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521. Russian Military Aggression in Ukraine and Georgia's National Security System

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In the modern era, due to the increased and diversified variety of threats which are mostly intertwined, the security system of any country faces serious new challenges. These threats can arise as a result of the actions of specific countries or different groups as well as through various events. Against this background, it is quite natural that the terms "hybrid threats" and "hybrid warfare" have become established in our daily lives. Russia's military aggression in Ukraine which, unfortunately, takes civilian lives, is still ongoing and it is too early to draw any in-depth conclusions. However, the Ukrainian example has already vividly illustrated the importance of a proper planning and implementation of a national security policy. Already at this stage, military experts give a high assessment to the effectiveness of the territorial and civil defense conducted by the Ukrainian military and special forces. At the same time, Ukraine is successfully operating on the diplomatic as well as informational and psychological warfare front lines. The actions of the Ukrainian intelligence services deserve special attention.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Armed Forces, Hybrid Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

522. Positions, Role and Activity of the International Community in the War Waged by Russia against Ukraine

Author:
Nika Petriashvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
This volume of the Security Review focuses on the Russia-Ukraine war. Regardless of the outcome of the war, it will fundamentally alter the post-Cold War world order and have a major impact on Georgia's security environment. Alex Petriashvili tells us about the reaction of the international community to the start of the war by Russia, what the West has done so far and what we should expect from it in the future. To what extent is the Georgian security system ready to withstand such challenges?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Community, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

523. Major Non-NATO Ally Status - Chance for Survival Or A Vision Doomed to Failure?

Author:
Nino Lezhava
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The ongoing war in Ukraine has confirmed that NATO as an institution of 30 members still lacks the readiness to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance, continuing to avoid confrontation with Russia.1 The unprecedented tragedy taking place in Ukraine was not a surprise and there were several lessons for the West to learn such as the August War in Georgia in 2008, Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, the open letters and statements from Russia’s president drawing a new world order,2 Russian military drills and so-called peacekeepers in and around neighboring countries. Nevertheless, 14 years have passed since the NATO Bucharest Summit3 and Georgia and Ukraine are still paying for their independence and sovereignty with blood. Meanwhile, NATO’s promise of eventual membership for both countries is fading.4 Russia’s so-called “military operation” has revealed that the Kremlin does not need Casus Belli to start waging a full-scale war against independent countries and, now more than ever, Ukraine and Georgia5 need to strengthen their defense capabilities and search for an alternative foreign security policy until NATO provides well-deserved places for them. In this light, many believe that in the absence of NATO unity, the United States is the only strategic partner that can protect Ukraine and Georgia by designating them as Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA).6 Indeed, the impact of a timely provided designation could have a decisive political and practical role for Ukraine and Georgia’s security, especially when both countries7 are reliant on US defense sales and actively cooperate with the US while transforming their defense capabilities.8
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

524. How Russia’s War Against Ukraine Will Affect Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region

Author:
Badri Belkania
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On February 21, 2022, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Lenta, 2022) which was officially supported by the de facto leaders of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The de facto leadership of the Tskhinvali region, which recognized the DNR and LNR back in 2014, hailed President Putin’s decision of February 21 as an «expected, reasonable and justified» step (RIA Novosti, 2022). Russia’s move was also lauded by the de facto President of Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, who said the decision was «fair, geopolitically adequate» and in line with modern challenges and threats (TASS, 2022). In a few days, the de facto leader of Abkhazia signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Ekho Kavkaza, 2022). The recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk is in itself a remarkable geopolitical step on the part of Russia which also brings significant changes in terms of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. However, within days of its recognition, it became clear that Moscow needed the move as a launch pad for war in Ukraine. Consequently, the recognition of the de facto republics was accompanied by a Russian military aggression in Ukraine which, from the prospective of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, changes even more than just the recognition of the Donbas region. As the domestic and foreign policy characteristics of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali differ, both will be discussed separately in this article.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Abkhazia

525. War, Censorship and Public Opinion in Russia: Putin’s Struggle at Home and Abroad

Author:
Eka Javakhishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s “special military operation,” as the Kremlin calls its full-scale war against Ukraine, has been underway for the second month in a row. However, the Russian army has not been able to cope with the combat tasks as effectively as Kremlin leaders originally planned. The incredible resilience and courage of the Ukrainian nation has fascinated the world but it has become an additional challenge for the Putin regime. In addition to the fact that the Russian government had to radically change its officially declared military objectives, it also faced the need to tighten measures to maintain control over the situation inside the country. At this stage, the Kremlin has to take effective steps both inside and outside of the country in order to fulfill Putin’s imperialist ambitions.
Topic:
Security, War, Public Opinion, Censorship, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

526. China - A Non-neutral Party in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In the Russo-Ukrainian war, we cannot call the position of one of the main challenges of the 21st century, communist China, “neutral”. Beijing’s position was obvious even before the war: it is pro-Russian, clearly antiWestern, and especially anti-American. China does not condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor does it call it an invasion. At the same time, reports have emerged of the prospect of Beijing providing military assistance to Moscow, and it is not beyond imagination that China will also help Moscow avoid the sanctions. The course of the war, and time, will show China’s level of support for its strategic partner, Russia. However, despite Moscow’s support and negative attitude towards the West, Beijing will still act according to its long-term strategic goals, and if China distances itself from Russia on specific issues, it will not be because of solidarity with Ukraine, but for its own strategic interests.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

527. Economic Consequences of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, coupled with Western political support for Ukraine, was followed by a tough economic response through an unprecedented package of sanctions against Russia set forth by the West. Their decision to do so seeks to make Russia pay an economic price for its military aggression, aiming to reduce its economic and martial capabilities, which are currently costing the lives of thousands of innocent people. The sanctions have already had quite severe economic consequences for Russia, but it is interesting to see whether they will achieve the West’s political goals and push President Putin to suspend the military aggression. Generally, a medium- to long-term period is required to see the effects of sanctions, and, currently, despite heavy economic losses, Russia is managing to coexist with the restrictions. Today, Russia is experiencing its biggest economic downturn since the end of the Cold War. The World Bank estimates that gross domestic product in Russia will reduce by 11% in 2022 (World Bank, 2022), while the International Monetary Fund forecasts this figure to be 8.5% (IMF, 2022). According to some estimates, the economic scale of the reduction may even reach 15% (IIF, 2022). Clearly, this largely depends on the potential consequences of the sanctions already imposed and the possibility of enacting new sanctions, including in terms of energy embargoes. As a result of the global economic crisis of 2008, the Russian economy shrank by about 8%, and now this figure is almost twice as high. Consequently, we can get some idea of its scale. The losses caused by sanctions will become more visible and tangible over time, resulting in much more severe social and economic effects in the coming years. According to the International Finance Institute, Russia will have lost the wealth it generated over the last 15 years by the end of 2023 (IIF, 2022). One of the main reasons for this will be reduced domestic demand, and if the trade-related sanction package is expanded, exports will fall further than expected, which in turn will lead to a sharp decline in budget revenues. Clearly, the Russian military aggression has also caused global economic consequences, such as rising prices for basic consumer goods, disruption of supply chains, and delays in international trade. However, since invading Ukraine, Russia’s financial losses have been high. It is interesting to take a look at what actual consequences the Russian Federation has faced in terms of sanctions, and how the country will be able to continue coexistence with the restrictions and expand its own aggressive foreign policy.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

528. Putin’s Infantrymen: Kadyrov’s Involvement in the 2022 Ukrainian Conflict

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze and Cerwyn Moore
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
External involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, particularly pro-Russian volunteerism, has been a prominent feature of the Russian war effort. Chechen involvement in the conflict is more complex than is often reported. Pro-Russian groups known as kadyrovtsy serve a number of functions, including bolstering Kadyrov’s cult of personality in Chechnya, although their military significance is negligible. Chechen volunteer groups are involved in support of the Ukrainian military: this raises issues about the role of foreign fighters and volunteerism. The political implications of pro-Kremlin Chechen volunteerism in Ukraine are linked to fierce institutional infighting within Russia.
Topic:
Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Foreign Fighters, Russia-Ukraine War, and Ramzan Kadyrov
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Chechnya

529. Military Effects Of Economic Sanctions On Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s military industry is a fundamental factor of its national power. The enterprises operating in its defense sector are largely state-owned. Consequently, Russia’s sizeable military corporations and their subsidiary organizations operate not on the principles of a competitive domestic market, which is one of the key foundations of technological progress, but their main goal is to pursue Moscow’s political interests and ensure the stability of the regime. Accordingly, along with military capabilities, having a powerful economic leverage in the form of energy resources, encourages Russia not only to pursue its own economic interests but also intimidate neighboring countries and extort their territories to satisfy its imperialist intentions. The responsibility of the defense industry in Moscow’s current governing model is exactly on what the Russian government itself has based its legitimacy - military modernization, restoring Russia’s strength and greatness. One of its ill-favored manifestations is the military aggression in Ukraine which is claiming the lives of thousands of innocent people. The unprecedented scale of sanctions imposed by the West will clearly affect Moscow’s defense capabilities but the only questions are - when and to what extent? Russian military production, on the one hand, helps the country to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and, on the other hand, arms exports are an important source of country’s budgetary revenues. At the same time, this allows it to exert political influence over the purchasing states. The collapse of the Russian attack on Ukraine may not only sacrifice the hegemonic goals of the latter but also lead to the loss of existing and potential customers of its military weapons. There is no doubt that Russia is experiencing colossal military losses as a result of the war and, at the same time, questions are being raised about the quality of its arms and heavy equipment. Until now, there has been a consensus that Russian armaments were a viable and affordable alternative to Western weapons, although this statement could also be another victim of the war. As a result of the sanctions, Russia faced not only financial but also technical problems. In addition to Western countries, Asia’s leading technology powers have restricted Russia’s access to critical components needed for military production. Existing restrictions apply to advanced technologies such as semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, software and encryption, microelectronics, aviation systems, oil extraction equipment and other manufacturing components. In this context, it is important to discuss the impact that economic sanctions may have on Russia’s military capabilities, its recovery prospects and its aggressive foreign policy in the future.
Topic:
Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

530. Phoenix or Icarus? European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
With all eyes on the next Russian move in Ukraine, the notion of European strategic autonomy is experiencing a revival. At first glance, this seems overdue given that talks between Washington and Moscow bypass Brussels entirely. But beyond a limited use for the concept to help mitigate vulnerabilities resulting from dependencies and credibly malign actors that can exploit them, the notion remains surplus to requirements. Broad use of the term ‘EU strategic autonomy’, as is in vogue, risks giving populism and nationalism an unnecessary impulse. It also risks unmooring the EU from its collaborative and compromise-oriented essence because it depicts the world outside the EU as a swamp where danger lurks behind every tree. If EU Member States want a more assertive and capable set of institutions that act on their behalf, they should just get on with their unfinished business – the Single European Market, industrial/digital policy, fiscal transfers and defence/security policy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine