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131. Global trends in countries‘ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Drawing on global media reports, we conduct a sentiment analysis of the image of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the evolution of its image over time. Our main finding is that perceptions of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many geographies from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is in sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past. This is notwithstanding increases in debt levels with China, much of which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant inter- and intra-regional differences in the average sentiment towards China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative in countries which, until today, are not part of the BRI. Finally, we focus on the European Union, Africa and China’s immediate neighbourhood to better understand the complexities behind the perceived benefits and challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

132. The hidden inequalities of digitalisation in the post-pandemic context

Author:
Cristiano Cadagnone and Maria Savona
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Digitalisation has a ‘hidden’ impact on employment, particularly on the invisible conditions of some jobs, as perceived by workers, that are relatively less explored in the literature and that could represent a substantial social cost, particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. We start by summarising a few main challenges of digitalisation, with a focus on the additional challenges brought about by the pandemic, the rise of platforms and alternative work arrangements, and the current attempts to regulate these. We then discuss the hidden aspects of inequality linked to the unmeasured side effects of digitalisation. Mental health in particular should be taken into account, particularly in the post-pandemic context, which has led to a significant amount of working from home. Also, the reduction of tasks previously done in the workplace in favour of remote working might limit social interactions, creativity and innovation potential. We conclude by suggesting areas for policy interventions.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Economy, Automation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

133. Pro- and anti-competitive provisions in the proposed European Union Data Act

Author:
Bertin Martens
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The proposed European Union Data Act gives users access and portability rights to the data generated by their use of tangible digital products and devices. This pro-competitive measure weakens the de-facto monopolistic control product manufacturers have over product data. However, the Data Act would also grant manufacturers a de-jure right to monopolistic pricing of data transfers to third-party service providers, restoring their control over data markets. Other anti-competitive provisions include restrictions on the use of data for competition purposes and a prohibition on transfering data to platforms identified as gatekeepers under the EU Digital Markets Act. Unnecessarily fuzzy definitions of products and data that fall under the Data Act would create uncertainty in implementation and incoherence with other EU data regulations. The Data Act should be simplified by dropping anti-competitive provisions and granting users and third-parties selected by users free access to all data generated by the use of a product or a service. This would increase competition in data-driven services and prevent users paying twice for their data. It would not disincentivise producers from investing in data-driven products and services. A further step could be the creation of a level playing field between producers and users in data-access rights. This can be achieved by introducing the principle of mutual exhaustion of data rights at point of sale. This would put all data co-generating parties in a position to generate economies of scale and scope in data aggregation, or data-driven externalities, to maximise innovation.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, European Union, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

134. The EU can manage without Russian liquified natural gas

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has committed to eliminate all Russian fossil-fuel imports by 2027. Progress has been made, with sanctions on oil and coal already introduced. The glaring exception is natural gas, on which the EU has so far refrained from imposing limitations, owing to greater dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, pipeline gas imports have fallen by four-fifths following Russia’s weaponisation of gas supplies. However, Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the EU have increased since the invasion of Ukraine. The EU needs a coherent strategy for these LNG imports. Our analysis shows that the EU can manage without Russian LNG. Anticipated impacts are not comparable to those felt in 2022 as Russian pipeline gas dried up. The regional impact would be most significant for the Iberian Peninsula, which has the highest share of Russian LNG in total gas supply. Meanwhile, the global LNG market is tight, and we anticipate that Russia would find new buyers for cargos that no longer enter Europe. We discuss the options available to the EU. Wait-and-see implies delaying any action until 2027, while soft sanctions would discourage additional purchases but not break long-term contracts. We argue instead for an EU embargo on Russian LNG, to reduce exposure to an unreliable and adversarial entity, and to limit the extent to which EU consumers fund the Russian state. The embargo may be designed to allow purchases only if they are coordinated via the EU’s Energy Platform, with limited volumes and below market prices. This could be accompanied by the implementation of a price cap on Russian LNG cargos that use EU or G7 trans-shipment, insurance or shipping services.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

135. Rebooting the European Union’s Net Zero Industry Act

Author:
Simone Tagliapietra, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In March 2023, the European Commission published a legislative proposal for an EU response to the US Inflation Reduction Act: the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA). It is an unconvincing policy proposal, both for what is in it and for what is not in it. The proposal has five problematic aspects. First, it takes a top-down approach, in which specific technologies are selected for preferential treatment. Preferable would be a technology-neutral approach open to all current and future technologies that help tackle the net-zero challenge. Second, its blanket 40 percent self-sufficiency benchmark for EU domestic cleantech manufacturing by 2030 sends a protectionist signal, is poorly defined and does not reflect the differences in EU capacity in the cleantech sector. Third, it relies on the acceleration of permitting procedures as the main policy instrument, although this is not the main obstacle to cleantech investment in the EU. Fourth, it proposes more strategic use of public procurement. While this is an objective to be supported, the specific proposals are likely to be ineffective because of the way they are designed. Fifth and not least, the NZIA would lack a governance structure that would ensure effective implementation. In addition, the NZIA does not tackle three critical issues. It does not address investment obstacles related to failures of the single market. It does not tackle the coordination problem at the core of developing an EU green industrial policy. Finally, it does not develop an EU-level funding strategy, but rather relies on state aid, with the related risk of fragmentation. The European Parliament and EU countries in the Council of the EU should reboot the proposal and refocus its objectives, sharpening its limited instruments, improving its governance, and adding financial incentives to ensure implementation. In parallel, the EU should develop a broader green industrial policy strategy that leverages the single market in a credible manner, building a solid new governance framework and a new EU-level funding approach.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Trade Policy, and Industry
Political Geography:
Europe

136. Can Chinese growth defy gravity?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Chinese growth, astounding since the beginning of the reform era, has slowed in the last decade. We offer a baseline estimate (based on the current trend) of China’s medium-term growth rate, which we project to fall to 2.4 percent by 2035. Several factors create uncertainty around this baseline. China’s rapid aging is already incorporated into our long-term growth scenario, but its impact on growth will depend on how China’s remaining urbanisation process spreads over time, how the shrinking labour supply affects labour productivity and whether the decline in total factor productivity growth, reflecting the lack of reform during the last decade and possibly the rising role of the state, can be reversed. Investment in China, for decades the largest factor in China’s growth, is expected to contribute less to growth given the increasingly low return on assets, particularly on state-led investment. The rapid piling up of public debt is also becoming a heavy burden for the Chinese economy. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic may have left significant scarring effects, such as structurally high youth unemployment and low investment confidence. On the upside for China, the rise in human capital and research and development expenditure may support innovation and growth, but the magnitude of this effect is uncertain, because it is unclear if higher innovation will translate into higher total factor productivity, and because of the United States’s push to contain China technologically.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

137. The value added of central bank digital currencies: a view from the euro area

Author:
Maria Demertzis and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Different jurisdictions have set out different reasons for creating central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Some countries, particularly those with already-operational CBDCs for retail purposes, aim to to promote financial inclusion. But in countries where most citizens have access to financial services, central banks are interested in CBDCs as an aspect of the increasing digitalisation of finance. Central banks could also choose to use CBDCs to guarantee in full citizen’s holdings (currently, deposits in commercial bank are only partially guaranteed), but this would trigger major changes in the financial system in terms of the role of commercial banks in intermediation and the role of fiat money. So far, central banks have not opted to go this way. In the euro area, consumers have multiple payment options and a very efficient retail payments system. The currency enjoys high levels of trust and is not challenged by the emergence of private currencies, such as Bitcoin, or by the risk that cash, a monetary system’s anchor, will disappear. Therefore, creating a CBDC for retail purposes in the euro area offers little obvious value added, at least for the foreseeable future. However, there is a strong case for building a CBDC that banks could use for cross-border wholesale purposes (ie with other currencies). Wholesale CBDCs could revolutionise the way that cross-border, cross-currency payments are made for two reasons. Cross-border payments are currently slow and inefficient. Pilot projects have shown that wholesale payments with CBDCs can generate substantial time and cost savings. Any two central banks that have operational wholesale CBDCs could settle transactions between themselves. This would be very different from the current system, as most settlements today are done via the dollar (and then the euro) infrastructure and use correspondent banks. The euro area and the United States would have to consider carefully from a geopolitical perspective how wholesale CBDCs might affect their global economic standing. By developing a CBDC for wholesale purposes, the European Union would be able to contribute to developing the global standard.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Governance, Regulation, Central Bank, Digital Currency, and Euro
Political Geography:
Europe

138. The rising cost of European Union borrowing and what to do about it

Author:
Gregory Claeys and Conor McCaffrey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Debt issuance by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union has increased massively. Of the approximately €400 billion in outstanding EU debt as of May 2023, 85 percent has arisen from borrowing since 2020. Large-scale borrowing is expected to continue until 2026 to fund the remainder of NextGenerationEU, and concessional loans to support Ukraine. When these programmes were launched, interest rates were at historic lows – even negative for maturities below 10 years. However, interest rates rose sharply in 2022. Beyond the widespread rise in euro-denominated interest rates due to monetary tightening by the European Central Bank in response to the inflation surge, the EU has also faced a widening of the spread between its yields and those of major European issuers, including France and Germany. This widening is driven by a combination of market features, circumstantial factors and institutional features. The EU cannot affect the overall cyclical movement of interest rates and will have to learn to live with it, like sovereigns do. However, the European Commission should continue to try to narrow the spread with major European sovereigns by further developing the relevant market infrastructure and improving its issuance strategy. The Commission will not be able to do this alone. Institutional developments, including progress on the development of new own resources and a long-term substantial presence in the bond market, will be necessary to fully reap the benefits of EU borrowing. A large share of EU borrowing (around €421 billion in total by the end of 2026, in current prices) is intended to finance unprecedented non-repayable support: Recovery and Resilience Fund grants and additional funding for existing EU programmes under the EU budget. The interest costs associated with this part of the debt lie with the EU budget. Our estimates suggest that, because of the high current and expected levels of interest rates, this cost could be twice as high as what was initially estimated at the start of the EU’s 2021-27 budget cycle. As a result, because interest costs for the borrowing of the non-repayable support are accounted for under the EU budget’s ‘expenditure ceiling’, this will exert further pressure on the funding of important EU programmes, which are already affected by inflation. The EU should thus quickly review how interest costs are accounted for in its budget and financial framework.
Topic:
Debt, Budget, European Union, and European Commission
Political Geography:
Europe

139. Adjusting to the energy shock: the right policies for European industry

Author:
Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In 2022, overall European Union industrial employment and output increased above 2021 levels, despite rocketing energy prices. However, output declined from energy-intensive industries including basic metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and paper, for which energy costs represent a much bigger share of production costs than for less energy-intensive manufacturing. Energy prices are likely to remain above historic levels for the foreseeable future. In its industrial strategy response to this context, the EU must ask first whether the energy-intensive parts of the value chain should be outsourced permanently. Conditional on the answer being no, the second question is how to reduce energy prices to ensure the competitiveness of the energy-intensive productions stages that remain in the EU. First, the EU could bridge the high energy price period with unconditional subsidies, which seems to be the preferred strategy currently. This will avoid irreversible large-scale relocation abroad but is expensive, does not help to drive down energy prices and poses risks of fragmentation within the EU. It will only succeed if internationally competitive energy supplies are made available quickly. Second, the EU could support decarbonised production processes built on large-scale deployment of domestic renewables, grid interconnectors and storage. This would accelerate the green transition and reduce clean-tech prices worldwide. However, EU taxpayers would bear the cost of new technologies, without any guarantee of solving the current cost-competitiveness issue. Third, the EU could facilitate imports of energy-intensive products, while helping EU industry move to higher value-added parts of the value chain. Subsidies could be given directly to industrial sectors that have not become structurally uncompetitive, while bringing down energy demand and thus energy prices. However, this strategy would result in temporarily higher unemployment and factory closures in energy-intensive industries, would need to accommodate concerns over excessive reliance on imports and would need to be engineered to address carbon leakage. Policymakers should implement a mix of these policies. The EU should subsidise existing energy-intensive industries only in clearly justified cases, while deciding which energy-intensive products can be left to international market forces. By choosing which decarbonisation investments should be supported in Europe, the EU can combine industrial competitiveness and environmental sustainability.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Value Chains, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

140. The longer-term fiscal challenges facing the European Union

Author:
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Gregory Claeys, Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Stavros Zenios
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The pandemic and subsequent price shocks triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have increased longer-term fiscal pressures in the European Union through higher debt, higher expected real interest rates and higher public investment needs. This Policy Brief makes some simple quantitative assessments of those effects and discusses policy implications, with the following results. First, long-term increases in primary fiscal balances required to offset higher debt and higher expected real interest rates are in the range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP for most EU countries. However, because of pre-existing differences in fiscal space, not all countries will need to undertake that adjustment, while some countries may need to adjust by substantially more. Among the 21 EU countries for which we have data to undertake this analysis, 14 will need to adjust by more than they were planning to do by 2025. Second, the required additional fiscal adjustment looks manageable, although it is substantial in some cases. To achieve medium-term debt-reducing primary balances, several EU countries will need to raise primary balances by more than 2 percent of GDP above their 2025 target, but no country will need additional fiscal adjustment of more than 3 percent of GDP. Third, market data suggests that the future path of real interest rates is very uncertain. Compared to the period immediately preceding the pandemic, longer-term expected real interest rates have increased by about 2 percentage points but remain low on average, at about 1 percent in real terms. Future developments depend on whether the structural factors that led to low interest rates in the first place persist or unwind. While interest rates might decline again, fiscal policymakers should not make plans that assume such a decline. Fourth, public spending needs for additional defence and climate spending run well above 1 percent of GDP per year. These needs do not appear to have been incorporated into current fiscal baselines, and hence will come on top of the adjustment described above. To ensure that fiscal adjustment does not defeat its purpose by slowing growth, it is essential that it is conducted gradually. In countries that require such adjustment, it should start as soon as cyclical conditions allow.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Finance, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Europe