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2. De-escalation Efforts: What Tehran wants from a prisoner swap deal with Washington?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- US National Security Council Spokesperson Adrienne Waston, in a statement on August 10, 2023, affirmed that Iran has released from prison five Americans who were detained and has placed them on house arrest. US citizens Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others were released from Tehran’s notorious Evin prison to house arrest. The US official described their release as “an encouraging step” and stressed that Washigton will continue efforts to bring them “all back home in the United States.”
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
3. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East
4. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?
- Author:
- Tato Kvamladze
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East
5. Biden’s Middle East Balancing Act: Iran’s Nuclear Program and Saudi-Israeli Ties
- Author:
- Leon Hadar
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- This summer, the Biden administration decided to negotiate a temporary deal with Iran involving the release of American prisoners held by the Islamic Republic in exchange for the release of some of the funds that were held by the United States as part of the economic sanctions on Tehran. The White House expects that this package deal will open the road to talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The outline of a deal would include a pause in the accumulation of enriched uranium and an Iranian pledge not to produce weapons-grade fissile material, in exchange for the removal of US economic sanctions. But any diplomatic deal between Washington and Tehran raises fears among two of America’s allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel, that regard Iran as an existential threat. From that perspective, a US-led process of normalizing the relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem could help contain Iran and reinforce the American pledge to strengthen the alliance with Saudi Arabia and Israel.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
6. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran
- Author:
- Jonathan Schachter
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
7. Disarming the Bomb: Distilling the Drivers and Disincentives for Iran's Nuclear Program
- Author:
- Jonathan Lord, Arona Baigal, Hunter Streling, and Stewart Latwin
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Negotiations to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal, reached an impasse this past year. Further, Iran made parallel decisions to brutally crack down on a nationwide protest movement and to inject itself into the conflict in Ukraine by furnishing Russia with weapons. These decisions may have rendered the impasse insurmountable. U.S. President Joe Biden has not retreated from the U.S. policy that it will never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s maximalist demands at the negotiating table, along with its domestic and foreign activities, have made it politically impossible for the United States and Europe to pursue further negotiation. Further complicating the situation and perhaps rendering the JCPOA increasingly obsolete, critical provisions of the original deal will expire in 2025 and 2030.1 The United States and the international community must consider how to constrain Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent in a post-JCPOA world, in which Iran has never been closer to achieving a bomb. The CNAS Middle East Security Program designed and ran a scenario exercise in October 2022 to identify key factors that might accelerate or decelerate Iran’s nuclear program in 2024. Additionally, the exercise explored how Iran, the United States, Israel, and the Gulf nations could prioritize their own national security objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, along with the potential actions each might take to accomplish those objectives. The exercise examined two scenarios. Scenario 1 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran failed to reenter the JCPOA. Scenario 2 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran successfully renegotiated a return to compliance with the JCPOA and faced the imminent expiration of elements of the deal. Overall observations from the exercise suggest that Iran’s leadership’s primary concern is self-preservation. Pursuing a nuclear program is secondary and ultimately serves to advance the primary objective (self-preservation). U.S. policymakers face many challenges in rallying partners against Iran while prioritizing a negotiated approach to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, Deterrence, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
8. The Next Generation of Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Technical Advances, Strategic Objectives, and Potential Western Responses
- Author:
- Farzin Nadimi
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- On May 25, 2023, Iran’s minister of defense, Gen. Mohammad Reza Qaraei Ashtiani, unveiled the so-called fourth generation of the Khoramshahr liquid-fuel ballistic missile—aka Kheibar—amid heightened tensions with Israel and the West regarding Tehran’s nuclear program and renewed talk of preventive strikes against Iran’s key nuclear sites. Ashtiani spoke at the Hakimiyeh Aerospace Industries Organization complex, east of Tehran, against a backdrop with the new missile and a large model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. The name Kheibar comes from a fortified oasis settlement north of Medina, Saudi Arabia, inhabited by Jewish tribes before the Islamic era. In AD 628, the Jews there were defeated by Muslim armies led by Ali ibn Abi Talib, who has become a legendary figure in Shia Islam. The message to Israel implicit in the Kheibar announcement was therefore unmistakable. The Khoramshahr is Iran’s most advanced liquid-fuel ballistic missile and probably the first using storable liquid fuel, with its first version having been introduced at a military parade on September 22, 2017. The missile is believed to have much in common technically with the North Korean Hwasong-10—itself based on the retired Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Iran is thought to have received several Hwasong-10 missiles from North Korea in 2005 for reverse engineering purposes. The Khoramshahr is also Iran’s first departure from the Russian Scud and scaled Scud-generation propulsion systems.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
9. Arming the Revolution: Trends in Iranian Defense Spending, 2013–23
- Author:
- Henry Rome
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The Islamic Republic boasts a large and expanding nuclear program, the most capable missile and drone force in the Middle East, and a broad network of proxies that threaten U.S. interests. Nevertheless, scholars have devoted little attention to a key area: Iran’s defense spending. Although the data is publicly available, tabulating it is more difficult than one might assume, and three particular hazards await: (1) conversion of Iranian rials to dollars at unrealistic rates, (2) reliance on spending plans as opposed to actual spending, and (3) undercounting. Thus, any attempt to understand Iran’s military spending must scrupulously avoid such traps. In this Policy Note, Iran expert Henry Rome offers the most detailed public accounting yet of Tehran’s recent defense spending, illustrated by charts showing domestic trends and comparisons with regional rivals. The findings show how spending surged following the 2015 nuclear deal and plummeted following the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018. They also suggest that a new nuclear accord with Washington will likely prompt another increase, demanding a broader strategy to counter Iran’s military ambitions alongside its nuclear ones.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Economy, Defense Spending, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
10. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy
- Author:
- Michael Singh
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
11. REVISITING THE EMBOLDENING POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- Author:
- Kyungwon Suh
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- Do nuclear weapons make their possessors more aggressive? A series of high-profile aggressive actions by some nuclear-armed states appear to substantiate the argument that nuclear weapons enable aggressive behavior. Since its all-out invasion of Ukraine in February, Russia has continued to conduct brutal, coercive operations, including missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and population centers. North Korea has continued to test launch a wide array of missiles, one of which recently landed close to South Korea’s territorial waters. Policymakers also echo the view that nuclear weapons are more than simply defensive weapons. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review argues that Russian leaders have exploited their nuclear arsenal as a “shield” behind which they launched military aggression against Ukraine. When he was CIA Director, Formal Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued that Pyongyang could use nuclear weapons “beyond self-preservation.”
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Russia-Ukraine War, and Mike Pompeo
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America
12. Seven Myths about the Iran Nuclear Deal
- Author:
- Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- In 2015, President Barack Obama worked with three European powers, the European Union, Iran, China, and Russia to conclude the Iran nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2018, President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the deal. Instituting his policy of “maximum pressure,” Trump imposed crippling economic sanctions that punished Iran not just for its ongoing nuclear weapons program but also for, among other things, its regional aggression and support for terrorism worldwide. Earlier in 2018, Israeli agents conducted a dramatic operation in Tehran, breaking into a secret warehouse and capturing a trove of Iranian nuclear files. These documents revealed a more advanced and comprehensive nuclear weapons program than had been previously known. The nuclear archive also showed Iranian officials’ plan for concealing nuclear weapons efforts under the guise of civilian research and development, and how Iranian officials systematically deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to cooperate with IAEA inspectors to verify the peaceful nature of its program. After the Israelis shared the nuclear archive with the IAEA, its inspectors found traces of uranium at several undeclared sites. Despite being obligated to do so, Tehran has refused to explain the presence of the uranium or reveal its current location. Iran’s requirements under the NPT are wholly separate from the JCPOA, but Tehran is using the Biden administration’s profound desire to return to the nuclear deal to bring political pressure on the IAEA to close the book on Iran’s violations. A fair-minded observer of Iran’s relations with the IAEA cannot but conclude that Tehran has never wavered from its intention to build a nuclear weapons capability and that its publicly declared “civilian” nuclear activities are an effort to hide its nuclear bomb program in plain sight. From the very inception of the JCPOA, however, the deal’s supporters have spun myths that disguise these self-evident truths. After Trump left the deal, those same supporters continued to recite the old myths while adding some new ones about the purported comparative advantage of the JCPOA over maximum pressure. As President Biden prepares to bring the United States back into the JCPOA, and as the public, the press, and Congress consider the deal's terms, we identify the seven most pernicious myths and explain the reality that they seek to conceal.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
13. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Six: Now or Never
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- After all is said and done, the Iran nuclear deal struck in 2015 remains the best way to achieve the West’s non-proliferation goals and the sanctions relief that Tehran seeks. The parties must not squander what is likely their last chance to save the accord.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
14. How Will a Revival of the JCPOA Affect Regional Politics and Iranian Militias?
- Author:
- Munqith Dagher
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The news about the imminent revival of the nuclear deal between the United States and Iran is heightening concerns, especially across the Middle East. The deal would involve the lifting of economic sanctions, resulting in Iran enjoying a significant flow of income. This analysis attempts to address two important questions: First, free of the U.S. sanctions, will Iran indeed decide to increase its regional influence by funding its regional militias? And second, how will Iran’s strategic direction and regional politics change in the near future? This analysis reveals that the geostrategic threats currently facing Iran as a result of its adopted hostile regional policy outweigh the gains from continuing in its current trajectory. In general, despite the long history of conflict, dispute, and mistrust, the region seems to be gearing toward an era of de-escalation. For the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to justify its continued presence, there is a need for its involvement in continuous conflicts, especially since it currently controls more than two-thirds of the Iranian economy. However, this buckling economy itself is now in dire need of renewal and revival to continue Iran’s ability to prop up the regime and all its components.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
15. Three Presidents, Three Flawed Iran Policies, and the Path Ahead
- Author:
- Robert Satloff
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- News reports of a nearing breakthrough in the Iran nuclear talks will trigger sighs of relief, but the deal will likely prove disappointing on many fronts. With Russia’s horrific onslaught against Ukraine, news reports of a likely breakthrough in the Iran nuclear talks will trigger sighs of relief. But sadly, that relief will be misplaced. U.S. negotiators have already admitted that the forthcoming deal will not match the nonproliferation achievements of the 2015 agreement, and no official has even hinted that the revised text will either penalize Iran for its flagrant violation of its commitments or address the range of problems that have emerged since the original deal was reached. In this Policy Note, Washington Institute executive director Robert Satloff delivers a powerful, bipartisan critique, assessing how and why three successive American presidents started their terms with sound ideas on Iran and leverage to advance them but accepted either flawed agreements or America’s own isolation. Looking beyond a new Iran deal, he proposes an urgent agenda: scrupulous enforcement; a renewed push for a “longer, stronger” agreement; early preparation for the day after restrictions expire; close coordination with regional partners to counter Iran’s rising influence; and outreach to the Iranian people, who will see little benefit from the windfall in sanctions relief likely coming to Tehran. American leadership, determination, and resilience, he notes, will be essential.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Negotiation, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
16. Iran's Nuclear Hedging Strategy: Shaping the Islamic Republic's Proliferation Calculus
- Author:
- Michael Eisenstadt
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Tehran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program may offer opportunities to stoke regime concerns about the potential costs of moving forward. Since halting its crash nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Islamic Republic has pursued a cautious hedging strategy that has enabled it to become an advanced nuclear threshold state, while also avoiding a military confrontation with the United States and Israel. Yet Iran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program in order to ease pressure—and in turn to pursue more urgent objectives—may help Washington constrain Tehran’s nuclear ambitions by amplifying its concerns about the potential risks and costs of proliferating. In this Policy Focus, military analyst Michael Eisenstadt surveys the evolution of Iran’s nuclear hedging strategy and suggests ways for the United States, along with its allies and partners, to shape the regime’s proliferation calculus with the goal of preventing an Iranian breakout and a nuclearized Middle East.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
17. Snapback Sanctions on Iran: More Bark Than Bite?
- Author:
- Henry Rome and Louis Dugit-Gros
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Threatening to reimpose old UN sanctions would likely have little practical effect on Tehran’s ability to trade oil and export drones, while the plethora of other potential complications suggest that it should be treated as a tool of last resort. In recent weeks, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany have argued that Iran’s sale of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine violates UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the backbone of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These allegations, combined with ongoing diplomatic deadlock over reviving that 2015 nuclear agreement, have led some to suggest pursuing “snapback,” a provision that would reimpose terminated UN resolutions on Iran and essentially scrub the JCPOA from the books. How would snapback work, and what political, economic, and security consequences would it have?
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
18. Ontological Security and Iran’s Missile Program
- Author:
- Ali Bagheri Dolatabadi
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
- Institution:
- Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
- Abstract:
- This article attempts to answer the question of why Iran is reluctant to discuss its missile program. Unlike other studies that focus on the importance of Iran’s missile program in providing deterrence for the country and establishing a balance of military power in the region, or that view the missile program as one of dozens of post-revolutionary contentious issues between Iran and the United States, this article looks into Iran’s ontological security. The paper primarily argues that the missile program has become a source of pride for Iranians, inextricably linked to their identity. As a result, the Iranian authorities face two challenges when it comes to sitting at the negotiation table with their Western counterparts: deep mistrust of the West, and the ensuing sense of shame over any deal on the missile issue. Thus, Iranian officials opted to preserve the identity components of the program, return to normal and daily routines of life, insist on the missile program’s continuation despite sanctions and threats, and emphasize the dignity and honor of having a missile program. The article empirically demonstrates how states can overcome feelings of shame and mistrust. It also theoretically proves that when physical security conflicts with ontological security, governments prefer the former over the latter, based on the history of Iran’s nuclear negotiations. They appeal to create new narratives to justify changing their previous policies.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Negotiation, and Identity
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
19. Russia’s War on Ukraine: Iran’s Growing Role and the Nuclear Threat
- Author:
- Alistair Taylor, Philip Breedlove, and Iulia-sabina Joja
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- In today's episode, Alistair Taylor sits down with experts from MEI's Frontier Europe Initiative to assess the trajectory of Russia's war on Ukraine. They discuss Russia’s growing attacks on critical infrastructure, its recent deployment of Iranian drones and their impact on the battlefield, the potential nuclear threat, and where things might be headed from here. Today's guests are General Philip Breedlove and Iulia-Sabina Joja. General Breedlove is a retired United States Air Force General who served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of U.S. European Command. He’s the Distinguished Chair of MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative and a Distinguished Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. Iulia is a Senior Fellow and Director of MEI's Frontier Europe Initiative and Director of its "Afghanistan Watch" project. She teaches courses on European security at Georgetown and George Washington universities.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, and Eastern Europe
20. Difficulties in the Negotiations with Iran: Implications for Israel
- Author:
- Eldad Shavit and Sima Shine
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The negotiations between the United States and Iran on renewing the nuclear agreement have run into serious difficulties following the opposition by the United States and the European partners to Iran's demand that the IAEA close the open files on the Iranian nuclear program before the implementation of the agreement (120 days after signing). At the same time, Iran continues to accelerate the program, including the enrichment of uranium using cascades of advanced centrifuges. Three scenarios are possible: a resolution of the crisis and achievement of an agreement; continued stagnation, i.e., lowintensity talks; or the collapse of the negotiations. The worst scenario for Israel is a continuation of the current situation, in which Iran could in a short time accumulate enough fissile material for weapons-grade enrichment for several nuclear facilities, while the temptation of a nuclear breakout increases. Thus, Israel should immediately formulate a new strategy regarding Iran. The government should conduct a discreet dialogue with the US administration and focus on proposals that seek to advance Israel’s military and strategic needs, including consolidating covert and effective cooperation with the countries of the region under the auspices of the United States.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
21. The Iranian Nuclear Program Advances, with only a Slim Chance of Restoring Nuclear Agreement
- Author:
- Sima Shine and Ephraim Asculai
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Although the nuclear talks in Vienna were renewed over a year ago, a return to the deal is not on the horizon, and the regime of the ayatollahs has increased the pace of its violations of the deal, which will make it even harder for the parties to reach understandings. The coming weeks will be critical, and at this point the world powers, as well as Israel, must prepare for a reality where there is no agreement, accompanied by troubling Iranian progress on its nuclear program
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Peace, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
22. Stalemate in Talks with Iran on a Return to the Nuclear Agreement
- Author:
- Sima Shine and Eldad Shavit
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The talks in Vienna between the United States and Iran ended with the text of the agreement almost complete. Conclusion of the deal rests on political decisions in Washington and Tehran, mostly concerning the Iranian demand to remove the Revolutionary Guards from the State Department’s list of terror organizations. At this stage the chances of finalizing the deal are equal to the chances of the talks collapsing. How should Israel act at this sensitive time?
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
23. Iran's Nuclear Policy: Nature, Ambition, and Strategy
- Author:
- Violet B. Eneyo, Jihad Talib, Frank Mbeh Attah, and Eric Etim Offiong
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
- Institution:
- Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
- Abstract:
- Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons represent the biggest danger to humanity. During the Cold War, the US and USSR provided ‘umbrella protection’ to convince allies not to acquire nuclear weapons. Most ‘newly’ independent nations never had such security during the Cold War since they were not part of a power bloc. During the Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-1988), the Islamic Republic of Iran was attacked with chemical weapons. Since Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an Iranian exile organization, exposed Iran's hidden nuclear program in 2002, the topic has gained worldwide attention. Iran's nuclear agenda has produced a worldwide catastrophe despite its NPT membership. Iran says its nuclear program is peaceful and respects Islamic values. Most US politicians and academics consider Iran a rough nation with political and strategic concerns, including regional hegemony, human rights, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and military operations beyond the border. This study examines Iran's nuclear policies to demonstrate its essence, goal, and strategy.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Chemical Weapons, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
24. Iranian Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine and Nuclear Options
- Author:
- Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- The current survey is an Update, rather than a comprehensive check on Iranian public attitudes. This interim report covers findings on two unfolding security challenges – Iran’s nuclear program and the war in Ukraine – and their potential interconnections.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East
25. “Maximum Pressure” Harms Diplomacy and Increases Risks of War with Iran
- Author:
- Daniel Depetris
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- With an economy less than a third the size of the U.S. defense budget and a military ill-suited for offensive operations, Iran is at best a minor threat to the U.S., and one in a region of limited strategic importance. The U.S. need not obsess over Iran policy. While Iran does not threaten vital U.S. interests, U.S. policy does seek to moderate Iran’s behavior and restrict its nuclear weapons development. That is why the U.S. negotiated the JCPOA, an agreement with Iran, Europe’s major powers, Russia, and China to constrain Iran’s nuclear activities. The Trump administration abrogated the JCPOA and imposed a policy of “maximum pressure” designed to compel Iran to renegotiate on nuclear issues and moderate its foreign policy. Rather than capitulate to U.S. demands, Iran expanded its nuclear program and increased its aggression in the Middle East. U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and imposition of a maximum pressure strategy harmed diplomatic efforts with Iran and increased the prospects of direct conflict. The Biden administration has so far continued the policy it inherited from the Trump administration. With nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran predictably stalled, U.S. officials should abandon maximum pressure. Ongoing diplomacy is the best path to revive the JCPOA, and more importantly, lower the risks of war. Even if the JCPOA dissolves completely, U.S.-Iran diplomacy, including on nuclear issues, should continue. War with Iran is not worth the costs.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
26. The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Springboard for a New Middle East Security Architecture
- Author:
- Nabil Fahmy
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- The Iran nuclear deal could be the first building block in a new Middle East security architecture.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
27. Solving the Nuclear Stalemate between Iran and the United States
- Author:
- Gawdat Bahgat
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- To reach an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and provide an effective security apparatus across the region, all Middle Eastern countries need to move beyond a zero-sum mentality.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
28. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons
- Author:
- Matthew Kroenig
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America
29. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration
- Author:
- John Harvey and Robert Soofer
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America
30. Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development Sites Requiring IAEA Inspections
- Author:
- David Block
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Nuclear weapons experts David Albright and Sarah Burkhard of the Institute for Science and International Security provide a meticulously researched analysis of Iran’s nuclear development activities in their new book, Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons. Based on their rare and extensive access to 300 tons of documents in Iran’s Atomic Archives, they reveal several previously unknown aspects of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, including a unique advanced indigenous design for a nuclear weapon just 55cm in diameter requiring less than 25kg of weapons grade uranium; a crash program designed to test and complete five ballistic capable nuclear weapons; as well a substantial site infrastructure for the enrichment, fabrication, manufacturing and testing of nuclear weapons cores and triggers. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chair Rafael Grossi, in a March 23 interview with Newsweek, said Iran must come clean about past undeclared nuclear activity, including recent findings of undeclared uranium, if there is any possibility to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, or JCPOA. Grossi added that “detailed and technical discussions” are needed to address the issue of Iran’s past undeclared work — including ascertaining the location of Iran’s undeclared stockpile of enriched uranium — which the world’s nuclear watchdog explained is “totally connected” to the future of the deal. Underscoring the urgency of Grossi’s point, following the IAEA Board of Governors June 10 meeting and reports on Iran’s NPT & JCPOA non-compliance, the Group of Seven nations (G7) issued a communique reiterating a joint commitment to “ensuring that Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon…ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme…and to ensure full and timely cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The statement was met with unusual outrage and defiance by Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, who warned that Iran can expand its nuclear program “on any day, at any hour” to increase uranium enrichment beyond the current level of 63 percent, which is already sufficiently enriched to fuel a nuclear weapon. Given the importance of Iran fully addressing its undeclared nuclear activity, this table identifies the locations of Amad and post-Amad facilities in various states, including razed, shut down, repurposed, or possibly still active, which is relevant to the IAEA’s efforts to determine the origin of undeclared nuclear materials, fate of undeclared facilities and activities, the completeness of Iran’s nuclear declaration, and whether nuclear weapons efforts have ended or in fact are ongoing. Such a determination requires IAEA visits to key sites in the Amad and post-Amad programs.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
31. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Five: A Revival?
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- The 2015 nuclear deal enters 2021 clinging to life, having survived the Trump administration’s withdrawal and Iran’s breaches of its commitments. When the Biden administration takes office, Washington and Tehran should move quickly and in parallel to revive the agreement on its original terms.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
32. Iran: The Riddle of Raisi
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- Iran has a new president, consolidating the hardliners’ control over the centres of power. What will he do about the country’s numerous crises? One answer is clear: the 2015 nuclear deal’s fate remains the most pressing issue for Tehran and its foreign interlocutors.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
33. President Biden’s Challenges in the Middle East after Former President Trump’s successes (?). From Trump to Biden: Continuity or Discontinuity?/Los retos del presidente Biden en el Medio Oriente tras los ¿éxitos? obtenidos por el ex -presidente Trump. De Trump a Biden ¿ruptura o continuidad?
- Author:
- Romualdo Bermejo García
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- The Middle East has recently seen a few bright spots in Arab Israeli relations, as evidenced by the wellknown Abraham Accords, led by former President Donald Trump and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. There remain, however, two major unresolved issues: one is that of Iran and the armed groups massively supported by Tehran, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and others that are beginning to have a certain relevance in both Iraq and Syria, as highlighted by international news; and the other, which is more defined, concerns the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, an aspect that is currently being addressed in the Vienna nuclear negotiations, following the Donald Trump withdrawal from the July 2015 nuclear deal. This highlights the fact that Iran has become one of the most important players in the region and Israel continues to keep a close eye on its activities, not only nuclear, but also those of the various armed groups under its economic, military and political patronage./La zona del Medio Oriente ha encontrado en los últimos tiempos unos vigorosos rayos de luz en las relaciones árabes-israelíes, como lo demuestran los ya conocidos Acuerdos de Abraham, liderados por el ya ex-presidente Donald Trump y por el también ya ex-primer ministro israelí Benjamin Netanyahu. Quedan, sin embargo, dos grandes temas muy importantes sin resolver: uno de ellos es el de Irán y los grupos armados apoyados masivamente por Teherán, como Hamás, Hezbolláh y otros que empiezan a tener una cierta relevancia tanto en Irak como en Siria, como lo pone de relieve la actualidad internacional; y el otro, que es más preciso, atañe a la cuestión del programa nuclear iraní, aspecto que se está tratando actualmente en las negociaciones nucleares de Viena, tras la retirada de los Estados Unidos del acuerdo nuclear de julio de 2015 por parte de Donald Trump. Esto pone de manifiesto que Irán se ha convertido en uno de los actores más importantes de la zona, lo que trae consigo que Israel siga vigilando de cerca sus actividades, y no solo las nucleares, sino también la de los diversos grupos armados que se encuentran bajo su patrocinio económico, militar y político.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, Hezbollah, International Court of Justice (ICJ), Donald Trump, Hamas, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
34. 2020 Country Brief: Iran
- Author:
- Third Way
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Third Way
- Abstract:
- A nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable threat to America and our allies. But because of Donald Trump, we are closer to—not farther from—this nightmare scenario. Donald Trump chose a bellicose, chaotic, go-it-alone strategy toward Iran. He blew up the Iran Deal, the international agreement that froze Iran’s nuclear weapons program, because it was negotiated by Barack Obama. When he blew it up, our European allies were shocked—and for the first time ever, they sided with Iran to preserve the deal over the Trump Administration. And that’s what just happened again at the United Nations in August of this year. Now it will be more difficult to stop Iran’s malign activity in the future. President Obama brought international pressure to bear to force Iran into a difficult choice: they could have an economy or nuclear weapons, but not both. Iran chose an economy, and in doing so, accepted restrictions on its nuclear program and submitted to international inspections. In return, the United States, our European allies, Russia, and China began to resume economic activity with Iran. After freezing Iran’s nuclear program, the United States could have begun dealing with Iran’s other malign activity. Unfortunately, against the advice of his senior national security advisors and allies, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Deal. Then he threatened our negotiating partners with sanctions for attempting to salvage the deal. And when that didn’t work, in January, he ordered a unilateral strike to kill one of Iran’s senior military leaders, Qasem Soleimani, risking outright war. Despite all this, he signaled he was open to negotiations with Iran but has not indicated what a successful agreement would include. Trump’s chaotic, bellicose strategy has yielded no positive results. Future policymakers will need to rebuild the coalition to deal with Iran and develop a long-term strategy to get Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, end its support for terrorists, and become a responsible global player.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
35. President Biden Has Five Options for Future Negotiations with Iran
- Author:
- Pat Shilo and Todd Rosenblum
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Third Way
- Abstract:
- President Biden has announced plans to re-engage with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. In this paper, we briefly outline the five most likely pathways ahead, each of which has strengths and challenges: Return to the JCPOA as it was. Return to the JCPOA plus new commitments that address other security concerns with Iran. Restore the JCPOA as it was plus a set of confidence-building measures to address other security concerns. Formally link a requirement for Iran to address our other concerns as a pre-condition for further talks. Return to the pre-JCPOA Middle East, where US and allies work to rollback Iran’s nuclear program and actively deter its regional actions by confrontation, punishment, and isolating measures. Each path carries risk and opportunity for restoring American leadership in the world, and congressional Democrats should remember the perfect deal does not exist. Members of Congress would be wise to measure the next deal against the status quo ante: an unconstrained, belligerent Iran again racing to a bomb.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
36. Iranian Illicit Procurement Scheme to Acquire Controlled Spectrometry Systems Busted
- Author:
- Spencer Faragasso and Sarah Burkhard
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- On September 9, 2021, the German Federal Prosecutors Office issued an arrest warrant for a German-Iranian citizen, Alexander J., who is accused of illegally exporting a multitude of laboratory equipment, including four spectrometers, in three separate cases, exports that appear to have also violated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).1 The total value of all the goods exported to Iran is 1.1 million euros. The defendant, Alexander J., is accused of violating the Foreign Trade Act (AWG) and Regulation (EU) No. 267/2012 of March 23, 2012, as amended in October 2015 in response to the establishment of a special Iranian procurement channel in the JCPOA, which places restrictive measures on certain Iranian entities and equipment for export (and related activities, such as brokering). In the first two cases, Alexander J. is alleged to have exported items to an Iranian national whose Iran-based companies were EU-sanctioned front companies procuring laboratory equipment for Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs at the time. Alexander J. further supplied the sanctioned entity with two spectrometers listed in Annex II of this EU regulation, which lists items that are not on the EU dual-use control list (Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009) but that could contribute to sensitive activities, including enrichment-related activities, reprocessing or heavy-water-related activities.2 These items require a license on a case-by-case basis. In addition, Alexander J. violated the regulation by providing goods to an embargoed entity. In the third case, Alexander J. exported two listed spectrometers to a different, unspecified Iranian entity, also without the required license.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Procurement
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
37. The 7th Round of Talks: Iran’s foot-dragging over the return to nuclear talks
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- French President Emanuel Macron, on September 6, held his sec-ond official phone call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi since his ascent to presidency, to discuss the future of the Vienna talks aiming to revive the 2015 nuclear deal. Six rounds of talks have been held so far In Vienna.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
38. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Special Issue on Strategic Culture
- Author:
- Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, Evan Kerrane, Matthew Brummer, Eitan Oren, Katie C. Finlinson, Mark Briskey, Ben Connable, Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, Jeffrey Taylor, and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- An ironic feature of U.S. strategic culture is a rather distinctive disinterest in the study of our own or others’ strategic cultures. The U.S. security institutions find themselves energized about cultural study during irregular conflicts in which the cost of cultural ignorance is made plain, but they persist in under developing the ability to apply that same cultural acumen to great power conflict and key relationships with allies. During the last 100 years of fighting, U.S. defense institutions have repeated a pattern of investing in cultural study during short bursts of counterinsurgency fighting and then abandoning it along with its lessons learned at the termination of conflict. As a consequence, U.S. planning efforts—including those now being designed for future great power conflict—suffer from an unnecessarily narrow optic and fail to account for the full range of perspectives and plausible courses of action considered by an adversary. America’s allies know it and are frustrated by it. More importantly, U.S. adversaries know it and plan to exploit it. The study of strategic culture accounts for the ways in which the culture of a group, whether it be the constructed culture of a nascent terrorist organization or the enduring culture of a nation, impacts thinking and decision making regarding defensive and offensive approaches to security. Within a complex state like Russia or China, one must account for sweeping national narratives that cultivate collective mentalities and impact decision making but must also include the internal cultures of key organizations within the nation’s security community. These organizations often develop distinctive identities, values, perceptions, and habits of practice that can be consequential in moments when the organization’s leaders wield instruments of state power. In the first section of this special edition of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) on strategic culture, Drs. Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, and Major Evan Kerrane provide strategic culture profiles on key U.S. adversaries: Iran, Russia, and China. Their work reflects the complexity involved in identifying and analyzing the narratives and drivers that compete for dominance across these three strategic culture landscapes. Acquainting ourselves with the multivariate and often-contested internal constructs that produce the behavior of our adversaries helps expand our own thinking about the range of possible and plausible competitive strategies we are likely to see from them. The second section of this issue highlights the utility of understanding not only U.S. adversaries but also American allies and partners. Drs. Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren examine the effort by Japan’s military leaders to shift their own strategic culture through an influence campaign aimed at altering domestic perceptions concerning the appropriate role for the military and thereby expanding its ability to more actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Whether they are successful has direct implications for U.S. alliance constructs in the Pacific and the action that might be reasonably expected from Japan should U.S. conflict with China become kinetic. Katie C. Finlinson offers analysis that benefits U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation efforts. She employs a two-tiered research approach— leveraging both strategic culture and analysis of national role conception—as a useful framework for assessing the propensity of the United Arab Emirates to consider weaponizing civilian nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. Finlinson offers an approach repeatable for other potential over-the-horizon states and demonstrates the interplay between a state’s strategic culture and powerful exogenous factors—like security assurances from the United States and potential nuclear acquisition by Iran—in determining outcomes. Finally, Dr. Mark Briskey offers a look at the aspects of Pakistan’s strategic culture that exist as an outgrowth of its army’s most formative historic experiences and have resulted in deeply entrenched perceptions of self, of key adversaries, and perceptions of the past that must be understood by Western partners seeking Pakistan’s cooperation and partnership in the region. Our third section offers a close look at the ways in which cultural analysis can illuminate policy options on particularly difficult problem sets. One of these is assessing will to fight on the part of both allies and adversaries. Dr. Ben Connable recommends a diagnostic tool developed and trialed by the Rand Corporation that demonstrates promise in advancing the ability of defense institutions to anticipate will to fight in kinetic conflicts but also will to act in consequential ways by great powers engaged in strategic competition. Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, and Jeffrey Taylor follow with applications of the Cultural Topography Framework, an approach to cultural data assessment and application that benefits from the insights supplied by the sort of comprehensive strategic culture profiles offered in section one of this issue and translates these into actionable intelligence against discrete problem sets. Their work, respectively, illuminates policy options for containing a potentially escalatory situation in Transnistria, decreasing violence and looting through a more effective reintegration strategy for former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and reexamining the value of technological advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may be having a deleterious impact on its deterrence strategy. The special issue concludes with a review essay by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, which offers readers critical analysis of three volumes of strategic culture scholarship. The articles collected for the special issue demonstrate a range of ways in which the study of strategic culture delivers critical insights to policy planners and strategists. Understanding other great powers on their own terms—the identities they seek to establish or defend, the values that inform their policies, the norms of strategic competition or warfighting that they deem acceptable and effective, and the worldview they espouse (whether an accurate fit with objective realities or not)—prepares policy makers to craft plans and strategies in ways that are tailored for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Given the steady shutdown of cultural inquiry labs and training facilities across the U.S. defense and security community, it is worth issuing a stern reminder that the advantage of knowing one’s enemy is far more consequential when engaged in great power conflict than in the irregular conflicts in which U.S. institutions have learned its worth. This issue of JAMS is provided as a resource to both reinforce that point and supply a wealth of initial material in advancing it.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, War, History, Power Politics, Realism, Strategic Competition, Resistance, Identity, and Strategic Culture
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Russia, Japan, Iran, Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America
39. Iran talks are likely going nowhere
- Author:
- Alexander Grinberg
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Iran uses uranium enrichment as leverage on the EU and US to get concessions.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Uranium, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
40. The time is ripe for an Israeli-Moroccan honeymoon, though it might not last forever
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- If Israel fails to halt Iran’s nuclear progress, the pro-Israel trend in the region will disappear.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Morocco
41. Israel, the US, and the Iranian Nuclear project – back to basics
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- It is not in America’s interest for Israel to be perceived as an obedient lap dog. On the contrary, keeping Israel’s options open, or even enhancing them, will ultimately prove to be of value to the US.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
42. The Nuclear Talks in Vienna: Biden’s Legacy at Stake
- Author:
- Eytan Gilboa
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- From Tehran’s perspective, the goals are lifting the sanctions and securing immunity from military attacks.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Leadership
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
43. Israel Must Actively Oppose US Return to the JCPOA
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar and Omer Dostri
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Even if Israel’s ability to influence US decision-making is limited, it is a serious mistake to downplay Israel’s opposition to the dangerous nuclear accord.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
44. The Road to Natanz Runs Through Beirut
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- One of the issues that must be dealt with before the Iranian nuclear program is removing the threat of Hezbollah missiles.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
45. What is Iran’s Real Goal in Nuclear Talks with the US?
- Author:
- Alexander Grinberg
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Sanctions relief, nothing else. Iran has no intention of forsaking its nuclear and missile programs nor its proxy wars across the region.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
46. Strategic Implications of the Damage at the Natanz Enrichment Facility
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The US should be appreciative of any significant delay in Iran’s breakout timetable towards a nuclear weapon. The time gained can and should be used to negotiate a “longer, stronger” agreement.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
47. No Agreement is Better than Another Bad Agreement with Iran
- Author:
- Yaakov Amidror
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel-US dialogue is necessary about Iran’s nuclear program, since a good agreement with Iran is a clear Israeli interest. But Israel must be prepared with a military option against Iran, as a last resort.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
48. After Soleimani: Maintain the Pressure on Iran’s Nuclear Project
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- A firm stand at this critical juncture may prove to be of use as part of the effort to bring Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table on terms more acceptable to the US and to Trump’s regional allies, including Israel.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Denuclearization, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
49. Europe Needs a Regional Strategy on Iran
- Author:
- Cornelius Adebahr
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The rift between Europe and the United States over Iran is deepening. To regain leverage, the Europeans should engage all eight Gulf states in talks about regional security and nonproliferation. The rift between Europe and the United States over Iran is deepening. Two years of U.S. maximum pressure on Tehran have not yielded the results Washington had hoped for, while the Europeans have failed to put up enough resistance for their transatlantic partner to change course. Worse, the U.S. policy threatens to destabilize the broader Persian Gulf, with direct consequences for Europe. To get ahead of the curve and regain leverage, the European Union (EU), its member states, and the United Kingdom have to look beyond their relations with the Islamic Republic and address wider regional security challenges. The United States’ incipient retreat as a security guarantor and Russia’s increased interest in the region make it necessary for Europe to engage beyond its borders. Despite being barely alive, the 2015 international nuclear deal with Iran offers a good starting point. The Europeans should regionalize some of the agreement’s basic provisions to include the nuclear newcomers on the Arab side of the Gulf. Doing so would advance a nonproliferation agenda that is aimed not at a single country but at the region’s broader interests. Similarly, the Europeans should engage Iran, Iraq, and the six Arab nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council in talks about regional security. Rather than suggesting an all-encompassing security framework, for which the time is not yet ripe, they should pursue a step-by-step approach aimed at codifying internationally recognized principles at the regional level.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
50. The Arms Control–Regional Security Nexus in the Middle East
- Author:
- Tytti Erästö
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The erosion of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement poses a risk for both Middle East regional security and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it highlights the need to build a more sustainable regional foundation for conflict resolution and arms control in the Middle East. This paper argues that the arms control– regional security nexus should be better reflected in European policy. While maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and preventing further US–Iranian escalation should be the European Union’s (EU) first priority, the paper urges the EU to develop a more comprehensive approach in support of regional security, arms control and disarmament in the Middle East. In addition to resolving inconsistencies in current EU policies on regional security, arms control and arms exports to the Middle East, the EU should consider throwing its political weight behind two emerging processes that could provide a much-needed opening for regional cooperation: security dialogue in the Gulf and the annual Middle East weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone conferences at the United Nations. If it involved regional non-proliferation cooperation, the former process could also help manage the negative consequences of the potential collapse of the Iran nuclear agreement.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, and Disarmament
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, and Middle East
51. Reengaging Iran: A New Strategy for the United States
- Author:
- Ilan Goldenberg, Elisa Catalano Ewers, and Kaleigh Thomas
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- It appears unlikely that Iran will engage in diplomatic negotiations with President Donald Trump’s administration before the U.S. elections. However, the international community may find Iran ready to consider a return to negotiations in 2021—regardless of the results in November—either because of Iran’s interest in engaging a Biden administration or in an effort to avoid four more years of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign. This report lays out potential options for a new U.S. administration to engage Iran in 2021. Many of the ideas also can be adapted for a second term Trump administration as described at the end of this report.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Engagement
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
52. Europe Is Creating an Opportunity for Iran Talks, and Washington Should Take It
- Author:
- Charles Thépaut and Elena DeLozier
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- By triggering the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, Britain, France, and Germany are opening diplomatic space that could help the United States and Iran return to the negotiating table. In a press conference following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, President Trump reaffirmed his administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and asked, once again, for European countries to leave the nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Tehran announced what it called a “fifth and final remedial step” away from its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In response, the British, French, and German foreign ministers stated on January 14 that they would trigger the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM). At the same time, however, the E3 clarified that they are not joining the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, which has steadily intensified ever since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018. Contrary to U.S. claims, the European decision will not immediately provoke “snapback” UN sanctions on Iran (though that scenario could unfold later if the E3 plan fails and Iran’s violations go before the UN Security Council). Instead, Europe is maintaining its evenhanded position somewhere between Washington and Tehran in order to preserve the possibility of new negotiations, on both the nuclear program and other regional issues.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
53. Dealing Preventively with NPT Withdrawal
- Author:
- Pierre Goldschmidt
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- Since it came into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has worked remarkably well to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The one major exception is North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT in 2003. Despite this track record of success, the stability of the current non-proliferation regime could be significantly undermined by further withdrawals by countries such as Iran. The right of states to withdraw from the NPT is clearly stated in the Treaty. Article X.1 provides that: “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” Since it is impossible to deny the right of states parties to withdraw from the NPT, it is all the more important to put in place appropriate preventive measures to dissuade withdrawal from the Treaty. The urgency of dealing preventively with NPT withdrawal increases as more nonnuclear-weapon states are poised to become “nuclear threshold states.”1 As the IAEA reported in 2008: “Much of the sensitive information coming from the [Abdul Qadeer Khan] network existed in electronic form, enabling easier use and dissemination. This includes information that relates to uranium centrifuge enrichment and, more disturbing, information that relates to nuclear weapon design.”2 and: “a substantial amount of sensitive information related to the fabrication of a nuclear weapon was available to members of the network."3 The widespread dissemination of this type of scientific and technical information raises the prospect that more states will acquire the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, thus increasing the
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
54. Operation “Olympic Games.” Cyber-sabotage as a tool of American intelligence aimed at counteracting the development of Iran’s nuclear programme
- Author:
- Mariusz Antoni Kamiński
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- The purpose of the article is to analyse Operation “Olympic Games” including, in particular, to indicate the political background to the activities aimed at preventing the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, and to examine the preparation and conduct of the operation, the involvement of the US and Israeli intelligence services, and the use of intelligence methods and sources. An equally important objective is to indicate the real consequences of the cyberattack with the Stuxnet virus. In the research process, a critical analysis of literature in the field of Intelligence Studies and source materials (including legal acts, strategies, reports, and other official studies of the entities forming the US Intelligence Community) was carried out. The example of Operation Olympics Games shows that complex cyber-sabotage operations resulting in the destruction of critical infrastructure on a large scale require the involvement of numerous state resources and advanced cyber activities, and the use of many different methods and intelligence sources. Thus, strong states with well-developed intelligence capabilities are much more capable of effectively using cyber-sabotage on a large scale.
- Topic:
- Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Cyberspace, and Sabotage
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
55. Pugwash Note on the Iran Nuclear Agreement and Middle Eastern Security
- Author:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Abstract:
- This is a very short note addressing the issue of the Iran nuclear agreement and pointing out some key issues that are relevant to enhancing Middle Eastern security.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
56. Iran Sanctions: The View From Iran
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- World Politics Review
- Abstract:
- The ballistic missiles that Iran fired at two military bases in Iraq housing American troops could only be the start of Tehran’s retaliation. Many observers worry that more blowback could come in the form of Iran’s favored tactic of asymmetric warfare waged through its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. This escalation did not begin with the killing of Soleimani, but in May 2018, when Trump unilaterally took the United States out of the international agreement curbing Iran’s nuclear program, known as the JCPOA, and reimposed crippling sanctions on Iran’s economy. What impact has the U.S. exit from the nuclear deal had in Iran? How has it changed the Iranian regime’s foreign policy calculations? And how have Iranian citizens reacted to Trump’s campaign of “maximum pressure” and more sanctions? This WPR report provides an essential view of events from Iran.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, and Iran
57. Between War and Peace: A Roadmap for U.S. Policy Toward Iran
- Author:
- Puneet Talwar
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The United States and Iran are at a dangerous impasse. After withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, the Trump administration embarked on a policy of “maximum pressure.” Its aim was to drive Iran to the negotiating table with the stated aim of striking a “better deal.” The policy has backfired as Iran has taken steps to reduce its breakout time to produce a nuclear weapon to just a few months and ramped up its aggressive policies in the Middle East. Hopes for diplomatic talks have faded and neither country seems willing to change course, heightening the risk of conflict. Indeed, Iran and the United States have approached the brink of war on more than one occasion in 2019 and 2020. Moreover, the United States has found itself isolated internationally, including from its closest allies. Against this backdrop, this ASPI issue paper, Between War and Peace: A Roadmap for U.S. Policy Toward Iran, examines the sources of tension in the U.S.-Iran relationship. To help clarify the policy choices, ASPI Senior Fellow Puneet Talwar lays out four alternative scenarios that could unfold in the period ahead, ranging from selective engagement to military escalation. The paper presents ten specific recommendations for U.S. policy toward Iran aimed at reviving diplomacy and lowering tensions on the nuclear issue while simultaneously challenging Iran over its destabilizing activities in the region.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, JCPOA, and Destabilization
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
58. Majority of Iranians Oppose Development of Nuclear Weapons
- Author:
- Dina Smeltz and Amir Farmanesh
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- Both the United States and Iran have been among the countries worst hit by the coronavirus, but neither country has moved away from mutual confrontation. Nationwide surveys conducted by IranPoll this winter – before the spread of the virus and before the US strike against Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani – show that although Iranians say their country should not develop nuclear weapons, they have lost confidence in the nuclear agreement and think that the P5+1 countries (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council including China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus Germany) have not lived up to their obligations. Chicago Council survey results from January 2020 show that a majority of Americans say they would favor rejoining the agreement if Iran restarts its nuclear weapons program.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Public Opinion, Disarmament, and UN Security Council
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
59. Americans Feel Less Safe after Killing of Soleimani
- Author:
- Dina Smeltz and Brendan Helm
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- On January 3, the United States launched a drone strike in Iraq that killed Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, ramping up tensions between Washington and Tehran. Results from a just-completed Chicago Council survey show that more Americans think the strike has made the United States less safe than more safe, and more name Iran as the country posing the greatest threat to the United States than any other country. If Iran restarts development toward a nuclear weapon, the US public prefers diplomacy, but more Americans now support military action against Iran.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Public Opinion, and Qassem Soleimani
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
60. The Implications of an Iran Sanctions Snapback
- Author:
- Richard Nephew
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- For several months, it has seemed likely that the Trump administration would elect to pursue the reimposition, or snapback, of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iran. For those less steeped in the terminology, the concept of sanctions “snapback” is one developed as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It refers to the ability of the United States and other partners to quickly reimpose the sanctions that were suspended as part of the quid pro quo that saw Iran accept significant restrictions and transparency requirements for its nuclear program. Conceptually, this was necessary because Iran had the ability to restart its nuclear program if the United States or others were seen as cheating on the deal. The United States and its partners needed some assurance that, if Iran were found to be cheating, they could react just as swiftly. On August 20, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo finally submitted the notification that, according to the US government, would trigger a 30-day timeline for the reimposition of these sanctions. In the US view there is now no stopping the return of the UNSC’s original Iran sanctions regime, though there may be some procedural wrangling over how and when the measures will be reimposed. It is not clear, however, whether this will be the case. A fair amount of analysis has gone into the fundamental question of whether the United States has the standing to trigger snapback, which is an issue I explored in 2019.[1] European, Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other observers argue that the United States has no such standing, because, under the terms of the UN Security Council resolution that created the snapback mechanism (UNSCR 2231), it is no longer a “participant” of the JCPOA following its withdrawal in 2018. Even former National Security Advisor John Bolton—who was in large part responsible for the US withdrawal from the JCPOA—tends to agree with this reading.[2] The Trump administration obviously disagrees. It is an important question, and one that speaks to the underlying credibility and integrity of the US snapback decision as well as its results. But, ultimately, there is no way of finding a conclusive answer. International law being what it is, there are no authoritative arbiters available to determine whether the United States or its many critics are right. Snapback is happening and will have consequences, we now need to shift to considering what comes next. I see four main outcomes that are directly relevant to this decision and the future of US sanctions policy and negotiations.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
61. Understanding Israel’s War in the ‘Grey Zone’
- Author:
- Jonathan Spyer
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel seeks to disrupt Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and to reverse the Iranian project to entrench its forces in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Regionalism
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria
62. Time for an Israeli Peace Initiative
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- To acquire greater freedom of action in dealing with Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, Israel needs to minimize tensions with the US on the Palestinian front.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America
63. To Understand Iranian Foreign Policy, Look at Iran's Politics at Home
- Author:
- Alex Vatanka
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Ambassadors Review
- Institution:
- Council of American Ambassadors
- Abstract:
- Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a cleric who will turn 80 in July 2019 and has ruled over Iran since 1989, has made a political career out of demonizing the United States. And yet, he knows full well that at some point—whether in his lifetime or after—Tehran has to turn the page and look for ways to end the bad blood that started with the birth of the Islamic Republic in 1979. But Khamenei’s efforts to make the United States a strawman are not easily undone in present-day Tehran, where anti-Americanism is the top political football, as the two main factions inside the regime—the hardliners versus the so-called reformists—battle it out for the future of Iran. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” on Iran has made it all but impossible for Khamenei to meet Washington half-way. Accordingly, the best Khamenei can do for now is to wait out the Trump White House. There will be no Khamenei-Trump summits. That much is abundantly clear if one listens to the chatter from Tehran. But the issue of possible relations with post-Trump America is still hotly contested in the Islamic Republic. In the meantime, with Trump’s re-imposition of sanctions from November 2018, Tehran’s hope in the short term is that Europe, together with Iran’s more traditional supporters in Moscow and Beijing, can give Iran enough incentive so that it can ride out the next few years as its economy comes under unprecedented pressure.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Domestic Politics
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iran, Middle East, and Israel
64. American Sanctions and European Sovereignty
- Author:
- Jean De Ruyt
- Publication Date:
- 02-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- The decision by the United States to withdraw from the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and re-impose sanctions on Iran broke an international understanding, sanctioned by a UN Security Council Resolution. However, European and other non-US companies dealing with Iran must abide by US law in order to avoid its extra- territorial effects on their US operations. Efforts are being made to help the EU keep its “sovereignty” on sanction issues when there is disagreement with the US, but until now these have not accomplished much. Therefore a new Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was launched at the end of January to ensure the continuation of some trade with Iran. But the only convincing way to allow the EU to increase its autonomy is to boost the role of the Euro in international transactions. Certainly, in today’s unpredictable world, we need more than ever to address the issue of the extraterritorial application of American sanctions – today it is Iran, what if tomorrow it is China?
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sovereignty, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and North America
65. Reviving the Security Function: EU's Path to Save the JCPOA
- Author:
- Abdolrasool Divsallar and Marc Otte
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Europe's efforts to keep the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for Iran alive hardly seem effective. On 28 June 2019, during a meeting of the Joint Commission of JCPOA, it was announced that the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) has been made operational. 1 Though it injected new hope into saving the deal, it is unlikely that in the long term INSTEX’ limited scope will meet Tehran's demands. The Middle East is going through tough times since the US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and started to exert 'maximum pressure' on Iran, prompting unparalled tensions between the two nations. Can the EU do more?
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, and Middle East
66. Preventing an Israeli-Iran War
- Author:
- Alon Ben-Meir
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- The EU is in a unique position to prevent the outbreak of a war between Israel and Iran that could engulf the Middle East in a war that no one can win.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Civil War, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America
67. Iran Looking East: An Alternative to the EU?
- Author:
- Annalisa Perteghella
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
- Abstract:
- In February 2018, anticipating the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared a policy of “preferring East over West”, thus paving the way for deeper cooperation with Asian powers such as China, Russia, and India. Differently from the “Look East” policy promoted during the presidency of Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the current Iranian strategy is not only functional to escape the US-led isolation, but it rather seems devoted to the consolidation of a block of power which can commit to security and economic schemes in alternative to the Western-dominated ones. This ISPI report aims to answer few crucial questions: Which are the major initiatives promoted within the Iran’s “Look East 2.0” strategy? To what extent will Tehran succeed in creating a solid Eastern block? What will be the influence of the wider geopolitical context? And finally, what role is left for the EU?
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Economy, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and India
68. Iranian Public Opinion under “Maximum Pressure”
- Author:
- Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in- depth surveys of Iranian public opinion on nuclear policy, regional security, economics, domestic politics, and other topics since the summer of 2014. Each survey includes a combination of trend-line questions, some going as far back as 2006, and new questions written to assess and inform current policy debates. This report covers findings from three surveys fielded in May, August, and early October 2019 to evaluate how the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign is affecting public opinion in Iran. The United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, and began re-imposing sanctions on Iran that the Obama administration had lifted under the terms of the 2015 agreement it had negotiated with Iran, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China. In the fall of 2018, it blacklisted hundreds of Iranian entities and threatened to impose secondary sanctions on anyone who did business with them. In spring of 2019, it tried to prevent Iran from getting any revenue from oil sales, its main export, by ending exemptions for key customers. In the summer of 2019, it tightened constraints on Iran’s access to the international financial system, including channels that had been used to pay for medicines and other humanitarian goods that were officially exempted from earlier sanctions. It also sanctioned Iran’s foreign minister, complicating his ability to interact with U.S. officials, experts, and media figures. The Trump administration’s stated objective is to keep imposing more sanctions until Iran acquiesces to a long list of U.S. demands articulated by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The original twelve points include the types of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program that the government rejected during previous negotiations and that the Iranian public has consistently opposed. It also includes stopping development of nuclear-capable missiles, ending support for various groups throughout the Middle East, halting cyberattacks and other threatening activities, and releasing all U.S. and allied detainees. Pompeo subsequently added other demands related to civil liberties in Iran. The Iranian public enthusiastically supported the JCPOA when it was first signed, partly due to unrealistic expectations about how much and how quickly economic benefits would materialize. After the International Atomic Energy Agency certified in January 2016 that Iran had met all of its nuclear obligations and implementation of sanctions relief began, foreign companies were slow to ramp up permissible trade with Iran or to make major investments there before they knew how the next U.S. president would view the JCPOA. By the end of the Obama administration few Iranians said that they had seen any economic benefits from the deal and most lacked confidence that the other signatories would uphold their obligations. But a solid majority of Iranians (55%) still approved of the agreement.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
69. Israel and Iran in the Age of Trump: Israeli Perspectives
- Author:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Abstract:
- On 2 March 2019 Pugwash held a roundtable in Tel Aviv in cooperation with the Israeli Pugwash Group and the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, University of Tel Aviv. More than 25 participants including former officials, academics, and members of civil society attended, including a small number from Europe, the US and Russia. Discussion broadly focused on the situation in the Middle East and the role of the United States and Russia, as well as China, and with a particular focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Many Israelis continue to have serious concerns regarding the entrenchment of Iranian influence and the extent of their force projection toward the Levant. Equally, many Israelis were keen to understand the nature of the Russian-Iranian relationship, most acutely expressed through their cooperation in Syria in recent years, and how the direction of US policy appears to be evolving in the region. In general, it was observed that the prevailing tensions in the region – with ongoing conflict in Syria and Yemen, the isolation of Qatar amongst many Arab countries, and the deepening rivalry between Iran and other countries – should be viewed through the lens of the lack of communication between officials and non-officials across the spectrum of complex issues.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North America
70. Tehran Meeting on JCPOA
- Author:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Abstract:
- On 23-24 June 2019 a delegation from Pugwash travelled to Iran to participate in a specially-arranged two-day meeting organized together with the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) in Tehran. The central focus of the discussions was the current status of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more than one year after the United States withdrew from implementing it, and the ensuing program of ever-tightening sanctions imposed by the US on Iran that has dramatically increased tension in the Middle East. The meeting also put this into context by looking at the regional situation of arms control, as well as Iran’s relations with China, Russia, the EU, and its neighbours including Afghanistan.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
71. Tehran Meeting on JCPOA
- Author:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Abstract:
- On 23-24 June 2019 a delegation from Pugwash travelled to Iran to participate in a specially-arranged two-day meeting organized together with the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) in Tehran. The central focus of the discussions was the current status of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more than one year after the United States withdrew from implementing it, and the ensuing program of ever-tightening sanctions imposed by the US on Iran that has dramatically increased tension in the Middle East. The meeting also put this into context by looking at the regional situation of arms control, as well as Iran’s relations with China, Russia, the EU, and its neighbours including Afghanistan.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, European Union, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America
72. Preemption: How Iran Is Reacting to the Warsaw Summit
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Following the announcement of hosting an international summit on February 13 and 14, 2019, Iran has launched a diplomatic offensive against Poland, where one of the conference main elements will be how to respond to the Iranian interventions in the region. In addition, Iran has also begun to take preemptive moves both to send messages to the powers concerned with the repercussions of those interventions and to tout its ability to contain the pressures of US policy. These moves include attempts to pivot to the East, particularly towards some neighboring countries, and hints at its ability to withdraw from the nuclear deal and resume its suspicious program again.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Middle East, Poland, North America, and United States of America
73. Iranian Economic Failure Spoils 40th Anniversary Celebrations
- Author:
- Yossi Mansharof
- Publication Date:
- 02-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The Iranian media claimed that millions filled the streets on the 40th anniversary of the Iranian revolution. The opposition, however says that fewer people participated. Iran’s nuclear program will not protect the regime against the people’s antipathy.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Economic Policy, and State Media
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
74. When you leave the Middle East, do it with a big bang
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 08-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- American withdrawal from the Middle East must be accompanied by steps that reduce the general impression of a weak US going home in defeat. President Trump should bomb Iran’s nuclear installations.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
75. The Iran-Israel War Is Here
- Publication Date:
- 08-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- More than a decade of civil strife has opened up the region for the escalating state-to-state conflict.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
76. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices
- Author:
- Elizabeth N. Saunders
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Security
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- When and how do domestic politics influence a state's nuclear choices? Recent scholarship on nuclear security develops many domestic-political explanations for different nuclear decisions. These explanations are partly the result of two welcome trends: first, scholars have expanded the nuclear timeline, examining state behavior before and after nuclear proliferation; and second, scholars have moved beyond blunt distinctions between democracies and autocracies to more fine-grained understandings of domestic constraints. But without linkages between them, new domestic-political findings could be dismissed as a laundry list of factors that do not explain significant variation in nuclear decisions. This review essay assesses recent research on domestic politics and nuclear security, and develops a framework that illuminates when and how domestic-political mechanisms are likely to affect nuclear choices. In contrast to most previous domestic arguments, many of the newer domestic-political mechanisms posited in the literature are in some way top-down; that is, they show leaders deliberately maintaining or loosening control over nuclear choices. Two dimensions govern the extent and nature of domestic-political influence on nuclear choices: the degree of threat uncertainty and the costs and benefits to leaders of expanding the circle of domestic actors involved in a nuclear decision. The framework developed in this review essay helps make sense of several cases explored in the recent nuclear security literature. It also has implications for understanding when and how domestic-political arguments might diverge from the predictions of security-based analyses.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Domestic Politics, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, Iran, and North Korea
77. U.S. Strategy, the JCPOA Iranian Nuclear Arms Agreement, and the Gulf: Playing the Long Game
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Few recent American foreign policy decisions have been as divisive as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear arms control agreement with Iran. Advocates of the agreement have focused far too exclusively on its potential benefits. Opponents equally exclusively on its potential faults. Both sides tend to forget that any feasible arms control agreement between what are hostile sides tends to be a set of compromises that are an extension of arms races and potential conflicts by other means. As a result, imperfect agreements with uncertain results are the rule, not the exception. President Trump has made it clear that he opposes the agreement and would like to terminate it. His dismissal of Rex Tillerson as Security of State, and his replacement by Mike Pompeo – along with his dismissal of General H.R. McMaster and replacement with John Bolton – indicate that President Trump may well seek to terminate the agreement in the near future – action which might or might not have significant bipartisan support. He faces a May 5th to decide whether to again waive economic sanction against Iran, a decision which comes up for renewal every 120 days.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel
78. Iran Sanctions at the Halfway Point
- Author:
- Sarah Ladislaw and Frank A. Verrastro
- Publication Date:
- 08-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- On May 8, President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement endorsed by Iran, the United States, France, Germany, China, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Concurrent with that action, Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2012 (NDAA) was reactivated, along with other U.S. sanctions under the Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act (IFCA), the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHRA). Departments and agencies are implementing these sanctions with 90-day and 180-day wind down periods, after which time the applicable sanctions come back into full effect.1 Since May, administration officials from several agencies have been travelling around the world to explain the rationale for the decision to pull out of the JCPOA and persuade countries to comply with the sanctions program. Earlier this week (following the end of the first 90-day wind down period), the administration announced that on August 7 sanctions would be reimposed on: Iran’s automotive sector; Activities related to the issuance of sovereign debt; Transactions related to the Iranian rial; Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals; Graphite, aluminum, steel, coal, and software used in industrial processes; The acquisition of U.S. bank notes by the government of Iran.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iran, Middle East, and Israel
79. Assessing the JCPOA from a Historical Perspective
- Author:
- Christian Koch, Marc Finaud, and Bernd W. Kubbig
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- This Policy Forum issue analyses the 2004-2006 initiative to establish a sub-regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Gulf (GWMDFZ) as a tool to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapon state. The initiative’s gradual approach which aimed at the ultimate goal of encompassing the entire Middle East (including Israel) was innovative, and the assertive role of some smaller Gulf states in expressing their security concerns/interests and verification standards that Tehran would have had to meet was unprecedented. But the entire sub-regional idea remained confined to the declaratory level. In contrast, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or greement/accord) – endangered as it currently is – struck between the E3/EU+3 and Iran exceeds some of the concerns of the earlier initiative, yet misses others. We conclude that new – and ultimately sustainable – regional forums as communication mechanisms are needed to tackle these issues without touching on the JCPOA. The challenges go beyond Iran and include the nuclear activities of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and even more so of Saudi Arabia. Our Cooperative Idea emphasises that moving beyond the purely declaratory policy of the GWMDFZ initiative could also help to overcome the current stalemate regarding a zonal disarmament arrangement for the whole Middle East/Gulf region.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations
80. Towards a Missile-Free Zone for the Middle East – Moving Beyond the Nuclear Dimension of the JCPOA
- Author:
- Marc Finaud and Bernd W. Kubbig
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- The highly controversial missile problem in the Middle East should – and can – be constructively tackled by not singling out Iran and by avoiding onesided maximalist and unrealistic demands towards Tehran. The authors aim at providing incentives for Iran to start discussion on its missile arsenal in three ways: they propose (a) applying vital elements that led to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA; (b) regionalising future talks in a triangle that includes from the beginning the missiles of Saudi Arabia and Israel; and (c) starting with modest confidence-building steps among the three major powers. Among the extra-regional players the United States continues to have a special responsibility for engaging in such a cooperative approach.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Saudi Arabia
81. Going nowhere alone: US sanctions on Iran and the afterlife of the JCPOA
- Author:
- Fridtjof Falk
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
- Institution:
- The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
- Abstract:
- On November 5th, 2018, the Trump administration re-imposed severe sanctions on Iran. These sanctions, which President Obama called the “toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government,” were lifted by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Deal. The JCPOA was signed with a view to blocking Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons, allowing international inspectors into Iran in return for sanctions relief. Withdrawing the United States (US) from the deal was a prominent promise of Donald Trump leading up to the presidential elections of 2016. In a May 2018 speech that described the deal as rooted in “fiction,” President Trump made good on his promise to leave the JCPOA and to move to unilaterally re-impose sanctions on Iran.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
82. Are Iran’s ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear capable?
- Author:
- Michael Elleman and Mark T. Fitzpatrick
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic-missile arsenal in the Middle East – could these systems one day be used to launch nuclear weapons? In a new report, IISS analysts Michael Elleman and Mark Fitzpatrick offer a detailed assessment of the design intentions behind each missile within Iran’s inventory. The result is a clear picture as to which platforms the United States and its allies should seek to remove, and which ones can be discounted. The common claim that Iran’s missile development must be stopped altogether because these systems could deliver nuclear weapons in the future rests on broad generalisations. While there is reason for concern, priority attention should be given to those missiles that might realistically be used for such a purpose, if Iran were to go down a perilous nuclear path. The international standard – but not treaty – for determining the inherent nuclear capability of missiles is the threshold developed in 1987 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to forestall exports of missile systems able to deliver a 500kg payload a distance of 300km or more. Eight of Iran’s 13 current ballistic missile systems – the largest and most diverse arsenal in the Middle East – exceed this threshold and are thus deemed to be nuclear capable. The other five, all within the Fateh-110 family of missiles, are certainly lethal, especially when shipped to Hizbullah for use against Israel, but they are clearly not intended for nuclear use. Because capability does not equal intent, the MTCR guidelines should be just the first step in an assessment of Iran’s intentions for its missiles. When the United Nations Security Council drafted a new resolution in July 2015 to accompany the Iran nuclear agreement finalised that month, an element of intent was added to previous sanctions resolution language that prohibited launches of Iranian missiles that were ‘capable of delivering nuclear weapons’. The 2015 resolution calls upon Iran not to engage in activity concerning missiles ‘designed to be’ capable of delivering nuclear weapons. What it means ‘to be designed’ is undefined. Judging intent is partly subjective, but technical clues and intelligence information can guide analysis. The soundest approach is to disaggregate Iran’s various missile systems, and to assess design intentions on the basis of the technical capabilities and lineage of the different missiles.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North America
83. America Is More Than Trump. Europe Should Defend the Iran Deal without Burning Bridges to the US
- Author:
- Thomas Gomart, Robin Niblett, Daniela Schwarzer, and Nathalie Tocci
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), will severely degrade regional and global security. His decision has increased the risk of war and a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and beyond. He has undermined attempts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons through multilateral diplomacy, as unilateral withdrawal equals non-compliance with a legally-binding UN Security Council resolution. This is a rejection of the UN as arbiter of international peace and security, as well as of international law as a lynchpin of international relations. The steps that Europeans now take will have serious consequences for their alliance with the US, for security in the Middle East, as well as for their relations vis-à-vis China, Russia and the wider world.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
84. ‘Fix it or Nix it’ is the Wrong Approach
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- What needs “nixing” is not the JCPOA – a piece of paper – but the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
85. Iran Nuclear Deal Procurement Channel Update: Is it being bypassed?
- Author:
- David Albright and Andrea Stricker
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Science and International Security
- Abstract:
- The procurement channel set up under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, appears to be considering fewer proposals than expected and is altogether unused by a traditionally illicit conduit to Iran’s nuclear, missile, and non-nuclear programs, namely China. The procurement channel was designed to regulate Iran’s imports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods for nuclear or non-nuclear use. Given that Iran’s non-nuclear industries have often imported nuclear dual-use goods, this finding raises the question of whether the procurement channel, and its associated Procurement Working Group (PWG), is simply not being used, but illicit, nuclear dual-use supplies are still going to Iran. Although no evidence has emerged of banned sales going from the United States, Europe, or Japan, which have often been targets of Iranian illicit procurement networks, there is concern that banned sales could be going from parts of Asia. In particular, Chinese entities may be continuing to make sales of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran without using the channel. The United States and its allies should augment efforts to detect and intercept the flow of any strategic goods from China to Iran and from other potentially illicit supplier countries to Iran. China needs to reach out to suppliers or distributors of dual-use goods operating on its territory and ensure that they are informed about China’s export control laws and PWG requirements governing the sale of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran’s industries, whether they be nuclear or non-nuclear.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
86. What is new in the Iran Nuclear Archive?
- Author:
- David Albright
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Science and International Security
- Abstract:
- The Nuclear Archive seized by Israel in Iran contains much new information not previously available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or Western governments about Iran’s past work on nuclear weapons under the so-called AMAD project. I have reviewed much of the information gathered by the IAEA about Iran’s past nuclear weapons programs and it is compelling, but this information has many gaps and is unable to allow for conclusions about the current program and its intentions. The archive fills in many of these holes, and overall, according to the Israelis, it presents a relatively complete and alarming picture of Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, and in far more detailed than previously available.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
87. Curbing Moderates: Will the Sanctions Revive the Role of “Shadow Institutions” in Iran?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- As the second batch of US sanctions, which are set to focus on oil exports, approaches, the government of President Hassan Rouhani are taking proactive measures to ease the sanctions that coincide with the spiraling internal protests due to the failure of handling various crises affecting living conditions. However, many obstacles continue to undercut the ability of government to pass its plans to cope with the sanctions, most notably the regime’s attempts to revive the roles of certain institutions that have oversight powers over government programs, such as the Expediency Council, and to continue questioning the ministers, such as the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance on some security and cultural issues.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Donald Trump, Hassan Rouhani, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC)
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
88. Limited Impact: European Moves to Dodge US sanctions on Iran
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- The European Union seeks to continue its economic relations with Iran under the nuclear deal, despite the US withdrawal from the deal on May 8 and the imposition of new economic sanctions against Iran. Accordingly, the EU has adopted, over the past months, countermeasures to protect its economic interests with Iran and to sidestep US sanctions. The most important of these measures is introducing the “Special Purpose Vehicle” and reviving the “Blocking Statute”, as well as allowing the European Investment Bank (EIB) to work in the Iranian market. However, these mechanisms seem to have little impact due to the reluctance of the European companies and institutions themselves to continue to deal with Iran for fear of US sanctions.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, European Union, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
89. The Benefit of Exposing the Iranian Nuclear Archive
- Author:
- Shmuel Even
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Israel’s exposure of the Iranian nuclear archive was an impressive and professional operation. It was meant to help prepare public opinion for President Trump’s statement and to make it more difficult for the other leaders who are party to the agreement and who are in no hurry to enter into a confrontation with Iran. In light of the importance of the great threat that Iran poses to Israel, the exposure operation was a vital step in a long struggle. The alternative of not exposing the material would have meant giving up the chance of using the information to create cognitive value and leaving it in the archives of the intelligence community.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iran, Middle East, and North America
90. The European Union after the United States Withdrawal from the JCPOA
- Author:
- Shimon Stein
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- President Trump’s announcement that the United States would withdraw from the JCPOA is the most recent development in a series of unilateral decisions by the administration that have thrown relations between the US and its European allies into a crisis. In the short term, Germany, France, and Britain, like the European Union as a whole, will need to confront their relations with Iran vis-à-vis the nuclear deal against the background of the American withdrawal, and in the long term, their future relations with the United States. Indeed, the crisis stemming from the agreement with Iran is a symptom of the fundamental disagreement that has characterized US-Europe relations since President Trump entered the White House, which reflects only limited commitment by the US to multilateral frameworks. Still, Europe’s dependence on the United States in the realm of security and economics is significant, and it has no potential alternative in the foreseeable future. As for Israel, even if many members of the European Union understand Israel’s need to contend with the threats posed by Iran, the EU is not party to the opposition of Prime Minister Netanyahu to the nuclear deal. It is therefore still unclear how Europe will respond to Israel’s position, which encouraged a situation whereby the deal that the Europeans regarded as an achievement of recent European foreign policy, and as a tool for achieving stability in the Middle East, will be erased.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, European Union, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, North America, and Israel
91. The missing piece of the puzzle
- Author:
- Yaakov Amidror
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Given the bad nuclear deal signed with Iran, Israel must be diligent about risk management; no matter how relentless intelligence gathering efforts are, not all threats can be countered. Israel will not allow enemy states to go nuclear.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
92. Global tensions: No end in sight
- Author:
- Yaakov Amidror
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- With global tensions on the rise, Israel could find itself alone, both in the struggle to prevent a nuclear Iran and in trying to contain Iran’s actions in Syria.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria
93. Trump’s Promo?
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The American-British-French strike in Syria should be seen as an exercise in building Western deterrence and creditability in advance of the decision expected next month regarding the nuclear deal with Iran
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Britain, Europe, Iran, Middle East, France, Syria, North America, and United States of America
94. The depth of Iran’s deception
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Many criticized Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s unveiling of a secret Iranian nuclear archive as “nothing new” and “a performance.” But there was plenty new in his presentation, and it will have far-reaching implications.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
95. Trump Changes the Discourse
- Author:
- David M. Weinberg
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The broader context to US President Trump’s recent decisions to nix the nuclear deal with Iran and to move the US embassy to Jerusalem is restoration of America’s credibility as a world power after eight years of diffident presidential leadership.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Leadership
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
96. US-Saudi Agreement to Increase Oil Production – Another Step towards Toppling the Iranian Regime
- Author:
- Omer Dostri
- Publication Date:
- 08-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The recent agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia to increase oil production is a significant blow to Iran. America seeks either regime change or a new nuclear deal on better terms.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Oil
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America
97. Nowhere, No-Time Supervision of Iran
- Author:
- David M. Weinberg
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel must continue to take the offensive against Iran’s nuclear program, without reliance on international inspectors.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
98. Trump’s Withdrawal from Syria: Not Unexpected and a Victory for the “Astana Three”
- Author:
- Joshua Krasna
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The possibility that Iran and Turkey will be emboldened by the American decision, is worrisome. The main counter to that will be robust deterrence from Israel, whose maintenance may increase the likeliness of escalation in Syria and Lebanon, and even more resort to the restraining hand of Russia.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America
99. The Red Star and the Crescent: China and the Middle East
- Author:
- Center for International and Regional Studies
- Publication Date:
- 01-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University in Qatar
- Abstract:
- The Red Star and the Crescent (Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2018) provides an in-depth and multi-disciplinary analysis of the evolving relationship between China and the Middle East. Despite its increasing importance, very few studies have examined this dynamic, deepening, and multi-faceted nexus. James Reardon-Anderson has sought to fill this critical gap. The volume examines the ‘big picture’ of international relations, then zooms in on case studies and probes the underlying domestic factors on each side. Reardon-Anderson tackles topics as diverse as China’s security strategy in the Middle East, its military relations with the states of the region, its role in the Iran nuclear negotiations, the Uyghur question, and the significance and consequences of the Silk Road strategy.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia
100. India: Policy Implications for the United States
- Author:
- Jon P. Dorschner
- Publication Date:
- 10-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- India has long been obsessed with its rivalry with Pakistan, and for many years India viewed Pakistan as its principal security threat. Pakistan continues to support terrorist attacks directed against India and India-controlled Kashmir, and is continually increasing its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems for nuclear warheads. Despite this, Indians have come to feel more self-assured and no longer see Pakistan as the country’s principal security threat.China now occupies this position. India no longer views itself simply as the predominant regional power in South Asia, but as an aspiring world power and is gearing up for what many in India believe is an inevitable conflict with its neighbor the Peoples Republic of China. India has embarked on an outreach program to solidify friendly ties to other Asian nations that feel threatened by China, and is devoting a lot of attention to the ASEAN states (particularly Viet Nam), Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. There is increasing speculation that this relationship could develop into a formal alliance, especially if the United States becomes less active in Asia.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Territorial Disputes, Economy, Trump, and Borders
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, India, North Korea, Kashmir, and United States of America
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