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1. Industrial policy for electric vehicle supply chains and the US-EU fight over the Inflation Reduction Act

Author:
Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 provoked a transatlantic trade spat. After the law was passed, the Biden administration addressed some of the concerns raised by the European Union by writing controversial rules to implement the legislation. These regulations are expected to have complex effects that, in some instances, may offset the intended impact of other provisions in the original legislation. This paper examines how the law, its implementing regulations, policy decisions on leasing, as well as potential critical minerals agreements all have the potential to affect the electric vehicle (EV) supply chain. The EV case study showcases the political-economic complications involved in US and EU attempts to cooperate over clean energy transition policy to address the global externality of carbon dioxide emissions. EVs are but one example of the challenge facing partners with integrated supply chains and similar levels of economic development that share concerns about climate change, rising inequality, workers, other social issues, and democracy itself. The EV conflict laid bare the differing US and EU prioritization of these issues relative to economic efficiency, World Trade Organization rules, the approach to nonmarket economies, and national security vulnerabilities that arise from depending on an authoritarian regime such as China for import sourcing of critical inputs.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Supply Chains, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

2. Harnessing allied space capabilities

Author:
Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

3. Impact of economic sanctions on net commodity-producing and net commodity-consuming countries

Author:
Sergio R. Vale and Eduardo Viola
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has had a marked economic impact. However, since Russia is a net producer of important commodities, the impact of sanctions on its economy was less than expected. But what would happen if there was a war involving a country that was a net importer of commodities? In the case of a possible China-US conflict over Taiwan, the impact on the world economy would be different, with a deeper recession around the world, but the impact on the Brazilian economy would still be positive on account of the possibility that would remain of agricultural exports to China.
Topic:
Agriculture, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Commodities, and Exports
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. Who Learns More from Afar? Spatial Empirical Evidence on Manufacturing and Services

Author:
Nina Vujanović
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This paper investigates spatial dependence of FDI knowledge spillovers in manufacturing and services using spatial panel techniques applied to the 2006-2014 Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus firm-level dataset for Croatia and Slovenia. The paper finds diverse results across the two sectors. The distance between regions does not hinder the absorption of foreign knowledge in manufacturing despite the strong market-stealing effects operating within regions as well as spatially. On the other hand, FDI knowledge spillovers decrease service productivity within regions, because of market-stealing effects operating strongly across a smaller geographical scale. However, its impact is lost as knowledge spillovers from more distant neighbours are accounted for, because the poaching of local labour is impeded by distance due to rising costs of labour mobility. The research indicates that for knowledge absorption, geographic distance plays differing roles in manufacturing and services, due to the different nature of the production process.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, Manufacturing, Econometrics, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, Croatia, and Slovenia

5. Assessing Digital Leadership: Is the EU Losing out to the US?

Author:
Dario Guarascio and Roman Stöllinger
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Since Leontief’s (1953) seminal work on the factor content of trade, the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin-model has been judged not only on the basis of formal tests of the theory but also tested against prior expectation. In this vein, this paper uses the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) approach to investigate whether supposed US leadership in the digital domain can be traced back to digital task endowments embodied in labour services. In a comparison between EU member states and the US, we find that the latter is more intensive in digital tasks than the EU and that this difference is explained by both an intensity-effect (US occupations being more digital-task intensive) and a structural component (relatively more digital-task intensive occupations). Viewed through the lens of the HOV theorem we find that the US is abundant in digital tasks relative to non-digital tasks, while the opposite is true for the EU. The standard tests for the predictive power of the HOV theorem are high and in line with the results for labour in previous literature.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Digitalization, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

6. Employment Effects of Offshoring, Technological Change and Migration in a Group of Western European Economies: Impact on Different Occupations

Author:
Michael Landesmann and Sandra Leitner
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This paper estimates conditional demand models to examine the impact of offshoring, technological change, and migration on the labour demand of native workers differentiated by four different types of occupational groups: managers/professionals, clerical workers, craft (skilled) workers and manual workers. The analysis is conducted for an unbalanced panel of five economies Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, and Switzerland covering the period 2005-2018. Our results point to important and occupation-specific effects: offshoring seems to have beneficial employment effects for native craft workers in this set of economies, while negative effects for native manual workers across a wide set of industries (including manufacturing and services industries) and managers/professionals in manufacturing. Furthermore, there are important distinctions whether offshoring occurs in other advanced economies, in the EU13 or in developing countries. The analysis of the impact of technological change shows the strong positive impact which the additional IT equipment has on most occupational groups of native workers (with the exception of manual workers), while robotisation in manufacturing showed strongly negative impacts on the employment of all groups of workers and especially of craft workers. Increasing immigrant shares in the work forces showed strongly negative impacts on native workers – however, considering only the partial substitution effects and not including the potential for productivity and demand effects – and this is mostly accounted for by immigration from low- to medium-income source countries.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Migration, Labor Issues, Immigration, Foreign Direct Investment, Employment, Competition, Income Distribution, and Offshoring
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, and Austria

7. Functional Specialisation and Working Conditions in Europe

Author:
Sandra Leitner, Roman Stöllinger, and Zuzana Zavarská
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Specialisation in value-chain functions is one of the new phenomena introduced by global value chains (GVCs). This report investigates the effects of functional specialisation on labour markets in fabrication and R&D activities as the two polar cases of value-chain functions, whereby the former is associated with factory economies, while the latter is characteristic of headquarter economies. More precisely, a metric similar to revealed comparative advantage is used to study the effect of relative functional specialisation on wages and non-wage working conditions. In line with the GVC literature emphasising power relations and organisational aspects of production networks, we are able to identify differentiated effects for functional specialisation patterns on wages in EU member states at the industry level across time. While relative functional specialisation in fabrication tends to hold back wages, functional specialisation in R&D has a positive effect on wage progression, controlling for labour productivity, GVC participation and numerous labour supply- and labour demand-side factors. The use of a constructed ‘sharp’ instrument allows giving these results a causal interpretation. Conversely, both functional specialisation measures are found to improve some non-wage working conditions, namely workers’ physical environment and their work intensity, which is evidence against a potential ‘race to the bottom’ effect of functional specialisation along GVCs. The effect is stronger for relative specialisation in fabrication than for relative specialisation in R&D.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Labor Issues, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Labor Market, Value Chains, and Wages
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Determinants of Functional Specialisation in EU Countries

Author:
Aleksandra Kordalska and Magdalena Olczyk
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This paper aims to identify factors that determine functional specialisation (FS) in global value chains (GVCs) in European Union countries. We focus on fabrication and R&D as two opposite business functions in terms of their character and their potential of creating value-added. To make our results robust two different approaches to measuring functional specialisation are used – an FDI-based approach and a trade-based approach. To assemble a relative functional specialisation index, for each approach we use the same metric – a revealed comparative advantages index. Our results suggest a positive effect of wages on specialisation in an R&D function, and a negative impact on FS in fabrication. Increasing labour productivity boosts both specialisation in fabrication and in R&D. The results are robust to different model specifications and different time intervals. The instrumental variables method allows us to interpret the results as causal relationships. Additionally, human capital and labour skills foster FS in R&D (only in FDI data), and growing employment makes FS in fabrication increase. The growth of GDP per capita positively affects functional specialisation in R&D activities. Among GVC participation measures, we confirm the importance of increasing backward linkages to explain the boost in fabrication activities. Dividing a full sample into a group of EU15 countries and a group of Central Eastern European countries we observe that patterns for the EU15 are similar to those for the full sample, while for CEE countries wages are insignificant and labour productivity affects FS in fabrication only.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Economy, Value Chains, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Trade Balances and International Competitiveness in Cyber-physical, Digital Task-intensive, ICT Capital-intensive and Traditional Industries

Author:
Alexandra Bykova and Roman Stöllinger
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
In this report, we analyse the international competitiveness of the EU in four industry groups over the period 1995-2018. The groups are delineated by specific factor intensities, where these intensities are assessed from digital tasks performed by labour services and ICT capital stocks. The EU’s positions relating to trade balances, revealed comparative advantages and unit value ratios are assessed relative to its main competitors, such as the US, China, Japan and South Korea. The trade specialisation patterns confirm EU advantages in traditional industries, which still represent the largest part of global trade, and in the group of digital task-intensive industries. In the cyber-physical group of industries, which are characterised by both high digital task and ICT capital intensities, the EU records a trade deficit, although this has been receding in recent years. Competitiveness indicators depict heterogeneity among EU countries. The loss of international competitiveness for some technology front-runners is a worrying sign. On the positive side, however, a reduction in trade deficits or an improvement in product quality and market shares is evident for certain EU countries, especially in the Central European region.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, Trade, Digitalization, and International Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

10. Exchange Rate Pass-Around

Author:
Matthieu Crozet, Julian Hinz, and Federico Trionfetti
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
In January 2015, The Swiss Franc (CHF) appreciated unexpectedly against the Euro by approximately 15%. We document a new fact: French firms that exported to both the Swiss market and the Eurozone also exhibited a sudden change in their export prices to the Eurozone. We coin this the “exchange rate pass-around” effect. We rationalise this fact with a simple model based on the endogenous decision of some firms to give up pricing-to-market and opt for single-pricing to all markets. An important implication of this finding is that single-pricing may be one of the causes of the incomplete pass-through. This mechanism has so far remained unexplored in the literature, which may have led to overestimating the importance of other factors. Based on monthly French export data, our empirical analysis confirms the existence of the pass-around. Firms directly affected by the CHF exchange rate shock increased their prices in neighboring markets by 0.8% compared to other exporters. The effect was stronger for firms with lower ex-ante price heterogeneity across markets and for firms with smaller trade costs to Switzerland. However, the effect was short-lived. As time passed, exporters tended to decouple the prices they set on the Swiss market from those for the Eurozone, and the pass-around effect faded.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Markets, Monetary Policy, European Union, and Exchange Rate Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

11. Blowback: The Effect of Sanctions on Democratic Elections

Author:
Matthieu Crozet and Julian Hinz
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Sanctions are meant to coerce political adversaries through economic measures. However, evidence for their effectiveness is scarce. In this paper we assess the impact of sanctions on a democracy — France — by studying the electoral consequences of the sanctions and countersanctions imposed between Russia and Western countries. Contrary to most of the existing literature we find clear evidence for exposure to the sanctions to cause an increase in the vote share for pro-Russian (and far-right) candidates during the French 2017 presidential election. Locally, the impact on voting is substantial. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that about 16,300 votes for the main far-right candidate can be directly attributed to the sanctions’ impact. This is the total number of votes cast in a medium-sized French city. It is however not nearly enough to have affected the outcome of the election at the national level.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, and Elections
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and France

12. Who is to suffer? Quantifying the impact of sanctions on German firms

Author:
Holger Görg, Anna Jacobs, and Saskia Meuchelbock
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
In this paper, we use a novel firm level dataset for Germany to investigate the effect of sanctions on export behaviour and performance of German firms. More specifically, we study the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in 2014 in response to the annexation of Crimea and Russia's countermeasures. We find a substantial negative effect on both the extensive and intensive margin of German exports. While the negative effects are strongest for firms exporting products subject to trade restrictions, we provide further evidence on the indirect effects of sanctions. Analysing the impact on broader measures of firm performance, we document that the cost of sanctions is heterogeneous across firms but overall modest. Our results reveal that the negative impact of the shock was concentrated primarily among a small number of firms that were highly dependent on Russia as an export market and those directly affected by the sanctions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Russia-Ukraine War, and Firm Dynamics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

13. The power of control: How the EU can shape the new era of strategic export restrictions

Author:
Tobias Gehrke and Julian Ringhof
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Technology is increasingly a battleground in the strategic competition between the US and China. Western technology contributes to China’s military modernisation as well as the development of Russian weapon systems. The US is restricting trade in key technologies with China and pushing EU member states to follow its lead. To better defend its interests, the EU needs to develop clearer policies on China and security, including pursuing the ‘de-risking’ of its relations with Beijing. The EU must develop a new strategic technology doctrine and upgrade its export control policy. This more coherent stance will enable the EU both to act where necessary but also to defend itself and its member states from future pressure from China – and the US.
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

14. EU-Pacific Talks: Trade relations with the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Eliška Prostřední
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
Overall, the debate focused on the diversification of global trading partners and how to achieve it. Speakers also discussed the threats associated with dependence on only a few strong countries, which can then take the position of rule makers. The whole debate was linked to the possibilities of global trade with countries that are part of the Indo-Pacific region. Writes Eliska Prostřední in her report on the debate "EU-Pacific Talks: Trade relations with the Indo-Pacific".
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Partnerships, Diversification, Trade, Debates, and Economic Dependence
Political Geography:
Europe and Indo-Pacific

15. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

16. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:
Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. U.S. Strategy: Rebalancing Global Energy between Europe, Russia, and Asia and U.S. Security Policy in the Middle East and the Gulf

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has already shown how dangerous it is for the U.S. to assume that it can rebalance its forces to one region and count on a lasting peace or detente in others. It now is all too clear that U.S. strategy must continue to focus on Europe as well as China. What is less clear is the extent to which the Ukraine War is an equal warning that the U.S. must have a truly global strategy – and one that continues to focus on other critical regions like the Middle East. The sudden escalation of the Ukraine crisis into a major regional conflict and the need for political and diplomatic support in the UN as well as for sanctions are warnings that much of the U.S. success in deterrence and defense lies in creating long-term global diplomatic and political support as well as true and lasting strategic partnerships.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. CONTAINMENT 2.0: SANCTIONS FOR THE LONG HAUL

Author:
David A. Lake
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The West is not imposing coercive sanctions on Russia to stop its current aggression. No one seriously expects that the sanctions will cause President Putin to withdraw from Ukraine. NATO made clear before the war that its members will not defend Ukraine with military force. The European members have also, as expected, carved out exceptions to the sanctions regime for oil and gas so as not to impose too much pain on their own economies. Putin anticipated the general scope of the sanctions likely to be imposed on Russia and decided it was worth invading Ukraine anyways. While he may have been surprised by the extent of the sanctions and unity of NATO so far, this is not enough to alter his calculus. Indeed, he is doubling down on the original plan. He also knows that he has other weapons and forms of coercion against the West up his sleeve. Rather, we are seeing the birth of a possible Containment 2.0, a forced decoupling of Russia from the Western international economy. This is a long-term, not a short-term, strategy. The point is to undermine the Russian economy, stifle its technological progress, deny Russians a standard of living comparable to that of the West, and break support for the regime over time. In doing so, the West undermines Russia’s ability to compete militarily, aiming to forestall further Ukraines, and weakens Putin’s hand at home and abroad.
Topic:
NATO, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Economy, and Containment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Global Focus, and United States of America

19. European unilateralism as a tool for regulating international trade: a necessary evil in a collapsing multilateral system

Author:
Alan Hervé
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), the fight to prevent illegal foreign subsidies, the ban on trade in deforestation products, the due diligence obligation imposed on European companies, the anti-coercion regulation, the reciprocity instrument in public procurement, the foreign investment screening regulation, not to mention the set of exceptional trade measures implemented in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic and the invasion of Ukraine; there is a long list of decisions adopted and under discussion that mark the European Union's determination to decide alone on the regulation of trade between itself and the rest of the world. This European "neo-unilateralism" is certainly based on a logic that is not entirely new - the defence of the Union's interests through trade policy or trade regulation instruments - but it also presents singular features and reflects political choices that prevail, more than in the past, over strict mercantile considerations. It is a vehicle for promoting the European Union's strategic autonomy in a multilateral system that is in the process of collapsing and an international order that has been hit by crises.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, Multilateralism, International System, and Unilateralism
Political Geography:
Europe

20. Carbon Pricing During an Energy Crisis

Author:
Harrison Fell and Pierre Noel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The European energy crisis, aggravated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, amplifies the tension between climate mitigation action and energy affordability. Introducing a more effective safety valve to the EU carbon market could reduce affordability concerns and the political pressure associated with extreme price spikes, making the system more resilient. It could be accompanied by a more effective price floor too.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Conflict, Carbon Emissions, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

21. Energy Markets and the Design of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Christof Ruhl
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Sanctions against the citizens, institutions, and products of the Russian Federation are evolving rapidly. Energy sanctions started late, but the number of countries embargoing oil, gas, or coal imports from Russia is expanding. These sanctions are likely to increase global fuel prices while depressing the price of the sanctioned fuel. The experience to date suggests that the current, gradual approach of reducing oil and gas imports from Russia one country at a time may have room to go further. Before the invasion of Ukraine, the sweeping and unprecedented sanctions promised in the event of a Russian invasion were often conceived as a two-pronged pincer movement. The idea was to isolate Russia from the global financial system while limiting its commodity and energy exports. Both moves were aimed at the source of the financial strength of “fortress Russia,” namely, its persistent balance of payment surplus.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Financial Markets, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

22. EU carbon border adjustment mechanism faces many challenges

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Megan Hogan, and Jisun Kim
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This Policy Brief assesses the evolving EU Emissions Trading System and EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and explains objections within Europe and from major trading countries likely to be affected by the proposed CBAM import levies. While EU officials have sought to ensure that the CBAM is consistent with obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), key aspects of the CBAM could violate WTO rules and are likely to be contested, taking years to play out. Meanwhile, several other countries will adopt new carbon-inspired border restrictions, adding to global trade frictions. Major carbon-emitting countries, therefore, need to act cooperatively instead of unilaterally to both advance the fight against climate change and update the rules-based global trading system. Two-thirds of greenhouse gas emissions result from nontraded activities, such as road transport, electricity generation, and home and office heating. Countries can curb emissions in these activities, while developing guidelines for carbon abatement in traded sectors.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization, European Union, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe

23. Is South Korea vulnerable to EU and US carbon border restrictions?

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
South Korean exports, especially carbon-intensive products like steel, are increasingly vulnerable to both the European Union’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)—set to begin on January 1, 2023—and the proposed Clean Competition Act (CCA) before the US Congress. Schott and Hogan caution that Korean exporters should not count on Korea’s decade-old EU and US free trade agreements (FTAs), nor on the multilateral trading rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to protect them from new carbon-based import barriers in key foreign markets. The WTO and the FTAs have broad and loosely defined exemptions for environmental protection. Nor is Korea likely to be shielded by its own cap-and-trade emissions trading system (the K-ETS), because of extensive use of free allowances and large differences between EU and Korean carbon prices. While the threat the EU CBAM poses to Korean exports is imminent, passage of the CCA faces major legislative obstacles. But US imports of Korean steel and other carbon-intensive goods are still subject to climate-related duties at the US border under US unfair trade statutes. The US Department of Commerce has ruled that free allowances issued under the K-ETS (and EU ETS) are implicit subsidies that can be offset by countervailing duties. These charges are in addition to the harsh tariff-rate quotas on imported Korean steel applied under the “national security” authority of Section 232 of US trade law, which are more restrictive than measures imposed against European and other steel exporters. The authors suggest relaxing these US barriers, as they have been for shipments from Europe, in return for Korean participation in the nascent US-EU talks to establish a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum.”
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Exports, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

24. Has Globalisation Really Peaked for Europe?

Author:
Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This paper builds on the recent arguments put forward by Richard Baldwin and others debunking the myth that we enter a period of de-globalisation. The paper argues that globalisation is a complex phenomenon that requires detailed, firm-level indicators going beyond simple aggregate metrics. When using such indicators, the picture is much more nuanced and, in the case of Europe, the role of global trade is as important as ever for hundreds of thousands of companies and millions of jobs supported by global trade flows. A strong participation in the “new globalisation” is also key for the future EU competitiveness in technology-driven sectors.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

25. The impact of the Ukraine crisis on international trade

Author:
Zsolt Darvas and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
We study the economic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, by scrutinising global trade volumes and commodity prices, trade balances and bilateral trade flows between major economic powers and Russia. We find that energy prices increased more in 2021 than in 2022, suggesting that the war and the sanctions were not the most important drivers. Nevertheless, International Monetary Fund forecast revisions from October 2021 to October 2022 suggest that the volume of global trade in goods and services declined by 3.4 percent, energy prices increased by about 100 percent, and the prices of non-energy commodities by 8 percent. The war could be an important driver of these forecast revisions, though other factors were also at play. While forecasts for important industrial production input costs were not revised, soaring energy prices deteriorated the trade balance of countries importing energy. Only half of the increase in Russia’s trade surplus was related to soaring energy prices. The other half resulted from the collapse of Russian imports, which will likely undermine the Russian economy’s productive capacity over time. Falling Russian exports of goods other than mineral fuels suggest Russia’s productive capacity has already weakened. Russia’s trade has been reoriented from advanced economies to China, India and Turkey, but this has only partially compensated for the decline in trade with advanced countries. We find that sanctions had an impact on trade. There is no evidence of European and US companies circumventing sanctions by re-routing sanctioned goods to Russia via China and Turkey. The UK and the US have already stopped importing fossil fuels from Russia, and such imports by the EU have declined. With the EU’s Russian seaborne crude petroleum import ban taking effect in December 2022 and the refined petroleum ban coming to effect in February 2023, Russia’s revenues from fossil fuel exports to the EU are set to shrink significantly, with limited options for redirecting exports to other countries. The three main policy-relevant implications from our research are: The war and the sanctions are not the most important drivers of energy price; The direct aim of sanctions seems to have been achieved; The capacity of the Russian state to finance the war from fossil fuel revenues is bound to shrink. The dataset used for most charts of this working paper is regularly updated and is available in the Russian foreign trade tracker
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Fossil Fuels, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

26. Economic and Social Impacts of FDI in Central, East and Southeast Europe

Author:
Doris Hanzl-Weiss and Branimir Jovanovic
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This study assesses the economic and social impacts of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 17 economies in Central, East and Southeast Europe (CESEE). More precisely, we investigate how different FDI inflows have affected various economic and social indicators, such as GDP growth, labour market outcomes, and poverty and inequality, for the period since the fall of communism until 2020. We pay particular attention to FDI that originates from the EU, as well as FDI from Germany and Austria, in order to evaluate whether their effects are different from the effects of FDI from other places of origin. We also examine whether there are differences in the impacts of different types of FDI – equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company debt, as well as of FDI that goes to different sectors of the economy – the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. We find that FDI inflows have had, in general, a positive effect on economic growth in CESEE, and that this effect has been particularly strong for German and Austrian FDI. For total FDI, higher inflows of 1 percentage point (pp) of GDP are associated with 0.19 pp higher GDP growth. For FDI from Germany and Austria, this effect is five times higher – FDI inflows of 1 pp of GDP have led to 0.9 pp higher GDP growth. The positive GDP effects have come from the higher consumption and exports that the FDI has induced. FDI inflows have also reduced unemployment and increased wages, but have had no effects on labour productivity. Total FDI has had only limited effects on inequality and poverty, but FDI from Germany and Austria has been found to reduce both inequality and poverty, likely because they have benefitted mainly lower-income persons. There are differences in the effects of the different types of FDI, with reinvested earnings and equity capital having in general more beneficial effects than intra-company loans. Also, FDI in different sectors of the economy has had different effects, with inflows to the secondary and tertiary sectors having greater effects than inflows to the primary sector. The policy implications of these results are that CESEE economies should not give up on their efforts to attract more FDI, but also that their endeavours should be more targeted, focusing on investments that have greater economic and social impacts. Moreover, foreign investment should not be criticised for the perhaps unsatisfactory economic and social performances of the economies from this region. Instead, the reasons for this should be sought in domestic factors and in the modest growth of the European Union during the past two decades.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Poverty, Foreign Direct Investment, Inequality, Economic Growth, and Unemployment
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Germany, and Austria

27. Brothers in arms: The value of coalitions in sanctions regimes

Author:
Sonali Chowdhry, Julian Hinz, Katrin Kamin, and Joschka Wanner
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii) compare prospective coalition partners and; (iii) provide bounds for the sanctions potential — the maximum welfare change attainable — when sanctions are scaled vertically, i.e. across sectors up to an embargo, or horizontally, i.e. across countries up to a global regime. To gauge the significance of simulation outcomes, we implement a Bayesian bootstrap procedure that generates confidence bands. We find that the implemented measures against Iran and Russia inflicted considerable economic harm, yielding 32 – 37% of the vertical sanctions potential. Our key finding is that coalitions lower the average welfare loss incurred from sanctions relative to unilateral implementation. They also increase the welfare loss imposed on Iran and Russia. Adding China to the coalition further amplifies the welfare loss by 79% for Iran and 22% for Russia. Finally, we quantify transfers that would equalize losses across coalition members. These hypothetical transfers can be seen as a sanctions-equivalent of NATO spending goals and provide a measure of the relative burden borne by coalition countries.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Sanctions, Alliance, and Embargo
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. Developing EU Trade Incentives: A Support Tool for Refugee Self-Reliance and Host Community Resilience in Turkey

Author:
Basak Kale
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) is developing innovative mechanisms to investigate the root causes of migration in order to offer better socioeconomic opportunities both to migrants and host communities. These mechanisms and actions require multi-country bilateral and regional assistance tools to support different partner countries. Innovative and out-of-the-box ideas include multiple countries and various stakeholders. They are developed to provide cooperation solutions in different regions to have a wider impact on the causes and implications of migration. Despite these efforts, political, social, economic and environmental causes continue to generate human mobility around and beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. The Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria have been creating human mobility in the EU neighbourhood. The war made approximately 7 million Syrians flee to neighbouring countries. Turkey is hosting around 3.7 million Syrians and another half a million asylum seekers and refugees from other regions (DGMM, 2021; UNHCR, 2021). The presence of Syrians in Turkey, together with other refugees benefitting from international protection, has become protracted. The efforts to create durable solutions in the form of “voluntary return, resettlement or local integration” have not yet successfully provided sustainable solutions. Turkey does not pursue an official state integration policy to integrate asylum seekers, refugees and the Syrians under temporary protection (STP). However, STPs, asylum seekers and refugees are becoming increasingly integrated into their host communities through informal and local integration mechanisms (Kale & Erdoğan, 2019). The delay in the access to formal employment and challenges in receiving formal employment permits aggregate the difficulties in the inclusion of refugees into formal employment schemes. Summer 2015 has shown that when there is a lack of economic and employment opportunities for asylum seekers, refugees and persons under temporary protection the incentive to have onward movement to other countries persists and the possibilities of integration in host communities stay low. It is clear that resilience-building and livelihood support through formal work is essential for vulnerable populations to have dignified living conditions in host countries. The EU-Turkey Statement in 2016 triggered the development of changes in the legal framework of international protection and migration policy. The Statement paved the way for the preparation of regulations on work permits for persons under temporary and international protection (Official Gazette, 2016). Legal developments targeted the acceleration of the economic integration of refugees into the Turkish labour market through formal employment. However, the difficulties in getting formal work permits resulted in only 132,000 issued until 2019. This indicates that approximately 4% of the STP working population has formal employment (UN Turkey, 2020). This percentage more or less matches the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimations (ILO, 2020). As a result, the majority of the refugee population is working informally, underpaid (Balkan & Tümen, 2016), without formal social and health security mechanisms, in unskilled jobs that are not wanted by Turkish citizens (Sunata, 2017). Informal employment has been a key element contributing to the lack of durable solutions and a protracted process. In Turkey, informal employment is widespread even among the host community members. It is estimated that there is about 30% of labour in host community among all sectors working unregistered. Informal employment is higher in sectors such as agriculture but significantly lower in the industrial sector. The COVID- 19 pandemic has also aggravated the increasingly poor state of the Turkish economy (Akay Ertürk, 2020). Previously, there were continuous efforts through FRIT (Facility for Refugees in Turkey) and 3RP (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan) projects with programmes focusing on improving the employability of refugees in the Turkish labour market as well as support for the entrepreneurship capacities of the refugees in accessing the formal labour market. However, under the current economic conditions these projects are failing to generate a significant long-term impact on employment for refugees (Özçürümez & İçduygu, 2020). These projects provide short-term trainings or restricted employment possibilities while including a very limited number of participants. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic conditions have shown that these livelihood support arrangements when they are not based on rights-based approaches overtime can transform back into humanitarian aid services (Kale & Yavçan, 2020). Long-term policy planning needs to include other incentive mechanisms that will cover multi-country and multi-region solutions. In the long run, if vulnerable populations in the host societies turn into the most vulnerable requiring humanitarian and emergency aid, the incentive for secondary movements to third countries can be high.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and International Community
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

29. Refining the EU’s Geoeconomic Approach to Trade Policy

Author:
Sjorre Couvreur
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The great powers are adapting their policies to a new geoeconomic context. When looking at the EU’s strongest external policy tool, trade policy, one could ask if the EU is doing enough? This policy brief makes recommendations on how to improve the buy-in of Member States for trade-security initiatives, advance cooperation between DG Trade and the EEAS, and avoid escalation in an age of geoeconomics.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

30. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A Piece in the Industry Decarbonization Puzzle

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a first step toward reconciling the European Union (EU)’s climate and trade interests. However, a complementary set of domestic and external policies will be needed to drive the decarbonization of European and global energy-intensive industries. • By 2035, the EU must have fully replaced its unsustainable free allocation regime by an effective CBAM. Yet, rushing implementation may bring little climate benefit and additional strains on industrial competitiveness, in a context of soaring energy prices. • Even with the CBAM as a complement, the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is no silver bullet. Triggering large-scale investment in deep-decarbonization projects across the EU requires a package of well-coordinated policies, including those enabling crucial access to affordable low-carbon electricity. • Climate clubs are not a credible alternative to the EU’s CBAM, nor desirable amid the geopolitical crisis. Instead, the EU should convince all large industrial countries that the race for clean manufacturing requires guiding principles, to avoid undue distortion of trade and ensure a fair industrial transition globally. • Setting expectations about CBAM at the right level – both internally and externally – is the best way to support the EU’s green industrial policy while containing diplomatic tensions.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, Industry, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe

31. Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who Has the Fairest Clauses of Us All? Stress-testing the Application of Mirror Clauses to Pesticides

Author:
Emily Rees
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
In less than six months, ‘mirror clauses’ have taken EU trade policy by storm. To inject ‘reciprocity’ in trading terms, the French Presidency of the Council is proposing that imported food and feed be produced under the exact same sanitary, phytosanitary, welfare and environmental standards as those imposed on domestic products within the European Union. The international trade rulebook is both complex and yet relatively straightforward in ensuring that process and production methods applied to imports respond to legitimate justifications and do not result in a disguised barrier to trade. The European Union may learn from the United States’ playbook to ensure that mirror clauses are negotiated with trading partners bilaterally, rather than imposed on them unilaterally. As part of its Farm to Fork strategy, the European Commission has announced two pesticides reduction targets to be attained by 2030, and it is in this framework that questions relating to plant health and international trade have been gaining traction. With pesticides targets set to raise costs for European farmers and productivity levels likely compromised, there are genuine concerns that domestic products will be competitively undercut by imports produced ‘less sustainably’. To grasp the complexity of mirror clauses applied to the phytosanitary sphere, understanding how the European Food Safety Agency authorises and bans active molecules and bio solutions is vital. Appreciating the daily efforts of national customs agents in checking imports for pesticides residues, and coordinating efforts of Member States on rejected food and feed imports that do not meet EU requirements, is also paramount. There are warranted societal justifications to impose measures to protect humans, animals, plants and ecosystems. To remain legitimate under international law however, mirror clauses should be ‘stress-tested’ to avoid being applied as a means to gain competitiveness. Countries are unequal when it comes to the risk of pests and climate change is already intensifying their distribution with potentially dramatic impact for global food security. When it comes to protecting plant health, regional conditions must be considered to not only avoid inconsistency with WTO rules but also to ensure that mirror clauses do not result in a practical ban on imports from developing countries impacting livelihoods worldwide.
Topic:
Agriculture, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Mercosur, and Pesticides
Political Geography:
Europe

32. Should the EU Pursue a Strategic Ginseng Policy? Trade Dependency in the Brave New World of Geopolitics

Author:
Oscar Guinea and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Political leaders all over the world are calling for strategic autonomy. The removal of critical trade dependencies has become a guiding principle in most policy proposals, including the EU’s new industrial strategy. In making these decisions, it is important for policymakers to understand the reasons behind why shortages of critical goods and technologies have emerged in the first place. The instruments that new policies cerate should respond to real problems, not invented ones. For instance, if shortages are due to temporary mismatches of supply and demand, most of them will be fixed without the need of any policy intervention. On the other hand, shortages can also be engineered by countries using their dominance in the production of certain goods to coerce other countries. As the EU experienced first-hand after the Russian war on Ukraine in 2022, the concentration of market power in the production of any product carries geopolitical risks. For that purpose, it is crucial to understand the nature of trade dependencies. This policy brief presents indicators and a conceptual framework to measure trade dependency. The framework consists of two indicators: the first measures the share of EU imports from outside the EU over EU production proxied as the sum of imports and exports, while the second indicator considers the market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). It then applies this framework to EU trade with the rest of the world in 2020 and elaborates on the product categories and partner countries behind these dependencies. From a total of more than 9,000 product categories, there were only 233 products that could be classified as dependent within our framework. In terms of values, they represented 1.5% of EU total imports or €50 billion. The major suppliers of these products to the EU were China, United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Imports of hydrocarbons from Russia are part of this list of trade dependencies, but so are many other goods which are not of strategic importance. A policy intervention should be tailored to the specific product and the specific export country. Given the small size of the EU imports in which the EU can be considered dependent, it is not advisable to base Europe’s new industrial policy on a general fear of dependency and apply new policies in many sectors. Many of these products are easy to substitute and the economy can function without them. For the select few products where dependency is an economic concern, our paper explores different measures that the EU can put in place to lower trade dependency and how this dependency can be reduced through international trade.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Geopolitics, and Imports
Political Geography:
Europe

33. Turkey’s Changing Posture on Russia and America

Author:
Hasan Unal
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
As of this writing, tensions between Russia and Ukraine appeared to continue unabated, despite the Putin‑Biden online meeting and the exchange of several messages between Washington and Moscow aimed at reducing them. The crisis has kept almost everyone guessing as to where all this is heading: will they subside or spiral out control? Will Russia invade Ukraine? If it does, how will America and its allies respond? As things stand at present, it sure seems as though Russia and the U.S. and its allies have gridlocked themselves into a crisis without any sensible way out. The former was emboldened by the feckless handling of the crisis by the Biden Administration such that Moscow now wants to dictate terms to America and NATO that amount to something like this: “give us proper, preferably written assurances that Ukraine and Georgia will not be admitted to NATO.” Team Biden, which has inadvisably goaded Ukraine against Russia for a second time in less than a year with its much‑hyped ‘America is back’ slogan cannot simply comply with the request. At the same time, America cannot stand up to Russia militarily in that part of the world. Moreover, neither the United States nor its NATO allies that have considerable military clout are prepared to make a promise to Ukraine regarding admission to NATO. Indeed, just as this edition of Baku Dialogues was going to press, the hectic diplomacy between NATO and Russia on the one hand and the U.S. and Russia on the other, climaxing in the latest meetings of 11‑12 January 2022, broke up with no agreement. This has given rise to further concern that the ongoing conflict is going to perpetuate. From Turkey’s perspective, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has turned insoluble— akin in not unimportant ways to the Turkish‑Greek dispute, with its clusters of psychologically combustible elements freely circulating across the board. Should Russia invade Ukraine, it would presumably trigger a harsh package of sanctions by both the EU and the U.S.; this would likely hurt Moscow considerably, albeit hardly enough to budge it from staying the course. Should the U.S. and NATO simply give in to Russia’s ultimatum, then this would amount to a complete surrender of the Western powers— particularly after the disastrous U.S. debacle in Afghanistan. At the same time, the likelihood that Russia will step back entirely from its position—that, in other words, it will calmly accept the prospect of the admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO—is close to zero. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on the one hand, and the U.S.‑led West and Russia on the other, will perpetuate.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

34. Functional Specialisation in EU Value Chains: Methods for Identifying EU Countries’ Roles in International Production Networks

Author:
Aleksandra Kordalska, Magdalena Olczyk, Roman Stöllinger, and Zuzana Zavarská
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Geographically dispersed production networks have allowed countries to specialise in different functions of the value chain. By making use of two methodologies for quantifying the magnitude of functional specialisation – one based on trade flows and one based on FDI flows – detailed profiles of the functional specialisations of EU member states are identified. The analyses are conducted at the country, industry and regional level. In line with the existing literature, they reveal that EU-CEE countries are predominantly specialised in the fabrication stage, that is, they serve as ‘factory economies’, while the Western EU countries are mainly performing knowledge-intensive pre-fabrication activities – a characteristic of ‘headquarter economies’. This dualism within the EU is confirmed by a cluster analysis. While functional specialisation patterns tend to be persistent, especially in the fabrication stage, there are also some signs of functional diversification in EU-CEE countries in more recent years. Still, these functional changes remain limited to a few industries. The dichotomy of factory and headquarter economies is also clearly discernible at the regional level. However, the fact that in most EU countries – mainly in the capital regions – there are some headquarter-type regions implies that a complete functional ‘lock-in’ in fabrication is less likely than suggested by the country-level patterns. Hence, while the results point towards major difficulties of functional diversification beyond the fabrication stage in the EU-CEE countries and regions, there are also several promising elements and trends discernible, in particular at the industry and the regional level.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, Economy, Value Chains, Specialization, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

35. FDI Spillover Effects on Innovation Activities of Knowledge-using and Knowledge-creating Firms: Evidence from an Emerging Economy

Author:
Iraj Hashi, Mehtap Hisarciklilar, Slavo Radošević, Nebojša Stojčić, and Nina Vujanović
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
The beneficial effects of innovation for firms’ performance and competitiveness are well documented, but it has been suggested in recent years that innovation regimes differ between advanced and emerging economies. While advanced economies rely on knowledge generation, their emerging counterparts follow mainly a knowledge-use regime through the application of existing knowledge and technology. Climbing up the technological ladder can be helped through spillovers from foreign investors to local firms. We investigate whether FDI spillovers influence different phases of the innovation process (from decision to innovate to productivity) among knowledge-using and knowledge-creating firms in an emerging European economy. The results show that the innovation process in emerging economies is closer to the imitation than the creation of novel products. Local firms benefit from foreign counterparts in the early phase of the innovation process. Stronger FDI effects are found among firms that undertake innovation through knowledge use rather than through knowledge generation.
Topic:
Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, Economy, Investment, and Knowledge Systems
Political Geography:
Europe

36. Assessing the Effects of Trade Liberalization With Third Countries: The Case of the Eurasian Economic Union

Author:
Simon Sngryan
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The processes of objectively conditioned integration in the economic, political, legal, and institutional spheres of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) Member States took place step by step, starting from preferential trade agreements, passing to the customs union, the common market and other stages of integration. This process is accompanied by the gradual deepening of trade liberalization with potential partners. The selection of potential partners should be carried out through a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the structure and volumes of foreign trade of the EEU Member States (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia) with third parties, their markets structure, existing customs regulation, trade barriers, and possible export potential. The research evaluated the EEU's possible enlargement effects on the Member States' economic indicators. The research aimed to assess the possible consequences of EEU expansion and signing free trade agreements, considering Pakistan, Korea, and Malaysia as potential trade partners. Modeling the effect of an FTA assumes horizontal zeroing of tariffs between partners. Then, using the GTAP model, a new state of general equilibrium was calculated corresponding to the changed parameters of customs and tariff regulation. In this case, most variables, such as change in GDP, production output, and export-import volumes, were estimated, manifesting the economic effect of trade liberalization.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Trade Liberalization
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

37. Cutting through the Value Chain: The Long-Run Effects of Decoupling the East from the West

Author:
Gabriel Felbermayr, Alexander Sandkamp, and Hendrik Mahlkow
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
With ever-increasing political tensions between China and Russia on one side and the EU and the US on the other, it only seems a matter of time until protectionist policies cause a decoupling of global value chains. This paper uses a computable general equilibrium trade model calibrated with the latest version of the GTAP database to simulate the effect of doubling non-tariff barriers - both unilateral and reciprocal - between the two blocks on trade and welfare. Imposing trade barriers almost completely eliminates bilateral imports. In addition, changes in price levels lead to higher imports and lower exports of the imposing country group from and to the rest of the world. The targeted country group increases exports to the rest of the world and reduces imports. Welfare falls in all countries involved, suggesting that governments should strive to cooperate rather than turning away from each other. By imposing a trade war on Russia, the political West could inflict severe damage on the Russian economy because of the latter’s smaller relative size.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Conflict, Trade Wars, Protectionism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

38. EU in Search of a WTO-Compatible Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

Author:
Cecilia Bellora and Lionel Fontagné
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
To meet the targets of the EU’s ”Fit for 55” package, the European Commission proposes to implement a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The CBAM is firstly intended to avoid carbon leakages, but it also deals with the thorny issue of the compliance by European producers in carbon-intensive industries. In addition, its design, as voted by the European Council on March 15, 2022, questions the compatibility of the CBAM with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The CBAM puts a price on carbon contained in imported products whose production-related emissions have not been taxed (or not at the same level as in the European Union) by the exporter country, in order to offset the difference in carbon prices at the border. This paper aims to quantify the economic and environmental impacts of different CBAM design choices with the aim of complying with WTO rules. Different from the previous literature, we evaluate the various options with a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring imperfect competition, global value chains, green-house gas emissions and endogenous price of emission quotas. We show that CBAM is effective in reducing carbon leakages. But its design leads to an increase in the price of carbon quotas in the European Emission Trading System (ETS) market. Losses in competitiveness on export markets are expected, also for downstream sectors not covered by the EU ETS nor the CBAM. Eventually, offsetting the difference in carbon prices at the border comes at a cost to the enforcing jurisdiction, suggesting that the CBAM was not designed as a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Carbon Emissions, WTO, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

39. Regional Diffusion of Foreign Demand Shocks Through Trade and Ownership Networks

Author:
Lionel Fontagné and Gianluca Santoni
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
International demand shocks are transmitted within the trade and ownership firms' networks and impact directly or indirectly domestic firm productivity and labor misallocation. Considering manufacturing firms for Italy, Spain and France over the period 2009-2017, we quantify these transmission channels from the global economy to the domestic firms, and within the domestic economy across locations, sectors and firms. We compute in a shift share fashion international demand shock at the district-sector-year level as plausibly exogenous to individual firms. Our results confirm that global shocks are transmitted through trade networks and that this transmission is largely mediated by firms' ownership networks both across and within the borders of the three countries.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Demand, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Spain, and Italy

40. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Taking Stock of Europe’s New Trade Policy Strategy

Author:
Fredrik Erixon
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This Policy Brief takes stock of the EU Trade Policy Review – the Commission’s proposed strategy for trade. Despite appearances, the Review doesn’t come close to its billing as a strategy for the new geopolitics of trade. In fact, the Review is weak on key geopolitical developments and rather gives the impression that the EU doesn’t have an ambition to shape outcomes. Obviously, the Review is anchored in Europe’s general economic climate: defensiveness on globalization, competition and digitalization. It follows that Europe is getting increasingly detached from world developments. There are several good parts in the Review. The Commission wants to revive and reform the World Trade Organisation, and it’s clear about what factors that have made the Geneva-based trade body dysfunctional. The Review also acknowledges that the EU will seek a closer alliance with the United States and use that for constructive purposes. Finally, it is welcome that the Commission proposes some new instruments for dealing with market distortions caused by foreign subsidies and protectionism in government procurement. All these initiatives can achieve good outcomes. However, they all require that Europe makes changes in its own policies and positions. The bad parts in the Review are Europe’s weak agenda for getting better market access in the growth regions in the world and its continued passivity on matters related to China. Europe’s main trade-policy challenge in the next decade is to ensure that businesses and consumers in Europe get better integrated with a world-market dynamism that predominantly will come from the Asian region. Absent a realistic and medium-term strategy for dealing with challenges connected to the rise of China, Europe will have difficulties getting the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment approved. Europe needs an actionable agenda for addressing bilateral frictions with China and problems that occur outside bilateral trade. Finally, the ugly part of the trade strategy are all the commercial policies in the EU – with strong effects on trade – that aren’t recognized or only casually mentioned in the Review. The latter category includes the ambition to introduce an autonomous carbon border tax on imports. Such a policy comes at a high political and economic cost, and the measure’s effect on reducing global carbon emissions is at best very negligible.
Topic:
Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Geopolitics, Digital Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

41. Economic crisis in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Marek Dabrowski and Marta Dominguez-Jimenez
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In the 2010s, the economic situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) deteriorated as a result of lower oil and other commodity prices, a new round of domestic political instability, continuous intra-regional conflicts, stalled economic and governance reforms and, finally, the COVID-19 pandemic. The growth of real GDP, which slowed after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, further decelerated in the second half of the 2010s and became negative in 2020 as result of the COVID-19 shock. Fiscal balances have deteriorated, even in the oil-exporting countries, and public debt has grown rapidly. MENA countries continue to face numerous long-term socio-economic and institutional challenges including high unemployment (especially youth unemployment), low female labour-market participation rates, the poor quality of education, costly and ineffective public sectors, high military and security spending, high energy subsidies and trade protectionism. Only comprehensive long-term reform programmes can address these challenges. The European Union is MENA’s second largest trading partner after the region itself, and is one of two main sources of foreign direct investment and a major aid donor. However, given the critical importance of the MENA region to its own security and stability, the EU’s engagement in conflict resolution and in supporting economic and political transformation of the region is insufficient and should be intensified. The EU should also update and upgrade its existing association agreements with the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, including their free trade provisions.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Governance, European Union, Trade, COVID-19, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

42. Volume 71 Issue 2

Author:
Gökhan Karabulut
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:
Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:
Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi is an open access, peer-reviewed, scholarly journal published two times a year in June and December. It has been an official publication of Istanbul University Faculty of Economics since 1939. The manuscripts submitted for publication in the journal must be scientific and original work in Turkish or English. Being one of the earliest peer-reviewed academic journals in Turkey in the area of economics, Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi aims to provide a forum for exploring issues in basicly economics and publish both disciplinary and multidisciplinary articles. Economics is the main scope of the journal. However, multidisciplinary and comparative approaches are encouraged as well and articles from various social science areas such as sociology of economics, history, social policy, international relations, financial studies are welcomed in this regard. The target group of the journal consists of academicians, researchers, professionals, students, related professional and academic bodies and institutions.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Oil, Political Economy, Natural Resources, Exchange Rate Policy, and Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia

43. Post-Covid-19 EU-Southern Neighbourhood Trade Relations

Author:
Katarzyna Sidlo, Esmat Mostafa Kamel, Hussein Suleiman, and Guillaume Van der Loo
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) is a key trade partner, both in terms of goods and services, for the countries in its Southern Neighbourhood (SN): Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Palestine,[1] Jordan and Lebanon.[2] The economic (and otherwise) relationship between the two partners is governed by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs), which came into force from the early to mid-2000s. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has, however, affected the trade exchange between the two, just as it has an adverse impact on trade globally. As pointed out in the second chapter of this policy study, one of the sectors of great importance to both the EU and the SN is agri-foods. Despite a general drop in merchandise trade, the agri-food exports from the EU actually increased globally by 0.5% during the first 10 months of the pandemic compared to the same period the year before, up to €151.8 billion. In the case of the SN, exports of agri-foods during the first three quarters of 2020 (year-on-year) grew particularly strongly in the case of Morocco (27.2%) and Algeria (20.3%) and decreased most visibly in the case of Lebanon (-37.9%). As for exports from the EU to the SN, during the same period a particularly impressive growth was witnessed in the case of Tunisia (40.3%) but the value of agri-food imports of Morocco also went up (8.4%). Trade in services, as analysed in chapter three, was hit more severely than trade in goods and declined significantly in all countries in the region during the first months of the pandemic. For Morocco, for instance, during the first three quarters of 2020 it plummeted by almost 60% (year-on-year). Because of lockdowns and travel bans, the tourism sector was among the hardest hit, even though the countries in the SN are mostly visited by travellers from nearby markets: the SN region or Europe – in 2019 the latter constituted between 29.4% (Tunisia) and 68.2% (Morocco) of all arrivals (after excluding nationals of SN countries who live abroad). As a result, tourism revenues plummeted (in Palestine, for instance, by an estimated 68%) and a significant number of people were made redundant; before the pandemic, between just under 6% (Algeria and Israel) and nearly 20% (Lebanon) of all (formally employed) workers were employed in the travel and tourism sector. The disturbances outlined above have adversely impacted food security in the region, as initial data presented in chapter four suggests. While isolating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on food security is difficult, as many other factors – such as bad harvest due to weather conditions in Morocco – were in play in 2020, the pandemic clearly affected both supply of and demand for foodstuffs. Some countries were more affected than others, as has already been mentioned above in the case of agri-food trade with the EU. At the same time, the impact on food security within the countries was also far from homogenous, with refugees (e.g., due to loss of work in informal sector) and poorer households – spending a bigger share of domestic budget on increasingly more expensive food products – more often forced to adopt emergency livelihood coping strategies, such as limitation of daily calory intake. Looking towards the post-COVID-19 trade relations, as outlined in chapter one of this study, the EU’s post-pandemic recovery plans and trade strategy review offer a new momentum for the SN countries to strengthen and modernise their framework for trade relations with the EU, to capitalise on potential re-shoring and near-shoring trends in EU and global value chains, and to promote (intra-) regional economic integration. However, the envisaged Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) currently under negotiation with Tunisia and Morocco may not be the most realistic option at this stage. A more gradual approach based on sectoral agreements could be adopted in the short- to medium-term instead, leading to a DCFTA-like model of trade integration. Moreover, in order to strengthen the (intra-)regional economic and value chain integration, modernisation of the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Convention should remain a priority. Finally, the modernisation of EU-SN trade relations should be linked and integrated into the broader (and longer-term) plans for EU-Africa trade relations, with an eye on the “continent-to-continent Free Trade Area” in the long run. Internally, governments in the SN should prioritise development of high productivity service sectors and work towards curbing their reliance on tourism and transportation. In order to achieve that goal, improving the quality of their institutions is as important as upgrading telecommunications infrastructure or adopting incentives such as tax breaks. More broadly, speeding up digital transformation would both facilitate servicification and reduce costs associated with merchandise trade.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

44. Can the Biggest Emitters Set Up a Climate Club? A Review of International Carbon Pricing Debates

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The world’s largest emitting countries are reconsidering the role of carbon pricing instruments and increasingly looking at carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) to address leakage concerns. This renewed momentum should trigger a broader discussion on how to make trade policies compatible with the climate agenda. With the Glasgow climate conference (COP26) approaching, the concept of putting a price on carbon is generating unprecedented interest in Canada and the United States (US), China and Japan. But the European Union (EU) still stands as an exception; it is the only regional trading bloc that is determined to leverage the full potential of its emissions trading system (ETS). To date, others have lacked the political backing to deploy nation-wide carbon pricing initiatives with a design sturdy enough to drive meaningful emission reductions. Canada has made significant progress with the adoption of a national framework for carbon pricing in 2018. The country’s draft regulations foresee the introduction of a federal ETS as of 2022 and a gradual increase in carbon prices, but its ambitions risk being upset by the lack of consistent efforts in the US, its largest trading partner. Given US political divides, a federal carbon pricing scheme is unlikely to materialize in the short run. In China, the long-delayed national ETS has finally been launched. However, its scope is restricted to the power sector for now, and it is likely to only have a modest impact on coal use with its current design. Several arguments may discourage China from fully extending its ETS as planned and rather argue in favor of introducing a complementary carbon tax. Japan has also engaged an expert debate on the benefits of introducing carbon pricing at the national level, but the government is struggling to find a balance between the risk of worsening competitiveness and the need to mobilize investment in clean technologies. For the EU, the upcoming reform of the EU ETS is an opportunity to introduce a truly demanding cap reduction for the 2023-2030 period and make this flagship instrument more robust, predictable, and fair. To initiate in-depth decarbonization of its industry, the EU will need to phase out free allowances. Therefore, other measures addressing unfair competition will have to be introduced and CBAM could be part of the solution. A unilateral application is however no panacea. The EU should move cautiously and start implementing the CBAM to a small set of sectors. This also means that the challenge of leveling the playing field with non-EU producers will remain largely unresolved. There is little chance that an international alliance on carbon pricing or “climate club” can be set up within a timeframe compatible with the climate emergency. Yet, the EU’s CBAM proposal can encourage trading partners to accelerate decision-making on carbon pricing, at least to obtain partial exemption. In addition, having a concrete anti-leakage proposal on the table leads to a sense of the inevitable mismatches between the global trade and climate agendas. Large emitters are starting to acknowledge the need for a multilateral discussion on how to decarbonize industries while maintaining a level playing field. The next step should be to kickstart an open discussion in all possible multilateral fora (G20, International Energy Agency, global industry associations, etc.) and mandate the World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop guidance on a wide range of instruments (including CBAM, but also eco-design labelling and standards, differentiated tariffs based on CO2 intensity, etc.) and including a common exemption approach for Least Developed Countries. Exploring a set of workable solutions should be more attractive to trade partners than pushing for a uniform solution, but results would still take time to materialize. Hence, establishing a level playing field with imports will likely require the EU – and all countries with an aggressive decarbonization agenda for their industries – to strengthen their financial and regulatory support to the deployment of innovative low-carbon manufacturing processes. Again, this almost-unavoidable resort to State aid would strongly benefit from a multilateral discussion.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, and Canada

45. Hydrocarbon Energy Complexes Central Eurasian Keystone Triangles

Author:
Robert M. Cutler
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The editorial statement of Baku Dialogues posits a certain geographic defini­tion of what is called the “Silk Road Region,” namely “the geographic space looking west past Anatolia to the warm seas beyond; north across the Caspian towards the Great Plain and the Great Steppe; east to the peaks of the Altai and the arid sands of the Taklamakan; and south towards the Hindu Kush and the Indus valley, looping down around in the direction of the Persian Gulf and across the Fertile Crescent.” When I served on the Executive Board of the Central Eurasian Studies Society 20 years ago, its website provided a lengthy but useful geographic definition of “Central Eurasia.” This definition included “Turkic, Mongolian, Ira­nian, Caucasian, Tibetan, and other peoples in a broad area that geo­graphically extends from the Black Sea region, the Crimea, and the Caucasus in the west, through the Middle Volga region, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and on to Siberia, Mongolia, and Tibet in the east.” To clarify the term “Black Sea re­gion,” which appears in that defini­tion, I adopt the European Union’s characterization of that region as stretching from Romania and Bul­garia, through northern Turkey and on to Georgia, but including only a thin coastal strip some 20‑60 kilo­meters wide within the EU itself, in­cluding the Danube delta. From that definition, it would follow that the Silk Road Region is largely em­bedded in Central Eurasia. The name “Central Eurasia” was sometimes used in the 1990s as a shorthand for the 15 former So­viet republics together (Russia in­cluded), but this usage has faded away. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not assure the even­tual geoeconomic consolidation of Central Eurasia, but the condi­tions for that consolidation have now been established. This has oc­curred thanks to the confluence of international financial and indus­trial interest in the region’s energy resources, the political will of the United States (the only remaining superpower), and the freedom and rapidity of networked information exchanges made possible by the internet.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regionalism, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

46. The Strategic Benefits of the Southern Gas Corridor

Author:
Vitaliy Baylarbayov
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
At the end of 2020, the Southern Gas Corridor became fully operational. This marked the completion of a journey that began a decade ago when the government of Azerbaijan and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) took a strategic decision to launch a major natural gas export project. The Southern Gas Corridor is one of the largest and the most expen­sive gas supply projects in the world built to date. In December 2013, SOCAR and its partners signed a Final Investment Decision (FID) to establish a gas pipeline corridor from Azerbaijan through Georgia, Turkey, Greece, and Albania be­fore ending in Italy. A branch pipe­line is now under construction to Bulgaria, which is expected to be completed in the second half of 2021. In July 2018, the project supplied its first gas to the Turkish market and went on to change the dynamics of that country’s gas market, whereby Azerbaijan is now one of its top gas suppliers. On December 31st, 2020, inaugural commercial gas supplies arrived from the Caspian into Europe, signaling the commencement of the Southern Gas Corridor’s full operations. For Azerbaijan, the Southern Gas Corridor provides a major source of revenue unlinked to the global oil market; the project also strengthens Baku’s links with its neighbors and Europe. For SOCAR—as operator of components of the project and investor in all its segments—the project’s success represents a major step in the company’s transition from a national to an international energy company. The Southern Gas Corridor provides new gas supplies to Turkey, Georgia, and Europe and is a platform for in­creased supplies to these markets and also can be extended to reach additional markets in Europe. With the completion of the first stage of the Southern Gas Corridor, Azerbaijan and SOCAR, together with their partners, are examining strategies for the next phase of the corridor’s development.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

47. Development or Regression? Eurasia’s Investment Attractiveness

Author:
Stanislav Pritchin
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
In 2021 the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus—some call it Eurasia, other the Silk Road re­gion—will celebrate thirty years of independence. Theoretically, this period should have provided suffi­cient time for each to have formed a new economic model, set and at least partially attain long‑term de­velopment goals, and developed a foreign policy model for optimal interaction with investors, in­cluding foreign ones. However, the experience of the post‑Soviet republics under consideration in this essay, which does not aspire to be comprehensive but should rather be considered a prelimi­nary assessment, indicates that independence is neither a prereq­uisite for successful development nor one that centers of achieving a sustainable increase in popular welfare. Despite the fact that in 1991 standards of living and educational and economic attainment in the Soviet republics that are examined in this essay were approximately similar, after three decades of inde­pendent development the countries under consideration have been sig­nificantly stratified in terms of na­tional wealth, types of political and social systems, and the specifics of their economic activities.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regionalism, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

48. The EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Lessons Learnt for Indonesia

Author:
Yan Lili Ing and Junianto James Losarili
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) and China have recently reached an agreement: the EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). As one of the most recent investment agreements concluded by the EU, the paper aims to assess specific concessions made in the agreement, and provides lessons learnt for Indonesia on the ongoing negotiations of the Indonesia–EU free trade agreement, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IEU CEPA). The paper will present an overview of the main areas covered under the CAI, assess the potential impacts of the CAI on EU investment into Indonesia, and set out lessons that can be learnt from the CAI.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Indonesia, and Asia

49. The Impact of Globalization and the Interconnectedness with the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada and the European Union

Author:
Marija Fileva
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Elimination of the trade barriers and stimulation of business activity through trade liberalization led to the expansion in the field of the global economy. There are plentiful hesitations about who gains the highest benefit from free trade, especially when it comes to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union. Analogously, the previous mention guides to the dilemma about the trade negotiations and their position in the same agreement in which are the labor standards. Additionally, trade liberalization has influenced the creation of a close link connection between trade, labor, and globalization. This paper focuses on the effects of globalization and trade liberalization with their connection apropos the provisions from CETA; especially with an emphasis on Chapter 23: 'Trade and Labour’.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, and North America

50. A CO2-Border Adjustment Mechanism as a Building Block of a Climate Club

Author:
Felix Bierbrauer, Gabriel Felbermayr, Axel Ockenfels, Klaus M. Schmidt, and Jens Sudekum
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
The EU steps up its efforts to curb its territorial CO2-emissions. It is planning to introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to level the playing field and to raise own resources. The authors point out that unilateral European climate policy action, whether shored up with a CBAM or not, can only play a limited role in reducing global CO2-emissions. A EU-CBAM cannot stop indirect leakage, it has ambiguous effects on other countries’ mitigation efforts, and it poses the risk of conflicts with trade partners. They propose that the EU, together with the US and other like-minded countries, should push hard to establish a climate club with a common minimum price of CO2 and a common CBAM applied to third countries. Such a framework would incentivize other countries to join while limiting leakage and reducing the risk of trade policy disputes.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe