key leg of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—into Afghanistan, are a significant development. The deal relating to oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin is the Taliban regime’s first major foreign investment deal. However, in the past, major Chinese projects have failed to take off. Will the recent deals remain in limbo as well? China’s growing role in Afghanistan faces formidable challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, and South Asia

4294. China’s Emerging Approach to Taiwan: Blockade and Disinformation

Author:: Chihwei Yu
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: It has been suggested that China intends to unify Taiwan through a military operation within the next five years. However, based on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) actions during the 1945-1949 civil war, military means may not be the most effective way for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to achieve its longstanding goal of unification with Taiwan. Since its inception in 1921, the CCP has relied on producing and disseminating disinformation to advance its policy objectives. This strategy is also frequently employed by China towards Taiwan, with the aim of undermining the morale of Taiwanese society through the spread of certain kinds of false information, for example, by claiming that the U.S. will eventually betray Taiwan. In fact, the CCP’s military tactics during the civil war share some similarities with its current Taiwan policy, particularly with regard to the so-called “Peiping Mode” (北平模式). This approach seeks to achieve its goals through a combination of deterring the opponent through superior force and employing United Front work, including deploying agents and spreading fake news to persuade opponents.
Topic:: Security, Disinformation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Military, and Blockade
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

4295. Taiwan’s Dwindling Diplomatic Allies

Author:: John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Amidst the drama surrounding Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s early April stopover in Southern California, where she met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and the subsequent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maneuvers around Taiwan that followed, it can be easy to forget why the Taiwanese President was transiting the U.S. in the first place. Tsai was returning home after a trip to Taiwan’s two remaining diplomatic allies in Central America, Guatemala and Belize, which was organized around the theme of “Meeting Democratic Partners, Fostering Shared Prosperity” (民主夥伴共榮之旅) (Office of the President, Republic of China [ROC] [Taiwan], March 29). Days prior to Tsai’s arrival in the Western Hemisphere, Honduras, which had maintained official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) for 82 years, established formal ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], March 26). The move occurred despite U.S. efforts to dissuade Honduras. On March 18, the Biden administration dispatched senior envoy and special adviser for the Americas, former Senator Chris Dodd, who is also well-regarded in Taipei, to Honduras in a last-minute effort to encourage the Xiomara Castro government to change course in derecognizing Taiwan (Taipei Times March 18). Under the government of Xiomara Castro, who took office early last year, Honduras has sought to pit Taipei and Beijing against each other in a bidding war for diplomatic recognition. While China has offered inducements, Taiwan has both rejected and called out the Castro government’s efforts to condition the continuation of the official relationship on major increases in financial assistance. Foreign Minister Eduardo Enrique Reina initially denied Taipei’s claims that Honduras had asked Taiwan for $2.5 billion but eventually acknowledged to the media that the Castro government had sought to obtain $2 billion in aid (ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Taiwan MOFA], March 23). However, he also claimed his country “never received a substantive response from the Taiwanese side” (TVBS, March 24). In a notice regarding these revelations and regretting the pending shift in recognition, the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry warned Honduras not to fall prey to China’s “debt trap diplomacy” (Taiwan MOFA, March 23). Upon announcing the termination of relations with Honduras, Tsai cautioned Taiwan’s other diplomatic allies against following the same course, stressing that “we will not engage in a meaningless contest of ‘dollar diplomacy’ with China.” She also criticized the PRC’s efforts to employ “any and all means to suppress Taiwan’s international participation” (Office of the President, Taiwan, March 26). Earlier this week, the Tsai government averted another diplomatic setback with the election of Santiago Pena of the ruling conservative Colorado Party to the presidency in Paraguay. Pena’s opponent, Efrain Alegre, who led a broad center-left coalition, campaigned on switching recognition from the ROC to the PRC in order to facilitate Paraguay’s access to China’s large agricultural import market (Nikkei Asia, April 18). In a response to a congratulatory tweet from President Tsai, Pena stated that “we are going to continue strengthening our historic ties of brotherhood and cooperation between our countries” (Taiwan News, May 2). However, the Tsai administration is hardly free from the challenge of maintaining the ROC’s dwindling network of official relationships. Guatemala, which is Taiwan’s largest diplomatic ally, will go to the polls to elect a new president in late June. President Alejandro Eduardo Giammattei Falla, who has been a staunch supporter of maintaining close ties with the ROC, is constitutionally barred from seeking a second term. According to long-time China-Latin America analyst R. Evan Ellis the prospect of “a victory by either a center-left-oriented candidate more open to working with the PRC such as Sandra Torres, or a right-oriented candidate such as Zury Rios, whose Presidency might deepen policy conflict with the Biden Administration, could present a small but not insignificant risk of Guatemalan diplomatic recognition of the PRC” (CEEP, March 7).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

4296. A Preliminary Survey of PRC United Front Activities in South Korea

Author:: Russell Hsiao
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) exercises influence over South Korea in multiple ways. Chinese influence operations against Seoul have been characterized as not subtle and even blatant compared to the more covert and subversive methods employed in other countries (China Brief, December 19, 2014). Indeed, the more overt and aggressive ways in which Beijing exercises influence were on full display when the PRC responded to Seoul’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2016 with boycotts, military exercises and diplomatic pressure (China Brief, March 31, 2017). Less well known, however, is how China employs other, more subtle means to influence South Korean politics and society. A general presumption exists that influence must be exerted overtly or in forms such as diplomatic protests or through sanctions, yet Beijing’s influence activities also take on a less pronounced and more obscured nature, which is commonly associated with its United Front activities. This article will provide a preliminary assessment of the local Chinese Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification of China (CCPPNR, 韩华中国和平统一促进联合总会) and the web of other United Front organizations that operate in South Korea. [1] This article does not seek to offer an exhaustive examination of these organizations, but to provide a preview of the key United Front apparatuses and their activities in South Korea.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Diaspora, Soft Power, and Influence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

4297. U.S.-China Data War Intensifies as Bilateral Relations Nosedive

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: U.S.-China relations appear headed for further deterioration despite the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) efforts to lure back American multinationals and Beijing’s relatively limited support for Russia in its war with Ukraine. Washington has characterized the “existential competition” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as an entrenched struggle on all fronts, but the data and information sectors have recently become areas of particularly intense contention. The Xi Jinping leadership has sternly retaliated against purported efforts by the U.S. and its allies to choke off the PRC’s high-tech development pathways. Recent moves targeting American and other foreign firms are also closely linked to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s obsession with cybersecurity and control of data. Last weekend, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the administrative arm of the policy-setting Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC) that Xi chairs, announced an investigation into the operations of leading American memory-chip maker Micron Technology. The CAC cited the need to safeguard the supply chains of Chinese IT and data companies. Regardless, Micron, whose China operations account for 11 percent of worldwide sales, has insisted that it “stands by the security of our products” (Straits Times, April 1; South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 31).
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Data Governance
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4298. Central African Republic Mine Attack: Can China Protect its Overseas Nationals?

Author:: John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On March 19, gunmen stormed a gold mine near Bambari, in the heart of the Central African Republic (CAR), killing nine Chinese workers. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Embassy in the CAR issued successive warnings for Chinese nationals to evacuate all areas outside of Bangui, the capital. On the same day as the attack, the Embassy called on Chinese citizens in the CAR’s external provinces to immediately evacuate themselves and report their whereabouts (PRC Embassy in CAR, March 19). A subsequent Embassy warning on March 22 went further, stressing that the situation in the CAR is now “red” or “extremely high risk,” emphasizing that the March 19 attack demonstrated the “extreme necessity of evacuating Chinese companies and nationals” in areas outside the capital “as soon as possible” (PRC Embassy in CAR, March 22). Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stressed that General Secretary Xi Jinping was closely monitoring the situation and had instructed that immediate action be taken to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals in the CAR and to “severely punish the murderers” (严惩凶手) (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], March 20). Exactly who perpetrated the attack remains, however, unclear. The CAR government faulted the rebel alliance, the Coalition of Patriots for Change, for the gold mine attack. However, the rebel group blamed Russia’s Wagner Group, which has been deployed in the country to protect the central government since 2018 (South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 20). The timing of the attack and subsequent allegations of Wagner’s involvement was inopportune for Xi as he prepared to travel to Moscow the following day for meetings with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, as Beijing sought to position itself as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine War (Xinhuanet, March 21). In a blog post on the CAR attack, the well-known nationalist firebrand and former Global Times editor Hu Xijin observed that in “the chaotic situation in CAR anything can happen,” but rejected Western media conjecture concerning the Wagner Group’s involvement as an attempt to “undermine Sino-Russian relations” (Sohu, March 22). He even claimed that due to Wagner’s cooperative relationship with the CAR government, its operators reportedly “helped the authorities deal with the aftermath of the situation and evacuate the bodies of the dead Chinese miners back to Bangui.” Finally, Hu averred that in the “2020s anyone who kills a Chinese national will face severe punishment and retribution.” A post on Tencent echoed these sentiments, stating: “the Central Africa Republic owes us nine lives” before castigating the U.S.-led West for treating Africa as a “modern colonial territory” and creating conditions for “vicious attacks” on Chinese companies to drive them out of emerging markets (Tencent, March 28). Putting aside the murkiness of the March 19 mine attack in the CAR, the incident highlights a growing problem for China, which is the sheer proliferation of state-owned and private businesses operating overseas, either in conflict zones or in areas with chronic political instability. The population’s widespread expectation that the government will exact swift retribution against the perpetrators of attacks on Chinese nationals overseas also puts Xi in a difficult position, as popular assumptions about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to target armed groups in distant and difficult operational environments do not align with its actual capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Non State Actors, Violence, and Mining
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Central African Republic

4299. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

4300. The Chinese Steel Industry: Three Pathways to Green Steel

Author:: Chin Hsueh
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On February 6, the China Meteorological Association (CMA) published the 2022 China Climate Bulletin (中国气候公报) (China Climate Bulletin, February 7). The annual report provides an overall analysis of China’s climate conditions and tracks significant meteorological disasters and major climate events from the previous year (CMA, February 24). The newly released China Climate Bulletin noted that the country recorded its second-highest annual mean temperature in history last year. In fact, last year’s spring, summer and autumn temperatures were the highest since record keeping began (China Climate Bulletin, February 7). During the press conference for the release of the bulletin, Jia Xiaolong, deputy director of China’s National Climate Center, stressed the importance of remaining alert to those “low probability, high impact” (小概率, 高影响) climate events, such as the heat wave that hit China in 2013, driving temperatures above 104 degrees Fahrenheit in at least 40 cities and counties (China News Service, February 7; Sohu, July 30, 2013). No plausible path to mitigating global climate change exists without China, the world’s largest carbon emitter, greatly reducing its carbon footprint. Among China’s major GDP drivers, few play a more critical role in the country’s decarbonization efforts than the steel sector (International Energy Agency, September 13, 2021). The steel industry is second only to power generation in terms of its carbon footprint, generating about 17 percent of China’s annual emissions (China Dialogue, May 23, 2022). In fact, the state-owned conglomerate China Baowu Steel Group (中国宝武),which is the world’s largest steel producer, put more CO2 into the atmosphere in 2020 than Pakistan (Jiemian, August 21, 2020).
Topic:: Climate Change, Manufacturing, Industry, Carbon Emissions, and Steel
Political Geography:: China and Asia

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