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1. De-escalation Efforts: What Tehran wants from a prisoner swap deal with Washington?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
US National Security Council Spokesperson Adrienne Waston, in a statement on August 10, 2023, affirmed that Iran has released from prison five Americans who were detained and has placed them on house arrest. US citizens Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others were released from Tehran’s notorious Evin prison to house arrest. The US official described their release as “an encouraging step” and stressed that Washigton will continue efforts to bring them “all back home in the United States.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

3. What Losing the Iran Deal Could Mean for the Region

Author:
Seyed Hossein Mousavian
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
If President Joe Biden is seeking to restore sustainable peace and security in the region, he has to start with reviving the JCPOA
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Peace, JCPOA, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

4. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

5. Biden’s Middle East Balancing Act: Iran’s Nuclear Program and Saudi-Israeli Ties

Author:
Leon Hadar
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This summer, the Biden administration decided to negotiate a temporary deal with Iran involving the release of American prisoners held by the Islamic Republic in exchange for the release of some of the funds that were held by the United States as part of the economic sanctions on Tehran. The White House expects that this package deal will open the road to talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The outline of a deal would include a pause in the accumulation of enriched uranium and an Iranian pledge not to produce weapons-grade fissile material, in exchange for the removal of US economic sanctions. But any diplomatic deal between Washington and Tehran raises fears among two of America’s allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel, that regard Iran as an existential threat. From that perspective, a US-led process of normalizing the relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem could help contain Iran and reinforce the American pledge to strengthen the alliance with Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

6. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

7. Disarming the Bomb: Distilling the Drivers and Disincentives for Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Jonathan Lord, Arona Baigal, Hunter Streling, and Stewart Latwin
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Negotiations to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal, reached an impasse this past year. Further, Iran made parallel decisions to brutally crack down on a nationwide protest movement and to inject itself into the conflict in Ukraine by furnishing Russia with weapons. These decisions may have rendered the impasse insurmountable. U.S. President Joe Biden has not retreated from the U.S. policy that it will never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s maximalist demands at the negotiating table, along with its domestic and foreign activities, have made it politically impossible for the United States and Europe to pursue further negotiation. Further complicating the situation and perhaps rendering the JCPOA increasingly obsolete, critical provisions of the original deal will expire in 2025 and 2030.1 The United States and the international community must consider how to constrain Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent in a post-JCPOA world, in which Iran has never been closer to achieving a bomb. The CNAS Middle East Security Program designed and ran a scenario exercise in October 2022 to identify key factors that might accelerate or decelerate Iran’s nuclear program in 2024. Additionally, the exercise explored how Iran, the United States, Israel, and the Gulf nations could prioritize their own national security objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, along with the potential actions each might take to accomplish those objectives. The exercise examined two scenarios. Scenario 1 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran failed to reenter the JCPOA. Scenario 2 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran successfully renegotiated a return to compliance with the JCPOA and faced the imminent expiration of elements of the deal. Overall observations from the exercise suggest that Iran’s leadership’s primary concern is self-preservation. Pursuing a nuclear program is secondary and ultimately serves to advance the primary objective (self-preservation). U.S. policymakers face many challenges in rallying partners against Iran while prioritizing a negotiated approach to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, Deterrence, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

8. The Next Generation of Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Technical Advances, Strategic Objectives, and Potential Western Responses

Author:
Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 25, 2023, Iran’s minister of defense, Gen. Mohammad Reza Qaraei Ashtiani, unveiled the so-called fourth generation of the Khoramshahr liquid-fuel ballistic missile—aka Kheibar—amid heightened tensions with Israel and the West regarding Tehran’s nuclear program and renewed talk of preventive strikes against Iran’s key nuclear sites. Ashtiani spoke at the Hakimiyeh Aerospace Industries Organization complex, east of Tehran, against a backdrop with the new missile and a large model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. The name Kheibar comes from a fortified oasis settlement north of Medina, Saudi Arabia, inhabited by Jewish tribes before the Islamic era. In AD 628, the Jews there were defeated by Muslim armies led by Ali ibn Abi Talib, who has become a legendary figure in Shia Islam. The message to Israel implicit in the Kheibar announcement was therefore unmistakable. The Khoramshahr is Iran’s most advanced liquid-fuel ballistic missile and probably the first using storable liquid fuel, with its first version having been introduced at a military parade on September 22, 2017. The missile is believed to have much in common technically with the North Korean Hwasong-10—itself based on the retired Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Iran is thought to have received several Hwasong-10 missiles from North Korea in 2005 for reverse engineering purposes. The Khoramshahr is also Iran’s first departure from the Russian Scud and scaled Scud-generation propulsion systems.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

9. Arming the Revolution: Trends in Iranian Defense Spending, 2013–23

Author:
Henry Rome
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Islamic Republic boasts a large and expanding nuclear program, the most capable missile and drone force in the Middle East, and a broad network of proxies that threaten U.S. interests. Nevertheless, scholars have devoted little attention to a key area: Iran’s defense spending. Although the data is publicly available, tabulating it is more difficult than one might assume, and three particular hazards await: (1) conversion of Iranian rials to dollars at unrealistic rates, (2) reliance on spending plans as opposed to actual spending, and (3) undercounting. Thus, any attempt to understand Iran’s military spending must scrupulously avoid such traps. In this Policy Note, Iran expert Henry Rome offers the most detailed public accounting yet of Tehran’s recent defense spending, illustrated by charts showing domestic trends and comparisons with regional rivals. The findings show how spending surged following the 2015 nuclear deal and plummeted following the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018. They also suggest that a new nuclear accord with Washington will likely prompt another increase, demanding a broader strategy to counter Iran’s military ambitions alongside its nuclear ones.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Economy, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

10. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

11. Iranian Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine and Nuclear Options

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The current survey is an Update, rather than a comprehensive check on Iranian public attitudes. This interim report covers findings on two unfolding security challenges – Iran’s nuclear program and the war in Ukraine – and their potential interconnections.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

12. REVISITING THE EMBOLDENING POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Author:
Kyungwon Suh
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Do nuclear weapons make their possessors more aggressive? A series of high-profile aggressive actions by some nuclear-armed states appear to substantiate the argument that nuclear weapons enable aggressive behavior. Since its all-out invasion of Ukraine in February, Russia has continued to conduct brutal, coercive operations, including missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and population centers. North Korea has continued to test launch a wide array of missiles, one of which recently landed close to South Korea’s territorial waters. Policymakers also echo the view that nuclear weapons are more than simply defensive weapons. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review argues that Russian leaders have exploited their nuclear arsenal as a “shield” behind which they launched military aggression against Ukraine. When he was CIA Director, Formal Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued that Pyongyang could use nuclear weapons “beyond self-preservation.”
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Russia-Ukraine War, and Mike Pompeo
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

13. Seven Myths about the Iran Nuclear Deal

Author:
Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2015, President Barack Obama worked with three European powers, the European Union, Iran, China, and Russia to conclude the Iran nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2018, President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the deal. Instituting his policy of “maximum pressure,” Trump imposed crippling economic sanctions that punished Iran not just for its ongoing nuclear weapons program but also for, among other things, its regional aggression and support for terrorism worldwide. Earlier in 2018, Israeli agents conducted a dramatic operation in Tehran, breaking into a secret warehouse and capturing a trove of Iranian nuclear files. These documents revealed a more advanced and comprehensive nuclear weapons program than had been previously known. The nuclear archive also showed Iranian officials’ plan for concealing nuclear weapons efforts under the guise of civilian research and development, and how Iranian officials systematically deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to cooperate with IAEA inspectors to verify the peaceful nature of its program. After the Israelis shared the nuclear archive with the IAEA, its inspectors found traces of uranium at several undeclared sites. Despite being obligated to do so, Tehran has refused to explain the presence of the uranium or reveal its current location. Iran’s requirements under the NPT are wholly separate from the JCPOA, but Tehran is using the Biden administration’s profound desire to return to the nuclear deal to bring political pressure on the IAEA to close the book on Iran’s violations. A fair-minded observer of Iran’s relations with the IAEA cannot but conclude that Tehran has never wavered from its intention to build a nuclear weapons capability and that its publicly declared “civilian” nuclear activities are an effort to hide its nuclear bomb program in plain sight. From the very inception of the JCPOA, however, the deal’s supporters have spun myths that disguise these self-evident truths. After Trump left the deal, those same supporters continued to recite the old myths while adding some new ones about the purported comparative advantage of the JCPOA over maximum pressure. As President Biden prepares to bring the United States back into the JCPOA, and as the public, the press, and Congress consider the deal's terms, we identify the seven most pernicious myths and explain the reality that they seek to conceal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

14. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Six: Now or Never

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
After all is said and done, the Iran nuclear deal struck in 2015 remains the best way to achieve the West’s non-proliferation goals and the sanctions relief that Tehran seeks. The parties must not squander what is likely their last chance to save the accord.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

15. How Will a Revival of the JCPOA Affect Regional Politics and Iranian Militias?

Author:
Munqith Dagher
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The news about the imminent revival of the nuclear deal between the United States and Iran is heightening concerns, especially across the Middle East. The deal would involve the lifting of economic sanctions, resulting in Iran enjoying a significant flow of income. This analysis attempts to address two important questions: First, free of the U.S. sanctions, will Iran indeed decide to increase its regional influence by funding its regional militias? And second, how will Iran’s strategic direction and regional politics change in the near future? This analysis reveals that the geostrategic threats currently facing Iran as a result of its adopted hostile regional policy outweigh the gains from continuing in its current trajectory. In general, despite the long history of conflict, dispute, and mistrust, the region seems to be gearing toward an era of de-escalation. For the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to justify its continued presence, there is a need for its involvement in continuous conflicts, especially since it currently controls more than two-thirds of the Iranian economy. However, this buckling economy itself is now in dire need of renewal and revival to continue Iran’s ability to prop up the regime and all its components.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

16. Difficulties in the Negotiations with Iran: Implications for Israel

Author:
Eldad Shavit and Sima Shine
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The negotiations between the United States and Iran on renewing the nuclear agreement have run into serious difficulties following the opposition by the United States and the European partners to Iran's demand that the IAEA close the open files on the Iranian nuclear program before the implementation of the agreement (120 days after signing). At the same time, Iran continues to accelerate the program, including the enrichment of uranium using cascades of advanced centrifuges. Three scenarios are possible: a resolution of the crisis and achievement of an agreement; continued stagnation, i.e., lowintensity talks; or the collapse of the negotiations. The worst scenario for Israel is a continuation of the current situation, in which Iran could in a short time accumulate enough fissile material for weapons-grade enrichment for several nuclear facilities, while the temptation of a nuclear breakout increases. Thus, Israel should immediately formulate a new strategy regarding Iran. The government should conduct a discreet dialogue with the US administration and focus on proposals that seek to advance Israel’s military and strategic needs, including consolidating covert and effective cooperation with the countries of the region under the auspices of the United States.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

17. The Iranian Nuclear Program Advances, with only a Slim Chance of Restoring Nuclear Agreement

Author:
Sima Shine and Ephraim Asculai
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Although the nuclear talks in Vienna were renewed over a year ago, a return to the deal is not on the horizon, and the regime of the ayatollahs has increased the pace of its violations of the deal, which will make it even harder for the parties to reach understandings. The coming weeks will be critical, and at this point the world powers, as well as Israel, must prepare for a reality where there is no agreement, accompanied by troubling Iranian progress on its nuclear program
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

18. Stalemate in Talks with Iran on a Return to the Nuclear Agreement

Author:
Sima Shine and Eldad Shavit
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The talks in Vienna between the United States and Iran ended with the text of the agreement almost complete. Conclusion of the deal rests on political decisions in Washington and Tehran, mostly concerning the Iranian demand to remove the Revolutionary Guards from the State Department’s list of terror organizations. At this stage the chances of finalizing the deal are equal to the chances of the talks collapsing. How should Israel act at this sensitive time?
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

19. Iran's Nuclear Policy: Nature, Ambition, and Strategy

Author:
Violet B. Eneyo, Jihad Talib, Frank Mbeh Attah, and Eric Etim Offiong
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons represent the biggest danger to humanity. During the Cold War, the US and USSR provided ‘umbrella protection’ to convince allies not to acquire nuclear weapons. Most ‘newly’ independent nations never had such security during the Cold War since they were not part of a power bloc. During the Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-1988), the Islamic Republic of Iran was attacked with chemical weapons. Since Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an Iranian exile organization, exposed Iran's hidden nuclear program in 2002, the topic has gained worldwide attention. Iran's nuclear agenda has produced a worldwide catastrophe despite its NPT membership. Iran says its nuclear program is peaceful and respects Islamic values. Most US politicians and academics consider Iran a rough nation with political and strategic concerns, including regional hegemony, human rights, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and military operations beyond the border. This study examines Iran's nuclear policies to demonstrate its essence, goal, and strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Chemical Weapons, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

20. Three Presidents, Three Flawed Iran Policies, and the Path Ahead

Author:
Robert Satloff
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
News reports of a nearing breakthrough in the Iran nuclear talks will trigger sighs of relief, but the deal will likely prove disappointing on many fronts. With Russia’s horrific onslaught against Ukraine, news reports of a likely breakthrough in the Iran nuclear talks will trigger sighs of relief. But sadly, that relief will be misplaced. U.S. negotiators have already admitted that the forthcoming deal will not match the nonproliferation achievements of the 2015 agreement, and no official has even hinted that the revised text will either penalize Iran for its flagrant violation of its commitments or address the range of problems that have emerged since the original deal was reached. In this Policy Note, Washington Institute executive director Robert Satloff delivers a powerful, bipartisan critique, assessing how and why three successive American presidents started their terms with sound ideas on Iran and leverage to advance them but accepted either flawed agreements or America’s own isolation. Looking beyond a new Iran deal, he proposes an urgent agenda: scrupulous enforcement; a renewed push for a “longer, stronger” agreement; early preparation for the day after restrictions expire; close coordination with regional partners to counter Iran’s rising influence; and outreach to the Iranian people, who will see little benefit from the windfall in sanctions relief likely coming to Tehran. American leadership, determination, and resilience, he notes, will be essential.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Negotiation, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

21. Iran's Nuclear Hedging Strategy: Shaping the Islamic Republic's Proliferation Calculus

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Tehran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program may offer opportunities to stoke regime concerns about the potential costs of moving forward. Since halting its crash nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Islamic Republic has pursued a cautious hedging strategy that has enabled it to become an advanced nuclear threshold state, while also avoiding a military confrontation with the United States and Israel. Yet Iran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program in order to ease pressure—and in turn to pursue more urgent objectives—may help Washington constrain Tehran’s nuclear ambitions by amplifying its concerns about the potential risks and costs of proliferating. In this Policy Focus, military analyst Michael Eisenstadt surveys the evolution of Iran’s nuclear hedging strategy and suggests ways for the United States, along with its allies and partners, to shape the regime’s proliferation calculus with the goal of preventing an Iranian breakout and a nuclearized Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

22. Snapback Sanctions on Iran: More Bark Than Bite?

Author:
Henry Rome and Louis Dugit-Gros
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Threatening to reimpose old UN sanctions would likely have little practical effect on Tehran’s ability to trade oil and export drones, while the plethora of other potential complications suggest that it should be treated as a tool of last resort. In recent weeks, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany have argued that Iran’s sale of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine violates UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the backbone of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These allegations, combined with ongoing diplomatic deadlock over reviving that 2015 nuclear agreement, have led some to suggest pursuing “snapback,” a provision that would reimpose terminated UN resolutions on Iran and essentially scrub the JCPOA from the books. How would snapback work, and what political, economic, and security consequences would it have?
Topic:
Security, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

23. Ontological Security and Iran’s Missile Program

Author:
Ali Bagheri Dolatabadi
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
This article attempts to answer the question of why Iran is reluctant to discuss its missile program. Unlike other studies that focus on the importance of Iran’s missile program in providing deterrence for the country and establishing a balance of military power in the region, or that view the missile program as one of dozens of post-revolutionary contentious issues between Iran and the United States, this article looks into Iran’s ontological security. The paper primarily argues that the missile program has become a source of pride for Iranians, inextricably linked to their identity. As a result, the Iranian authorities face two challenges when it comes to sitting at the negotiation table with their Western counterparts: deep mistrust of the West, and the ensuing sense of shame over any deal on the missile issue. Thus, Iranian officials opted to preserve the identity components of the program, return to normal and daily routines of life, insist on the missile program’s continuation despite sanctions and threats, and emphasize the dignity and honor of having a missile program. The article empirically demonstrates how states can overcome feelings of shame and mistrust. It also theoretically proves that when physical security conflicts with ontological security, governments prefer the former over the latter, based on the history of Iran’s nuclear negotiations. They appeal to create new narratives to justify changing their previous policies.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Negotiation, and Identity
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

24. Russia’s War on Ukraine: Iran’s Growing Role and the Nuclear Threat

Author:
Alistair Taylor, Philip Breedlove, and Iulia-sabina Joja
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
In today's episode, Alistair Taylor sits down with experts from MEI's Frontier Europe Initiative to assess the trajectory of Russia's war on Ukraine. They discuss Russia’s growing attacks on critical infrastructure, its recent deployment of Iranian drones and their impact on the battlefield, the potential nuclear threat, and where things might be headed from here. Today's guests are General Philip Breedlove and Iulia-Sabina Joja. General Breedlove is a retired United States Air Force General who served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of U.S. European Command. He’s the Distinguished Chair of MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative and a Distinguished Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. Iulia is a Senior Fellow and Director of MEI's Frontier Europe Initiative and Director of its "Afghanistan Watch" project. She teaches courses on European security at Georgetown and George Washington universities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, and Eastern Europe

25. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Special Issue on Strategic Culture

Author:
Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, Evan Kerrane, Matthew Brummer, Eitan Oren, Katie C. Finlinson, Mark Briskey, Ben Connable, Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, Jeffrey Taylor, and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
An ironic feature of U.S. strategic culture is a rather distinctive disinterest in the study of our own or others’ strategic cultures. The U.S. security institutions find themselves energized about cultural study during irregular conflicts in which the cost of cultural ignorance is made plain, but they persist in under developing the ability to apply that same cultural acumen to great power conflict and key relationships with allies. During the last 100 years of fighting, U.S. defense institutions have repeated a pattern of investing in cultural study during short bursts of counterinsurgency fighting and then abandoning it along with its lessons learned at the termination of conflict. As a consequence, U.S. planning efforts—including those now being designed for future great power conflict—suffer from an unnecessarily narrow optic and fail to account for the full range of perspectives and plausible courses of action considered by an adversary. America’s allies know it and are frustrated by it. More importantly, U.S. adversaries know it and plan to exploit it. The study of strategic culture accounts for the ways in which the culture of a group, whether it be the constructed culture of a nascent terrorist organization or the enduring culture of a nation, impacts thinking and decision making regarding defensive and offensive approaches to security. Within a complex state like Russia or China, one must account for sweeping national narratives that cultivate collective mentalities and impact decision making but must also include the internal cultures of key organizations within the nation’s security community. These organizations often develop distinctive identities, values, perceptions, and habits of practice that can be consequential in moments when the organization’s leaders wield instruments of state power. In the first section of this special edition of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) on strategic culture, Drs. Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, and Major Evan Kerrane provide strategic culture profiles on key U.S. adversaries: Iran, Russia, and China. Their work reflects the complexity involved in identifying and analyzing the narratives and drivers that compete for dominance across these three strategic culture landscapes. Acquainting ourselves with the multivariate and often-contested internal constructs that produce the behavior of our adversaries helps expand our own thinking about the range of possible and plausible competitive strategies we are likely to see from them. The second section of this issue highlights the utility of understanding not only U.S. adversaries but also American allies and partners. Drs. Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren examine the effort by Japan’s military leaders to shift their own strategic culture through an influence campaign aimed at altering domestic perceptions concerning the appropriate role for the military and thereby expanding its ability to more actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Whether they are successful has direct implications for U.S. alliance constructs in the Pacific and the action that might be reasonably expected from Japan should U.S. conflict with China become kinetic. Katie C. Finlinson offers analysis that benefits U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation efforts. She employs a two-tiered research approach— leveraging both strategic culture and analysis of national role conception—as a useful framework for assessing the propensity of the United Arab Emirates to consider weaponizing civilian nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. Finlinson offers an approach repeatable for other potential over-the-horizon states and demonstrates the interplay between a state’s strategic culture and powerful exogenous factors—like security assurances from the United States and potential nuclear acquisition by Iran—in determining outcomes. Finally, Dr. Mark Briskey offers a look at the aspects of Pakistan’s strategic culture that exist as an outgrowth of its army’s most formative historic experiences and have resulted in deeply entrenched perceptions of self, of key adversaries, and perceptions of the past that must be understood by Western partners seeking Pakistan’s cooperation and partnership in the region. Our third section offers a close look at the ways in which cultural analysis can illuminate policy options on particularly difficult problem sets. One of these is assessing will to fight on the part of both allies and adversaries. Dr. Ben Connable recommends a diagnostic tool developed and trialed by the Rand Corporation that demonstrates promise in advancing the ability of defense institutions to anticipate will to fight in kinetic conflicts but also will to act in consequential ways by great powers engaged in strategic competition. Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, and Jeffrey Taylor follow with applications of the Cultural Topography Framework, an approach to cultural data assessment and application that benefits from the insights supplied by the sort of comprehensive strategic culture profiles offered in section one of this issue and translates these into actionable intelligence against discrete problem sets. Their work, respectively, illuminates policy options for containing a potentially escalatory situation in Transnistria, decreasing violence and looting through a more effective reintegration strategy for former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and reexamining the value of technological advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may be having a deleterious impact on its deterrence strategy. The special issue concludes with a review essay by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, which offers readers critical analysis of three volumes of strategic culture scholarship. The articles collected for the special issue demonstrate a range of ways in which the study of strategic culture delivers critical insights to policy planners and strategists. Understanding other great powers on their own terms—the identities they seek to establish or defend, the values that inform their policies, the norms of strategic competition or warfighting that they deem acceptable and effective, and the worldview they espouse (whether an accurate fit with objective realities or not)—prepares policy makers to craft plans and strategies in ways that are tailored for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Given the steady shutdown of cultural inquiry labs and training facilities across the U.S. defense and security community, it is worth issuing a stern reminder that the advantage of knowing one’s enemy is far more consequential when engaged in great power conflict than in the irregular conflicts in which U.S. institutions have learned its worth. This issue of JAMS is provided as a resource to both reinforce that point and supply a wealth of initial material in advancing it.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, War, History, Power Politics, Realism, Strategic Competition, Resistance, Identity, and Strategic Culture
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, Japan, Iran, Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

26. Iran talks are likely going nowhere

Author:
Alexander Grinberg
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Iran uses uranium enrichment as leverage on the EU and US to get concessions.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Uranium, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

27. The time is ripe for an Israeli-Moroccan honeymoon, though it might not last forever

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
If Israel fails to halt Iran’s nuclear progress, the pro-Israel trend in the region will disappear.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Morocco

28. Israel, the US, and the Iranian Nuclear project – back to basics

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It is not in America’s interest for Israel to be perceived as an obedient lap dog. On the contrary, keeping Israel’s options open, or even enhancing them, will ultimately prove to be of value to the US.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

29. The Nuclear Talks in Vienna: Biden’s Legacy at Stake

Author:
Eytan Gilboa
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
From Tehran’s perspective, the goals are lifting the sanctions and securing immunity from military attacks.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

30. Israel Must Actively Oppose US Return to the JCPOA

Author:
Efraim Inbar and Omer Dostri
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Even if Israel’s ability to influence US decision-making is limited, it is a serious mistake to downplay Israel’s opposition to the dangerous nuclear accord.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

31. The Road to Natanz Runs Through Beirut

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
One of the issues that must be dealt with before the Iranian nuclear program is removing the threat of Hezbollah missiles.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

32. What is Iran’s Real Goal in Nuclear Talks with the US?

Author:
Alexander Grinberg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Sanctions relief, nothing else. Iran has no intention of forsaking its nuclear and missile programs nor its proxy wars across the region.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

33. Strategic Implications of the Damage at the Natanz Enrichment Facility

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The US should be appreciative of any significant delay in Iran’s breakout timetable towards a nuclear weapon. The time gained can and should be used to negotiate a “longer, stronger” agreement.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

34. No Agreement is Better than Another Bad Agreement with Iran

Author:
Yaakov Amidror
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel-US dialogue is necessary about Iran’s nuclear program, since a good agreement with Iran is a clear Israeli interest. But Israel must be prepared with a military option against Iran, as a last resort.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

35. After Soleimani: Maintain the Pressure on Iran’s Nuclear Project

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
A firm stand at this critical juncture may prove to be of use as part of the effort to bring Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table on terms more acceptable to the US and to Trump’s regional allies, including Israel.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Denuclearization, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

36. “Maximum Pressure” Harms Diplomacy and Increases Risks of War with Iran

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
With an economy less than a third the size of the U.S. defense budget and a military ill-suited for offensive operations, Iran is at best a minor threat to the U.S., and one in a region of limited strategic importance. The U.S. need not obsess over Iran policy. While Iran does not threaten vital U.S. interests, U.S. policy does seek to moderate Iran’s behavior and restrict its nuclear weapons development. That is why the U.S. negotiated the JCPOA, an agreement with Iran, Europe’s major powers, Russia, and China to constrain Iran’s nuclear activities. The Trump administration abrogated the JCPOA and imposed a policy of “maximum pressure” designed to compel Iran to renegotiate on nuclear issues and moderate its foreign policy. Rather than capitulate to U.S. demands, Iran expanded its nuclear program and increased its aggression in the Middle East. U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and imposition of a maximum pressure strategy harmed diplomatic efforts with Iran and increased the prospects of direct conflict. The Biden administration has so far continued the policy it inherited from the Trump administration. With nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran predictably stalled, U.S. officials should abandon maximum pressure. Ongoing diplomacy is the best path to revive the JCPOA, and more importantly, lower the risks of war. Even if the JCPOA dissolves completely, U.S.-Iran diplomacy, including on nuclear issues, should continue. War with Iran is not worth the costs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

37. The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Springboard for a New Middle East Security Architecture

Author:
Nabil Fahmy
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
The Iran nuclear deal could be the first building block in a new Middle East security architecture.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

38. Solving the Nuclear Stalemate between Iran and the United States

Author:
Gawdat Bahgat
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
To reach an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and provide an effective security apparatus across the region, all Middle Eastern countries need to move beyond a zero-sum mentality.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

39. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

40. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:
John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

41. Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development Sites Requiring IAEA Inspections

Author:
David Block
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons experts David Albright and Sarah Burkhard of the Institute for Science and International Security provide a meticulously researched analysis of Iran’s nuclear development activities in their new book, Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons. Based on their rare and extensive access to 300 tons of documents in Iran’s Atomic Archives, they reveal several previously unknown aspects of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, including a unique advanced indigenous design for a nuclear weapon just 55cm in diameter requiring less than 25kg of weapons grade uranium; a crash program designed to test and complete five ballistic capable nuclear weapons; as well a substantial site infrastructure for the enrichment, fabrication, manufacturing and testing of nuclear weapons cores and triggers. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chair Rafael Grossi, in a March 23 interview with Newsweek, said Iran must come clean about past undeclared nuclear activity, including recent findings of undeclared uranium, if there is any possibility to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, or JCPOA. Grossi added that “detailed and technical discussions” are needed to address the issue of Iran’s past undeclared work — including ascertaining the location of Iran’s undeclared stockpile of enriched uranium — which the world’s nuclear watchdog explained is “totally connected” to the future of the deal. Underscoring the urgency of Grossi’s point, following the IAEA Board of Governors June 10 meeting and reports on Iran’s NPT & JCPOA non-compliance, the Group of Seven nations (G7) issued a communique reiterating a joint commitment to “ensuring that Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon…ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme…and to ensure full and timely cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The statement was met with unusual outrage and defiance by Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, who warned that Iran can expand its nuclear program “on any day, at any hour” to increase uranium enrichment beyond the current level of 63 percent, which is already sufficiently enriched to fuel a nuclear weapon. Given the importance of Iran fully addressing its undeclared nuclear activity, this table identifies the locations of Amad and post-Amad facilities in various states, including razed, shut down, repurposed, or possibly still active, which is relevant to the IAEA’s efforts to determine the origin of undeclared nuclear materials, fate of undeclared facilities and activities, the completeness of Iran’s nuclear declaration, and whether nuclear weapons efforts have ended or in fact are ongoing. Such a determination requires IAEA visits to key sites in the Amad and post-Amad programs.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

42. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Five: A Revival?

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The 2015 nuclear deal enters 2021 clinging to life, having survived the Trump administration’s withdrawal and Iran’s breaches of its commitments. When the Biden administration takes office, Washington and Tehran should move quickly and in parallel to revive the agreement on its original terms.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

43. Iran: The Riddle of Raisi

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Iran has a new president, consolidating the hardliners’ control over the centres of power. What will he do about the country’s numerous crises? One answer is clear: the 2015 nuclear deal’s fate remains the most pressing issue for Tehran and its foreign interlocutors.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

44. President Biden’s Challenges in the Middle East after Former President Trump’s successes (?). From Trump to Biden: Continuity or Discontinuity?/Los retos del presidente Biden en el Medio Oriente tras los ¿éxitos? obtenidos por el ex -presidente Trump. De Trump a Biden ¿ruptura o continuidad?

Author:
Romualdo Bermejo García
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The Middle East has recently seen a few bright spots in Arab Israeli relations, as evidenced by the wellknown Abraham Accords, led by former President Donald Trump and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. There remain, however, two major unresolved issues: one is that of Iran and the armed groups massively supported by Tehran, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and others that are beginning to have a certain relevance in both Iraq and Syria, as highlighted by international news; and the other, which is more defined, concerns the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, an aspect that is currently being addressed in the Vienna nuclear negotiations, following the Donald Trump withdrawal from the July 2015 nuclear deal. This highlights the fact that Iran has become one of the most important players in the region and Israel continues to keep a close eye on its activities, not only nuclear, but also those of the various armed groups under its economic, military and political patronage./La zona del Medio Oriente ha encontrado en los últimos tiempos unos vigorosos rayos de luz en las relaciones árabes-israelíes, como lo demuestran los ya conocidos Acuerdos de Abraham, liderados por el ya ex-presidente Donald Trump y por el también ya ex-primer ministro israelí Benjamin Netanyahu. Quedan, sin embargo, dos grandes temas muy importantes sin resolver: uno de ellos es el de Irán y los grupos armados apoyados masivamente por Teherán, como Hamás, Hezbolláh y otros que empiezan a tener una cierta relevancia tanto en Irak como en Siria, como lo pone de relieve la actualidad internacional; y el otro, que es más preciso, atañe a la cuestión del programa nuclear iraní, aspecto que se está tratando actualmente en las negociaciones nucleares de Viena, tras la retirada de los Estados Unidos del acuerdo nuclear de julio de 2015 por parte de Donald Trump. Esto pone de manifiesto que Irán se ha convertido en uno de los actores más importantes de la zona, lo que trae consigo que Israel siga vigilando de cerca sus actividades, y no solo las nucleares, sino también la de los diversos grupos armados que se encuentran bajo su patrocinio económico, militar y político.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, Hezbollah, International Court of Justice (ICJ), Donald Trump, Hamas, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

45. 2020 Country Brief: Iran

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
A nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable threat to America and our allies. But because of Donald Trump, we are closer to—not farther from—this nightmare scenario. Donald Trump chose a bellicose, chaotic, go-it-alone strategy toward Iran. He blew up the Iran Deal, the international agreement that froze Iran’s nuclear weapons program, because it was negotiated by Barack Obama. When he blew it up, our European allies were shocked—and for the first time ever, they sided with Iran to preserve the deal over the Trump Administration. And that’s what just happened again at the United Nations in August of this year. Now it will be more difficult to stop Iran’s malign activity in the future. President Obama brought international pressure to bear to force Iran into a difficult choice: they could have an economy or nuclear weapons, but not both. Iran chose an economy, and in doing so, accepted restrictions on its nuclear program and submitted to international inspections. In return, the United States, our European allies, Russia, and China began to resume economic activity with Iran. After freezing Iran’s nuclear program, the United States could have begun dealing with Iran’s other malign activity. Unfortunately, against the advice of his senior national security advisors and allies, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Deal. Then he threatened our negotiating partners with sanctions for attempting to salvage the deal. And when that didn’t work, in January, he ordered a unilateral strike to kill one of Iran’s senior military leaders, Qasem Soleimani, risking outright war. Despite all this, he signaled he was open to negotiations with Iran but has not indicated what a successful agreement would include. Trump’s chaotic, bellicose strategy has yielded no positive results. Future policymakers will need to rebuild the coalition to deal with Iran and develop a long-term strategy to get Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, end its support for terrorists, and become a responsible global player.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

46. President Biden Has Five Options for Future Negotiations with Iran

Author:
Pat Shilo and Todd Rosenblum
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
President Biden has announced plans to re-engage with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. In this paper, we briefly outline the five most likely pathways ahead, each of which has strengths and challenges: Return to the JCPOA as it was. Return to the JCPOA plus new commitments that address other security concerns with Iran. Restore the JCPOA as it was plus a set of confidence-building measures to address other security concerns. Formally link a requirement for Iran to address our other concerns as a pre-condition for further talks. Return to the pre-JCPOA Middle East, where US and allies work to rollback Iran’s nuclear program and actively deter its regional actions by confrontation, punishment, and isolating measures. Each path carries risk and opportunity for restoring American leadership in the world, and congressional Democrats should remember the perfect deal does not exist. Members of Congress would be wise to measure the next deal against the status quo ante: an unconstrained, belligerent Iran again racing to a bomb.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

47. The 7th Round of Talks: Iran’s foot-dragging over the return to nuclear talks

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
French President Emanuel Macron, on September 6, held his sec-ond official phone call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi since his ascent to presidency, to discuss the future of the Vienna talks aiming to revive the 2015 nuclear deal. Six rounds of talks have been held so far In Vienna.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

48. Iranian Illicit Procurement Scheme to Acquire Controlled Spectrometry Systems Busted

Author:
Spencer Faragasso and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
On September 9, 2021, the German Federal Prosecutors Office issued an arrest warrant for a German-Iranian citizen, Alexander J., who is accused of illegally exporting a multitude of laboratory equipment, including four spectrometers, in three separate cases, exports that appear to have also violated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).1 The total value of all the goods exported to Iran is 1.1 million euros. The defendant, Alexander J., is accused of violating the Foreign Trade Act (AWG) and Regulation (EU) No. 267/2012 of March 23, 2012, as amended in October 2015 in response to the establishment of a special Iranian procurement channel in the JCPOA, which places restrictive measures on certain Iranian entities and equipment for export (and related activities, such as brokering). In the first two cases, Alexander J. is alleged to have exported items to an Iranian national whose Iran-based companies were EU-sanctioned front companies procuring laboratory equipment for Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs at the time. Alexander J. further supplied the sanctioned entity with two spectrometers listed in Annex II of this EU regulation, which lists items that are not on the EU dual-use control list (Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009) but that could contribute to sensitive activities, including enrichment-related activities, reprocessing or heavy-water-related activities.2 These items require a license on a case-by-case basis. In addition, Alexander J. violated the regulation by providing goods to an embargoed entity. In the third case, Alexander J. exported two listed spectrometers to a different, unspecified Iranian entity, also without the required license.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Procurement
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

49. Europe Needs a Regional Strategy on Iran

Author:
Cornelius Adebahr
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The rift between Europe and the United States over Iran is deepening. To regain leverage, the Europeans should engage all eight Gulf states in talks about regional security and nonproliferation. The rift between Europe and the United States over Iran is deepening. Two years of U.S. maximum pressure on Tehran have not yielded the results Washington had hoped for, while the Europeans have failed to put up enough resistance for their transatlantic partner to change course. Worse, the U.S. policy threatens to destabilize the broader Persian Gulf, with direct consequences for Europe. To get ahead of the curve and regain leverage, the European Union (EU), its member states, and the United Kingdom have to look beyond their relations with the Islamic Republic and address wider regional security challenges. The United States’ incipient retreat as a security guarantor and Russia’s increased interest in the region make it necessary for Europe to engage beyond its borders. Despite being barely alive, the 2015 international nuclear deal with Iran offers a good starting point. The Europeans should regionalize some of the agreement’s basic provisions to include the nuclear newcomers on the Arab side of the Gulf. Doing so would advance a nonproliferation agenda that is aimed not at a single country but at the region’s broader interests. Similarly, the Europeans should engage Iran, Iraq, and the six Arab nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council in talks about regional security. Rather than suggesting an all-encompassing security framework, for which the time is not yet ripe, they should pursue a step-by-step approach aimed at codifying internationally recognized principles at the regional level.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

50. The Arms Control–Regional Security Nexus in the Middle East

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The erosion of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement poses a risk for both Middle East regional security and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it highlights the need to build a more sustainable regional foundation for conflict resolution and arms control in the Middle East. This paper argues that the arms control– regional security nexus should be better reflected in European policy. While maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and preventing further US–Iranian escalation should be the European Union’s (EU) first priority, the paper urges the EU to develop a more comprehensive approach in support of regional security, arms control and disarmament in the Middle East. In addition to resolving inconsistencies in current EU policies on regional security, arms control and arms exports to the Middle East, the EU should consider throwing its political weight behind two emerging processes that could provide a much-needed opening for regional cooperation: security dialogue in the Gulf and the annual Middle East weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone conferences at the United Nations. If it involved regional non-proliferation cooperation, the former process could also help manage the negative consequences of the potential collapse of the Iran nuclear agreement.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Middle East