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  • Author: Amy Zalman
  • Publication Date: 03-2014
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: The title of Moises Naim's newest book is an apt summary of its basic thesis. The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn't What it Used to Be is about exactly that: how the large institutions and bureaucracies that have controlled territory, ideology and wealth for the last several hundred years have been compelled to cede this control to numerous smaller players.
  • Topic: Government
  • Political Geography: United States, China
  • Publication Date: 03-2014
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: When I looked at the intelligence system, as the Chief Intelligence Officer for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces Afghanistan in 2009, I realized that for us to be successful with President Obama's new population-centric strategy we had to refocus on the right aspects of the environment. We were focused to a large degree – I would say 95 percent – on the enemy networks (e.g. Taliban, the Haqqani Network, etc.). We had tremendous fidelity on those issues because we had been studying them for years. What we quickly realized was that we had no knowledge, no real understanding of the various tribal elements within Afghanistan. We had to understand the cultures that existed, the dynamics of the type of government that we were trying to support and the population centers in which we were actually operating. We honestly did not have any deep understanding of any of that. We were trying to figure out who was who, from the local governments on up to the national government, and we did not have any captured data, information or knowledge. We did not have that real depth of understanding that we had in other places – in Iraq it took us a while to get there. Those conditions led me and two colleagues to sit down and put our thoughts together to say we needed to do something different. We needed to completely realign our focus to the population and to the build out of the Afghan National Security Forces. We outlined the color system: the red, the white, the green, and the blue. The red was the enemy; white was the population; green was Afghan National Security Forces; and blue was us. We had a really good picture of the red and the blue, but we had no picture of the green or the white, and it was really stunning. So, we decided to put our thoughts down on paper.
  • Topic: Government, National Security
  • Political Geography: Afghanistan, United States
  • Author: James A. Larocco, William L. Goodyear
  • Publication Date: 12-2013
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: The “arab Springs” that are underway throughout the region share some common features, including the yearning and visible desires for a variety of “Freedoms From”: freedom from the oppression of dictators and their stooges, freedom from economic exploitation, and freedom from censorship, to name a few. at the same time, these countries have not even begun the national dialogue on what they want “Freedom For.” Do the peoples of this region want democratic competition or the replacement of one oligarchy for another, market or statist economies, full freedom of expression, or limited national and individual discourse? In our view, as the united States looks at the region, we need to acknowledge several realities:
  • Topic: Markets
  • Political Geography: United States
  • Author: Sebastiaan Rietjens, Paul C. Van Fenema, Peter Essens
  • Publication Date: 12-2013
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: In 1973 General William F. DePuy, first commander of the u.S. army's training and Doctrine Command (tRaDOC), emphasized that it was necessary to expose soldiers to realistic battlefield conditions before they experienced actual combat.1 Doing this should improve the soldiers' preparation and thereby, in the long run, their effectiveness and efficiency. DePuy's belief was widely shared and led to the development of new training methods and a training philosophy that is often referred to as “train as you fight”. ever since, military training programs have continuously been improved and better shaped towards the real threats that soldiers were facing in the theater. a clear example reflecting the new philosophy was the establishment of the uS Combat training Centers (CtCs). the five pillars upon which the CtC program is based, require (1) that participating units be organized as they would for actual combat, (2) a dedicated, doctrinally proficient operations group, (3) a dedicated, realistic opposing force (OPFOR), (4) a training facility being capable of simulating combat conditions, and (5) a base infrastructure.2 this suggests that the main focus in training is to develop a combat ready force that is physically and psychologically prepared to fight and win wars.3 the dominant focus on combat readiness is also mentioned in a 2006 RaND report reviewing for the united States army its leadership development. the authors concluded that whereas changes in operational environment were identified (e.g. “operations other than war”), “adaptation has centered largely on the more tangible elements and mechanics of war.”
  • Topic: War
  • Political Geography: United States
  • Author: Liora Danan, Johanna Mendelson Forman
  • Publication Date: 12-2013
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: Foreign internal conflicts clearly remain a permanent feature of the u.S. foreign policy landscape, especially since the united States regularly participates in efforts to stabilize countries affected by conflict and then helps them recover afterwards. Yet u.S. government officials and the american public in general have difficulty accepting the inevitability of u.S. involvement in such efforts. to ensure lasting progress and security in post-conflict situations, the united States must adjust its approach from a focus on large military operations to preparing adequately for small-scale, long-term interventions. Most u.S. military deployments since the end of the Cold War have been in “small wars” or what the Department of Defense once called “military operations other than war.”1 Yet the military has usually been more prepared to fight large, technologically advanced wars than smaller contingencies that require greater integration with civilian capacities. as a consequence, each time the u.S. military is deployed to a complex–but “small”–emergency, it has had to relearn lessons on the ground about the best way to manage these types of contingencies. Civilian participation in stabilization and reconstruction efforts is likewise inevitable, but civilian institutions are even less prepared for such work than the military. Lessons learned over the last decade are only recently being institutionalized, through offices like Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the u.S. agency for International Development's Office of transition Initiatives (OtI). In part this is due to bureaucratic politics.
  • Topic: Foreign Policy, Cold War
  • Political Geography: Afghanistan, United States
  • Author: Larry Lewis, Sarah Holewinski
  • Publication Date: 12-2013
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: Civilian casualties can risk the success of a combat mission. While not new, this is a lesson US defense forces have had to repeatedly relearn. Historically, civilian protection and efforts to address harm became priorities only when external pressures demanded attention. as the Pentagon reshapes its defenses and fighting force for the next decade, continuing this ad hoc pattern in the future is neither strategically smart nor ethically acceptable. the budget submitted this year to Congress by Secretary of Defense Panetta charts a strategic shift toward smaller and more clandestine operations. Our forces will need to become leaner and more agile, able to take decisive action without the heavy footprint of recent wars. there are good political and economic reasons for this; certainly, maintaining a large military presence around the world is no longer feasible.Civilian casualties can risk the success of a combat mission. While not new, this is a lesson uS defense forces have had to repeatedly relearn. Historically, civilian protection and efforts to address harm became priorities only when external pressures demanded attention. as the Pentagon reshapes its defenses and fighting force for the next decade, continuing this ad hoc pattern in the future is neither strategically smart nor ethically acceptable. the budget submitted this year to Congress by Secretary of Defense Panetta charts a strategic shift toward smaller and more clandestine operations. Our forces will need to become leaner and more agile, able to take decisive action without the heavy footprint of recent wars. there are good political and economic reasons for this; certainly, maintaining a large military presence around the world is no longer feasible.
  • Topic: NATO
  • Political Geography: United States
  • Author: James Q. Roberts
  • Publication Date: 12-2013
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: The new defense strategy, “Sustaining u.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” released in January of this 2012, makes clear the mandate for the Department of Defense to continue, in fact to increase significantly, its abilities to improve the capabilities of partners around the globe. In his cover letter to the guidance, President Barack Obama directs us to “join with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity.” Likewise, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in his preface, stresses that the department will focus on “strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions.” this is not traditional guidance for the Department of Defense. Such guidance usually focuses on how to fight and win the nation's wars. But after more than ten years of combat operations in afghanistan and Iraq, and in these times of impending steep fiscal reductions the utility of partners who can share the burden of defending their countries individually, and their regions collectively, has come to the fore. this guidance displays the degree to which the department in general, and the Geographic Combatant Commanders in particular, have come to recognize the value in helping partners improve their capability to govern their own territories.
  • Topic: Foreign Policy
  • Political Geography: United States
  • Author: Alexander Ferguson
  • Publication Date: 12-2013
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: The most publicly discussed link between economics and security is the relationship between economic performance and power. the underpinnings for this relationship come from the philosophical approach that sees political power stemming from economic power. espoused at least since the 17th century by english Civil War philosopher James Harrington, these ideas saw their most well known expression in the philosophy of Karl Marx, who saw economic change driving political change. If economic structures determined politics then the link with security is clear. Carl von Clausewitz's likened war to other areas of conflict within developed societies, such as commerce and politics: “It is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it different from others.”
  • Topic: Security, War
  • Political Geography: United States, Iran, Germany
  • Author: Elizabeth Young
  • Publication Date: 12-2013
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: The year 2001 began with the inauguration of a U.S. President deliberately aiming to shift the use of the military away from the numerous humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions of the 1990s toward responding to and defeating conventional threats from nation-states. The mood was optimistic, with the new U.S. national Security Strategy, recently put in place by the departing Clinton administration, citing widespread financial prosperity and conveying no sense of an imminent threat to the homeland.2 But this situation proved fragile: the events of a single day, September 11, 2001, altered the trajectory of the United States and the way it used its military over the next decade. a nation focused on countering conventional threats was now confronted by an enemy that attacked the homeland with low-tech means in asymmetric and unexpected ways—individuals armed with box-cutters using hijacked civilian aircraft.
  • Topic: Security, War
  • Political Geography: United States
  • Author: Stuart W. Bowen, JR., Craig Collier
  • Publication Date: 12-2013
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: PRISM
  • Institution: National Defense University Press
  • Abstract: From 2004-2012, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted 387 inspections and audits of U.S.-funded projects and programs that supported stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq. Most of SIGIR's reviews focused on large-scale projects or programs. In a recent special report, SIGIR accomplished a novel study examining a particular part of the rebuilding effort. That report reviewed the remarkably diverse spectrum of programs and projects executed in a crucial geographic area in Iraq, the Rusafa Political district, delving into who built what and at what cost. The nature of this new report opens the door to deeper perspectives on what was actually achieved – and how it was achieved–by various U.S. government agencies operating during operation Iraqi Freedom (oIF). SIGIR elicited seven lessons-learned from the study, which conclude this article.
  • Topic: Government
  • Political Geography: United States, Iraq