Political Geography: Europe / Topic: War

1. Putin’s war in Ukraine: How to get out of it?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II has entered its 300th day without a clear outcome. “Moscow cannot afford to lose in Ukraine, and it will use every means available to avoid defeat” (Mearsheimer, 2022). I believe that Russia’s hasty withdrawal from northeastern Ukraine and its humiliating defeat in Kherson are by no means signaling the last stretch of the war. As I write these lines, missiles and drones target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, destructing half of Ukraine’s power grid and depriving millions of civilians of electricity, water and heat. So where is this war going?
Topic:: War, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?

Author:: Christoph Trebesch, Ariana Antezza, Katelyn Bushnell, Andre Frank, and Pascal Frank
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper presents the Ukraine Support Tracker, which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the third update we track support by 41 countries, specifically the EU member states, other members of the G7, as well as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, China, Taiwan, India and Iceland. The database is intended to support a facts-based discussion about support by other countries to Ukraine. Private donations and aid through non-governmental organizations are not included due to a lack of systematic data. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP.
Topic:: Economics, War, Foreign Aid, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

3. Is There Life in the Desert? Russian Civil Society After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: By the end of 2021, all leading independent NGOs and individual human rights activists had been completely suppressed, and all issues deemed inconvenient for the Kremlin had been removed from the agenda of those still operating. This report focuses on the state of Russian civil society at the outset of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as on how it was affected by the war and what are the prospects for its development in the future. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has been moving along the path of creating a fully state-controlled civil society in which the political potential of independent civil activism would be completely undermined. To achieve this goal, the Kremlin pro-actively advanced its network of government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) while simultaneously limiting foreign funding for NGOs. Those who did not abide by the Kremlin’s rules were systematically discriminated against and persecuted under the so-called “foreign agent” laws. Meanwhile, local authorities have stopped all formal and informal interaction with “politicised” civil actors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added further impetus to these trends and strengthened the Kremlin’s resolve to root out any sources of potential defiance. The independent professional NGOs that remained were in a deep crisis. Since February 2022, they have switched to survival mode. In all likelihood, they will either be co-opted by the state through a centralised system of financial support or cease to exist in the near future. The niches that they have left – including in the field of human rights advocacy – are being quickly filled by GONGOs. With their colossal resources, wider media access, and connections in the government, GONGOs are able to attract more young people to join their ranks. In many regions, even the scanty of organised independent civic activism that existed before the war was neither there nor likely to re-emerge in the coming years. In Russia, the level of involvement in NGOs has always been low and the population at large indifferent to the problems of civil society. Therefore, one should be wary of inflated expectations when contemplating the future of Russian civil activism. Even if Putin’s regime collapses, one can hardly anticipate a quick transition towards a truly independent and vibrant civil society. The study was conducted on the basis of interviews with representatives of independent NGOs from various regions who, as of February 2022, were based in Russia. The geography of this survey was expanded as much as possible to make the study more reliable and better reflect the content of the processes underway in the country. This analysis also shows that representatives from Moscow, large provincial cities, and the North Caucasus differ significantly in their perception of the current situation with civil society, whereas their visions for the future diverge considerably. A profound lack of communication among them only amplifies the divisions and fragmentations in Russia’s civil society. The situation in the North Caucasus is of particular note. Albeit being severely weakened, local independent NGOs and activists are – in contrast with the rest of Russia – more disapproving of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine but more optimistic about the future of their home regions. They pin their hopes on the revival of indigenous languages and cultures with the help of diasporas abroad and the emergence of civil society.
Topic:: Civil Society, Human Rights, Politics, War, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Russia’s Military Expenditure During Its War Against Ukraine

Author:: Julian Cooper
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights paper is devoted to an analysis of military spending by the Russian Federation during its war against Ukraine, and the sources of funding for that spending. Russia’s total military expenditure has increased since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but not dramatically. Despite difficulty in accessing information on budget spending, total budgeted military spending in 2023 can be estimated at 6648 billion roubles. This represents 4.4 per cent of forecast Russian gross domestic product. While military spending in early 2023 seemed to accelerate beyond the budgeted amount, the rate of spending can be shown to be similar to that in early 2022 and does not suggest any unusual surge. The Russian government is attempting to restrain spending on the war to minimize the domestic impact and enable the pursuit of policy goals set before the invasion. The Russian economy can afford this level of spending notwithstanding severe sanctions, while leaving open the possibility of increased war-related funding if the government considers it necessary in the future.
Topic:: War, Budget, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. European Communities in South America and the Global Total Wars of the 20th Century: An Interview with Dr. María Inés Tato

Author:: María Inés Tato and Salvador Lima
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:: Total wars do not just affect the belligerent societies. The two global conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century had repercussions in neutral countries and colonial territories that could not escape of their economic and political impact. This was certainly most evident for the European diasporas in the South American region. How did overseas Europeans participate in the war effort? What were the tensions surrounding the mobilization? What were the effects on the relationship with the adoption countries? These are some of the questions that the authors of Transatlantic Battles. European Immigrant Communities in South America and the World Wars (Brill, 2022) address. The book was edited by María Inés Tato, researcher at the National Council of Science and Technic Research (CONICET), in Argentina, and director of the Group of Historical War Studies of the Institute of Latin American and Argentine History “Dr. Emilio Ravignani”, University of Buenos Aires. Under her coordination, this collective project gathered several historians from different backgrounds, including Juan Pablo Artinian, Norman Fraser Brown, Juan Luis Carrellán Ruiz, Hernán Díaz, Marcelo Huernos, Milagros Martínez-Flener, Germán Friedmann and Stefan Rinke. The main goal of the project was to explore how European communities in South America expressed the transnational nature of their national identities through enlistment in armies and the mobilisation of economic and cultural assets. As Tato says in the book’s introduction, these immigrants, and their families “had two homelands: they were attached to their countries of origin and, at the same time, exhibited strong connections with the societies they resided in, developing a complex identity that recognized their dual allegiance.” Transatlantic Battles should not be understood as an isolated piece of work, but as a contribution to a growing academic movement that, for the last twenty years, has attended to the global dimension of the twentieth-century total wars. Tato herself has published and directed several books on the subject, working closely with colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:: War, History, Diaspora, and Interview
Political Geography:: Europe and South America

6. Fragile States Index 2023 – Annual Report

Author:: Nate Haken, Daniel Woodburn, Emily Sample, Wendy Wilson, and John Madden
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Fund for Peace
Abstract:: The Fragile States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Fragile States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.
Topic:: War, Territorial Disputes, Fragile States, Political stability, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Sudan, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Armenia, Peru, Guyana, Global Focus, Burkina Faso, and Nagorno-Karabakh

7. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Early Air War

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The fifth brief of the series looks at the early air war. Russia’s failure to conduct a devastating air offensive and secure air superiority, despite having all the advantages on paper at the start of its war in Ukraine, was a great surprise to observers and had major strategic impact. In this brief, ICDS research fellow Tony Lawrence describes the recent historical context for Russia’s air campaign, its failures in the air in Ukraine, the role of Western assistance, and the importance of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles. The intertwining of the air war and information war is a common theme throughout.
Topic:: War, Air Force, Information Warfare, Military, Aerospace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:: Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

9. Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union

Author:: Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The economic shock from the war in Ukraine is forcing Europe to face difficult policy choices, according to Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry. Governments must decide how best to soften the blow of higher energy and food prices, and how much to rely on debt finance. The European Central Bank must decide how to balance the fight against inflation with the need to sustain aggregate demand, in the face of decreases in real income. The authors analyze the impact of the war on the European economy, discuss the pros and cons of policy options, and call for coherence in balancing sanctions, fiscal measures, and monetary policy. They argue for the use of transfers rather than across-the-board subsidies and point to the room for debt finance. They show the potential role of tripartite wage agreement and also argue that monetary policy can remain on its current trajectory but be ready to adjust.
Topic:: War, European Union, Economy, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. Starr Forum: The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: A prologue to WWIII or another frozen conflict?

Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Dmitry Gorenburg is a senior research scientist at CNA, where he has worked since 2000. Dr. Gorenburg is an associate at the Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. His research interests include security issues in the former Soviet Union, Russian military reform, Russian foreign policy, and ethnic politics and identity. Olga Oliker is the program director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group. Her research interests include foreign and security policies of Russia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian and Caucasian successor states to the Soviet Union, domestic politics in these countries, US policy towards the region, and nuclear weapon strategy and arms control. She received her PhD from the MIT Department of Political Science. Serhii Plokhii is the Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History and director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. His research interests include the intellectual, cultural, and international history of Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on Ukraine. Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is a research associate at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Dr Saivetz is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues, including an assessment of the “reset,” Russian policies toward the other Soviet successor states, and current US-Russian relations. Elizabeth Wood is professor of history at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine (Woodrow Wilson Center and Columbia University Press, 2016). She is co-director of the MIT Russia Program, coordinator of Russian studies, and adviser to the Russian Language Program.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

11. Determinants of China's Policy Towards the War in Ukraine

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China’s position on the war in Ukraine depends mainly on the stabilisation of China’s internal situation before the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress planned for autumn this year. By holding NATO responsible for the conflict, the CCP reinforces its rhetoric about the legitimacy of the rivalry with the U.S. China’s signals on supporting peace negotiations and not helping Russia to circumvent sanctions are intended to protect China from possible Western secondary sanctions. The prospect of further Sino-Russian cooperation should induce the EU to reduce its economic interdependence with China.
Topic:: War, Sanctions, European Union, Rivalry, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

12. The Impact of the Russian Aggression Against Ukraine on the EU's Economy

Author:: Melchior Szczepanik
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: A spike in energy prices provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will inhibit the economic rebound in the EU. Member States will have to face high inflation for longer than previously expected. Forced to increase spending, they also could postpone plans to reduce their debts. The conflict with Russia is mobilising the Community to speed up the development of renewable energy and reduce dependencies on third countries, especially authoritarian ones, in strategic sectors.
Topic:: Energy Policy, War, European Union, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. Russia's Wartime Censorship and Propaganda

Author:: Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian authorities have introduced wartime censorship, forbidding the publication of content that does not conform to the official message of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. This massive and unprecedented propaganda is leading to an increase in support for Vladimir Putin, and Russians protesting against the war are being brutally repressed and persecuted. The consequence is the strengthening of the totalitarian character of the Russian state and the emigration of Russians who do not support the war. The most significant element of the Russian war propaganda is that of “denazification”, a claim aimed also at Poland.
Topic:: War, Authoritarianism, Media, Propaganda, and Censorship
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

14. Germany in the Shadow of War and Inflation: Six Months of the Scholz Government

Author:: Łukasz Jasiński
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), The Greens, and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) came to power with the intention of undertaking significant economic and social reforms. Their ambitious plans were symbolised by the title of the coalition agreement, “Daring to Make More Progress”. The war in Ukraine, though, has forced the government to take revolutionary steps in the areas of defence and energy security. The Chancellor’s vagueness about the supply of weapons to Ukraine has been causing his SPD’s ratings to fall and The Greens’ popularity to rise. To reverse this trend, the chancellor will pursue further social reforms.
Topic:: Government, War, Domestic Politics, Inflation, and Olaf Scholz
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

15. How Russia Fights

Author:: Nicolò Fasola
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Until this year’s renewed aggression on Ukraine, over-reliance on catchy labels such as “hy- brid war” has led many observers and deci- sion-makers to under-appreciate (if not disregard com- pletely) one undeniable fact: that over the last 20 years, the Kremlin has achieved its key strategic goals mainly through kinetic military means. Notwithstanding a weak tactical performance, Rus- sia won the 2008 “August war” against Georgia in only five days and successfully imposed its own regional set- tlement. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea, while sup- ported by the promotion of favourable socio-political conditions, was carried out and secured militarily; even more so in the Donbas campaign, where Russian propa- ganda suffered from serious limitations. Finally, the role of the Russian military in Syria beginning in 2015 was evident, albeit frequently reduced solely to the use of the Aerospace Forces. Notably, and besides obvious differences linked with the specifics of each theatre, the military interventions that Russia has conducted since 2008 display a consistent modus operandi. An analysis of these experiences can help illuminate what Russia is doing today and might do in the future, thus enabling NATO to fine-tune its posture on the Eastern flank. This Policy Brief draws on an expanded research project regarding Russia’s approach to war, as well as on a wealth of Russian-language military essays and commentary – deliberately highlighting the way the Russian military thinks of and practises war on its own terms.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

16. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:: Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:: International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

17. Environment in Times of War: Climate and Energy Challenges in the Post-Soviet Region

Author:: Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: The impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine has been devastating both politically and environmentally. On top of the environmental damage directly caused by military operations, the invasion has put an abrupt end to the EU-Russia “green cooperation”, which had previously raised many hopes. At the same time, it has also shifted international attention away from climate and environmental concerns, which are particularly acute in the post-Soviet region. This Report analyses some of the main climate change and environmental issues in the post-Soviet space, providing an initial assessment of the invasion’s impact. The bulk of the latest scholarly and policy production on these matters focuses on Russia — given the country’s geopolitical and energy relevance. However, this analysis finds that environmental disasters such as the desertification of the Aral Sea transcend state borders and require a broader approach both from an analytic and policy standpoint.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, War, European Union, Post-Soviet Space, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. The cost of appeasement

Author:: Larry P. Goodson
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The 1938 Munich Agreement (Akehurst, 1972) by which the Allies allowed Adolf Hitler’s Germany to take the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia is also known as the Munich Betrayal or, to English speakers, as appeasement by Neville Chamberlain (Valladares, 2020). This historical moment reminds me very much of how the West has dealt with Russia since Vladimir Putin rose to power. Like Adolf Hitler, Vladimir Putin has been sending aggressive signals to his neighbours and Western nations (Putin, 2007) since his 2005 speech arguing that the collapse of the Soviet empire ‘was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century’” (Putin, 2005). Note that he did not mention the Bloodlands that Timothy Snyder described, i.e. the killing of 14 million people in Central and Eastern Europe (Snyder, 2010), or World War II (Halloran, 2015) as the greatest catastrophe.
Topic:: War, International Security, Vladimir Putin, Appeasement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

19. Russia's War and The Future of European Order

Author:: Thomas Diez
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine fundamentally challenges the post-Cold War international order. Yet the scenario of a renewed Cold War must be balanced by alternative visions of European order. This contribution reassesses the concepts of interdependence, socialization, normative power, and international society taken from international relations theory to develop some general lessons for European order and concrete pointers toward alternative policy paths. Such an order needs to build on a more honest engagement, serious great power management mirrored by societal linkages, and creative thinking about joint institutions and regional overlaps.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, War, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. War or Peace? Turkish Moves in Syria

Author:: Gallia Lindenstrauss and Carmit Valensi
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Recent increased attacks on Kurdish targets in northern Syria by Turkey and the Syrian rebel groups its supports raise the question whether Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan intends to carry out his threat of May 2022 to begin another major ground operation against the Kurds. On the other hand, conciliatory statements regarding the Assad regime have been sounded recently in Turkey, and there has been discussion of the possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries after over a decade of hostility and competition. These two processes appear to be contradictory, given that the Syrian regime opposes existing Turkish control of Syrian territories, and does not wish to see this control broadened. On the other hand, this may be a calculated Turkish move that aims to show the Turkish public a concerted multi-faceted effort to confront both the Kurdish underground and the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Discussion of events in northern Syria and the web of Syrian and Turkish interests can be used to assess the question, which trend will prevail in Turkish-Syrian relations: normalization or escalation?
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Homeland Security, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

21. The Ukrainian Civil Front – An Interim Assessment

Author:: Meir Elran, Uri Bar-Yosef, and Zvi Magen
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Most of Ukraine’s civilian population demonstrates a high degree of steadfastness during the war, rallying around the flag – and around the president. Nonetheless, the challenge to Ukrainian national resilience remains high, given the huge waves of migration, the losses in the hinterland, and the severe damage to national infrastructure and the local economy – which could have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to recover from the war
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Politics, War and Eastern Mediterranean Gas

Author:: Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In the past two months, there have been several significant, interlocking developments regarding Eastern Mediterranean gas. In January, the Biden Administration withdrew American support for the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek EastMed gas pipeline. In February, U.S. officials shuttled between Israel and Lebanon for another round of talks to resolve the question of the maritime border and the exclusive rights to exploit gas in their disputed waters. Most importantly, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began in late February, has transformed the long-discussed European need to reduce its dependence on Russian gas (and oil) into an urgent priority. It has also exposed the disconnect between optimistic policies that anticipated an imminent shift to renewable resources and the reality that the developed world will, in the short- to medium-term, remain dependent on fossil fuels. Confronted with this new reality, does Europe's need to rapidly diversify its sources of energy increase the strategic value of Eastern Mediterranean gas? And can the Eastern Mediterranean contribute meaningfully to reducing Europe's dependence on Russian gas?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Politics, War, and Gas
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and United States of America

23. Disability and the War in Ukraine: Organized Support

Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Please join us for a panel discussion on disability and the war in Ukraine, organized by Svetlana Borodina (Harriman Institute). This event will feature the voices of the people who have been working to support people with disabilities in Ukraine during this war. They will speak about their first-hand experiences and the impact that this war has had on the lives of people with disabilities in Ukraine.
Topic:: War, Disability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

24. Russia’s War on Ukraine: A New Phase

Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has entered a new phase. The Kremlin’s initial plan to seize Kyiv with a lightning strike failed due to spirited defense by the Ukrainian military. In response, Russia has concentrated forces in the Donbas, and to a lesser extent southern Ukraine. Fighting remains fierce in these areas and experts disagree about the trajectory of the conflict. Some argue that Ukraine’s superior morale and greater international support will be decisive, while others point to Russia’s sheer advantage in numbers. Our panel of experts will discuss the implications of this new phase of the war. Can Ukraine gain back territory lost in recent weeks? Have Russia’s war aims changed? Should the US and NATO change course? Is it time for all sides to seek a negotiated settlement?
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. Journalism During Wartime: A Conversation with The Kyiv Independent

Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: The Kyiv Independent is a leading English-language media source based in Ukraine. Olga Rudenko (Chief Editor, Kyiv Independent) and Daryna Shevchenko (CEO, Kyiv Independent) will talk about the Kyiv Independent’s work in Ukraine and about the challenges of reporting in a country that is at war. Lili Bivings (Contributing Editor, Kyiv Independent) will then lead a discussion with the two presenters which will be followed by a Q & A with the audience moderated by Mark Andryczyk (Harriman Institute). This event is cosponsored by Razom for Ukraine.
Topic:: War, Media, Journalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

26. Navalny and Russia's Opposition During the War: A Conversation with Maria Pevchikh

Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Please join the Harriman Institute at Columbia University for a discussion with Maria Pevchikh, head of the investigation department at the Anti-Corruption Foundation. Moderated by Elise Giuliano, Senior Lecturer in Political Science.
Topic:: War, Authoritarianism, Civil-Military Relations, Opposition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

27. Saludos desde Mariúpol: Covering Ukraine for the Spanish audience

Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: In the Spanish media landscape, the shadow of Russia has always loomed large over the image of Ukraine: a confusion fueled by geographical distance and historical myth-making. The Russian-Ukrainian war that began in 2014 and the current large-scale invasion have created an opportunity for Spanish journalists to get to know Ukraine, challenge stereotypes and engage in a dialogue with the readers back home. An ongoing process that nevertheless has brought some change.
Topic:: War, Media, Language, Journalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Spain

28. Narrating the War Everydayness

Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: In early March 2022, the Center for Urban History and colleagues from Poland, the UK, and Luxembourg started to discuss the possibility of ethically well-grounded and methodologically reasonable emergency collecting and archiving of oral testimonies of Ukrainian refugees, IDPs, and volunteers. During the presentation, Otrishchenko will describe multiple decisions we made in this project concerning interactions within the team, sensitivity of recruitment, trauma-informed interviewing, and ethical preservation of collected stories.
Topic:: War, Media, Interview, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

29. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:: Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

31. HOW GERMANY’S COALITION CHANGE CONTRIBUTED TO PUTIN’S STRATEGIC MISCALCULATION IN UKRAINE

Author:: Debra Leiter and Rebecca Best
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Vladimir Putin almost certainly failed to anticipate that Germany would be willing to sacrifice the benefits of cheaper Russian gas to punish Russian aggression in Ukraine. But Tuesday, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz indefinitely paused certification of the completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline to “reassess” the situation. While the move didn’t stop Putin from invading Ukraine—by that point Putin already had too much skin in the game to risk the loss of face from backing down—it has substantially raised the costs for Russia. Why did Germany do this, and why didn’t Putin see it coming?
Topic:: NATO, Oil, War, Gas, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

32. WILL NATO FIGHT RUSSIA OVER UKRAINE? THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX SAYS NO

Author:: Andrew Kydd
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Many observers of the current war between Russia and Ukraine have expressed concern that NATO support for Ukraine could escalate the conflict to a direct major conventional war between NATO and Russia, and that from there it could easily escalate to a nuclear war. A group of foreign policy experts have proposed that NATO impose a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine, while other analysts have decried the escalatory potential of such a move. In a recent poll of international relations scholars, 40 percent thought a no-fly zone would lead to large-scale conventional war between NATO and Russia and 13 percent thought it could lead to nuclear war.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, War, Escalation, and Instability
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

33. Türkiye and the Russia-Ukraine War: Impact on the West, Central Asia, and the Caucasus

Author:: Matthew Bryza
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: During a recent webinar, I was asked to address the following question: what does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for Türkiye’s approach to the Caucasus and Central Asia? At first, the question struck me as odd. Having worked on these issues since the late 1990s and now living in Istanbul, it seemed obvious to me that Türkiye’s goals in these regions have been enduring since the end of the Cold War and were not changing because of Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine. These goals, I said, were and remain to: secure westward exports of oil and natural gas produced in the Caspian Basin; promote stability in the South Caucasus; and strengthen Türkiye’s business and cultural ties with the Turkic populations of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Türkiye’s approach toward Russia in this context also remains what it has been since the Ottoman centuries: cooperate where possible but confront where necessary. Reflecting momentarily on this question, however, I realized how different Ankara’s goals appear from the perspectives of Washington, Paris, and Athens. In these and other NATO capitals, Turkish foreign policy seems to have shifted from its pursuit of “zero problems with neighbors” during the early years of the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to one of “zero neighbors without problems.” Türkiye is thus viewed within the Atlantic Alliance as a belligerent outlier, bent on violating international law to pursue the extraction of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons, enabling Azerbaijan to use military force during the Second Karabakh War, and aligning in Syria more with Russia than with its own treaty allies.
Topic:: Security, War, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia

34. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:: Isabella Martin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. From Struggle to Permanent Failure Why the Karabakh Attempt at Secession Failed

Author:: Azer Babayev
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: After 44 days of fighting, the Second Karabakh War came to an end on 10 November 2020 as a result of a Russian‑brokered ceasefire agreement. The most important questions here appear to be: what led to this dangerous military escalation, and what does it mean for the conflict, given that it seems to have now entered into a (new) political phase, again? In the declining Soviet Union, what was originally a status dispute over the autonomous Nagorno‑Karabakh region escalated into an international violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Following the end of a bloody war in 1994 (the First Karabakh War, 1992‑ 1994), a fragile situation around the conflict region took root: the “frozen conflict,” as it came to be known, lasted for nearly three decades and led to conditions of neither war nor peace. And during this period, it was feared that the longer the sides had to wait for a peace agreement to be reached, the more likely the conflict would re‑escalate and eventually erupt again into a hot war. As it turned out, this is exactly what happened: an all‑out six‑week war erupted again unexpectedly between the conflict parties in late September 2020, and, as a result, the Armenian side more or less capitulated. But first things first: in the First Karabakh War, Azerbaijan suffered a major defeat, ceding to Armenian forces not only the secessionist region itself but also seven surrounding territories. These other lands were, as a whole, twice the size of Nagorno‑ Karabakh itself and contained five times the old oblast’s population, the entirety of which was expelled by the time an armistice was signed in 1994. And that is why during this war the UN Security Council responded by passing four resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan. However, the UN resolutions failed to have any effect. Since that time, no international protagonists felt a strong, compelling need to try to resolve the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. In addition, all international actors dismissed the idea of “power mediation.” Moreover, although Russia as a key international actor is directly involved in all the conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, its involvement in the Nagorno‑Karabakh dispute has been rather indirect: in the Karabakh case, Moscow has been both a critical and a questionable actor. On the one hand, the Kremlin has taken a central position in mediating a peaceful settlement to the conflict while, on the other hand, it has been delivering weapons to both sides. This last represents perhaps the most striking situation regarding the international dimension of the conflict. Russia is militarily allied with Armenia and has a military presence in the country. It has provided security guarantees to Yerevan, primarily through their shared membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which neutralized to a certain extent the potential effects of Russian arms being sold to financially strong Azerbaijan on a purely commercial basis.
Topic:: Security, War, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

36. Future warfare, future skills, future professional military education

Author:: Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Created in 1951 by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to endow NATO Allies’ officers with a forum for strategic education and politico-military re- flection, this year the NATO Defense College is cele- brating its 70th anniversary. In a world of rapid change and growing uncertainty, the best way to honor the past is to prepare for the future. This Policy Brief contributes to this goal by looking at the future of Professional Military Education (PME). Based on the recent Con- ference of Commandants,1 the discussion is divided into three parts: what the future of warfare is, what skills future warfighters will need to possess, and how professional military education will have to change ac- cordingly.
Topic:: NATO, Education, War, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Professionalism
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

37. El artículo analiza la compleja relación, presente en la esfera internacional,entre política y justicia que queda reflejada en el Tribunal Especial para el Líbano. Se emplean,como líneas argumentales, la problemática de su establecimiento por medio de la resolución 1757 (2007) del Consejo de Seguridad y su carácter selectivo, así como la confrontación jurídico-doctrinal planteada en el caso Ayyash et al., también conocido como asunto Hariri. Se subraya la importancia de los factores contextuales,especialmente aquellosdesencadenados a partir de 2004, con el fin de explicar la división interna —con protagonistas internacionales—del país en dos bloques cuya confrontación serviría de pretexto para la puesta en marcha de un tribunal único que responde a los intereses de una comunidad internacional seducida porla posibilidad de lograr una condena judicial por terrorismo contra Hizballah —y/o Siria—en un momento de preponderancia de la formación chií.La decisión interlocutoria de 2011 de la Sala de Apelaciones pareció manifestarse como un buen augurio en aquella dirección al afirmar la necesidad de interpretar el delito de terrorismo recogido en el artículo 314 del Código Penal del Líbano conforme a un crimen internacional de terrorismo de carácter consuetudinario. La revolucionaria decisión —junto con el proceso que llevó a su publicación—reveló,sin embargo,cierta precipitación y oportunismo que por fortuna y justicia la sentencia de 2020 rechaza por innecesaria e incierta.El artículo sostiene que todo ello ha contribuido a debilitar la credibilidad de un Tribunal,ejemplo de justicia selectiva, y ha mostrado pocadeferencia por la soberanía del Estado libanés.

Author:: Esteban Vidal Pérez
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: Este artículo trata los diferentes enfoques geopolíticos de las causas de la guerra. Comienza con la exposición de la relación histórica entre la geopolítica y la guerra a partir de las contribuciones de diferentes autores para presentar las principales explicaciones sobre esta materia. De esta forma analizamos el papel de la geografía en la guerra y su impacto en los conflictos. Esto nos conduce a la perspectiva organicista que considera que la expansión del Estado es un fenómeno natural que produce la guerra. Además, la geografía físicainfluye en el estallido de la guerra. El segundo enfoquees el de la disposición de las tierras emergidas que afirma que determinados lugares son propensos a la guerra debido a su ubicación estratégica. El tercer enfoque es el accidentalista. Los autores de esta perspectiva afirman que la guerra depende de la distancia geográfica entre países y los conflictos fronterizos. Finalmente, desarrollamos una nueva perspectiva basada en la fragmentación geopolítica para explicar la guerra en la Europa moderna. Este enfoque explora la importancia de la fragmentación en la formación del Estado moderno y en el moldeamiento de un entorno anárquico con el nacimiento del sistema de Estados. La guerra se convirtió en un rasgo del sistema internacional debido a que el Estado moderno nació para hacer la guerray se convirtió en la institución dominante. Por tanto, la fragmentación geopolítica es la causa principal dela violencia entre Estados en la Europa moderna.
Topic:: War, Geopolitics, State, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:: Europe

38. Vengeful Citizens, Violent States: A Theory of War and Revenge, Rachel Stein

Author:: Peter Liberman
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: By showing that mass vengefulness helps democratic leaders bring their nations to war, this wonderful book significantly advances our understanding of how cultural values affect international politics. Its most important contribution is demonstrating that democracies that retain death penalty laws were significant more likely to initiate the use of force than non-death-penalty democracies in the 1945–2001 period. The finding is robust to a variety of control variables and specifications, although skeptics may wonder whether it might be inflated by ethnocentrism, beliefs about the utility of violence, or other unmeasured potential covariates. Rachel Stein attributes the belligerence of death penalty states to cross-national differences in vengeful cultures, on the grounds that citizens’ vengefulness predicts both cross-sectional support for the death penalty and cross-national differences in the penalty’s retention. Her rigorous analysis greatly strengthens the case that the unusual bellicosity of retributivists, observed by Stein and other researchers, affects actual interstate conflict.
Topic:: War, Prisons/Penal Systems, Leadership, Book Review, Elites, and Capital Punishment
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

39. Biowar next? Security implications of the coronavirus

Author:: Karsten Friis
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: What are the possible short-, medium- and long-term implications of the coronavirus for global security and defence? In this Strategic Update, Karsten Friis investigates the pandemic's potential consequences for the world, its armed forces, the integration of Europe, US-China relations, as well as the concept and practice of 'war' more broadly. Although much remains uncertain, the disruptions which are beginning to emerge demand a reckoning with a changed world -- and world order.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

40. Devil in the Detail: Local versus regional approaches to peace in Donbas

Author:: Karen Madoian
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Following the Euromaidan protests and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has witnessed continued violence in the east of the country, with approximately 13,000 people killed, including more than 3,300 civilians, and as many as 30,000 wounded. After a period of stalled negotiations, 2019 brought new momentum to the peace process: Ukraine’s new president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and his political party ‘Servant of the People’ won an unprecedented majority in the 2019 elections, gaining full control over the executive and legislative branches of power with more than 70% of all votes cast across the country. One of the instrumental factors for President Zelensky’s victory was his promise to end the war in Donbas. To this end, he agreed to revive negotiations in the Normandy Format (between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine) and reactivated direct communication channels with the Kremlin. The president’s message regarding reconciliation with the separatist, Russia-backed ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk appears to resonate with the majority of Ukrainians: more than 50% of citizens believe that Kyiv should negotiate a peace deal with separatist leaders and more than 70% support the Ukrainian president’s engagement in direct dialogue with Russia.
Topic:: Civil Society, Regional Cooperation, War, Conflict, and Decentralization
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

41. Migraciones, deportaciones, colonización y geopolítica durante las guerras dácicas de Trajano (101-106 d.C.) (Migrations, Deportations, Colonization and Geopolitics during Trajan’s Dacian Wars (101 -106 AD))

Author:: David Soria Molina
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: Las guerras dácicas de Trajano (101-106 d.C.) implicaron múltiples movimientos de población por parte de todos los contendientes, que afectaron al desarrollo y desenlace del conflicto, condicionando muchas de las decisiones de las potencias implicadas. Del mismo modo, la intensidad y escala de la conflagración, que se extendió a lo largo y ancho de la Europa danubiana y póntica, se saldó con cuantiosas pérdidas de población, consecuencia directa e indirecta de los enfrentamientos armados. Finalmente, el proceso de consolidación del poder romano en Dacia tras la conquista y sus particularidades supusieron la deportación y desplazamiento intencional de grupos de población nativa, migraciones hacia zonas libres de la ocupación romana y otros problemas de orden sociopolítico y demográfico resueltos por el Imperio romano mediante una colonización planificada del nuevo territorio y toda una serie de arreglos diplomáticos concluidos en 119 d.C. En este artículo abordamos, a través de las fuentes literarias, epigráficas, numismáticas, arqueológicas e iconográficas disponibles, estos procesos demográficos, las realidades derivadas de los mismos y sus consecuencias en el marco de las guerras dácicas de Trajano, procesos que condicionaron la situación geopolítica de la región y, por lo tanto, la futura configuración de la Europa del Este.
Topic:: Migration, War, History, Geopolitics, and Deportation
Political Geography:: Europe and Eastern Europe

42. The Srebrenica Genocide: A Testament to Persistence in “The Last Refuge”

Author:: Carly Kabot
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: History is the storyteller that holds all truth, yet when she speaks, much of mankind closes its ears. Hasan Nuhanović, a survivor of the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide committed by a Bosnian Serb militia, narrates his family’s harrowing journey through Bosnia in The Last Refuge: A True Story of War, Survival, and Life under Seige in Srebrenica. Though Nuhanović’s story is tragic, it is not uncommon. He makes this clear from the beginning, writing, “I did not write this book to tell my own story” (5). Rather, his story embodies the experiences of eight thousand Bosniaks who were executed by Serb forces on July 11, 1995, and brings to mind the millions of genocide victims worldwide who have been mercilessly slaughtered in the past century.
Topic:: Genocide, War, History, Book Review, Ethnic Cleansing, and Memoir
Political Geography:: Europe, Bosnia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Srebrenica

43. Hitting Home: Cyber-Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine and Its Impact on the United States

Author:: Yuriy Danyk, Chad Michael Briggs, and Tamara Maliarchuk
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: The conflict in Ukraine has received renewed attention in Washington D.C., and it is worth considering the relevance of this conflict to US national security interests. The open conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014 has been part of a larger hybrid war, including political and information warfare, cyber warfare, assassinations, promotion of corruption, and traditional (kinetic) warfare carried out by destructive geopolitical actors (DGAs) [1]. The conventional conflict cannot be taken out of context, and it is the less visible and “dark” aspects of hybrid warfare that should particularly worry the United States. Hybrid warfare consists of a wide spectrum of attacks, from conventional to covert, carried out to destabilize one’s opponent. Rather than being isolated incidents, cyber attacks often represent part of a wide spectrum of coordinated, offensive strategies against countries like Ukraine and the United States.
Topic:: National Security, War, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

44. Coming Home to Roost: War Threatens to Spill Beyond Syria’s Borders

Author:: James M Dorsey
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:: As tens of thousands more refugees are shunted by Turkey toward Europe and a new phase of the brutal Syrian war unfolds, Russia, Turkey, the EU, and the international community are being handed the bill for a flawed short-term approach to the nine-year conflict that lacked empathy for the millions of victims and was likely to magnify rather than resolve problems.
Topic:: War, Refugees, Syrian War, and International Community
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

45. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:: Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

46. Ottomanism at its Final Gasp: Memoirs of the Ottomans on Duty in Arab Provinces during World War I

Author:: Can Eyup Cekic
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: This study aims to expose the ways in which leading officials of the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP) interpreted, internalized, and questioned the conditions of their mission in Arab lands during World War I (WWI). It builds on the memoirs of Falih Rıfkı, aide-de-camp of Commander-in-Chief Cemal Pasha, and Halide Edip, an ardent supporter of the social and educational reforms of the CUP government. Both written after the war, these memoirs reflect not only nostalgia and regret but also the complicated relationship between Turkish officials and Arabs on the eve of their breakup from one another as citizens of the Ottoman State. The study also questions the orthodox argument that the Turkist and anti-Arabic ideology of the CUP government in general and Cemal Pasha’s wartime crusade against Arab nationalists in particular triggered the emergence of Arab nationalism. By contemplating the memoirs of CUP members in Arab lands, this study argues that Falih Rıfkı, Cemal Pasha, and Halide Edip tried to understand the region and its people in order to create a mutual future for Turks and Arabs within the Ottoman Empire.
Topic:: Nationalism, War, Citizenship, and World War I
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Asia, and Ottoman Empire

47. Turkish AK Parti’s Posture towards the 2003 War in Iraq The Impact of Religion amid Security Concerns

Author:: Alberto Gasparetto
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This paper focuses on Turkey’s foreign policymakers’ attitudes in the context of the 2003 US decision to wage war against Iraq. The main goal is to assess and downplay the impact of religion in relation to security-related concerns. Drawing on official speeches, interviews, declarations by key figures in the foreign policy process, the paper argues that religion is nothing more than an intervening factor in the case of Turkey’s approach to the 2003 war in Iraq. Therefore, notwithstanding the role of Islamist elites in the foreign policy decision-making of Turkey, Turkey’s foreign affairs were rather inspired by realist behaviour, driven by pragmatic considerations, aimed at pursuing rationalist goals.
Topic:: Security, Religion, War, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

48. Mission Command of Multi-Domain Operations

Author:: Mark Balboni, John A. Bonin, Robert Mundell, and Doug Orsi
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: This research monograph explores the Army’s emerging concept of multi-domain operations and its implications on the mission command approach. The transition to multi-domain operations changes the traditional view of how Army commanders and staffs conduct operations in the physical environment to include simultaneously operations in the information environment within the competition continuum. This monograph will utilize the introduction of the aircraft during World War I as a historical case study for the integration of new domains. The Army has integrated new domains in the past and this example provides the historical context for the challenges involving integration of new domains. An overview and analysis of what multi-domain operations are will provide a baseline understanding of how multi-domain operations are changing not only how we fight but also how the Army must change roles and responsibilities to allow the Joint force to compete across the competition continuum, especially below armed conflict. The transition to multi-domain operations will require new processes. Changes will be required not only to the physical systems employed but also to Joint professional military education, Joint and Army doctrine, and headquarters staff structures as leaders and their staffs will require different skills to operate in this new environment.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, World War I, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

49. Hybrid Warfare and Deniability as Understood by the Military

Author:: Håkan Gunneriusson
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Russia and China are terraforming the maritime environment as part of their warfare. In both cases the actions are illegal and the performance is offensive to its actual nature. In the case of China, the practice is construction of artificial islands in the South Chinese Sea and in the case of Russia it is about the infamous bridge built over the Kerch strait, Ukraine. Neither Russia nor China expects an armed conflict with the West in the near future. That is a reasonable assumption, which is weaponized at the political-strategically level. The attack of this weaponized situation is that the trust in the West. Primarily the EU (European Union) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), is eroded for every day which these countries challenges the international system which the western democracies say that they present and defend. China and Russia offer their authoritarian systems as a replacement and there are a lot of pseudo-democratic or even out-right authoritarian regimes on the sideline watching this challenge unfold. The article highlights the difference for the NATO-countries in logic of practice when it comes to the political social field on one hand and the military political field on the other hand. The article uses material from a previously unpublished survey made on NATO-officers then attending courses at NATO Defense College (NDC).
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, European Union, Conflict, Civil-Military Relations, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

50. The Risks of Foreign Fighters in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

Author:: Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In none of the conflicts in the post-Soviet area have so many foreign fighters participated than in the conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014. It is estimated that more than 17,000 fighters from 55 countries have fought there on either side. Those fighting on the Russian side pose a special challenge to Ukraine’s security and to neighbouring countries because these fighters can engage in terrorism or other radical actions and are part of Russia’s hybrid warfare.
Topic:: War, Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

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