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101. The Shah’s Son and the Future of Iranian Opposition

Author:
Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
For the Iranian opposition movement to be viable, it has to offer a clear vision for Iran that can unite most Iranians. Those opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran must keep in mind the people in Iran, including those who have not yet shown any support for the opposition, and let them know what their future would look like if the opposition prevails. Any movement that would try to rely on sentiments favoring the Iranian monarchy is doomed to fail. The Iranian people will not get behind replacing one autocratic leader for another. This is one of the reasons for despair among many Iranians of the middle generation. The Iranian opposition’s vision for the country should include the role of those who are now employed or involved in the state apparatus.
Topic:
History, Domestic Politics, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

102. Biden’s Middle East Balancing Act: Iran’s Nuclear Program and Saudi-Israeli Ties

Author:
Leon Hadar
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This summer, the Biden administration decided to negotiate a temporary deal with Iran involving the release of American prisoners held by the Islamic Republic in exchange for the release of some of the funds that were held by the United States as part of the economic sanctions on Tehran. The White House expects that this package deal will open the road to talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The outline of a deal would include a pause in the accumulation of enriched uranium and an Iranian pledge not to produce weapons-grade fissile material, in exchange for the removal of US economic sanctions. But any diplomatic deal between Washington and Tehran raises fears among two of America’s allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel, that regard Iran as an existential threat. From that perspective, a US-led process of normalizing the relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem could help contain Iran and reinforce the American pledge to strengthen the alliance with Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

103. Iran and the ‘Axis of Resistance’ Vastly Improved Hamas’s Operational Capabilities

Author:
Colin P. Clarke
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Iran has provided training, equipment, and financing to Hamas over the years, vastly improving the terrorist organization’s capabilities, evidenced by the cross-border attack into Israel on October 7 that resulted in more than 1,400 killed. The unification of Iran’s network of proxies under the purview of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani has been a force multiplier and cemented Iran’s “unity of fronts” strategy as the most effective means of encircling Israel. Israel has declared its intention to destroy Hamas completely, but any attempt to do so will come at an extremely high cost and could spur other Iranian proxies like Hezbollah to join the fray, prolonging the conflict and increasing the likelihood of a region-wide conflagration.
Topic:
Terrorism, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Proxy Groups, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

104. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

105. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

106. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

107. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

108. Petroleum and Progress in Iran: An Interview with Gregory Brew

Author:
Mirek Tobiáš Hošman and Gregory Brew
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Between the 1940s and the 1960s, Iran developed into the world’s first petro-state. In the recently published Petroleum and Progress in Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War (2022, Cambridge University Press), author Gregory Brew argues that Pahlavi petro-state emerged from a confluence of global and local forces in the context of the Cold War, the global oil economy, and the nascent practice and discourse of international development assistance. The Toynbee Prize Foundation interviewed Gregory Brew on the main arguments and events of his book. Next to providing a brief chronology of the political and economic development of Iran in post-WW2 decades – including the episode of the failed attempt to nationalize Iranian oil industry in the early 1950s followed by the coup d’état in 1953 – Brew explained the concept of dual integration introduced in his book, which tries to account for both local and global integration of the Iranian oil industry. He also highlighted the role of the international development actors, including the World Bank, American developmentalists and development economists in shaping the Pahlavi regime and the Iranian development project.
Topic:
Development, Oil, History, and Industry
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

109. Disarming the Bomb: Distilling the Drivers and Disincentives for Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Jonathan Lord, Arona Baigal, Hunter Streling, and Stewart Latwin
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Negotiations to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal, reached an impasse this past year. Further, Iran made parallel decisions to brutally crack down on a nationwide protest movement and to inject itself into the conflict in Ukraine by furnishing Russia with weapons. These decisions may have rendered the impasse insurmountable. U.S. President Joe Biden has not retreated from the U.S. policy that it will never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s maximalist demands at the negotiating table, along with its domestic and foreign activities, have made it politically impossible for the United States and Europe to pursue further negotiation. Further complicating the situation and perhaps rendering the JCPOA increasingly obsolete, critical provisions of the original deal will expire in 2025 and 2030.1 The United States and the international community must consider how to constrain Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent in a post-JCPOA world, in which Iran has never been closer to achieving a bomb. The CNAS Middle East Security Program designed and ran a scenario exercise in October 2022 to identify key factors that might accelerate or decelerate Iran’s nuclear program in 2024. Additionally, the exercise explored how Iran, the United States, Israel, and the Gulf nations could prioritize their own national security objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, along with the potential actions each might take to accomplish those objectives. The exercise examined two scenarios. Scenario 1 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran failed to reenter the JCPOA. Scenario 2 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran successfully renegotiated a return to compliance with the JCPOA and faced the imminent expiration of elements of the deal. Overall observations from the exercise suggest that Iran’s leadership’s primary concern is self-preservation. Pursuing a nuclear program is secondary and ultimately serves to advance the primary objective (self-preservation). U.S. policymakers face many challenges in rallying partners against Iran while prioritizing a negotiated approach to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, Deterrence, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

110. CTC Sentinel: June 2023 Issue

Author:
Pierre Boussel, Kristina Hummel, Teddy Macdonald, Ashley A. Mattheis, Amarnath Amarasingam, Graham Macklin, and Marc-Andre Argentino
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Pierre Boussel provides a deep examination of the Quds Force in Syria. He writes: “The key mission of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) is to defend the Iranian Islamic Revolution and create armed militias in the countries of its ‘Axis of Resistance.’ Its organization is opaque and complex, coordinating combat operations with soft-power actions aimed at, among other initiatives, establishing a Pax Irania in the Middle East, a ‘peace’ of which it is the initiator and guarantor. Although the Quds Force’s apparatus in Syria has been under pressure from Israeli airstrikes, Tehran is sticking to its mission set: infiltrating Syrian civil society and sending fighters to the north, where the civil war will one day end, and to the south, on the edge of the Golan Heights, to establish a base against Israel if necessary.” Our interview is with Brian Nelson, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. He describes how his office “marshals the Department’s intelligence and enforcement functions with the dual aims of safeguarding our financial system against illicit use and also combating corrupt regimes, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats.” On May 6, 2023, Mauricio Garcia, a man with longstanding neo-Nazi views, murdered eight people in a mass shooting at the Allen Premium Outlets mall in Allen, Texas. Ashley Mattheis, Amarnath Amarasingam, Graham Macklin, and Marc-André Argentino look at what led to the attack. They write that the deceased perpetrator “had an ideologically fuzzy tapestry of extreme thoughts tied to rampant violence. He appeared to view neo-Nazis and other members of the extreme far-right as living the ‘real’ masculine ideal in its fullest form by their commitment to generating dominance through violent, radical, racial, and cultural action. This interaction between race and gender is an increasingly present aspect of far-right violence and needs to be better understood.”
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Financial Crimes, Far Right, Mass Shootings, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Political Extremism, Quds Force, Domestic Terrorism, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, North America, United States of America, and Golan Heights

111. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

112. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

113. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

114. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

115. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

116. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

117. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

118. Iran: Political and institutional effectiveness

Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Background, Forecast, and Political and institutional effectiveness
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

119. Iran: Political forces at a glance

Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Background, and Political forces at a glance
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

120. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

121. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

122. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Turkey, Canada, India, Israel, France, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Italy, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Angola, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, and Russian Federation

123. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

124. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

125. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

126. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

127. Iran: Country fact sheet

Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Summary, Economy, Background, and Fact sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

128. Iran: Country forecast summary

Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Summary, Economy, 5-year summary, and Key indicators
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

129. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

130. Iran: Basic data

Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Summary, Basic Data, Economy, and Background
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

131. Iran: Economic structure

Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Economic structure, Charts and tables, and Monthly trends charts
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

132. Iran: Political structure

Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, and Political structure
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

133. Iran: Country outlook

Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Outlook, Forecast, and Overview
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

134. Iranian Turks In Nation-Building Process: First Pahlavi Era

Author:
Heidari Mojtaba
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AURUM Journal of Social Sciences
Institution:
Altinbas University
Abstract:
The study explores the emergence of Turkic identity because of identity politics committed in the aftermath of the nation-state building in Iran after 1925. It is believed that the primordial nationalism on the base of the Aryan race impacted the country’s diverse population and ethnic categories and the imposition of highly restrictive measures and social policies in cementing Iranian nationalism built upon the Persian culture and myth, paved the way for the politicization of identity. To obtain a thorough analysis, a set of theories are applied. Pierre Bourdieu’s class formation and symbolic concept of power and language in a semi-patrimonial society and the social identity theory and having an eclectic grasp of the literature on assimilation and violence have contributed to the theoretical base of the study. Firsthand materials, journals, and archives are used to enrich the research content. The establishment of the modern state in the 20th century and the biased ethnic-lingual policies precipitated centrifugal forces among ethnic realities, so the alchemy of stereotyping and discrimination, and social comparison giving birth to group identification contributed to the politicization of ethnic identity among Azerbaijani Turks and their ethnic awareness.
Topic:
Ethnicity, Identity, Racism, Turkic People, and Nation Building
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

135. The Transition from Nationalism to Islamism in Iran’s Foreign Policy

Author:
M. Reza Pashayi and Timuçin Kodaman
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AURUM Journal of Social Sciences
Institution:
Altinbas University
Abstract:
The 1979 Iranian Revolution is a multifaceted phenomenon with intricate causes, complex evolution and far-reaching outcomes. Rooted in the Constitutional Revolution of the early 20th century and the rise to power of the Ayatollahs, its beginnings are distinct but interconnected. Unlike many revolutions of the 20th century, the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a departure from the socialist or communist model and manifested itself as a revolt against both Western and Eastern systems, with unique outcomes. The 1979 Revolution shook a traditional and established order and paved the way for the rise of Islamism within a new political framework. This ideology, like its predecessors, adopted a singular leadership based on religious doctrine. To differentiate itself from global and regional powers and focus on its unique revolution, the Iranian regime shaped a foreign policy summarized by the slogan “neither East nor West, the Islamic Republic” and aimed to export this ideology globally. The policy focused primarily on political and ideological interests, resulting in permanent sanctions imposed by the United States. This economic aspect contributes to the changes in Iran’s foreign policy towards the United States, from pre-revolutionary Persian nationalism to post-Revolutionary political Islam, emphasizing its strength and adaptability in the face of external pressures.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Shiism, and Iranian Revolution
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

136. Strategic Hedging or Alignment? Qatar’s Foreign Policy Toward Iran in the Wake of the Blockade Crisis

Author:
Duygu Dersan Orhan
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
The blockade imposed on Qatar changed the power dynamics in the Persian Gulf, increasing tension and insecurity in the area. Qatar’s ability to overcome the blockade was largely due to its cooperation with Iran, and the two countries’ ties grew as a result. This study investigates whether Qatar’s long-standing hedging toward Iran has changed into an alignment in the wake of the 2017 blockade. The key conclusion of the article is that, despite Qatar’s faint signals of alignment with Iran during the blockade, it did not entirely stray from its hedging strategy. Qatar-Iran relations has been selected as a case study to illustrate the effects of regional developments and security crises on the hedging strategy within the context of the Blockade Crisis.
Topic:
Partnerships, Small states, Economic Cooperation, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Qatar, and Gulf Nations

137. Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future in Turkey and India, and Iran and Russia

Author:
Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The institutions and practices necessary for open and fair competition for political power are eroding across the world. In some countries, such as Turkey and India, the democratic dividend of electoral competition has been steadily undermined by majoritarian autocrats who have proved adept in campaigning for office and winning elections. In others, such as Russia and Iran, political leaders have marginalised or suppressed electoral processes, reducing them to closely managed performances that seek to demonstrate public consent. At least some traces of the mechanisms of electoral competition often remain in place, however, even where genuine public consent has been almost extinguished. This leaves open the possibility that the trend away from competitive electoral politics could be at least partially reversed in future, in the context of political succession or the electoral defeat of incumbents. In June 2023, LSE IDEAS brought together experts from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and other institutions to examine the potential for restoring the democratic dividend of competitive politics in four major countries. Turkey and India were selected for their timeliness—national parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Turkey in May 2023, and national parliamentary elections are due in India in April 2024—and for their similarities: both political systems are characterised by powerful elected leaders with a strong record of performance in national elections, each backed by large political parties based on an appeal to national and religious identity. Iran and Russia were chosen as examples of two states where competitive electoral politics had been temporarily enabled by significant political change—respectively, an impasse in Iran’s theocracy in the 1990s, and the end of the Soviet Union—only to be undermined by the reassertion of autocratic power. Two assumptions underlay the planning of this discussion on ‘Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future’. The first is that the characterisation of political systems as either democratic or autocratic provides an insufficient basis for explaining many differences in the workings of political institutions, or for guiding policy. The second assumption is that while certain institutions and practices appear to be essential to maintaining open competition for political power—including for example, freedom and diversity of comment in major channels of communication like broadcast television, radio, newspapers, and social media—there is no useful empirical example or theoretical formulation of an ideal or perfect democratic political system. The exclusion from the discussion of countries with longer established forms of competitive politics, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, was not intended to suggest an implicit comparison with ideal types of functioning democracies. On the contrary, there are grounds for concern about the maintenance of open competition for political power in every country professing to be a democracy. As David Runciman has said of the future of democratic practices: ‘The question for the twenty-first century is how long we can persist with institutional arrangements we have grown so used to trusting, that we no longer notice when they have ceased to work.’ He warns that ‘democracy could fail while remaining intact’.
Topic:
Elections, Political stability, Autocracy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, India, and Asia

138. Is there Eurasian Connectivity without Europe?

Author:
Niva Yau
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Tucked between Russia, Iran, and China, Central Asia is now desperately looking for solutions to cushion the impacts of global tension on its fragile economies, which are deeply tied to sanctions against Russia and a local production slowdown as China recovers from its zero COVID policy. While European diplomacy has come at a crucial time, its Central Asian policy is ambiguous, and commitments misplaced. Central Asia is continuously perceived by the EU as a region in need of developmental assistance, which leads to European regional policies that focus on digitalization and climate issues. What Central Asia needs is the establishment of concrete logistical connectivity that will enable efficient flow of products across Eurasia.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, Economics, European Union, Connectivity, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

139. An Heir and a Spare? How Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah” Could Change Iran’s Deterrent Calculus

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Since October 27, the Houthis have launched three medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel, a first since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles into the country in 1991. The Yemen-based jihadists have also launched at least eight salvos of cruise missiles and long-range explosive drones focused on the southern port of Eilat. Moreover, they have attacked U.S. assets directly during the Hamas-Israel war, shooting down one MQ-9 Reaper drone and routing numerous missiles near Navy vessels. If Iran continues to develop the group’s capabilities, the Houthis may provide the broader “axis of resistance” with a potent new chess piece. In this timely Policy Note, Michael Knights assesses the rising Houthi threat and explains how the United States and its allies can respond more assertively and effectively. A revamped policy would recognize the intimate alliance between the Houthis and Iran—which has never been a “marriage of convenience,” as some analysts have imagined—and seek to counter the group’s aggression with the goal of securing U.S. interests and providing a better future for the Yemeni people.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Deterrence, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

140. The Next Generation of Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Technical Advances, Strategic Objectives, and Potential Western Responses

Author:
Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 25, 2023, Iran’s minister of defense, Gen. Mohammad Reza Qaraei Ashtiani, unveiled the so-called fourth generation of the Khoramshahr liquid-fuel ballistic missile—aka Kheibar—amid heightened tensions with Israel and the West regarding Tehran’s nuclear program and renewed talk of preventive strikes against Iran’s key nuclear sites. Ashtiani spoke at the Hakimiyeh Aerospace Industries Organization complex, east of Tehran, against a backdrop with the new missile and a large model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. The name Kheibar comes from a fortified oasis settlement north of Medina, Saudi Arabia, inhabited by Jewish tribes before the Islamic era. In AD 628, the Jews there were defeated by Muslim armies led by Ali ibn Abi Talib, who has become a legendary figure in Shia Islam. The message to Israel implicit in the Kheibar announcement was therefore unmistakable. The Khoramshahr is Iran’s most advanced liquid-fuel ballistic missile and probably the first using storable liquid fuel, with its first version having been introduced at a military parade on September 22, 2017. The missile is believed to have much in common technically with the North Korean Hwasong-10—itself based on the retired Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Iran is thought to have received several Hwasong-10 missiles from North Korea in 2005 for reverse engineering purposes. The Khoramshahr is also Iran’s first departure from the Russian Scud and scaled Scud-generation propulsion systems.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

141. The Regent of Allah: Ali Khamenei's Political Evolution in Iran

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
During his lengthy tenure as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei has shown a knack for consolidating power by creating layers of bureaucracy in military, economic, and religious affairs. In turn, he has liberally purged officials who have hinted at disloyalty to him, the Islamic Republic, or its governing doctrine, velayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudent). But Khamenei does not lack for personal complexity. As a younger man, he dressed casually, flaunted his love of literature, and composed poetry. And as a leader, he has often demonstrated flexibility—coined as “heroic flexibility” in the case of the 2015 nuclear deal—at times of national risk or strained social cohesion. He has likewise blessed the rise of relatively moderate presidents such as Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani when he thought their leadership would reinforce national stability. In this wide-ranging study, former Qom theologian Mehdi Khalaji details Khamenei’s political ascent, from his role as an influential cleric in Mashhad to his presidency under Ruhollah Khomeini and his surprising appointment as Supreme Leader. Whoever succeeds him, the author makes plain, will inherit an infrastructure designed to preserve Iran’s authoritarian system and suppress rumblings of internal dissent.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Political Islam, and Ali Khamenei
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

142. Arming the Revolution: Trends in Iranian Defense Spending, 2013–23

Author:
Henry Rome
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Islamic Republic boasts a large and expanding nuclear program, the most capable missile and drone force in the Middle East, and a broad network of proxies that threaten U.S. interests. Nevertheless, scholars have devoted little attention to a key area: Iran’s defense spending. Although the data is publicly available, tabulating it is more difficult than one might assume, and three particular hazards await: (1) conversion of Iranian rials to dollars at unrealistic rates, (2) reliance on spending plans as opposed to actual spending, and (3) undercounting. Thus, any attempt to understand Iran’s military spending must scrupulously avoid such traps. In this Policy Note, Iran expert Henry Rome offers the most detailed public accounting yet of Tehran’s recent defense spending, illustrated by charts showing domestic trends and comparisons with regional rivals. The findings show how spending surged following the 2015 nuclear deal and plummeted following the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018. They also suggest that a new nuclear accord with Washington will likely prompt another increase, demanding a broader strategy to counter Iran’s military ambitions alongside its nuclear ones.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Economy, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

143. Is Iran Looking to Inspire Shia Homegrown Violent Extremist Attacks?

Author:
Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
An October 2018 report by the National Counterterrorism Center defined Shia homegrown violent extremists as “individuals who are inspired or influenced by state actors such as Iran, foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or Shia militant groups but who do not belong to these groups and are not directed by them.” At the time, the prospect of such Shia violence was largely theoretical, and officials could identify no tangible threats on American soil. But the January 2020 targeted killing of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani changed the picture, and U.S. officials could now point to a “catalyzing event,” as envisioned in the NCTC brief. Last year’s attack against writer Salman Rushdie and another at a Las Vegas hotel exemplified how Iran-inspired individuals were motivated to act. In this Policy Note, experts Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt explore lone-offender Shia violence largely through the lens of social media. Closer tracking of online networks, they argue, could illuminate this flourishing virtual activity and how it might lead to real-world harm.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Shia
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

144. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

145. Striking Back: Iran and the Rise of Asymmetric Drone Warfare in the Middle East

Author:
Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iranian drone strikes, as exemplified by the September 2019 attack against Saudi Aramco facilities, have jolted Middle East leaders and revealed Tehran’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The regime’s large and growing drone force, which can be used for reconnaissance or strike missions, now poses an existential threat to the Gulf states and a direct threat to Israel, as does its formidable missile force. Moreover, Iranian drones transferred to Russia have had a significant impact on Moscow’s war against Ukraine. In the bigger picture, advances in drone technology have produced an inflection point in aerial warfare—comparable to the introduction of manned flight more than a century ago—that has ended the guarantee of U.S. air superiority over its forces and bases. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. explores the contours and consequences of Iran’s drone activities in this timely Policy Note. To counter the Islamic Republic, the former CENTCOM commander recommends an approach centered on clearer U.S. communication about its goals for the region, tighter collaboration with partners and allies, and enhanced efforts to counter Iran’s drone fleet, along with its ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Drones, Military, and Asymmetric Warfare
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

146. New Bahrain Poll Reveals Support for Russia, Entente with Iran, Split on Israel

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On Iran, Bahrainis (especially among the country’s Shia majority) mostly favor rapprochement, and oppose military action or cooperation with Israel against it. Popular acceptance of business ties with Israel is steady, at around 40% in this small yet strategic island nation that joined the Abraham Accords in late 2020. But other measures show strong anti-Israel sentiment, probably in part because the survey was taken during Ramadan, a time of heightened tension with the Palestinians.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Public Opinion, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Israel, Bahrain, and Gulf Nations

147. Iran’s Misunderstood Nuclear Law

Author:
Henry Rome
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
This summer, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his most detailed remarks in years on Iran’s nuclear trajectory. While his comments on a potential agreement with the West drew the most attention, he also called on Iranian officials to follow a controversial 2020 law that ordered rapid steps to escalate the nuclear program and reduce international monitoring. “Some people think that this law creates problems for the country,” he stated. “They are wrong. This law is a good law...And it must be followed.” Indeed, the 2020 legislation has played a prominent role in Iranian debates about nuclear advances, and Khamenei’s comments suggest this will remain the case. Yet the law is widely misunderstood; more important, it has not been the primary driver of Iran’s actual nuclear activity over the past three years. The governments of Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi each sidestepped key provisions of the legislation while also escalating the program in ways the law does not require. Despite Khamenei’s sentiment, neither the existing law nor potential successor legislation is likely to compel escalation or constrain diplomacy.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Legislation, Nuclear Energy, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

148. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:
Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

149. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

150. Iran: Basic data

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Summary, Basic Data, Economy, and Background
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

151. Iran: Economic structure

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Economic structure, Charts and tables, and Monthly trends charts
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

152. Iran: Political structure

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, and Political structure
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

153. Iran: Country outlook

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Outlook, Forecast, and Overview
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

154. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

155. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

156. Iran-Saudi and China Trilateral Agreement: Reshaping the Global World Order

Author:
Rana Eijaz Ahmad, Mahnoor Mansoor, and Muhammad Sajid
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
This research paper explains the changing global world order under the leadership of China. The qualitative method with secondary sources describes the Chinese struggle for peace and interdependence in the post-Covid-19 era, maligned with the Russia-Ukraine war and American support to Ukraine under the banner of NATO. The theory of meditated realism (a third kind of realism, which results from contemplation and introspection, which leads to being proactive instead of reactive.) is used in the paper to explain the trilateral agreement. China is heading towards more alliances and agreements with Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa. It is reshaping the global world order and striving to replace the dollar with the yuan. It may start a new financial war between China and the U.S.
Topic:
NATO, Treaties and Agreements, and Realism
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

157. Shifting Dynamics in the Middle East: Implications for Pakistan

Author:
Zosha Noor, Muhammad Javed, and Shakeel Ahmed
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
China's resurgence as a global actor has significantly altered international relations, particularly in the Middle East, particularly with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan's unique geographical location and complex international interactions present an intriguing situation due to these changes. Pakistan's close relations with China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, along with its shared border and cultural ties with Iran, influence its security concerns, domestic politics, economy imperative, and foreign policy. China's growing relationship with Saudi Arabia is driven by its oil needs, global influence, and regional stability. Iran offers China a valuable counterbalance and potential ally in the Middle East due to its geostrategic position and abundant natural resources. The United States' long-standing hegemony in the Middle East has been put to the challenge by China's growing influence and strategic alliances in the region. This qualitative study investigates the issues relating to Middle East with an objective to evaluate the role of great powers‘ politics in the region. The Middle East's shifting geopolitical environment could be advantageous for projects like the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Chabahar Port Development, and Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline.
Topic:
International Relations, Political stability, Rapprochement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

158. Impacts of Saudi-Israel Relations on the Middle East: An Analysis

Author:
Zahid Yaseen, Muhammad Muzaffar, and Kinza Tariq
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
This qualitative study aims to analyze the impact of Saudi-Israel relations on the Middle East. The study also focused on the reaction of Arab countries to their bilateral ties and incidents that have arisen in the Middle East as a direct result of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The deteriorating condition of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia wreaked havoc throughout the region. The United States plays a pivotal role in the politics of the Middle East; therefore, a nation that is willing to operate as the United States' right hand was sorely needed in the region. Israel, a country that is not recognized on a global scale, has set up shop in that vacated seat. Together, they aid proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which contributes to instability in the region. The only thing that could diminish the damage would be a concerted effort by Muslim states against Israel.
Topic:
Politics, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Instability
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia

159. The Unfulfilled Promise of EU Foreign and Security Policy towards Iran

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro, Steven Blockmans, Akin Unver, and Sine Özkaraşahin
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With the 2015 nuclear deal dead in all but name, Iran is getting closer to Russia and more repressive at home, while EU member states’ priorities about the Islamic Republic now extend beyond nuclear proliferation to human rights and European security. This shift in priorities cements a re-orientation of the EU’s approach to Iran from conditional engagement to confrontation. EU member states’ options are limited, however. Pressure worked prior to the nuclear agreement because the EU cut off significant trade with Iran. But US extraterritorial sanctions, re-imposed after the United States left the deal in 2018, have rendered EU-Iran trade so modest that cutting it would have little impact. The EU could get more leverage by providing incentives, yet the political inexpediency of rewarding Iran at a time of rising belligerence of the Islamic Republic greatly restricts the range of benefits potentially on offer. Still, in the mid- to longer term, the EU and its member states will need to combine pressure with some form of incentives if they want to defend their interests in non-proliferation, European security and the protection of human rights in Iran. They also need to resort to a variety of international partnerships in order to maximise their residual leverage.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Middle East

160. What is Iran's Next Move?

Author:
Abdolrasool Divsallar and Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss Iran's next moves in light of the Israel-Hamas War and the resulting shifts in regional dynamics.
Topic:
Politics, Hamas, Armed Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

161. Iran and the Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Alistair Taylor and Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
On this week's episode, MEI's Editor in Chief Alistair Taylor talks to Iran Program Director Alex Vatanka about Iran and the Israel-Hamas war. As fighting rages in Gaza and the prospects for regional escalation continue to mount, Iran will remain a critical actor to watch. It is not only Israel’s main regional foe but also the leading provider of military aid and training for Hamas. Given the centrality of Iran in this latest Middle Eastern war, understanding how Tehran views the conflict and its endgame will be critical.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Escalation, Military Aid, Regional Politics, and October 7
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

162. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

163. Iran: Basic data

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Summary, Basic Data, Economy, and Background
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

164. Iran: Economic structure

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Economic structure, Charts and tables, and Monthly trends charts
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

165. Iran: Political structure

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, and Political structure
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

166. Iran: Country outlook

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Outlook, Forecast, and Overview
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

167. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

168. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

169. Saudi Arabia’s Balancing Game: The Palestinian Cause and Regional Leadership

Author:
Giulia Daga and Luigi Simonelli
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In the hours following Hamas’s violent attack on Israel of 7 October, the Saudi authorities called for “an immediate de-escalation”, while noting that they had previously warned against the outcomes of “the continued occupation and depriving Palestinians of their legitimate rights and the repeated systematic provocations against their sanctities”.[1] In a more recent declaration, the Saudi Foreign Minister has reiterated the country’s “categorical rejection of calls for the forced displacement of the Palestinian people from Gaza, and its condemnation of the continued targeting of defenceless civilians there”.[2] Reportedly, the heavy retaliation measures adopted by Israel, whose bombing campaign against Gaza has been one of the most intense of this century,[3] also including the apparent use of white phosphorus,[4] resulted in the halt of the normalisation process between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which should have followed suit on the 2020 Abraham Accords. Only a few weeks before, on 20 September, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had announced on US television that “every day, we get closer” to an agreement with Israel.[5] A few days later, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had reiterated the same optimism in front of the United Nations General Assembly general debate, insisting that the Palestinians should not be given “a veto over new peace treaties with Arab states”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Regional Power, and October 7
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia

170. China’s Grand Vision and the Persian Gulf

Author:
Anoushiravan Ehteshami
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
China’s engagement with Asian regions beyond its geographical periphery has grown exponentially since the 1990s and this is nowhere more evident than in West Asia and the Persian Gulf subregion. While energy drove China’s early interactions with the Gulf states, within two decades after the Cold War the relationships had evolved into much tighter networks of partnerships. China’s relations with the Gulf states, however, has not been uniform and the case studies of the United Arab Emirates and Iran highlight the complexities of China’s strategy in this subregion and the ways in which it actively pursues its diverse set of interests.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

171. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

172. Iran: Basic data

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Summary, Basic Data, Economy, and Background
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

173. Iran: Economic structure

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Economic structure, Charts and tables, and Monthly trends charts
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

174. Iran: Political structure

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, and Political structure
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

175. Iran: Country outlook

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Outlook, Forecast, and Overview
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

176. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

177. Global business environment improves

Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam

178. Components of Industry Resilience to Maintain Sustainable Economic Growth under COVID-19 Within the Knowledge-Based Economy Frame-work: A Comparative Study Between Iran and South Korea

Author:
Marzieh Asaadi
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
COVID-19 was first reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and spread rapidly across the globe. Then on March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic, causing more than 600 million confirmed cases and 6.49 million deaths around the world so far. The effects of the pandemic on societies can be examined mainly by two criteria: 1) the number of lives lost due to the disease (Mortality Rate), and 2) the number of jobs lost due to social distancing rules (fall in GDP). Both have a wide consequence for economic growth and other key macroeconomic indicators. An important explanatory factor for the significant difference between Case Fatality Rate (CFR) for Iran and Korea can be related to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) components (Daliri and Asaadi 2021). The WGI is a composite index consisting of six measurement factors, including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption. Furthermore, another critical factor is COVID-19 governance which can be monitored by calculating Government Stringency Index. This index is a composite measure based on several indicators which monitor the state of lockdowns and social distancing and range to values between 0-100, while 100 presents the most restrictive. In addition to the governance of COVID-19, from the perspective of public health and lives saved, maintaining jobs and supporting the resilience of industries to achieve SEG has been another important concern for nations and governments worldwide. As stated by Bernanke (2020), it is widely believed that the global economic crisis caused by COVID-19 is different from past crises in terms of cause, scope, and severity that suddenly disrupted economic activity. These necessitate research on the potential determination factors influencing the response of countries, companies, and individuals to the COVID-19 crisis. The key to ensure Business Continuity and SEG is to identify factors that increase the resilience of businesses under COVID-19 circumstances and other potential public health crises. Theoretical and empirical studies confirm that three main explanatory factors are at play: 1) macroeconomic structure and governance, 2) financial resilience of companies which is traced by available capital (i.e., the physical and human capital), and firms' adopted strategies and 3) digital evolution state and momentum and the adaptation of countries to technological innovations and Digital Intelligence, which is an indicator of transmission to KBE. By examining these components, it is possible to evaluate the structure and response of countries to the pandemic and post-COVID era. Thus, the report seeks to contribute to the literature on sustainable economic growth under crisis through a comparative study of Iranian industries with South Korea. The main research question here relates to the components of successful covid-19 governance from the perspective of SEG and business continuity within a KBE environment.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Industry, Resilience, COVID-19, and Knowledge Economy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Asia, and South Korea

179. Korea's Economic Presence in Iran under Trump and Its Prospects during the Biden Presidency

Author:
Shirzad Azad
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
On July 14, 2015, when Iran and the 5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany) ultimately agreed over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Republic of Korea (ROK) was practically one of the top three trade partners of the Persian Gulf country. In early May 2016 and only a few months after the nuclear deal was carried through, the then Korean President, Park Geun-hye, made an official visit to Iran where the two countries vowed to ratchet up their economic relations from roughly $6 billion to more than $18 billion in the years to come. Accompanied by “the largest business delegation in the history of Korean presidential trips,” Park’s high-profile trip to Iran persuaded many interested experts and observers to believe that the East Asian country was really determined to shore up its economic weight in Iran by drawing certain policies relevant to the long-term presence of Korean businesses in the Middle Eastern country (Choi 2016). Despite all those upbeat expectations about the ROK’s future economic and technological role in Iran, however, various data and statistics coming out indicate that over the past several years nearly all well-known Korean brands and products have increasingly lost their market share in the Mideast country to brands and goods supplied by other competitors. As a matter of fact, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the East Asian nation emerged as one of the Persian Gulf country’s top trading partners in the world, outstripping a number of Tehran’s traditional trading partners from the West. And while Korea managed to even expand its economic presence in Iran in the heydays of sundry international sanctions levied against the Middle Eastern country over its contentious nuclear program a couple of years before the JCPOA was eventually agreed in 2015, the ROK has been doing relatively poor in Iran during the past years (Azad 2018). Such lackadaisical performance, epitomized by abandoning the long-established pattern of significant trade in energy with Iran, has critically influenced a sharp decline in the total volume of two-way commerce between the two countries. While the plummeting share of Korean brands and goods in Iranian markets had indubitably something to do with certain policies pursued by the Moon Jae-in-led Korean government, however, the main culprit turned out to be the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018. The crippling sanctions which Washington under Trump subsequently imposed on Iran played a pivotal role in reshaping the scope and size of Korean commercial connections to the Persian Gulf country, though some unprecedented diplomatic and political troubles involving Seoul and Tehran during the past years have also had a lot to do with those punitive economic and financial measures targeting the Iranians. How did then the Koreans respond to those unique circumstances rendered largely by Trump’s approach toward the Persian Gulf country? What are going to be the prospects of a Biden administration’s policy shift for Korea’s economic performance in Iran? This study seeks to shed some light on Trump’s Iran policy with regard to Korea, its repercussions for the East Asian nation’s economic relationship with the Middle Eastern country, and potential solutions to chip away at those impediments under a Democrat administration in Washington led by Joe Biden.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Donald Trump, JCPOA, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

180. Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Game Theory, Coercion, and International Competition
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

181. REVISITING THE EMBOLDENING POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Author:
Kyungwon Suh
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Do nuclear weapons make their possessors more aggressive? A series of high-profile aggressive actions by some nuclear-armed states appear to substantiate the argument that nuclear weapons enable aggressive behavior. Since its all-out invasion of Ukraine in February, Russia has continued to conduct brutal, coercive operations, including missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and population centers. North Korea has continued to test launch a wide array of missiles, one of which recently landed close to South Korea’s territorial waters. Policymakers also echo the view that nuclear weapons are more than simply defensive weapons. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review argues that Russian leaders have exploited their nuclear arsenal as a “shield” behind which they launched military aggression against Ukraine. When he was CIA Director, Formal Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued that Pyongyang could use nuclear weapons “beyond self-preservation.”
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Russia-Ukraine War, and Mike Pompeo
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

182. Seven Myths about the Iran Nuclear Deal

Author:
Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2015, President Barack Obama worked with three European powers, the European Union, Iran, China, and Russia to conclude the Iran nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2018, President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the deal. Instituting his policy of “maximum pressure,” Trump imposed crippling economic sanctions that punished Iran not just for its ongoing nuclear weapons program but also for, among other things, its regional aggression and support for terrorism worldwide. Earlier in 2018, Israeli agents conducted a dramatic operation in Tehran, breaking into a secret warehouse and capturing a trove of Iranian nuclear files. These documents revealed a more advanced and comprehensive nuclear weapons program than had been previously known. The nuclear archive also showed Iranian officials’ plan for concealing nuclear weapons efforts under the guise of civilian research and development, and how Iranian officials systematically deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to cooperate with IAEA inspectors to verify the peaceful nature of its program. After the Israelis shared the nuclear archive with the IAEA, its inspectors found traces of uranium at several undeclared sites. Despite being obligated to do so, Tehran has refused to explain the presence of the uranium or reveal its current location. Iran’s requirements under the NPT are wholly separate from the JCPOA, but Tehran is using the Biden administration’s profound desire to return to the nuclear deal to bring political pressure on the IAEA to close the book on Iran’s violations. A fair-minded observer of Iran’s relations with the IAEA cannot but conclude that Tehran has never wavered from its intention to build a nuclear weapons capability and that its publicly declared “civilian” nuclear activities are an effort to hide its nuclear bomb program in plain sight. From the very inception of the JCPOA, however, the deal’s supporters have spun myths that disguise these self-evident truths. After Trump left the deal, those same supporters continued to recite the old myths while adding some new ones about the purported comparative advantage of the JCPOA over maximum pressure. As President Biden prepares to bring the United States back into the JCPOA, and as the public, the press, and Congress consider the deal's terms, we identify the seven most pernicious myths and explain the reality that they seek to conceal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

183. How to Target Iran’s Kleptocracy

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called morality police sparked protests that continue to spread across the country, posing the most serious challenge to Tehran’s theocratic dictatorship in years. The demonstrations have focused on opposing the compulsory wearing of the hijab, but Iranians are also venting anger at a regime that has lost legitimacy after decades of political repression, economic mismanagement, and systemic corruption. Policymakers in the United States are rightly focused on constraining Iran’s nuclear program and state sponsorship of terrorism. Sanctions and other measures targeting the regime’s illicit financial networks tend to reflect these urgent priorities. But Iran’s theocratic regime is also a sprawling, deeply entrenched kleptocracy against which the US should apply more pressure. This brief examines the prevailing forms of corruption within Iran, the implications for US policy, and how the US can intensify efforts to expose and target the regime’s kleptocracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Human Rights, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

184. Los Estados medio-orientales en su competencia por recursos y alianzas en África subsahariana (2000-2021)

Author:
Rafael Bustos and Juan Carlos Pastor
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El artículo explora la importancia antigua y nueva que para estos países de Oriente Medio tiene el continente africano a principios del siglo XXI. Para algunos de ellos es un interés histórico arraigado como es el caso de Egipto y su presencia en Sudán y las fuentes del Nilo, el de Turquía ligado al Imperio otomano o el de Omán, cuya vieja relación se remonta al comercio de esclavos y al control de Zanzíbar desde finales del siglo XVII, mientras que para Arabia Saudí o Irán esa relación data de los años 70 y para Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Catar este interés es mucho más reciente y arranca en el siglo XXI. Intereses que tienen múltiples vectores, entre los que destacan la competencia por la hegemonía regional de Oriente Medio, el prestigio, la intermediación y, en menor medida, pero también la compra de tierras cultivables en suelo africano. Por su parte, Israel, aunque es un actor que tratamos secundariamente, persigue también desde hace poco una agenda propia que resulta claramente distinguible del resto.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Alliance, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa

185. Risk and Responsibility: Managing Future Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats

Author:
Becca Wasser and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Washington is reimagining its global role, leading the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to make difficult choices about priorities, resources, and risk to better address the long-term “pacing challenge” posed by China. To do so, the United States plans to accept risks in the Middle East and against future Iran threats. Iran’s possession and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—specifically, its nuclear program, chemical weapons, and biological agents—pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests and Washington’s ability to accept risk in the region. But how Iran might leverage WMDs to threaten U.S. interests and upend Washington’s plans to make trade-offs in global responsibilities is unclear, while the risks of failing to address these challenges remain high. As a result, the DoD and its component organizations, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), must enhance their understanding of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities and the escalation dynamics surrounding Iranian WMDs during crisis and conflict. By doing so, the United States can better accept risk in the Middle East and revise its global priorities while still protecting core U.S. interests. To improve the DoD’s understanding of future Iranian WMD-related threats and escalation dynamics, the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) conducted a series of three virtual strategic-operational tabletop exercises (TTXs) exploring future Iranian nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons use. The TTXs indicated that even if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, the likelihood the regime will use it is low. Instead, the regime may be more likely to use chemical and biological weapons to escalate conflict. Moreover, there are significant asymmetries between American and Iranian views of conflict timelines, escalation redlines, and risk tolerance, all of which make it difficult to offer and signal credible ways to de-escalate a crisis. Differences between Washington’s risk acceptance and that of its regional partners—Israel, in particular—further complicate U.S.-Iran interactions. The TTXs aimed to enable the United States to identify where and how it might mitigate the risk it must accept to better marshal resources in support of the department’s strategic guidance. Accepting greater risk against Iran and in the Middle East more broadly means shifting U.S. strategic priorities in the region. This shift has the potential to unsettle allies and partners, and may possibly embolden Iran in the near term, but such tough choices must be made if the United States wishes to prioritize other long-term threats that may be of greater impact to U.S. security, such as China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Risk
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

186. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

187. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

188. October 2022 Issue

Author:
Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, Casey Coombs, and Brian Michael
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
With a truce in Yemen that had lasted six months elapsing in early October, there is concern that Yemen will once again be plunged into civil war and that the Tehran-allied Houthi militants will once again threaten Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with drones and ballistic missiles. In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, and Casey Coombs provide a “fuller understanding of the Houthi political-military leadership, its core motivations, and the nature and extent of Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah influence within the movement.” Their study argues that “the Houthi movement is now more centralized and cohesive than ever, in part due to close mentoring from Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.” They conclude that “the Houthi Jihad Council is emerging as a remarkable partner for Iran and the Houthi-Iran relationship and should no longer be viewed as a relationship of necessity, but rather a strong, deep-rooted alliance that is underpinned by tight ideological affinity and geopolitical alignment. The emergence of a ‘southern Hezbollah’ is arguably now a fact on the ground.” In this month’s feature commentary, Brian Michael Jenkins thinks through what elements are necessary for a pragmatic and non-partisan strategy to counter domestic political violence. He writes that “Americans appear to reside in separate cultural and political camps. Increasing threats against public officials and displays of public hostility have prompted growing apprehension of future political violence. It is in this fragile and fraught environment that any efforts to contain politically motivated violence will have to operate.” He stresses that it is important to recognize “the limits of what law enforcement can do while addressing the greater challenge of national reconciliation.” Our interview is with Air Vice-Marshal Sean Corbett, the founder and CEO of IntSight Global, a management consultancy within the intelligence and security sector with a focus on open-source intelligence. During his 30-year service in the Royal Air Force, Air Vice-Marshal Corbett worked in key leadership roles, including as Chief of U.K. Intelligence in Afghanistan and was the first non-U.S. Deputy Director of a major U.S. intelligence agency in serving in Washington, D.C., at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Topic:
Political Violence, Violent Extremism, Geopolitics, Hezbollah, Houthis, and Command and Control
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Yemen, and Lebanon

189. February 2022 Issue

Author:
Matthew Levitt, Paul Cruickshank, Kristina Hummel, Don Rassler, Charlie Winter, and Abdullah Alrhmoun
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Notwithstanding the possibility of a deal soon being reached to revive the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran, nefarious activity by Iran continues to pose significant counterterrorism and security concerns. In this month’s feature article, Matthew Levitt examines trends in Iranian external assassination, surveillance, and abduction plots based on a dataset of 98 Iranian plots from 1979 through 2021. Levitt notes that “perhaps the most important finding to emerge from this study is the fact that Iran pursues international assassination, abduction, terror, and surveillance plots in a very aggressive fashion, even at times and in places that are particularly sensitive. With the exception of a period right after the 9/11 attacks … Iranian operatives and proxies have carried out operations even during periods of key negotiations—including current negotiations over a return to the JCPOA.” He adds: “Today, with the revolutionary leadership solidifying control over key elements of power in Iran, and with an eye toward protecting the revolution at a time when the revolutionary leadership sees increasing threat coming from elements both foreign and domestic, operations like these are likely to increase.” Our interview is with Randall Blake, who recently retired from U.S. government service after spending 35 years working in a variety of critical roles in the counterterrorism enterprise, including most recently as National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats at the National Intelligence Council. Charlie Winter and Abdullah Alrhmoun assess the trajectory in Syria of the Islamic State in the wake of its fluctuating fortunes so far this year. The group’s multi-day assault on Ghwayran prison in northeastern Syria was “by a significant margin, the highest impact and most complex operation launched by the Islamic State in Syria since its territorial defeat.” But just days later, the Islamic State’s leader, who had orchestrated the prison attack, was ‘removed from the battlefield’ during a U.S. raid. Winter and Alrhmoun’s analysis of Islamic State attack claims in Syria since the group’s territorial defeat in March 2019 “suggests Islamic State cadres in Syria may have been saving their energies to carry out a large strike, cutting through the notion that previous declines in operational activity were a sign of weakening or that the prison attack necessarily portends a resurgence.” They add: “In Syria, the Ghwayran prison attack was an example of the latent threat posed by the Islamic State exploding into view. Whatever the monthly ebb and flow of Islamic State operations in Syria, the group is likely to persist as a threat for the foreseeable future.”
Topic:
Intelligence, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Surveillance, Assassination, and Abductions
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

190. Iran Entangled: Iran and Hezbollah’s Support to Proxies Operating in Syria

Author:
Nakissa Jahanbani and Suzanne Weedon Levy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
At a time when power dynamics in the Middle East region are in flux due to the shifting circumstances of the Islamic State, the drawdown of U.S. troops in the region, and the intensification of Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. and Saudi Arabian targets in the region, an historical look at the support Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) provided to proxies during the Syrian civil war may yield insights into Iran’s past and present playbook not only in Syria but potentially other contexts. The civil war in Syria was a unique catalyst that intensified Iranian economic, political, and religious activity in the country, which was ongoing since the 1980s. During the conflict, Iran demonstrated the ability to exert influence tactically while also building a religious and social support base in Syrian society. Iran achieved these goals, in part, through raising and supporting various non-state militant groups in Syria. Drawing on open sources and interviews with subject matter experts, this report investigates the nature of Iranian and LH support to proxies operating in Syria from 2011 to 2019. While the nature of Iran’s proxy network is dynamic, it is useful to investigate the network at its peak years to understand existing and potential future structures and capabilities for Iranian external operations. This report investigates support from Iranian actors—inclusive of the IRGC and its various components, notably the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), as well as the Iranian government more generally—and LH through the lens of kinetic (e.g., joint attacks between the militias and Iranian actors and/or LH, personnel placed with militias, and training and weapons provided to militias) and non-kinetic assistance (e.g., funding, logistical support, recruitment and social service assistance, and meetings between Iranian actors and/or LH and militias). Looking at these two categories of support provides a more holistic snapshot of Iranian influence and capacity-building with proxies in Syria. The report’s findings indicate a pattern of support on the part of Iran and LH that potentially indicates a phased rollout of battlefield-related supports to be replaced with longer-term societal entrenchment efforts. Furthermore, Iran and LH share a division of labor between Iranian actors and LH for kinetic supports, but not non-kinetic ones. Specifically, this report found training, weapons provisions, funding, and joint attacks among the most common supports provided by Iran and LH. Finally, of all Iranian actors, this report found the IRGC to be the most prolific supporter to proxies operating in Syria.
Topic:
Terrorism, Weapons, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Proxy War, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Strategy, and Military Tactics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

191. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Six: Now or Never

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
After all is said and done, the Iran nuclear deal struck in 2015 remains the best way to achieve the West’s non-proliferation goals and the sanctions relief that Tehran seeks. The parties must not squander what is likely their last chance to save the accord.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

192. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

193. The Inflation Weapon: How American Sanctions Harm Iranian Households

Author:
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
This study examines the humanitarian harms of U.S. sanctions on Iranian citizens by focusing on their principal economic impact—high rates of inflation. Although nonexperimental, the study draws upon various data to present a cohesive, if not comprehensive, narrative of the economic shocks that followed the imposition of U.S. sanctions in 2012 and 2018.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

194. How Will a Revival of the JCPOA Affect Regional Politics and Iranian Militias?

Author:
Munqith Dagher
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The news about the imminent revival of the nuclear deal between the United States and Iran is heightening concerns, especially across the Middle East. The deal would involve the lifting of economic sanctions, resulting in Iran enjoying a significant flow of income. This analysis attempts to address two important questions: First, free of the U.S. sanctions, will Iran indeed decide to increase its regional influence by funding its regional militias? And second, how will Iran’s strategic direction and regional politics change in the near future? This analysis reveals that the geostrategic threats currently facing Iran as a result of its adopted hostile regional policy outweigh the gains from continuing in its current trajectory. In general, despite the long history of conflict, dispute, and mistrust, the region seems to be gearing toward an era of de-escalation. For the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to justify its continued presence, there is a need for its involvement in continuous conflicts, especially since it currently controls more than two-thirds of the Iranian economy. However, this buckling economy itself is now in dire need of renewal and revival to continue Iran’s ability to prop up the regime and all its components.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

195. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

196. Starr Forum: Republics of Myth: National Narratives and the US-Iran Conflict

Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Why does the rift between the US and Iran persist? A new book by CIS scholars sheds new light on this longstanding conflict.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

197. The Russian-Iran Partnership in a Multipolar World

Author:
Clément Therme
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The strengthening of the partnership between Russia and Iran depends on overlapping security interests; bilaterally, regionally and on the world stage. Tehran has pursued a regional policy program that is largely in line with Russia’s interests, whether these relate to Syria (from 2011), the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Afghanistan (since 1991). This security dimension was already one of the foundations of the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War-period. It has now appeared in regional dealings between Tehran and Moscow. In addition, the decline of US international predominance, which has been apparent since the 2000s, has allowed Russia and Iran to develop a shared ideological discourse in opposition to “Western values”. Beyond this shared ideological basis, Tehran has developed a true “Realpolitik” whereby it relies on Russian foreign policy to relieve US pressure on Iran that is aimed at regime change or, at the very least, a change in the behavior of the Islamic Republic. In other words, in seeking to preserve intact the main ideological tenets of its regime, Tehran has added a new dimension to its relationship with Moscow. Since 1991, this relationship has become a matter of survival for a regime that faces both popular opposition at home and external pressure from Washington: pressure that increased during the Trump administration of 2017-2021.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, and Middle East

198. Afghanistan: Where US-Iranian interests may yet intersect

Author:
Borzou Daragahi
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
A new issue brief, Afghanistan: Where US-Iranian Interests May Yet Intersect, authored by Atlantic Council senior fellow Borzou Daragahi delves into the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and how the swift collapse of the US-backed government in Kabul last summer not only shocked the United States and its allies in the 20-year struggle in that country, but also Afghanistan’s influential neighbor, Iran. As refugees continue to stream into Iran, the government in Tehran has still not recognized the Taliban regime and remains worried about a further deterioration in Afghanistan’s economy and social cohesion, as well as the growing presence of Sunni Jihadi militants. As Iran-Afghan relations evolve, will US concerns about Afghanistan’s fragile state provide a basis for tacit cooperation between Washington and Tehran, similar to what existed when the Taliban was last in power?
Topic:
Government, Taliban, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and United States of America

199. Iran: Briefing sheet

Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
Political Geography:
Iran and Islamic Republic of

200. Sino-Iranian Relations and Their Impact on South and Central Asia

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
In July 2020, a draft text of a series of Sino‑Iranian agreements outlining a comprehensive 25‑year strategic partnership between Iran and China was leaked. The leaked text accords presaged the formal accords signed in 2021 whose text has not been released. These agreements fundamentally transformed Sino‑Iranian relations and also converted the Middle East into another theater of the global Sino‑American confrontation. That latter consideration shows that the significance of these accords transcends the Middle East. Although most Western commentary naturally emphasize the Sino‑American and Middle Eastern repercussions of these accords, we cannot neglect their no less enormous impact on Central and South Asia and focus on those unduly neglected issues. China’s agreement to the terms, as leaked—$400 billion in investments in Iran over 25 years, particularly in large scale transportation energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, projects, and access to Iranian ports—signified a vast expansion of China’s policy of forming a global network of partnerships with countries wary of American dominance. Even if this is more a declaration of intent than what will actually happen, the parties’ intentions are clearly serious. The agreements also stipulated that these programs would come under the administrative rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature policy, and very much a Chinese‑directed series of projects. Commitments on this scale also clearly denote a major new strategic orientation by China and Iran. Even observers who underplay these revelations like Jonathan Fulton, a Non‑Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, concede their dramatic impact on Sino‑Iranian relations and world politics more generally. This is particularly significant as China does not cavalierly establish comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) with other states. For example, China has signed such agreements with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia—so signing one with Riyadh’s main Middle Eastern revival cannot have been a routine or impulsive decision. Neither will its impact be restricted to the Gulf and Middle East. A CSP is (or was, before the February 2022 agreement with Russia) the highest level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations. In a CSP, the partner states commit to the “full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs.” Since Beijing does not offer this level of partnership easily, as Fulton has also observed, a state receiving that status must be perceived by China as playing an important political and economic role internationally, and the bilateral relationship must already feature a high level of political trust, dense economic relations, and a strong, well‑established relationship in other areas.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia