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You searched for: Political Geography United States Remove constraint Political Geography: United States Publication Year within 10 Years Remove constraint Publication Year: within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years Remove constraint Publication Year: within 5 Years Journal Journal of Military and Strategic Studies Remove constraint Journal: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies Topic Deterrence Remove constraint Topic: Deterrence
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  • Author: Nicole Jackson
  • Publication Date: 08-2019
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
  • Institution: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
  • Abstract: This paper examines controversies over responses to hybrid warfare ranging from defensive societal and institutional resilience to more aggressive measures, and considers some of the strengths and limits of classic deterrence theory. How Canada and NATO interpret major transformations, and the language of ‘hybrid war’ that they adopt, matter because they influence responses. Reflecting NATO’s rhetoric and policies, Canada has become more internally focused, adopting a ‘whole of government’ and increasingly ‘whole of society’ approach, while at the same time taking more offensive actions and developing new partnerships and capabilities. Canada and NATO are taking significant steps towards ‘comprehensive deterrence’, yet more clarity is needed in how responses are combined to avoid the dangers of hybrid wars with no end.
  • Topic: NATO, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Deterrence
  • Political Geography: United States, Europe, Canada, North America
  • Author: Adam MacDonald
  • Publication Date: 09-2017
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
  • Institution: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
  • Abstract: China is embarking on a comprehensive modernization program to quantitatively and qualitatively improve their nuclear force. These efforts, however, do not reflect or indicate a distinct shift in Chinese views towards or policy governing the purpose and use of nuclear weapons, but to achieve and maintain a secured second strike capability in a changing strategic landscape. Specifically, military developments by the United States including Ballistic Missile Defence and Precision Global Strike are seen as threatening the credibility of their nuclear deterrent, motivating the construction and deployment of a more modern, diverse and capable force. These force reconfigurations, however, create the potential of causing confusing and misunderstandings with the United States, and other nuclear powers, of the rationales informing their improvement. Ensuring the nuclear force balance between Beijing and Washington remains a minor and largely benign matter separated from and not influencing other more divisive matters is critical in the maintenance of their relatively stable, but increasingly complicated and tense, great power relationship and the international system in general. In order to achieve this, both states must clearly signal an understanding of their nuclear relationship as one defined by mutual vulnerability and the necessity of providing guarantees and evidence that their respective military technological developments and force structure changes are not designed to alter this reality.
  • Topic: Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, Modernization
  • Political Geography: United States, China, Asia, North America
  • Author: Mark Halchin
  • Publication Date: 09-2017
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
  • Institution: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
  • Abstract: The reasoning behind North Korea’s continued efforts to develop a nuclear deterrent remains puzzling to many, with the heavy costs and behavior of the regime leading to the belief that it is irrational. This paper argues that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is instead a rational strategy for the regime. The perceived threat from South Korean and American military forces, as well as its own ineffective conventional forces, make a North Korean nuclear program a viable and relatively cheap deterrent. Its limited foreign relations and near-total dependence on China largely insulate it from economic punishment. Finally, the nature of the regime allows it to disregard popular opinion while forcing it to accommodate military demands for a nuclear deterrent. The necessity of nuclear weapons for defence and the few downsides of possessing them means that Pyongyang is unlikely to give them up, thus dooming denuclearization efforts to failure.
  • Topic: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, Denuclearization
  • Political Geography: United States, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America