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1. Global Terrorism Index 2023

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
The GTI report is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) using data from TerrorismTracker and other sources. TerrorismTracker provides event records on terrorist attacks since 1 January 2007. The dataset contains almost 66,000 terrorist incidents for the period 2007 to 2022. In 2022, deaths from terrorism fell by nine per cent to 6,701 deaths and is now 38 per cent lower than at its peak in 2015. The fall in deaths was mirrored by a reduction in the number of incidents, with attacks declining by almost 28 per cent from 5,463 in 2021 to 3,955 in 2022. However, if Afghanistan was removed from the index, terrorism deaths would have increased by four per cent. Afghanistan remained the country most impacted by terrorism for the fourth consecutive year, despite attacks and deaths falling by 75 per cent and 58 per cent respectively. The GTI does not include acts of state repression and violence by state actors and, as such, acts committed by the Taliban are no longer included in the scope of the report since they took control of the government.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Finance, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Global Focus

2. Iran and the ‘Axis of Resistance’ Vastly Improved Hamas’s Operational Capabilities

Author:
Colin P. Clarke
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Iran has provided training, equipment, and financing to Hamas over the years, vastly improving the terrorist organization’s capabilities, evidenced by the cross-border attack into Israel on October 7 that resulted in more than 1,400 killed. The unification of Iran’s network of proxies under the purview of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani has been a force multiplier and cemented Iran’s “unity of fronts” strategy as the most effective means of encircling Israel. Israel has declared its intention to destroy Hamas completely, but any attempt to do so will come at an extremely high cost and could spur other Iranian proxies like Hezbollah to join the fray, prolonging the conflict and increasing the likelihood of a region-wide conflagration.
Topic:
Terrorism, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Proxy Groups, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

3. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

4. The global terrorist threat forecast in 2023

Author:
Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The article presents three significant developments in the global terrorism landscape: Far-right terrorism, the growth of al Qaeda, with Taliban patronage from Afghanistan, and the persistence of the Islamic State as the most dominant threat in the world despite the successive decapitation of its leadership The article notes the importance in this context of political Islam and the spread of "jihadist" doctrines both from the Gulf and from conflict zones supplanting traditional and local Islam. The article also notes the potential impact of the radical environmental movement and the growing problem of the use of violence by other radical groups.
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Far Right, and Political Islam
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, and Global Focus

5. La narrativa de Al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico frente a la irrupción del Estado Islámico

Author:
Elena C. Díaz Galán
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El presente artículo explora las transformaciones producidas en la narrativa de la Al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico y su adaptación a la aparición en la escena yihadista global de Estado Islámico y la declaración del restablecimiento del Califato. A través de la compilación, la codificación sistematizada y la explotación de un corpus monolingüe especializado, representativo, equilibrado y diacrónico de todas las publicaciones propagandísticas relevantes de AQMI entre 2004 y 2017, esta investigación pone de manifiesto los cambios producidos en la narrativa de la organización magrebí y la adaptación de su discurso a la aparición de competencia en la contienda actual abierta por el liderazgo de la yihad global.
Topic:
Terrorism, Islamic State, Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Narrative
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

6. CTC Sentinel: October/November 2023 Issue

Author:
Devorah Margolin, Matthew Levitt, Paul Cruickshank, Brian Dodwell, and Caroline Morgan
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On October 7, Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis in the largest terror attack since 9/11, carrying out acts of brutality that matched, and even surpassed, the worst atrocities of the Islamic State. The resulting war in Gaza, the escalation in tensions across the Middle East, and the anger in Arab and Muslim communities over the large number of Palestinian civilians killed in the conflict so far have upended the international terror threat landscape, creating acute concern about reprisals, and given the attacks already seen in France and Belgium, raised the specter of a new global wave of Islamist terror. In our feature article, Devorah Margolin and Matthew Levitt write that “The brutal Hamas-led October 7 attack on Israeli communities near Gaza represented a tactical paradigm shift for the group.” They observe that “the group’s explicit targeted killing and kidnapping of civilians [on October 7] baldly contradicts Hamas’ articulated revised political strategy since it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Ironically, Hamas’ sharp tactical shift only underscores that the group never abandoned its fundamental commitment to the creation of an Islamist state in all of what it considers historical Palestine and the destruction of Israel.” Global jihadi groups have been exploiting the conflict in Gaza to call for attacks. In our feature interview, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Ilkka Salmi says that “these calls to attack or to engage in some terrorist activity spread extremely quickly on social media and that’s why they could have a rapid and serious impact on the security situation. It reminds me of the days back in 2014-2016 when Daesh propaganda was at its high peak. The situation in Israel, combined with that sort of propaganda, could change the security situation in the E.U. quite drastically.” Tore Hamming writes that “three factors are likely to determine the impact of the ongoing events on the trajectory of the terrorism threat in the West: the length of the war, the scale of Israel’s offensive in Gaza, and the degree of support from Western nations to Israel.” Erik Skare stresses that analysts need to holistically examine both what Hamas says and does to better understand the group. He writes: “October 7 likely signifies the victory of those in the movement who have grown frustrated with an excessive focus on politics, advocating instead for a renewed emphasis on violence to reach their long-term goals.” In our second interview, General (Retired) Stephen Townsend, who commanded AFRICOM until August 2022, warns about intensifying jihadi terrorist threats across Africa. He says that al-Qa`ida’s affiliates there are “probably the largest threat to U.S. interests in the region today. And as they gain capacity, they’ll broaden their picture to the region and globally, to include our homeland eventually, I think.” Finally, Asfandyar Mir examines the counterterrorism dilemmas facing the United States in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He writes: “Al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State are pivoting to exploit Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack on Israel and the civilian harm in Israel’s military campaign in Gaza since … Policymakers should take seriously the risk of a surprise terrorist provocation from Afghanistan.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

7. İşverenlerin Engelli, Eski Hükümlü ve Terör Mağduru İstihdam Etme Yükümlülüğü

Author:
Melike Yaman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AURUM Journal of Social Sciences
Institution:
Altinbas University
Abstract:
Hukukumuzda temel dayanağını Anayasa’nın 48. maddesinden alan sözleşme serbestisi ilkesi; 6098 sayılı Türk Borçlar Kanunu hükümleri uyarınca da koruma altına alınmış ve İş Hukuku alanında da uygulanan genel bir ilkedir. Söz konusu ilkenin bir gereği de sözleşme tarafını seçebilme serbestisidir. Ancak iş hukukunda sözleşme serbestisi ilkesine sosyal düşünceler ve işçiyi koruma düşüncesinin sonucu olarak birtakım sınırlamalar getirilmiştir. Bu sınırlamalardan birisi de belli niteliklere sahip işverenlerin engelli, eski hükümlü ve terör mağduru istihdam etme yükümlülüğü yüklenmesidir. İşverenler, elli veya daha fazla işçi çalıştırdıkları özel sektör işyerlerinde yüzde üç engelli, kamu işyerlerinde ise yüzde dört engelli ve yüzde iki eski hükümlü isçiyi veya terör mağdurunu çalıştırmakla yükümlüdürler. İlgili yükümlülük temel olarak 4857 sayılı İş Kanunu’nun 30. maddesinde öngörülmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, 854 sayılı Kanun’da da bir düzenleme yer almaktadır. Ayrıca Yurtiçinde İşe Yerleştirme Hizmetleri Hakkında Yönetmelik, Kamu Kurum ve Kuruluşlarına Eski Hükümlü veya Terörle Mücadelede Malul Sayılmayacak Şekilde Yaralananların İşçi Olarak Alınmasında Uygulanacak Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik ile Erişkinler İçin Engellilik Değerlendirilmesi Hakkında Yönetmelik’te de konuya dair incelenmesi gereken hükümler bulunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla işverenlerin engelli, eski hükümlü ve terör mağduru istihdam etme yükümlülüğü kapsamında ele alınması gereken düzenlemelerin mevzuatta dağınık bir şekilde yer aldığı söylenebilir. Bu çalışmanın amacı ilgili yükümlülüğün kapsamının, uygulanmasının ve sonuçlarının ortaya konulmasıdır. Söz konusu amaç doğrultusunda çalışma kapsamında, doktrindeki görüşler ve Yargıtay kararlarından da yararlanılarak bahsi geçen birincil ve ikincil mevzuat incelenmiş ve engelli, eski hükümlü, terör mağduru, özel sektör, kamu sektörü kavramları, bu yükümlülük kapsamında çalışacak işçilerin yerine getirmesi gereken koşullar, çalıştırılacak işçi sayısının tespitinde ve işçilerin belirlenmesinde başvurulan kurallar, bu yükümlülüğün uygulanmasına ilişkin temel esaslar ile ilgili yükümlülüğün denetimi, ihlali ve bu ihlale bağlı sonuçlar açıklığa kavuşturulmuştur.
Topic:
Terrorism, Employment, Disability, and Labor Rights
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

8. Is Iran Looking to Inspire Shia Homegrown Violent Extremist Attacks?

Author:
Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
An October 2018 report by the National Counterterrorism Center defined Shia homegrown violent extremists as “individuals who are inspired or influenced by state actors such as Iran, foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or Shia militant groups but who do not belong to these groups and are not directed by them.” At the time, the prospect of such Shia violence was largely theoretical, and officials could identify no tangible threats on American soil. But the January 2020 targeted killing of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani changed the picture, and U.S. officials could now point to a “catalyzing event,” as envisioned in the NCTC brief. Last year’s attack against writer Salman Rushdie and another at a Las Vegas hotel exemplified how Iran-inspired individuals were motivated to act. In this Policy Note, experts Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt explore lone-offender Shia violence largely through the lens of social media. Closer tracking of online networks, they argue, could illuminate this flourishing virtual activity and how it might lead to real-world harm.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Shia
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

9. Countering “ISIS at Large” in Syria

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In U.S. Central Command’s 2022 “year in review” statement on the current status of the fight against the Islamic State, commanding general Michael Kurilla highlighted three categories: (1) “ISIS in detention,” meaning the thousands of men and boys affiliated with the group and held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons; (2) the “potential next generation of ISIS,” meaning the approximately 55,000 women and minors held in camps; and (3) “ISIS at large,” meaning the leaders and operatives that the United States and its partners “are currently fighting in Iraq and Syria.” Although Gen. Kurilla praised the ongoing effort to militarily degrade ISIS, he also noted that the group’s ideology persists, and that “partnered operations” are needed to keep up the pressure. This view aligns with the pivot in U.S. strategy in Syria over the past year and a half, from a military mission to “advising, assisting, and enabling” local partners. At the same time, however, U.S. forces have continued launching unilateral strikes against ISIS leaders in Syria as recently as this month.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

10. The Future of Repatriation from Northeast Syria

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) recently announced that due to the international community’s slow response to the repatriation of thousands of individuals affiliated with the Islamic State (IS), it will begin to hold “fair and transparent trials in accordance with international and local laws related to terrorism.” The announcement comes after representatives from more than eighty countries gathered in Saudi Arabia on June 8 for a ministerial meeting convened by the Global Coalition Against Daesh, where U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reminded attendees, “We know that repatriation is the only durable solution.” His statement stood out in this context because citizens from many coalition states are still being detained indefinitely in northeast Syria. While the United States has proactively advocated for repatriation across two administrations, most other countries around the world have been reluctant or slow to take such action. To date, approximately 5,500 Iraqis and 2,700 third-country nationals (i.e., not Syrian or Iraqi) have been repatriated from detention camps, and the international community is on track to repatriate more such individuals in 2023 than in years past. Although this is a step in the right direction, it means that more than 10,000 third-country nationals from almost 60 countries remain in detention in northeast Syria, including approximately 2,000 men and boys and 8,000 women and minors. These numbers do not include the more than 18,000 Syrians and 25,000 Iraqis who are also being held indefinitely. With numerous international conflicts dominating daily headlines, much of the international community is no doubt fatigued by the challenges emanating from the fight against IS and the repatriation of IS-affiliated individuals. Yet the AANES announcement and other developments show that these challenges will only proliferate without concerted attention from Washington and its coalition partners.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, Repatriation, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

11. Sinjar: Challenges and Resilience Nine Years after Genocide

Author:
Izat Noah
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Nearly a decade later, many victims are still missing, and thousands now live in displacement camps in unstable, unsanitary conditions. This anniversary is an opportunity to reflect on the ongoing armed conflict in the Sinjar region and the profound influence on its inhabitants. It also serves as an opportunity to appreciate the resilience of the Yazidis, looking toward a future with new hope and new aspirations—a future where Yazidis can experience peace, stability, justice, and equitable opportunities to reconstruct their lives and their communities. Yazidi resilience is clearly evident in how they bore the burden of this genocide, how they have persevered in the face of ongoing persecution and genocide for centuries, and how they have been steadfast in maintaining their identity and heritage despite these adversities and the repeated campaigns to tarnish their image. Yet Yazidis still face significant challenges in Iraq today. Despite relative stability in the Sinjar region, there are concerns among the Yazidi population about the return of armed conflict between groups vying for influence. Even more troubling, the issue of expulsion and displacement remains unresolved despite the liberation of Sinjar from ISIS in 2015. Many Yazidis still live in displacement camps, where they are without their homes, their land, or their basic rights. These refugees have yet to be materially compensated for their losses.
Topic:
Genocide, Politics, Terrorism, and Yazidis
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Sinjar

12. Seven Myths about the Iran Nuclear Deal

Author:
Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2015, President Barack Obama worked with three European powers, the European Union, Iran, China, and Russia to conclude the Iran nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2018, President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the deal. Instituting his policy of “maximum pressure,” Trump imposed crippling economic sanctions that punished Iran not just for its ongoing nuclear weapons program but also for, among other things, its regional aggression and support for terrorism worldwide. Earlier in 2018, Israeli agents conducted a dramatic operation in Tehran, breaking into a secret warehouse and capturing a trove of Iranian nuclear files. These documents revealed a more advanced and comprehensive nuclear weapons program than had been previously known. The nuclear archive also showed Iranian officials’ plan for concealing nuclear weapons efforts under the guise of civilian research and development, and how Iranian officials systematically deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to cooperate with IAEA inspectors to verify the peaceful nature of its program. After the Israelis shared the nuclear archive with the IAEA, its inspectors found traces of uranium at several undeclared sites. Despite being obligated to do so, Tehran has refused to explain the presence of the uranium or reveal its current location. Iran’s requirements under the NPT are wholly separate from the JCPOA, but Tehran is using the Biden administration’s profound desire to return to the nuclear deal to bring political pressure on the IAEA to close the book on Iran’s violations. A fair-minded observer of Iran’s relations with the IAEA cannot but conclude that Tehran has never wavered from its intention to build a nuclear weapons capability and that its publicly declared “civilian” nuclear activities are an effort to hide its nuclear bomb program in plain sight. From the very inception of the JCPOA, however, the deal’s supporters have spun myths that disguise these self-evident truths. After Trump left the deal, those same supporters continued to recite the old myths while adding some new ones about the purported comparative advantage of the JCPOA over maximum pressure. As President Biden prepares to bring the United States back into the JCPOA, and as the public, the press, and Congress consider the deal's terms, we identify the seven most pernicious myths and explain the reality that they seek to conceal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

13. Seven Myths about the “Historic” Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Agreement

Author:
Michael Doran
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Commentators in the United States and Israel have hailed the agreement on the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon, which the Biden administration recently brokered, as a great success. They liken it to the Abraham Accords and claim that it is a major step toward normalizing relations between the Jewish State and a historic Arab foe. But a close examination of the agreement simply does not support this view. Amos Hochstein, the US State Department senior advisor for energy security, led the mediation effort to resolve this dispute. He built on the initiatives of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump to reconcile the conflicting claims of Israel, which claimed Line 1 (see map) as the northern border of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and Lebanon, which claimed Line 23 as its southern border. In the final months of the Trump administration, Lebanese negotiators revised their claim, moving it further south to Line 29. Beirut, however, never registered this new claim with the United Nations. In other words, Line 23 always remained the official Lebanese position. When Hochstein arrived in Beirut last February, the Lebanese government abruptly dropped its insistence on Line 29 and presented its retreat as a sign of its flexibility, a compromise proposal that it could withdraw if the negotiations failed to produce satisfactory results.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

14. Iran Entangled: Iran and Hezbollah’s Support to Proxies Operating in Syria

Author:
Nakissa Jahanbani and Suzanne Weedon Levy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
At a time when power dynamics in the Middle East region are in flux due to the shifting circumstances of the Islamic State, the drawdown of U.S. troops in the region, and the intensification of Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. and Saudi Arabian targets in the region, an historical look at the support Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) provided to proxies during the Syrian civil war may yield insights into Iran’s past and present playbook not only in Syria but potentially other contexts. The civil war in Syria was a unique catalyst that intensified Iranian economic, political, and religious activity in the country, which was ongoing since the 1980s. During the conflict, Iran demonstrated the ability to exert influence tactically while also building a religious and social support base in Syrian society. Iran achieved these goals, in part, through raising and supporting various non-state militant groups in Syria. Drawing on open sources and interviews with subject matter experts, this report investigates the nature of Iranian and LH support to proxies operating in Syria from 2011 to 2019. While the nature of Iran’s proxy network is dynamic, it is useful to investigate the network at its peak years to understand existing and potential future structures and capabilities for Iranian external operations. This report investigates support from Iranian actors—inclusive of the IRGC and its various components, notably the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), as well as the Iranian government more generally—and LH through the lens of kinetic (e.g., joint attacks between the militias and Iranian actors and/or LH, personnel placed with militias, and training and weapons provided to militias) and non-kinetic assistance (e.g., funding, logistical support, recruitment and social service assistance, and meetings between Iranian actors and/or LH and militias). Looking at these two categories of support provides a more holistic snapshot of Iranian influence and capacity-building with proxies in Syria. The report’s findings indicate a pattern of support on the part of Iran and LH that potentially indicates a phased rollout of battlefield-related supports to be replaced with longer-term societal entrenchment efforts. Furthermore, Iran and LH share a division of labor between Iranian actors and LH for kinetic supports, but not non-kinetic ones. Specifically, this report found training, weapons provisions, funding, and joint attacks among the most common supports provided by Iran and LH. Finally, of all Iranian actors, this report found the IRGC to be the most prolific supporter to proxies operating in Syria.
Topic:
Terrorism, Weapons, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Proxy War, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Strategy, and Military Tactics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

15. Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Its self-declared caliphate is gone, but ISIS continues to stage attacks and intimidate the public in much of its former domain. The forces fighting the group need to hinder the militants’ movement between Syria’s regions – and, above all, to avoid debilitating conflicts with one another.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, ISIS, War on Terror, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

16. Fighting Jihadists By, With, and Through U.S. Partners: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects

Author:
Ido Levy
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Special forces have succeeded especially in such missions, but any BWT effort requires some U.S. ground presence to achieve its goals. As part of its bid to end Middle East “forever wars,” the United States has employed a “by, with, and through” (BWT) doctrine for fighting jihadist adversaries. Such operations rely on local partner forces to assume the bulk of the hard ground combat, sometimes with U.S. accompaniment, while American advisors provide support through training, intelligence, heavy air and artillery assets, equipment, funding, and logistics. BWT missions have seen success over the past two decades in theaters such as Iraq (with the Counter Terrorism Service), Syria (with the Syrian Democratic Forces), and Somalia (with the Danab Brigade). But they do not succeed on their own and must be guided by several principles, including a serious U.S. commitment, alignment of American and partner interests, and strong interpersonal relations between advisors and local actors. In this tightly argued Policy Note, military analyst Ido Levy emphasizes the particular success of U.S.-created special forces in missions against jihadist forces. But he cautions that BWT efforts cannot thrive without some U.S. ground presence and, as occurred in Afghanistan, would likely fail amid an outright American withdrawal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

17. Rhetoric Meets Reality in Jawlani’s Push for Self-Sufficiency

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As a key UN vote approaches, Washington should push Turkey to help promote a diverse, balanced economy in HTS-controlled northwest Syria. On July 10, a United Nations vote will decide the future of the cross-border aid mechanism for northwest Syria, an area run by the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The mechanism—which facilitates aid to northwest Syria via Turkey without having to go through Damascus—faces the prospect of nonrenewal for the first time since it was created in 2014, as a consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A failure to renew the mechanism would exacerbate an already daunting humanitarian situation in northwest Syria, where some three-fourths of the population consists of internally displaced persons (IDPs). While aid will likely continue on a far more limited basis if Russia vetoes the mechanism, from a U.S. perspective a more self-reliant HTS-run territory requiring less international assistance would actually be far preferable to a situation in which aid renewal remains subject to periodic dramas. Over the past roughly six years, HTS has transformed itself from an al-Qaeda branch into something resembling a typical regional state governing body, with the group engaging in human rights violations and embracing inflammatory rhetoric. To begin with, it has focused increasingly on developing local institutions and the economy. The group’s strides in governance have been facilitated, in part, by the March 2020 Turkey-Russia ceasefire agreement, which more or less froze the conflict line. Since then, HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani has reiterated the value he places on self-sufficiency and constructing a new polity and society that does not rely on outside help. If HTS and its civilian-led Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) actually followed through on Jawlani’s ideas, locals could find other avenues to support themselves. Yet one must acknowledge at this point that HTS has not matched its lofty rhetoric with efforts to develop indigenous capabilities. Instead, it has worked hard to monopolize economic power.
Topic:
Politics, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

18. Scoring Iraq’s New Government: Metrics for Preserving U.S. Interests

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The protracted post-election process has been a step backward for Iraqi democracy, so Washington will need to closely monitor the new leadership’s actions and hold Baghdad to measurable benchmarks. Iraq’s stalled government formation process finally lurched forward on October 17, with new president Abdul Latif Rashid taking office more than a year after the 2021 election. Incoming prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will now try to ratify his cabinet during a parliamentary session on October 22. If he succeeds as expected, Baghdad will finally close perhaps its most troubled electoral cycle yet—a chapter in which a clear popular vote nearly failed to produce a peaceful transition of power, and the losing factions spurred the biggest winner to abandon parliament through corrupt judicial rulings. Under these sad circumstances, the U.S. government and its partners need to quietly but insistently push for early, inclusive elections to restore legitimacy to the democratic process. Simultaneously, all of Iraq’s friends must watch the new government like a hawk to ensure that militias and corrupt politicians do not attempt to purge technocrats, conduct witch hunts against Western-leaning officials, cover up past graft, or initiate a new wave of “asset-stripping” via state institutions. After many false alarms, the survival of Iraq’s close relationship with the West is truly at stake right now, and only firm expectation-setting can ensure that the partnership continues.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Government, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Military
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

19. Hamas at 35

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A look back at the group’s track record and unchanging core ideology shows why its gestures toward democracy and inclusivity should not be mistaken for true moderation. On December 14, Hamas celebrated the thirty-fifth anniversary of its founding. In addition to unveiling a new logo, the group held a rally in Gaza City, where it showed off the gun of slain Israeli soldier Hadar Goldin, released numerous statements reiterating its goals, and hinted at future conflicts with Israel. Such hostile displays are no surprise given the course of the group’s ideological and political development over the past four decades.
Topic:
Economics, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, Hamas, and Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

20. What is Different in this Wave of Violence and What Should be Done About It?

Author:
Hillel Frisch
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
A static “dumb” security fence can hardly be effective against young and resourceful workers, many of whom work in construction and are experts in dismantling barriers and desperately want to work within the green line.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

21. Increased and Targetted Force Reduced Violence in the Last Terror Wave

Author:
Hillel Frisch
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israeli forces, again, consistently entered these towns and their environs almost daily to make arrests, which led to a 90% decrease in terrorism.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

22. The Unavoidable Campaign to Destroy the Jenin Terrorist Hub

Author:
Kobi Michael and Ori Wertman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the current wave of terror, the IDF has focused its efforts specifically on the old-new terror capital of Jenin, which, while having had some success in thwarting attacks, has not eradicated the extensive terrorist system in the city and has contributed to the erosion of Israeli deterrence. Is it time to reconsider the course?
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

23. Between ISIS and Arab Citizens of Israel

Author:
Yoram Schweitzer, Ephraim Lavie, and Meir Elran
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Although the three Israeli citizens who committed the terrorist attacks in Beersheba and Hadera were identified with ISIS, the organization has not gained a foothold within Israel’s Arab society. In general, the Arab sector objects to the ISIS ideology and violent measures. Israel must try to preserve this norm, building on the public denunciation of terror by Arab leaders and the further social and economic integration of the Arab society in the state
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, ISIS, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

24. A Multi-Front Terror Campaign: How Should Israel Respond?

Author:
Kobi Michael and Udi Dekel
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
There is a tendency to see the recent terror attacks in Israel as a new wave of terror, destined, like any wave, to ebb following its limited duration. Alternatively, recent events might challenge this paradigm and reflect a multi-theater campaign led by Hamas, in cooperation with Islamic Jihad and with Iranian support. How should Israel act in face of the current situation?
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

25. With Ramadan Approaching, the Fear of Escalation

Author:
Yohanan Tzoreff
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The recent terrorist attacks are a tangible illustration of the growing concern in the security establishment and among the public of possible escalation approaching and during Ramadan. Israel has a few possible ways to act to lower the flames, including political and security moves that can be taken by virtue of improved ties with states in the region
Topic:
Religion, Terrorism, ISIS, Conflict, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

26. Taliban Victory Serves as a Model for Palestinian Terror Groups

Author:
Marta Furlan
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
World powers and Israel should refuse to recognize the Taliban regime. This would give hope to Middle Eastern terrorist groups like Hamas that they could also gain recognition under the right conditions. Upon returning to government, the Taliban have been implementing a system of civilian administration based on their Islamist ideological background. The consequences for women and minorities have been horrifying. The same can be said about Afghanistan’s economy, which can no longer provide for its starving population. The Taliban began house searches around Kabul recently, drawing criticism from Western diplomats about rights abuses. The Taliban claim that the operations are to find “kidnappers, professional thieves and crime groups,” however, seven residents told Reuters that the searches were spreading fear and appeared indiscriminate. In terms of security, the Afghan-Pakistani border and the Afghan-Iranian border have traditionally been porous, with illicit goods, illegal immigrants, and terrorists linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province moving undetected from one country to another. Similarly, the borders shared by Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan with Afghanistan remain characterized by volatility, which exposes those countries to the risk of exportation of terrorism from Afghanistan. Though Afghanistan’s neighbors have engaged in efforts to increase border security by erecting fences, conducting anti-terrorism exercises in the border areas, and relocating troops to border areas, the potential security threats originating from Afghanistan remain a source of great concern for the region and beyond. Nevertheless, for Islamists across the border in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world, the Taliban’s victory – and ability to hold onto power in Afghanistan – serves as a model they seek to follow. This should cause worry for Israel due to the encouragement this provides to radical Islamist armed groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) that a return to the armed struggle is the only path to defeat Israel.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

27. US Policy Towards the Yemeni Conflict Must Change

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Re-designating the Houthi movement as a terrorist organization after the drone attack on the UAE is imperative. This, along with overt support for the UAE, would deliver a sharp message and likely have a beneficial effect on Iranian conduct in Vienna.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Humanitarian Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Yemen, North America, and United States of America

28. Europol-Israel Police Operational Agreement: Enhanced cooperation with EU in combatting crime and terrorism

Author:
Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The Israeli Police and Europol, the European Union’s police agency, have been conducting negotiations over an operational agreement for several years. In September there was signing of end of negotiations, but in December the Council of the European Union decided to re-open the talks. In a global world where crime and terrorism cross borders, countries need to strengthen cooperation among themselves. Such inter-police cooperation takes on a unique form in the EU. The operational agreement between Israel’s Police and Europol can have considerable importance in contributing to the parties’ ability to deal with terror and crime. This paper will review Europol, its cooperation with Israel’s police and other enforcement agencies, including the negotiated agreement, the motivations for upgrading relations with Israel and the benefits and challenges of doing so.
Topic:
Crime, International Cooperation, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Police, and Europol
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

29. THE IMPACT OF ISIS ON IRAQ’S NATIONAL SECURITY: REVIEW OF THE PERIOD FROM 2014 TO 2017

Author:
Araz Ramazan Ahmad and Gardwn Tahir Othman
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
In the post-Ba’athist era, stability and national security remain the two key goals. Iraq has suffered from many extremist terrorist groups on several separate stages from 2003 to 2017. The most threatening terrorist group was ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), which has enormous impacts on Iraqi society, given the vast geographical areas that it controlled, and the dangers, crimes and violations suffered by the Iraqi people with all its components. The main aim of this study is to determine the impacts of ISIS on Iraqi national security. The study relied on Content Analysis Method to analyze the collected data and achieve its aims. Also, the primary research question is about the impact of ISIS on Iraq’s national security from 2014 to 2017. Correspondingly, an international coalition of more than a hundred countries was formed to stop the rapid expansion of ISIS. The number of victims who lost their lives and were affected at the psychological and humanitarian levels was explained in this study. According to the research results, ISIS was seeking long-term goals. The most important was the preparation for disseminating this new extremist ideology. The intelligence and the exploitation of poverty, ignorance, and political conflicts that ISIS used aimed to implant the extremist mentality in the most significant number of attention.
Topic:
National Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, and International Coalition
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

30. Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
After suffering grievously under ISIS, and during the battles to defeat it, Raqqa is being rebuilt. The calm is tenuous, however. The U.S. and partners should work toward long-term stability in Syria’s north east, through investment and talks about sustainable governance and security arrangements.
Topic:
Terrorism, ISIS, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

31. Responses to 9-11: The United States, Europe, and the Middle East

Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Reflections on the One-Year Anniversary of 9/11
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

32. Arab Gulf States and the Situation in Afghanistan

Author:
Sara Nowacka
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Arab state authorities are refraining from making unequivocal declarations about the future of relations with Afghanistan after the Taliban took power. The priority of the Arab leadership in the Persian Gulf will be to prevent the destabilisation of Afghanistan and to influence the Afghan government policy towards terrorist organisations. Given the convergence of EU and Arab state goals related to countering the threat of terrorism in the country, the Union could include them in the announced regional platform for cooperation on Afghanistan.
Topic:
International Relations, Terrorism, Taliban, and European Union
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

33. November 2021 Issue

Author:
Andrew Watkins, Seth Morrow, Nicholas Tallant, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Matthew Bamber
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
It has been three months since the Taliban entered Kabul and retook control of Afghanistan. According to the head of the U.N. World Food Programme, “23 million people [are now] marching toward starvation. 95% of Afghans don’t have enough food. The economy is collapsing. Winter is coming. This is going to be hell on earth.” In this month’s feature article, Andrew Watkins assesses the Taliban’s efforts to rule Afghanistan so far. He writes that “The Taliban have busied themselves consolidating control, reacting swiftly and harshly to perceived threats. They have not clearly defined the scope or structure of their state, nor have they shared long-term plans for their rank-and-file, many of which continue to operate as they did before August 15, 2021. Taliban leaders have demonstrated the continued primacy of maintaining internal cohesion, a longstanding trait that will likely stunt the group’s response to Afghanistan’s impending economic and humanitarian crises.” Watkins writes that from their perspective, “accepting aid that might sustain their state would prove worthless if doing so fueled a fissure within their own organization. The Taliban would become the very thing their origin story professes they rose up to eradicate and replace: a fractious constellation of militant bands. To put it another way, if Afghanistan’s compounding crises pose the Taliban with the prospect of either failing to provide for the desperate needs of the Afghan people or their own potential fragmentation, the Taliban will put their own organization first.” This month’s interview is with General Richard D. Clarke, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. In a commentary, Jerome Bjelopera argues that “given that the U.S. national security establishment has taken up great power competition (GPC) as its primary concern recently, and terrorism has slipped from the top position, it is time for the security policy community to place terrorism within a new conceptual framework, one that combines terrorists, violent criminals, drug traffickers, insurgents, and others under the heading of violent non-state actors (VNSA).” Interviews that Matthew Bamber conducted with 43 former Islamic State civilian employees shed light on two distinct categories: those who became full members of the group and those who did not. He writes that “there are significant differences in how these two categories were treated by the Islamic State, the positions they were able to fill, the financial benefits they received, and the processes through which they joined and left Islamic State employment ... Understanding the nuances is important in assessing the culpability of the Islamic State’s civilian workers and the danger they may pose in the future.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, and United States of America

34. The Role of Media in Peacebuilding in Iraq after ISIS

Author:
Araz Ramazan Ahmad
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The victory over the territorial rule of the so-called Islamic State provides an opportunity for the government of Iraq to restore its state institutions and reassert its authority. Can the Iraqi leadership step beyond cycles of failure in this transition to tackle the systemic issues that sustain state weakness and promote the emergence of groups like ISIS? This paper aims to enlighten the challenges faced by Iraq after ISIS for the restoration of peace between minorities and religious groups, and coexistence after the myth, so that conflicts are going on between minorities and religious groups, particularly in Mosul and other cities under the control of ISIS, the state could not reconcile the displaced people. Correspondingly, this paper intends the focus and role of local, regional, and international media in the process of peacebuilding and coexistence in Iraq after ISIS.
Topic:
Terrorism, Peacekeeping, Counter-terrorism, Media, ISIS, and State Building
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

35. How the Islamic State Sees the Future: Why the end of times does not mean the end

Author:
Florence Gaub
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
One would not exactly think of the Islamic State (IS) as a future-oriented organisation: it uses medieval-sounding language and barbaric methods and preaches an archaic lifestyle. In reality, however, it is very much a forward-looking organisation with clear ideas not just on what the future will bring, but on what it should bring. In fact, it is this attitude towards the future that has not only enabled its past successes, but also allowed the organisation to persist and endure since losing its territory in Syria and Iraq – and, most importantly, what will determine its next steps and ambition. Understanding how IS conceives its own future will enable law enforcement authorities to take the necessary precautions ahead of time. This Brief first outlines why it is crucial to understand how the future as an organising principle shapes the strategy and posture of terrorist organisations, and shows that terrorist organisations lacking such a concept will lose traction faster than those that do. It goes on to examine IS’s future concept pre-and post-loss of its territory and to elaborate why it was and is an attractive future. Lastly, it seeks to anticipate the future trajectory IS will take based on its articulation of an eschatological vision of the future.
Topic:
Terrorism, Islamic State, and Future
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North Africa, and Syria

36. Afghanistan: The Possible Arena for Major Powers Inevitable Cooperation

Author:
Suman Naz and Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Afghanistan has been a center of a struggle between major powers since the 19th century. In 2001, the fight against terrorism had sparked a new power struggle among local, regional, and international Afghanistan actors. Various state and non-state players with conflicting perspectives and conflicting approaches are trying to pursue their strategic, political, and economic goals in Afghanistan. Due to similar security threats, complex economic interdependence, and economic liberalism, different scenarios may emerge in Afghanistan, leading to the potential collaboration of major global and regional powers in Afghanistan. This partnership can be expanded for several logics and reasons, among which security comes first. The peace treaty concluded between the United States and the Taliban on February 29, 2020. The continuing peace process via intra-Afghan peace talks with regional states has fortified hopes for peace in Afghanistan through cooperative measures among major regional and international powers.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

37. Accidental Allies: The US–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership Against the Islamic State

Author:
Michael Knights and Wladimir van Wilgenburg
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
To some, America's partnership with the SDF exemplified an economy-of-force effort that minimized U.S. casualties and wrested control of northeast Syria from the Islamic State. To others, it was a cautionary tale about a U.S. military hoodwinked into working with a terrorist group. The story of America’s military and political partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces is a controversial one. To some, it is a shining example of an economy-of-force effort that minimized U.S. casualties, wrested control of northeast Syria from the Islamic State, and improved the area’s general political trajectory. To others, it is a cautionary tale of a U.S. military that was hoodwinked by a charismatic and capable partner closely tied to a U.S.-designated terrorist group, the Kurdistan Workers Party, with Washington deliberately averting its eyes from the strategic, political, and moral costs of the partnership. The subject deserves a neutral, data-led investigation that follows the facts wherever they lead. In this volume—copublished by The Washington Institute and I.B. Tauris—military expert Michael Knights and journalist Wladimir van Wilgenburg dive deep into the U.S. relationship with the SDF. The study benefited from intensive debates on sourcing, objectivity, and the need to probe uncomfortable issues. The findings cast light not only on the successes and shortcomings of this particular alliance, but also on how Washington might most profitably pursue “by, with, and through” operations with other forces in the future.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Terrorism, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Military
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

38. Back to Basics: U.S.-Iraq Security Cooperation in the Post-Combat Era

Author:
Michael Knights and Alex Almeida
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Questions about the viability of the Iraqi security forces—brought into sharp focus by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan—require a data-led analysis of where the forces are today and what mix of U.S., NATO, and European efforts can help them thrive in the future. The August collapse of the Afghan National Security Forces shook the world’s faith in U.S. security cooperation, prompting hard questions about similar arrangements with Iraq. In a country where the United States has been training forces for two decades, officials need straight answers. How resilient are today’s U.S.-supported Iraqi security forces, and could they operate with gradually reduced American support? What kind of near-term Iraqi force development should the coalition credibly expect to see? And how should U.S.-led security cooperation evolve after the December “transition of mission” to a non-combat role? In this urgently applicable Policy Focus, longtime ISF watchers Michael Knights and Alex Almeida provide a data-led analysis of where Iraq’s security forces are today, how they will look tomorrow, and what mixture of U.S., NATO, and European efforts can ensure the best result commensurate with American interests. The roadmap they outline shows how Baghdad can ultimately achieve enduring victory over the Islamic State and overmatch the domestic opponents of a sovereign, stable, and democratic Iraq.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Politics, Terrorism, and Shia
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

39. A Blurred Line Between Civil Society and Terrorism: Examining Charges of NGOs Funding the PFLP

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Israeli evidence could reveal a troubling reality wherein groups publicly defend the human rights of some people while supporting acts of terrorism targeting others. On October 19, Israel designated six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist groups affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, causing a firestorm among international civil society and human rights organizations. While such action is inherently controversial, any assessment must consider the underlying evidence, which here emerged from a series of investigations pointing to massive fraud. The effort drew on various sources, including classified intelligence, seized materials, and statements made by arrested employees. And it cast light on high-profile cases such as the August 2019 murder of Israeli teen Rina Shnerb, whose killers were employed by one of the designated groups. In this groundbreaking Policy Note, counterterrorism expert Matthew Levitt closely analyzes Israel’s NGO designations. In doing so, he validates U.S., European, and international requests for an explanation, but simultaneously cautions that the evidence—if proven even partially true—could reveal a troubling reality wherein Palestinian NGOs publicly defend the human rights of some people while supporting terrorist acts against others.
Topic:
Civil Society, Terrorism, NGOs, and Palestinians
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

40. El Tribunal Especial para el Líbanoy la sentencia Hariri. ¿Justicia selectiva?

Author:
Berta Alam-Pérez
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
El artículo analiza la compleja relación, presente en la esfera internacional,entre política y justicia que queda reflejada en el Tribunal Especial para el Líbano. Se emplean,como líneas argumentales, la problemática de su establecimiento por medio de la resolución 1757 (2007) del Consejo de Seguridad y su carácter selectivo, así como la confrontación jurídico-doctrinal planteada en el caso Ayyash et al., también conocido como asunto Hariri. Se subraya la importancia de los factores contextuales,especialmente aquellosdesencadenados a partir de 2004, con el fin de explicar la división interna —con protagonistas internacionales—del país en dos bloques cuya confrontación serviría de pretexto para la puesta en marcha de un tribunal único que responde a los intereses de una comunidad internacional seducida porla posibilidad de lograr una condena judicial por terrorismo contra Hizballah —y/o Siria—en un momento de preponderancia de la formación chií.La decisión interlocutoria de 2011 de la Sala de Apelaciones pareció manifestarse como un buen augurio en aquella dirección al afirmar la necesidad de interpretar el delito de terrorismo recogido en el artículo 314 del Código Penal del Líbano conforme a un crimen internacional de terrorismo de carácter consuetudinario. La revolucionaria decisión —junto con el proceso que llevó a su publicación—reveló,sin embargo,cierta precipitación y oportunismo que por fortuna y justicia la sentencia de 2020 rechaza por innecesaria e incierta.El artículo sostiene que todo ello ha contribuido a debilitar la credibilidad de un Tribunal,ejemplo de justicia selectiva, y ha mostrado pocadeferencia por la soberanía del Estado libanés.
Topic:
Terrorism, Hezbollah, Justice, UN Security Council, and Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

41. Iran’s Intimidation of Azerbaijan Must Be Answered

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The way Tehran uses military intimidation, as well as terror by proxy and other means of threatening regional players, must become a factor in the formulation of Western policy towards Iran in this decisive period.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Azerbaijan

42. There is No Clear-Cut Solution for Gaza

Author:
Yaakov Amidror
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
There are plenty of nice plans for Gaza, but none that will change the core truth: Hamas will continue to seek Israel’s destruction, and Israel will continue to defend itself.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

43. Countering Terrorism since 9/11: International Perspectives

Author:
Edmund Fitton-Brown, Ken Dilanian, Nadwa Al-Dawsari, Jane Marriott, and Aimen Dean
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were a dramatic wake up call to the United States and the wider world as to the threats posed by violent jihad. However, more than 20 years later, the challenges remain and efforts to combat the likes of al-Qaeda and ISIS have led to even greater levels of conflict and terrorism itself. With a view to hindsight and an eye focused forwards, this panel will seek to assess the lessons learned from the war on terror since 2001 from a range of international perspectives and to present alternative approaches to dealing with the challenges that prevail today.
Topic:
Terrorism, History, Counter-terrorism, and 9/11
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

44. The ICC’s folly also hurts the Palestinians

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
If the International Criminal Court of Justice conducted a fair investigation into the ongoing conflict, it would see that Hamas terrorists are committing double war crimes daily.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Terrorism, Conflict, and International Criminal Court (ICC)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

45. A Deterring Blow is Needed

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
IDF strikes on Gaza’s terrorists should be intense and aimed at causing severe damage to the intermediate level of command, infrastructure and weapons.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

46. Professionalizing the Iraqi Army: US Engagement after the Islamic State

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Security cooperation with Iraq remains a critical component of the US-Iraq relationship. Despite neighboring Iran’s ability to limit US political and economic engagement, Iraq still seeks US assistance to develop its military and to combat resurgent terrorist organizations. This monograph provides a historical and cultural basis from which to understand the limitations and potential for US cooperation with Iraq’s armed forces.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Islamic State, and Economy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

47. Rethinking Transnational Terrorism: An Integrated Approach

Author:
Martha Crenshaw
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The 2011 civil war in Syria attracted thousands of fighters from at least seventy countries to join the Islamic State. Al-Shabaab carried out large-scale attacks on civilian targets in Uganda and Kenya as retribution for the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Somalia. In this report, Martha Crenshaw considers the extent to which civil war and foreign military intervention function as a rationale for transnational terrorism, and how understanding the connections between terrorism, civil war, and weak governance can help the United States and its allies mount an appropriate response.
Topic:
Terrorism, War, Non State Actors, Islamic State, Transnational Actors, Peace, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:
Uganda, Kenya, Africa, Middle East, Syria, Somalia, and United States of America

48. Iran in Lebanon: A Fatal Occupation

Author:
Hassan Mneimneh
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2020, Lebanon should be celebrating its centenary. It is not. Instead, it is close to terminal collapse as a polity, an economy, and even as a society. Lebanon is under Iranian occupation, although ascertaining this condition may demand some attentive consideration from the uninitiated. Iran’s proponents assess it as a confirmation of the “Axis of Resistance” against imperialism and Zionism; its detractors ascribe it to a deliberate plan of Iranian expansion across the region. However, the Iranian occupation of Lebanon may be rooted in Lebanon’s own tumultuous history rather than in Tehran’s designs. Iran in Lebanon may be more an artifact of history than a product of strategy. In fact, the outcome of Lebanon’s present course may not yield Iran any tangible advantage. And it certainly seems to be on the verge of destroying Lebanon.
Topic:
International Relations, Corruption, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Radicalization, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Lebanon

49. State Violence and Public Monitoring – Britain’s use of torture in Mandatory Palestine

Author:
James Hopkins
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University, Scotland
Abstract:
In his influential work Torture and Democracy, Darius Rejali argues that when democracies use torture, they tend to resort to the use of stealthy torture techniques in order to avoid detection. Using primary archival sources, this paper examines Rejali’s hypothesis by looking at torture in the British Mandate in Palestine up to 1945. First, looking specifically at torture it will show that the case study fits the hypothesis, as torture was generally stealthy, but also systemic and at times officially sanctioned. It locates the reason for the use of torture in the failure of intelligence gathering, before examining the pressures public monitoring put on the British. The historical literature tends to emphasise the concerns British authorities had over propaganda in both the foreign and local press: however, this paper also highlights the threat of pan-Arabic and Muslim agitation across the Middle East and India. After noting that torture is merely one form of violence in the state’s repertoire, and therefore cannot be fully understood in isolation, the paper aims to put the use of torture in its wider context. In Palestine, torture took place alongside a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, in which British servicemen systemically carried out casual brutality against the local population, which, in contrast to the use of torture, was highly visible and unconcerned with public monitoring. It is argued that the reasons for this casual brutality were the poor conditions of service, the make- up of the force, and the racism endemic in it. Despite this seeming contradiction of the monitoring hypothesis, the paper concludes by arguing that the hypothesis can explain the disparity between stealthy torture and visible casual brutality. In doing so, it draws attention to the importance of perception in public monitoring as well as the shifts in the factors affecting the Mandate.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Torture, State Violence, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Middle East, and Palestine

50. The Terrorist Lists: An Examination of the U.S. Government’s Counterterrorism Designations Efforts

Author:
Seth Loertscher, Daniel Milton, Bryan C. Price, and Cynthia Loertscher
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
After the attacks of September 2001, the U.S. government grappled with ways to apply all aspects of its national power against the terrorist groups it found itself combating militarily. On the diplomatic and financial fronts, much of this increased effort revolved around the sanctioning and designating of terrorist groups and individual terrorist actors, resulting in a drastic increase of the number of individuals and groups which were branded with the term “terrorist.” Yet despite the application of these tools for almost 20 years, or longer in some cases, little work has been done to understand the impact of these programs. This report examines two sanctioning efforts the U.S. government has employed against terrorist actors: the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list and the designation of individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under the authority granted by Executive Order 13224. Although the specific purposes of each of these programs differ from one another, ultimately both represent a non-kinetic approach to counterterrorism that relies on the application of diplomatic and/or financial statecraft. The examination of each of these programs in this report has two general goals. The first is to provide an overview of the program and descriptive statistics regarding its implementation. The second is to provide some form of assessment regarding the impact that these programs have on terrorist groups and individuals. In accomplishing these two goals, the authors relied exclusively on open-source information collected by researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). This report attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the impacts of these tools, in addition to highlighting some of the structural limitations and gaps in the application of counterterrorism sanctions.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, Hamas, and Abu Sayyaf
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Global Focus, and United States of America