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921. The Future of the Digital Order

Author:
Jeff Cirillo, Sarah Curtis, Joshua Fitt, Kara Frederick, Coby Goldberg, Ilan Goldenberg, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Megan Lamberth, Martijn Rasser, and Dania Torres
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Nations that successfully harness the vast economic, political, and societal power of emerging information and communications technologies will shape the future of the global digital order. This future is not set in stone. A digital order defined by liberal democratic values requires U.S. leadership and the cooperation of trusted like-minded partners. In the absence of democratic leadership, autocratic rivals of the United States can fill that void—exploiting the control of information, surveillance technologies, and standards for technology governance to promote a digital ecosystem that entrenches and expands their authoritarian practices. In exploring how a closed, illiberal order is taking root in strategic regions around the world, this report offers recommendations for how to craft, promote, and preserve a more open and democratic alternative. An assessment of crosscutting trends between China, Russia, and the Middle East across three pillars—information control, surveillance, and technology governance—leads us to the following conclusions: China is the prime mover in shaping the evolving digital order in its favor. Beijing’s use of technologies such as facial recognition software and telecommunications networks allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand control over its citizens. The CCP’s ability to promote and export this model of digital repression, in turn, gives like-minded, nondemocratic governments a roadmap for how to deploy digital technologies for control and abuse in their own countries. Russia’s model of digital authoritarianism, while technologically less sophisticated than China’s, could prove to be more readily adaptable and enduring for current and aspiring autocrats. Regional powers such as Belarus, Azerbaijan, and some Central Asian states have already incorporated elements of this model. In the Middle East, authoritarian leaders use digital tools to control internal populations by sabotaging and spying on citizens, and this contributes to the construction of an illiberal digital order that is beneficial to America’s peer competitors—China and Russia. These conclusions reveal four key trends with implications for the future of the digital order: Growing China-Russia alignment will generate dangerous digital synergies, such as (1) making digital autocracy accessible for a broader swath of states; (2) accelerating China’s and Russia’s digital innovation; (3) eroding liberal norms in international institutions; and (4) raising the prospects of a “splinternet,” a fragmenting of the internet along nationalistic, political, technological, religious, or ethnic lines. Countries around the world, particularly autocratic regimes and those flirting with illiberalism, will seek to regulate online communications platforms through (1) social media; (2) data localization laws; and (3) instigating company self-censorship, which restricts free speech and increases online control. Illiberal regimes will seek out Chinese technology to help them control social movements and civil protests. U.S. nondemocratic partners, adversaries, and even some democratic partners justify their pursuit of Chinese technology by underscoring ways the adopted technologies will contribute to economic growth, social stability, and efforts to fight crime and terrorism. The practices of illiberal regimes will reduce the efficacy of U.S. mitigation practices. Russia and China’s efforts to promote an illiberal digital order complement one another and could accelerate innovation between the two nations. The United States must craft a policy response that considers these emerging patterns and incorporates more than its usual partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Shoring up the existing coalition of democratic actors to counter these illiberal trends will likely not be sufficient. This report offers recommendations that the United States can implement on three fronts: at home, while engaging with traditional U.S. democratic as well as nondemocratic partners, and when countering U.S. adversaries such as China, Russia, and Iran. The United States must take a leadership role, recognizing that the future digital order is at stake.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Authoritarianism, Leadership, Surveillance, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

922. Beyond Emergency Relief: Averting Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Catastrophe

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
International donors cut off all but emergency aid to Afghanistan after the Taliban’s takeover in August. Months later, the state is collapsing and a humanitarian disaster is looming. Donors should work with the state to restore basic public services and mitigate the population’s suffering.
Topic:
Disaster Relief, Infrastructure, Governance, Humanitarian Crisis, and Public Service
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

923. Lessons of the Syrian Conflict: Toward a Better Intervention Debate

Author:
Nick Danforth
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In October 2019, The New York Times published a feature story describing how “Russia, Turkey and Bashar al-Assad carved up northern Syria as the Americans retreated.”1 It is hard to think of a more telling, and damning, one-sentence encapsulation of both the failure of American policy in Syria and the skewed political discourse compounding it. Somehow the United States was retreating from a place it never wanted to occupy—and the Syrian regime’s success in partially clawing back control of a country it once ruled with an iron fist was prime evidence of American decline. This paper begins from the premise that Washington will increasingly be confronted with conflicts where it can neither determine the outcome nor stay out entirely, and the country needs better strategies for charting a middle course. Given the scale of the tragedy that has befallen Syria, and the damaging repercussions it continues to have for U.S. interests in the region, few would argue that Washington’s handling of the Syrian civil war represents a success. Yet there remains no consensus on the nature of Washington’s failure. In a highly charged debate, many critics are adamant that faster and more forceful military intervention could have secured a more favorable outcome. Others, by contrast, are equally insistent that Washington should have done even less. It is possible that the ideal form of intervention advocated by interventionists or the ideal form of nonintervention advocated by noninterventionists would have created a better outcome in Syria. Instead, Washington pursued a sometimes-inconsistent intermediate approach that achieved the worst of both worlds. The United States engaged in the conflict in a way that put its credibility at stake without positively affecting the outcome. By examining how this happened, this paper seeks to ensure that Washington can avoid similar failures in the future.
Topic:
Military Intervention, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

924. November 2021 Issue

Author:
Andrew Watkins, Seth Morrow, Nicholas Tallant, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Matthew Bamber
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
It has been three months since the Taliban entered Kabul and retook control of Afghanistan. According to the head of the U.N. World Food Programme, “23 million people [are now] marching toward starvation. 95% of Afghans don’t have enough food. The economy is collapsing. Winter is coming. This is going to be hell on earth.” In this month’s feature article, Andrew Watkins assesses the Taliban’s efforts to rule Afghanistan so far. He writes that “The Taliban have busied themselves consolidating control, reacting swiftly and harshly to perceived threats. They have not clearly defined the scope or structure of their state, nor have they shared long-term plans for their rank-and-file, many of which continue to operate as they did before August 15, 2021. Taliban leaders have demonstrated the continued primacy of maintaining internal cohesion, a longstanding trait that will likely stunt the group’s response to Afghanistan’s impending economic and humanitarian crises.” Watkins writes that from their perspective, “accepting aid that might sustain their state would prove worthless if doing so fueled a fissure within their own organization. The Taliban would become the very thing their origin story professes they rose up to eradicate and replace: a fractious constellation of militant bands. To put it another way, if Afghanistan’s compounding crises pose the Taliban with the prospect of either failing to provide for the desperate needs of the Afghan people or their own potential fragmentation, the Taliban will put their own organization first.” This month’s interview is with General Richard D. Clarke, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. In a commentary, Jerome Bjelopera argues that “given that the U.S. national security establishment has taken up great power competition (GPC) as its primary concern recently, and terrorism has slipped from the top position, it is time for the security policy community to place terrorism within a new conceptual framework, one that combines terrorists, violent criminals, drug traffickers, insurgents, and others under the heading of violent non-state actors (VNSA).” Interviews that Matthew Bamber conducted with 43 former Islamic State civilian employees shed light on two distinct categories: those who became full members of the group and those who did not. He writes that “there are significant differences in how these two categories were treated by the Islamic State, the positions they were able to fill, the financial benefits they received, and the processes through which they joined and left Islamic State employment ... Understanding the nuances is important in assessing the culpability of the Islamic State’s civilian workers and the danger they may pose in the future.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, and United States of America

925. October 2021 Issue

Author:
Don Rassler, Michael Knights, Michael Smith, Crispin Smith, Hamdi Malik, Sean Morrow, and Jonathan Schroden
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights, Crispin Smith, and Hamdi Malik examine the increased discordance within the Iran Threat Network militias in Iraq (muqawama) based on their detailed tracking of recent dynamics for the “Militia Spotlight” platform at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. They find that “while the IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force) still runs Iran’s covert operations inside Iraq, they face growing difficulties in controlling local militant cells. Hardline anti-U.S. militias struggle with the contending needs to de-escalate U.S.-Iran tensions, meet the demands of their base for anti-U.S. operations, and simultaneously evolve non-kinetic political and social wings.” The authors assess that, having under-performed in the recent elections, the muqawama will likely prioritize a bottom-up approach to building up their political base. And they warn that “any shift from Iran’s de-escalatory position, perhaps linked to a failure of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks—or a more significant loss of Iranian influence over muqawama factions—could trigger a sustained escalation of muqawama operations against the U.S.-led coalition in 2022 and beyond.” In this month’s interview, former U.S. National Security Advisor Lieutenant General (Ret) H.R. McMaster provides his perspective on what led to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. In a commentary, Don Rassler argues that the United States needs to better leverage its vast terrorism data holdings by creating a new terrorism and counterterrorism data action plan that exploits the power of data-science and artificial intelligence driven approaches. That plan, he writes, should include five key precepts: 1) reinvest in and advance core terrorism data, 2) strategically leverage captured material, 3) better develop and utilize counterterrorism data, 4) practice data alchemy, and 5) automate basic and other analytical tasks, and augment data. Jonathan Schroden looks at lessons learned from the 2021 collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF). He writes that six themes that emerge are: “the ANDSF collapse was months—if not years—in the making; the United States did not give the ANDSF everything they needed to be independently successful; the ANDSF did put up a fierce fight in many areas; the ANDSF were poorly served by Afghan political leaders; the ANDSF were poorly served by their own commanders; and the Taliban strategy overwhelmed and demoralized the ANDSF. From these themes, there are three key lessons: the ANDSF’s failure had many fathers; the U.S. model of security assistance requires reform; and greater emphasis on non-material factors (e.g., morale) is needed in future security force assessments.”
Topic:
Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Militias
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

926. February 2021 Issue

Author:
Ali Soufan, Matthew Kriner, Jon Lewis, Johannes Saal, Felix Lippe, and Hassan Abbas
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Ali Soufan provides a comprehensive profile of Saif al-`Adl, an Egyptian charter al-Qa`ida member who could soon become the group’s third emir. Soufan writes that “with the confirmed deaths of Hamza bin Ladin and Abu Muhammad al-Masri, as well as the reported (but as yet unconfirmed) demise of al-Qa`ida’s second emir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the likely next in line to inherit the leadership is … Saif al-`Adl. Like the late Abu Muhammad, Saif lives in Iran and is apparently restricted from leaving the country. Little is known about his current movements or activities. Nevertheless, Saif’s revered status within the movement, as well as his deep experience as a military, intelligence, and security leader and a terrorist planner, make him a potentially dangerous emir.” In this month’s feature analysis, Matthew Kriner and Jon Lewis assess that the Boogaloo movement “has quickly evolved into a significant domestic violent extremist threat” with “an accelerationist faction within Boogaloo” seeking to “instigate decentralized insurrectionary violence.” They write that the movement “is best conceptualized as a decentralized, anti-authority movement composed of a diverse range of actors,” including white supremacists, neo-Nazis, militia movement members, accelerationists, and ultra-libertarians, who are mobilized in part by the “belief that they are following in the footsteps of the United States’ founders and participating in a revolution against tyranny.” Johannes Saal and Felix Lippe provide a case study of the November 2020 Vienna terrorist attack. They write that “the Vienna attacker, Kujtim Fejzulai, grew up in the city he attacked and had longstanding connections within the jihadi extremist milieu in Austria as well as jihadi contacts in other European countries and further afield. His two failed attempts to join the Islamic State overseas and the failure of efforts to deradicalize him after he was convicted for seeking to join the group underline the threat that can be posed by failed jihadi travelers and terrorist convicts after their release, as well as the difficulties in rehabilitating jihadi prisoners.” Hassan Abbas writes that “even as Pakistan has made progress in reducing the threat from terrorist sanctuaries in the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal areas, an increased crime-terror nexus in urban centers and a new terrorist recruitment drive by Islamic State Khorasan province, or ISK, in Baluchistan has raised alarms. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is trying to stage a comeback, and sectarianism is also rising, creating a congenial environment for terrorist and extremist organizations, including some Kashmir-focused groups that have evaded counterterrorism scrutiny.”
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Far Right, Political Extremism, and Boogaloo Bois
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Austria, and United States of America

927. Structure of a State: Captured Documents and the Islamic State’s Organizational Structure

Author:
Daniel Milton
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
When the group known as the Islamic State declared its caliphate in June 2014, it did so with a promise that it was not just an organization engaged in fighting, but in governing as well. As a result, the group’s pursuit of “stateness” required an investment in more than just battlefield advances. It also had to demonstrate a capability to create institutions that ostensibly served the dual purposes of imposing its interpretation of order on people while also improving the lives of its citizens. While much has been written about the various bureaucratic agencies and institutions created by the Islamic State during the highwater mark of its tenure in Iraq and Syria, still relatively little is known about the size and scope of those institutions, or the personnel power needed to sustain them. Through analysis of a small number of key primary source documents, this report offers a glimpse at both facets, demonstrating that the Islamic State created intricate organizational structures to support its governance efforts, but also that the group’s funding supported tens of thousands of individuals and their families in Iraq. Although it has lost much of its territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has continued to show interest in governance there and in its affiliate provinces around the world, making the information contained in this report an important baseline against which to compare the group’s ongoing efforts.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

928. Cash Camps: Financing Detainee Activities in Al-Hol and Roj Camps

Author:
Audrey Alexander
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Over two years since the fall of Baghouz, entities managing the detention facilities holding Islamic State-affiliated adults and minors in northeastern Syria face overwhelming challenges in securing this population, particularly alongside people displaced by conflict in the region. Often characterized as wastelands inhabited by a volatile population living in squalid conditions, camps like Al-Hol actually serve as a valuable hub for the region’s violent extremists and criminal networks. Since the international community has not decisively answered calls to remedy the humanitarian and detention crisis involving facilities holding Islamic State detainees, many actors have exploited opportunities afforded by inaction, particularly with regard to financial activity. This dynamic has short-, medium-, and long-term implications for terrorism financing and, more broadly, the region’s stability. The Islamic State, for instance, has leveraged the situation to raise and move funds, build ideological and financial support for the cause, and establish logistical channels that benefit the organization. To explore this phenomenon and inform how stakeholders in the counterterrorism community mitigate the issue, this report uses publicly available information and social media monitoring to trace how funds 1) move into, 2) move around, and 3) move out of two camps holding Islamic State detainees in northeastern Syria. In short, the report details how individuals, networks, and groups inside and outside Al-Hol and Roj camps raise, use, move, manage, store, and obscure funds for and from alleged Islamic State detainees held in the facilities. The analysis seeks to explain some of the trends and dynamics emerging at each stage. The section about funds going into the facilities discusses notable players raising and moving money for detainees, particularly from abroad, then highlights popular funds transfer methods. The second section describes how and why funds move around the detention facilities, particularly within the camps’ formal and informal economies, the latter of which involves transactions that camp administrators and security do not authorize or oversee. The third section details how funds leave the facilities, including trends like detainees paying smugglers to facilitate their escape, and discusses why payments for such services are detrimental to stability in the region. Ultimately, this report makes the case that funds moving into, around, and out of Al-Hol and Roj camps enable some traditional terrorism financing issues and invite risks to the region by injecting funds that embolden facilitation networks involving violent extremists, criminals, and corrupt officials. Invigorating such networks has notable implications for the region and beyond since numerous entities may ultimately exploit the players and smuggling routes regenerating in Syria today. After establishing a clearer understanding of financial activity in and around the camps, this report concludes with six policy considerations for players that can help challenge terrorist financing trends in Al-Hol and Roj camps, and thus, dynamics in the surrounding region.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Finance, Islamic State, Innovation, and Internal Displacement
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

929. Saudi Arabia: A Colossus with Clay Feets/Arabia Saudí: Un coloso con los pies de barro

Author:
Eugenia López-Jacoiste Díaz
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The political-religious foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is Wahhabism that marks its identity, society and politics. The Al Saud dynasty defends and expands Sunni Islam in the region and beyond its borders. In order to understand the interests and objectives of Saudi foreign policy, this article analyzes the main geopolitical elements at the service of the stability and hegemony of the Al Saud house in the most turbulent region of the Middle East. The Saudi government is developing a foreign policy, unsuspected in the past, to maintain its historic alliance with Washington, despite the ups and downs, and to transform the old rivalries between Riyadh and Tehran into new opportunities, including with Israel. This change in Saudi foreign policy is due to the controversial Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman who knows how to take advantage of the changing regional geopolitics and Saudi financial instruments, but also the military and technological in favor of a more proactive and modern Saudi Arabia, despite his weaknesses./El fundamento político-religioso del Reino de Arabia Saudí es el wahabismo que marca su identidad, su sociedad y su política. La dinastía Al Saud defiende y expande el islam sunní en la región y fuera de sus fronteras. Para poder entender los intereses y objetivos de la política exterior saudí, este artículo analiza los principales elementos geopolíticos al servicio de la estabilidad y hegemonía de la casa Al Saud en la región más convulsa de Oriente Medio. El Gobierno saudí está desarrollando una política exterior, insospechada en el pasado para mantener su histórica alianza con Washington, a pesar de los altibajos, y transformar las viejas rivalidades entre Riad y Teherán en nuevas oportunidades, incluso con Israel. Este cambio en la política exterior saudí se debe al controvertido Príncipe Heredero Mohamed bin Salmán que sabe aprovechar la cambiante geopolítica regional y los instrumentos financieros saudíes, pero también los militares y tecnológicos a favor de una Arabia Saudí más proactiva y moderna, a pesar de sus debilidades.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Oil, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Wahhabism
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Persian Gulf, and United States of America

930. President Biden’s Challenges in the Middle East after Former President Trump’s successes (?). From Trump to Biden: Continuity or Discontinuity?/Los retos del presidente Biden en el Medio Oriente tras los ¿éxitos? obtenidos por el ex -presidente Trump. De Trump a Biden ¿ruptura o continuidad?

Author:
Romualdo Bermejo García
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The Middle East has recently seen a few bright spots in Arab Israeli relations, as evidenced by the wellknown Abraham Accords, led by former President Donald Trump and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. There remain, however, two major unresolved issues: one is that of Iran and the armed groups massively supported by Tehran, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and others that are beginning to have a certain relevance in both Iraq and Syria, as highlighted by international news; and the other, which is more defined, concerns the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, an aspect that is currently being addressed in the Vienna nuclear negotiations, following the Donald Trump withdrawal from the July 2015 nuclear deal. This highlights the fact that Iran has become one of the most important players in the region and Israel continues to keep a close eye on its activities, not only nuclear, but also those of the various armed groups under its economic, military and political patronage./La zona del Medio Oriente ha encontrado en los últimos tiempos unos vigorosos rayos de luz en las relaciones árabes-israelíes, como lo demuestran los ya conocidos Acuerdos de Abraham, liderados por el ya ex-presidente Donald Trump y por el también ya ex-primer ministro israelí Benjamin Netanyahu. Quedan, sin embargo, dos grandes temas muy importantes sin resolver: uno de ellos es el de Irán y los grupos armados apoyados masivamente por Teherán, como Hamás, Hezbolláh y otros que empiezan a tener una cierta relevancia tanto en Irak como en Siria, como lo pone de relieve la actualidad internacional; y el otro, que es más preciso, atañe a la cuestión del programa nuclear iraní, aspecto que se está tratando actualmente en las negociaciones nucleares de Viena, tras la retirada de los Estados Unidos del acuerdo nuclear de julio de 2015 por parte de Donald Trump. Esto pone de manifiesto que Irán se ha convertido en uno de los actores más importantes de la zona, lo que trae consigo que Israel siga vigilando de cerca sus actividades, y no solo las nucleares, sino también la de los diversos grupos armados que se encuentran bajo su patrocinio económico, militar y político.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, Hezbollah, International Court of Justice (ICJ), Donald Trump, Hamas, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel