International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Russia considers the rapprochement or integration into NATO of other countries of Central and Eastern Europe or the Caucasus as a direct threat, even though it does not pose any danger to its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. Instead of interpreting this process as a mere competition for influence, Russian leaders perceive it primarily as a military threat, which would even justify the use of force to counteract it. In the present article we investigate the social and ideational factors that have led to this securitization of NATO enlargement, preventing Moscow from adapting to the new game of alliances in a more pragmatic way. The concept of “ontological security” allows us to explain the consistency and permanence over time of these Russian perceptions, which are derived from its own subjective needs.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Sovereignty, Non-Traditional Threats, and Ontology
The initiative to create an autocephalous national Orthodox Church in Ukraine, proposed by the political leadership of he country, now seems more likely than ever before. The Russian Orthodox Church duly risks losing its economic support and status in the Orthodox world, which has political implications for Russia as well.
In no aspect of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture is the challenge of Alliance management more demanding than in its nuclear dimension. This is especially the case at a time when Russia’s aggressive actions and threatening behavior have fundamentally changed the security environment in Europe, and President Donald Trump’s approach to NATO has presented challenges of its own.
In this context, it is crucial that Allies understand the positions that they have agreed on in terms of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ADN), as well as nuclear weapons policy, doctrine and posture.
Considering the security benefits they receive in return for the United States’ extension of its nuclear deterrent to its NATO Allies, these states must also distinguish between the nuclear-related roles and responsibilities they are expected to take on and those with regard to which they have the option to ‘opt out’.
For its part, the Trump Administration must appreciate that if all Allies are expected to close ranks behind the enhancements to NATO’s nuclear posture that are needed in order to respond to Russia’s threatening behavior, many will require an equally robust arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation posture as a quid pro quo.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Despite concrete achievements in energy and military-technical cooperation, long-term trends, such as Russia’s growing dependence on China, India’s tilt towards the US, and tense Sino-Indian relations are not conducive to closer strategic cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, and International Cooperation
While speculation about whether Russia may repeat the Crimean scenario in Belarus should not be totally dismissed, exaggerated alarmism would not be appropriate either. Rather, Moscow’s policy is aimed at making sure that Belarus and its leadership remain critically dependent on Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Empire, and Annexation
While the idea of a “European nuclear deterrent” has a long history, it has recently made a comeback in the light of Russian aggression on the continent, growing tensions in the transatlantic relationship since the election of Donald Trump, as well as the British decision to leave the European Union. Voices are being heard in Germany in particular, arguing for stronger European nuclear autonomy.
This paper analyses how the French and British deterrents could play a broader and stronger role in ensuring the security of the continent. Discarding the idea of a single “European deterrent”, it suggests possible credible pathways to enhance European nuclear cooperation based on French and possibly British forces, preferably outside the EU context. Furthermore, it suggests that future US decisions and policies towards Europe will be a critical factor in defining the range of realistic scenarios and outcomes.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, European Union, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Europe, France, and North America
Marcin Kaczmarski, Mark Katz, and Teija Tiilikainen
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The great-power system has been in constant change since the end of the Cold War. The US became the hegemonic power, and under its shelter, the European Union was able to transform into a European-wide political body.
Soon, a group of leading regional powers started to question the universalist aspirations of the Western-led international order. Two members of this club in particular were not satisfied with the role of a regional hegemon and had more global ambitions. China has already become the largest trading nation globally, and Chinese foreign policy has assumed an assertive tone. China has both the potential to challenge US hegemony, as well as the political will to use it. Russia’s project to achieve a global great-power status, on the other hand, is inspired by its historical identity and its alleged humiliation by the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia longs for recognition of its great-power status in particular from the US.
This report focuses on relations between China and Russia on the one hand and the US and Russia on the other. It analyses the current developments and future trends in these relationships, as well as their implications for the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America
Western actors have long dominated the political processes and discourses that shape global norms impacting interstate behaviour. Yet, more recently, powerful autocratic regimes such as China and Russia have seemingly challenged democracies, emerging as potential contesters of international norms. What might be the outcome of this contestation? This paper broadly explores this query by investigating Russia’s humanitarian justifications for its Ukrainian incursion. It examines whether Russia’s claim of humanitarian intervention is more than a petty attempt to disguise pure power politics. Is Russia contesting Western understandings of humanitarian interventions in order to reshape our ideas of permissible violations of sovereignty norms to protect vulnerable populations? Using Atlas.ti, we also explore global responses to Russia’s humanitarian claims. Our initial findings indicate that the Ukrainian intervention enabled Russia to contest Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and to champion an alternative version of humanitarian intervention with some limited success.
Topic:
Imperialism, Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, and Conflict
One of the most notable consequences of the end of the Cold War was the diminished role of nuclear weapons in international relations. The world’s primary nuclear weapon powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, made considerable reductions in their nuclear forces. The climax of the process was the New START Treaty signed in 2010.
Now, the optimism that characterized the first decades of the post-Cold War era is rapidly evaporating. Geopolitical competition again dominates global and regional security dynamics. Nuclear powers are modernizing their forces and introducing novel systems that may affect strategic stability. At the same time, existing arms control regimes are crumbling.
This report takes stock of recent developments in deterrence in general, and nuclear deterrence in particular. Its main ambition is to understand how deterrence has changed in light of certain post-Cold War trends.
To this end, the report introduces the basic principles of deterrence. It also explores the nuclear-related policies and capabilities of the four nuclear weapon states most directly involved in European security affairs – Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Importantly, the report also analyses the implications of the recent trends in strategic deterrence for Northern Europe.
This report is part of a research project conducted by the FIIA entitled ‘New Challenges for Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century’. The project is part of the implementation of the Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research 2018.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Europe, France, and North America
States join security alliances to increase their level of security vis-à-vis neighbours that may pose a threat. The deterrence logic that was the main rationale for joining NATO in 1949 still represents the cornerstone of Norway’s security policy. However, belonging to a military alliance can also pose challenges. This policy brief focuses on some possible negative spillover effects that could emerge from being member of a military alliance. The focus here is on current challenges within NATO, and the possible implications for Norway. First, we present a broader conceptual framework. What are the internal and external challenges facing NATO? How do NATO and its members deal with them? We then proceed to the implications for Norway. Due to structural factors that shape relations in Norway’s strategic environment – including the location of Russian strategic bases close to the border, and the clear asymmetry in capabilities – negative developments in other regions and theatres may influence Norwegian security directly. We argue that, in order to minimize the likelihood of negative trends spilling over to Norway’s strategic neighbourhood, it is important to communicate the special features of this neighbourhood clearly to other members of the alliance. Further, to facilitate intra-alliance trust and cohesion, Norway should also emphasize NATO’s internal, shared value-base, in order to make the alliance better prepared to meet external security challenges.
The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has already obstructed cooperation across a range of issues. Could it also affect state interaction between Norway and Russia in the Arctic—an area and a relationship long characterized by a culture of compromise and cooperation?
In two policy briefs we examine changes in how Russia and Norway have approached each other in the Arctic in the period 2012–2016. This first brief presents the development of official Norwegian and Russian narratives on the relations between the two countries in the Arctic. Such narratives stipulate logical paths for action. Showing how Norwegian and Russian policies have changed in line with these narratives, we conclude that what some refer to as “the New Cold War” is indeed spreading to the Arctic.
Topic:
Cold War, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Territory
This policy brief examines changing Russian and Norwegian approaches to each other in the period 2012–2016, and discusses how the “New Cold War” spread to the North. This is an intriguing question, since both parties had initially stated that, despite the overall worsening of Russia–West relations following the crises in Ukraine, the North should be protected as a space for peaceful interaction. To address this question, watching and tracking the changing patterns of Russian exercises and military modernization is not enough; understanding the rise in tensions requires studying the effects of the interactions underway between the parties in this region. Three interaction effects need to be taken into consideration in explaining why the tense relations following the conflict in Ukraine spread to the low-tension Northern theatre. In this, we stress the interactive dynamics that ensues when two parties start to view each other as threats, interpreting new moves by the other as expressions of hostile intent. Further, we explain the observed New Cold War “contamination” with reference to domestic policy agendas and practices of decision-making. On both the Norwegian and the Russian sides, the new military posturing in the North, now interpreted as part of a growing conflict, has emerged partly as a side-effect of implementing what actually were longstanding national goals.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Strategic Competition
Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was originally
about cost-effectiveness. The Nordic states sought to work
together when training and educating their soldiers,
procuring new equipment, and logistically supporting
their forces. Faced with a relevantly benign security
situation at home, with Russia regarded in principle as a
partner, operational military cooperation was primarily
about expeditionary operations far from northern Europe.
Even if NORDEFCO never became the beacon of Nordic
cooperation that some political speeches sought to paint it
as, it nonetheless provided the Nordics with a flexible and
non-bureaucratic framework through which various forms of
defence cooperation could be pursued.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and the
subsequent deterioration of Western-Russian relations,
changed this. NORDEFCO today is much more about meeting
pressing security challenges in the Nordic region. This policy
brief explores the potential for further Nordic cooperation.
What are the opportunities and constraints? The study is
primarily based on seven recent interviews with civilian
and military officials,
as well discussions with independent
security scholars, from all the Nordic countries except
Iceland.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Affairs
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
500 nautical miles north of the city of Tromsø, off of the northern cape of Norway, lies the Svalbard Archipelago; a collection of islands nearly one fourth the size of continental Norway with a unique history and an even more unique status under international law. Since its official discovery in the mid-1500s Svalbard has generally been an area of peace and cooperation due in large part to its location on the fringes of civilization. However, Svalbard’s tranquility has been punctuated by periods of competition and conflict when profitable resources are at stake. From whaling in the 1700s, coal in the late 1800s, and fishing in the present, profit from natural resources has been a consistent driver of instability in the area. Outside of resource-driven tension, the island chain spent most of its pre–20th century existence as a de facto “no man’s land” or global commons, ungoverned by any one nation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Territorial Disputes, Maritime, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, Arctic, and United States of America
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
With the weakening of ISIS, the growing strength of Russia in Syria, and the continuing retraction of American involvement in the region – Iran apparently feels emboldened enough to escalate its confrontation with Israel.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and ISIS
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In his recent “State of the Nation” address, Russian President Putin unveiled six new strategic, advanced weapon systems. The important point about these impressive weapons is their ability to penetrate the global missile defense system that according to Putin is being deployed by the United States. But, such a system does not exist and is not even being planned. It is not surprising that the US responded to Putin’s speech with indifference. Putin’s speech reveals, more than anything else, the continuing Russian trauma from the “Star Wars” initiative of President Reagan
Topic:
Military Strategy, Weapons, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In spite of the impressive international front against Russia following the former spy’s poisoning in Britain, its activity seems to be limited mainly to rhetoric and diplomatic gestures, which will not achieve Russia’s isolation
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Assassination
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Don’t congratulate the administration on avoiding Russian retaliation. The humanitarian crisis in Syria remains, and the real collision course here is between Israel and Iran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Crisis
Today’s geopolitical conflicts, especially among great powers, involve a desire to fundamentally revise the order of alliances as well as solidify new norms of conduct. The purpose of our paper is to delineate two distinct phenomena in international affairs – hybrid warfare, which emphasizes the tactical level and grey-zone conflicts, which incorporates a long-term strategic dimension into international disputes. We argue that hybrid warfare can be a tactical subset of grey-zone conflict deployed under certain conditions and in varying degrees. We examine four case studies: China’s application of ‘unrestricted warfare’, Russia’s strategy of ‘hybrid balancing’, ‘regional hybridism’ practiced by Israel and ‘restricted hybridism’ applied by Canada/NATO globally. We conclude that the solution to challenges from Russia and China is not a military one but a political and collective one based on baseline requirements for building resilience. Israel, on the other hand, is largely uninterested in the revision of order of alliances and will continue to utilize its tactical advantage vis-à-vis regional neighbors to achieve victories in short conflicts. We conclude that NATO (and Canada) should work more closely with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Union to effectively extend security guarantees to its members. In doing so Canada and likeminded countries will involve the costs of engaging in hybrid warfare and the subsequent erosion of democratic accountability.
Topic:
NATO, War, Geopolitics, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Middle East, Canada, Israel, and Asia
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel may soon face a dilemma. The “arrangement” with Russia as to the future of Syria may stave-off an Iranian presence but will pose an existential danger to the groups of rebels near the border – groups which have worked closely with the IDF to prevent direct friction with hostile elements on the line of contact. It is vital that the solutions to this challenge demonstrate to future partners that Israel does not turn its back on those who have assisted it facing a common threat.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The US is failing to appreciate the significance of the leverage points that the Syrian arena provides for Russia. This leverage allows Russia to exact a heavy toll for the measures the US is demanding.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia is actively promoting international involvement in the reconstruction of Syria as a humanitarian effort aimed at creating the conditions for refugees to return, but in practice this will reinforce the foundations of Assad’s rule and territorial control. The US is in no hurry to respond, but the Russian initiative will not remain unanswered.
Topic:
Human Rights, Refugees, Humanitarian Crisis, and Repatriation
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In the Mideast of today, the US is largely irrelevant, when it is not disruptive, and is certainly not providing clear leadership. With the current disarray in DC, it does not look like this will change any time soon.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The downing of a Russian plane by Syrian artillery after an Israeli strike proves how vital it is to maintain open lines of communications between Israel and Russia. The IDF may have to exercise more restraint, but it will still do what it must.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Communications, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia’s accusations against Israel that it is responsible for the downing of its plane is meant primarily for a domestic audience. Until now, Russia has made sure to behave with restraint in the Syrian arena and to operate based on its strategic interests. One of those interests is the Russian desire to minimize Iranian involvement in Syria.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The possibility that Iran and Turkey will be emboldened by the American decision, is worrisome. The main counter to that will be robust deterrence from Israel, whose maintenance may increase the likeliness of escalation in Syria and Lebanon, and even more resort to the restraining hand of Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide.
This month the Global Security Pulse focuses on the subject of political warfare. It specifically assesses how it plays a role in the foreign relations of Russia
Gas trade between the European Union and Russia increased considerably in both 2016 and 2017, despite the ongoing political crisis. Simultaneously, two long-standing disputes in the EU-Russia gas relationship – regarding Gazprom’s monopolistic practices and the EU’s third energy package – were settled.
Russian companies have invested in new infrastructural projects for the export of gas to Europe, including the launch of the Yamal LNG terminal in December 2017 and the construction of the TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. However, significant challenges remain for the relationship, most notably the intra-EU controversy on Nord Stream 2 and uncertainty about future gas transit in Ukraine.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Political Economy, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
The Kremlin has cast a cloud over the horizon for millions of Russian citizens. People do not perceive the forthcoming pension reform as a necessary measure for sustaining economic and social stability. Rather, it has ignited a collective sense of anger among the people that they have been cast adrift by the elite
Russia and China play dissimilar roles in global governance and define their interests in this sphere in divergent ways. While the two states agree on certain international principles and norms, their engagement with global governance differs significantly. These differences pose the most serious long-term obstacle to closer cooperation between Moscow and Beijing
On 12 October ISPI in cooperation with the IEMed organised a workshop “New Euro-Mediterranean Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean”. The event was organised in the framework of the EuroMeSCo ENI Project, co-funded by the European Commission.
This dialogue workshop aimed at discussing the initial research results of the Joint Policy Study and engaging the participants in analyzing and sharing their perspectives on whether the Russian moment in the MENA region corresponds to opportunism, a new strategy or it falls in between these options. Additionally, this workshop aimed at shedding light on the role Russia is currently playing, how this can influence the balance of power as well as how regional players look at Russia.
The present report is a summary of main points raised in workshop discussions
France and Germany are key in shaping European policies toward Russia. However, while the general public is largely skeptical of Vladimir Putin in both countries, the picture is more diverse in the political realm. Whereas Germany remains focused on multilateralism and a rules-based international order, French political parties have been split on Russia. The differences between and within France and Germany impact on Franco-German relations and go beyond the question on how to deal with Russia.
Topic:
International Cooperation and International Affairs
North Central Europe has become the central point of confrontation between the West and a revisionist Russia. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia is determined to roll back the post-Cold War settlement and undermine the rules-based order that has kept Europe secure since the end of World War II. Moscow’s invasion and continued occupation of Georgian and Ukrainian territories, its military build-up in Russia’s Western Military District and Kaliningrad, and its “hybrid” warfare against Western societies have heightened instability in the region have made collective defense and deterrence an urgent mission for the United States and NATO
President Vladimir Putin is in India on a two-day state visit to India, his third trip to India during Prime Minister Modi’s term. A key agreement that has just been signed is the $5 billion deal for the S-400 air defence system. However, U.S. sanctions on Russia’s top defence manufacturers will be a hurdle in closing this agreement, making payments to Russia difficult and scaring away potential Indian partners, especially those with investments in the West. Gateway House looks at India’s options for successfully concluding this agreement without falling foul of American sanctions
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia has strengthened its military position in Central Asia and the South Caucasus through a combination of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has become the most important multilateral defense structure in the former Soviet Union and is an essential instrument in Russia’s resurgence. The CSTO has expanded its missions, authorities, and capabilities. However, it faces both internal and external challenges, especially debilitating divisions among its members.
Topic:
Security, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Multilateralism, and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, North America, and United States of America
Russia recently conducted military strikes on several fronts in Deir Ezzor province in eastern Syria, especially to the south in the border town of Boukamal. These strikes were conducted to retake ISIS’ last strong- holds in Syria after the liberation of Raqqa, the group’s de facto capital, in mid-October by the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led militia. The militia, backed the US-led coalition, controls the east side of the Euphrates river in Deir Ezzor and now is in a frantic race with al-Assad’s forces to recapture Boukamal, where Russia’s use of air and naval re- power aims to settle the battle and consolidate its presence ahead of the coming political milestones in Syria.
Topic:
International Cooperation and International Affairs
With the International Olympic Committee excluding the Russian national team from the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea, the importance for Russia’s authorities of the FIFA World Cup is increasing. World Cup competition will be held from 14 June to 15 July 2018. The tournament will be used in Russia’s internal politics, especially in the presidential campaign, and in relations with other countries to strengthen bilateral contacts and portray Russia as a country with a strong international position.
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Questions regarding definitions of authoritarianism and totalitarianism date from the interwar period. This article draws on the classic approaches and argues that the definition of Juan Linz, with changes suggested by Roman Bäcker
(2011), and may o er a solid base for understanding the location of each non-democratic regime on a continuum determined by two extreme ideal types: authoritarianism and totalitarianism. e former is de ned here by three essential features: bureaucratic sovereignty (or siloviki), social apathy and emotional mentality. e latter is identified by references to: state-party apparatus sovereignty, mass and forced mobilisation, and political gnosis. these categories are useful to deal with the research problem considering where Russia is on this continuum, after the annexation of Crimea. It requires, however, carrying out an in-depth analysis on three levels: sovereignty, social behaviour and social consciousness. is article aims to reveal how to identify and approach these analytical levels.
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The war that Russia is conducting against Ukraine today is not only related to breaking the post-World War II rules of engagement, but is also being run in a new way, which was to a certain degree unknown before. is phenomenon had been named “hybrid warfare”, initially mainly paying attention to the military aspect of the issue, symbolically represented by “little green men”. e focus of attention has been shifting to what military actions of hybrid-war are often accompanied by intense propaganda activities, with the Internet as the main tool. they are planned and carried out in Russia, possessing extensive resources in Russian literature on so-called “information warfare”.
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
On 25 September 1990, one of the rst meetings of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia was held in the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. e agenda consisted of the issue of ensuring the economic
sovereignty of Russia in the USSR. Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Yuri Skokov, responsible for industrial policy, spoke with bitterness about his meeting with Minister of Metallurgy of the USSR Seraphim Baibakov: “We spoke to him about our sovereignty, and he said: ‘I’m sorry, but last year I became an owner of property and a legal successor of state property.’ Kolpakov became Krupp. Now he creates 10-15 companies, leaving a small management structure. It is presidential rule in the steel-casting complex.”
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Twenty- five years ago, we bade farewell to the Soviet Union, but after a quarter- century we still feel how much of its empire it left behind. It was not an “ordinary” empire because its essential feature was a totalitarian system. ideological pressure of Soviet Russia has changed the social structures of great swathes of the globe. e legacy of the USSR is a fascinating research topic, unfortunately today one rarely raised by researchers.
The aim of this paper is to identify the enduring principles at the basis of Russian military thought, offering an alternative to the contemporary analytical mainstream – which deems Moscow’s military behavior to be revolutionary and unprecedented. This is based on comparative analysis of Russian official military discourse and practice between 2008 and 2016. Critical inspection of the two Military Doctrines approved during this timeframe and of various military drills will reveal a series of rhetorical and operational recurrences. Notwithstanding numerous changes at the international and domestic levels that could have had an impact on Russian military behavior, no substantive shift is distinguishable. These empirical findings will constitute the basis for a reconstruction of Russian military thought. Through a deductive method, we will be able to reconstruct the ultimate assumptions granting them logical coherence and legitimization. Far from being incomprehensible, Russian military thought will be presented as the adaptation of classical strategic principles to contemporary contingencies.
The article aims to highlight Russian approaches to Chinese One Belt-One Road initiative. It examines possible opportunities and challenges for co-development of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt project. Both projects and their co-development may reduce the uncertainty in Eurasia, caused by significant structural changes in international relations and the world economy, the emergence of new trade regimes and the erosion of leadership in international affairs. Russian interests in this regard are determined by the need for modernization and long-term development, which could also help to address acute security issues. These particular factors encouraged Russia to come up with an ambitious plan of the Extensive Eurasian Partnership, although the prospects of its implementation currently are uncertain. The present article argues that the success of Russia-China collaboration in Eurasia will depend crucially on the future dynamics of the Eurasian integration, as well as on the agreement to co-develop the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt Initiative with concrete and mutually beneficial
projects.
International analytical center “Rethinking Russia” presents a commentary of Dmitry Streltsov, doctor of history, head of the Department of Oriental studies of the MGIMO University, on the results of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Japan.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and International Affairs
In this new Transition 2017 paper, Institute expert Andrew J. Tabler argues that Syria remains de facto partitioned, making the establishment of safe zones in non-Assad-controlled areas the Trump administration's most expedient course of action. Moreover, it would further Washington's cause to drive a wedge into the country's Russia-Iran alliance, and both isolate and pressure the Assad regime.
If Washington's objectives in Syria are to defeat U.S.-designated terrorist groups and stem the outflow of refugees, President Bashar al-Assad is under no circumstances the right person to entrust with these missions. Simply in practical terms, he lacks the manpower to retake and hold the two-thirds of Syrian territory outside his control any time soon, despite having sufficient support from Russia and Iran to maintain control in large parts of the country. But more important, Assad is an avowed adversary of the West, undeserving of its cooperation.
Topic:
International Relations, Civil War, International Security, International Affairs, and Neoimperialism
Deception and active measures in all their incarnations have long been and will remain a staple of Russia’s dealings with the outside world for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Security, International Affairs, Elections, Democracy, and Post Truth Politics
Russia faces bleak economic prospects for the next few years. It may be a case of managed decline in which the government appeases social and political demands by tapping the big reserves it accumulated during the boom years with oil and gas exports. But there is also a smaller possibility of a more serious economic breakdown or collapse. A proper analysis requires consideration of a number of key and often overlooked features of Russia’s post-Soviet economy.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, and Economic structure