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11. What is new about the reset between Israel and Turkey?

Author:
Selin Nasi
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Entering 2021, revising its foreign policy became an ever more pressing necessity for Ankara, in the light of both international and domestic developments. The Turkish government only took steps towards mending its broken ties with countries in the region, including Israel, when the economic cost of its assertive policies began to threaten Erdoğan’s rule. Israeli PM Netanyahu’s defeat in the 2021 elections provided an opportunity for Ankara to step up its diplomatic overtures toward Israel. Bilateral relations may follow a different course than they did in the 2000s, primarily because the basic parameters of the relationship between Israel and Turkey have changed since Israel made new friends in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The erosion of institutions and the subsequent personalization of Turkish foreign policy render bilateral relations prone to crisis. For Israelis, this is a manageable risk, at least for now, given the benefits Ankara can expect from normalizing relations with Israel. Against the backdrop of an intensifying power competition between the US and China, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, and the current security landscape in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, opportunities for cooperation between Israel and Turkey remain dependent on the resolution of long-standing issues.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Israel

12. Greece and Turkey in the world today: the public’s view

Author:
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Panagiota Manoli, and Evangelos Areteos
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The Policy Paper by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Senior Research Fellow, Head of ELIAMEP Turkey Programme; Associate Professor, University of Bilkent; Panagiota Manoli, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Assistant Professor of Political Economy of International Relations, University of Peloponnese and Evangelos Areteos, Research Associate at ELIAMEP Turkey Programme, highlights the main findings of the third joint poll in Greece and Turkey, which took place in the first ten days of May 2022. Among other things, it aims to capture and compare the perceptions of Greek and Turkish public opinion regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the role of the United States and NATO in European security, and Greek and Turkish identity.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Greece

13. Turkey’s quest for Strategic Autonomy

Author:
Alexandros Diakopoulos
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Ankara is pursuing a radical revision of the regional status quo by projecting power in neighboring regions with increasing aggression and disregard for international legality. Turkey moved from a security-based to a power-based foreign policy and took advantage of the power vacuum in Eastern Mediterranean to make a bid for regional hegemony by resorting to the use of hard power. The Turkish army developed autonomous expeditionary capabilities, bolstered by a strengthened national defense industry. The lessons learned in Syria clearly informed the series of Turkish foreign policy moves that followed. A revisionist Turkey involved itself in all regional theaters of conflict, fomenting instability in the region while also reaping strategic and economic benefits. These interventions shaped Turkish-Russian competitive cooperation and strategic realignment. Since 2016 the relationship has evolved into something almost symbiotic, with the two countries coordinating their presence on multiple fronts. The two countries are drawn to one another by their shared authoritarian models of governance and similar strategic cultures and operational codes: Both countries are revisionist, aggressive and assertive on their peripheries. Both countries claim to be surrounded, which serves as a pretext for their unilateral actions. Both countries have militarized their foreign policy by conducting hybrid warfare, using surrogate forces and coercing countries that resist.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Strategic Autonomy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Middle East

14. Achieving qualitative superiority: Greek conscription and the Turkish threat

Author:
Antonis Kamaras and Nikos Stournaras
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
This policy paper argues that, by emulating its peer countries, wealthy, small to medium sized democracies facing national security threats, in Northern Europe and the Middle East (namely Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Israel), Greece can modernize its conscript component and thus attain qualitative superiority over the Turkish Army. Turkey’s conscript model is riven by deep-seated class, geographical and ethnic cleavages, giving to Greek political and military leaders the opportunity to gain a qualitative military edge through judicious modernization of the Greek conscript model. Such a modernization is eminently feasible today as Greece’s economic crisis has created the political space to overcome resistance to the reform of conscription. By contrast, Greece’s main national security threat, Turkey, belongs to that group of authoritarian or illiberal countries which have suboptimal conscription models, featuring evasion of conscript service by the well-educated, inefficient training and harsh, counterproductive treatment of those conscripts who do serve. Greece, also due to its post WWII illiberalism or authoritarianism, and not unlike Taiwan which has a similar legacy, has not infused its conscript component with demanding training and operational standards, roles and missions. The time is ripe, due to the resurgence of the Turkish threat and Greece’s economic crisis, which has removed many of the country’s outdated shibboleths, to modernise Greek conscription, as its peer countries have done, and thus acquire an Army qualitatively superior to that of Turkey. By doing so, Greek policy-makers will decisively strengthen Greece’s deterrence and produce positive externalities for the consripts themselves . Indeed, the more effective conscription becomes in operational terms for the Greek Armed Forces, the greater the benefits to be reaped in civilian life.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Conscription
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Greece

15. The Impact of Finland's and Sweden's Accession to NATO on the Security of the Alliance

Author:
Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO will increase the Alliance’s ability to conduct collective defence missions in the Baltic Sea region and to deter Russia. Therefore, the gains from the enlargement of the Alliance will far exceed the costs, which may include the need to create a new command responsible for missions on the Northern Flank of NATO. However, Türkiye’s opposition may prolong the accession process and increase the risk associated with the intensification of Russia’s provocative actions against the candidates.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Finland, North America, and Sweden

16. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

17. Russian-Turkish Relations and Implications for U.S. Strategy and Operations

Author:
Hanna Notte and Chen Kane
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia and Turkey’s complex relationship has significant implications for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic interests. The two states cooperate, deconflict, and compete in multiple theatres within Turkey’s extended neighborhood, which straddles United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and United States European Command (USEUCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). 1 Their bilateral strategic trade has created mutual dependencies and vulnerabilities across multiple sectors, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has many implications for the Russia-Turkey relationship. While engaging actively with Russia and stoking fears that its commercial ties with Moscow could serve Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions, Turkey has also provided TB2 Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, invoked the Montreux Convention, and offered itself as a mediator on various operational issues in the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result of these steps, Turkey’s leverage over both Russia and NATO allies has increased since February 2022. From a U.S. perspective, the implications have been mixed as Turkey has translated its increased leverage into foreign policy steps that threaten to undermine U.S. interests and NATO cohesion. Turkey remains of significant importance to the United States in enabling its interests in the three aforementioned AORs, preventing third actors like China and Iran from operating in the “seams,” and generating an enhanced, unified, and credible NATO capability and capacity in response to Russian aggression. It follows that Turkey’s interplay with Russia in its extended neighborhood has far-reaching implications for the United States and NATO. This study aims to shed light on this relationship, its likely trajectory over the coming decade, its implications for U.S. strategic interests, and how the United States and NATO might shape the Russia- Turkey interplay to their advantage.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

18. Turkey's Growing Role as a Security Actor in Somalia: Dynamics and Motivations

Author:
Abdurrahim Siradag
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Academic Inquiries
Institution:
Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:
Somalia has a special place in the foreign policy of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which has been in power since November 2002. Turkey's relations with Somalia started to develop after the official visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Somalia on 19 August 2011, who was the prime minister at that time, to support Somalis affected by severe drought and civil war. After 2011, Turkey launched one of the largest humanitarian aid campaigns to Somalia. Turkey has not only developed a soft power policy in Somalia but also started to implement a hard power policy. In this respect, Turkey has been training hundreds of Somali soldiers and police in both Ankara and Mogadishu since 2012. At the same time, Turkey opened its largest military base abroad in Somalia in 2017. This research explores the reasons and dynamics behind Turkey's deepening of its security policy in Somalia and sheds light on what Turkey's security policy means for Somalia. The research argues that there is a combination of factors driving Turkey's security policy towards Somalia, including socio-cultural, economic, and geopolitical. This study examines Turkey's security policy with a holistic approach, using conceptual and theoretical perspectives.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Soft Power, and AKP
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, Middle East, and Somalia

19. Somalia (Horn of Africa, part 2 of 2)

Author:
Guled Ahmed
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Guled Ahmed joins the program to discuss the political climate in Somalia, its recent elections, security conditions, and the role of external actors including the African Union, Gulf states, Turkey, and the U.S.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Elections, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, Somalia, United States of America, Gulf Nations, and Horn of Africa

20. Can the West Afford to Let the World Go Hungry? Overcoming Challenges to Establishing a Humanitarian Corridor in the Black Sea

Author:
Isak Runarsson
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
While economic interdependencies do not prevent war, witnessed most recently by Russia’s naked war of conquest in Ukraine, the costs of war in a globalised world spread far and wide. Russia has taken the world’s food markets hostage by blockading Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea. The resulting food price increases make a humanitarian crisis in the world’s poorest countries increasingly likely; this, in turn may lead to regime fragility and turmoil in the international system. The question of lifting the blockade by establishing a human corridor into the port of Odessa has recently been much discussed. There are challenges to any such effort, both strategic and operational. Yet a careful analysis reveals that the costs and risks of non-intervention are greater than the risks of intervening. An international naval force, co-led by the EU or its member states and Turkey is the best option for such a mission.
Topic:
Security, Food Security, Hunger, Maritime, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Black Sea