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42. One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The geopolitical struggle is not where you think it is
- Author:
- Roshni Menon and Faiza Shaheen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation
- Abstract:
- When Russia invaded Ukraine one year ago, there were immediate concerns about the effects on food and energy security, and on geopolitical alignment in other countries. The world was right to be concerned, but the repercussions have been much wider and deeper than many predicted. There are two main ways in which conflict dynamics have shifted, neither of them solely caused by the war but both exacerbated by it: Russian’s war on Ukraine has shone the lens on inter-state conflict and proxy war Compounding the pandemic and climate change, a war started in one corner of the world has resulted in a global cost-of-living crisis and increasing debt for almost every country worldwide—countries that had no hand in Russia’s invasion or in the failure to respond to public health and socio-economic crisis. This analysis looks at the multiple and cascading crises (increasingly referred to as the polycrisis), and how we can take action in the face of polycrisis,
- Topic:
- Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
43. Women's Security in Local Communities
- Author:
- Lajla Leko and Sabahudin Harčević
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Centre for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- With the project "Improvement of Women's Safety and Security in Local Communities - AwareBiH", CSS aims to point out the state of security from the point of view of women, therefore it is necessary that some of the biggest cities, namely Mostar, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, are bearers of positive changes in the implementation of the project's results. In addition, the project aims to show the ability of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to influence changes that would make their environment safer. This topic is not discussed in BiH as much as it should be, while the security sector is still perceived as a sector dominated by men. Therefore, this project will help society and decisionmakers to better understand the needs and feelings of women in BiH about their own security.
- Topic:
- Security, Law Enforcement, Women, Violence, and Survey
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
44. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part I
- Author:
- Erdin Halimić, Dajana Bašić, and Aleksandar Maletić
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Centre for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 13 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
- Topic:
- Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
45. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part II
- Author:
- Erdin Halimić, Ajla Popović, Haris Vejezović, Aleksandar Maletić, and Dajana Bašić
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Centre for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 12 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
- Topic:
- Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
46. The Return of the Foreign Fighters and Their Families to Their Homeland: Existing Practices and Considerations Regarding Security and Human Rights
- Author:
- Katerina Christoforaki
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Centre for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- The creation of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has attracted an unprecedented flow of thousands of people from more than 100 countries all over the world to join their cause. After the fall of the so-called caliphate, the countries involved have to deal with the aftermath of the conflict and the future threat of the resurgence of ISIS or other terrorist groups. The people who volunteered and joined ISIS might pose a security threat in the future. This paper aims to examine the different approaches that countries have taken regarding the return of foreign fighters (FFs) and their families who joined ISIS to their homeland. This is a multidimensional and complex matter since it has legal, moral, and political implications, and therefore the decisions in this regard are never unanimous, nor do they come without criticism and opposition. On the one hand, it would be easier to just leave the FFs and their families there, prosecute them there and incarcerate them there. It would also be easier to collect evidence and to have testimonies of the witnesses and the survivors, and also it would keep the potential security threat away from their homeland. However, this would only be beneficial for the countries of origin and in the short term as it wouldn‘t solve the problem of radicalization. In fact, it might fuel it even more, and the proximity of the ISIS member in prisons or in camps could benefit them to rebuild their network and plan future attacks. Moreover, leaving them there would be against all human rights norms regarding the death penalty, fair trial, torture, rights of the child, and more. On the other hand, the return of the fighters and their families could indeed pose a danger to the security of the homeland. Not all of the returnees have committed punishable crimes and for those who have, very often there is not enough admissible evidence to the national courts. In fact, in the case of women and children, the countries are more reluctant to their return because they might have not taken part in the atrocities but that does not mean that they are innocent and bear no responsibility. Complicated is also the case of children and teenagers, some of whom have taken part in the atrocities willingly or unwillingly, some were brought by their families, some traveled alone in order to join ISIS, and some were born under ISIS control and risk statelessness.
- Topic:
- Security, Human Rights, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters, and Repatriation
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Syria, United States of America, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
47. La “Ceguera Marítima”: características, consecuencias y alternativas.Alemania, Brasil y la Organización Marítima Internacionalen comparación
- Author:
- Herminio Sánchez de la Barquera y Arroyo
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
- Institution:
- International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
- Abstract:
- El presente texto parte de tres puntos importantes que darán paso al análisis de la ceguera marítima, sus características y consecuencias desde laperspectiva de las acciones emprendidas por Alemania, Brasil y laOrganización Marítima Internacional(OMI). El enfoque principal de esta investigación es conocer cómo estos tres actores, mediante distintos recursos, tratande contribuir a reducir la ceguera marítimapropia (en el caso de las dos naciones analizadas) y lade países en desarrollo(en el caso de laOMI). Posteriormente determinaremos sus características, medios y objetivos.
- Topic:
- Security, Maritime, Seapower, and Dependency
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Brazil, South America, and Germany
48. El océano azulde la política común de seguridad y defensa
- Author:
- Xavier Torrens
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
- Institution:
- International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
- Abstract:
- El océano azul de la política común de seguridad y defensa (PCSD)de la Unión Europea es el objeto de estudio de esta investigación, desde una aproximaciónbásicamente de policy-making, centrada en el policy design. Como punto de partida, toma contenidos de la geopolítica y las teorías del realismo que analizan por qué es tan problemática la política común de defensa europea.El estudio explica la herramienta del océano azul con el caso práctico de la aeronave F-35. A partir de su comprensión, se describe la estrategia del océano rojo frente a la estrategia del océano azul, contraponiendo unaEuropa en el seno de la OTAN y con dependencia de EEUU ante una Europa como A²E (actor estratégico y autonomía estratégica).Posteriormente, se elabora el esquema de cuatro accionesen la construcción de una política común de defensa en Europa. Se estructura la matriz del océano azul, donde se analiza la construcción de una política común de defensa en Europa, presentando aquello que debería eliminarse de la política de defensa, lo que debería reducirse, lo que se debería incrementar y, finalmente, lo que se crearía para alcanzar una política común de seguridad y defensa de la Unión Europea (UE). Luego, se plantean las cuatro barreras organizacionales para alcanzar unas Fuerzas Armadas Europeasy los tres componentes clave del cambio a las Fuerzas Armadas Europeas.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
49. Prescription for Military Paralysis: Wartime Reactor Meltdowns (Occasional Paper 2305)
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- More than 15 months into the war, Russian attacks against Ukraine’s nuclear plants have yet to release any radiation. As the likelihood of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant reopening quickly declines and Putin’s desire to distract the world from his declining political and military standing increases, some experts fear he may want to induce a radiological release from the plant. In any case, Putin’s military assaults against the Zaporizhzhia plant have already set a worrying precedent. Last December, NPEC held a wargame, the results of which The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists just published, to examine what might happen in a future Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this reinvasion in 2037, Russia targets power reactors in Ukraine, Poland, and Romania. The United States plans to build scores of new reactors in these countries. What if Russian missiles targeted them in a future war? NPEC tapped the expertise of Ukrainians, Romanians, NATO officials, Poles, US security experts, and Hill staff to find out. It hosted five sessions over two weeks and ran a three-move wargame. The game’s play revealed how the uncertainties and dangers of military attacks against nuclear power plants can paralyze decision-making and fundamentally alter the course of wars. The military disruptions these uncertainties introduce may far outstrip the safety issues any reactor radiological release might otherwise present. The game’s play revealed three reasons why.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, War Games, Nuclear Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
50. NATO in the North: The emerging division of labour in Northern European security
- Author:
- Matti Pesu
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The Russian war of aggression has rendered Northern Europe an increasingly significant region for Euro-Atlantic security. A stable and secure Northern Europe is a critical precondition for a safe and stable Euro-Atlantic region. The alliance should treat Northern Europe as a strategic whole although the different subareas of Northern Europe have their distinctive security dynamics and concerns. NATO is currently improving its deterrence and defence posture. It is simultaneously shifting its military strategy from a model of deterrence by reinforcement to one of deterrence by denial. NATO’s evolving posture and strategy in Northern Europe should be underpinned by a more explicit division of labour. The regional allies and stakeholders can be divided into four categories in terms of their role in regional security: frontline nations, hubs, security providers and the ultimate security guarantor. The regional frontline nations include the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, which can also play a role as hubs and even security providers along with the United Kingdom and Germany. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are first and foremost hubs. The United States remains the ultimate security guarantor of the area.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic Sea