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1. IMperial or Colonial: The War is Fought Over The Soviet Past an A Broken Relationship

Author:
Li Bennich-Bjorkman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia is trying, through its bombs, attacks, and brutality, to erase what Ukraine was. Therefore, it is a war effort to keep remembering how Ukraine in peace looked like, how it smelled, tasted, and felt. And to never forget that this is a war against Ukraine, in its own right. Not as a representative of the West, and not as a representative of democracy. But because Ukraine is of such importance to Russia, that a break between the two is unthinkable for Putin. That was what Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukrainian president, realized already in 1991. He, and Ukrainian leaders after him, tried to protect their territory while at the same time reassuring Russia that relations could still be friendly. But Russia has never changed in a similar way
Topic:
Imperialism, Military Strategy, Colonialism, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Exploring the Russian Perspective on the War in Ukraine: Demography's Power and Ukraine's Uniqueness

Author:
Aybars Arda Kilicer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Western officials and media have portrayed Russia as a rogue state that seeks to undermine the fundamental foundations of the Western lifestyle, which are based on democratic and liberal principles, especially more since the invasion of the remaining Ukrainian territories began on 24 February 2022. According to this perspective, Russia allegedly launched its strike to prevent Ukraine from joining the club of liberal nations. This move would have been a clear message to any other post-Soviet countries, further strengthening Russian control over them. It would be unfair to completely dismiss this argument, yet, justifying the simplification of the procedure and the continuation of conflict on these reasons goes much beyond presenting the facts. A thorough examination of the many issues involved is necessary to comprehend the Russian motivations for the ongoing war. This calls for an in-depth analysis of the Crimean Question, focusing on how Russia uses demographics in its foreign strategy. In addition, within the broader context of The Russian World (Russkiy Mir) Vision, it is crucial to understand the relevance of Russia’s unique perspective on Ukraine. The objective of this study is to provide an analytical framework concentrating on these apparently most visible factors for Russia’s willingness to raise tensions in Eastern Europe further and invade the remaining territory under the sovereignty of Ukraine.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Why Romania is a NATO "Model Ally?"

Author:
Petre Roman
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
NATO’s eastward expansion was a fundamental geopolitical process that allowed countries to be prepared for the worst, the Russian revanche, by pursuing the best, the most successful path for democracy. Romania, which emerged from the tremendous communist Ceausescu regime, strongly wanted NATO membership and, after the first encouraging meetings in 1990, officially entered in 2004. However, Romania has been already back then contributed to many Western missions. Due to its geographical position, Romania is central to all NATO objectives. Now, Romania and Poland are the pivots of NATO’s defensive complex in the “postsoviet space”: Poland protects the Baltic Sea, Romania the Black Sea, where the Russian old-imperial appetites remain; Romania still defends the precious grain corridor. Furthermore, Romania is a “model ally”. There is a solid pro-Atlantic and pro-American sentiment in the country.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe and Romania

4. Towards a Fuzzy World Order: What Role for NATO

Author:
Richard Higgott and Simon Reich
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Bi-polarity, multi-polarity, the end of globalization, or Cold War v. 2.0. New explanations of world order abound. Often, they are asserted rather than reasoned by pundits looking for their 15 minutes of fame. This paper is much more modest. It eschews grand statements about world order. Rather we demonstrate that the future is far less clear cut and predetermined. Yes, a global binary is emerging around U.S.-China competition, but it is what we describe as fuzzy bifurcation. If our analysis is accurate, then it affects the behavior of other actors differently than a tight bi-polar system. In this paper we look at the implications of a fuzzy bifurcation of world order for that most important of alliances – NATO.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

5. The Putin Doctrine: What is it? The Russian Strategic Issue and the Enlarged National Security

Author:
Jose Alexandre Altahyde Hage
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
One can mention that this essay is only a contribution for an urgent issue in International Relations that is igniting debates in part of the academic community and the press in general, Russian expansionism and its conception of international security that, in our view, can be defined as enlarged national security. For Moscow, the dividing line between the international and the domestic whereas considering this issue is very thin4. This is why it is not a part of our objective to exhaust such a broad and complex topic, but to present some of its features.The period analysed in this article begins in 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, till January 2022, that marks the beginning of military exercises in some parts of Ukraine, namely the Donbass region, promoted by Putin ́s government. Our theoretical and methodological framework is based on classical and contemporary geopolitical literature, Halford Mackinder and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and International Relations realist thinkers such as Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer. Nevertheless, that does not mean that we will not be able to reference some liberal authors, such as Francis Fukuyama and Joseph Stiglitz.Apart from this Introduction, our essay is divided as such: a first part in which we propose a brief review of the concept of doctrine, as used by interstate politics and the State ́s national power principle. Following, we present an analysis of the Putin Doctrine, seen as both a result and as a drive for Moscow ́s revisionism in the face of the current geopolitical balance. In the third part, we examine some passages of the 1990s and of this emerging system, as an era of globalization, liberalization and “shock therapy” that disturbed the Russian quantum. Last, but not least, in our Final Thoughts some reflections will be brought.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

6. Starr Forum: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:
Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8. Reach for the Stars: Bridging Italy’s Potential in Space with Its Foreign and Security Policy

Author:
Karolina Muti
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italian capabilities, expertise and potential in the space sector are not widely known. Among state actors, Rome has actually been a pioneer in the field, boasting a long tradition that started in 1964 when Italy became the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United States, to send a nationally manufactured satellite into orbit.[1] From an industrial standpoint, Italy is among the few countries whose companies cover the whole space value chain.[2] In Europe, Rome is ranked second for total number of assets in orbit and is currently the third contributor to the European Space Agency (ESA).[3] An Italian astronaut, Samantha Cristoforetti, has recently become the first European woman to take command of the International Space Station (ISS).[4]
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

9. “Trying Not to Lose It” The Allied Disaster in France and the Low Countries, 1940

Author:
Richard J. Shuster
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article argues that the critical point of failure in the Allied catastrophe in France and the Low Countries in 1940 was a military plan that ignored key tenets of operational art and planning. In doing so, it points out that the Allies lacked a strategy oriented toward victory, failed to balance their operational factors of time, space, and force, and planned against a single potential enemy course of action. Together, these components set the conditions for a swift Allied defeat that shocked the world.
Topic:
History, Military Strategy, and World War II
Political Geography:
Europe and France

10. Introduction to Special Issue on Navigating NATO dynamics: Addressing various challenges in the international security environment

Author:
Bert Chapman, Jarosław Gryz, and George Andrew Zombanakis
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
As the international security environment undergoes significant changes, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) capacity to adapt shows how alliances can evolve from focusing on military defence to encompassing a wider spectrum of regional security challenges in an integrated manner. Russia’s violation of international law in 2014, followed by the war in Ukraine, has drawn the attention of NATO to the fact that apart from diplomatic measures, there might be a need to resort to more dynamic means in order to safeguard its members’ interests, especially when the security of the alliance’s eastern flank is threatened. NATO’s evolving role in the international security landscape reflects the alliance’s strategic adaptation to contemporary geopolitical challenges. The 2022 Strategic Concept embodies this change, emphasising NATO’s primary purpose of ensuring collective defence through a comprehensive approach focused on deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security (Calmels, 2020; North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2022). This change occurs within a complex geopolitical context, further complicated by evolving public opinion. For example, recent trends in the United States, particularly among younger Republican congressional representatives, reveal evolving attitudes towards the support for Ukraine. With growing disapproval of President Biden’s management of the Ukraine crisis, and varying opinions on the level and duration of support for Ukraine, it is evident that public sentiment is divided and evolving (Cerda, 2023; Langer, 2023). These findings reveal the complexity of the US involvement in the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the need for policymakers to consider these diverse viewpoints when shaping the future foreign policy decisions. The shifts in public opinion can also have significant implications for the ongoing conflict (Fisher, 2020), which is expected to continue for an extended period. This dynamic international security situation and shift in public opinion have set the stage for the ongoing challenges that NATO member states face in addressing the war in Ukraine. Consequently, there has been a significant surge in literature exploring these issues, examining them in terms of geopolitics, economics, and even psychology. Thoroughly investigating complex conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, requires an integrative research approach, drawing on multiple research sources, including scholarly journal articles, government information resources from multiple democratic countries and international organisations, datasets, public policy research institute materials, multiple social media platforms, and public opinion polls. Researchers must navigate the strengths and weaknesses inherent in these resources while adopting an interdisciplinary methodology to comprehensively analyse these events.
Topic:
NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, Hybrid Warfare, Adaptation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

11. Military capabilities in Europe: a framework for assessing the qualitative dimension

Author:
Bastain Giegerich and James Hackett
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
There is renewed focus in Europe on deterring and defending against state-level aggression. However, after decades of mainly crisis-management operations abroad, questions are being asked about the capability of European armed forces to achieve these tasks. Within the context of a deteriorating security environment, limited resources and a need for governments to better explain the benefits of defence, this report examines factors important in assessing military capability. There is particular focus on six input areas that are central to assessing the qualitative dimension of capability. The report includes contributions from seven specialists from across Europe, offering perspectives on these lines of enquiry and their relative importance to European states’ military capability now and in the future.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, State Building, and Resource Management
Political Geography:
Europe

12. The EU is Reluctantly Getting Tougher with Putin

Author:
Emmanuel Navon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Europeans surely remember what happens when you let an autocrat get away with grabbing territories hoping that the last bite will be the last one
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. Understanding the Russia-Iran-Israel Triangle

Author:
Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
As Tehran invests efforts to improve relations with Russia, Israel will have to maintain a dialogue with Moscow to safeguard its military and diplomatic freedom of action.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

14. North Africa Can Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas by Transporting Wasted Gas Through Existing Infrastructure

Author:
Mark Davis, Perrine Toledano, and Thomas Schorr
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
North Africa can reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas by transporting wasted gas through existing infrastructure.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. What Does $40 Billion in Aid to Ukraine Buy?

Author:
Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Congress has approved $40 billion in aid for Ukraine and other countries affected by the conflict―the sixth aid package since the war began. A major change is that this package looks ahead months rather than weeks. The aid package provides $19 billion for immediate military support to Ukraine, continuing the effort that has been vital to sustaining Ukrainian resistance, and $3.9 billion to sustain U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The package also contains about $16 billion for economic support to Ukraine, global humanitarian relief, and a wide variety of international programs as well as $2 billion for long-term support to NATO allies and DOD modernization programs. Although some elements of the aid package will be available quickly, many will take years to fully implement. This raises questions about why long-term elements could not have gone through the regular congressional authorization and budget processes.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

16. The Challenge of European Political Will

Author:
Rachel Lutz Ellehuus and Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In this follow-on report to 2021’s Europe's High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities and Missions, the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and International Security Program examine the other side of the coin of European military effectiveness: the political will of European countries to conduct military missions and operations. The report identifies the endogenous and exogenous factors constraining or increasing political will and maps them onto six country case studies. Four prototypes of political will emerged from the analysis: global partners, international activists, constrained partners, and minimalists. The report then assesses the political will of European allies and partners to conduct fifteen types of military missions and operations worldwide, from peacekeeping to large-scale combat. It concludes with a summary of key findings. First, it finds that internal and external factors—such as strategic culture and alliance dependence, respectively—will continue to constrain European political will in many cases, even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Second, European states are more likely to have the political will to engage in military missions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum (such as maritime patrol missions) and less likely at the higher ends of the spectrum, except in cases of significant collective or national defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Landmines are designed to maim or kill indiscriminately and can lie inactive in the soil for years. As such, they represent a constant threat to local populations, restrict people’s freedom of movement, and pose an obstacle to the return of refugees and to development during post- conflict reconstruction.1 Currently tens of millions of landmines have been laid in more than 60 countries and many of them are still unmapped.2 Among the most contaminated countries worldwide, four are in the OSCE region: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Turkey. Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia are also highly contaminated.3 In addition, several OSCE countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia, the United States, and Uzbekistan) did not join the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (generally known as the Ottawa Convention), which bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines; encourages mutual assistance among states parties to destroy existing landmines and stockpiles as soon as possible; and provides assistance to mine victims.4 Some of the non-signatory states are engaged in protracted conflicts in which the OSCE has played a role for years as mediator or facilitator in negotiations. This paper investigates whether mine action could be implemented as a CSBM as part of conflict transformation in the OSCE region, taking three post-Soviet ethnic conflicts as case studies (Georgia, Eastern Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh), where the problem of landmines and protracted conflicts are two interconnected dimensions of the same complex scenario, although with the possibility of generalising results to other areas. The study starts by illustrating the evolution of mine action and then moves on to address the multitrack approach to peacebuilding to explain how this can be combined with mine action. By reviewing the literature on conflict transformation and good practices worldwide, the study concludes that there is sufficient ground to consider mine action to be a promising CSBM in the OSCE area.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, Landmines, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

18. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

19. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. Iranian Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine and Nuclear Options

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The current survey is an Update, rather than a comprehensive check on Iranian public attitudes. This interim report covers findings on two unfolding security challenges – Iran’s nuclear program and the war in Ukraine – and their potential interconnections.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

21. tarr Forum: An Update on Russia's War Against Ukraine

Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
What is the status of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Starr Forum: Energy as a Weapon of War: Russia, Ukraine and Europe in Challenging Times

Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
How has Russia weaponized energy in this war? What have been the effects? How have Europeans responded to this weaponization of energy and what may be their responses this winter?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Military Strategy, European Union, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. Türkiye and the Russia-Ukraine War: Impact on the West, Central Asia, and the Caucasus

Author:
Matthew Bryza
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
During a recent webinar, I was asked to address the following question: what does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for Türkiye’s approach to the Caucasus and Central Asia? At first, the question struck me as odd. Having worked on these issues since the late 1990s and now living in Istanbul, it seemed obvious to me that Türkiye’s goals in these regions have been enduring since the end of the Cold War and were not changing because of Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine. These goals, I said, were and remain to: secure westward exports of oil and natural gas produced in the Caspian Basin; promote stability in the South Caucasus; and strengthen Türkiye’s business and cultural ties with the Turkic populations of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Türkiye’s approach toward Russia in this context also remains what it has been since the Ottoman centuries: cooperate where possible but confront where necessary. Reflecting momentarily on this question, however, I realized how different Ankara’s goals appear from the perspectives of Washington, Paris, and Athens. In these and other NATO capitals, Turkish foreign policy seems to have shifted from its pursuit of “zero problems with neighbors” during the early years of the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to one of “zero neighbors without problems.” Türkiye is thus viewed within the Atlantic Alliance as a belligerent outlier, bent on violating international law to pursue the extraction of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons, enabling Azerbaijan to use military force during the Second Karabakh War, and aligning in Syria more with Russia than with its own treaty allies.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

24. How the Conflict Over Ukraine Affects Security in the South Caucasus

Author:
Nargiz Gafarova
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Against the background of the present stage of the conflict over Ukraine, the South Caucasus is experiencing perturbation. Three examples rise immediately to mind: elements of the 10 November 2020 tripartite between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War statement (and the arrangements that have derived from it) are being suboptimally implemented; the leaders of Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia continue to hold out the possibility to conduct a referendum on “unification” with Russia; and the uncertain outcome of the talks in Vienna to revive the Iran nuclear deal. Such and similar examples have led all three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) to pursue variants of a policy some call “neutrality” and others “hedging” between the parties to the conflict over Ukraine. Located at the intersection of Europe, Russia, and the Greater Middle East—and thus constituting the western part of the Silk Road region, as defined by the Editorial Statement of Baku Dialogues—the South Caucasus is one of the most important and, at the same time, one of the most potentially explosive areas bordering the West. Over the past several decades, developments within all three South Caucasus states have contributed to a general sense of insecurity within the region. These include, most obviously, ethno‑political conflicts, civil wars, and color revolutions; the lackluster development of Western‑style governance institutions; and the widely‑held perception of ongoing high levels of corruption. Even the potentially positive strategic consequences of the outcome of the Second Karabakh War—namely, the prospect for the normalization of two sets of bilateral relationships (Armenia‑Azerbaijan and Armenia‑Türkiye) and the unblocking of all economic and transport connections in the region—have been overshadowed by the ongoing restructuring of world order, manifested by the increase of geopolitical volatility and ambiguity due to the major escalation of the conflict over Ukraine whose present phase began on 24 February 2022. The effects of the Western‑led sanctions and export restrictions regime against Russia have spilled over into the South Caucasus— notwithstanding the fact that none of the region’s states have formally aligned themselves with them. This essay provides an overview of the reverberations of the conflict over Ukraine towards the South Caucasus, with a focus on its impact on the region’s political, economic, and security environment.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe, Caucasus, and Asia

25. A Revitalized NATO and Its "New Strategic Concept" Amin Global and Regional Changes

Author:
E. Fuat Keyman
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
At the beginning of 2022, just as the globalizing world was entering the postCovid period and the United Nations Climate Change Conference declared a “code red” emergency for the climate crisis at COP 27, a strategically calculated move came from Russian President Vladimir Putin to unlawfully invade Ukraine. From the beginning, the invasion of Ukraine has generated impacts much larger and more transformative than any previous crisis, triggering serious crisis-ridden developments in the international system and globalization and forcing national governments and global actors to recalibrate and reposition. It is in this global and broader context NATO’s Madrid Summit and its “new Strategic Concept” should be analyzed and assessed. This paper argues that the summit is historic, necessary, but not sufficient. To substantiate this argument, it analyzes is NATO’s new strategic concept in detail, exploring its critical importance, its transformative effect and the six challenges that it faces.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

26. NATO's Changing Priorities

Author:
Ahmet O Evin
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to have led, with very few exceptions, to greater cooperation among members of the Western alliance and brought the transatlantic partners closer to one another. As a result, NATO, which has undergone several changes since the end of the Cold War, has regained its key role as the cornerstone of the West’s collective security interests. In its enhanced position, NATO also appears to be emerging as the champion of the liberal order as well as the universal values embraced by transatlantic partners. Yet, it may also be facing new challenges both from within, particularly in the case of a prolonged conflict in Europe, and from China, which is demonstrating increasing rivalry to the West.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

27. Future Uncertain: NATO in a Post-Quantum Post-AI World

Author:
James Sperling
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The emerging and disruptive technologies of the 21st century—artificial intelligence and quantum technologies—confront NATO with a paradox: the integration of those technologies into national armed forces will significantly narrow and possibly invert the systemic technology dominance NATO has enjoyed since 1945 and widen the technology gap within the Alliance with potentially debilitating consequences for operational effectives and allied cohesion. The precise impact of these disruptive technologies must remain largely speculative, but it is certain that they will change the nature of war-fighting, exacerbate the security dilemma, and precipitate in a recalibration of the global balance of power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

28. Russia's Assault on Ukraine: Fallout From the War

Author:
Dina R. Spechler and Martin C. Spechler
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The war between Russia and Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, has now gone on for more than four months. It has already taken a severe toll on much of the world and will cause much more harm the longer it continues. Moreover, it does not seem likely to end soon. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently declared that Russia has barely begun its military operation in Ukraine. He has clearly stated his goal of taking the entire Donbas. Success in that endeavor may motivate him to continue the fight for other objectives, including the major industrial center of Kharkiv, the key Black Sea port of Odesa, and perhaps even Kyiv and its environs. For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly said his goal is to push Russia back to the line it occupied on 23 February. His Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba has spoken of winning back the entire Donbas and liberating “the rest of our territory.” The U.S. Director of National Intelligence has predicted that a “grinding struggle” may continue for a long time. This article will explore some of the consequences of the war already in evidence
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

29. The Historical Roots of NATO Engagement in the Mediterranean

Author:
Matteo Gerlini
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The new strategic concept of the alliance looks at the Mediterranean situation as a shift in the engagement with a history that is as old as the origins of the Western bloc. In this history, the Italian role has been an example for the other Mediterranean countries that later joined NATO. The steps in the construction of the Atlantic coalition started also in Mediterranean with U.S. military engagement grounded in Truman’s doctrine. Twenty years late, the North Atlantic Council’s report on the alliance’s future tasks examined crucial “exposed areas” for NATO, and first among them was the Mediterranean. After the collapse of the Soviet system, NATO worked on a relationship of coexistence and cooperation with Russia. The ongoing invasion in Ukraine has thwarted years of discussion and work, but the partnerships promoted by NATO with the countries of the so-called enlarged Mediterranean stand as a success story.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

30. A Compass and a Concept: A Guide to the EU and NATO Strategic Outlooks

Author:
Ricardo Borges de Castro and Rita Barbosa Lobo
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 upended Europe’s security order. The invasion was a wake-up call that peace in the continent should not be taken for granted and a catalyst for change at European and transatlantic level. The EU adopted a long-term Strategic Compass for security and defense. NATO, no longer “braindead,” issued a new Strategic Concept for the coming decade and is expanding. While there is convergence in strategic outlooks, questions remain on how both organizations will cooperate and coordinate their actions, implement the investment, troops and capabilities’ goals set in each document as well as deal with countries such as China.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

31. NATO: The Importance of Activism in the Mediterranean Scenario

Author:
Lorenzo Somigli
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The secure defense of NATO members does not depend on the Kyiv frontline; the southern flank is the most unguarded. This paper deals with the Mediterranean, a closed sea without borders which globalized before globalization, examining some strategic alternatives for Western allies. The Mediterranean is a point of contact, a diaphragm, and a battlefield. In addition, the central Mediterranean is a relevant area where Russia and China have their foot in the door because of the disengagement of France and Italy and the lack of attention of NATO. It is precisely on this weaker frontier that NATO must relaunch its commitment and presence. Defending marine spaces determines the continent’s safety. So, losing the Mediterranean can be disastrous. And finally, it examines Italian policy in the Mediterranean to date and the reasons why Italy can and must correct the strabismus of the USA, which is completely looking at the Indo-Pacific, and of imagines a peripheral Europe without politics.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Activism
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

32. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Mine action has the potential to incentivise confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), because it could contribute to development and reconciliation through the creation of communities of practice among individuals from civil society and at the grassroots level as part of post-conflict reconstruction. Although many Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating States are contaminated by mines, mine action as a CSBM has scarcely been included in peace negotiations, because it is thought that it might hinder the peace process. Yet mine action, if “depoliticised”, could be implemented independently of peace negotiations through the creation of spaces for cooperation in demining projects of common interest to rival communities. The OSCE is well placed to propose these strategies, especially in Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are not only affected by protracted conflicts with limited engagement of the population in the peace process but are also highly contaminated by mines.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Violence, and Landmines
Political Geography:
Europe

33. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The global debate on weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) often focuses on futuristic “killer robots”, which risks overlooking the fact that these technologies are already part of the security landscape. Diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in states’ discourse pose a considerable risk for European security and stability. The impact of AI is not inevitable, and states should address this issue through political means, such as a political declaration with a commitment to ensuring human control over the use of force. With its inclusive membership, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can and should become the platform through which its participating States can take a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

34. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:
Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

36. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

37. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

38. The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Grace Hwang
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
NATO countries have already provided massive amounts of military aid to Ukraine, deployed additional forces to support the NATO countries that share a border with Russia, improved the Alliance’s ability to rapidly deploy forces forward in a crisis, and worked with key powers like Poland to strengthen its capabilities. NATO has accepted Finland and Sweden as future members of the Alliance, and it has made numerous other short-term adjustments to its force posture that enhance its deterrence and defense capabilities. NATO faces a future, however, where it cannot predict how much territory Ukraine will lose and where it must now view Russia as an ongoing major threat at virtually every level from the limited conventional threats Russia poses to the NATO countries on its border to the major increases in its threat of strategic nuclear forces. NATO cannot continue to treat Russia as a potential partner, and that seems to be an unlikely path forward so long as Putin or anyone like him is in power. NATO also cannot ignore the rise in China’s military and economic power or the prospects of closer Russian and Chinese strategic cooperation. The challenge NATO faces goes far beyond Ukraine. The days in which NATO countries could keep taking peace dividends by cutting their forces, failing to modernize, and failing to adopt new forces of tactics and interoperability are over. NATO cannot deal with the Russian threat in terms of half-measures or by continuing to focus on empty and virtually meaningless force goals like spending 2% of national GDP on defense and 20% of defense expenditure on equipment. NATO needs to act now to look far beyond the short-term priorities of the Ukraine conflict. It needs to revitalize its entire force planning progress. It needs to create effective levels of deterrence and defense capability, while it modernizes its forces to deal with radically new requirements like joint all-domain operations (JADO), emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), new precision-strike capabilities, changes in air and missile warfare and defense, and the revival of Russian naval power and the growth of a Chinese blue-water navy. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy has prepared a report, entitled, The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise, that examines how NATO must approach an effective force planning exercise that can give its new strategy real meaning. This report documents the pointless character of NATO’s present emphasis on burdensharing, and it examines the real-world shifts in spending and forces in NATO since 2014, as well as how these changes have affected the national forces in given sectors of Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

39. Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?

Author:
Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew "BINCS" Zublic
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone operations are underway, and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine. In this effort, Russia’s playbook will test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter further Russian aggression.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Baltic States

40. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

41. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:
Pavel Baev
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

42. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

43. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

44. The War against Ukraine and European Defence: When will we square the circle?

Author:
Bruno Angelet
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
After the end of the Cold War, Europe’s harvesting of the peace dividend was fed by wrong assumptions and led to a persistent underinvestment in defence. Today, problems are three-fold: too small stocks, inadequate, insufficient capabilities, and very low industrial production capacity. In many cases, stocks went well below accepted NATO standards, putting many European military units in serious difficulty to achieve NATO and EU readiness-levels. Strategic enablers were in further decline over the last 20 years, and many European countries dismantled their stocks of heavy weaponry. Both in Libya (2011) and in Afghanistan (until the withdrawal of NATO troops, in August 2021), European armed forces were unable to sustain combat, or evacuate, without support of US military hardware. On the eve of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the intelligence gap left Europeans in disbelief when US intelligence proofed almost entirely correct. The European Defence industry is fragmented and overprotected by exemptions to the Single Market regulations for reasons of “national security”. Companies face shrinking export markets (due to stringent export-criteria) and reduced production capacity, often by more than half. They became easy prey for foreign take-overs. The war against Ukraine propels those problems to the critical edge: the rush to arm Ukraine has depleted national stocks. Heavy weaponry needed for Ukraine’s territorial defence (and for ours) is missing or already sold to private stores. The European industry cannot not ramp-up production without a long term prospect of sustained demand for Europe’s Armed Forces.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

45. Russian Spring 2022 Recruitment Cycle

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In May 2022, we published our Egmont Paper 116 entitled The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited, in which we suggested, “The current spring recruitment cycle (1 April-15 July 2022) may be considered a more accurate indication of popular support for Putin’s war in Ukraine than the results of public opinion research as we know it. Therefore, the 2022 spring recruitment cycle may be regarded as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine with the voenkomati as its voting stations.” Near the end of this recruitment period, it is time to return to this statement. How did the spring recruitment cycle go, and which conclusion can we draw from it? A critical review.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Civil-Military Relations, Recruitment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

46. Tanks versus Banks: Russian Military versus EU Geoeconomic Power

Author:
Bernard Siman, Sven Biscop, and Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
War is an instrument of policy. Those who lose sight of the policy objectives, or keep shifting them, rarely do well in war. The European Union and its Member States (and NATO) are not directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, but they have unleashed a major geoeconomic offensive in response to Putin’s geopolitical gambit. They too, therefore, have to define precise objectives, and prepare for the new geoeconomic and geopolitical world that will inevitably result from this war. First, rerouted supply chains will create new challenges and dependencies for the EU. Second, instability in other states, as a consequence of the disruptions in the global economy, may indirectly also affect the EU. Finally, long-term relations with Russia obviously have to be reassessed, but relations with China and the alliance with the US are evolving too.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Civil-Military Relations, and Banking
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

47. Putin Is Creating the Multipolar World He (Thought He) Wanted

Author:
Sven Biscop, Bart Dessein, and Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Up until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s and China’s worsening relations with the European Union and the United States meant that the world order was at risk of falling apart into two rival blocs, as during the Cold War: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese. Since 24 February 2022, that is not so clear anymore. The more Russia escalates the violence in Ukraine, but also the strategic anxiety (by putting its nuclear forces on alert), the more difficult it becomes for other powers to stay completely aloof, let alone to simply align with Russia. The more EU and US sanctions reverberate throughout the global economy, the more it becomes impossible for other powers to avoid going at least partially along. China in particular has in fact already made a defining choice.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Social Order, Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

48. Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’

Author:
Sinikukka Saari and Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012, geopolitical competition has also become rooted in the Nordic region, and small states’ room for manoeuvre in security policy has shrunk. In Russia’s view, maintaining ‘good neighbourly relations’ is primarily the responsibility of small states that always need to negotiate the limits of their sovereignty with great powers, such as Russia. From the Nordic point of view, the relations may require walking on eggshells. Prior to 2014, Norway was often mentioned among Russia’s ‘good neighbours’, but now Russia regularly calls off its policy of ‘reassurance and deterrence’. There are increasing signs that, in Russia’s view, a ‘good neighbour’ should refrain from extensive security collaboration and training with NATO and the US. Hence, Finland and Sweden cannot wholly avoid political tension with Russia merely by staying outside of the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

49. A policy agenda for Finland’s entry into NATO: From ‘one for one’ to ‘one for all’

Author:
Edward Hunter Christie
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
At the NATO Madrid Summit in June 2022, Allies invited Finland and Sweden to join the NATO Alliance. In preparing for its membership, Finland will need to go through a reflection process on how it intends to contribute to NATO’s core tasks and make the most of its membership. Finland should consider making substantial contributions to the deterrence and defence posture in the Baltic Sea region, including in the Baltic states, and elsewhere on the Eastern Flank. In parallel, Finland should also ensure it contributes to the Southern Flank. Finland should aim to hit the ground running into the next cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and fulfil all relevant capability targets. Finland should also aim to “start strong to stay strong” on all existing NATO Pledges, notably those on defence investment, cyber-defence, and resilience. It is typical for individual NATO Allies to seek a salient role when it comes to certain specific topics. For Finland, the Arctic (Northern Flank) and resilience seem most promising.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

50. The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly

Author:
Zachary Jonathan Jacobson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:
Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.2 In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky’s artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the “soft powers” of persuasion.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine