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Begin New Search Topic Weapons of Mass Destruction Political Geography Israel

1. A Comprehensive Israeli Concept for a WMD/DVs-Free Zone in the Middle East/Gulf

Author:
Shemuel Meir
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Attempts to achieve a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD-Free Zone) in the Middle East have become even more complicated than in the past. This Policy Forum issue provides a fresh look at the topic in order to offer common ground for positive discussions on Middle East disarmament. Its main novelty is to look at the security threat as perceived by Israel in the context of an Israeli-Egyptian-Iranian triangle that complements the old paradigm of an Israeli-Egyptian dyad. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or agreement/accord) with Iran is a challenge for some regional actors but at the same time could form a basis for bridging the disarmament gap, especially with its unprecedented robust verification regime. From a purely strategic angle, the JCPOA is beneficial to Israel’s national security interests. It is therefore to be hoped that this multilateral agreement will withstand the Donald Trump administration’s attempts to dismantle it.
Topic:
National Security, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

2. A New Egyptian Track II Approach to the WMD/DVs-free Zone in the Middle East/Gulf

Author:
Mona Ahmed Saleh
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Policy Forum issue revisits the stalemate in the negotiations of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (WMD/ DVs-Free Zone) in the Middle East/Gulf, which has been negatively impacted by several regional developments. It starts by highlighting the basic gap in the different conceptions of such a zone by the Egyptian-led Arab states, in addition to Iran, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other. Arguing from a comprehensive security perspective in the region, this Policy Forum issue presents a new Track II Cooperative Idea by viewing the establishment of the WMD/DVs-Free Zone as an incremental, multi-stage, long-term process that should take place on different tracks and should combine the traditionally incompatible calls for “Disarmament First!” and “Peace/Recognition First!” of the respective negotiating parties. While emphasizing how important it is to keep (in-)formal talks going – and to be patient – a Preparatory Commission for a WMD/DVs Treaty is proposed whose mandate would include special assignments for Track II actors.
Topic:
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Egypt, and Gulf Nations

3. Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan

Author:
Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Many accounts suggest that the United States did little to prevent Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa from developing nuclear weapons. These accounts are flawed, however. The United States did attempt to stop all three countries from acquiring the bomb and, when those efforts failed, to halt additional proliferation measures such as further testing and weaponization.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Israel, and South Africa

4. Iran's Present Day Military Capabilities and Military Aspirations in the Middle East

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Far too much of the analysis of Iran's search for nuclear weapons treats it in terms of arms control or focuses on the potential threat to Israel. In reality, Iran's mix of asymmetric warfare, conventional warfare, and conventionally armed missile forces have critical weaknesses that make Iran anything but the hegemon of the Gulf. Iran's public focus on Israel also disguises the reality that its primary strategic focus is to deter and intimidate its Gulf neighbors and the United States – not Israel. It has made major progress in creating naval forces for asymmetric warfare and developing naval missiles, but it has very limited air-sea and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (IS) capabilities. It lacks modern conventional land, air, air defense and sea power, has fallen far behind the Arab Gulf states in modern aircraft and ships, and its land forces are filled with obsolete and mediocre weapons that lack maneuver capability and sustainability outside Iran. Iran needs nuclear weapons to offset these facts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

5. A more in-depth, technical Q from Siegfried Hecker on North Korea

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
North Korea announced on April 2, 2013, that it would restart its nuclear facilities, including its 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, north of the capital, which had been disabled and mothballed since an agreement in October 2007.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, and North Korea

6. The Tenth Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum

Author:
Walter H. Shorenstein
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Meeting after North Korea had raised tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the spring, participants in the Tenth Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum focused on the implications for the Korean Peninsula of leadership changes in North and South Korea and especially China. Participants also focused on regional dynamics, including increased confrontation between China and Japan and various, sometimes conflicting, efforts to increase regional economic integration in Northeast Asia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bilateral Relations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Israel, and Asia

7. Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close

Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
China tolerates the nuclear ambitions of North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK) for now because its interests in the neighbourhood are much wider and more complex than this single issue. Beijing and the West often work toward their shared goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula with contradictory approaches that reflect their different priorities. The West uses diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions and extended deterrence to pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program. Many Western policymakers believe the DPRK will denuclearise if sufficient costs are imposed and that Beijing holds the keys because the North is economically dependent on it. But China is reluctant to take any coercive action that might destabilise the regime and change a delicate geopolitical balance. It instead continues with diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation as the instruments it hopes will cause the leadership to denuclearise in the indeterminate future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
China, Israel, and North Korea

8. Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korea Peninsula

Author:
Scott Snyder, Marcus Noland, Bonnie S. Glaser, and Contributor: Stephan Haggard
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The accession to power of a new leader in North Korea has not increased the prospects for denuclearization. Hints that Kim Jong-un might experiment with agricultural and economic reforms are not accompanied by any suggestion that he is considering abandoning the country's nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, all signs point to North Korea's staunch determination to advance the nuclear program while undertaking efforts to compel the international community to recognize it as a nuclear weapons state. Given the growing urgency of the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons development, it is essential to consider new ways to persuade Pyongyang to freeze, reverse, and eventually eliminate its nuclear capabilities
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Israel and Korea

9. The Last Living Fossil of the Cold War The two Koreas, the Dragon and the Eagle: towards a new regional security complex in East Asia?

Author:
Erik Beukel
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The divided Korean peninsula is a flashpoint in the regional security complex in East Asia. The central issue is the threat posed by North Korea and how to meet it. After a review of North Korea as an international actor and of two important incidents in 2010 (the sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan and North Korea's shelling of the South Korean coastal island of Yeonpyeong), the rationality underlying the country's military efforts is considered. South Korea's Nordpolitik is reviewed and the rise and decline of its sunshine policy and the role of its alliance with the United States is described. Two non-Korean great powers, China and the United States, are important actors in the region, and their relations with North Korea, goals and priorities, and implementation strategies are outlined. The report concludes with reflections on the potential for changing the present security complex, which is marked by a fear of war, into a restrained security regime, based on agreed and observed rules of conduct.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Cold War, Communism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, Israel, East Asia, Korea, and Island

10. Iranian nuclear weapons: a self-fulfilling prophecy?

Author:
Mariano Aguirre
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
The debate about the Iranian nuclear programme has heated up over recent months, with the danger that the situation could get out of control and violence may erupt. Currently, the main threatis an escalation of violence between Iran and the U.S. Strategically, an attack will further decrease U.S. legitimacy in a region already in turmoil and will isolate Israel even further. The consequencesof these processes are both serious and unpredictable.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

11. A Nuclear-free Middle East - Just Not in the Cards

Author:
Liviu Horovitz and Roland Popp
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
A scheduled conference to promote a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East has renewed hopes for nuclear disarmament in this unstable region, if only innovative diplomacy could take advantage of the current shifts. However, a realistic assessment suggests that optimism is unwarranted. Fundamental strategic considerations related to Iran's nuclear program, Israel's atomic options, and the region's ingrate security architecture remain nearly insurmountable hurdles. Therefore, policymakers should focus first on attaining a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Topic:
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

12. North Korea and the Politics of Visual Representation

Author:
Dirk Nabers and David Shim
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Within international discourses on security, North Korea is often associated with risk and danger, emanating paradoxically from what can be called its strengths—particularly military strength, as embodied by its missile and nuclear programs—and its weaknesses—such as its ever-present political, economic, and food crises—which are considered to be imminent threats to international peace and stability. We argue that images play an important role in these representations, and suggest that one should take into account the role of visual imagery in the way particular issues, actions, and events related to North Korea are approached and understood. Reflecting on the politics of visual representation means to examine the functions and effects of images, that is what they do and how they are put to work by allowing only particular kinds of seeing. After addressing theoretical and methodological questions, we discuss individual (and serial) photographs depicting what we think are typical examples of how North Korea is portrayed in the Western media and imagined in international politics.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Israel and North Korea

13. Israel and Iran's Nuclear Weapon Programme: Roll Back or Containment?

Author:
Massimiliano Fiore
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The latest IAEA Report suggests that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon capability. Preventing the Islamic Republic from becoming nuclear is the most important issue on Israel's agenda, and Jerusalem will do everything it can to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear capability. Considering the limited impact of international sanctions and covert operations, it is therefore possible that at some point in the next 12-15 months Israel's policy-makers and military officials will decide whether or not to act militarily to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities. Though the probability of successfully destroying all of Iran's nuclear targets is not very high, Israeli policy-makers and military officials would nevertheless still be extremely satisfied with delaying Iran's nuclear programme. But would it be worth all the trouble it would inevitably unleash? While Israeli fears are understandable, given the heavy costs and poor chances for success of the military option, containment still represents the most sensible policy for Israel.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

14. Israeli arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa

Author:
Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Israel accounted for less than 1 per cent of transfers of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2006–10. Deliveries consisted mainly of small numbers of artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles, armoured vehicles and patrol craft. However, in addition to major weapons, Israel also supplied small arms and light weapons, military electronics and training to several countries in the region. Israeli weapons, trainers and brokers have been observed in numerous African trouble spots and may play a bigger role than their numbers imply.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Africa and Israel

15. North Korea's Missile Launch: The Risks of Overreaction

Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
North Korea says it is preparing to launch an experimental communications satellite using a rocket that is part of its ballistic missile program. This would be in the face of an international outcry, and of what is a strong though not definitive argument that it violates two UN Security Council resolutions. Japan has been most vocally opposed, saying it will shoot down the rocket if it threatens to fall on its territory. But even if the test is successful, it would only slightly increase security risks, while an overblown response would likely jeopardise the Six-Party Talks to end North Korea's nuclear program. What is needed is a calm, coordinated response from the key actors to raise pressure on Pyongyang to return to the talks rather than a divided reaction that only fulfils the North's desire to widen splits among its neighbours.
Topic:
Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and International Security
Political Geography:
Israel, Asia, and North Korea

16. North Korea: Getting Back to Talks

Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The motivations for North Korea's second nuclear test are, as with many of its actions, mostly impenetrable. It may be the latest step in an unrelenting drive to become a permanent nuclear state or it could be advertising nuclear wares to potential buyers. It may be driving up the price others will pay for the North to give up its weapons or it might be about ensuring that the military will accept whatever decision Kim Jong-il has made on his successor. Most likely, North Korea's nuclear weapons program serves multiple purposes for the leadership. Whatever the rationale, there are no good options in response. Finding a way to resume talks on ending the nuclear program may appear to reward Pyongyang's bad behaviour, but diplomacy is still the least bad option. At the same time, the UN Security Council's strong and united condemnation of the test in Resolution 1874 must be enforced, while containment of proliferation and deterrence of North Korean provocations need to be boosted.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Israel, Asia, and North Korea

17. An Israeli Strike on Iran

Author:
Steven Simon
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Successive Israeli governments have held that a nuclear weapons capability in the region, other than Israel's own, would pose an intolerable threat to Israel's survival as a state and society. Iran's nuclear program—widely regarded as an effort to obtain a nuclear weapon, or put Tehran a “turn of a screw” away from it—has triggered serious concern in Israel. Within the coming year, the Israeli government could decide, much as it did twenty-eight years ago with respect to Iraq and two years ago with respect to Syria, to attack Iran's nuclear installations in order to delay its acquisition of a weapons capability.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Tehran, and Syria

18. Decommissioning the North Korean Nuclear Facilities: Approaches and Costs

Author:
Hui Zhang
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
If the agreed objective of complete denuclearization of Korean peninsula is to be achieved, it can be expected that dismantling and ultimately decommissioning North Korean plutonium production facilities have to be proceeded. This paper will focus on decommissioning the 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) plutonium production reactor and the reprocessing plant. It explores and recommends the best decommissioning approaches to those nuclear facilities. It also provides a discussion of the decommissioning costs for these nuclear facilities.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Israel, North Korea, and Sinai Peninsula

19. Iran: Is Productive Engagement Possible?

Author:
Karim Sadjadpour
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Although Tehran and Washington appear hopelessly divided, issues of broad mutual concern reveal important overlapping interests. The United States can more effectively support democracy and human rights in Iran with policies that facilitate, rather than impede, Iran's modernization and reintegration in the global economy. The next U.S. president should not immediately seek comprehensive engagement with Tehran, as this might enhance Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's chances of reelection in Iran's June 2009 presidential elections. The United States must deal with those who hold power in Tehran, namely Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Given the widespread mutual mistrust between Washington and Tehran, confidence should be built with negotiations on areas of common interest, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than those of little or no common interest, such as the Palestinian–Israeli conflict or the nuclear issue. When it comes to U.S.–Iranian interaction, the record shows that “secret” or “private” discussions out of public earshot have a greater success rate. Building confidence in the public realm will be difficult, as politicians on both sides will likely feel the need to use harsh rhetoric to maintain appearances. It is imperative that Washington maintain a multilateral approach toward Iran, especially regarding the nuclear issue. Tehran is highly adept at exploiting rifts in the international community and diplomatic efforts to check Iran's nuclear ambitions will unravel if key countries approach Iran with divergent redlines. Powerful spoilers—both within Iran and among Iran's Arab allies—have entrenched economic and political interests in preventing U.S.–Iranian reconciliation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iran, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Tehran, and Palestine

20. Institutionalising Northeast Asia: The energy market

Author:
Stuart Harris
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian National University Department of International Relations
Abstract:
Interest in more comprehensive institutional arrangements for Northeast Asia have been given a fillip by the suggestions emerging from the Six Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. The following paper looks at regional interactions on energy and related policies. It asks whether the regional actors see conflicts emerging within the region in their individual attempts to solve their energy security concerns, or whether they envisage cooperative ways for resolving such problems. In the light of this, it asks whether there could be a functionalist basis arising from energy cooperation for a wider process of community-building in Northeast Asia.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Israel, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea