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1. South Caucasus at the Crossroad of Peace and War

Author:
Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:
Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:
The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “South Caucasus at the Crossroad of Peace and War” is dedicated to the different mediation activities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Armenia’s internationally wrongful acts and foreign policy, Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, as well as the news initiatives in the South Caucasus region. The CSP’s new issue includes 7 articles. The CSP’s current authors analysed the EU’s and the US’s mediator roles to reconcile Armenia and Azerbaijan, Armenia’s international responsibility in relation to the formerly occupied territories of Azerbaijan, Russia-Armenia relations, the perspective of the Middle Corridor, and Iran-Armenia relations and its implications for Azerbaijan, etc.
Topic:
Nationalism, Territorial Disputes, European Union, Mediation, Peacebuilding, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Ecocide
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and United States of America

2. De-colonising the Azerbaijan-Armenian Conflict: Breaking the Knot of Security and Dependence

Author:
Leila Alieva
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The recent military operation in the Nagorno Karabakh area reflects a broader regional transformation. Its essence is in the second attempt (with the first one in Azerbaijan 30 years ago) of changing the security paradigm, this time in Armenia, leading to de-colonisation of relations in the region. The core of this change is liberation from the dependence on Russia’s almost two centuries old patronage, with Nagorno Karabakh conflict evolving as a tool of this dependence. With all the contradictions over the territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and difference in current political systems, the countries seem at last to arrive to the same conclusion of Russia and her control of the Karabakh elite being one of the obstacles to the peaceful relations, reforms and integration in the West. The power balance in the region, affected by such factors as Turkey’s greater involvement, distraction of the West, Russia’s increasing isolation, besides power change in Armenia, has also contributed to the “window of opportunity” for a change of paradigms. The role and influence of the EU and the US in this process, including in deterring potential military developments, will be dependent on the perception of them by the parties as non-partisan brokers, promotion of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as independent subjects of international relations and consistency in support of democracy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Mediation, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

3. How Russia’s War Against Ukraine Will Affect Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region

Author:
Badri Belkania
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On February 21, 2022, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Lenta, 2022) which was officially supported by the de facto leaders of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The de facto leadership of the Tskhinvali region, which recognized the DNR and LNR back in 2014, hailed President Putin’s decision of February 21 as an «expected, reasonable and justified» step (RIA Novosti, 2022). Russia’s move was also lauded by the de facto President of Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, who said the decision was «fair, geopolitically adequate» and in line with modern challenges and threats (TASS, 2022). In a few days, the de facto leader of Abkhazia signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Ekho Kavkaza, 2022). The recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk is in itself a remarkable geopolitical step on the part of Russia which also brings significant changes in terms of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. However, within days of its recognition, it became clear that Moscow needed the move as a launch pad for war in Ukraine. Consequently, the recognition of the de facto republics was accompanied by a Russian military aggression in Ukraine which, from the prospective of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, changes even more than just the recognition of the Donbas region. As the domestic and foreign policy characteristics of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali differ, both will be discussed separately in this article.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Abkhazia

4. The Threat of New Wars in the Caucasus: A Good Case for U.S. Restraint

Author:
Anatol Lieven and Artin DerSimonian
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The decline of Russian power due to military defeats in Ukraine risks leading to increased violence and instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The effects of this can already be seen in the flare–up of fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, inadequately checked by Russian peacekeepers. This shift in power creates a temptation for Washington to increase its involvement in the region in an effort to end Russian influence there. This temptation should be resisted. The United States has no vital national interest in this region — certainly not ones that are worth the risk of new wars. The conflicts in the southern Caucasus are deeply intractable, and have roots that long predate the Soviet collapse and indeed the Soviet Union itself. They were not created by Russia, and cannot be solved by the United States. Increased support for Georgia risks empowering a new attempt by Georgia to retake its lost territories by force, leading to another war with Russia, the outcome of which would be uncertain and highly dangerous. Increased support for Azerbaijan threatens Armenia and would create a fierce backlash in the Armenian–American community. Instead, the United States should continue to play a helpful but limited diplomatic role, aimed not at solving these disputes but at reducing tensions and preventing new eruptions of violence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Russia, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

5. Post-war Prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh left many issues unresolved and the front lines volatile. The parties should establish a formal communication channel to address urgent post-war problems, Russian peacekeepers need a clearer mandate and aid agencies must be granted access to the conflict zone.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Caucasus

6. The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict in its Fourth Decade

Author:
Thomas de Waal
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
As the Nagorny Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan enters its fourth decade, the 2020 war was a reminder that it remains the most dangerous conflict in the post-Soviet space. Azerbaijan completely reversed the losses it suffered in the conflict of the early 1990s, leaving the Armenian side defeated and humiliated. Russia inserted itself into the heart of the conflict zone for the first time, through the introduction of a peacekeeping force in Karabakh itself. But a final Armenian-Azerbaijani peace agreement that resolves the status of Nagorny Karabakh – the trigger for the conflict in 1988 – and a normalisation of relations between Baku and Yerevan looks as elusive as ever.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

7. Growing Azerbaijani–Central Asian Ties Likely to Trigger Conflicts With Russia and Iran

Author:
Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War (September 29–November 9) has had a transformative effect on the country. It not only changed the attitudes of its population, whose members now feel themselves to be heroes rather than victims (see EDM, January 21), but also bolstered the diplomatic weight and possibilities of the Azerbaijani government in its dealings with other regional states. In prosecuting a triumphant war against Yerevan, Baku demonstrated its own ability to act. But just as importantly, Azerbaijan has shown to peoples and governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia that it is a force to be reckoned with, in part thanks to its growing links with Turkey. Moreover, that alliance makes possible an appealing path to the outside world for all who join it. That reality is causing countries east of the Caspian to look westward to and through Azerbaijan in their economic planning and political calculations. At the same time, however, these developments are generating concerns in Moscow and Tehran, which oppose east-west trade routes that bypass their countries’ territories and instead favor north-south corridors linking Russia and Iran together. As a result, Azerbaijan’s recent successes in expanding links with Central Asia set the stage for new conflicts between Azerbaijan and its Turkic partners, on the one hand, and Russia and Iran, which have far more significant naval assets in the Caspian, on the other (see EDM, November 27, 2018 and February 20, 2020; Casp-geo.ru, December 24, 2019; Chinalogist.ru, November 21, 2019).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Central Asia, Middle East, and Azerbaijan

8. Russian Crisis Behavior, Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey?

Author:
Richard Giragosian, David G. Lewis, and Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
On September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan initiated a war to retake the disputed Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven districts of Azerbaijan held by Armenian forces.1 The forty-four-day war resulted in a resounding defeat for the Armenian forces and only halted with the acceptance of a Russian-imposed agreement for a cessation of hostilities on November 9-10, 2020. Although the war was initially expected to unfold as a war of attrition with an eventual stalemate based on the advantages of terrain of the Armenian defenders, reality differed in terms of duration, intensity, and outcome.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

9. Russian Aggression in the Black Sea: Regional and International Responses

Author:
Gonul Tol, Philip Breedlove, Iulia Joja, Yoruk Isik, and Mamuka Tsereteli
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Russia’s largest military buildup since the 2014 annexation of Crimea is taking place along the Ukrainian border and in the Black Sea. Moscow has resorted to escalatory measures, announcing the closing of the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea to foreign ships and cutting off Ukraine’s ability to export. In response, the West has reacted with warnings and invitations to dialogue while Turkey is trying to walk a fine line between Russia and Ukraine. To prevent further escalation of the crisis, much will depend on the Biden administration’s response. What are possible conflict scenarios of Russia towards Ukraine and the Black Sea? What options does the West have in deterring Russian aggression in the region? In what ways is this significant to the long-term US regional strategy? How is Russian military buildup significant not only for Ukraine, but also for the broader stability of the Black Sea region?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Military Affairs, and Navy
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, and Black Sea

10. Annexation of Crimea from the Perspective of Offensive Realism | Ofansif Realizm Bağlamında Kırım’ın İlhakı

Author:
Oğuzhan Çakır and Ayça Eminoğlu
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:
The main purpose of this study is to understand what motives the Russian Federation, a regional power, uses military force against its neighbor, Ukraine, and annexes Crimea. As a result of the literature review conducted for this purpose, this approach of Russia was generally interpreted from two different theoretical perspectives. Some of the critics evaluated Russia's attitude during the crisis process under the name of defensive realism, while the other group, on the contrary, evaluated Russia's attitude under the name of offensive realism. The work is addressed in the context of these two theories, with a deductive approach. The great powers do not refrain from using hard power when it comes to their security. The answer has been searched to the arguments that the Revisionist movement that Russia displayed in this crisis was caused by international developments rather than domestic political developments and that there is no sanctioning power against the great powers that have become a chronic problem of international law. When the relevant study concluded, and the previous crisis experiences of Russia taking in the consideration, it is observed that Russia has similar characteristic features in this crisis as well. It has been concluded that Russia has not been able to get rid of the sense of the siege it experienced during the Cold War and has pursued aggressive policies when it feels such a threat in its nearby geography. On the other hand, what happened in Crimea has clearly shown that the great powers do not refrain from using force and ignoring international law when it comes to their benefits and security. | Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, bölgesel bir güç olan Rusya Federasyonu’nun, komşusu olan Ukrayna’ya karşı hangi saiklerle askeri güç kullandığı ve Kırım’ı ilhak ettiğidir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda yapılan literatür çalışması sonucunda, Rusya’nın bu yaklaşımı genel olarak iki farklı teorik perspektiften yorumlanmıştır. Düşünürlerin bir kısmı Rusya’nın kriz sürecindeki tutumunu defansif realizm bağlamında değerlendirmekteyken diğer grup ise tam aksine Rusya’nın tutumunu ofansif realizm bağlamında ele almışladır. Çalışma, bu iki teori bağlamında, tümdengelimci bir yaklaşımla ele alınmıştır. Büyük güçler, güvenlikleri söz konusu olduğunda sert güç kullanmaktan kaçınmamaktadırlar. Rusya’nın bu krizde sergilemiş olduğu revizyonist hareketin, iç politik gelişmelerden ziyade uluslararası gelişmelerden kaynaklandığı ve uluslararası hukukun kronik sorunu haline gelen büyük güçlere karşı bir yaptırım gücünün olmadığı argümanlarına cevap aranmıştır. İlgili çalışma sonuçlandığında, Rusya’nın geçmişte yaşadığı krizler de ele alındığında, bu krizle benzer karakteristik özelliklere sahip olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Rusya’nın, Soğuk Savaş dönemi yaşadığı kuşatılma algısından kurtulamadığı ve yakın coğrafyasında bu şekilde bir tehdit hissettiği zaman saldırgan politikalar izlediği sonucu varılmıştır. Öte yandan Kırım’da yaşananlar, büyük güçlerin kendi menfaatleri ve güvenlikleri söz konusu olduğunda güç kullanmaktan ve uluslararası hukuku hiçe saymaktan kaçınmadıklarının açıkça göstermiştir.
Topic:
International Law, Territorial Disputes, Realism, and Annexation
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea

11. The Normandy Negotiations Renewed: Divisions at Home and Opportunity Abroad

Author:
David Carment
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
After three years of limited discussion, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine renewed their peace talks to resolve the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas). Efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Donbas began five years ago with the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. This framework, developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), attempted to facilitate a dialogue between Russia and Ukraine through the mediation of an impartial actor, and it culminated in the Minsk I (September 2014) and then Minsk II (February 2015) agreements. The Minsk II agreements comprised a 13-point peace plan, chief among which is an arrangement specifying support for the restoration of the Ukrainian-Russian border. While the implementation of the military portions of the Minsk II agreements were finalized within three months of signing, the political and security portions remained unresolved. Though President Vladimir Putin has declared his intent to protect the Russian-speaking peoples of the region, he has also stated he has no interest in reclaiming Eastern Ukraine. Not surprisingly, since Russia’s ultimate goal is undeclared, the conflict has proved very difficult to resolve.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Territorial Disputes, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, France, Germany, and United States of America

12. Peace in Ukraine (II): A New Approach to Disengagement

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy came to power in 2019 promising to bring peace to Ukraine’s Donbas region, where government and Russian-backed separatist forces are locked in low-level combat. Yet a full, sustained ceasefire remains elusive. Although casualties have dropped from their 2014-2015 peak, fighting continues to kill soldiers and civilians. Why does it matter? Each of the warring parties wants a ceasefire but only if it will lead to peace on its own terms. All prefer to tolerate continued fighting rather than stop the shooting under conditions they deem unfavourable. What should be done? A comprehensive ceasefire is likely unattainable under today’s political conditions. In its absence, the parties should pursue sectoral bilateral disengagements with clear humanitarian and related goals, even as they seek a durable political settlement through talks.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Peace, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

13. Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus

Author:
Philip Remler
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the battle between Armenia and Azerbaijan heats up, Russia struggles to contend with a vastly more complicated landscape in the South Caucasus. Since shortly after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s aims and policies in the South Caucasus have been constant, but its capabilities to project power and influence have fluctuated. Russia’s engagement with the entire Caucasus region is best characterized as a tide. Its power and influence began to ebb at the start of the Karabakh conflict—with the February 1988 massacre of Armenians in the Azerbaijani city of Sumqayit being the key galvanizing event.2 After that, the tide receded rapidly, leaving even Russian possessions in the North Caucasus without effective central control. The First Chechen War marked low tide, which only began to rise with the Second Chechen War, beginning in 1999. Until about 2004, Russia was too weak and internally divided to project power and influence in the wider Caucasus region in a meaningful way. To be sure, Russian influence was never gone completely, even during the lowest ebb of the tide. Russia still marshaled greater resources than the new states of the Caucasus could muster, and it threw its weight around. But in the 1990s, Russia did not have a unified governing apparatus, but rather a mass of competing clans among which regional actors could maneuver. For example, after the Soviet collapse, Moscow left the Russian military units in the Caucasus to their own devices. Those units served as mercenaries, arms suppliers, and logistics providers to both sides in the Karabakh conflict. It took a decade for Moscow to reassert its so-called power vertical in the Caucasus, symbolized by President Vladimir Putin’s success in 2004 in finally ousting chief of the general staff Anatoliy Kvashnin.3 Russia’s assertiveness in the region grew steadily thereafter, with sharp upticks after the 2008 war with Georgia and Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Elites, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

14. Russia’s Arctic Policy

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia views the Arctic as a contested area with the U.S. and a place of competition with China. It regards any loss of its dominant position as the most important challenge in the Arctic region. To counteract it, Russia develops energy, military, and logistics infrastructure in the region. Although the role of transport in the Arctic, along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), is limited for now, the increased Russian military presence in the region is already a challenge for the security of NATO countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

15. The Estonia-Russia Border Dispute

Author:
Kinga Raś and Rafał Tarnogórski
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The centennial of the Treaty of Tartu between the Republic of Estonia and Soviet Russia in February 2020 did not end the border dispute. In 1944, the Soviet authorities changed the borders and since then, 5% of the territory of pre-war Estonia remains under Russia’s control. It argues the change was legally justified and that the region has not shown any willingness to adjust its borders back to those of the interwar period. Estonia, though, aims to assert its statehood, and some elites are directly raising claims. This means the continuation of the stalemate over the border, which will negatively impact bilateral relations.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
Russia and Estonia

16. Water Shortages in Occupied Crimea

Author:
Daniel Szeligowski
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Water shortages in occupied Crimea are of a long-term character since its local resources are insufficient to meet its needs. In the short term, the Russian authorities will attempt to resolve the water deficit on an ad hoc basis while stepping up pressure on Ukraine to unblock the North Crimean Canal. A forced takeover of the canal by the Russian military should be considered a last resort, given that the cost of such an operation for Russia would significantly exceed the possible benefit.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Territorial Disputes, Water, and Occupation
Political Geography:
Russia and Crimea

17. Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Scope and Implications

Author:
Mamuka Tsereteli, Margarita Assenova, Alex Vatanka, and Rauf Mammadov
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has entered its fourth week. The scope of the war has not been limited to the boundaries of the combat zone, resulting in human loss and destruction of civil infrastructure. The region’s important network of energy infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines, are not immune to this latest round of fighting. The military confrontation is taking place in proximity to the critical energy infrastructure that connects the Caspian basin with the European markets. Can the fighting cause disruption to oil and gas flows to the West? What could potential disruption mean for global markets? Can the Southern Gas Corridor be prevented from being launched by the end of this year as had been planned? What are the interests of regional stakeholders such as Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Iran and others that are either energy exporters, consumers or transit nations for Caspian hydrocarbons. And finally, what are the interests of the United States in this conflict and its impact on the energy markets?
Topic:
Energy Policy, Territorial Disputes, Infrastructure, Conflict, and Exports
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and United States of America

18. What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States?

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, alarmed not only Western-leaning states in Central Europe and the Baltic but also Moscow’s traditional allies. These events signaled that Moscow is now willing and capable of using direct military force against perceived strategic threats in its self-proclaimed region of vested interests. With the exception of Ukraine and the Baltic States, this Letort Paper examines how Russia’s front-line states have adjusted their foreign policy posture since 2014. Belarus, Moldova, the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus calculate the benefits and risks in their relationship with Moscow and either make concessions or strengthen their defenses accordingly to avoid triggering a Russian reaction. This Letort Paper provides a range of policy recommendations intended to maximize the opportunities of a new alignment with the West for these states while minimizing the risk of Russia, using again, those capabilities it has demonstrated in Ukraine and Syria.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Crimea

19. Facing Up to China’s Military Interests in the Arctic

Author:
Anne Marie Brady
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
China’s military ambitions in the Arctic, and its growing strategic partnership with Russia, have rung alarm bells in many governments. In May 2019, for the first time, the U.S. Department of Defense annual report on China’s military capabilities had a section on China’s military interests in the Arctic and the possibility of Chinese submarines operating in the Arctic basin (Department of Defense, May 2019). In August 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg raised concerns about what he diplomatically referred to as “China’s increased presence in the Arctic” (Reuters, August 7). From a nuclear security point of view, the Arctic is China’s vulnerable northern flank. The flight path of U.S. and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted at China transit the Arctic. Key components of the U.S. missile defense system are also located in the Arctic. Chinese submarine-based ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating in the Arctic could restore China’s nuclear deterrence capability (Huanqiu Ribao, October 28, 2013). China currently operates six nuclear-powered attack submarines, four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and fifty diesel attack submarines, with more under construction. If Chinese nuclear-armed submarines were able to access the Arctic basin undetected, this would be a game-changer for the United States, the NATO states and their partners, and the wider Asia-Pacific (Huanqiu Ribao, April 11, 2012). China would be able to target missiles at the United States and Europe with ease; such ability would strengthen China’s military dominance in Asia and bolster China’s emerging position as a global military power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

20. The War in Donbas: Realities and Prospects of Settlement

Author:
Hanna Pashkova and Halyna Balanovych
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
The first section looks into some geopolitical aspects of the Russian intervention in Donbas; reviews goals and peculiarities of Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine; studies the role and impact of the West in resolving the conflict; and assesses the “Donbas” policy of Ukraine. The second section describes the overall trends and processes in occupied territories in the military, economic, energy, political, information and environmental spheres. The third section provides possible scenarios of developments in the conflict zone and assesses chances and prospects of deploying the UN peacekeeping mission to Donbas. The fourth section offers conclusions, as well as a set of proposals for resolving the conflict in the East of Ukraine. The first
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, United Nations, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Donbas