The Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary agreement is not a direct agreement between the two countries, but rather two separate agreements with the United States.
It is unique: the first such agreement reached between countries with no diplomatic relations, the first between adjacent states in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the first in the region to be resolved through indirect negotiations facilitated by a mediator.
A confluence of domestic and geopolitical events contributed to the signing of the agreement, including elections in Israel, the deterioration of Lebanon’s economy and the country’s descent into political crisis, and the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the global energy market.
Effective mediation between parties was more important than the degree of trust the parties had in the mediator or the mediator’s relative neutrality on the issue. The United States was not an unbiased mediator, but because of its own incentives to deliver an agreement and its leverage over both parties it was the only possible one.
International oil and gas companies influenced the negotiations, but did not directly participate in them. Due to their vested interest in securing their existing or prospective investments, they used public communications and discrete engagements with the Israeli and Lebanese governments to encourage a deal.
This agreement could serve as a model for other maritime disputes by demonstrating at least two things. Firstly, solutions can be achieved when parties delink their maritime negotiations from the core issues in their bilateral relationship. Secondly, if two sides are committed to reaching an agreement, the international law of the sea is sufficiently flexible for them to find a solution, even when one party is a signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the other is not.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Maritime, and Negotiation
Neutrality is a naturally occurring phenomenon. There have always been actors on the world stage that have remained outside the conflicts of others, be they countries, religious institutions or international organisations (IOs). Even during the two world wars and the first Cold War (i.e. the US and its allies versus the USSR and its allies), some actors managed to avoid the battlefields or claimed a position separate from the various alliance systems. Despite the beliefs of some commentators that neutrality is coming to an end, there is no indication that world politics is actually about to change dramatically enough to eradicate the reasons and logic for neutrality. In fact, the least conductive international environment for neutrality – unipolarity – seems to be ending. What could be called the “New Cold War” (the West-aligned countries versus Russia in Europe and versus China in Asia) and the emerging multipolar world will likely produce the dynamics leading to more neutrality as a counter-reaction to the new great power rivalry. We should expect neutrality and neutralism – i.e. political movements demanding the adoption of neutrality policies – to strengthen. Nevertheless, neutrality is shifting. It is moving from Europe to other regions of the world, and, in the process, will likely also change conceptually. This Policy Brief will first describe the nature of neutrality and the three basic motivations for actors to opt for its policies. It then discusses the challenges any neutrality policy faces and will conclude by providing concrete recommendations for policymakers seeking to maintain neutrality vis-à-vis either hot or cold conflicts.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Neutrality
The Arctic lies at the intersection of several issues with global consequences such as climate change, increased accessibility to and availability of resources, and global strategic contestation that have made the region increasingly relevant to the world.
Temperatures in the Arctic continue to rise at four times the global annual average, driving many of the changes under way there, most prominently sea-level rise and the thawing of permafrost, which impact both local ecosystems and the global climate system. International scientific cooperation and data monitoring and sharing are crucial to understanding the impact of climate change, counteracting its negative effects, and enhancing living conditions and economic activity.
Apart from a few limited pockets of cooperation that still exist, cooperation between Russia and the West with regard to the Arctic has largely been put on hold since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. The current absence of research and data sharing among scientists is threatening to jeopardise scientists’ understanding of the warming trends in the Arctic, exacerbating the environmental emergency the region in particular is facing.
One of the few channels that still exists for constructive dialogue on a range of Arctic-related issues is the GCSP’s “‘High North Talks”’, through which discreet exchanges on various important issues continue.
Among other things, the G20 agenda includes climate change, sustainable development and the environment, all of which are under threat due to the cessation of Artic-related scientific engagement. The G20 also represents a rare platform where engagement between Russia and the West has not yet ceased.
The suspension of dialogue and scientific exchange vis-à-vis the Arctic is driven by a deep distrust that needs to be overcome by an interlocutor that is acceptable to all stakeholders. India's theme for its G20 presidency resonates strongly with the Arctic and its impact on the world. The resumption of Arctic-related scientific exchange is an easy deliverable with global benefits that India, which has the necessary legitimacy, credibility and relevance, should use its G20 presidency to strive for.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, G20, and Sustainability