Political Geography: Russia / Publication Year: within 25 Years

1841. Russia’s 5th Column

Author:: Ken Gude
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: Russia’s actions to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election and help then-presidential candidate Donald Trump win were similar to its activities to build a network of far-right political parties and movements in Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin is using this network to advance his policy objectives at home and abroad. In this effort, Russia is motivated by both the desire to lead a conservative revival against Western liberal democracies and a flawed interpretation of recent waves of popular uprisings against autocratic rulers that sees an American conspiracy behind them. Putin has adopted a deliberate strategy to directly challenge the liberal international order led by the United States. That global system helped end the historical pattern of devastating wars among major powers and brought much of the world an unprecedented era of peace and prosperity since the end of World War II.
Topic:: Corruption, Social Movement, Leadership, Far Right, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

1842. War by Other Means

Author:: Max Bergmann and Carolyn Kenney
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: Liberal democracies across the globe are under attack. They are being attacked not by traditional weapons of war but by disinformation—intentionally false or misleading information designed to deceive targeted audiences. While these attacks may not pose a threat to the physical safety of democratic citizens, they do pose a threat to democracy. In modern democratic societies, credible information is critical to the economy, political system, and way of life that citizens have come to expect. When citizens of democracies do not trust information, the forums for discussing politics and debating policy are compromised. If the media in a democracy is viewed as biased or, worse, as aligned with special interests, the bedrock of the democratic system—its ability to resolve differences through debate, persuasion, and compromise—breaks down. A democratic society can withstand deep disagreements, but if its citizens cannot agree on some basic and fundamental facts, that democracy will struggle to function.
Topic:: War, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

1843. First on the Front Lines – the Role of Volunteers in Countering Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine

Author:: Dmitri Teperik, Anna Bulakh, and Grigori Senkiv
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s military aggression gave rise to many spontaneous social and economic developments in Ukraine. At this critical moment, and against the backdrop of a series of dramatic events – the Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014, the subsequent annexation of Crimea, and the armed conflict in the east of the country that developed from artificially provoked separatist sentiments directed from outside the region – people showed a strong will to self-organise, albeit for a short period of time. Thus, one can say that the birth of the mass volunteer movement played a decisive role in preserving the integrity of the Ukrainian state, thereby meeting the demands of the period of crisis. The patriotically-minded population, aware of the significant dangers posed by ongoing events, sought to fill the gaps of leadership that existed not only in political and socio-economic realms, but also in defence and national security. The voluntary movement thus partly assumed several functions of a government that had shown itself unable to respond effectively to hybrid threats – making it a unique phenomenon in the history of modern Europe. But just who were these volunteers? What motivated them and brought them together? How could ordinary people spontaneously organise themselves to contain the military threat – and to be first on the front lines? To explore such questions, ICDS established an interdisciplinary research team to study the involvement of volunteers in defending Ukraine against Russia’s aggression. Recognising that our study cannot cover every single aspect of this complex phenomenon, our objective instead has been a more modest one: to provide the public with an outside perspective that can foster deeper understanding of how a volunteer military movement can be formed during a chaotic period of active military operations. We hope that this analysis will be also useful to the Baltic states, where volunteers are already extensively involved in national defence. As expected, when we started the project we found that the phenomenon of military volunteers in Ukraine had been rather thinly studied. It is thus welcome that some publications covering and highlighting this topic have been released during our research period. It should also be noted that the personal stories of those who were “first on the front lines” still carry enormous emotional weight. In a country that is de facto still at war, it is difficult to track, fully understand, or reliably analyse complex processes such as the volunteer movement. Accordingly, our work required the development of an effective and objective approach to analysing the processes of creating, developing and integrating volunteer units. We hope that this report will serve as a starting point for further research and expert discussion.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Civil Society, Armed Forces, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

1844. Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025: Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum

Author:: Roger N. McDermott
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This study examines how and why Russia’s military has turned its attention since the reform initiated in late 2008 to more fully exploiting and developing significant use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) by employing electronic warfare (EW) assets. This is consistent with the interest in various “force enablers” and in adopting network-centric approaches to military operations as the Russian military becomes further “informationised”. The report finds that Moscow is stepping up its efforts to renew and modernise the EW inventory, and this effort is complemented by changes to organisation, doctrine, command structure, training and tactics, as well as techniques and procedures. The effect of those changes is evident in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, where EW forms an organic part of Russia’s kinetic and non-kinetic operations—both in support of proxy forces and conducted independently. Further EW capability development will pose a serious challenge to the proper planning and execution of NATO’s defence of the Baltic states, and NATO’s entire Eastern Flank, in the event of a Russian assault. This capability is an integral part of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) approach and is clearly tailored to target NATO’s C4ISR. NATO’s planners must also understand that the Russian EW capability extends well beyond air defence or even A2/AD, as it is fielding a wider array of systems to assist, for example, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and cyber operations. Russia’s ability to contest the EMS, combined with its holistic military thinking, means that EW capability will be exploited and effects created well beyond the traditional realms in which NATO’s thinking about EW is rooted. We might witness an ever-growing convergence of Russia’s EW, cyber- and information warfare approaches, which will further challenge NATO’s concepts and practices. As a result, NATO needs to plan, revise its scenarios, and train to conduct defensive and offensive operations in a fiercely contested EMS battlespace. In their current form, NATO plans to defend its Eastern Flank including the Baltic states might be inadequate as they do not take account of the full spectrum of Russia’s current and future EW capabilities and their uses—as part of A2/AD approach and beyond. NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and further development of its posture in the Baltic area, which might possibly include assets for integrated air and missile defence in the future, will fail to deliver the desired outcome if the Alliance falls behind in the contest for EMS dominance.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Hybrid Warfare, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria