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Begin New Search Political Geography Global Focus Publication Year within 5 Years

651. Digital resilience beyond data localisation: National approaches to global challenges

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Data localisation refers to the technologies and policies aimed at ensuring localised data hosting and localised data routing instead of utilising offshore server and processing centres. Data localisation is often suggested as a solution to global challenges stemming from the increasing dependence of societies on data and digital technologies, as well as the fear of an external actor leveraging this dependence for power political purposes. Data localisation does not, however, reduce key technological dependencies. The goal of digital resilience should be to ensure the security and continuity of data and infrastructure software, and to secure access to critical digital services irrespective of their location. Instead of data localisation measures, international cooperation should be deepened and digital traffic should have overseeing systems similar to those that have been in place for land, air, and maritime traffic for decades. EU member states would benefit greatly from the creation of a unified auditing and standardisation process within the European single market. At the same time, tighter ties with US digital service providers would improve digital resilience.
Topic:
Local, Resilience, Data, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

652. Large-Scale Land Deals and Social Conflict: Evidence and Policy Implications

Author:
Alexander De Juan, Daniel Geissel, Jann Lay, and Rebecca Lohmann
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
How do large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) increase the risk of conflict, and what kind of policies can mitigate this effect? We address these questions with a systematic and poli-cy-oriented synthesis of prior research. First, we suggest a simple conceptual framework linking LSLAs to social conflict through relative deprivation. Second, we present empirical evidence on the associations between land investments and social conflict, drawing on pre-existing quantitative and qualitative studies as well as on own descriptive analyses and case studies. Taken together, this evidence suggests that conflicts accompany a sub-stantive share of LSLAs (10 to 20 percent). Specifically, contentious dynamics often start with violations of community interests, which spur largely peaceful community protests that trigger coercion and violence at the hands of armed actors associated with national governments and investors. Third, we develop a set of policy recommendations in high-lighting the need for thorough regulatory frameworks, meaningful consultation, and full transparency.
Topic:
Reform, Regulation, Conflict, Transparency, Land, and Community
Political Geography:
Global Focus

653. Sustaining Civic Space in Times of COVID-19: Global Trends

Author:
Jasmin Lorch, Monika Onken, and Janjira Sombatpoonsiri
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
In this paper we challenge the conventional wisdom that COVID-19 and related legal restrictions invariably reinforce a global trend of shrinking civic space. We argue that the legal guarantee of civil liberties is not the sole factor configuring civic space. Instead, civic space is best understood as being configured by three interacting components: 1) the legal guarantee (or restriction) of civil liberties, that is, rights-based space; 2) socio-economic needs that configure needs-induced space; and, 3) civil society activism. During the pandemic needs-induced space for civil society has emerged both from the health crisis and because restrictive government responses have had severe socio-economic side effects on people’s livelihoods. These socio-economic conditions, along with civic discontent over restrictions on civil liberties, have driven civil society engagement in the form of both relief and advocacy/protest activism. Along with the structural condition of needs-induced space, this civil society activism has worked to sustain civic space.
Topic:
Civil Society, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Lockdown Policies
Political Geography:
Global Focus

654. The return of inflation: Can we protect real incomes?

Author:
Manos Matsaganis and Sotiria Theodoropoulou
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
High inflation, virtually unknown in advanced economies since the 1980s, has made a comeback. In this policy paper, we first explain where inflation comes from, and describe how the policy context for dealing with it was shaped after Keynesian demand management proved unable to defeat stagflation. We then critically examine the various policy options. Generally speaking, policy makers may attempt to (i) contain inflation by raising interest rates or, more directly, by controlling prices, (ii) alleviate the impact of inflation on household budgets through price subsidies or income transfers, and (iii) protect workers’ real incomes via wage indexation and social pacts. We conclude by assessing the merits, costs, and distributional implications of each option in turn.
Topic:
Economy, Inflation, and Income
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

655. Policy Options for an Equitable Re-globalization

Author:
Constantine Michalopoulos
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Developing countries made impressive gains in reducing poverty and global income inequality in the past half century, many riding the wave of globalization. But the dozen years that followed the 2008 financial crisis witnessed a deterioration of global commitments to a more equitable economic order made in the early years of the 21st century. The pandemic undermined development prospects, intensified pre-existing anti-globalization sentiments, and raised questions about the effectiveness of the international institutions within which developing countries achieved great progress. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine created a major geopolitical split and contributed to large increases in energy and food prices with disastrous results for developing countries, many of which were just recovering from the increased poverty created by the pandemic. This paper sets out an agenda for what I call a more equitable re-globalization. This has several parts: addressing climate change, providing economic assistance to help reduce poverty in low income countries, strengthening the social safety net, limiting the power of MNCs, and reestablishing an effective multilateral trading system. The potential calamities of future pandemics and the threats posed by climate change require countries to submerge narrow national political objectives and develop a collaborative global multilateral approach. The last part of the paper discusses the steps the international community must take to revitalize multilateralism to enable it to cope with global challenges effectively and equitably.
Topic:
Globalization, Poverty, Income Inequality, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

656. Artificial Intelligence and Arms Control

Author:
Paul Scharre and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) pose immense opportunity for militaries around the world. With this rising potential for AI-enabled military systems, some activists are sounding the alarm, calling for restrictions or outright bans on some AI-enabled weapon systems.1 Conversely, skeptics of AI arms control argue that as a general-purpose technology developed in the civilian context, AI will be exceptionally hard to control.2 AI is an enabling technology with countless nonmilitary applications; this factor differentiates it from many other military technologies, such as landmines or missiles.3 Because of its widespread availability, an absolute ban on all military applications of AI is likely infeasible. There is, however, a potential for prohibiting or regulating specific use cases. The international community has, at times, banned or regulated weapons with varying degrees of success. In some cases, such as the ban on permanently blinding lasers, arms control has worked remarkably well to date. In other cases, however, such as attempted limits on unrestricted submarine warfare or aerial bombardment of cities, states failed to achieve lasting restraint in war. States’ motivations for controlling or regulating weapons vary. States may seek to limit the diffusion of a weapon that is particularly disruptive to political or social stability, contributes to excessive civilian casualties, or causes inhumane injury to combatants. This paper examines the potential for arms control for military applications of AI by exploring historical cases of attempted arms control, analyzing both successes and failures. The first part of the paper explores existing academic literature related to why some arms control measures succeed while others fail. The paper then proposes several criteria that influence the success of arms control.4 Finally, it analyzes the potential for AI arms control and suggests next steps for policymakers. Detailed historical cases of attempted arms control—from ancient prohibitions to modern agreements—can be found in appendix A in the pdf available for download. For a summary table of historical attempts at arms control, see appendix B. History teaches us that policymakers, scholars, and members of civil society can take concrete steps today to improve the chances of successful AI arms control in the future. These include taking policy actions to shape the way the technology evolves and increasing dialogue at all levels to better understand how AI applications may be used in warfare. Any AI arms control will be challenging. There may be cases, however, where arms control is possible under the right conditions, and small steps today could help lay the groundwork for future successes.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Artificial Intelligence, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

657. Risk-Limiting Audits: A Guide for Election Observation Efforts

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
The risk-limiting audit (RLA) is a statistical technique for limiting the risk of certifying an incorrect election outcome — that is, the risk that the apparent winner did not in fact receive the most votes. A random sample of paper ballots is visually checked by auditors, and the results are compared with the outcome reported by the tabulator/scanner equipment. If there is sufficiently strong statistical evidence based on this sample that the reported outcome was correct, the audit stops and the tabulated result is confirmed. If evidence from the sample is inconclusive, another sample is drawn, potentially progressing all the way to a full hand recount. The RLA thus either confirms the reported outcome or corrects it.
Topic:
Elections, Election watch, Election Observation, and Audit
Political Geography:
Global Focus

658. May 2022 Issue

Author:
Gary A. Ackerman, Zachary Kallenborn, Philipp C. Bleek, Paul Cruickshank, Audrey Kurth Cronin, and Jaime Yassif
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
With more than a million Americans dead from COVID-19 and the pandemic associated directly or indirectly with around 15 million deaths globally by the end of 2021 according to World Health Organization estimates, it is essential to reassess the global biological threat landscape, including the possibility that bioterrorists or other bad actors might seek to exploit advances in biotechnology to engineer a future pandemic. In a joint effort, the Combating Terrorism Center and the Department of Chemistry and Life Science at West Point have assembled some of the best and brightest thinkers in the counterterrorism, policy, and scientific communities around the world for their perspectives and analysis on the evolution of the biological threat picture. The result is a two-volume set of special issues, with the second volume being published this month. In the feature article, Gary Ackerman, Zachary Kallenborn, and Philipp Bleek present a bioterrorism classification schema to evaluate the pandemic’s impact on bioterrorism. They assess that “when it comes to bioterrorism, the pandemic probably has not moved the needle much. Although COVID-19 might encourage apocalyptic cults, some radical environmentalists, some extreme right-wing groups, and some Islamist extremist groups toward biological weapons, most other terrorist groups are more likely to be discouraged. The pandemic has bolstered some terrorists’ bio-related capabilities but in at most modest ways. At the same time, lessons from the COVID-19 experience may both help reduce the consequences of a future attack and heighten perceptions of bioterrorism risk.” Our interview is with Shmuel Shapira, who served as Director General of the Israel Institute for Biological Research between 2013 and 2021. Audrey Kurth Cronin argues that “the most significant new risks of [biological] attacks come largely from insider threats by knowledgeable scientists with questionable motives, proxy actors backed by adversarial states, or even those experimenting with new biotechnologies irresponsibly.” She writes that “the old threats of bioterrorism remain, but they are joined by new ones that are falling between the seams of biology and other disciplines, especially engineering, data science, and computer science, and especially at the intersection between molecular biology and artificial intelligence.” Jaime Yassif argues it is vital to “take action to safeguard the life sciences to prevent biotechnology catastrophe, in addition to bolstering law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to more effectively anticipate and prevent bioterrorism and other biological threats.” She writes: “In biosecurity, there is no single solution or intervention that can eliminate all risk. That is why a layered defense is needed, in which multiple interventions in aggregate add up to substantial risk reduction.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Counter-terrorism, COVID-19, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Global Focus

659. April 2022 Issue

Author:
Stephen Hummel, F. John Burpo, Jeremy Hershfield, Andrew Kick, and Kevin J. O'Donovan
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has claimed nearly one million American lives. It has upended many more and produced disastrous consequences around the world. But it could have been even more catastrophic had Western nations and companies not developed highly effective vaccines. As the world hopefully begins to emerge from the pandemic, it is important to reassess the global biological threat landscape, including the possibility that bioterrorists or other bad actors might seek to exploit advances in biotechnology to engineer a future pandemic. In a joint effort, the Combating Terrorism Center and the Department of Chemistry and Life Science at West Point have assembled some of the best and brightest thinkers in the counterterrorism, policy, and scientific communities around the world for their perspectives and analysis on the evolution of the biological threat picture. The result is a two-volume set of special issues, with the second volume being published next month. The feature article of this volume anticipates how bioterrorists may exploit tunable viral agents in a new age of bioterrorism. The article is authored by Major Stephen Hummel and Colonel F. John Burpo with Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Hershfield, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Kick, Kevin O’Donovan, and Colonel Jason Barnhill. They write: “Components of a disease such as transmissibility, lethality, and the infectious window can potentially be modified for desired tactical, operational, or strategic effects. While this capability is currently beyond the skills and knowledge of the biology enthusiast, a trained individual would possess such skills and knowledge, though they may lack the necessary material and infrastructure support. Hence, it is necessary to develop and maintain capabilities that can respond to a variety of pathogens and possible effects.” This issue features an interview with Lawrence Kerr, who until his retirement from government service earlier this year was the Director of the Office of Pandemics and Emerging Threats in the Office of Global Affairs at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. We also interview Brad Ringeisen, the Executive Director of the Innovative Genomics Institute. Before his retirement from government service in July 2020, Dr. Ringeisen served as the Director of the Biological Technologies Office at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Filippa Lentzos, Gregory Koblentz, and Joseph Rodgers argue “the biological risk landscape is rapidly evolving and presents significant new challenges to preventing the accidental, reckless, or malicious misuse of biology. At the same time, oversight systems to ensure that life sciences research is conducted safely, securely, and responsibly are falling behind. An urgent overhaul to realign biorisk management with contemporary risks is needed.”
Topic:
Health, Counter-terrorism, Risk, Pandemic, and Bioterrorism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

660. They melted down our tanks, we are creating the strongest power in the region – militarist narratives serving the purpose of state capturing

Author:
Luka Steric
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In this publication, BCSP researcher Luka Šterić analyzes how are the militarist narratives used for the legitimising in public the capturing of the state. Defence system capturing is done in various ways. The authorities are using the procurement of armament from different parties to achieve foreign policy goals in order to reduce the external pressure on the authoritarian regime. Insisting on military neutrality and foreign policy balancing, Serbia is trying to keep access to both the Eastern and Western armament markets. Also, through non-transparent contracts, individuals and companies close to the government opulently profit at the expense of the military industry, as well as through exporting weapons oftentimes conducted in contravention of both domestic and international law and norms. However, the focus of this analysis shall be on the militarist narratives constructed by the authorities to legitimise in public the capturing of the state and its defence system. In this publication, we shall present three major militarist narratives used by the authorities to capture the state: the narrative of the personal power of the “commander-in-chief“, the narrative of non-transparent armament in order to defend the country from the external enemy and the narrative of discrediting criticism and political opponents on topics of defence. The narrative of efficient personal power in the defence system has got a dual function. On the one hand, building the cult of a leader as the only guarantor of the state’s success, thus the Army’s success, justifies the non-constitutional concentration of power in the hands of the President. On the other hand, it normalises the military hierarchy as the most efficient model for civilian authorities’ structure, too, whereby the institutional and other mechanisms of government control are discredited. The narrative about the external enemy and the necessity of armament serves to justify the reduced transparency and scandals related to the defence system. The narrative about the inept and non-patriotic former government is used for settling the political accounts with political opponents, as well as for suppression of any criticism against the regime regarding the topics of defence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus