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621. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After six weeks of combat, where is the Russo-Ukrainian War going? Modern technology both facilitates and hampers the answer to that question. Every day, this war is evaluated from every angle and perspective, but modern technology provides only a soda-straw view of the war’s entire canvas. This article will try to discern that larger canvas of the war, including a focus on casualties, information operations and morale, and logistics to see how they and the tactical correlation of forces may influence several possible strategic outcomes.
Topic:
Conflict, Military Tactics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

622. Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States and its allies in the West have been unable to use the threat of military force to coerce Russia into stopping its war in Ukraine. In part, this is because the West is more concerned about escalation than Russia. Further analysis using Alexander L. George’s framework of coercive diplomacy, however, suggests the problem is more complex and deep-rooted: Few of the historical conditions or factors that favor coercive diplomacy are present in Ukraine. This analysis reveals three things the United States and its allies should do to revive the prospects of ending the war in Ukraine through coercive diplomacy. First, they should take smaller, more achievable steps which are less likely to inspire Russia to double-down. Second, they should exploit Russia’s deteriorating position through a mixture of carrots and sticks. Finally, the West should seek to minimize the intensity of its wider confrontation with Russia and focus on strategic stability as an end in itself. This will be challenging because of the gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. But it may help end the war through coercive diplomacy, and avoid a serious miscalculation with Russia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Coercion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

623. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

624. The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is poised to bring into being a new European security order. Although the last eight months have been full of surprises, that new order may very well be marked by unstable standoffs, buildups, and dangerous activities and incidents between both Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Ukraine’s Western backers. These will risk ever more dangerous crises, all with the threat of nuclear war looming. The last eight years of military deployments, near-simultaneous exercises, and other proximate activities by Russia and NATO offer some hints as to what this future may look like. These, notably, were undertaken not to prevent an escalation in Ukraine but to deter NATO from attacking Russia and vice versa. During this time, discussions about a return to conventional arms control in Europe to mitigate the dangers of military activities gained little traction with policymakers, and the agreements and arrangements that had been in place continued to deteriorate and dwindle. In late 2021, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the West offered Russia a return to conventional arms control solutions. Russia countered with demands that NATO return to its 1990s-era force posture and eschew any further enlargement, and then proceeded to roll its tanks into Ukraine. During the tense months prior to Russia’s invasion, the conventional arms control mechanisms that remained, such as the Vienna Document, made it possible to call out Russia’s buildup, but not reverse it or prevent attack. Although there is little logic and less appetite for new arms control deals now, an end to fighting in Ukraine will create new imperatives to make Europe safer than it is today. While sanctions can limit Russian capacity to some extent, they may well be inadequate to prevent substantial buildups. For this reason, NATO members and their partners should be thinking in advance about how they could limit Russian capabilities via negotiated arrangements with robust verification measures and repercussions for violations. Once the shooting stops in Ukraine, deals such as these could make a more secure Europe, bolstered by more reliable deterrence, attainable.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

625. Pari Passu Lost and Found: The Origins of Sovereign Bankruptcy 1798-1873

Author:
Marc Flandreau
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Verdicts returned by modern courts of justice in the context of sovereign debt lawsuits have upheld a ratable (proportional) interpretation of so-called “pari passu” clauses in debt contracts which, literally, promise creditors they will be dealt with equitably. Such verdicts have given individual creditors the right to interfere with payments to others, in situation where the sovereign had failed to make proportional payments. Contract originalists argue that this interpretation of pari passu clauses has no historical foundation. Historically, they claim, pari passu clauses never granted individual creditors a unilateral right to block payments to other bondholders assenting to a government debt restructuring proposal. This article shows this claim is incorrect. Drawing on novel archival research, it argues that pari passu clauses find one potent historical origin in the operation of a now forgotten sovereign bankruptcy tribunal, the London stock exchange. Under the law of the stock exchange, departure from ratable payments did create a unilateral right for individual creditors to interfere with sovereign debt discharges. In fact, ratable distributions provided the touchstone for the stock exchange sanctioned sovereign debt discharge system. What is more, sophisticated contract drafters availed themselves of the logic. The result was a weaponization of pari passu clauses, and their inscription into sovereign debt covenants in the 19th century. The article concludes that the modern debate on the role of clauses in sovereign debt contracts cannot be held without thorough reconsideration of the history of sovereign bankruptcy.
Topic:
Finance, Banking, Stock Markets, and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and England

626. Separating electricity from gas prices through Green Power Pools: Design options and evolution

Author:
Michael Grubb and Drummond Pike
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper develops a detailed proposal for an efficient way to channel the value of large-scale renewables, which have become much cheaper than gas-driven wholesale electricity prices, to consumers at ‘cost-plus’ prices. This would reduce the fiscal pressure on governments for market- wide subsidies and offer more stable support for consumers most in need. We detail how this ‘green power pool’ approach could interact with the wholesale market to ensure firm power, also bringing transparency to the cost of balancing the variable renewables output, and maintaining incentives for efficient supply and demand responses. We illustrate the approach with reference to the cost and volume trajectories of UK renewables backed by government CfDs, targeted initially to particular consumer groups, as a first step in a wider transition towards direct consumer access to cheap renewables.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Green Technology, Renewable Energy, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

627. CPLP: the first twenty-five years

Author:
Joseph Marques
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:
The decision by Conjuntura Austral to dedicate a special issue to the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) is to be commended. The uniqueness of the organization justifies a timely review of a small sample of its activities to date. Created in 1996, the CPLP adopted three main vectors of activity:1) the promotion and dissemination of the Portuguese language; 2) cooperation in a wide array of domains (i.e., education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public administration, communication, justice, public safety, culture, sport and social communication, sustainable development, etc.); and 3) political and diplomatic coordination, especially in multilateral forums. The organization also agreed to adhere to several fundamental political principles such as the respect of the sovereignty of each member country; non-interference in domestic issues; reciprocal treatment; peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights, and social justice; territorial integrity of each member state; and the commitment to the promotion of development and cooperation. In addition to a common language and shared cultural heritage, the uniqueness of the CPLP results from the union of nine non-contiguous member states into a privileged geocultural space – the lusosphere – dedicated to the active promotion of its three main goals across four continents. It is a privileged forum for a “pluricontinental dialogue” in Portuguese. In addition, each country contributes by bringing its history, its unique interpretation of the “lusosphere” as well as its regional context (i.e., membership in the European Union, Mercosur, Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of West African States, etc.) as well as economic opportunities to the group. By joining, member countries reinforce the group’s collective projection onto the world stage as well as the opportunity to expand each member country’s diplomatic footprint. While each member had different reasons to join (i.e., maximize politicaldiplomatic cooperation, language promotion, widen access to technical cooperation, etc.), all believe that the CPLP can bolster the group’s overall political and diplomatic prestige while enhancing their collective and individual prospects. This special issue consists of six articles ranging from language to health, security and defense issues, business negotiations and civilian-military relations. It covers but a few topics from a long list of issues which, after the first twentyfive years of this new international organization, warrant the attention and critical review of academic scholars.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Health, Business, Language, Indigenous, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Brazil, South America, Southeast Asia, and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)

628. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

629. NATO Should Defend Europe, Not Pivot to Asia

Author:
Jan Gerber
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In 2021, the U.K., France, and Germany deployed 21 naval ships to the Indo-Pacific with a stated aim of helping the U.S. shoulder the burden of collective security and sustaining the “rules-based international order.” Naval deployments by the U.K., France, and Germany are symbolic and unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia. A European pivot to the Indo-Pacific draws scarce attention and resources away from defense issues in Europe. Instead of encouraging Asian forays, the U.S. should encourage its European allies to assume primary responsibility for European security, freeing the United States to focus on the Pacific, if needed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, France, Germany, and Indo-Pacific

630. To Prevent War and Secure Ukraine, Make Ukraine Neutral

Author:
Stephen W. Van Evera
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S.-NATO-Russia-Ukraine crisis could be resolved by a grand bargain among the parties that defines Ukraine as a neutral state. Neutrality deals worked well in the past to forestall Franco-British conflict over Belgium in the 1830s and East-West conflict over Finland and Austria in the Cold War. The Belgian, Finnish, and Austrian neutrality deals enhanced the security of the states they made neutral. Neutrality was an asset for Belgium, Finland, and Austria, not a handicap. Major powers never calmly accept the close approach to their borders of unfriendly powers or alliances. Russia is no exception. It will not accept a settlement that leaves open the possibility of Ukraine in NATO or NATO in Ukraine. Hence, a neutrality solution is both sufficient and necessary to resolve the current crisis. Ukraine is not worth a costly confrontation for the U.S. Hence, U.S. leaders should be open to compromise. If compromise proves elusive, the U.S. should not pay high costs or run large risks to impose a deal on its terms, as it has higher priorities at home and elsewhere.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine