Political Geography: Japan / Publication Year: within 10 Years / Topic: Foreign Policy

1. South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral

Author:: Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Multilateral Relations, Maritime, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, Philippines, East China, United States of America, and South China Sea

2. The Return of Shuttle Diplomacy

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In March 2023, Japan and South Korea had a long-awaited breakthrough in their bilateral relations, which many viewed as being at the lowest point since the 1965 normalization. On March 16, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio held a summit in Tokyo and agreed to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” a crucial mechanism of bilateral cooperation that had been halted for about a decade. Behind the positive developments was President Yoon’s political decision on the issue of compensating wartime forced laborers. The two leaders took steps to bring ties back to the level that existed prior to actions in 2018 and 2019, which precipitated the downward spiral in their relationship. Japan decided to lift the export controls it placed on its neighbor following the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018. South Korea withdrew its complaint with the World Trade Organization on Japan’s export controls. Less than a week after the summit, Seoul officially fully restored the information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) that it had with Tokyo. They also resumed high-level bilateral foreign and security dialogues to discuss ways to navigate the changing international environment together as partners. The big question now is whether this trend of restoring and expanding bilateral cooperation would continue throughout and beyond the Yoon presidency. In South Korea, critics argue that his handling of the forced labor issue is not a lasting solution to historical issues with Japan. The breakthrough was not a product of any major change in South Korean public sentiment toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Nor was it a product of changes in the Japanese position on outstanding bilateral historical and territorial issues. Both the Japanese and South Korean governments, however, feel the urgent need to cooperate for their own national security, and for economic reasons. Whether the advances in the first four months of 2023 will be short-lived or the start of a new partnership and reconciliation will likely depend on how much understanding they both show in seeing things from the other’s perspective and how willing they will be in accommodating the other’s political needs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

3. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy

Author:: Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea

5. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:: Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

6. Japan’s New National Security Strategy Is Making Waves

Author:: Ryan Ashley
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) contains several groundbreaking commitments, including plans to deploy long-range counterstrike capabilities and to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. A slim-but-significant majority of Japan’s public now seemingly supports efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, a political consensus once nearly unthinkable. The United States, India, Taiwan, and others that share Japan’s concern about military aggression from China, North Korea, and Russia have welcomed Japan’s NSS. Some countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and certain Southeast Asian nations, have expressed mixed reactions to the NSS, as some still harbor distrust toward Japanese military power due to the historical memory of the Second World War. China and North Korea continue to cultivate anti-Japan sentiment within their domestic populations and within other countries in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

7. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

8. Japan's New Security Strategy and the Changing Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Sheila Smith and Gerald Curtis
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Major changes that have occurred in the global political economy and in international politics in recent years have had a profound impact on nations all around the world. This is nowhere more evident than in the countries in the Indo-Pacific region and especially Japan. This conversation addresses Japan's evolving foreign policy and its impact in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

9. Abe Shinzo: In Memoriam

Author:: Rob York, Jada Fraser, Stephen Nagy, Brad Glosserman, and Kei Koga
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: A famous, albeit fictional, statesman once said “A good act does not wash out the bad, nor a bad act the good.” As Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, Abe Shinzo left a legacy. Fair-minded individuals would be able to find grounds for criticism in that record: Abe climbed to leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party by stoking doubts about his country’s record in World War II, provoking outrage from neighboring countries. He relished sparring with his rivals in Japan’s other political parties and in the press; his country’s press freedom ranking consequently declined under his leadership. His efforts at addressing his country’s stagnant economy and moribund birthrate saw, interpreted charitably, only modest successes. But Abe Shinzo should be remembered for much more than that. Much as Winston Churchill should be remembered, both for his foresight regarding the rise of the Nazi threat and his record as ruthless defender of Britain’s colonial interests, proponents of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision that Abe championed should remember his record as a partisan, but also as an international institution builder in an age where both “freedom” and “openness” are under attack in the Indo-Pacific. In doing so, he revived Japan as an international player and helped set the stage for multilateral cooperation to preserve existing rules and norms, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the “Quad”) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Such efforts make him one of the most influential statesmen of this era. Since Abe’s shocking assassination on July 8, the Pacific Forum has sought to ensure that the fullness of this legacy is remembered, and as such used our PacNet series to explain his impact from a variety of perspectives. In doing so, we reached out to many old friends whose names are familiar to the Pacific Forum’s long-time readers. In PacNet #37, Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum’s senior advisor and my co-editor at Comparative Connections, identifies the specific attributes of Abe’s—specifically his strongly held opinions and behind-the-scenes advocacy—that made it possible for him to be this institutional builder and to restore Japan’s role on the foreign policy stage. In PacNet #36 Stephen Nagy of the International Christian University in Tokyo provides a comprehensive overview of Abe the diplomat, including his successful managing of relations with the PRC, which were actually at a low point before his lengthy stint as PM. In PacNet #39 Kei Koga of Nanyang Technological University demonstrates how under Abe, Japan countered the PRC’s growing influence in Southeast Asian countries through sustained engagement, winning their trust despite their unwillingness to match his hawkishness toward Beijing. Furthermore, in PacNet #43 Jagannath Panda of ISDP, Sweden explains how Abe’s dealings with India paved the way for the latter’s increased engagement with the outside world, including through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. In PacNet #40, I note that Abe’s tireless engagement with American presidents across changes in parties has made good relations with Tokyo that rarest of things in US politics: an area of bipartisan agreement that looks unlikely to change, regardless of the outcome of the 2024 election. The Pacific Forum also reached beyond its regular contributors’ list to acquire new perspectives. Shihoko Goto of the Wilson Center details Abe’s prescient vision for the defense of Taiwan, something the US would gradually awaken to. Jada Frasier—an MA student in Asian Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service that we believe policy professionals will be hearing from more and more in the future—explains how despite causing tensions in the Japan-South Korea relationship, Abe also deserves credit for increasing the two East Asian democracies’ opportunities for security cooperation through his emphasis on minilateral groupings. Now that Japan has laid the former prime minister to rest last week, those who remember the darker side of his leadership will find grounds to do so, and some of those criticisms will be warranted. Abe, however, left a legacy far beyond those unpleasantries, especially if, as was the case with Churchill, his country and the international community rise to the challenge they presently face.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Leadership, Assassination, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

10. Strengthening Japan-ROK Relations: The Prime Time to Rebuild Relations Through Young Parliamentary Diplomacy

Author:: Hideshi Futori
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol began his remarkable administration by emphasizing the values of freedom and democracy, and the triangular Japan-U.S.-ROK relationship. Contrasting the previous administration, which prioritized reconciliation with North Korea, President Yoon embraced positive messages on restoring Japan-ROK relations even before taking office. On August 15, the National Liberation Day of Korea, President Yoon described Japan as a “neighbor that joins forces against the challenges that threaten freedom.” Such a posture clearly distinguishes President Yoon’s approach from that of previous South Korean administrations. Truly, even after the Yoon Administration’s approval rating began declining, Japan-ROK relations were not used politically to alleviate the pressure. One of the best takeaways from my recent visit to South Korea was Foreign Minister Park Chun’s assurance to “persistently work from a strategic perspective to improve relations with Japan, a partner that shares the universal values of freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.” Heretofore, Japan has not been able to capitalize on the precious opportunities it has been afforded to mend ties with Korea. Instead, Japan continues to take a hardline approach toward South Korea and is unable to flexibly respond, instead prioritizing Japan’s self-image, as suggested by the export control regulations toward South Korea. Since 2019, the Japanese government has tightened control regulations on exports of semiconductor materials to South Korea in response to potential seizures of Japanese assets as reparations for forced labor claims related to Japan’s 1910-1945 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. I believe Japan should consider changing its policies toward South Korea as South Korea has proactively improved its policies in response to Japan’s request, nonetheless, the effects have faded. From the perspective of economic security, it is also necessary to diversify Japan’s supply chain and strengthen trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and South Korea. Similar voices have been raised not only from South Korea but also by Japanese experts.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Parliament
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

11. After Hegemony: Japan’s role and dilemma in maintaining the rules-based order

Author:: Yu Inagaki
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The phrase “rules-based order” has recently become a recurring theme in the Japan-US alliance . This is based on the recognition that the liberal international order (LIO)—which the United States built and maintained, and that Japan has significantly benefited from—is now being challenged. While the war in Ukraine has heightened the sense of crisis over global power dynamics, China has been considered the main threat to the LIO. The United States has identified China as not just a security threat but a “ most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge ,” and Japan has come to view the current international environment from a larger perspective, international order. In fact, Japan has expected to play a leading role in maintaining the LIO as US international engagement weakened under the Trump administration. However, is it possible for Japan, a constrained middle power, to maintain the existing order in the face of a declining hegemon and rising challengers? This raises a classic question in international relations: What will happen to the international order after hegemony; and what can and will Japan, occupying a particular place and role in the international system, be able and willing to do regarding international order?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, Hegemony, and International Order
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

12. The Future of the Quad and the Emerging Architecture in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Garima Mohan and Kristi Govella
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The Quadrilateral grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States (the Quad) has come a long way from its origins, establishing itself as a crucial pillar of the Indo-Pacific regional architecture and significantly shifting in tone and focus from its early iterations. Since its revival in 2017, the Quad has been elevated to a leader-level dialogue, it has begun issuing joint statements, and it has developed a new working-group structure to facilitate cooperation. It has also significantly broadened and deepened its agenda to include vaccines, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, infrastructure, cyber, and space. These recent changes to the Quad raise several questions about its future trajectory. What are the drivers of engagement, the domestic support, and the bureaucratic capacity in the four countries to continue investing in the Quad? How well does the Quad’s new working-group structure function, and will the working groups be able to deliver tangible results? How has the Quad’s agenda evolved, and will it return to its initial focus on security challenges? Are the Quad countries open to cooperation with additional countries and, if so, what form will this take? This paper analyzes these questions drawing on recent publications, official statements, and interviews with key experts and policymakers in the four countries. In doing so, it offers five key takeaways into the Quad as an evolving part of the Indo-Pacific architecture, as well as a vehicle for achieving the goals of its four member countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Quad Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Asia, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

13. Trouble on the Rocks: US Policy in East China Sea and South China Sea Disputes

Author:: Benjamin Tracy
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The South and East China Seas are strategic not only for US security and commercial interests, but are vitally so for US treaty allies Japan and the Philippines. Both countries are involved in territorial disputes with China, a rising power and security concern for the US and its allies. Despite treaty alliances with both, the United States has consistently confirmed that the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are covered under Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty while stating that Philippine-claimed islands in the South China Sea are not explicitly covered in the Mutual Defense Treaty. This research project aims to understand why US policy is inconsistent in defending treaty allies’ territory. The methods used to solve this question are to look at the historical context of both disputes as well as strategic interests. UNCLOS is also analyzed to see whether international law influenced US policy. The result was that the US more consistently covered the Senkaku Islands due to the need to gain Japan’s trust as an ally in the post-war order and the US has an interest in maintaining status-quo in the region. There are three recommendations for the US in order to create a more consistent policy, which include signing UNCLOS, reengaging with regional allies such as the Philippines to establish a stronger defense commitment, and strengthening alliances with actors such as the Quad as well as the UK and France.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

14. Japan on the Borderlines: Is Japan Still a Civilian Power?

Author:: Bahadir Pehlivanturk
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The New Security Legislation (NSL) passed through the Japanese Diet in 2015 has created concerns among the public and some parts of the academia about whether Japan’s potentially unhindered actions will destabilize the region. By adopting a civilian power ontology within the neoliberal framework, this study analyzes the 2015 NSL and its implications through three hallmark civilian power credentials: internationalization; the scope of the use of force; and the autonomy of security policy. The analysis and empirical evidence suggest that even after allowing for collective self-defense through the 2015 constitutional reinterpretation and the ensuing expanded scope for international security activity, Japan can still be narrowly considered a civilian power.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Legislation
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

15. Abe Shinzo: Diplomat-in-Chief

Author:: Yuki Tatsumi
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Abe Shinzo is the longest-serving prime minister in post-World War II Japan. Having occupied the office since December 2012, Abe has attempted to leverage his stable tenure to increase Japan’s international presence. In particular, Abe has tried to reshape the way Japan conducts its foreign policy, from being responsive to proactive. “A proactive contribution to peace with international principle” or chikyushugi o fukansuru gaiko (diplomacy that takes a panoramic view of the world map) symbolizes his government’s approach, part of an earnest attempt to remain relevant on the international scene even as the country grapples with irreversible trends including population decline and aging.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

16. Mobilizing Resources and Signaling Intentions: a Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Japan’s Domestic and International Instrumentalization of the Senkaku Islands Dispute and China’s Maritime Assertiveness

Author:: Alana Camoca Gonclaves de Oliveira
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: Using a neoclassical realist model, this paper builds an analytical model to understand how countries are able to change or adjust their security and foreign policies. The article analyzes Japan’s foreign and security policies under the Shinzo Abe government, exploring how the Japanese government’s internal and international propaganda on Chinese maritime assertiveness and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue influenced the government’s capacity to mobilize resources in order to transform security policies and legitimize Japan’s military role in the Asia Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Political Theory, Military Strategy, and Propaganda
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

17. The New Taiwan Clause: Taiwan and the Security of Japan

Author:: Tetsuo Kotani
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: A summit meeting between Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and President Joe Biden was held on April 16, 2021, followed by a joint statement. In the statement, for the first time in the 52 years since 1969, the importance of the security of the Taiwan Strait was emphasized by the leaders of Japan and the United States, confirming that both countries are increasingly concerned about the current situation regarding Taiwan. According to a poll conducted by Nikkei Inc. after the summit, 50% of the Japanese public considered the U.S.-Japan summit itself as "positive" (32% "negative"), and 74% of the respondents "agreed" that Japan should be involved in stabilizing the Taiwan Strait, while only 13% "disagreed." These figures were received with some surprise by experts. This paper will analyze these changes in Japan's perception of Taiwan, and then examine the issues that Japan should address in the future following the recent Japan-U.S. joint statement.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Japan, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

18. To Beat China On Tech In Emerging Markets, Learn From It: Competing with China on 5G and future technologies

Author:: Luke Patey
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Recommendations: The US, South Korea, Japan, and the EU can pool resources to level the playing field with China and offer new finance options for developing countries seeking to upgrade their communications and technology infrastructure. The US should look to the India and Vietnam model and help other nations develop domestic capacities that lower dependencies on Huawei and other foreign tech providers over time. Open RAN is no silver bullet to compete with China. Its potential will only be fully realized in the mid and long run, after high integration costs, security gaps, and other problems are worked out.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Politics, Science and Technology, Power Politics, Economy, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. ASPI - Embassy of Japan 1.5 Track Dialogue on Responsible Behaviour in Space

Author:: Malcolm Davis and Khwezi Nkwanyana
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Earlier this year, ASPI and the Embassy of Japan in Australia convened a hybrid workshop on responsible behaviours in space; a concept which has emerged as a key focus of the international space policy community. At the workshop, participants discussed the stable and sustainable use of space and management of security challenges in space, and ways to define responsible behaviour in space, including through UN General Assembly Resolution 75/36. Participants at this workshop included academics, practitioners, government representatives, military personnel and legal experts from Australia, Japan, Britain and Southeast Asia. This workshop and report were sponsored by the Embassy of Japan in Australia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Space
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Australia

20. Partisan Biases in U.S.‐Japan Relations

Author:: Paul Nadeau
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Japan will welcome the Biden administration with relief in the wake of what was perceived as Trump’s bombast, threats, and unpredictability – but it will be mixed with apprehension (fair or not) that Biden’s presidency will follow the Obama administration’s perceived weakness, or even accommodation, toward China. It’s a crude simplification, but Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s relationship with U.S. political parties is roughly that they share preferences but not perceptions with Democrats, and share perceptions but not preferences with Republicans. In practical terms, this means that Japanese decision makers favor alliances and multilateral approaches over unilateralism and brinksmanship, but are more suspicious of China’s intentions and behavior than they believe Democrats to be. Put more indelicately, the LDP prefers working with Republicans rather than Democrats. This is combined with a traditional perception that Democrats undervalue Japan as a partner. Taken as a whole, this means that the incoming administration may have to do more to convince Japan that its priorities are being taken seriously – but will find in Japan an essential partner for advancing U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

21. Biden Must Assist Japan and South Korea with the History Issue

Author:: Tom Le
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The Biden administration’s focus on allies and partners and the inability of democratic U.S. allies Japan and South Korea to move beyond historical pitfalls of apologies and treaties provides President Biden’s team the perfect opportunity to show leadership by taking on a mediator role. By taking an active role, the United States can demonstrate that it is not a passive observer to would-be revisionists in the region, shore up its alliances, and signal to the world that the United States is still the leader in the promotion of human rights. Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945 was brutal. The Japanese military coerced between 10,000 and 200,000 women into sexual slavery and many more Koreans were forced to work in the Japanese war machine, the very one that annexed Korea in 1910. Following the abrupt end of Japanese colonization after World War II, brought about by the only direct use of nuclear bombs on a human population in history, Japan quickly signed treaties and paid reparations to former colonies, recovered its economy, and successfully rehabilitated its image with much of the world. However, it was not until 1965 that Japan-South Korea relations were “normalized.” The new Japan-South Korea relationship included abandoning reconciliation with North Korea altogether, and Tokyo providing grants to an authoritarian South Korean leader who was later assassinated and remains a divisive figure in contemporary Korean domestic politics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, History, Alliance, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

22. The United States and Japan Should Cooperate to Include India in Indo‐Pacific Economic Governance

Author:: Kensuke Yanagida
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Both the United States and Japan consider India as an important strategic partner in their respective Indo-Pacific concepts. However, India still faces many domestic challenges as a developing country. India also has traditionally been reluctant when it comes to trade liberalization. U.S. bilateral trade negotiations with India, and Japan`s effort in promoting an East Asia regional trade agreement that includes India share objectives and interests and hence can be coordinated. On November 15, 2020, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was signed by 15 countries with the glaring exception of India. RCEP is a regional free trade agreement (FTA) whose negotiations were initiated by ASEAN and six partner countries, namely Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India in 2012. The signing of RCEP finally came after eight years of negotiations, but India decided to pull out from the pact at the final stage of negotiations. The Japanese and U.S. Indo-Pacific concepts aim to achieve regional peace, stability, and prosperity through ensuring a rules-based international order, and to enhance cooperation among like-minded countries in both economic and security spheres. RCEP can be positioned as an important economic partnership initiative that embodies the Indo-Pacific concepts of rules-based, free and fair trade and investment governance, and contributing to the economic prosperity of the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

23. The U.S.‐Japan Relationship: Modeling New Frontiers in Subnational Diplomacy

Author:: Sarah Sieloff and Sean Connell
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: In our increasingly networked world, the international activities of states, cities, and other subnational actors are expanding rapidly. Their rising importance has spurred Congress to consider legislation establishing an Office of Subnational Diplomacy within the U.S. State Department that would institutionalize and support these initiatives, while better aligning them with national diplomatic strategies. Moreover, they offer opportunities for envisioning new foreign policy approaches that directly benefit U.S. communities. The U.S.-Japan relationship — with its robust history of subnational interaction, strategic global interests and increasingly integrated economies — offers a fertile environment for developing and implementing new models for subnational diplomacy, with global applicability. While state and local governments cannot commit the federal government to action, they can conduct activities that advance both local and national interests. This is evidenced by an ever-expanding range of trade and business missions, and cultural and educational exchanges that bridge subnational actors with international partners. Increasingly, these activities are evolving into new areas, including technology-driven entrepreneurship, environmental quality and disaster resilience. At their best, subnational initiatives—which national leaders have cited as critical to U.S. foreign relations—create meaningful, long-term relationships amid often-changing national-level politics and officials. By stimulating information exchange, training and research opportunities, and business connections, they deliver concrete benefits to participants on both sides of the Pacific, especially in areas where national governments are not best positioned to engage.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Japan's 2021 Elections: What Happened, What's Next?

Author:: Yusaku Horiuchi, Yesola Kweon, Charles McClean, and Daniel Smith
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: This event will take the form of a one-hour roundtable (~10 minutes for each speaker plus Q&A) of experts’ views on the main takeaways from the 2021 Japanese general election, which was held on October 31st, 2021. This roundtable of experts will explain the results of the election, and what they might signify for Japan’s domestic and foreign policy going forward. This event is cosponsored by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and the APEC Study Center.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Elections, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

25. What the Quad Is, Is Not, and Should Not Be

Author:: Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Since its establishment in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD or Quad) has transformed into a multilateral forum to enhance military coordination in the Indo-Pacific among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia and to address issues of mutual concern—particularly the rise of China. The U.S. has pushed for this transformation. Quad members speak of the group as a forum for issues in the Indo-Pacific ranging from COVID-19 and climate change to emerging technologies. But China, Asia’s biggest power, is integral to addressing each issue. In early 2021, the group’s leaders signed a joint statement reiterating the importance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific—a reference to what all four members regard as China’s illegitimate claims in the South and East China Seas. Indo-Pacific Quad members also have disputes with China: India over its shared border with China; Japan over China’s sovereignty claims over the Senkaku islands; and Australia over worsening ties, including onerous trade restrictions and tariffs.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, COVID-19, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Australia, and United States of America

26. Japan's Foreign Policy Under Kishida

Author:: Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The government of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, formed on 10 November, will continue the foreign policy of his predecessors Abe Shinzō and Suga Yoshihide. In response to China’s regional policy, Japan intends to develop its military potential and deepen cooperation with the U.S. and other partners, including European, in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Kishida will strive for stable relations with China and trade liberalisation in the region out of Japan’s own economic interest. The new government’s focus on the country’s internal socioeconomic problems will be conducive to maintaining the current course in foreign policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, Economy, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

27. Shaping the Indo-Pacific? Japan and Europeanisation

Author:: Yee-Kuang Heng
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In this Strategic Update, Professor Yee-Kuang Heng investigates European power projection and presence in the Indo-Pacific, and its converging nature with Japan’s attempt to shape the regional environment in its favour. While UK threat perceptions have converged significantly with Japan’s since former Prime Minister David Cameron’s promulgation of a “golden era” in relations with China, managing expectations of Japan’s attempt to ‘shape’ and encourage Europeanisation remains crucial. But is it fair to conclude that Japan has been successful in encouraging a stronger European presence to help it shape the Indo-Pacific order?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Europeanization, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Indo-Pacific

28. US, Japan, and South Korea Coordination Key to Competing in Southeast Asia

Author:: Karl Friedhoff and Lea Chang
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: In picking fronts that offer the paths of least resistance, trilateral cooperation will maximize the presence of all three countries in ASEAN, maintaining balance in the region and making collective progress toward economic and development goals. Despite its size, economic dynamism, and geographic position, Southeast Asia has received comparatively little attention in US foreign policy. Even as American policy becomes more focused on China, the United States lacks a coordinated strategy to respond to and compete with China’s vast trade and investment in Southeast Asia. But most ASEAN countries are wary of China’s growing influence and would be open to US involvement as they look to diversify. To take advantage of this opportunity, the United States must supplement its focus on the South China Sea with diplomatic and financial efforts on land. These efforts should offer an alternative to China’s largesse but should not seek a direct competition in hard infrastructure or in terms of dollar amounts invested. Nor should the United States go it alone. Instead, it should seek to cooperate with its allies—Japan and South Korea in particular—to pursue their respective competitive advantages. These include identifying and investing in small- and medium-sized enterprises in ASEAN, developing human capital in the region, and conducting joint maritime cleanup activities in coordination with ASEAN countries. Creating coordinated activities with Japan and South Korea in Southeast Asia should be the first step for the United States to roll back China’s influence in the region. But these efforts will need to be calibrated to ensure that they focus on the needs of countries in the region and not just engulf the region in the US-China competition.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

29. Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans Wary of China's Intentions

Author:: Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Dina Smeltz
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: American, Japanese, and South Korean publics see China as a more of a threat than a partner. Trilateral cooperation will be key to managing China's rise. Against a backdrop of growing regional rivalry, March and April 2021 surveys conducted in the United States, Japan, and South Korea show that publics in all three countries share similar views of China’s growing influence and intentions. But the data also show that internal divisions within the US-Japan-South Korea relationship will pose challenges to deeper cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:: Japan, China, East Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

30. So Far, Yet So Close: Japanese and Estonian Cybersecurity Policy Perspectives and Cooperation

Author:: Henry Rõigas, Tomas Jermalavicius, Jun Osawa, Kadri Kaska, Liis Rebane, Toomas Vaks, Anna-Maria Osula, and Koichiro Komiyama
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Estonia and Japan are among the leaders in cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity on the global stage, Japan also being a key strategic partner for the EU and NATO. They have many similarities in their approaches to cybersecurity and state behaviour in cyberspace, which has established solid ground for closer bilateral ties. This report, authored by leading Estonian and Japanese researchers of cybersecurity policy, gives a valuable insight into the experiences and perspectives of these two countries, their success stories and challenges in building a secure cyberspace, as well as the potential for cooperation.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Japan, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Estonia

31. Strategic Ambivalence: Japan’s Conflicted Response

Author:: Matthew Goodman
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Abe administration has adopted a strategy that combines three main lines of effort: enhanced diplomatic and economic engagement with Beijing; hedging and balancing, including deepening integration with other countries of the Indo-Pacific region and attempting to keep the United States engaged in the Indo-Pacific region; and leadership on regional and global economic rule-making. The main strands of this approach are likely to continue after Abe leaves office, though uncertainty surrounds them all.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

32. Japanese Views of South Korea: Enough is Enough

Author:: Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: While the sources of contention are deep and enduring, relations between Japan and South Korea have been especially troubled in the last few years. The two countries are grappling with deeply entrenched, emotional legacies that have been inflamed by recent controversies, rendering history both immediate and real. This chapter explores Japan’s perception of and reaction to those events. While it aims to provide an objective assessment of Japanese thinking, it does not purport to be even-handed or balanced. It is an analysis of the Japanese view of the relationship with South Korea. To be brief and blunt, Japanese are frustrated with and angered by South Koreans. Frustrated because they have been unable to build a future with them that rests on a foundation of shared concerns and values; domestic politics continues to override strategic interests. Angry because Korean complaints deny the many changes that have occurred in Japan since the end of World War II. Japanese do not deny that atrocities took place, but they are offended when they are laid at the feet of current generations. A growing number of Japanese believe that Koreans prefer to occupy the moral high ground over building a mutually beneficial long-term partnership. This belief increasingly colors the way that Korean actions and statements are interpreted.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

33. South Korean Views of Japan: A Polarizing Split in Coverage

Author:: Cheol Hee Park
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: South Korean views of Japan are neither uniform nor unified. Considering that national strategic identities are competing even within a single country, it is not strange at all that South Koreans have complex and fragmented views of Japan. Depending on their ideological and dispositional orientations, South Koreans hold varying perceptions about Japan. It is much more so in the age of ideological polarization. Not only in the United States, but also in South Korea, identity politics more and more dominate. Widespread social networking service communications made tribal communications, instead of mass communications, permeate the society, which strengthened the trend of polarization. Increasingly people do not cross over ideological divides or social cleavage lines, creating islands of tribes to convince themselves in a particular way. The combination of ideological divide and tribal communications opens an unexplored political domain of contending views in a society. This chapter aims to delineate the development of complex and divided South Korean views of Japan, especially under the Moon administration. It shows South Korea divided within. Then it analyzes the rise of anti-Japanese elements in Moon’s handling of Japan affairs after 2017. Careful analysis of the Moon government’s posture toward Japan reveals that such aspects can be visibly identified. I also analyze the political background of rising anti- Japanese elements within the ruling party of South Korea, while attempting to show that alternative views of Japan are widely available despite the Moon government’s generally negative posture toward Japan. Based on a review of newspaper columns and civic initiatives for reconciling with Japan, this study further illustrates the existence of modest alternative views that are different from the government position. This clearly reflects that South Korea’s discursive space remains relatively democratic and plural. Finally, I address the question of whether political and diplomatic tensions would increase or decrease in the process of South Korean and Japanese interactions. Prescriptions are highly conditional in a sense that the level of tensions will be determined by the way interactions address the issues in contention. I take the position that there is not a single view but multiple and divided views of Japan in South Korea, particularly under the Moon administration. Although the Moon government contains a strong anti-Japanese and nationalist orientation, conservative intellectuals keep a moderate, cooperative stance toward Japan. One can find increasing diversity despite intense bilateral controversies over contemporary and past issues. I conclude that tensions between South Korea and Japan originate from political elites, rather than the general populace. Narrowing the perception gap between political leaders may be easier to do in bettering the relationship.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

34. Looking West. The Rise of Asia in the Middle East

Author:: Valeria Talbot, Ugo Tramballi, Paola Magri, Zhao Jianming, Kabir Taneja, Adel Abdel Ghafar, Jeongmin Seo, Naser Al-Tamimi, Nael Shama, Sara Bazoobandi, and Anshel Pfeffer
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: As the world’s economic and political centre of gravity moves increasingly towards East and South Asia, we can expect a number of countries in these regions to devote more attention to the Middle East. The relations between East and South Asia and the Middle East have significantly expanded as a result of the global rise of Asian economic powers, particularly China, India, Japan and South Korea. Not only oil but also trade, investment, infrastructure, and tourism is the name of the business with the MENA region. Beyond energy and economic interests, questions arise about the potential geopolitical dimension of these evolving ties. What are the strategic implications of the projection of Asian countries in an unstable, fragmented and volatile region? How do they interact with each other and with other international players? Last but not least, will the Covid-19 pandemic be a game changer in (re)shaping relations in the future?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Geopolitics, Business, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, India, Israel, Asia, South Korea, Egypt, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Gulf Nations

35. New Zealand Picks up on the Indo-Pacific

Author:: David Scott
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Traditionally, New Zealand’s strategic focus has been on Australia and the South Pacific. As recently as 18 October, 2018, Ben King, New Zealand’s Deputy Secretary for Americas and Asia said that “the term Indo‑Pacific may not resonate in New Zealand yet.” And this despite a July 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Statement that already pinpointed New Zealand’s “Indo-Pacific partners reinforcing the rules based order” as being Australia, India, Japan and the United States. It is worth noting that the Strategic Defence Policy Statement gave lengthy details on the threat posed by China; in its Maritime Silk Road push into the Indian Ocean, its militarization of the South China Sea, and its push into the Pacific islands. Events from August 2019 to February 2020 reinforce that New Zealand is seeking out “Indo-Pacific” cooperation with these four particular “partners” (Japan, United States, India, Australia) over shared concerns about China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Economy
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

36. Next Steps for US-Japan Collaboration on Energy Infrastructure

Author:: Courtney Weatherby
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has re-centered discussion of geopolitical competition in Asia around infrastructure. Responding both to BRI and the region’s well-known infrastructure gap, the United States has launched efforts to unlock US private investment for infrastructure. Japan’s engagements in the region emphasize high-quality infrastructure and best practices (an implicit criticism of China’s sometimes less rigorous standards). The foreign policy approaches of the United States and Japan dovetail nicely and have led to many new initiatives and institutional partnerships, as well as the quality-focused Blue Dot Network. But despite the two countries’ intentions to work collaboratively, their efforts have been held back by differences in organizational practices, the lengthy overhaul of US financing, and a lack of immediate movement from US-Japan consortia. For now, a less ambitious approach of closely coordinating technical assistance and conditional funding on proposed projects may serve as a model for closer US-Japan collaboration as efforts mature.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Renewable Energy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, and United States of America

37. Spring 2020 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:: Vahram Ter–Matevosyan
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:: Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:: CONTENTS LILIT HARUTYUNYAN THE NEW IMAGE OF THE BUSINESS ELITE IN LEBANESE POLITICS: RAFIK AND SAAD HARIRI, NAJIB MIKATI AND ISSAM FARES .......................................................................................... 4 YEVA HARUTYUNYAN JAPAN’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRATEGY IN CENTRAL ASIA ........................................................................................................ 25 LILIT MAYILYAN UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERLYING DYNAMICS OF TURKISHAZERBAIJANI RELATIONS: “ONE NATION, TWO STATES?” ...... 39 ASTGHIK HAYRAPETYAN MANIFESTATIONS OF NEOCONSERVATISM IN US MIDDLE EAST POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2001-2009) ............................................................................ 68 AUTHORS LIST .................................................................................... 87 ANNEX ................................................................................................... 88
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Business, Economic Cooperation, and Neoconservatism
Political Geography:: Japan, Central Asia, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, and Lebanon

38. The Role of the Philippines in the World

Author:: Kyra Lüthi
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: First association most people have when they think about Asia are countries like China, Japan or India, as they are big countries, present for a long time on the world map. During the past decades, Hong Kong and Singapore have also gained a lot of attraction worldwide as business comprise the world’s most ancient civilizations. So regardless of a country’s geographical size and sustainability, each one is vital in playing a role in the global economic and political order. Unfortunately, more often than not, the South East Asian countries and most specifically and finical hubs of Asia. These are indeed the key players in Asia but the biggest continent in the world is not only composed of these few states. It is home to 48 countries and 4.5 billion people with different ethnicities and cultures that the Philippines, if not forgotten, is commonly underestimated in the contribution that it provides in the international arena due to the multiple misconceptions about the country’s general conditions. But in reality, the Philippines has always been in the global scheme from the earliest times up to today, therefore it is important and relevant to learn more about its history, involvement and influence on relations in Asia and globally.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong

39. Change and Continuity in Japan-Russia Relations: Implications for the United States.

Author:: Paul Saunders and John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Abstract:: The report provides a synthesis of Japanese and American expert perspectives on the recent history, current state and future prospects for Japan-Russia relations. The authors examine the political, diplomatic, security, economic and energy dynamics of this important, but understudied relationship. They also assess how the Japan-Russia relationship fits within the broader geopolitical context of the Asia-Pacific region, factoring in structural determinants such as China’s rise and the level of U.S. presence in the region. Finally, the authors consider potential policy implications for the United States, paying special attention to how shifts in relations between Tokyo and Moscow could impact the U.S.-Japan alliance. As Saunders observes in his introduction to the volume, the currently shifting strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, which is a central factor in Tokyo and Moscow’s efforts to foster constructive relations, also raises a host of questions for the US-Japan alliance. What are the prospects for Japan-Russia relations? What are Russian and Japanese objectives in their bilateral relations? How does the Trump administration view a possible improvement in Russia-Japan relations and to what extent will U.S. officials seek to limit such developments? Is the U.S.-Russia relationship likely to worsen and in so doing to spur further China-Russia cooperation? Could a better Russia-Japan relationship weaken the U.S.-Japan alliance? Or might it in fact serve some U.S. interests?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

40. Financial Development in Myanmar and the Role of Japan

Author:: Tomoo Kikuchi and Takehiro Masutomo
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Since 2011, under the Thein Sein government, Myanmar has started to build financial institutions almost from scratch. Japan has played a leading role in this effort, writing off debt, opening the Yangon Stock Exchange, vying for the entry of Japanese banks, and laying out finance-related laws. Myanmar’s weak institutions present considerable challenges. By examining common features of financial markets in Southeast Asia, this paper identifies the preconditions for financial development to be a vehicle for Myanmar’s industrialisation as well as the rationale for Japan’s public and private involvement in Myanmar.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Finance, Institutions, Private Sector, and Industrialization
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Myanmar

41. The Cornerstone and the Linchpin: Securing America’s Northeast Asian Alliances

Author:: Patrick M. Cronin
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: During an era in which strategic gravity is shifting to Asia, the United States cannot be careless in tending to its alliances with Japan and South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK). The three countries face persistent threats from North Korea and from China’s semi-transparent bid for regional hegemony. Meanwhile, rocky relations between Tokyo and Seoul are jeopardizing vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. The latest disagreement between America’s premier allies raises new questions about alliance strategy, commitment, and burden-sharing. These fissures have become exacerbated as the U.S. pressures allies to increase their contributions to regional security and reciprocal trade. [...] This report seeks to explain why the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliance are still a vital means of achieving overlapping strategic interests. At the same time, it also argues that keeping these alliances fit for purpose requires radical change rather than business as usual. Both a rapidly changing security environment and growing intra-alliance squabbling pose dangers that require U.S. leadership. This report concludes with specific ideas for advancing bilateral and trilateral cooperation in the coming months and years, without trying to achieve too much too quickly.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, International Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

42. Getting Japan to the Negotiating Table on the North Korea Crisis: Tokyo's evolving security agenda

Author:: Luke Patey
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Japan’s absence from frontline diplomacy on the North Korea crisis is undermining inter-national efforts to bring about a lasting peace. A close alliance with Tokyo is essential for American and European interests in East Asia. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ The European Union should consider playing a larger role as a mediator in the North Korean crisis. ■The United States can use its diplomatic weight to help Japan solve the abductee issue with North Korea. ■In the face of their shared security threat, Japan should take steps to ease current tensions with South Korea.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Power Politics, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

43. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Inroads into Central Asia: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Cooperation Roadmaps for Uzbekistan

Author:: Timur Dadabaev
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: China, Japan, and South Korea have regarded Central Asia as a new Asian frontier in their foreign policies since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With time, their policies evolved into regionbuilding initiatives exemplified by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Belt and Road Initiative, Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue Forum, and Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum. This paper raises the following research questions: What are the areas of interest for China, Japan, and Korea in their relations with Central Asian states and Uzbekistan in particular? What are the patterns of agenda setting in establishing intergovernmental cooperation? What are the particular projects that these states initiate? What are the objectives of projects initiated within these areas of interest? How competitive or complementary are these projects of China, Japan, and Korea? Throughout, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean “Silk Road” roadmaps with Uzbekistan are discussed to highlight their similarities and differences.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Central Asia, Asia, South Korea, and Uzbekistan

44. Japan's Strategy to Keep the North Koreans and Chinese Down, the Americans in, and the Russians Neutral

Author:: James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Japanese government makes no secret of its intensifying security concerns. The Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual white paper includes the assessment that, “The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.” The report is also explicit about the source of these challenges. The most immediate danger is identified as North Korea, whose “military development such as its nuclear and missile development constitute unprecedented, serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan.” Second on the list is China, which is singled out for the non-transparent strengthening of its armed forces, as well as the increase in its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Lastly, the white paper notes that “Russia has been modernizing its forces including its nuclear capability not only in the Europe region but in the periphery of Japan,” and that close attention needs to be paid to these developments. The country faces not only the individual security challenges posed by North Korea, China, and Russia, but also the danger of increased cooperation between these three nuclear-armed neighbors. What is more, at just the time when Tokyo needs reliable partners, it finds itself dealing with a South Korean government that it considers chronically untrustworthy and a U.S. administration that often seems less like a loyal friend and more like an increasingly expensive supplier of commercial security services. Having identified the nature of this problem, the remainder of this essay focuses on explaining Japan’s strategy for addressing it. It does so by adapting Lord Ismay’s famous description of the fundamental goal of NATO as being to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”13 Correspondingly, Japan’s current strategy can be characterized as aiming to keep the North Koreans and Chinese down, the Americans in, and the Russians neutral. After outlining the details of each part of this strategy, the essay will identify the main challenges to overcome in its implementation.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and National Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, North Korea, and United States of America

45. Ministers For Foreign Affairs 1972-83

Author:: Melissa Conley Tyler and John Robbins
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) is pleased to present the latest book in the Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs series. In May 2016 the AIIA held a one-day forum to examine the achievements of Australia’s foreign ministers between 1972-83. This forum and publication is the third book in the AIIA’s Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs series following on from Ministers for Foreign Affairs 1960-72 and R.G. Casey: Minister for External Affairs 1951-60.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, Human Rights, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, Asia, and Australia

46. Japan’s new assertiveness: institutional change and Japan’s securitization of China

Author:: Kai Schulze
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:: Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:: In recent years, Japan's foreign policy elite has started to increasingly securitize China in their security discourse. The harsher tone from Tokyo is widely evaluated as a direct reaction to China’s own assertive behavior since 2009/2010. Yet, the change in the Japanese government’s rhetoric had started changing before 2010. In order to close this gap, the present article sheds light on an alternative causal variable that has been overlooked in the literature: a change in Japan’s security institutions, more specifically, the upgrade of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense, in 2007. While utilizing discursive institutionalism and securitization-approaches, the present article demonstrates that a strong correlation indeed exists between the institutional shift and the change in Japan’s defense whitepapers in the 2007–10 period. It thus opens up a research avenue for the further scrutiny of the hitherto understudied but significant causal linkage in the study of contemporary Japanese security policy toward China
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Government
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia-Pacific

47. Fears of War on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Dario Kuntić
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: War is lurking on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has embarked on an accelerated buildup of weapons of mass destruction and modernization of its already large conventional force. It has been consistently testing a series of ballistic and intercontinental missiles, performing nuclear tests, and accelerating toward development of a fully functional nuclear weapon that could strike the United States. The North Korean regime is now estimated to have as many as twenty nuclear warheads and could soon be able to make some to �it on the missiles necessary to deliver them. With time running out, Washington may come to the conclusion that a preventive military strike against North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is the only way to deprive Pyongyang of capability to launch a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile on the US. On a visit to Seoul in March this year, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson left open the option of a military strike to prevent the development of nuclear weapons program from advancing too far, vowed to defend allies in the region, and ruled out negotiations with Pyongyang. As Washington and Pyongyang escalate their war of words, with both sides hinting it could end with a nuclear con�lict, the prospect of serious con�lict is stronger than ever.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

48. Explaining India’s Foreign Policy: From Dream to Realization of Major Power

Author:: Takenori Horimoto
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:: Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:: A power transformation appears to be taking place in Asia, brought about by the rapid emergence of China and the relative decline of US influence. India has sought a way to cope with this new situation. India itself has been rising to prominence since the 1990s, particularly its nuclear weapon tests in 1998 onward. Since the start of the twenty-first century, India has been perceived as the next country to follow China in seeking a major power status. Although India has previously tended to conceal its power aspirations, in 2015 it declared its intention to be a leading power. This article elucidates this transformation through India's policy orientation on a local, regional, and global level and its key partnerships with Russia and Japan. India’s metamorphosis holds great implications for the transformation of power in Asia.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Power Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, India, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

49. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-Japanese Relations

Author:: Yinan He
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Sino-Japanese relations have been in another volatility cycle since the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes flared up again in summer 2012. The downward trend seems to have bottomed out in November 2014 when the two leaders Xi Jinping and Abe Shinzo finally held their first meeting since entering office. However, the anticipated recovery has proved tenuous; the momentum toward further improvement has halted since early 2016 when confrontation escalated in both the South China Sea and East China Sea. While acknowledging the role of realist power shift and geostrategic rivalry in causing Sino-Japanese tension, this paper argues that a widening gap between their national identities is also highly relevant. The current Xi government has promoted a national reinvigoration campaign emphasizing Chinese history and culture, the socialist model, and defense of core interests, which runs counter to that of Abe’s Japan, a democratic and historically revisionist country. This national identity conflict has exacerbated mutual distrust, denied chances of reassurance, and generated domestic popular objections to diplomatic compromise between the two countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Identity
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

50. The Dispatch (Winter 2016)

Author:: David J. Bercuson, Frédérick Gagnon, Randolph Mank, Colin Robertson, Robert Huebert, Hugh Stephens, Gary Soroka, Hugh Segal, Daryl Copeland, David Perry, and Robert Muggah
Publication Date:: 12-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Global Exchange
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: The Dispatch (later called The Global Exchange) is the Canadian Global Affairs Institute’s quarterly magazine featuring topical articles written by our fellows and other contributing experts. Each issue contains approximately a dozen articles exploring political and strategic challenges in international affairs and Canadian foreign and defence policy. This Winter 2016 issue includes articles on the election of Donald Trump, energy policy, Canadian defense capability, and more.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Energy Policy, Elections, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, Europe, Canada, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

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