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711. Mainstreaming Evidence Use through Locally Led Development: Recommendations for USAID

Author:
Janeen Madan Keller, Amanda Glassman, Julia Kaufman, and Ruth Levine
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
ince the 2006 release of the CGD report When Will We Ever Learn? Improving Lives Through Impact Evaluation, there have been nearly two decades of progress in generating and using evidence for public policy decisions and development programs. There has been a steady increase in the number of impact evaluations—a rigorous approach that establishes the attributable net impact of a project or program. Their ability to assess attribution makes impact evaluations uniquely well suited for decision making. Nevertheless, the COVID-19 pandemic put a spotlight on an unfinished agenda and underscored the need for high-quality, timely, and context-specific evidence. Across sectors, decision makers in governments, aid agencies, multilateral organizations, and NGOs have not yet fully harnessed the value of evidence for better public policies. Numerous challenges limit evidence use. On the demand side, impact evaluations may lack relevance to policy decisions and fail to respond to decision makers’ priorities, timelines, and questions. On the supply side, decision makers often lack institutional incentives and funding to generate and act on relevant evidence. Current funding models compound these challenges by contributing to misaligned incentives between policymaker needs and academic researchers. In response to these challenges, CGD launched the Working Group on New Evidence Tools for Policy Impact to develop a renewed agenda for the next generation of investments in impact evaluation and related evidence systems to enhance their value for real-world decision making. The group brought together policymakers and experts to review the progress and obstacles to the use and utility of evidence for global development. Its final report highlights how far the field has come in addressing critiques about the scale, generalizability, and policy utility of impact evaluation, and offers recommendations to the development community on “what and how to fund to deliver on the promise of impact evaluation and bolster the broader evidence ecosystem.” The working group proposes five ways to improve impact evaluation funding and practice: (1) design evaluations that start from the policy question and decision space; (2) harness technology for timely, lower-cost evidence; (3) advance locally grounded evidence-to-policy partnerships; (4) enact new incentives and structures to strengthen evidence use; and (5) invest in evidence leaders and communities. This brief details how USAID can mainstream evidence use across the agency. It is based on working group discussions, numerous consultations with experts including current and former USAID staff, and background research over the course of the project.
Topic:
Development, Local, USAID, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

712. ABCs of the IFIs: Understanding IDA20

Author:
Jocilyn Estes and Erin Collinson
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
With the COVID-19 pandemic hitting government balance sheets especially hard in low-income countries, the World Bank’s shareholders—including the United States—agreed to an advance replenishment of its grant and low-interest loan window, the International Development Association (IDA). By holding a pledging session one year early, donors sought to ensure IDA, which serves the world’s poorest countries, would have the resources to provide financing where it was needed most. In December 2021, following the final meeting of the 20th replenishment of IDA (IDA20), the World Bank announced a $93 billion replenishment package, leveraging $23.5 billion in contributions from 48 high- and middle-income countries. The United States reclaimed its position as IDA’s top donor, pledging $3.5 billion over three years to support pandemic response and an economic rebound in the world’s poorest countries. The United States has long had a vested interest in the World Bank, and in IDA in particular, working to ensure it is well run and resourced appropriately, and that its policy agenda reflects US interests. The US Congress plays a pivotal role in overseeing US engagement with the institution—managed by the Treasury Department—and providing funding to enable the US to meet its commitments. Due to the acceleration of IDA19, the US has two IDA installments due this year. The president’s fiscal year 2023 (FY23) budget request includes funding for a final payment to deliver on its IDA19 commitment and a partial first installment toward the latest US pledge to IDA.
Topic:
Development, Multilateralism, Sustainability, and Banking
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

713. Recommendations for US-Africa Space Cooperation and Development

Author:
Rose Croshier
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The United States, a leader in space exploration and innovation, has a unique opportunity to establish enduring diplomatic, commercial, and security ties with African nations through space cooperation—with the potential to yield substantial development benefits. The U.S. space sector is robust, an area of comparative strength vis-à-vis Europe, Russia, and China. By driving space cooperation, the U.S. can reinforce the rules-based order as articulated in international agreements like the Artemis Accords. Expanded space capabilities can also support the achievement of several of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, which range from improving data-driven governance to closing the global digital gap. U.S. policymakers have an opportunity to implement a collaborative approach with emerging African space actors both to grow a peaceful and law-abiding community in space and to benefit from Africa's contributions to the global space ecosystem. Space capability can also serve a crucial infrastructure role, yielding similar benefits to “traditional” infrastructure—including facilitating access to 5G connectivity through low orbit satellites and addressing clean water and food security needs through remote sensing and satellite communications.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Space, and Territory
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

714. Greening the US Sovereign Bond Guarantee Program: A Proposal to Boost Climate-Directed Sovereign Finance in Developing Countries

Author:
Scott Morris, Rowan Rockafellow, and Alan Cameron
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Sovereign bond guarantees (SBGs) are an effective but underutilized instrument available to the US government in support of developing country partners. By protecting bond purchasers in the event of a foreign issuer country’s default, SBGs substantially reduce borrowing costs for developing country governments. In this CGD policy paper, we estimate the costs and benefits of historical US sovereign bond guarantees in order to model the use of SBGs for climate finance purposes. We demonstrate that the US government-provided SBG has the effect of conferring the US government’s cost of borrowing on the partner government. On that basis, it represents substantial savings for these countries. Based on this analysis, we propose a $20 billion “Green” SBG program aimed at financing climate change mitigation efforts in 28 emerging market economies. We estimate that the US government could support $20 billion in bond issuances through a subsidy outlay of $2 billion, resulting in a 22 percent reduction in borrowing cost of the target countries, which represents $4 billion in budgetary saving for their governments. We propose that the subsidy appropriations in support of the guarantees be retained and recycled within the Green SBG program, which would substantially improve the financial leverage of the program over time. We also suggest that the program could be used for climate adaptation purposes by targeting a different group of developing countries
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Finance, Sustainability, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

715. Governing the Global Commons: Challenges and Opportunities for US-Japan Cooperation

Author:
Kristi Govella, John Bradford, Kyoko Hatakeyama, Saadia M. Pekkanen, Setsuko Aoki, James Lewis, and Motohiro Tsuchiya
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The global commons—domains beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of any single state but to which all states have access—are essential to the stability and prosperity of the international order. In addition to the high seas, outer space, the atmosphere, and Antarctica, which are defined as global commons by international law, analysts have also suggested that other domains such as cyberspace may also qualify as potential commons. These domains provide essential public goods such as trade routes, transportation and communication networks, fish stocks, satellite imagery, global positioning, and e-commerce infrastructure that benefit countries around the world. To successfully manage the resources of the global commons and ensure open access to their spaces, effective governance structures must exist to accommodate and integrate the interests and responsibilities of state and non-state actors. Consequently, states have tried to come to agreements in each domain about how to enable broad access, avoid conflict, and enable cooperation. Over time, these discussions have resulted in the creation for each domain of a “regime,” a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge (see Box 1). These regimes can take shape in the form of international law, national law, local regulations, private standards, and institutional bodies. They differ dramatically in maturity and complexity: the governance regime of the oceans has developed over the course of centuries, while the rules and norms of cyberspace have only had a few decades to coalesce. However, all these regimes attempt to solve similar dilemmas surrounding shared access and resources.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Democracy, Economy, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

716. Building a Quad-South Korea Partnership for Climate Action

Author:
Kristi Govella
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Climate change is a pressing global problem that requires action at the local, national, and international levels. While most policy has logically focused on creating international pacts to address and mitigate climate change, interest in regional or minilateral cooperation among smaller groups of countries has also grown in recent years. When the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—more commonly known as the Quad—convened its first leader-level summit in March 2021, its member countries Australia, India, Japan, and the United States identified climate change as a priority for the grouping and for the Indo-Pacific. They established a Quad Climate Working Group to strengthen implementation of the Paris Agreement and to cooperate on climate mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, capacity building, and finance.1 Since then, the Quad has continued to expand its climate activities. In September 2021, the grouping added the formation of a green-shipping network and the establishment of a clean-hydrogen partnership to its goals.2 In May 2022, the four partners took the additional step of launching the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP).3 Why have the Quad countries decided to include climate change on their agenda? They share serious concerns about climate change, which poses a significant threat to themselves and to the Indo-Pacific as a whole. In recent years, climate change has risen in prominence on the domestic political agendas of the four Quad partners, and there are gains to be achieved through coordination and cooperation of their separate national efforts. At a time when many countries feel that international institutions simply are not working quickly or effectively enough, minilateral initiatives such as the Quad have gained appeal as a more flexible way to facilitate joint action.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Partnerships, Quad Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

717. The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations

Author:
Jessica Drun and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
There is a campaign underway by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to reinterpret UN Resolution 2758 as based on its “One China” Principle and spread the fallacy that, through the resolution, UN member states came to a determination that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Yet, in passing the resolution in 1971, the countries solely intended to grant the seat occupied by the Republic of China in the General Assembly and the Security Council to the PRC. This is reflected in the official historic record and meeting minutes as well as in the resolutions raised at the time for the General Assembly’s consideration. The PRC understood then that the resolution did not contain the Taiwan conclusions it wanted. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai noted that, if Resolution 2758 passed, “the status of Taiwan is not yet decided.” Beijing, through its proxies at the UN, expressed its unwillingness to join the organization if it allowed “‘two Chinas,’ ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ or ‘the status of Taiwan remaining to be determined.’” However, given that Beijing did not enjoy the same level of international influence then as it does today, it did not reject the resolution when it passed. Instead, PRC officials assumed the “China” seat and only later began to leverage their position to promote Beijing’s stance on Taiwan at the UN level. The PRC’s efforts to rewrite Taiwan’s status at the UN ramped up in the 1990s and early 2000s at the same time as the island’s democratization. The PRC has since worked to “internationalize” its “One China” Principle and to conflate it with UN Resolution 2758, a revisionist shift from the original intent of the document. Beijing has managed to further institutionalize and normalize its stance on Taiwan within the UN by signing secret agreements with UN bodies, restricting Taiwan’s access to the UN and its facilities, and embedding PRC nationals across various levels of UN staff. The UN and its specialized agencies have not made the texts of these agreements, such as that of the 2005 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the PRC and the World Health Organization, available to the public or to any entity beyond the main signatories, though leaked guidance memos provide insights into the scope of the MOU’s content (See Appendix B). The PRC has likewise sought to force its views on nomenclature relating to Taiwan within the UN. This includes withholding UN accreditation from NGOs and civil society groups that do not refer to Taiwan as a part of the PRC in their organizational materials or on their websites. Recently, it has come to light that the PRC and its representatives have altered historic UN documents to change references of “Taiwan” to “Taiwan, Province of China.” (Examples are presented in a case study.) These developments have played out alongside marked shifts in the guidance of the UN Office of Legal Affairs on Taiwan, where it only 15 years ago cited an ambiguous and undefined “One China” policy, but now reiterates the PRC position on Taiwan. The PRC has likewise used UN Resolution 2758 and bilateral normalization agreements with other member states to falsely claim that its “One China” Principle is a universally accepted norm. It has also ensured that a plurality of countries back its views at the UN level and will cast votes alongside it—particularly on issues of Taiwan’s participation—and it reinforces this support through economic pressure on governments. The PRC’s efforts to constrain Taiwan at the UN have broader implications for international governance, as it shows a prioritization of one member state’s national interests over the global community’s—as exemplified by Taiwan’s damaging exclusion from global health debates during the coronavirus pandemic. The United States opposes the PRC’s attempts to redefine UN Resolution 2758 and has pushed back against UN statements claiming that Taiwan is a province of the PRC, including issuing a 2007 “non-paper” asserting its position that Taiwan’s status is not yet determined. The PRC has recently attempted to use its narrative of the “One China” Principle as embedded in UN Resolution 2758 to call into question the legitimacy of longstanding US policy on Taiwan—including the Taiwan Relations Act, which is US law.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, United Nations, and International Community
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America

718. Embedding Human Rights in European and US China Policy

Author:
Malin Oud
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe and the United States share an interest in promoting human rights in China but often struggle to affect change in this regard. Because of ineffective approaches and low political commitment, human rights are a marginalized issue in transatlantic China policy and an afterthought to commercial interests. European and US policymakers have attempted to compartmentalize their approach to China, keeping human rights separate from commercial and other interests. This does little to advance human rights, and it only seems to encourage more assertive and coercive behavior by China. During the last few years, the Western assumption that trade and foreign capital would transform China into a more open and democratic society has been replaced by a disillusioned realization that its rise as a superpower is reshaping the international order. Under President Xi Jinping, China has evolved from its previous position as rule-taker and status quo-keeper at the UN to become an assertive rule-maker and international norm entrepreneur. Its vulnerability to external pressure has declined while its power to exert pressure and economic coercion on others has increased. China no longer presents its political and economic model merely as different from but as superior to that of the liberal democracies in the West. For several years now, European and US policymakers have declared an “end of naivety” in relation to China. After years of debating how to make the EU more resilient and robust, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has “given birth to geopolitical Europe,” in the words of its chief diplomat, Josep Borrell. It remains to be seen whether this moment of clarity will translate into a more principled defense of human rights and investment in democratic resilience. For this to happen, there needs to be a broader reckoning with how Western countries for decades mishandled the authoritarian challenge to the international order, often because they were pursuing stronger economic ties with the same governments they now see as systemic rivals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Business, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

719. Next-generation Perspectives on Taiwan

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, Taiwan has received a surge of international attention. As the coronavirus pandemic began to spread worldwide in 2020, Taiwan emerged as a success story with relatively low numbers of cases and deaths. In the global battle against the virus, it provided medical supplies, medicine, and technology to countries in need, cooperated on vaccine research and development, and shared its best practices. The pandemic’s impact on global semiconductor supply chains also led to heightened interest in Taiwan, which dominates the foundry market, or the outsourcing of semiconductor manufacturing. The island is home to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which produces more than 90 percent of global output of the most advanced semiconductors and is gearing up to launch next-generation three-nanometer chips this year. Another reason for increased attention to Taiwan stems from international awareness of China’s growing diplomatic and military pressure on the island. Since President Tsai Ing-wen assumed office in 2016, Beijing has poached eight of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked it from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization. The Chinese military flew nearly 1,000 warplanes in Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone in 2021. China has also stepped up its use of disinformation, United Front tactics, and other measures to widen splits within Taiwan’s political system and induce pessimism among its people about their future to achieve its goal of taking over the island. With the upswing of global interest in Taiwan, there is a pressing need for greater knowledge about the many factors that make it so crucial to the world. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to provide future leaders a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work, their writing, and their overall worldview. It imbues them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s experience and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. After a two-year hiatus due to the coronavirus pandemic, TUPP resumed in January 2022 for a virtual session. Although holding virtual meetings with officials and experts from Taiwan and the United States was not ideal, the program was nonetheless successful in achieving its goals. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s cohort also included for the first time a few experts from Europe, expanding the program’s reach. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with knowledge about Taiwan and support for sustaining and expanding its ties to the world. Hopefully, TUPP will contribute to ensuring that Taiwan remains peaceful and prosperous. The contributions here, written by nine of the eleven members of the 2022 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate even greater global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, COVID-19, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

720. Six Lessons from a Decade of Asia Strategy Simulations

Author:
Zack Cooper
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
How can the United States and its allies and partners succeed in the Indo-Pacific and better prepare for long-term competition in the region? Since the US rebalance to Asia began, the German Marshall Fund of the United States has brought together rising experts from Asia, Europe, and the United States to examine this question through a series of workshops and simulations conducted via the Young Strategists Forum (YSF). The discussions that have taken place during these sessions suggest six lessons about effective long-term strategies for the Indo-Pacific. First, trying to maintain the status quo is neither realistic nor strategic. Established powers tend to describe their objectives in terms of maintaining the status quo. This aim is not just unrealistic, but often deprives them of the ability to adjust the existing order in potentially beneficial ways. US leaders must present a vision of the future that is defined by looking forward not backward. Second, the United States needs to calibrate its responses to near-term crises with an eye to mobilizing the largest possible balancing coalition in the long run. In the simulations, US teams often miss short-term opportunities that could yield long-term benefits. Thinking strategically sometimes means allowing other countries to recognize that they face a serious threat today and cannot simply rely on the United States to solve problems. Third, overreaching by China presents opportunities for the United States. Over the last decade, China’s growth in power has been accompanied by increased assertiveness, in YSF simulations and in real life. China’s behavior creates opportunities for US and other leaders to create and expand coalitions that can push back against it. Fourth, acknowledging the reality of impending multipolarity in the Indo-Pacific can benefit the United States. US experts, including participants in YSF simulations, often tend to see the competition in the Indo-Pacific as largely bipolar between the United States and China. Regional actors, however, typically regard the Indo-Pacific as increasingly multipolar. By championing the rise of new power centers, the United States can foster a regional order that is broadly supportive of its interests yet less dependent on US guarantees. Fifth, focusing on “swinging” states as well as “swung” states pays dividends for the United States. Over the last five years, the United States has done an impressive job of bringing together those countries that are most willing to push back against China. But the region’s “swinging” states—those that have not yet made a clear alignment decision—deserve more attention. Quick wins with these actors are unlikely, but sustained engagement today can set the stage for realignment tomorrow. Finally, building robust coalitions requires US leadership. Many of the lessons we have learned over the last decade have to do with the importance of recognizing that other countries have greater capacity for independent action than is often acknowledged by US observers. That does not mean that US leadership is unimportant—in fact, YSF simulations suggest that it is critical if other states are to join coalitions to push back against China. The United States often labels its various allies as “lynchpins” or “keystones” in the region, but the fact remains that the most effective regional groupings are still reliant on its coordinating role, especially when it comes to China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Planning, Simulation, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America