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42. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)
- Author:
- Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
43. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine
- Author:
- Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine
44. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world
- Author:
- Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
45. EU – Pacific Talks: EU – Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia
- Author:
- Tomáš Moudrý
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Europeum Institute for European Policy
- Abstract:
- If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia, here you can read the report from the debate written by Tomáš Moudrý. During the debate, it was discussed, for example, that despite the considerable geographical distance, the EU and the Indo-Pacific region are now more interconnected than ever before and both sides are seeking to strengthen their partnership in many areas, with security policy now one of the most important due to many factors.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia-Pacific
46. Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine
- Author:
- Benjamin H. Friedman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether via the NATO alliance or some lesser means. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Those dangers are why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia today, and they would induce similar caution if the United States guaranteed Ukraine’s security. Lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine will be unserious and unbelievable. Fake security guarantees for Ukraine might have some deterrent value, despite their lack of credibility, given the terrible risks involved for Russia in testing those promises. However, fake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine’s security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. Announcing plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security once the war ends would encourage Russia to continue fighting. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees or fighting for Ukraine and sparking an immediate nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
47. El modelo de intervención militar ruso-soviético
- Author:
- Alberto Priego
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Desde comienzos del siglo XX, Rusia y la URSS ha promovido un modelo de intervención militar que responde más a su visión imperialista que a sus necesidades de seguridad. Este hecho ha provocado que salvo cuando la intervención consistiera en una operación relámpago de cambio de gobierno, las aventuras militares hayan acabado en fracaso. Además, la incapacidad de Moscú para modernizar de facto sus doctrinas militares, unido a su atraso tecnológico, ha convertido al ejército ruso en una estructura ineficaz donde el factor humano no es valorado. Este trabajo pretende elaborar un modelo de intervención ruso-soviética que se repite en todas las aventuras militares rusas desde los años cincuenta hasta hoy mismo.
- Topic:
- Security, Imperialism, History, and Military Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Soviet Union, Chechnya, Hungary, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Czechoslovakia
48. EU-Ukraine wartime trade: Overcoming difficulties, forging a European path
- Author:
- Svitlana Taran
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- During the first year of Russia’s war in Ukraine, EU trade-liberalisation measures and EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provided Ukraine with alternative export routes and allowed the country to reorient part of its exports to the EU market. However, the insufficient logistics capacity and lack of adequate coordination and cooperation during the operation of Solidarity Lanes led to tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours. While a compromise between the European Commission and the Eastern European countries allowed the extension of temporary trade-liberalisation measures for a further year, resolving the immediate crisis, more is needed to ensure their smooth operation. This Discussion Paper provides recommendations on how the EU can further intensify efforts to facilitate Ukraine’s trade flows and prevent sudden trade disruptions and restrictions. These include: Enhance the strategic alignment and connectivity between Ukraine and the EU; Ensure security guarantees and increase the capacity of seaport corridors; Enhance coordination and unity between the Commission, EU member states and Ukraine; Avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lanes' disruptions; Protect critical port and export infrastructure from Russia’s attacks; Facilitate EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Trade Liberalization, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
49. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat
- Author:
- Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden
50. Charting a Transatlantic Approach to Russia: A Working Paper of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Although the United States and Europe are not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, Moscow clearly sees itself as being at war with the West. The United States and Europe, therefore, must be prepared for a period of what is likely to be prolonged confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of that confrontation. Successfully navigating this period of sustained confrontation requires continued cohesion and coordination between the United States and Europe to ensure they share a common picture of the challenge that Russia poses and the necessary response. Russia’s war in Ukraine has precipitated rapid and major changes in Europe and broader ripple effects that are altering political dynamics much farther afield. Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia itself is changing in still unknowable ways. Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking the country in a more authoritarian direction, Russian society is shifting, and the Russian military’s degradation in Ukraine means that the nature of the Russian threat is evolving. Russia’s war, therefore, requires the allies to re-examine long-held assumptions and understandings about Russia and its intentions and capacity, and it is those updated assessments that should guide the transatlantic partners’ future policy approach toward Moscow. There is no going back to the way things were with Russia prior to its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Western allies must build on ongoing efforts to constrict and constrain the Kremlin’s ability to sustain aggression in Ukraine and more broadly beyond Russia’s borders. It also will require the development of a long-term and sustainable approach to restoring peace and stability to Europe, increasing resilience to the Kremlin’s tools and tactics, and planting the seeds for a less confrontational relationship with a future Russia. In many ways, such an approach will resemble the containment strategy first set out in the 1940s, a strategy designed to apply steady and forceful counterpressure to a regime whose paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West, just as the Putin regime does today. Each of the transatlantic allies’ preferred policy approaches will reflect their own proximity to and history with Russia, as well as current political realities within their own borders. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus within the alliance that the unprecedented cohesion and coordination among allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion must hold. To that end, this working paper provides a starting point for the development of a transatlantic approach to Russia. It articulates expectations for relations with Russia that should guide the allies’ approach, outlines the broad objectives that a transatlantic Russia policy should seek to accomplish, and in some cases more specific near-term actions the allies can take. The analysis reflects two years of dialogue that CNAS has conducted through its Transatlantic Forum on Russia (TFR). It brings together and builds on previous work facilitated by the Forum, including policy papers, op-eds, articles, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, “What Comes Next for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” and other cited publications.1 The paper aims to provide fodder for policymakers and experts on both side of the Atlantic to debate and refine through continued dialogue, including through the future work of the TFR.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
51. Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its nuclear rhetoric has become more permissive, more inconsistent, and more instrumental. Russia has also placed greater emphasis on military exercises involving nuclear-capable weapons, and it has altered policies and planning for its nuclear forces. Although it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions as the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the lessons that Russia draws from it uncertain, the changes in Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons since its invasion suggest that Russia is likely to adopt a more assertive nuclear force posture, especially with respect to its non-strategic nuclear weapons, in order to signal that the country will no longer be a status quo power and increase the credibility of its nuclear threats. Russia is also likely to increase its efforts to test NATO cohesion—potentially through greater nuclear provocations and/or by signaling an insincere willingness to engage in forms of arms control or cooperative threat reduction—and continue to look for opportunities to leverage nuclear weapons to signal great-power status. In a future war with NATO, Russia would likely perceive the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, either to seek victory against superior NATO conventional forces through nuclear first use on the battlefield, or to prevent defeat by those NATO forces. Moreover, since 2022, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. and Russian policymakers to discern each other’s red lines, raising the risk of unintended escalation. Heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric at home could also alter the public’s views of acceptable nuclear use, eroding a potential constraint on Kremlin decision-making. Finally, changes since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate both reduced Russian commitment to nonproliferation as its image increasingly becomes that of a rogue actor in international affairs, and diminished opportunities for nuclear arms control, for now.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
52. CTC Sentinel: August 2023 Issue
- Author:
- Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, Abdul Sayed, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, Lucas Webber, and Alec Bertina
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- As we enter a new era of calibrated counterterrorism 22 years after 9/11, in this month’s feature article senior analysts at the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center provide a unique window into the U.S. government’s continuing efforts to suppress international terrorism. NCTC director Christine Abizaid writes: “It is clear to me that Americans at home and abroad would be confronted with a more severe terrorism threat if it were not for the sustained and focused efforts of the entire U.S. CT community over the past 22 years. As we approach another 9/11 anniversary, I asked senior analysts from NCTC to share more with the public and academic community about the constant, behind-the-scenes work of CT professionals across the government. It is my hope that, through this product, others can gain a greater degree of insight into what this community regularly confronts in its mission to protect innocent civilians from persistent terrorist adversaries.” In the second feature article, Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, and Abdul Sayed examine the enduring threat posed by Islamic State Khorasan (ISK). They write: “An analysis of ISK’s operations, outreach, and clashes with the Taliban indicate that the organization remains capable of strategic adaptation and is only broadening and deepening its influence in the region, posturing to become a truly regional organization. And while the Taliban have demonstrated some capacity in targeting ISK commanders, any security gains are unlikely to hold in the absence of sustained counter-ISK operations.” With the Islamic State earlier this month announcing the appointment of its fifth caliph, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, Aymenn Al-Tamimi examines what little is known about the group’s recent paramount leaders. He writes: “Despite the fact that the group’s caliphs are now very much ‘men of the shadows,’ there is little evidence pointing to the prospect of the group’s fragmentation in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere around the world, with the group’s affiliates seemingly willing to accept successor caliphs about whom little or nothing is publicly known.” Lucas Webber and Alec Bertina profile the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and its paramilitary wing, the Russian Imperial Legion (RIL), tracing their involvement in the Ukraine conflict since 2014. They write: “With the Wagner Group’s resources waning, there may be an opportunity for RIM/RIL to deepen its involvement in Russia’s efforts in Ukraine. This could bolster the group’s recruitment, paramilitary capabilities, and thus increase the broader threat it poses. However, the organization may face sanctions in the future from the Russian state if the Kremlin continues to clamp down on Russian pro-war ultra-nationalist elements.”
- Topic:
- Security, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, 9/11, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Russia, Syria, North America, and United States of America
53. Russian Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone Filled with Foreign Parts: Western Parts Enable Russian Lancet-3 Drone to Have Advanced Targeting and Anti-jamming Capabilities.
- Author:
- Spencer Faragasso
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed open-source images and information found on the internet, identifying several key Western parts, commonly available on the commercial market, used in the Russian Lancet-3 kamikaze drone. - The Lancet-3 is an effective combat drone that has been successful in combat operations against Ukrainian systems, including Western supplied armor and artillery. - This report follows a series of reports published in the last year by the Institute on Russian drone systems and its acquisition of foreign technology. - Russia is increasingly relying on large quantities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to identify, target, and attack Ukrainian positions, vehicles, and structures. - Russia has a limited capability to design and produce advanced strategic commodities. To build these UAVs, Russia depends on extensive procurement networks to acquire strategic commodities produced by foreign countries, particularly the United States. - Because of the use of civilian Western components in Russian military systems, the United States and its partners are intensifying controls on critical items used in Russian drones, but more needs to be done.
- Topic:
- Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
54. Satellite Imagery Update on Alabuga Shahed-136 Drone Factory
- Author:
- David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Victoria Cheng
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- Iranian-designed Shahed-136 kamikaze drones continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran-2, are produced and assembled by JSC Alabuga inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with critical assistance from Iran. Recent commercial satellite imagery appears to show that the buildings making the drones continue to operate, and at higher levels than other facilities located at the SEZ. The image, taken on a Wednesday morning in late November, shows a winter scene of the SEZ, with all the visible buildings covered in snow, except the two buildings making the Shahed-136 drone. The heat generated by the Shahed-136 buildings’ interior appears to have melted the snow on their roofs, implying ongoing operation.
- Topic:
- Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
55. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East
- Author:
- Nathan P. Olsen
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
56. De-colonising the Azerbaijan-Armenian Conflict: Breaking the Knot of Security and Dependence
- Author:
- Leila Alieva
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The recent military operation in the Nagorno Karabakh area reflects a broader regional transformation. Its essence is in the second attempt (with the first one in Azerbaijan 30 years ago) of changing the security paradigm, this time in Armenia, leading to de-colonisation of relations in the region. The core of this change is liberation from the dependence on Russia’s almost two centuries old patronage, with Nagorno Karabakh conflict evolving as a tool of this dependence. With all the contradictions over the territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and difference in current political systems, the countries seem at last to arrive to the same conclusion of Russia and her control of the Karabakh elite being one of the obstacles to the peaceful relations, reforms and integration in the West. The power balance in the region, affected by such factors as Turkey’s greater involvement, distraction of the West, Russia’s increasing isolation, besides power change in Armenia, has also contributed to the “window of opportunity” for a change of paradigms. The role and influence of the EU and the US in this process, including in deterring potential military developments, will be dependent on the perception of them by the parties as non-partisan brokers, promotion of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as independent subjects of international relations and consistency in support of democracy.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Mediation, and Interdependence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh
57. Conclusions from the use of aviation in the first half of the first year of the Ukrainian-Russian war
- Author:
- Sylwester Lubiejewski
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- The aim of the article is to suggest a desirable direction in which the Polish air force, and indeed the air forces of other NATO countries, should develop so that they are better prepared for the challenges identified in the conflict in Ukraine so far. In order to achieve the aim of the research and answer the formulated research question, the collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents, observation and interviewing took place. In order to have the ability to deter and gain air superiority during a defensive operation, the Polish air force, and air forces of other NATO countries, should have a large resource of fighter, multi-role, and fighter-bomber aircraft. An object-oriented multi-layer air defence of every military airfield needs to be organised and certain roads reconstructed as runways in the event of war. In turn, helicopter aviation units should be able to organise forward arming and refuelling points for helicopters to effectively support land forces. Attack helicopters should also have integrated fire systems that allow them to attack from a distance beyond the range of man-portable air-defence systems. All warplanes should be equipped with proven and modern systems of active and passive self-defence to make them less susceptible to enemy influence. To sum up, in light of the war in Ukraine, the article explains what aviation equipment is necessary and what actions should be taken to increase both Polish air force’s ability and other NATO air forces’ ability to perform tasks during wartime.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Air Force, Aviation, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
58. Conventional and Hybrid Actions in the Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
- Author:
- Craisor-Constantin Ionita
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- The paper aims to analytically present the existing data and information regarding notable aspects of the ongoing war in Ukraine, notably through lessons identified in the political-military field, both conventionally and hybrid. The article hypothesis starts from the consideration that even the war is not over, there are some lessons identified that should be considered for the future security of Europe and the international environment. The author uses the analytical method of research to explain the cause-effect relationship between the war itself and its future influence for the European security and world order, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. It will also theoretically test those implications to determine whether they fit the specified hypothesis. The conflict itself has deepened the international consequences of almost two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. It magnified the disastrous security situation not only in Europe, but all around the world, by creating additional energy (gas) and food (cereal) crises. Therefore, the Russian – Ukrainian War has significantly modified regional and international security environment and there are tendencies to challenge the current World order. What happened in Ukraine in the past year has and will continue to have direct implications for the European and Euro-Atlantic security, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. Therefore, this paper is significant for advising the political-military decision-makers on better understanding the modern operational environment and addapting future defence capabilities to face 21st Century Warfare.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
59. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare
- Author:
- Sarah J. Lohmann, Chuck Benson, Vytautas Butrimas, Georgios Giannoulis, and Gabriel Raicu
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the United States and its NATO partners to be confronted with the impact of hybrid warfare far beyond the battlefield. Targeting Europe’s energy security, Russia’s malign influence campaigns and malicious cyber intrusions are affecting global gas prices, driving up food costs, disrupting supply chains and grids, and testing US and Allied military mobility. This study examines how hybrid warfare is being used by NATO’s adversaries, what vulnerabilities in energy security exist across the Alliance, and what mitigation strategies are available to the member states. Cyberattacks targeting the renewable energy landscape during Europe’s green transition are increasing, making it urgent that new tools are developed to protect these emerging technologies. No less significant are the cyber and information operations targeting energy security in Eastern Europe as it seeks to become independent from Russia. Economic coercion is being used against Western and Central Europe to stop gas from flowing. China’s malign investments in Southern and Mediterranean Europe are enabling Beijing to control several NATO member states’ critical energy infrastructure at a critical moment in the global balance of power. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare will be an important reference for NATO officials and US installations operating in the European theater.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Economics, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Renewable Energy, and Hybrid Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Western Europe, and Southeast Europe
60. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War
- Author:
- Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine