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101. The EU–US Data Protection Framework: Balancing Economic, Security and Privacy Considerations

Author:
Federica Marconi
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The rapid evolution of digital technology has ushered in a data-centric economy, where data accessibility drives marketplace efficiency and economic growth across various industries. However, this shift, while offering numerous benefits, introduces significant privacy and data security challenges, particularly in the context of transatlantic data transfers. Considering the vast economic ties between the EU and the US, the transatlantic data flow vividly illustrates the complexities involved in governing and transferring data. It grapples with the ongoing challenge of striking a satisfactory balance between economic advantages stemming from data utilisation and various concerns pertaining to national security, digital sovereignty and individual rights. In recent years, the European Commission approved two different frameworks on transatlantic data flow – Safe Harbour in 2000[1] and Privacy Shield in 2016[2] – asserting that the US provided a level of data protection for data transfers essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU. However, despite initial optimism, both adequacy decisions faced a significant setback when the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated them in what is commonly referred to as the “Schrems saga”,[3] named after the Austrian activist who first challenged both frameworks before the European Court. The core arguments centred on the absence of adequate safeguards for personal data within US domestic law and the extent of state surveillance over such data when it was transferred, as initially disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013.[4] This legal development led to a period of significant uncertainty and further heightened the ongoing debate concerning the regulation of transatlantic data transfer. To address the consequences of this legal turmoil, both EU and the US committed to establishing “a renewed and sound framework for transatlantic data flows”,[5] seeking a long-term solution to address the complexities of data privacy and security, eventually leading to the recently adopted EU–US Data Privacy Framework (“DPF”).
Topic:
Security, Economics, Political Economy, European Union, Privacy, Transatlantic Relations, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

102. Climate Action, Geopolitical Risks and Strategic Policy: The Western Race to Secure Critical Raw Materials

Author:
Salvatore Finizio
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Climate action, economic competition and geopolitical shifts are more intertwined than ever. In the wake of the skyrocketing inflation and deteriorating China relations, United States President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law on 16 August 2022. Conceived as the foundation of the new US industrial policy, the IRA aims to rebuild the country’s industrial capacity, including 500 billion US dollars in new spending and tax breaks, among which almost 400 billion aimed at boosting clean energy.[1] Across the Atlantic, the European Union expressed concerns about the potential loss of industrial competitiveness resulting from the IRA. In response, the EU unveiled its own Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) in February 2023.[2] The objective of this plan is to promote the enhancement of net-zero manufacturing capacities in order to meet the EU’s climate targets. Both the IRA and the GDIP have a common goal of reducing dependence on China, especially in clean technology, although through different approaches. The US focuses on bringing high-value production back to its shores, while the EU aims to develop and diversify supply chains.[3] This divergence is also reflected in the debate between “decoupling” and “derisking”, with the latter recently gaining prominence as policymakers recognise the challenges of completely reshoring supply chains domestically.[4] The US and the EU share industrial and geoeconomic objectives, but will also encounter similar challenges, in particular concerning the first stages of green supply chains. Despite their heterogeneous approaches, Western policymakers will in fact have to secure critical raw materials for clean technology manufacturing, with the aim of resourcing the energy transition.
Topic:
Security, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Raw Materials
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

103. Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italy is stepping up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, both in the economic and security realms. The cabinet led by Giorgia Meloni – a centre-right coalition often portrayed by commentators as right-wing and nationalist – is rebalancing Rome’s policy in the Far East by scaling down ties with Beijing and by effectively lending support to the United States and its Asian allies vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and self-confident China. Moving away from previous centre-left governments that tended to prioritise commercial relations with Beijing, the conservative coalition in power since September 2022 has been fostering defence-related cooperation with Japan and India and chip-related cooperation and investments with Taiwan. Moreover – and remarkably for a country that has long been absent from Asian security – the Italian government has sent a patrol vessel to the South China Sea and plans to forward the country’s flagship aircraft carrier to the area to conduct joint exercises with the navies of Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The quantity and quality of initiatives being undertaken warrant the label of an Italian ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. By upgrading its presence in the region, Italy joins the other G7 nations in their efforts to uphold the rules-based order and dissuade Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, to consolidate the western anchorage of this pivot, the Meloni government needs to fully align its policy towards Beijing with that of the Euro-Atlantic allies – which includes deciding whether to continue to lend Italy’s official support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or not.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Italy, and Indo-Pacific

104. Defence expenditure and public debt in Greece: A non-linear relationship

Author:
Ioanna Bardakas, Dimitris Doulos, and George Andrew Zombanakis
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to consider and evaluate the widely–used argument attributing the growth of the public debt of Greece in recent decades to the country’s defence expenditure. We employ a two-equation model that focuses on the determinants of the military debt and how this has affected the public debt. The source of our military debt data is the Hellenic General Accounting Office, an option taken to cope with confidentiality issues. Finally, we insist on focusing on the expenditure on defence equipment imports rather than the total defence spending that the literature mostly covers, for reasons extensively analysed. Our methodology firstly assumes a linear relationship between military debt and public debt. We solve the system using 3SLS to obtain consistent and efficient estimates to derive interesting policy implications. The employment of a non-linear quadratic form not previously adopted proves to be superior in terms of performance and reveals the complexity of the above relationship. These point to the conclusion that the defence equipment purchases made since the beginning of the eighties have not had a decisive impact on the public debt of Greece. The defence equipment purchases made since the beginning of the eighties represent a very low percentage of the total public debt of Greece. Moreover, these are considered to be an investment activity rather than consumer spending, which has been acknowledged in the literature as the primary cause of Greece’s high indebtedness and the ensuing economic crisis.
Topic:
Security, Public Debt, Public Spending, Economic Security, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

105. Conclusions from the use of aviation in the first half of the first year of the Ukrainian-Russian war

Author:
Sylwester Lubiejewski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The aim of the article is to suggest a desirable direction in which the Polish air force, and indeed the air forces of other NATO countries, should develop so that they are better prepared for the challenges identified in the conflict in Ukraine so far. In order to achieve the aim of the research and answer the formulated research question, the collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents, observation and interviewing took place. In order to have the ability to deter and gain air superiority during a defensive operation, the Polish air force, and air forces of other NATO countries, should have a large resource of fighter, multi-role, and fighter-bomber aircraft. An object-oriented multi-layer air defence of every military airfield needs to be organised and certain roads reconstructed as runways in the event of war. In turn, helicopter aviation units should be able to organise forward arming and refuelling points for helicopters to effectively support land forces. Attack helicopters should also have integrated fire systems that allow them to attack from a distance beyond the range of man-portable air-defence systems. All warplanes should be equipped with proven and modern systems of active and passive self-defence to make them less susceptible to enemy influence. To sum up, in light of the war in Ukraine, the article explains what aviation equipment is necessary and what actions should be taken to increase both Polish air force’s ability and other NATO air forces’ ability to perform tasks during wartime.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Air Force, Aviation, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

106. Defensive lawfare and deterrence: Analysis of Latvia’s approach to legal bases in the context of hybrid warfare (2014-2022)

Author:
Valerijs Bodnieks
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Following the ‘hybrid form’ of Russian aggression in Ukraine that emerged in 2014, the period after February 24th, 2022 is referred to as the ‘new reality’. Hence, the question that needs to be addressed is how to deter and prevent Russian aggression of this kind. The national legal framework against the aggressor is a part of the deterrence policy and can be construed as defensive lawfare. Focusing on Latvia, the aim of the paper is to analyse defensive lawfare and deterrence in the context of hybrid warfare. The following research question has been identified: What is Latvia’s approach to establishing defensive lawfare in terms of hybrid warfare? For the empirical analysis, the chronological framework has been set from 2014 to 2022. To complete the empirical analysis of the present paper, both qualitative and quantitative research has been implemented comprising document analysis and semi-structured interviews, as well as content analysis, respectively. The improvement of a regulatory base and the development of deterrence, whilst using regulatory acts, is an element of deterrence and a way to act legally. The law can be used as a weapon. Lawfare, a concept with three definitions, has two forms: defensive a nd offensive. Latvia’s legal base includes a regulation to overcome hybrid threats and to implement a broad-spectrum of defence measures. Latvia’s regulatory framework is designed for defence purposes, whilst also being a way of promoting deterrence. Decision makers must be able to manoeuvre with the powers assigned to them.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Hybrid Warfare, Lawfare, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Latvia, and Baltic States

107. Implications of the war in Ukraine for the strategic communication system of the Polish Ministry of National Defence

Author:
Agnieszka Glapiak
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The paper explores the evolving role of strategic communication at the operations centre of the Minister of National Defence in Poland, particularly in the period leading up to and during the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine. The study investigates both proactive communication initiatives and reactive communication in response to citizens’ needs. Our research methodology primarily involved analysing official Polish national defence documents and comparing findings from studies conducted before and during the war in Ukraine. The results show that the conflict had a profound influence on the MOD’s strategic communication, emphasising the pivotal role of the Operations Centre of the Minister of National Defence. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the need for a comprehensive communication approach that encompasses both domestic and international audiences, spanning traditional and social media.
Topic:
Security, Communications, Disinformation, Military, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

108. Conventional and Hybrid Actions in the Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Craisor-Constantin Ionita
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The paper aims to analytically present the existing data and information regarding notable aspects of the ongoing war in Ukraine, notably through lessons identified in the political-military field, both conventionally and hybrid. The article hypothesis starts from the consideration that even the war is not over, there are some lessons identified that should be considered for the future security of Europe and the international environment. The author uses the analytical method of research to explain the cause-effect relationship between the war itself and its future influence for the European security and world order, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. It will also theoretically test those implications to determine whether they fit the specified hypothesis. The conflict itself has deepened the international consequences of almost two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. It magnified the disastrous security situation not only in Europe, but all around the world, by creating additional energy (gas) and food (cereal) crises. Therefore, the Russian – Ukrainian War has significantly modified regional and international security environment and there are tendencies to challenge the current World order. What happened in Ukraine in the past year has and will continue to have direct implications for the European and Euro-Atlantic security, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. Therefore, this paper is significant for advising the political-military decision-makers on better understanding the modern operational environment and addapting future defence capabilities to face 21st Century Warfare.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

109. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Mine action has the potential to incentivise confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), because it could contribute to development and reconciliation through the creation of communities of practice among individuals from civil society and at the grassroots level as part of post-conflict reconstruction. Although many Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating States are contaminated by mines, mine action as a CSBM has scarcely been included in peace negotiations, because it is thought that it might hinder the peace process. Yet mine action, if “depoliticised”, could be implemented independently of peace negotiations through the creation of spaces for cooperation in demining projects of common interest to rival communities. The OSCE is well placed to propose these strategies, especially in Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are not only affected by protracted conflicts with limited engagement of the population in the peace process but are also highly contaminated by mines.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Violence, and Landmines
Political Geography:
Europe

110. Blockchain Technology: An Innovative Policy Tool for Enhancing Conventional Arms Control and Verification

Author:
Nicolo Miotto
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Blockchain represents an unprecedented opportunity for enhancing conventional arms control (CAC) and verification. Based on the principles of transparency, verifiability, and predictability, this state-of-the-art technology could build confidence and facilitate the implementation of arms control mechanisms. Blockchain-based so-called “smart contracts” have advantageous practical implications for CAC. They could improve the verification of countries’ compliance with their CAC obligations by enhancing monitoring procedures and could strengthen arms export controls by improving treaty signatories’ ability to monitor weapons and ammunition supply chains. Reinforcing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) framework for conventional ammunition control with a permissioned blockchain would provide greater confidentiality and improve monitoring and data verifiability, thus strengthening the OSCE’s CAC regimes.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
Europe

111. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The global debate on weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) often focuses on futuristic “killer robots”, which risks overlooking the fact that these technologies are already part of the security landscape. Diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in states’ discourse pose a considerable risk for European security and stability. The impact of AI is not inevitable, and states should address this issue through political means, such as a political declaration with a commitment to ensuring human control over the use of force. With its inclusive membership, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can and should become the platform through which its participating States can take a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

112. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)

Author:
Carl V. Evans, Chris Anderson, Malcom Baker, Ronald Bearse, and Salih Biçakci
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
In 2014 NATO’s Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) launched the inaugural course on “Critical Infrastructure Protection Against Terrorist Attacks.” As this course garnered increased attendance and interest, the core lecturer team felt the need to update the course in critical infrastructure (CI) taking into account the shift from an emphasis on “protection” of CI assets to “security and resiliency.” What was lacking in the fields of academe, emergency management, and the industry practitioner community was a handbook that leveraged the collective subject matter expertise of the core lecturer team, a handbook that could serve to educate government leaders, state and private-sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, academicians, and policymakers in NATO and partner countries. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency is the culmination of such an effort, the first major collaborative research project under a Memorandum of Understanding between the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), and NATO COE-DAT. The research project began in October 2020 with a series of four workshops hosted by SSI. The draft chapters for the book were completed in late January 2022. Little did the research team envision the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February this year. The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, successive missile attacks against Ukraine’s electric generation and distribution facilities, rail transport, and cyberattacks against almost every sector of the country’s critical infrastructure have been on world display. Russian use of its gas supplies as a means of economic warfare against Europe—designed to undermine NATO unity and support for Ukraine—is another timely example of why adversaries, nation-states, and terrorists alike target critical infrastructure. Hence, the need for public-private sector partnerships to secure that infrastructure and build the resiliency to sustain it when attacked. Ukraine also highlights the need for NATO allies to understand where vulnerabilities exist in host nation infrastructure that will undermine collective defense and give more urgency to redressing and mitigating those fissures.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Alliance, Crisis Management, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

113. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:
Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

114. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

115. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

116. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

117. The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Grace Hwang
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
NATO countries have already provided massive amounts of military aid to Ukraine, deployed additional forces to support the NATO countries that share a border with Russia, improved the Alliance’s ability to rapidly deploy forces forward in a crisis, and worked with key powers like Poland to strengthen its capabilities. NATO has accepted Finland and Sweden as future members of the Alliance, and it has made numerous other short-term adjustments to its force posture that enhance its deterrence and defense capabilities. NATO faces a future, however, where it cannot predict how much territory Ukraine will lose and where it must now view Russia as an ongoing major threat at virtually every level from the limited conventional threats Russia poses to the NATO countries on its border to the major increases in its threat of strategic nuclear forces. NATO cannot continue to treat Russia as a potential partner, and that seems to be an unlikely path forward so long as Putin or anyone like him is in power. NATO also cannot ignore the rise in China’s military and economic power or the prospects of closer Russian and Chinese strategic cooperation. The challenge NATO faces goes far beyond Ukraine. The days in which NATO countries could keep taking peace dividends by cutting their forces, failing to modernize, and failing to adopt new forces of tactics and interoperability are over. NATO cannot deal with the Russian threat in terms of half-measures or by continuing to focus on empty and virtually meaningless force goals like spending 2% of national GDP on defense and 20% of defense expenditure on equipment. NATO needs to act now to look far beyond the short-term priorities of the Ukraine conflict. It needs to revitalize its entire force planning progress. It needs to create effective levels of deterrence and defense capability, while it modernizes its forces to deal with radically new requirements like joint all-domain operations (JADO), emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), new precision-strike capabilities, changes in air and missile warfare and defense, and the revival of Russian naval power and the growth of a Chinese blue-water navy. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy has prepared a report, entitled, The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise, that examines how NATO must approach an effective force planning exercise that can give its new strategy real meaning. This report documents the pointless character of NATO’s present emphasis on burdensharing, and it examines the real-world shifts in spending and forces in NATO since 2014, as well as how these changes have affected the national forces in given sectors of Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

118. Transforming European Defense

Author:
Max Bergmann, Colin Wall, and Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Europe, which has taken decisive steps to assist Ukraine and shore up European security and defense. Yet this moment could be short-lived if not followed by a sustained, collective effort to transform and rationalize European defense. Without this, additional European defense spending may be wasted and the continent will continue to rely on the United States for its defense. European nations should fully leverage the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other multilateral formats to overcome fragmentation and avoid a piecemeal approach to defense. By doing so, they can invest together in modern capabilities, build a strong, resilient, and open industrial base, and think creatively to pool and share forces. Importantly, the United States has a crucial role in providing both practical and political support to achieve this shared goal of a stronger and more capable European defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe

119. Of Ships and Cyber: Transposing the Incidents at Sea Agreement

Author:
Alexander Klimburg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Amid the geopolitical crises caused by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it may seem wildly optimistic—or even bad diplomacy—to consider future arms-control scenarios for cyber operations. However, good policy needs to prepare for the day after tomorrow, and smart policy will look at what has gone wrong today and what can be learned from yesterday. Arguably, one element that may have contributed to rising geopolitical tensions over the past decade has been a lack of clear cyber signals among the main adversaries. This makes it even more urgent to consider what can be learned from past arms-control exercises such as the vaunted Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement—especially as this accord was conceived in the wake of several of its own perilous crises. In 1962, a lack of agreed signaling protocols nearly led to World War III. According to a riveting account in the 2020 book Nuclear Folly, 1 on October 27, 1962—at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the U.S. Navy cornered one of the few Soviet submarines unaccounted for off Cuba. In an effort to convince the Foxtrot-class B-59 submarine to surface, the destroyer USS Cony employed practice depth charges—which were not accurately identified as such by B-59’s beleaguered crew. When, in the middle of the night, the submarine did indeed surface, a low-flying anti-submarine aircraft dropped flares and pyrotechnics so it could take better photographs. This seemed like an attack to the submarine, and the exhausted captain of B-59 ordered a crash dive and speculated that perhaps the war had already broken out. He gave orders to prepare to launch a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo at the U.S. Navy task force. It took a near-mutiny by senior officers to stop him. This close call remained unknown until fairly recently. But several more prominent naval incidents throughout 1960s convinced the Soviet Union and the United States that a basic common agreement was necessary, and the Cold War “thaw” of the early 1970s made this possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

120. WHO ATTACKED MONTENEGRO? THE MORAL AND STRATEGIC HAZARDS OF MISASSIGNING BLAME

Author:
Erica Lonergan and Maggie Smith
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
A few weeks ago, Montenegro—a NATO member—was hit with a cyber attack that targeted government servers. Montenegro’s outgoing Prime Minister, Dritan Abazovic, initially hedged about potential responsibility for the attack, stating on August 26: “We do not have clear information about the organizers… Security sector authorities couldn’t confirm that there is an individual, a group, a state behind [the attack].” Nevertheless, later that same day officials from Montenegro’s national intelligence agency attributed the attack to Russia. They also implied that the attack was related to Montenegro’s support for Ukraine and push for membership in the European Union. Yet, the extent of Russian involvement in the cyber attack remains ambiguous, which poses significant political and strategic challenges.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, Montenegro, and United States of America

121. MANAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RIVALS

Author:
Elizabeth Radziszewski and Jeremy Berkowitz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Sweden’s and Finland’s recent decisions to join NATO marked a historic moment for the two Nordic states known for their neutrality. The move not only reflects evolving security concerns about Russia’s aggression in Ukraine but marks a shift that is set to end decades of accommodation toward Russia. It also sheds light on a broader question about why some rival countries—or those that have a history of tensions—sustain policies of accommodation over the years, and what pushes them to abandon such policies. Why would Sweden and Finland refrain from alienating Russia for years only to break suddenly with this tradition with their unprecedented decision to apply for NATO membership?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Asia, Spain, North Africa, Sweden, Morocco, and United States of America

122. Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?

Author:
Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew "BINCS" Zublic
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone operations are underway, and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine. In this effort, Russia’s playbook will test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter further Russian aggression.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Baltic States

123. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

124. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

125. EU Defence After Ukraine: Denmark’s CSDP U-Turn

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The final brief looks at Denmark’s decision to abandon its opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy which, while not as significant as Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO, will bring greater strategic coherence to northern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

126. German-US Relations and the Security of the Baltic States

Author:
Marko Mihkelson
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the fourth brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, we turn our attention to the meaning of Germany’s bilateral relationships. Here, Marko Mihkelson examines the German-US relationship. The health of this relationship is vital for Baltic security, but it has sometimes been turbulent. Berlin’s refusal to support Washington’s invasion of Iraq caused a deep and long-lasting fracture. More recently, their relations have been troubled by Donald Trump’s attacks on Germany, especially over defence spending and the trade imbalance, and by energy politics. To the surprise and disappointment of the Baltic states, President Biden, looking to restore US-German relations, cancelled the Trump administration sanctions that had prevented the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. With Russia again threatening Ukraine, what to do with Nord Stream 2 is now a question for Germany’s new chancellor. Meanwhile, there is little to suggest that Berlin will meet Washington’s expectations for improving defence spending any time soon and diverging US and German policies towards China present fresh challenges to their relationship. It Is vital that Germany recognises, when it deals bilaterally with the US, that it is unavoidably acting as a representative of its European allies too.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, United States of America, and Baltic States

127. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy

Author:
Kristi Raik
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

128. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War in Cyberspace

Author:
Dmytro Dubov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war in cyberspace. Dmytro Dubov, Head of the Information Security and Cyber Security Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, examines Russia’s methods of cyber attack against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure facilities, and their impact. He discusses the close coordination between Russia’s cyber and propaganda activities and highlights future challenges for Russia in the IT realm that, if left unaddressed, will degrade its competitiveness in cyberspace. He concludes that Russia has so far failed—at least in part due to Ukraine’s progress in cyber security and defence—to deliver the effects it desired in its cyber attacks against Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Propaganda, Cyberspace, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

129. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War at Sea

Author:
Bill Combes
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The sixth brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war at sea. Captain USN (ret) William “Bill” Combes, the Director of the Department of Leadership and Management Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, examines the activities and the role of Russia’s Black Sea Navy since 2014, and particularly after 24 February 2022, including the blockade against Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s naval and coastal defence. He assesses that the loss of the air defence and command functions associate with the flagship Moskva and the damage to other ships that carry land-attack missiles has eroded Russia’s ability to maintain sea control and reduced its naval-based strike capabilities. He concludes that what Ukraine really needs is direct naval assistance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Navy, Maritime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic Sea

130. Baltic States’ Expectations Regarding Germany’s Role in Baltic Security

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
ICDS is introducing a series of policy briefs “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States”. In the first brief, introducing the series, Toms Rostoks sets out in broad terms what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would like Germany to contribute to Baltic security and assesses the prospects for achieving this. Germany plays a major role in the security of the Baltic region and, especially, of the Baltic states. Although the Baltic states would favour Germany taking an even more prominent role, there are obstacles to this due to its very different views on issues such as military power, Russia and European defence integration. Germany’s military power is, by policy choice, limited. Its willingness to use that power, even for the purposes of deterring Russia, is still more limited. More broadly, Germany seems to assume that the worst excesses of Russia’s behaviour can be tamed through dialogue and interdependence. European defence cooperation, however, offers an opportunity for Germany to build a stronger military without raising concerns about its actions. In the long term, the Baltic states expect Germany to play a robust role in the region and to more efficiently counter Russia’s policy, but in the short-term their objective would be to ensure that Germany’s commitments to their security do not decrease.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

131. Baltic Perspectives on Germany’s Role in NATO

Author:
Justinas Juozaitis
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the second brief in our “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States” series, Justinas Juozaitis considers Germany’s contribution to NATO from a Baltic perspective and looks at what might change under Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Germany’s contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, including in the Baltic region, is substantial, but does not match what might be expected given its economic strength. The Bundeswehr already struggles to meet its commitments to the Alliance and recent increases in the defence budget have not translated into major improvements in capability. Germany will most likely not meet in full the promises it has made to enhancing collective defence. Even then, the new government will have to face decisions that will be unpopular with the public, and within their own coalition. Germany’s continued political support for deterrence in the Baltic region will likely continue, but its own military contribution will probably be smaller than promised.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Economy, Regional Integration, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

132. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

133. The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is poised to bring into being a new European security order. Although the last eight months have been full of surprises, that new order may very well be marked by unstable standoffs, buildups, and dangerous activities and incidents between both Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Ukraine’s Western backers. These will risk ever more dangerous crises, all with the threat of nuclear war looming. The last eight years of military deployments, near-simultaneous exercises, and other proximate activities by Russia and NATO offer some hints as to what this future may look like. These, notably, were undertaken not to prevent an escalation in Ukraine but to deter NATO from attacking Russia and vice versa. During this time, discussions about a return to conventional arms control in Europe to mitigate the dangers of military activities gained little traction with policymakers, and the agreements and arrangements that had been in place continued to deteriorate and dwindle. In late 2021, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the West offered Russia a return to conventional arms control solutions. Russia countered with demands that NATO return to its 1990s-era force posture and eschew any further enlargement, and then proceeded to roll its tanks into Ukraine. During the tense months prior to Russia’s invasion, the conventional arms control mechanisms that remained, such as the Vienna Document, made it possible to call out Russia’s buildup, but not reverse it or prevent attack. Although there is little logic and less appetite for new arms control deals now, an end to fighting in Ukraine will create new imperatives to make Europe safer than it is today. While sanctions can limit Russian capacity to some extent, they may well be inadequate to prevent substantial buildups. For this reason, NATO members and their partners should be thinking in advance about how they could limit Russian capabilities via negotiated arrangements with robust verification measures and repercussions for violations. Once the shooting stops in Ukraine, deals such as these could make a more secure Europe, bolstered by more reliable deterrence, attainable.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

134. CPLP: the first twenty-five years

Author:
Joseph Marques
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:
The decision by Conjuntura Austral to dedicate a special issue to the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) is to be commended. The uniqueness of the organization justifies a timely review of a small sample of its activities to date. Created in 1996, the CPLP adopted three main vectors of activity:1) the promotion and dissemination of the Portuguese language; 2) cooperation in a wide array of domains (i.e., education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public administration, communication, justice, public safety, culture, sport and social communication, sustainable development, etc.); and 3) political and diplomatic coordination, especially in multilateral forums. The organization also agreed to adhere to several fundamental political principles such as the respect of the sovereignty of each member country; non-interference in domestic issues; reciprocal treatment; peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights, and social justice; territorial integrity of each member state; and the commitment to the promotion of development and cooperation. In addition to a common language and shared cultural heritage, the uniqueness of the CPLP results from the union of nine non-contiguous member states into a privileged geocultural space – the lusosphere – dedicated to the active promotion of its three main goals across four continents. It is a privileged forum for a “pluricontinental dialogue” in Portuguese. In addition, each country contributes by bringing its history, its unique interpretation of the “lusosphere” as well as its regional context (i.e., membership in the European Union, Mercosur, Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of West African States, etc.) as well as economic opportunities to the group. By joining, member countries reinforce the group’s collective projection onto the world stage as well as the opportunity to expand each member country’s diplomatic footprint. While each member had different reasons to join (i.e., maximize politicaldiplomatic cooperation, language promotion, widen access to technical cooperation, etc.), all believe that the CPLP can bolster the group’s overall political and diplomatic prestige while enhancing their collective and individual prospects. This special issue consists of six articles ranging from language to health, security and defense issues, business negotiations and civilian-military relations. It covers but a few topics from a long list of issues which, after the first twentyfive years of this new international organization, warrant the attention and critical review of academic scholars.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Health, Business, Language, Indigenous, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Brazil, South America, Southeast Asia, and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)

135. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

136. NATO Should Defend Europe, Not Pivot to Asia

Author:
Jan Gerber
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In 2021, the U.K., France, and Germany deployed 21 naval ships to the Indo-Pacific with a stated aim of helping the U.S. shoulder the burden of collective security and sustaining the “rules-based international order.” Naval deployments by the U.K., France, and Germany are symbolic and unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia. A European pivot to the Indo-Pacific draws scarce attention and resources away from defense issues in Europe. Instead of encouraging Asian forays, the U.S. should encourage its European allies to assume primary responsibility for European security, freeing the United States to focus on the Pacific, if needed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, France, Germany, and Indo-Pacific

137. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:
Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

138. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe

139. The EU as a Soft Power Superpower: Why a Green Marshall Plan for the Sahel Is Imperative

Author:
Friso Stevens and Dortih Kool
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
This research paper argues that the European Union should roll out a European Green Marshall Plan for ecosystem restoration and local governance in the Sahel region, located between the Sahara to the north and the Sudanian savanna to the south. Ecological degradation and related climate change put mounting pressure on the region. In combination with cyclical resource-related conflicts and the presence of terrorist and insurgent groups, this has created an increasingly volatile situation. European security and stability are indirectly at stake. The EU’s ‘Old War’ footing and support for illegitimate, corrupt, and autocratic governments to ‘mow the lawn’ of terrorists and insurgents fails to address and often undermines fundamental human security needs in the region. The authors propose a remodelling of EU foreign and security policy to shift focus from current securitization efforts towards facilitating a green, bottom-up transition that empowers local communities’ ecological stewardship by using their existing knowledge, skills, and dynamics, and Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR). Failure to make these changes toward a human security-centred approach means the EU’s current security and climate-related policies risk further undermining rather than contributing to regional security.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

140. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

141. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

142. Stabilizing the European Continent Reflections on the Future of EU Enlargement

Author:
Jean De Ruyt
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Since the decision to accept Croatia as a candidate member in 2011, the debate in the European Union about its enlargement has been rather subdued. But in 2022, after the bloody invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops, the new European security architecture that the EU (and NATO) tried to build after the end of the cold war has been profoundly shaken. We thought we could manage our ambiguous relationship with Russia and the European members of the ex-Soviet Union through dialogue and economic partnerships. We underestimated the urgency of stabilizing the Western Balkans through EU accession. After membership was offered to Croatia, gestures have been made – more bureaucratic than political – to negotiate the accession of other Western Balkan countries. But ‘enlargement fatigue’ fast developed – ignoring the fact that Russia and China were growing as non-democratic competitors and that Turkey was drifting out of the Western values system. Time has come now to redraw the map. The EU, NATO and the G7 reacted to the Russian aggression in Ukraine with a spectacular show of unity. In the European Council of June 24, 2022, candidate status has been offered to Ukraine and Moldova as well as a membership perspective to Georgia, and a meeting with the leaders of all Balkan countries has revived their hope for a reinvigoration of their own accession. Even if the war in Ukraine is still ongoing, it is time to prepare public opinion in the EU to this new approach to enlargement policy – starting with the fulfilment of the promises we made to the Western Balkans countries as early as in 2003 at the Thessaloniki summit. Looking also where the enlargement of the EU should end, in order to restore as best as possible ‘stability’ on the continent, the aim of the European project from the start. The basic premise that has to be kept in mind from the outset, is that the launching of the European community, its transformation into a Union, and its step by step enlargement, contrary to what Vladimir Putin pretends, has nothing to do with imperialism – nor a secret American plot to prolong or revive the cold war. It aims only at reinforcing the stability of the continent. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate this premise through the history of EU enlargement, and to look at how future steps in this direction could make this happen.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

143. Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU An Everlasting Candidate Between Delusion and Realities

Author:
Jean-Francois Drevet
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The relationship between Turkey and the European Union has never been easy. It is now affected by the activism of Ankara’s foreign policy, conducted in disregard of international law. Turkey remains, however, an important partner for the EU, as it is still officially a candidate for membership (since 1987) and in the Customs Union (since 1995). It impacts the EU, both in its internal (immigration, trade, other common policies) and external policies (through its gunboat diplomacy against two Member States (Greece and Cyprus) and countries eligible to the European Neighbourhood Policy). Moreover, the impact of the war in Ukraine will affect relations between Brussels and Ankara. In the face of Turkish activism, the EU lacks the capacity to anticipate and react, a problem that concerns not only its relations with Turkey, but its overall neighbourhood and association relations with its periphery. In the framework of the work on the neighbourhoods of the European Union (EU) carried out by the Institute for European Studies of the University of Saint-Louis and following its Annual Conference, with the aim of contributing to a better account of the Union’s relations with its periphery, the working group “Turkey” presents its elements of analysis in the run-up to 2023, which will be marked both by the centenary of the Republic and by long-awaited elections. Although much of this work was done before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (24 February 2022), it has lost none of its relevance. One might even think that a stronger EU attitude towards Turkey in 2018-2020 might have made the Kremlin think twice. Faced with Turkish bellicosity in the eastern Mediterranean, the weakness of European reactions may have convinced Moscow that it could act with impunity against a country that is a member of neither the EU nor NATO.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

144. Why Belgium Needs a Cyber Command

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 19 October 2022, the Belgian Ministry of Defence declared the Initial Operating Capability of its new Cyber Command. Responding to the trend of states seeking competitive advantages in a new operational domain – as illustrated by several high-profile cyber-attacks on Belgian State institutions – the choice for developing a new instrument of statecraft has been made. This Egmont Policy Brief outlines the growing importance of developing cyber defence capabilities, discusses the organisational set-up for this Cyber Command, and finally zooms in on the challenges ahead.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

145. Keeping the OSCE Alive

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
From September to December 2022 Belgium is chairing the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation. Whilst political gridlock has plagued the organisation before, the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine has now plunged the OSCE in an existential crisis. This bodes badly for the European security architecture and the multilateral rules-based order in general. This Egmont Policy brief reviews the risk of a full breakdown in the functioning of the OSCE, analyses the multiple reasons for keeping the organization alive, and discusses several avenues by means of which the Belgian chairpersonship can contribute to such an outcome. Irrespective of the way in which the Russian-Ukraine war eventually concludes, the OSCE provides a unique framework for managing the post-war aftermath and reconstituting a novel arms control regime over the longer term.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

146. The New Force Model: NATO's European Army

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
At the June 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO leaders gave the green light to transition to a New Force Model (NFM) in the course of 2023. The avowed aim is to create a pool of 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness (as opposed to some 40,000 today), and to pre-assign these to specific defence plans. This is very ambitious (as well it should be), all the more so because these will mostly be European troops. Is NATO building a European army? The rationale behind the NFM is that to be able to respond to all eventualities, the NATO military commander, SACEUR, requires a better view of the available forces, and their state of readiness, beyond the 40,000 currently on rotation at any one time in the NATO Response Force (NRF). Hence the NFM provides for the organisation of forces in three tiers: 100,000 troops in tier 1 should be available within 10 days; 200,000 more in tier 2 within 10 to 30 days. Adding to the existing scheme of pre-deployed battlegroups in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, some additional tier 1 and 2 forces will be pre-deployed on NATO’s eastern flank, on a rotational basis, but probably not substantially so. More importantly, NATO aims for all tier 1 and 2 troops to be assigned to specific geographic defence plans for which they can then train. Tier 3, finally, provides for at least 500,000 troops more within one to six months.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

147. Tanks versus Banks: Russian Military versus EU Geoeconomic Power

Author:
Bernard Siman, Sven Biscop, and Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
War is an instrument of policy. Those who lose sight of the policy objectives, or keep shifting them, rarely do well in war. The European Union and its Member States (and NATO) are not directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, but they have unleashed a major geoeconomic offensive in response to Putin’s geopolitical gambit. They too, therefore, have to define precise objectives, and prepare for the new geoeconomic and geopolitical world that will inevitably result from this war. First, rerouted supply chains will create new challenges and dependencies for the EU. Second, instability in other states, as a consequence of the disruptions in the global economy, may indirectly also affect the EU. Finally, long-term relations with Russia obviously have to be reassessed, but relations with China and the alliance with the US are evolving too.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Civil-Military Relations, and Banking
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

148. A European Defence Summit in May 2022: From Compass to Capabilities

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
By launching a war against Ukraine, right on the borders of the European Union, Russia has unleashed the strongest push to strengthen Europe’s defence since the end of the Cold War. Only its initial, 2014 invasion of Ukraine came close to having such effect. NATO has activated its defence plans and deployed forces on the borders with Russia. Just about every state in Europe has announced increased defence spending. And the EU finalised its Strategic Compass, its first ever defence strategy, with a much increased sense of urgency and purpose. The role of the EU in linking up national announcements and NATO targets is crucial, in fact, by providing a framework to align the efforts of the EU Member States, and by ensuring that the EU’s own indispensable targets are incorporated.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

149. Turkey in Central Asia: Possibilities and limits of a greater role

Author:
Toni Alaranta and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Turkey’s long-term search for strategic autonomy, shifting global power relations, and Central Asian governments’ desire to foster multi-vector foreign policies have prompted Turkey to successfully intensify its activities in Central Asia. From the 1990s onwards, Turkey’s activism in Central Asia has strengthened cultural, trade, and diplomatic relations. Its multilateral coordinating body, the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, is being further institutionalized into the Organization of Turkic States. Turkey’s potential for acquiring a greater role in the region is limited. Its economic engagement remains modest, and Central Asian states’ responses to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan indicate that Russia and China remain the region’s preferred security partners. Although Turkey, China, Russia, and other external actors compete in Central Asia, no full-fledged confrontation has taken place in the region so far. Turkey’s new initiatives are unlikely to change this dynamic, as long as they are conducted in the spirit of inclusive multipolarity.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Power
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, Turkey, and Asia

150. Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’

Author:
Sinikukka Saari and Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012, geopolitical competition has also become rooted in the Nordic region, and small states’ room for manoeuvre in security policy has shrunk. In Russia’s view, maintaining ‘good neighbourly relations’ is primarily the responsibility of small states that always need to negotiate the limits of their sovereignty with great powers, such as Russia. From the Nordic point of view, the relations may require walking on eggshells. Prior to 2014, Norway was often mentioned among Russia’s ‘good neighbours’, but now Russia regularly calls off its policy of ‘reassurance and deterrence’. There are increasing signs that, in Russia’s view, a ‘good neighbour’ should refrain from extensive security collaboration and training with NATO and the US. Hence, Finland and Sweden cannot wholly avoid political tension with Russia merely by staying outside of the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe