Political Geography: Europe / Journal: / Topic: Security

51. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience

Author:: Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe and Finland

52. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:: Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Arctic

53. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:: Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:: Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

54. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:: Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe

Author:: Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:: Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

56. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:: Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

57. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:: Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

58. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa

Author:: Kristin Adeoti
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Estonia

59. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

60. The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?

Author:: Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Having been crumbling already for years, international arms control architecture is now in a perilous state. Existing arrangements have either been losing their effectiveness or outright failing due to Russia’s non-compliance, whilst Russia’s aggression against Ukraine might have delivered the final blow to this system. Even after the war in Ukraine has ended, it will take years to re-establish the level of trust necessary to, again, engage with Russia on arms control. The return to the pre-war ‘business as usual’, where the dialogue will resume as if never interrupted, is unlikely. Arms control dialogue with Russia ‘at any cost’ cannot produce an acceptable result. Arms control as we have known it, with its legally binding and verifiable agreements, may have come to an end. The trends emerging from the expert discussions are more focused on a different set of instruments, such as political commitments, risk reduction, or transparency and confidence building measures. Development of new technologies, proliferation of new weapon systems, the rise of China as a global player, and increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russian and Chinese military doctrines will all have an impact on global arms control. The fate of the New START Treaty will have a decisive effect on the future of arms control and the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime already under immense pressure. This report attempts to summarise the developments in arms control architecture over the last decades and accentuate the trends that might be consequential when designing the arms control system of the future. The year 2023 has already demonstrated that arms control is less relevant in Russia’s security thinking. Moscow exploits the existing arrangements mainly as leverage to influence the US and NATO’s policy towards Ukraine or obtain concessions regarding its proposals on the new European security arrangements. The role of arms control in European security might be in decline, but the key elements of European security architecture are still in place, and most states continue to implement them. NATO allies – when discussing and designing arms control or confidence-building measures – shall consider how these instruments advance the security of allies. Under the current circumstances, the priority is to strengthen defence and deterrence of the Alliance. This is the only way to lay the groundwork for a constructive arms control dialogue with Russia.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

61. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:: Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

62. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

63. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

64. Naval Incident Management in Europe, East Asia and South East Asia

Author:: Ian Anthony, Fei Su, and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Navy, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:: Europe, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

65. Climate, Peace and Security in a Changing Geopolitical Context: Next Steps for the European Union

Author:: Simone Bunse
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This policy brief analyses current initiatives and ways forward to address the nexus between climate change, peace and security within the European Union’s (EU) foreign, security and defence policies. Considering Sweden’s reputation and credibility in advancing international cooperation on climate security and in light of the 2023 Swedish presidency of the Council of the EU, there is an opportunity to address the current lack of alignment between the climate and conflict-sensitizing work of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the climate adaptation and mitigation work of the European Commission. Closer collaboration between the EEAS, the European Commission and EU member states to align resources and tools would allow for a qualitative leap forward by fostering actions that are preventative rather than reactive to climate-related security risks in the short to medium term.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe

66. The Arctic is Hot: Addressing the Social and Environmental Implications

Author:: Emilie Broek
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: The Arctic is becoming more hotly contested and attracting new developments. The European Union (EU) is one actor that is turning to the Arctic to achieve its climate, energy, space-related and security goals. However, this increased interest can result in negative social and environmental local implications if not properly planned for and considered. This SIPRI Policy Brief provides an overview of the EU’s focus on the Arctic, with a particular focus on Kiruna, and the importance of human-centred and precautionary approaches.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Environment, European Union, Space, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Arctic

67. New Compact, Renewed Impetus: Enhancing the EU’s Ability to Act Through its Civilian CSDP

Author:: Timo Smit
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: In May 2023, European Union (EU) member states adopted a new compact to further strengthen the EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The new Civilian CSDP Compact succeeds the compact established in 2018 and is in line with the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, in particular its objective to increase the EU’s ability to act whenever crises emerge. While most stakeholders agree that the old compact was a worthwhile initiative, EU member states under-delivered on the commitments to increase national contributions and raise the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. The new compact doubles down on these commitments—not only by renewing them but also by refining them, and by raising the level of ambition when it comes to capability development and increasing women’s representation. Among other things, this has implications for the review process of the new compact, which this paper recommends that the European External Action Service and EU member states consider before setting the process in motion.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe

68. Transparency and Accountability: US Assistance to Ukraine

Author:: Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Americans are raising questions about the tracking and oversight of aid to Ukraine. Russia has long sought to dominate Ukraine, and wherever Russia hooks its tentacles, corruption naturally follows. By helping Ukraine defeat Russia on the battlefield, the United States can strike a major blow against corruption in Europe. In the meantime, the US government is carefully tracking American aid to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DoD) established a Security Assistance Group Ukraine last fall that tracks military shipments. (By contrast, the US did not establish a similar effort in Afghanistan until seven years into the war). Moreover, Congress required significant reporting on oversight and accountability in each major assistance package passed to date: the four Ukraine supplementals, the FY2023 NDAA, and the FY2022 and FY2023 omnibus bills. Specifically, Congress mandated the creation of a list of all security assistance and defense articles provided to Ukraine—and enhanced monitoring of that equipment once it enters Ukraine. Congress also mandated that the DoD reports on all end-use of military equipment. As of this writing, the DoD has found no evidence of Ukraine diverting US-supplied defense equipment. This makes basic sense: a smaller, weaker country like Ukraine could not defeat its much larger Russian adversary if Western weapons were not reaching the front lines. Indeed, Ukraine’s battlefield successes follow a basic rhythm. In June, the US released Harpoon coastal defense systems to Ukraine. Later that month, the British Defense Ministry announced that Ukraine used this Western system to sink a Russian ship on its way to Snake Island, causing the Russians to abandon the strategic outpost. The HIMARS launcher, first sent last summer, propelled Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the south and east, enabling Ukraine to liberate Kherson and take back major territories in the Kharkiv region. And the US shipment of over 100 M777 Howitzers proved effective against Russian equipment at a time when the Ukrainians were running dangerously low on artillery systems. Still, in keeping with its responsibilities, the new Republican majority in the House is standing watch and directing new efforts. Earlier this month, Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, led a congressional delegation to Romania and Poland to oversee the distribution of Ukraine aid. Following the trip, the bipartisan group of lawmakers agreed that they “came away with a clear understanding of the various safeguards the US government, in partnership with the Ukrainians and other nations, have put in place to ensure each article is accounted for and tracked to the frontline of the war.” Because Congressman Rogers sees oversight as a top priority of his committee, he will press the point in an oversight hearing on Tuesday, February 28.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

69. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)

Author:: Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

70. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine

Author:: Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

71. The battle for the Indian Ocean: How the EU and India can strengthen maritime security

Author:: Frédéric Grare and Manisha Reuter
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Over the last decade, China has gradually expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, combining its military modernisation and cooperation with partners with active diplomacy towards the island and coastal states of the region. China’s presence and capabilities threaten the freedom and influence of other actors in the area, including India and the EU. Europe’s key maritime trade routes to Asia run through the Indian Ocean, making the security of the region and freedom of navigation crucial for European interests. Many of the island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean have limited economic resources to exercise effective control at sea and are therefore dependent on extra-regional powers. As part of their approach to respond to China’s growing assertiveness in the region, the EU and India should jointly establish a regional maritime capacity building programme for island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Maritime, Trade, Modernization, and Military
Political Geography:: China, Europe, India, and Indian Ocean

72. Renewable relations: A strategic approach to European energy cooperation with the Gulf states

Author:: Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine prompted a frenzy of energy deals between EU member states and countries in the Middle East and North Africa, but their implementation is slow. The EU needs a new approach to energy cooperation with states in the Middle East and North Africa that serves both its energy security imperative and its climate goals. The Gulf monarchies represent a good test case for such an approach, due to their green ambitions, abundant resources, and significance to the fight against climate change. Political and ideological differences are currently the greatest obstacle to long-term, strategic energy cooperation between the regions. But this year’s COP28 in Dubai is an opportunity for both sides to focus on practical ways to accelerate the green transition. Europeans should emphasise four promising areas of energy cooperation with the GCC states: energy efficiency and electrification, renewable energy, and the circular carbon economy.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Decarbonization, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

73. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world

Author:: Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

74. The power of control: How the EU can shape the new era of strategic export restrictions

Author:: Tobias Gehrke and Julian Ringhof
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Technology is increasingly a battleground in the strategic competition between the US and China. Western technology contributes to China’s military modernisation as well as the development of Russian weapon systems. The US is restricting trade in key technologies with China and pushing EU member states to follow its lead. To better defend its interests, the EU needs to develop clearer policies on China and security, including pursuing the ‘de-risking’ of its relations with Beijing. The EU must develop a new strategic technology doctrine and upgrade its export control policy. This more coherent stance will enable the EU both to act where necessary but also to defend itself and its member states from future pressure from China – and the US.
Topic:: Security, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Exports
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

75. EU – Pacific Talks: EU – Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia

Author:: Tomáš Moudrý
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia, here you can read the report from the debate written by Tomáš Moudrý. During the debate, it was discussed, for example, that despite the considerable geographical distance, the EU and the Indo-Pacific region are now more interconnected than ever before and both sides are seeking to strengthen their partnership in many areas, with security policy now one of the most important due to many factors.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

76. Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine

Author:: Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether via the NATO alliance or some lesser means. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Those dangers are why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia today, and they would induce similar caution if the United States guaranteed Ukraine’s security. Lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine will be unserious and unbelievable. Fake security guarantees for Ukraine might have some deterrent value, despite their lack of credibility, given the terrible risks involved for Russia in testing those promises. However, fake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine’s security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. Announcing plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security once the war ends would encourage Russia to continue fighting. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees or fighting for Ukraine and sparking an immediate nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

77. The European Political Community from Paris to Chisinau: an idea taking shape?

Author:: Florent Marciacq, Denis Cenusa, and Ioannis Armakolas
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The European Political Community (EPC), an idea put forward by President Macron of France, echoing a similar proposal made by former Italian PM Enrico Letta, was launched and gained traction in response to the challenge posed by Russia’s war against Ukraine. The imperative of focusing on security and forming a common front against Russian aggression served as a key rationale for expanding the EPC beyond a value-based community of like-minded democratic states. The first EPC Summit was held in Prague in October 2022. A successful gathering of 44 states, including countries with still-strong ties to Russia, it gave the sense that a common pan-European front was gradually forming against Moscow. Seven priority areas were identified: energy security, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, youth, migration, regional cooperation in the Caucasus and Black Sea area, and resilience funding. The second Summit took place on 1st June 2023 near Chisinau, the capital of the Republic of Moldova, a small landlocked state in Eastern Europe which only recently achieved candidate status for EU accession. The Summit was a strong signal of support for Moldova’s efforts to consolidate its escape from Russia’s stranglehold, but also for its neighbour, embattled Ukraine. Discussions in Chisinau addressed energy security, transport networks and connectivity, cybersecurity and the integrity of critical infrastructure. Strategic cooperation was another prominent topic. Leaders reiterated the importance of restoring peace by providing increased military support to Ukraine, but also combating hybrid threats in Moldova through the recently launched EU Partnership Mission (EUPAM). At present, the EPC format seems to be pursuing two separate agendas: structuring the EU’s relations with its neighbours, and rallying the European family against Russia. Articulating and balancing these objectives properly will not be easy, and would seem to require the removal of stumbling blocks and a clarification of the level of institutionalisation at which the EPC would be required to operate. Thus, as the EPC Summit moves next to Spain and then to the United Kingdom, there is still no comprehensive consensus as to what the overall purpose of the EPC is, and whether and to what extent it should be institutionalised, which is to say endowed with a secretariat, separate funding and a certain degree of functional autonomy. A number of influential countries, including France and the U.K., see the EPC’s greatest advantage as residing in its informality and lack of institutionalisation. However, it could be argued that for the EPC’s strategic engagement in security, energy and connectivity to be successful, some level of institutionalisation and greater involvement by the EU will be required. At the same time, for the EPC to maintain its added value, it will need to preserve significant pockets of informality and flexibility of process.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, European Union, Energy, Regional Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Europe

78. Drafting Greece’s “Internal Security Strategy” – Challenges and Prospects

Author:: Panayotis Tsakonas and Triandafyllos Karatrantos
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The radical change in the structure of the international system caused a scientific and political revolution in the definition and concept of security. Issues such as the climate crisis, forced displacements and extreme nationalism have led the interest and especially the debate on achieving security from external to internal threats. The focus is now on the main “object of reference” of security which is not the state or some sub-state groups, but “the individual”/”the citizen”. In the modern globalized environment, all the risks that threaten the daily life of citizens require dealing with the concept of security in a “holistic” and, at the same time, more “human-centered” way. Greece lacks an institutional document for the internal security strategy. There are structural reasons that make a comprehensive reform of the internal security sector necessary. In addition to the established weaknesses and inadequacies of specific agencies and/or services of the internal security system, the overall organic interconnection between crisis management services is still required. The first lesson from the effects of the pandemic is the need for the evolution of Greece into a “Modern National Security State”. Greece, due to its geographical position on the external borders of the EU, as well as the crises it has experienced in recent years, faces a series of internal security threats and challenges. Security and respect for fundamental rights are not mutually conflicting but coherent and complementary objectives. The Strategy will help build an internal security governance system and a central coordination process.
Topic:: Security, Governance, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

79. ¿Hacia una Europa de la Defensa?

Author:: María Isabel Nieto
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: El regreso de la guerra a Europa ha provocado, en palabras del Consejo Europeo de Versalles, “un gran cambio en la historia de Europa” y ha desencadenado efectos mundiales con una crisis alimentaria, así como efectos en sectores como la economía –con una inflación galopante– la energía y la seguridad. La seguridad y la defensa se han convertido en una prioridad en la agenda política de la Unión Europea, que ha cruzado “líneas rojas” como la decisión de suministrar armamento a Ucrania a través del Fondo Europeo de Apoyo a la Paz, algo hasta ahora impensable. Este artículo examinará cómo la agresión rusa ha servido de estímulo para el proyecto de integración y analizará los grandes desafíos y los principales desarrollos en seguridad y defensa desde la aprobación de la Estrategia Global de Política Exterior y de Seguridad en 2016.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

80. La relación de España con Argelia: Más allá de la colaboración energética

Author:: Sagrario Morán Blanco
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: España, puente de unión entre los continentes africano y europeo, tiene como objetivo preferente de su política exterior mantener estrechas y profundas relaciones de cooperación con los dos vecinos situados en la orilla sur del Mediterráneo y actores esenciales del Magreb: Marruecos y Argelia. Este artículo intenta explicar si la recomendación hecha por el Emperador Carlos V a su hijo Felipe, “dos países vecinos no pueden ni deben ser enemigos”, ha sido la tónica general en los vínculos entre los dos Estados; así como los factores que han condicionado el contenido de sus relaciones de cooperación en las últimas décadas, y también los vaivenes o momentos de tensión vividos, junto con las causas específicas que los produjeron. España y Argelia son dos países vecinos y muy próximos geográficamente, pero representan realidades políticas, culturales y religiosas diferentes que explican, en buena medida, la distancia que existe entre los dos países y la complejidad de sus relaciones. Esta diferenciación exige una mayor atención a iniciativas de sociedades civiles.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Cooperation, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, Algeria, Spain, and North Africa

81. Addressing Cohesion Policy’s identity crisis in a changing European Union

Author:: Alison Hunter
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Since the late 1980s Cohesion Policy has been one of the cornerstone policies of the European Union. However, nowadays, a different, bolder Cohesion Policy debate is needed, reflecting a radically changed global environment. This Discussion Paper focuses on the upcoming review of the post-2027 Multi Annual Financial Framework and the debate concerning the future EU Cohesion Policy. It argues that Cohesion Policy’s purpose requires reinvention, not an incremental upgrade. Four overarching themes are analysed, reframing Cohesion Policy with a strategic, long-term investment perspective: EU resilience, security, strategic autonomy, and reforms. The author then proposes five recommendations which weave together these themes with the policy’s long-standing core features: Acknowledge the need to review the Cohesion Policy’s purpose. The EU should breathe new life into the Cohesion Policy debate. Revitalise Cohesion Policy’s long-term value by defending its pillars. The EU should re-confirm Cohesion Policy’s role as a structural policy. Position Cohesion Policy as the ‘guardian’ of EU place-based policymaking. Cohesion Policy should champion the “future-proofing” of regional resilience. Articulate Cohesion Policy’s role in the evolving EU governance and reform agenda. The EU should reach beyond the Recovery and Resilience Facility to reclaim Cohesion Policy’s role in structural reform. Improve Cohesion Policy’s convening power to catalyse deeper EU innovation cooperation. The future Cohesion Policy must deliver a more coordinated approach to the EU’s innovation agenda. The Paper concludes that the future Cohesion Policy should evolve in lockstep with citizens’ needs. This will not be easy. As discussions on the EU’s future have been sidelined in this crisis-prone area, the challenges ahead require strong leadership and coordination. The post-2027 EU Cohesion Policy will have much to contribute to rebuilding the EU’s future vision.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Reform, European Union, Regional Integration, Social Cohesion, Resilience, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

82. Quantum technologies and value chains: Why and how Europe must act now

Author:: Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: As next-generation foundational technologies, quantum computing, communication, and sensing carry significant economic and security implications that go to the core of today’s strategic competition. In contrast with the US, where Big Tech actors dominate, Europe’s strengths lie in a vibrant ecosystem of research organisations and start-ups. This growing ecosystem is now at a critical juncture to develop into an internationally competitive European industry. This paper is based on research and a series of workshops conducted with European policymakers, stakeholders and industry actors looking into Europe’s technological position in contested international value chains. It proposes ten recommendations for the EU’s industrial policy mix under the following headings: KNOW – Embrace tech forecasting at the EU level COOPERATE – Combine European efforts in an EU Quantum Industrial Alliance INVEST – Mobilise European public-private capital for industrial scale-up PROTECT – Deploy Europe’s defensive toolbox prudently In a year that will see the launch of the EU Sovereignty Fund and adoption of the European Chips Act, quantum stands as a test case for the EU’s technological competitiveness and industrial policy agenda.
Topic:: Security, Economics, European Union, Industry, Quantum Computers, and Value Chains
Political Geography:: Europe

83. How the EU and US can advance the green transition along with energy and resource security

Author:: Annika Hedberg and Olga Khakova
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The benefits of enhanced transatlantic cooperation on the green agenda are immense — and waiting to be seized. At the Ministerial Meeting in Sweden in May, the EU and US reiterated their commitment for collaboration. While progress on the EU-US Trade & Technology Council’s (TTC) green agenda has been slow, it is now time to implement this commitment. This Policy Brief provides recommendations for the TTC for turning shared principles into joint action, with a focus on the following three areas: 1. Aligning climate and sustainability ambitions with security and geoeconomic goals; 2. Building on the power of technologies and developing common standards for the green transition and energy and resource security; 3. Ensuring access to resources needed for the green transition. In conclusion, the Paper calls for the TTC to assist the EU and the US in stepping up their joint efforts in addressing environmental challenges as well as enhancing climate action, resource and energy security through trade and technology solutions. It recognises the role the platform should play in opening the transatlantic market for products and services needed to accelerate the green transition.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Natural Resources, European Union, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

84. Soldiers out, civilians left behind: EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: This is the introduction to a three-part Report that reviews the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. Even if Europe’s security debate has moved on to this bigger and more pressing challenge, the EU must heed the lessons from Kabul as it reviews its crisis management architecture and implements the Strategic Compass. The exact conditions of the Afghanistan evacuation might not be seen again for many years. Still, the EU must consider a range of other scenarios: European soldiers or citizens in danger needing evacuation from failing states or war zones, military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or even short-term stability support to governments and initial entry missions. This requires a commitment to, and building of, EU rapid deployment capacities that are effectively ready to be used, associated with appropriate crisis management structures for EU decision-making. These are the questions that have interested this project, whose examination is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:: Security, NATO, and European Union
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Europe, and South Asia

85. EU-Ukraine wartime trade: Overcoming difficulties, forging a European path

Author:: Svitlana Taran
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: During the first year of Russia’s war in Ukraine, EU trade-liberalisation measures and EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provided Ukraine with alternative export routes and allowed the country to reorient part of its exports to the EU market. However, the insufficient logistics capacity and lack of adequate coordination and cooperation during the operation of Solidarity Lanes led to tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours. While a compromise between the European Commission and the Eastern European countries allowed the extension of temporary trade-liberalisation measures for a further year, resolving the immediate crisis, more is needed to ensure their smooth operation. This Discussion Paper provides recommendations on how the EU can further intensify efforts to facilitate Ukraine’s trade flows and prevent sudden trade disruptions and restrictions. These include: Enhance the strategic alignment and connectivity between Ukraine and the EU; Ensure security guarantees and increase the capacity of seaport corridors; Enhance coordination and unity between the Commission, EU member states and Ukraine; Avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lanes' disruptions; Protect critical port and export infrastructure from Russia’s attacks; Facilitate EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Trade Liberalization, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

86. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat

Author:: Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden

87. Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe

Author:: Becca Wasser
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The United States faces an unprecedented challenge: simultaneously deterring large-scale conventional aggression by two nuclear-armed powers. The nation will need to deter these major adversaries from overt aggression in the near term in two primary, yet distinct, regions: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. However, the U.S. military is unprepared to concurrently meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. These challenges have become more pronounced as Beijing continues its ambitious military modernization and Moscow continues to threaten European security despite its currently diminished military strength. Effective simultaneous deterrence requires the United States to reembrace the basic principles of deterrence to reverse unfavorable trends in military power that are eroding long-standing U.S. warfighting advantages. It necessitates U.S. forces to project power into far-flung regions that are contested by China and Russia to uphold America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies and partners. To do so, the Pentagon must shift from previous approaches designed to deter opportunistic aggressors and respond to crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has realigned its strategy to focus on great-power deterrence, it has faced hurdles in strategy implementation that have stymied changes needed to organize more effectively for simultaneous deterrence. This is due in part to a sizable mismatch between strategy and resources. The U.S. military does not have the kinds and numbers of forces required to simultaneously deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe from conventional conflict. This deficit is especially telling in two priority scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China, and a Russian invasion of the Baltics. American forces lack the modernized capabilities, necessary posture, right levels of readiness, and familiarity with executing the types of warfighting missions needed to meet the current challenge.1 The balance between meeting global demands and responding to persistent threats while shifting to emphasize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is precarious. Concentrating on strategic priorities requires accepting risk in other regions, as the United States, with fewer forces and resources stretched around the globe, moves capabilities and forces to priority theaters. A new approach to simultaneous deterrence is needed. The Biden administration has outlined the concept of campaigning as a key component of peacetime deterrence. This concept seeks to sequence and link military activities so they intentionally counter coercion by priority adversaries. The intent is to enable the Pentagon to respond to challenges posed by China and Russia, while still meeting global demands. But the concept is currently ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation does not help the DoD meet its deterrence requirements or align strategy and resources. Instead, campaigning runs the risk of engaging U.S. forces in activities that do not contribute to or are counterproductive to deterrence. A failure to curb these activities will result in either the need to expand force size, or the hindrance of modernization efforts.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

88. Charting a Transatlantic Approach to Russia: A Working Paper of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Although the United States and Europe are not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, Moscow clearly sees itself as being at war with the West. The United States and Europe, therefore, must be prepared for a period of what is likely to be prolonged confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of that confrontation. Successfully navigating this period of sustained confrontation requires continued cohesion and coordination between the United States and Europe to ensure they share a common picture of the challenge that Russia poses and the necessary response. Russia’s war in Ukraine has precipitated rapid and major changes in Europe and broader ripple effects that are altering political dynamics much farther afield. Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia itself is changing in still unknowable ways. Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking the country in a more authoritarian direction, Russian society is shifting, and the Russian military’s degradation in Ukraine means that the nature of the Russian threat is evolving. Russia’s war, therefore, requires the allies to re-examine long-held assumptions and understandings about Russia and its intentions and capacity, and it is those updated assessments that should guide the transatlantic partners’ future policy approach toward Moscow. There is no going back to the way things were with Russia prior to its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Western allies must build on ongoing efforts to constrict and constrain the Kremlin’s ability to sustain aggression in Ukraine and more broadly beyond Russia’s borders. It also will require the development of a long-term and sustainable approach to restoring peace and stability to Europe, increasing resilience to the Kremlin’s tools and tactics, and planting the seeds for a less confrontational relationship with a future Russia. In many ways, such an approach will resemble the containment strategy first set out in the 1940s, a strategy designed to apply steady and forceful counterpressure to a regime whose paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West, just as the Putin regime does today. Each of the transatlantic allies’ preferred policy approaches will reflect their own proximity to and history with Russia, as well as current political realities within their own borders. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus within the alliance that the unprecedented cohesion and coordination among allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion must hold. To that end, this working paper provides a starting point for the development of a transatlantic approach to Russia. It articulates expectations for relations with Russia that should guide the allies’ approach, outlines the broad objectives that a transatlantic Russia policy should seek to accomplish, and in some cases more specific near-term actions the allies can take. The analysis reflects two years of dialogue that CNAS has conducted through its Transatlantic Forum on Russia (TFR). It brings together and builds on previous work facilitated by the Forum, including policy papers, op-eds, articles, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, “What Comes Next for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” and other cited publications.1 The paper aims to provide fodder for policymakers and experts on both side of the Atlantic to debate and refine through continued dialogue, including through the future work of the TFR.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

89. Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its nuclear rhetoric has become more permissive, more inconsistent, and more instrumental. Russia has also placed greater emphasis on military exercises involving nuclear-capable weapons, and it has altered policies and planning for its nuclear forces. Although it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions as the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the lessons that Russia draws from it uncertain, the changes in Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons since its invasion suggest that Russia is likely to adopt a more assertive nuclear force posture, especially with respect to its non-strategic nuclear weapons, in order to signal that the country will no longer be a status quo power and increase the credibility of its nuclear threats. Russia is also likely to increase its efforts to test NATO cohesion—potentially through greater nuclear provocations and/or by signaling an insincere willingness to engage in forms of arms control or cooperative threat reduction—and continue to look for opportunities to leverage nuclear weapons to signal great-power status. In a future war with NATO, Russia would likely perceive the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, either to seek victory against superior NATO conventional forces through nuclear first use on the battlefield, or to prevent defeat by those NATO forces. Moreover, since 2022, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. and Russian policymakers to discern each other’s red lines, raising the risk of unintended escalation. Heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric at home could also alter the public’s views of acceptable nuclear use, eroding a potential constraint on Kremlin decision-making. Finally, changes since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate both reduced Russian commitment to nonproliferation as its image increasingly becomes that of a rogue actor in international affairs, and diminished opportunities for nuclear arms control, for now.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

90. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order

Author:: Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America

91. Russian Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone Filled with Foreign Parts: Western Parts Enable Russian Lancet-3 Drone to Have Advanced Targeting and Anti-jamming Capabilities.

Author:: Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed open-source images and information found on the internet, identifying several key Western parts, commonly available on the commercial market, used in the Russian Lancet-3 kamikaze drone. - The Lancet-3 is an effective combat drone that has been successful in combat operations against Ukrainian systems, including Western supplied armor and artillery. - This report follows a series of reports published in the last year by the Institute on Russian drone systems and its acquisition of foreign technology. - Russia is increasingly relying on large quantities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to identify, target, and attack Ukrainian positions, vehicles, and structures. - Russia has a limited capability to design and produce advanced strategic commodities. To build these UAVs, Russia depends on extensive procurement networks to acquire strategic commodities produced by foreign countries, particularly the United States. - Because of the use of civilian Western components in Russian military systems, the United States and its partners are intensifying controls on critical items used in Russian drones, but more needs to be done.
Topic:: Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

92. Satellite Imagery Update on Alabuga Shahed-136 Drone Factory

Author:: David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Victoria Cheng
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Iranian-designed Shahed-136 kamikaze drones continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran-2, are produced and assembled by JSC Alabuga inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with critical assistance from Iran. Recent commercial satellite imagery appears to show that the buildings making the drones continue to operate, and at higher levels than other facilities located at the SEZ. The image, taken on a Wednesday morning in late November, shows a winter scene of the SEZ, with all the visible buildings covered in snow, except the two buildings making the Shahed-136 drone. The heat generated by the Shahed-136 buildings’ interior appears to have melted the snow on their roofs, implying ongoing operation.
Topic:: Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

93. Future-proofing EU security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Stefania Benaglia, and Linus Vermeulen
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has led policymakers to re-prioritise the European security architecture and the EU’s neighbourhood, including a positive reassessment of NATO’s role as a reliable security provider. As the transatlantic relationship and the Indo-Pacific are inherently intertwined, this once again highlights the imperative of the EU making the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority. This presents the EU with an opportunity to project its values, interests and power, though hampered at present by political infighting and the mushrooming of conflicts in and around Europe. Still, the time has come for the EU to assess how it should adjust its approach to Indo-Pacific security. How can the EU effectively strike a balance in security and defence cooperation with partners to uphold key principles of international law and order without endorsing the idea that ‘might makes right’ in the Indo-Pacific?
Topic:: Security, NATO, International Cooperation, International Law, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe and Indo-Pacific

94. The Unfulfilled Promise of EU Foreign and Security Policy towards Iran

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro, Steven Blockmans, Akin Unver, and Sine Özkaraşahin
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: With the 2015 nuclear deal dead in all but name, Iran is getting closer to Russia and more repressive at home, while EU member states’ priorities about the Islamic Republic now extend beyond nuclear proliferation to human rights and European security. This shift in priorities cements a re-orientation of the EU’s approach to Iran from conditional engagement to confrontation. EU member states’ options are limited, however. Pressure worked prior to the nuclear agreement because the EU cut off significant trade with Iran. But US extraterritorial sanctions, re-imposed after the United States left the deal in 2018, have rendered EU-Iran trade so modest that cutting it would have little impact. The EU could get more leverage by providing incentives, yet the political inexpediency of rewarding Iran at a time of rising belligerence of the Islamic Republic greatly restricts the range of benefits potentially on offer. Still, in the mid- to longer term, the EU and its member states will need to combine pressure with some form of incentives if they want to defend their interests in non-proliferation, European security and the protection of human rights in Iran. They also need to resort to a variety of international partnerships in order to maximise their residual leverage.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, and Middle East

95. How to Reduce the Impact of Internal Contestation, Regional Fragmentation and Multipolar Competition on EU Foreign and Security Policy

Author:: Sarah van Bentum, Caterina Bedin, Gregor Walter-Drop, Steven Blockmans, Agnès Levallois, and Tiffany Guendouz
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: In a Union of 27 Member States, differences in (geo)political interests, socio-economic realities, historical trajectories and national identity construction constantly threaten internal unity and thus also the external coherence of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUFSP). The following three factors and their mutually reinforcing interplay appear to have a significant impact on the creation and shaping of EUFSP, especially when it comes to managing international crises and conflicts: internal contestation, regional fragmentation and multipolar competition. The analysis in this paper draws on the main findings from nine case studies carried out under the Horizon 2020 JOINT project. The paper first assesses the (generally negative) impact of the three factors on EUFSP in these contexts of international crises, identifies common patterns and divergent approaches. The second part of the paper identifies strategies to mitigate and/or reduce the (negative) impact of these challenges on EUFSP and points towards windows of opportunity to take action moving forward. The ultimate aim of this research is to provide experts and officials with concrete ideas about how EU policy decision-making processes can enable greater coherence among EU institutions and Member States in their response to international crises and conflicts.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, Multipolarity, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:: Europe

96. What should the EU do about violent extremism?

Author:: Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Tatjana Stankovic, Pernille Rieker, and Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Despite a recent spike in concern about a resurgence in great power conflict, addressing terrorism and violent extremism has driven the foreign policy debate in the collective West for the better part of two decades since 9/11. In the European Union, these concerns most prominently emerged in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) that identified terrorism and “violent religious extremism” originating in the EU’s neighbourhood and caused by weak institutions, conflict, and state failure as a primary concern. The crux of the matter, however, is how this increased attention translates in policy terms. In other words, is the EU’s chosen CT-P/CVE policy mix balanced and fit for purpose? First, the EU’s CT-P/CVE action can hardly be framed according to a binary security versus democracy logic because of the significant emphasis placed by the EU on socio-economic development to address the structural causes of violent extremism. Second, despite the EU’s developmental focus, the language of good governance and peacebuilding, as well as funding for these areas, are key elements missing from the EU’s engagement. In order to remedy the many upstream and downstream diplomatic trade-offs that EU policymakers face in tackling violent extremism, the EU must begin to frame CT-P/CVE as part of its wider endeavour to support sustainable peace. It can do this by formulating an EU Agenda for Peace that once again underlines the EU’s commitment to promoting inclusive governance, community resilience, and social justice.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe

97. The EU and CT-P/CVE in its external action

Author:: Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Tatjana Stankovic, Pernille Rieker, and Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: This article re-frames the ongoing democracy versus security debate surrounding the European Union’s (EU) policies to counter terrorism and prevent/counter violent extremism (CT-P/CVE). Indeed, extant literature has primarily focused on how the EU’s CTP/CVE-specific emphasis on security concerns has come at the expense of attention towards good governance and social justice, thereby undermining the effectiveness of its approach. After reviewing general concepts discerned from previous research on the EU’s CT-P/CVE policy, tracing its approach over time, analysing key documents, and conducting interviews with policymakers, this analysis finds that the EU – in its words, funding, and policy implementation – also pays significant CT-P/CVE-relevant attention to the structural causes of radicalisation to violent extremism and terrorism by mobilising significant developmentoriented resources and diplomatic energy. By doing so, the EU’s CT-P/CVE policies balance an emphasis on security concerns and broader socio-economic and diplomatic engagement. However, the EU simultaneously de-emphasises good governance and peacebuilding, which must be reinforced and mainstreamed across its primary developmental engagement for the EU’s CT-P/CVE approach to be considered fully fit-for-purpose.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Governance, Violent Extremism, European Union, Democracy, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Europe

98. Playing the Long Game in the South China Sea

Author:: Andrew Mantong
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: In the South China Sea (SCS), as indeed the wider Indo-Pacific, the EU is facing a deepening strategic rivalry between China and the US. In the SCS, China has been able to create physical realities in defiance of international law by constructing artificial islands in the attempt to sustain its claims to the disputed Spratly and Paracel archipelagos as well as expand its military projection deep into international waters. The US is still the predominant security player in the Indo-Pacific, but its military presence has an increasingly hard time shoring up American power in the SCS. The security dilemma between the great powers is threatening rules-based multilateralism, which runs deep in the veins of the EU and to a great extent defines its international posture.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, International Law, European Union, Multilateralism, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

99. European Security, Eurasian Crossroads?

Author:: Zachary Paikin and Christos Katsioulis
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The NATO summit in Vilnius taking place from 11 to 12 July 2023 marks another step towards deepening the relationship between Ukraine and the collective West. When paired with the EU’s reinvigorated enlargement process, there is a growing tendency to assume that Washington and Brussels can – or even must – set the terms of the European security order without input from Moscow. However, in a world of ‘mega-regions’ and competing visions of international order, cooperative security remains relevant if the EU wishes to salvage some degree of rules-based order in the space that connects Europe with Eurasia. As first steps in this direction, the EU should work to keep the OSCE operational, launch a limited dialogue with Belarus on arms control, and envision a future for the European Political Community that someday includes Russia.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and International Order
Political Geography:: Europe and Eurasia

100. Regional actor, global player: Can the EU get the best of both worlds?

Author:: Zachary Paikin, Shada Islam, and Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The collapse of Europe’s security order coincides with a period of global transformation. Both these phenomena threaten to change the international environment that the EU has grown accustomed to and that has served its interests relatively well. They also raise major questions over the sort of actor the EU wants to be – regional or global. While the immense challenges of internal reform and breathing new life into a now-geopolitical enlargement process suggest a regional focus for the EU’s core strategic priorities, the EU can still take certain measures to avoid losing sight of the rest of the world. If the EU is serious about retaining its influence as a global actor, it must rethink its traditional way of doing business with the ‘Global South’ and learn how to autonomously navigate an unpredictable – and often fractious – multipolar world.
Topic:: Security, Reform, European Union, and Global South
Political Geography:: Europe

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS