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1. Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index 2021–22

Author:
Chi Fang and Jade Reidy
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Military tensions are on the rise in Northeast Asia as the likes of China, North Korea, and the United States flex their combat capabilities—but this does not mean that war is imminent. This is an important insight from the latest Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index (DTI) for the period spanning 2021 to 2022. Carried out every two years by the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the DTI offers a detailed examination of how open or closed major regional states are in disclosing information on their defense postures, including defense budgets, publication of official annual defense reports, legislative oversight, and the nature of external military activities. The 2021–22 DTI found that there was only a marginal decline in the overall defense transparency level for Northeast Asia, with Japan showing a noteworthy improvement in its transparency performance. The concealment of defense activities is often an indicator that countries are quietly making preparations for military conflict and contributes to declining trust and confidence. The evidence from this DTI that defense transparency is relatively stable in Northeast Asia is cause for cautious optimism that the long peace that the region has enjoyed remains intact for now. Transparency though is just one indicator of the overall state of defense affairs, and the powerful underlying currents that are the main determinants of war and peace, such as threat perceptions and arms dynamics, all appear to be trending negatively.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Security, and Transparency
Political Geography:
China, North Korea, Northeast Asia, and United States of America

2. U.S. Security Ties With Korea and Japan: Getting Beyond Deterrence

Author:
Stephen Haggard
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Japan and Korea—the United States’ two key allies in Northeast Asia—are both advanced industrial democracies facing similar constraints from a rising China and a nuclear North Korea. One would think that trilateral cooperation would be a cinch. Yet Japan and Korea have been at each other’s throats over simmering historical issues and differing approaches to China. Forging a trilateral alliance is highly unlikely. But strengthening cooperation is possible by focusing less on the military components of the alliance—i.e., providing extended deterrence—and more on new issues such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and infrastructure, which can strengthen collective capabilities and make cooperation more appealing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Nuclear Power, Innovation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, China, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific

3. Deter and Normalize Relations with North Korea

Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. is strong and safe—North Korea is weak, deterred by U.S. power, and desperate for economic relief.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Sanctions, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
United States, Asia, North Korea, and Korea

4. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices

Author:
Elizabeth N. Saunders
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When and how do domestic politics influence a state's nuclear choices? Recent scholarship on nuclear security develops many domestic-political explanations for different nuclear decisions. These explanations are partly the result of two welcome trends: first, scholars have expanded the nuclear timeline, examining state behavior before and after nuclear proliferation; and second, scholars have moved beyond blunt distinctions between democracies and autocracies to more fine-grained understandings of domestic constraints. But without linkages between them, new domestic-political findings could be dismissed as a laundry list of factors that do not explain significant variation in nuclear decisions. This review essay assesses recent research on domestic politics and nuclear security, and develops a framework that illuminates when and how domestic-political mechanisms are likely to affect nuclear choices. In contrast to most previous domestic arguments, many of the newer domestic-political mechanisms posited in the literature are in some way top-down; that is, they show leaders deliberately maintaining or loosening control over nuclear choices. Two dimensions govern the extent and nature of domestic-political influence on nuclear choices: the degree of threat uncertainty and the costs and benefits to leaders of expanding the circle of domestic actors involved in a nuclear decision. The framework developed in this review essay helps make sense of several cases explored in the recent nuclear security literature. It also has implications for understanding when and how domestic-political arguments might diverge from the predictions of security-based analyses.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Domestic Politics, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Iran, and North Korea

5. North Korea’s Military Strategy, 2018

Author:
Chun In-bum
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
As the focus shifted from North Korea’s military advances in 2017 to its diplomatic offensive in 2018, we should not lose sight of the strategic thinking behind gaining the maximum time to develop the capacity to extend its military threat. At present North Korea needs time to perfect its nuclear strike capability. It has been very successful in developing missile capabilities, but it needs additional time to achieve its goals. Starting with high-level North-South talks on March 5, 2018, the DPRK has just gained what it needs most: time. Whenever the first talks begin with the United States and the DPRK, there should be no surprise if the DPRK comes with an improved capability to threaten the alliance. Thus, for an extended period in 2018, as diplomacy proceeds, we should expect a subdued North Korean approach: not flaunting its nuclear weapons and missiles, while striving to boost capabilities for the struggle ahead. In the seven years since Kim Jong-un officially inherited the leadership of the DPRK, his stated policy has been byungjin ( 병진, 竝進), the pursuit of both economic and military development. In conjunction with purges and efforts to eliminate rivals, byungjin may, in part, derive from Kim’s efforts at the outset of his tenure to consolidate political power. Through it, Kim displayed moderate economic flexibility, thereby gaining favor with the North Korean people through facilitating an improvement in living standards. It is tempting to see byungjin as a sign of the regime’s weakness, or as an indication of moderation, either of which would prompt the eventual collapse of the Kim regime. Correspondingly, one might see it as a reflection of Kim’s immaturity, inexperience, and lack of political and strategic acumen. These viewpoints reflect mirror imaging more than a sophisticated understanding of North Korea. Byungjin may be more of a political device and a strategic communications element of a grand strategy, as opposed to the regime’s strategy. It may be a significant instrument in the regime’s effort to maintain elite cohesion and focus the energies of the North Korean people toward productive pursuits that likewise add to the regime’s legitimacy and staying power. It by no means suggests any diminishing of the priority of making advances in nuclear and missile development in order to pose a more serious threat. Since taking power, Kim’s regime has fired close to one hundred missiles of wide variety and range compared to thirty-one for his father and grandfather combined. He has also conducted four nuclear tests, boasting of a thermal nuclear capability. During his 2018 New Year’s address, Kim Jong-un proclaimed that the DPRK had perfected its nuclear and intercontinental missile capabilities, supporting North Korea’s constitutional claim to be a nuclear power. Despite an upsurge in diplomacy after this address, we should keep our eyes on its military advances.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Security, Military Strategy, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and Korea

6. Unpacked: The threat from North Korea

Author:
Jonathan Pollack
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
Brookings Senior Fellow and SK-Korea Foundation Chair Jonathan Pollack explains the threat that North Korea poses to the United States, its neighbors, and the world. Pollack also explores the different options that the United States has to handle threats from North Korea and describes the different scenarios that could escalate tensions between the United States and North Korea.
Topic:
International Security and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
America, North Korea, and Global Focus

7. North Korea and the Middle East

Author:
Alon Levkowitz
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
Kim Jung-un’s new year declaration that North Korea will test its new ICBM this year (2017) poses a further challenge to the incoming Trump administration. It is truly a “rogue state” – a country that conducts nuclear tests in defiance of the UN Security Council, and that is willing to sell conventional and non-conventional weapons to other rogue regimes, including Israel’s enemies. The nuclear cooperation between North Korea, Syria and Iran forces Israel into new alliances to counter this threat.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
North Korea and Global Focus

8. North Korea Policy: Failure is the Only Option

Author:
Denny Roy
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As many analysts have pointed out, US policy towards North Korea is “failing.” It is true that Pyongyang has declined the US/South Korean offer to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for economic opportuni es and upgraded poli cal rela ons. Instead, the North Korean government remains intensely hos le towards Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo, and con nues making progress towards deploying a nuclear‐ pped intercon nental ballis c missile — a frightening prospect.
Topic:
International Relations, International Security, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
North Korea

9. North Korean ICBM Tests: No Surprises, No Good Answers

Author:
Emily Landau
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
While North Korea’s recent nuclear tests significantly raised the level of fear in the United States, they were not a surprise. North Korea, long a nuclear state, is a dangerous nuclear proliferator that has shirked international commitments. Pyongyang issues highly aggressive rhetoric toward the United States and its regional neighbors on a regular basis; it flaunts its nuclear capability and threatens to use it, and tends to share nonconventional know-how and technologies. And herein lies a link to Tehran: as Iran also remains motivated in the nuclear realm despite the JCPOA, the direct implications of North Korea's activities for Iran's nuclear program must be under constant scrutiny. The indirect implications for dealing with Iran's nuclear motivation invoke the ability to rely on negotiations to stop a determined proliferator. The North Korean case of failed negotiations must be heeded when thinking about Iran.
Topic:
International Relations and International Security
Political Geography:
North Korea

10. North Korea: The Agitator of East Asia?

Author:
Fuad Olajuwon
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
In recent news, North Korea has been the hot button issue with governments and bureaucrats alike. The geopolitical nature of the country leaves many world leaders apprehensive as to what will happen next. Recent missile tests conducted by Pyongyang as well as brazen rhetoric spouted by Kim Jong Un towards neighboring countries poses a threat as to what actions North Korea will take moving forward. While it’s interesting to note the movements of the country in question, the reaction of the other nations in the region have the potential to shift the geopolitical balance of power. So the questions remain the same; is North Korea an aggressive force that has the resources and capability to fracture East Asian relations? Or can countries use these events to craft a new reality to preserve the sanctity of their respective states?
Topic:
International Relations and International Security
Political Geography:
North Korea

11. A Blueprint for New Sanctions on North Korea

Author:
Edward Fishman, Peter Harrell, and Elizabeth Rosenberg
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
North Korea has emerged as one of the most significant national security threats facing the United States and its allies today. Since leader Kim Jong Un came to power in 2011, North Korea has accelerated the pace of its nuclear tests, and appears to have made substantial progress in developing operational medium-, long-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Many experts assess that if left unchecked, Pyongyang could develop the capability to strike the contiguous United States with a nuclear warhead within 5–10 years. Because of that, in June 2017 U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis characterized North Korea as “the most urgent and dangerous threat” to U.S. peace and security.
Topic:
International Relations, International Security, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
North Korea and Global Focus

12. North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program: The Known and Unknown

Author:
Hyun-Kyung Kim, Elizabeth Philipp, and Hattie Chung
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Amidst the growing threat of North Korea’s nuclear program, the assassination of Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother via VX nerve agent in February 2017 brought renewed interest in North Korea’s other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs—chemical and biological weapons. If used on a large scale, these weapons can cause not only tens of thousands of deaths, but also create panic and paralyze societies. Nevertheless, the vividness of the nuclear threat has overshadowed other weapons programs, limiting the attention and policy input that they deserve. This paper focuses on North Korea’s biological weapons (BW).
Topic:
International Security and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
North Korea

13. North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: How to Halt Its Slow but Steady Advance

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In the first five weeks of 2016, North Korea twice defied UN Security Council resolutions designed to stem its pursuit of nuclear weapons. On January 6, it conducted its fourth underground nuclear test; on February 7, it launched a satellite into space for the second time. These two events provided a vivid reminder that North Korea continues to make progress mastering the technology needed for developing long-range ballistic missiles and arming them with nuclear warheads. U.S. leaders have long sought to formulate and implement policies that would secure a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but these efforts have not been successful. U.S. political commentary on North Korea vacillates between taking at face value the regime’s exaggerated claims of technological prowess and reducing its leadership to cartoonish stereotypes. A clearer understanding of North Korea’s motives and the current status of its nuclear and missile programs can lead to a more realistic strategy for enhancing U.S. security. That strategy would involve using enhanced sanctions as leverage for achieving a halt in North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing and production of fissile material, but this can only happen through negotiations.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, International Security, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States and North Korea

14. The Inflated Yet Unsolvable North Korean Nuclear Threat

Author:
Boyan Boyanov
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
After Pyongyang conducted its fourth nuclear test on the 5th of January 2016 and declared it a successful experiment with a hydrogen bomb, the international community resumed its appeals for finding a definitive solution to the issue with North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. What impresses is the routine of the international response following the North Korean habitual act of defying the nuclear nonproliferation system: diplomatic condemnation mostly coming from the United States, South Korea, Japan, and, in a far more restrained manner – from China. When Pyongyang launched a satellite in space two days later, Seoul responded by shutting down the Kaesong industrial complex – a mutually beneficial industrial zone where South Korean companies employ North Korean labor1 . Even this seemingly harsh action does not constitute a precedent. At that time it was not very demanding to foretell the execution of consequential U.S. – South Korea military drills to display the U.S. resolution to be constantly involved in whatever is happening on the Korean Peninsula and to dismay the latest great leader of the North.
Topic:
International Security, International Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
North Korea

15. Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
With the world focused on the nuclear crisis in Iran, it is tempting to think that addressing this case, North Korea, and the problem of nuclear terrorism is all that matters and is what matters most. Perhaps, but if states become more willing to use their nuclear weapons to achieve military advantage, the problem of proliferation will become much more unwieldy. In this case, U.S. security will be hostage not just to North Korea, Iran, or terrorists, but to nuclear proliferation more generally, diplomatic miscalculations, and wars between a much larger number of possible players. This, in a nutshell, is the premise of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, which explores what nuclear futures we may face over the next 3 decades and how we currently think about this future. Will nuclear weapons spread in the next 20 years to more nations than just North Korea and possibly Iran? How great will the consequences be? What can be done?
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, International Security, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

16. Understanding the North Korean Nuclear Threat

Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference continues in New York, the international community's failure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea looms large. Unlike the four of the world's nine nuclear-weapon states that have shown some progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals, North Korea is working hard to expand its arsenal and make it more credible. Unlike six of the nine, which have either ratified the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or maintained a testing moratorium since the treaty was concluded, North Korea has conducted three underground nuclear tests, the only state to do so during the last 17 years. Unlike the three nuclear-weapon states that never became parties to the NPT, North Korea signed the treaty, declared it was withdrawing, later pledged to denuclearize, and then reneged on its commitment. The North's nuclear program today is out of control and accelerating, damaging both the NPT and international stability. Addressing this grim reality begins with an objective assessment of North Korea's actual nuclear capabilities and an acknowledgment that the Obama administration's "strategic patience" approach is not working. Washington and Beijing must step up their efforts to revive the six-party process with the near-term goal of freezing Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, taking care to manage potential spoilers, Russia and the U.S. Congress.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Political stability, Nonproliferation, Denuclearization, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and North Korea

17. Theories on Why North Korea Rejects the World

Author:
Victor Cha
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
North Korea last week rejected South Korea’s invitation to attend the Seoul Defense Dialogue in September, denigrating the talks as “puerile.” In the same breath, it also rejected a proposal by National Assembly speaker Chung Ui-hwa for a meeting with his northern counterpart to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the Korean Peninsula on Aug. 15. If you ask an Obama administration official about America’s “strategic patience” policy of non-dialogue with North Korea, he or she will tell you that the problem is not an unwillingness on the part of the United States to have dialogue. On the contrary, the Obama administration has tried every channel possible, from six-party talks to personal communications to secret trips, to jump-start a dialogue. But the regime in Pyongyang has rejected all of these.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
United States, South Korea, and North Korea

18. Countering Sanctions: The Unequal Geographic Impact of Economic Sanctions in North Korea

Author:
Yong Suk Lee
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
This paper examines how an autocratic regime domestically counters the impact of economic sanctions. A stylized model predicts that, as long as non-compliance is not too costly, the autocrat redistributes resources to the more valuable urban area when sanctions increase. Empirically, I examine the case of North Korea. I use the satellite night lights data to create average luminosity for each one minute by one minute cell between 1992 and 2010. I construct a sanctions index that varies based on the international response to North Korea's nuclear pursuit. I find that sanctions increase the urban-rural luminosity gap by 1.07%. Consistent with urban elite capture, Pyongyang, the center of power is best shielded from sanctions followed by province capitals. The hinterlands respond: luminosity near the Chinese border increases with sanctions. Sanctions that fail to change the leader's behavior increase inequality at a cost to the already marginalized hinterlands.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Sanctions, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
South Korea and North Korea

19. Nuclear Developments in North Korea

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
Three years ago, Pyongyang expelled the international inspectors from its Yongbyon nuclear complex and abandoned the Six - Party talks. The crisis atmosphere on the Korean peninsula sparked by Pyongyang's military actions in 2010 turned into diplomatic calm in 2011, but Pyongyang continued to expand its nuclear program. It conducted a second nuclear test in 2009, unveiled a modern, sophisticated uranium centrifuge facility, and rolled out a road - mobile intermediate - range ballistic missile in 2010. Its coopera tion in missile technologies with Iran continued and nuclear cooperation is suspected. Beijing protected Pyongyang from crippling sanctions while Washington and Seoul remained reluctant to engage having been burned by Pyongyang's unveiling of its clandestine uranium enrichment program. Prospects for resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis looked grim. Then, surprisingly in December 2011, just before the death of Kim Jong - il, American and North Korean diplomats nearly reached a deal to return to the negotiating table. Even more surprisingly, the new Kim regime agreed to take initial steps with Washington in February. In this paper, I describe the troubling nuclear developments in 2011 and suggest targets for the upcoming negotiations to further reduce the nuclear risks while the parties resume the long road toward eventual denuclearization and normalization of relations on the Korean peninsula.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
North Korea

20. Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-totalitarian Politics

Author:
Patrick McEachern
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Columbia University Press
Abstract:
North Korea's institutional politics defy traditional political models, making the country's actions seem surprising or confusing when, in fact, they often conform to the regime's own logic. Drawing on recent materials, such as North Korean speeches, commentaries, and articles, Patrick McEachern, a specialist on North Korean affairs, reveals how the state's political institutions debate policy and inform and execute strategic-level decisions. Many scholars dismiss Kim Jong-Il's regime as a "one-man dictatorship," calling him the "last totalitarian leader," but McEachern identifies three major institutions that help maintain regime continuity: the cabinet, the military, and the party. These groups hold different institutional policy platforms and debate high-level policy options both before and after Kim and his senior leadership make their final call. This method of rule may challenge expectations, but North Korea does not follow a classically totalitarian, personalistic, or corporatist model. Rather than being monolithic, McEachern argues, the regime, emerging from the crises of the 1990s, rules differently today than it did under Kim's father, Kim Il Sung. The son is less powerful and pits institutions against one another in a strategy of divide and rule. His leadership is fundamentally different: it is "post-totalitarian." Authority may be centralized, but power remains diffuse. McEachern maps this process in great detail, supplying vital perspective on North Korea's reactive policy choices, which continue to bewilder the West.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific
Publication Identifier:
9780231526807
Publication Identifier Type:
ISBN