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1. Facing Pressure: Iran executes former Defence Minister

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iran executed on January 14, 2022, a British-Iranian national who once served as its deputy defence minister, defying calls from London and Washington for his release. Alireza Akbari was arrested in 2019 and accused of spying for Britain. He served as a defence minister between 2000 and 2005 under former President Mohammad Khatami, and he fought during the Iraq-Iran war. He also served in other high-ranking positions in the navy and the ministry of defence’s research centre, and was appointed as the general secretariat of the national security council.
Topic:
Security, Elites, and Capital Punishment
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Iran, and Middle East

2. The Return of the Foreign Fighters and Their Families to Their Homeland: Existing Practices and Considerations Regarding Security and Human Rights

Author:
Katerina Christoforaki
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
The creation of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has attracted an unprecedented flow of thousands of people from more than 100 countries all over the world to join their cause. After the fall of the so-called caliphate, the countries involved have to deal with the aftermath of the conflict and the future threat of the resurgence of ISIS or other terrorist groups. The people who volunteered and joined ISIS might pose a security threat in the future. This paper aims to examine the different approaches that countries have taken regarding the return of foreign fighters (FFs) and their families who joined ISIS to their homeland. This is a multidimensional and complex matter since it has legal, moral, and political implications, and therefore the decisions in this regard are never unanimous, nor do they come without criticism and opposition. On the one hand, it would be easier to just leave the FFs and their families there, prosecute them there and incarcerate them there. It would also be easier to collect evidence and to have testimonies of the witnesses and the survivors, and also it would keep the potential security threat away from their homeland. However, this would only be beneficial for the countries of origin and in the short term as it wouldn‘t solve the problem of radicalization. In fact, it might fuel it even more, and the proximity of the ISIS member in prisons or in camps could benefit them to rebuild their network and plan future attacks. Moreover, leaving them there would be against all human rights norms regarding the death penalty, fair trial, torture, rights of the child, and more. On the other hand, the return of the fighters and their families could indeed pose a danger to the security of the homeland. Not all of the returnees have committed punishable crimes and for those who have, very often there is not enough admissible evidence to the national courts. In fact, in the case of women and children, the countries are more reluctant to their return because they might have not taken part in the atrocities but that does not mean that they are innocent and bear no responsibility. Complicated is also the case of children and teenagers, some of whom have taken part in the atrocities willingly or unwillingly, some were brought by their families, some traveled alone in order to join ISIS, and some were born under ISIS control and risk statelessness.
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters, and Repatriation
Political Geography:
Iraq, United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Syria, United States of America, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

3. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

4. Using Risk Analysis to Shape Border Management: A Review of Approaches during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Kelley Lee, Julianne Piper, and Jennifer Fang
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
The near universal adoption of travel measures by governments to control the spread of COVID-19 has proved controversial during the pandemic. National responses have been highly varied and frequently changing, and the use of travel measures—ranging from advisories and screening to quarantine, testing, immunity certification, and restrictions on entry—has been poorly coordinated across jurisdictions. Particularly in the early stages of the crisis, this created chaos for travelers and the travel sector, and caused significant economic and social harms. Many governments also failed to clearly communicate the rationale for using travel measures, the evidence underpinning them, and the measures’ role within overall pandemic response strategies. There is now substantial evidence that these measures’ early and stringent use by some governments during the initial stages of the pandemic slowed the importation of the virus and reduced its onward transmission. Yet, there is also growing recognition of weaknesses in the quality of evidence available to inform policy decisions. Evaluating the appropriateness of travel measures and applying them effectively during future public-health emergencies will depend on international consensus on methodologies that lead to a more harmonized and coordinated approach and to greater public trust in policy decisions. This report presents a comparative analysis of 11 publicly available methodologies used to assess travel-related risks during the pandemic—those of Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Air Transport Association, World Health Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Union. It offers a set of lessons learned and recommendations, including a proposed decision instrument that could improve the use of risk analysis for border management during future public-health emergencies.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, International Organization, Governance, Border Control, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Taiwan, South Korea, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Global Focus, and United States of America

5. Monitoring Progress on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Author:
Robert U. Nagel, David Guzman, and Carla Koppel
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
To advance the WPS Agenda and monitor progress, in 2019 the governments of Finland and Spain initiated Commitment 2025 (C-25). The member countries agreed to track their efforts to increase the meaningful and substantive participation of women along nine specific commitments related to conflict prevention and resolution, negotiation and mediation processes. This agreement currently has 13 signatories: Finland, Spain, Norway, Iceland, Germany, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Namibia, Canada, Uruguay, and Argentina. The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) has partnered with C-25 members to track progress toward the commitments. To increase transparency and accountability while also providing metrics for progress, we collected and analyzed data on women’s representation in political governance, diplomatic, and peace and security institutions. We combined data from various sources to generate analysis and insights about the status of progress on C-25 commitments. Findings indicate that concerted efforts are needed to reach targets by 2025. Despite some progress, women’s participation and meaningful inclusion in matters of peace and security is still lacking. Governments can and must do better including and empowering women in peace and security institutions and processes. The data underscore the importance of continued dedication to women’s empowerment and the importance of holding governments accountable through monitoring progress.
Topic:
Security, Women, Accountability, Peace, Transparency, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, Norway, Argentina, Uruguay, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, Iceland, and Namibia

6. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America

7. Sign of the Times: How the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review Affects Relations with Africa

Author:
Zainab Usman and Jonathan Glennie
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In March 2021, the British government published a vision document: “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.”1 Previously, the government had issued documents on security, defense, development, or foreign policy, but this integrated review bundled together all aspects of policy related to a vision of a so-called Global Britain. This newly integrated approach to policymaking mirrors a strategic consolidation within the UK government, specifically the merger of the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to become a new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). While the review is framed as a necessary response to a changing global landscape, domestic political considerations around the British exit from the European Union (Brexit) weigh heavily. The review also points to the current UK government’s inclination to prize geopolitical competition over a previous emphasis on global cooperation. Steep cuts to the UK’s generous foreign aid budget as well as the abolition of DFID have already drawn significant academic, policy, and media attention. Yet these actions are part of a broader UK strategy to redefine the country’s relations to the rest of the world, with significant implications beyond the controversial foreign aid cuts for poor countries, including those in Africa. The review will shape relations with a continent that has deep historical ties from the colonial era, a large diasporic presence, and long-standing economic relations with the UK. This analysis draws out the implications of the UK’s 2021 integrated review for African countries and recommends next steps for African and other international stakeholders to navigate the UK’s overhauled external relations strategy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Development, and Integration
Political Geography:
Africa and United Kingdom

8. France and AUKUS: Bouncing Back to Live Up to Pacific Challenges

Author:
Jérémy Bachelier and Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Back in September 2021, the announcement of AUKUS – the defense partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) was a shock to Paris. Not only it meant the brutal conclusion of a submarine deal signed in 2016, but it also provoked a major breach of confidence in France’s relations with its three key partners – shedding crude light on the divergences of approaches regarding the best way to salvage the rules-based order and address the China challenge. This initiative, intended to be a coordinated response to the Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific, called into question France’s strategic positioning in the region. One year after, however, AUKUS does not seem to have marked a major turning point regarding the French strategy in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the Pacific. After an immediate aftershock, France's bilateral relations with Washington, Canberra and to an extent London gradually recovered. Political and strategic discussions at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, the recent visits of the Australian Prime minister and minister of Defense in France and numerous bilateral calls at the end of Summer between French and Australian political and military leaders have pointed to a positive dynamic for an improved strategic cooperation in the region. Rather than prompting a radical change in the France's Indo-Pacific strategy, AUKUS highlighted a fault line between the strategic/political rhetoric level and the operational level of defense cooperation regarding the French engagement in this region. The multiple maritime security and climate change challenges in the Pacific Islands region require France to cooperate closely with its regional partners, starting with Australia, and continue to promote effective multilateralism. In addition, the growing risks of high-intensity conflicts in the vicinity of the Pacific Islands region, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and/or in the South China Sea, require for France to speed up the strengthening of its interoperability with its regional allies in the coming years and probably to decide on the role it would like to - and be able to - concretely support its own interest and allies.
Topic:
Security, Maritime, AUKUS, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, France, Australia, United States of America, Pacific Ocean, and Pacific Islands

9. NATO Should Defend Europe, Not Pivot to Asia

Author:
Jan Gerber
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In 2021, the U.K., France, and Germany deployed 21 naval ships to the Indo-Pacific with a stated aim of helping the U.S. shoulder the burden of collective security and sustaining the “rules-based international order.” Naval deployments by the U.K., France, and Germany are symbolic and unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia. A European pivot to the Indo-Pacific draws scarce attention and resources away from defense issues in Europe. Instead of encouraging Asian forays, the U.S. should encourage its European allies to assume primary responsibility for European security, freeing the United States to focus on the Pacific, if needed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, France, Germany, and Indo-Pacific

10. UK, Australia and ASEAN cooperation for safer seas: A case for elevating the cyber–maritime security nexus

Author:
Huong Le Thu and Bart Hogeveen
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
A safe and secure Indo-Pacific maritime domain is vital to the UK, Australia and Southeast Asian states for their national prosperity. While there are common objectives, the three parties have different priorities, capabilities and areas of expertis. There’s a long history of multilateral cooperation between Southeast Asia and Australia, among other key partners. In the post-Brexit context and in the light of the UK Government’s Indo-Pacific tilt, London would do well to harmonise its maritime engagements with allies such as Australia and align its activities with priorities of Southeast Asian partners. While maritime security cooperation at sea tends to be dominated by activities, programs and operations of navies, we recommend taking a comprehensive approach to maritime security cooperation that includes partnerships with non-military actors and considers civilian-related aspects of maritime security. In finding a value-added role in the crowded space of maritime security cooperation and capacity building, we suggest exploring UK–Australia–ASEAN cooperation on issues of technology, cybersecurity and maritime-based digital infrastructure. Those are transformational aspects that will define the future of maritime activities in the Indo-Pacific and affect Southeast Asia’s safety, security, livelihoods and regional economic competitiveness. This scoping report recommends UK–Australia–ASEAN cooperation to elevate and further explore the cyber–maritime security nexus.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Cybersecurity, Maritime, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Australia, and Indo-Pacific