Political Geography: Europe / Publication Year:

201. ‘Ten pound touts’: post-conflict trust and the legacy of counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland

Author:: Kristin M. Bakke and Kit Rickard
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: This paper explores the legacies of wartime rebel governance and counterinsurgency tactics. Insurgents rely on civilian support for resources, information, and cover. To defeat insurgents, the state attempts to extract information from communities where support for insurgents is highest. We argue that strong norms against civilian collaboration emerge in these areas, which may have long legacies for local community trust. To explore these legacies, we conduct a case study of post-conflict Northern Ireland. While both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups established wartime institutions, the counterinsurgency targeted Republican groups in urban areas with the use of informants. Drawing on secondary literature and a survey, we show that strong norms against informers—‘touts’—persist long after the end of the conflict in Republican strongholds. These areas show lower levels of local community trust than their Loyalist counterparts. The Northern Irish case demonstrates the detrimental effects of dynamics likely to shape other post-conflict states.
Topic:: Counterinsurgency, Governance, Civilians, Survey, and Trust
Political Geography:: Europe and Northern Ireland

202. Harnessing allied space capabilities

Author:: Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

203. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:: Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

204. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:: Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

205. Kazakhstan could lead Central Asia in mitigating the world’s energy and food shortages

Author:: Margarita Assenova, Ariel Cohen, and Wesley Hill
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has had significant economic and political repercussions across the globe, including energy shortages and growing food insecurity. The war has forced Central Asian states to emphasize their independence from Moscow and accelerate their economic diversification. Central Asia—comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—has the potential to mitigate global shortages of energy, food, and fertilizers, caused by Russia’s war of aggression. The primary challenges for Central Asia and its Western partners remain diversifying export routes and expanding the capacity of alternative transportation corridors, especially the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Corridor, or the “Middle Corridor.” Kazakhstan is the leading producer of uranium ore in the world, grows 2 percent of the world’s wheat, and has major hydrocarbon reserves. Kazakhstan has the opportunity to lead Central Asia forward on the path to becoming an important supplier of energy, grain, fertilizers, and nuclear fuel to world markets. The energy crisis in Europe spurred renewed interest in the long-planned Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline. A potential United States and European Union ban on uranium civilian-reactor fuel exports from Russia could ensure Kazakhstan’s importance as a nuclear fuel exporter to Europe. To do this, Kazakhstan first needs to build its own conversion and enrichment facilities. This would allow it to double its share in the European market while utilizing the Middle Corridor. By encouraging Western investment, the states of Central Asia can become an important force in global commodity markets. To this end, they should implement the recently signed far-reaching regional agreements on cooperation and integration, so that they are less susceptible to “divide and conquer” strategies from predatory foreign powers and can exercise greater leverage when negotiating as a bloc. The US and the EU should also recognize that Central Asia’s energy and agricultural potential and resources make the region an area of strategic interest with promising business opportunities. The Central Asian states need to intensify their Western-oriented diplomatic outreach to attract support from state and private actors for investment and technological partnerships. Geographic proximity to Russia and China means Central Asian countries will always have economic relationships with Moscow and Beijing. But greater Western engagement in the region can diminish the chances for Russo-Sino cooperation in Central Asia. Russia’s war against Ukraine has weakened its geopolitical position and the Western sanctions on its economy have opened up new opportunities for Central Asia to supply critical energy and food commodities to world markets. Kazakhstan, as the region’s largest economy and its largest producer of oil, uranium, and grain, is well-positioned to lead this transition.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Food Security, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Kazakhstan

206. Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Author:: Roman Osadchuk and Andy Carvin
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In the lead-up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin and its proxies perpetrated information operations to justify military action against Ukraine, mask its operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the war. DOWNLOAD PDF Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America. Building upon daily monitoring by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), this report synthesizes Kremlin attempts to undermine Ukraine by targeting local, regional, and global audiences over the course of 2022 since the start of the war on February 24 of that year.
Topic:: Media, News Analysis, Conflict, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

207. Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China

Author:: Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Set against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the June 2022 Madrid NATO Summit set the tone for the next decade of the Alliance’s shared future. Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Allies laid out actions to be taken across the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Now the Alliance must implement those responses. Beijing will be watching closely.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

208. China and the new globalization

Author:: Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined. Many of the causal factors for this very significant change revolve around China and the consequent responses to its actions by the United States, other democracies of the transatlantic alliance, and the advanced democratic economies of the Indo-Pacific. There are other important factors generating this new globalization including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war both on energy markets and on trade and investment with Russia generally, as well as the global requirements for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, China has been a critical element in what might be described as the “maximum trade-centered globalization,” which has dominated trade and investment policy in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. This issue brief describes the still-developing new globalization focusing on the issues surrounding China. A fundamental challenge that China presents arises because its actions have generated significant security and economic challenges, yet it nonetheless is a massive trade and investment partner for the “advanced democratic economies” (ADEs),1 which for purposes of this analysis include the Group of Seven (G7) countries,2 plus Australia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. Adapting to a new globalization requires establishing a strategic approach that resolves the inherent contradictions between those conflicting considerations.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

209. Authoritarian kleptocrats are thriving on the West’s failures. Can they be stopped?

Author:: Francis Shin and Ben Judah
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: A hidden web of power revealed itself to Internet users in early 2022. Following a brutal government crackdown in Kazakhstan in January, anyone using open-source flight-tracking websites could watch kleptocratic elites flee the country on private jets. A little more than a month later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought a new spectacle: social media users were able to track various oligarchs’ superyachts as they jumped from port to port to evade Western sanctions. These feeds captured a national security problem in near real time: In Eurasia and beyond, kleptocratic elites with deep ties to the West were able to move themselves and their assets freely despite a host of speeches by senior officials, sanctions, and structures designed to stop them. Kleptocratic regimes—kleptocracy means “rule by thieves”—have exploited the lax and uneven regulatory environments of the global financial system to hide their ill-gotten gains and interfere in politics abroad, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. They are aided in this task by a large cast of professional enablers within these jurisdictions. The stronger these forces get, the more they erode the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the international sanctions regime imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine has little hope of long-term success if the global financial system itself continues to weaken. The West still has a long way to go to rein in the authoritarian kleptocrats who have thrived on the institutional dysfunction, regulatory failure, and bureaucratic weakness of the transatlantic community for far too long. We need to rethink not just how we combat kleptocracy, but also how we define it. Policy makers need to understand that authoritarian regimes that threaten transatlantic security are closely linked to illicit financial systems. As it stands, our thinking about how foreign corruption spreads is too constrained by stereotypes about kleptocratic goals and actions.
Topic:: Corruption, Diplomacy, Intelligence, Politics, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Rule of Law, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, and United States of America

210. Impact of economic sanctions on net commodity-producing and net commodity-consuming countries

Author:: Sergio R. Vale and Eduardo Viola
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has had a marked economic impact. However, since Russia is a net producer of important commodities, the impact of sanctions on its economy was less than expected. But what would happen if there was a war involving a country that was a net importer of commodities? In the case of a possible China-US conflict over Taiwan, the impact on the world economy would be different, with a deeper recession around the world, but the impact on the Brazilian economy would still be positive on account of the possibility that would remain of agricultural exports to China.
Topic:: Agriculture, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Commodities, and Exports
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

211. Strategic Survival in Syria

Author:: Omar Abu Layla
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: How Russia and Iran maintain their grip in Syria under the shadows of the Ukraine war
Topic:: Defense Policy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria

212. Building Resilience? The Cybersecurity, Economic & Trade Impacts of Cloud Immunity Requirements

Author:: Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: EU Member States should call on the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and the European Commission to abandon immunity requirements in the proposed EU Cloud Certification Scheme (EUCS). With immunity requirements in the EUCS, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box, paving the way for data localisation, foreign ownership restrictions, and local establishment requirements in digital industries globally leading to rising trade tensions. ENISA’s current proposal could increase policymakers’ appetite for data localisation in the EU. It would empower the European Commission and Member State authorities to exclude foreign businesses from domestic cloud services markets and set a dangerous precedent for any data-intensive sector. The list of “sectors of high criticality” could be logically extended to both existing services (e.g., financial services) and to new technologies and business models, such as IoT in the energy and healthcare sectors, and autonomous driving in the transport sector. Non-EU jurisdictions would be pressured to respond in kind. EUCS immunity requirements would increase cloud adopters’ exposure to cybersecurity risks. Data localisation often creates obstacles to an integrated management approach towards cybersecurity risks. Country of headquarter and foreign ownership restrictions in the proposed EUCS risk removing global frontier cybersecurity technologies from Member State markets. Excluding these and other EU and non-EU companies from EU Member States could result in a long-lasting security deficit of EU cloud adopters vis-à-vis organisations that are still able to use reliable and often best-practice cloud services offered by providers from outside EU Member States. Immunity requirements in the EUCS are discriminatory by design. They could provoke retaliatory measures by EU trading partners, either unilaterally or through WTO or bilateral FTA (e.g., UK-EU) Dispute Settlement. Local establishment requirements and foreign ownership restrictions would by design discriminate against foreign cloud providers. US-headquartered companies, which currently serve more than 75% of the EU market, would be most affected by EU immunity requirements.[1] Depending on US preferences and the scope of the proposed EUCS, the EU could be subject to retaliatory tariffs of up to USD 12 billion worth of EU goods exports or equivalent restrictions for EU services exports to the US. Other governments could lodge complaints via the WTO as well (e.g., Singapore, Japan, Canada and others, where cloud development is advancing rapidly). EU suppliers are currently in no position to manage a broad-based transition to cloud, and thus such requirements would delay significant efficiency and security gains that current foreign suppliers could offer. A blanket exclusion of non-EU cloud vendors would also likely undermine Europe’s objective to achieve a 75% cloud adoption rate for EU enterprises. Sensitive European businesses and public sector organisations would have to delay migration and make do with legacy systems for a very long time. Contrary to large countries, these negative impacts would be much more pronounced for smaller EU Member States, which lack the presence of large domestic incumbents and generally rely much more on an open international trading regime for digital services. ENISA’s cloud certification scheme should be limited to technical and transparency requirements. Immunity requirements for non-personal data should be addressed in bilateral initiatives such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) or agreements requiring a company that sought to offer services of the highest level of sensitivity to be headquartered in a country granted adequacy with EU data protection rules, or a country that is an adherent to the OECD’s Trusted Government Access principles, or (concerning the US) a participant in the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework. Excluding foreign companies from operating in the EU would have far-reaching consequences. If that is the intent, it should require a sound legal analysis and the decision should be taken through a formal legislative procedure at the EU level.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Europe

213. The Economic Dividend of Competitiveness

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Elena Sisto, and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: In a world of technological and economic rivalry, the EU must devote increased attention to its competitiveness. Higher levels of competitiveness will help the EU build a more prosperous economy which will in turn produce innovation and resources to address the great challenges of our time. ECIPE published a study presenting a competitiveness compass with concrete policy recommendations that will improve EU’s competitiveness. These policy recommendations, once implemented, will bring tangible benefits to the EU economy in the form of higher levels of trade and productivity. This report presents five scenarios in which the EU pursues competitiveness policies that lead to higher economic growth.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Growth, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

214. Building a Mature UK Trade Policy

Author:: David Henig
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Global Britain has not delivered according to the hopes expressed by supporters of leaving the EU. Trade with the rest of the world has not grown to make up for leaving a bloc with seamless trade, early Free Trade Agreements with Australia and New Zealand are of minor economic significance, and it is hard to discern much of a strategy beyond completing a few more similar deals. Meanwhile the world of trade policy is transformed since 2016, negatively. The US has essentially declared its national interests to be more important than global rules, while the EU wants to act unilaterally as the global regulator. In both, the climate crisis is being used as an excuse to reintroduce protectionist measures threatening economic damage and global stability. Expectations of what a UK outside of the EU could achieve were exaggerated, but nonetheless the country could be doing a lot better in its trade policy. There is no good reason for such tensions as exist with a broad range of frustrated stakeholders, the absence of clear purpose on UK strengths such as services, or the defensiveness that seemingly takes pride in secrecy and resistance to proper scrutiny. Adjustment time was inevitable, but six years should have been enough.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Free Trade, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

215. In Support of Market-Driven Standards

Author:: Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The EU published its new Standardisation Strategy in 2022. The strategy contains some good ideas to improve the way European standards are set. However, in its attempt to gain more control over technical standards, the EU risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The primary motivation behind the strategy is the belief that the process governing the way CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI – the three European Standardisation Organisations – take decisions over EU standards favours non-EU multinationals. To address this perceived imbalance, EU National Standardisation Bodies will have the exclusive power to accept standardisation requests, and adopt, revise and withdraw European technical standards. These changes are particularly significant for ETSI, Europe’s Standardisation Body in charge of telecommunication standards and one of Europe’s most successful organisations. ETSI is a prime example of EU normative power since it hosts companies from more than 60 countries, while retaining a large membership of EU firms. The regulatory changes included in the strategy are not risk-free. There could be unintended consequences that may undermine a standardisation system that has delivered significant economic benefits for the EU and the world. First, giving more responsibility to EU’s National Standardisation Organisations will turn a European discussion into 30 (EU and EEA) national debates. As a consequence, small companies will not be able to contribute to each and every one of the National Standardisation Organisations, diluting their contribution, while multinational companies, with the resources needed to cooperate with a larger number of bodies, will benefit from an expanding role in the EU standard setting process. Second, if standards are fragmented along national borders and companies must multiply their efforts to take part in several Standardisation Development Organisations, there will be less resources for Research and Development spending. Finally, if each and every National Standardisation Organisation needs to have a position with regards to the acceptance of a standardisation request, or adoption, revision and withdrawal of European technical standards, the time period required to adopt a technical standard may be extended rather than shortened, which is the exact opposite of what the European Commission wants to achieve. The regulatory changes included in the EU Standardisation Strategy are akin to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. If the European Commission is concerned about the influence of non-EU companies in European Standardisation Bodies, it does not need to overhaul their governance systems. Supporting greater participation of European firms in the European standard system will ease EU’s concerns without the downside risks associated with changing the rules of the game that govern Europe’s Standardisation Bodies. The success of the European standardisation system, which is market-driven and based on consensus, has had significant economic benefits in the development of specific industries, like the European Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Technical standards in ICT have shaped a European industry that is not only dynamic and international but also enjoys some of the highest levels of wages and Research and Development spending. Moreover, if technical standards are not developed through an open, consensus-based, and industry-led voluntary process, they will be developed in different ways. For instance, governments and private companies can develop standards by themselves. Both solutions are inferior to the current market-driven approach that governs European standards. However, the European market-driven approach to set standards is voluntary, and its success and continuation must not be assumed. European policymakers should be worried about tinkering with a European standardisation system which has produced economic specialisation and innovation to the benefits of EU firms and consumers.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, and Standardization
Political Geography:: Europe

216. What is Wrong with Europe’s Shattered Single Market? – Lessons from Policy Fragmentation and Misdirected Approaches to EU Competition Policy

Author:: Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: What is wrong with Europe’s Single Market? The brief answer to that question is that it does not really exist – it is unsingle. The Single Market is in many ways a political illusion. It exists only nominally. Any company doing business in Europe faces significant barriers to cross-border exchanges within the EU, and it is these barriers that hamper companies’ ability to scale and compete internationally on the back of innovation and economic integration. We outline that Brussels and national governments need to beat the drum for eliminating policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market and at the same time change course in competition policy to sufficiently support investments in innovation, business growth, and the adoption of advanced technologies across industries. Major economic indicators show that Europe is caught in a protracted corporate and technology crisis. The EU has for a very long time now been tailing US corporate and innovation leadership. At the same time, competition with technology-intensive imports from China is getting increasingly intense. Europe’s underperformance is rooted in a legally fragmented internal market which is disincentivising business growth and innovation. On top of that, an outdated approach to competition policy is discouraging businesses from adopting innovation and scaling across national borders, risking that EU companies continue to lose clout and international competitiveness. 30 years have passed since the formal establishment of Europe’s Single Market. Data reveals that regulatory convergence has reversed or come to a halt in most policy areas. Recent policies for technologies and digital business models, which are key sources of cross-industry competitiveness, created new layers of regulation and legal uncertainty in EU and Member State law. Overall, EU policies have not significantly helped European companies, large and small, to do business in another Member State or use advanced technology-enabled services. EU competition policy does not live up to its promise to “enable the proper functioning of the EU’s internal market”. Europe’s competition policy is still fragmented along national borders and largely ignorant to dynamic effects of competition, especially investments in innovation. Due to mixed legal competences, competition rules are often enforced differently by Member States’ national authorities and can be appropriated to support protectionist industrial policy ambitions. The recently enacted Digital Market Act (DMA) demonstrates that the European Commission and Member State authorities favour protection and discretionary enforcement over innovation and economic disruption, without providing solid evidence of abusive business behaviour and consumer harm. With the DMA, the EU introduced legislation with serious ambiguities in objectives, concepts, and rules, and explicitly allows national Member States to regulate competition at their own discretion. A recent attempt by Germany’s competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, to enforce its own rulebook for large digital companies (Section 19a of the German Competition Act) risks creating a patchwork of competition rules for large providers of advanced digital services across the EU. Local adopters of advanced digital services, particularly small businesses, that use advanced technology services to compete in their markets would be confronted with less choice and quality. Recently imposed policies under the umbrella of European Strategic Autonomy will hardly help policymakers in their ambition to achieve “innovation and technology leadership”. The paramount task for the EU and national governments is to eliminate policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market, accompanied by an approach to competition policy that embraces investments in innovation and business growth while accounting for the substantial value created through the adoption of innovative technologies and disruptive business models across industries in the EU.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Economy, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

217. Reforming Standard Essential Patents: Trade, Specialisation, and International Jurisprudence

Author:: Fredrik Erixon and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The European Commission is considering a radical overhaul of the system governing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). A leaked proposal suggests that the Commission wants to take control over the registration of SEPs, take efforts to regulate their essentiality, and intervene in negotiations over royalty rates if parties do not come to an agreement. The underlying assumption is that such a system will benefit SEP implementers and the European economy, and that the common holders of SEPs will be cut down a size or two. The logic behind this policy is that, since there are more SEP implementers than holders, any change in favour of implementers will have a net positive effect on the EU economy. However, this is doubtful. The EU is a R&D powerhouse for many of the technologies protected under SEPs and since most of the global production of the goods using these technologies is done outside Europe, the EU is a net exporter of innovation and a receiver of revenues from the licensing of these technologies. Using data on trade, specialisation, and market revenues, this paper comes to a different conclusion: the EU economy is likely to be a net loser if the balance between holders and implementers is changed. Moreover, there is a general and fundamental interest for Europe to preserve a system of standards and SEPs that allows it to punch above its weight in international policies and practices in standards and patents.
Topic:: Reform, European Union, Trade, Patents, Specialization, European Commission, and Jurisprudence
Political Geography:: Europe

218. Strategic Autonomy and the Competitiveness of Europe’s Innovative Pharmaceutical Sector: A Wake-up Call

Author:: Fredrik Erixon and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: It is high time for Europe to break its relative decline in the pharmaceutical sector. Europe used to be the preeminent region in the world for Research and Development and innovation in the sector – being the location for a majority of R&D and the development of new medicines. However, its competitiveness has been going down for several decades – and, in more recent time, the pace of the decline is now accelerating. Europe is not just outpaced by the United States. Unless there is a new direction, China will soon be ahead of Europe too. Europe is behind the global frontier in innovation and new product development in medicines. It is not just Europe’s share of global R&D that is going down. Of all the new chemical and biological entities that are developed, Europe is contributing a falling share. There is a similar development in the drug pipeline – medicines that are in the regulatory approval process. The location of clinical trials for Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products – an area of new frontline drug development – is moving out of Europe. If Europe is to improve its strategic autonomy and restore competitiveness in the pharmaceutical sector, better policies are needed to incentivise innovation and attract R&D investment. A new strategy for the pharmaceutical industry should include – among other things – better protection of intellectual property, more and focused R&D expenditures, and streamlined regulatory and reimbursement processes.
Topic:: European Union, Pharmaceuticals, Strategic Autonomy, Research and Development, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

219. Trade and Competitiveness: Putting the Firm at the Centre of the Analysis

Author:: Lucian Cernat and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The European Commission published its communication for the long-term competitiveness of the EU. Trade and Open Strategic Autonomy were among the selected policy areas that will drive EU competitiveness in the future and trade with the rest of the world as a share of EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was the selected indicator to measure progress. This Policy Brief proposes a new set of indicators that complement this and similar indicators that focus on the value of trade. Using the Trade by Enterprise Characteristics (TEC) database, this paper produces indicators that measure the number of exporters, non-EU suppliers, non-EU customers, and foreign companies. By putting the firm at the centre of the analysis, these indicators offer insights that complement policy-makers’ views on trade and competitiveness.
Topic:: European Union, GDP, Trade, Strategic Autonomy, European Commission, Economic Competition, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

220. Increasing Systemic Legal Risks in the EU: The Economic Impacts of Changes to the EU’s Product Liability Legislation

Author:: Matthias Bauer and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The EU’s Product Liability Directive (PLD) determines the rules for strict product liability in the EU. It establishes a framework in which manufacturers’ liability is determined solely based on the presence of defects in the product, regardless of the manufacturer’s fault. The PLD is intended to serve as a “safety net” when fault-based or contractual liability rules do not offer sufficient compensation to consumers. It operates independently from contractual arrangements between businesses and consumers, and it cannot be weakened by contractual agreements between businesses and consumers. The PLD is a horizontal regulation that applies to a wide range of industries in the EU because it applies to all products available on the EU market. The recently proposed changes by the European Commission would increase systemic legal uncertainty for producers and sellers of technology-intensive goods and services in the EU. The impact assessment of the European Commission does not sufficiently account for changes to the PLD proposed in 2022. Nor does it sufficiently account for the major impacts of increased legal uncertainty for European businesses. Legislators in the Council and the European Parliament should slow negotiations to allow time for policymakers to collect more evidence on the impacts on businesses, insurers, and courts we detail in this paper. This would be an opportunity to improve regulatory quality in light of the high levels of legal uncertainty associated with the changes proposed by the Commission.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Legislation, and Risk
Political Geography:: Europe

221. The Putin Doctrine: What is it? The Russian Strategic Issue and the Enlarged National Security

Author:: Jose Alexandre Altahyde Hage
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: One can mention that this essay is only a contribution for an urgent issue in International Relations that is igniting debates in part of the academic community and the press in general, Russian expansionism and its conception of international security that, in our view, can be defined as enlarged national security. For Moscow, the dividing line between the international and the domestic whereas considering this issue is very thin4. This is why it is not a part of our objective to exhaust such a broad and complex topic, but to present some of its features.The period analysed in this article begins in 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, till January 2022, that marks the beginning of military exercises in some parts of Ukraine, namely the Donbass region, promoted by Putin ́s government. Our theoretical and methodological framework is based on classical and contemporary geopolitical literature, Halford Mackinder and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and International Relations realist thinkers such as Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer. Nevertheless, that does not mean that we will not be able to reference some liberal authors, such as Francis Fukuyama and Joseph Stiglitz.Apart from this Introduction, our essay is divided as such: a first part in which we propose a brief review of the concept of doctrine, as used by interstate politics and the State ́s national power principle. Following, we present an analysis of the Putin Doctrine, seen as both a result and as a drive for Moscow ́s revisionism in the face of the current geopolitical balance. In the third part, we examine some passages of the 1990s and of this emerging system, as an era of globalization, liberalization and “shock therapy” that disturbed the Russian quantum. Last, but not least, in our Final Thoughts some reflections will be brought.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

222. Refugees Revitalizing Emptied Spain

Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Susan Akram is a Clinical Professor at the Boston University School of Law and the Director of the International Human Rights Clinic. Her research and publications focus on immigration, asylum, refugee, forced migration, and human and civil rights issues, with an interest in the Middle East, the Arab, and Muslim world. She is currently leading the "Refugees Revitalizing Emptied Spain" project, which would place refugees and asylum seekers in municipalities that are struggling to survive in the face of massive population loss, as young people move to larger cities in search of economic opportunities.
Topic:: Immigration, Refugees, Asylum, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe and Spain

223. Starr Forum: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War

Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

224. Centralization in National High-Performance Sports Systems: Reasons, Processes, Dimensions, Characteristics, and Open Questions

Author:: Wolfgang Maennig
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg
Abstract:: Centralization provides for the bundling of tasks that are relevant to the achievement of an institution's goals. Centralization is discussed in almost all areas of life: For example, in politics (more centralized structures in France vs. more decentralized structures in Germany), in economics (centrally planned organization as in the former COMECON-Countries), decentralized decision-making at the individual level in market economies), and at the corporate level. Objects of centralization can be, for example, decision-making processes, products, personnel and customer groups. In some cases, the aim is to centralize (only) certain objects, while other activities are to remain decentralized, for example. In some cases, centralization in some areas virtually necessitates decentralization in others: For example, centralization by product usually leads to decentralization by sales area. Synergy effects, specialization advantages and, ultimately, cost degression effects are cited as benefits or advantages of more centralization; duplication of work and infrastructure can be avoided. Decision-making processes can be accelerated and simplified – subordinate or geographically distant units do not participate in the decision-making process. Unified concepts and strategies can be better enforced. “Density effects" must also be taken into account: There often are positive spill-over effects between people with related activities, for example, due to imitation and learning effects, but also due to the exchange of experience, which leads to an increase in the productivity of those involved. However, the decentralization tendencies that have emerged as a result of the Corona pandemic, for example through homeworking, partly question this finding. One of the disadvantages of centralization is that large centralized companies have high demands on information and decision-making systems because the experience, problems and ideas for solutions that arise decentrally have to reach the decisionmakers and therefore often (but not always) react more slowly to external changes. Less consideration may be given to regional peculiarities. Due to the standardization usually associated with centralization the scope for adaptation to specific circumstances may be lost. Centralization can increase the distance of decision-makers from "grassroots" concerns. The non-central units can suffer from devaluation, delegitimization, and demotivation, possibly associated with a long-term decrease of activities. The restricted competition of ideas can lead to a long-term decline in competitiveness, since the reduced competencies of the decentralized employees can inhibit their individual performance development. Centralization leads to a greater burden on central decisionmakers because the quantity and complexity of decisions increase. Individuals affected by centralization (in a different location) may experience family relocation problems and additional financial problems. The Corona pandemic and the current China discussion have brought additional arguments into the discussion with contagion risks for (too) many and (too) strong dependencies/blackmail possibilities on centralized procurement. And Ukraine's energy supply, which is based on relatively few large nuclear power plants, illustrates the possible increased susceptibility of certain centralized structures to crises.
Topic:: Sports, Economic Policy, Olympics, and Centralization
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, and Global Focus

225. Erdoğan's Re-election as President Raises Concerns among Allies

Author:: Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s win in the presidential election and ministerial appointments promises to further weaken democracy, move Türkiye further away from EU standards, and continue so-called personal diplomacy and transactionalism in foreign policy. This could prolong the Turkish parliament’s ratification of Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Sweden

226. EU-South Korea Extend Cooperation Beyond the Economy

Author:: Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The 10th EU-Republic of Korea Summit, held on 22 May in Seoul, reaffirmed the importance of South Korea as a critical Asian partner of the Union. The meeting also signalled the growing importance of security issues in bilateral relations. South Korea shares the EU’s assessment of Russian aggression against Ukraine and intends to continue to support the invaded country, but not with supplies of military equipment for now. The announcement of a “green” partnership indicates both sides’ willingness to engage in other areas of cooperation, which also will benefit the development of Polish-South Korean relations.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, South Korea, and Poland

227. What is the Significance of Prigozhin's Revolt for Russian Security Policy?

Author:: Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: On the night of 23-24 June, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group private military company, which has been fighting in Ukraine and operating elsewhere, stood up to the Russian Ministry of Defence and began an armed march on Moscow. However, in the end he and his forces did not storm the capital, officially as a result of negotiations led by Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenka. Prigozhin’s actions will worsen the morale of Russian soldiers and mercenaries fighting in Ukraine but will not change Russia’s hostile actions towards NATO countries.
Topic:: NATO, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

228. EU Development Cooperation Policy Shifts from Charity to Self-interest

Author:: Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In recent years, the EU’s development cooperation policy has evolved, moving away from an approach based on poverty eradication and the needs of partner countries to focusing more on its own interests. This change is supported by the majority of EU members. This gives the EU the opportunity to exert strategic influence in the world but risks the loss of its unique identity as an altruistic donor and attractive partner in development cooperation. The change in the Union’s approach is consistent with the position of Poland, which can use it to reform and strengthen its development aid system.
Topic:: Development, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Development Aid
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

229. Using Frozen Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine: Possibilities for the EU

Author:: Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU wants to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine, using for this purpose frozen Russian assets, among others. The European Commission proposes to improve the system of confiscation of private assets of sanctioned persons in case of criminal activity and to obtain income from the active management of immobilised Russian public assets. These solutions may yield limited results. To be more effective, the EU would have to reach an international agreement to confiscate the reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Topic:: Sanctions, Reconstruction, European Union, Assets, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

230. Businesses, EU Strengthening International Supply Chains

Author:: Piotr Dzierżanowski
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Over the past three years, global supply chains have experienced problems on an unprecedented scale. Given the rising political tensions and changes in the perception of the role of the economy in international rivalries, a return to international economic relations based on globalisation and trade liberalisation is highly unlikely. Instead, we will witness a necessary strengthening of supply chains, both at the individual business and national levels. For Western economies, the main challenge will be the reduction of related costs.
Topic:: Globalization, European Union, Economy, Business, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

231. South Africa-Russia Maintain Special Relations

Author:: Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Although South Africa declares it is neutral regarding the war in Ukraine and offers mediation, it remains a de facto ally of Russia. This is due to the strong sentiment among the ruling elites for the period of cooperation with the USSR, its successor Russia and its activity and influence in this country, and the perception that BRICS will help elevate South Africa’s international importance. If Vladimir Putin visits Johannesburg as scheduled in August, the authorities of the state, which is party to the Rome Statute, will not be willing to fulfil their obligation to arrest him or may even leave the International Criminal Court.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and South Africa

232. Triggering the Rule-of-Law Conditionality Mechanism against Hungary

Author:: Veronika Jóźwiak
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The mechanism that makes the payment of funds from the EU budget conditional on compliance with the principles of the rule of law is the newest instrument for protecting the Union’s financial and political interests. The tool allows the European Commission and the EU Council (Council) to exert influence on Member States that violate the fundamental principles of the Community. Triggering it against Hungary might result in a reduction of EU funds to the country as a consequence of rule-of-law violations for the first time in EU history. It is doubtful, however, that this will lead to systemic changes in Hungary.
Topic:: European Union, Rule of Law, European Commission, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe and Hungary

233. Refugees from Ukraine Adapting to the European Labour Market

Author:: Jolanta Szymańska
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Due to the length of the war in Ukraine, more and more refugees from this country have decided to take up employment in the EU. Preliminary data indicate that they are integrating into European labour markets faster than refugees from other regions. However, the mismatch between their jobs and qualifications remains a challenge. Despite the refugees’ inclusion, the deteriorating economic situation in Europe may lead to negative perceptions in host countries.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Refugees, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

234. China Adapts Policy in Response to Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China perceives the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expression of resistance to the U.S. and NATO hegemony and an important element of building a new international order that marginalises the West. Based on this, China is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, striving to weaken the international position of the U.S., the EU, and their partners, while testing reactions to a possible escalation of Chinese actions towards Taiwan, for example. President Xi Jinping expressed this policy course during his March visit to Russia. At the same time, China is trying to gain support from the countries of the Global South. This approach means a continuation of China’s assertive policy towards the European Union, among others.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

235. With Charisma, Stick, and Carrot: Reviewing the Effectiveness of EU Climate Diplomacy

Author:: Zuzanna Nowak and Stefania Kolarz
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Last year’s COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, was a major challenge for EU climate diplomacy, which, despite the unfavourable external circumstances (e.g., the war in Ukraine and economic turbulence), contributed to the conference’s positive outcome. The EU, as a global leader in the fight against climate change, seeks to increase its influence with external partners. Many of them would not have joined the climate action without its support. In addition to participation in policy dialogue, among the EU’s main tools of influence are various types of incentives and forms of support, as well as leverage measures such as political conditionality. However, the effectiveness of these tools is still being refined.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, European Union, and Influence
Political Geography:: Europe

236. Climate Protection Litigation on the Rise

Author:: Szymon Zaręba
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In the last several years, national courts and international institutions have increasingly begun to treat conservative or climate-adverse actions by states as violations of their obligations under international law and human rights. This has been followed by some countries more affected by climate change and engaged in international bodies to put more pressure on Global North states to protect the climate. The sympathetic attitude of international courts towards such complaints may, in the long term, force the need for increased climate ambition or even compensation payments by, among others, Poland.
Topic:: Climate Change, Human Rights, International Law, Courts, and Litigation
Political Geography:: Europe, Poland, and Global Focus

237. EU Seeks Greater Transparency in Wake of EP Corruption Scandal

Author:: Tomasz Zając
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The European Parliament (EP) corruption scandal, which began with the arrests of then current or former MEPs last December, showed that the mechanisms in place to ensure institutional transparency do not sufficiently protect against the influence of non-EU countries. In addition, the parliament’s internal standards are of limited effectiveness as penalties for non-compliance are not very severe and rarely applied. The effect of the scandal will most likely be to further increase the transparency of EP conduct. The probability of a new body to monitor ethical issues in EU institutions has also increased.
Topic:: Corruption, European Union, Transparency, and European Parliament
Political Geography:: Europe

238. EU Member States Take a Position on the Emigration of Russians

Author:: Aleksandra Kozioł and Stefania Kolarz
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Hundreds of thousands of Russians have decided to emigrate as Vladimir Putin’s regime has increased repression of citizens with dissenting views of the government or unwilling to participate in the war in Ukraine. Some of them are trying to enter the EU, justifying it with humanitarian reasons. However, the Member States, which decide the granting of visas and residence permits, have different practices. Elaborating a unified approach remains a major challenge for the EU.
Topic:: Migration, European Union, Civilians, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

239. Member States Seek to Unmask Russian Espionage in the EU

Author:: Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russian intelligence services are actively developing their networks of spies in the EU. While Member States are trying to counteract this and are undertaking coordinated action, many of them have limited operational capacities. Their cooperation at the EU level is hampered by differences in threat perceptions and a lack of mutual trust. With the aim of developing common competences, EU diplomacy can inform Member State societies about the growing scale of espionage threats by publishing regular reports on this subject.
Topic:: Intelligence, European Union, Espionage, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

240. Multipolarity After Ukraine: Old Wine in New Bottles?

Author:: Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: One year after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war has exacerbated the rift between Russia and the “collective West”. While Western governments have been steadfast in punishing Russia for the invasion, other countries around the world have been more ambiguous, at times even choosing to side with Moscow politically or economically. These dynamics have revived the idea of a shift towards multipolarity along an anti-Western trajectory. Are we really heading in that direction? Are we facing increasing fragmentation due to the war or a re-consolidation of longstanding alliances? What principles underlie the formation of these blocs? What are the consequences of these dynamics for global security and the global economy? This Report aims to shed light on these questions, while also outlining the war’s possible future implications for the Russian Federation, the “West”, and the international order.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Economy, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

241. Europe and Russia on the Balkan Front. Geopolitics and Diplomacy in the EU’s Backyard

Author:: Giorgio Fruscione
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has taken its toll on the stability of the Balkans by reshuffling regional geopolitics and reviving diplomatic competition between the West and Russia. Since the summer of 2022, growing tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have raised concerns about a possible Russian involvement and pushed the European Union to react promptly. By brokering a new normalisation agreement, the West seeks to prevent new hotbeds in Europe and push Russia one step back from the Balkans. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given new momentum to the integration process of candidate states, making EU membership a tangible goal rather than an unattainable dream. Will the EU be able to stabilise the Balkans? Will Russia continue to exert its influence in the region? Are Belgrade and Pristina on the eve of a new phase in the normalisation process?
Topic:: Diplomacy, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Balkans

242. The EU Indo-Pacific Bid: Sailing Through Economic and Security Competition

Author:: Filippo Fasulo
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Over the past five years, the Indo-Pacific region's importance for Europe has grown significantly. However, the launch of the EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in September 2021 and its subsequent implementation have been affected by growing polarisation between the US and China, and by a fast-changing scenario caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This Report examines the state and perspectives of the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy, 18 months after its launch. Are there avenues for cooperation with regional military initiatives, such as the QUAD? How is the economic landscape changing, in particular after the start of negotiations for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)? What are the main strategies of Indo-Pacific countries for the green transition? And how do the US, China, and ASEAN countries view and act in the Indo-Pacific region?
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

243. What should be done about Google’s quasi-monopoly in search? Mandatory data sharing versus AI-driven technological competition

Author:: Bertin Martens
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The first part of this paper focuses on competition between search engines that match user queries with webpages. User welfare, as measured by click-through rates on top-ranked pages, increases when network effects attract more users and generate economies of scale in data aggregation. However, network effects trigger welfare concerns when a search engine reaches a dominant market position. The EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) imposes asymmetric data sharing obligations on very large search engines to facilitate competition from smaller competitors. We conclude from the available empirical literature on search-engine efficiency that asymmetric data sharing may increase competition but may also reduce scale and user welfare, depending on the slope of the search-data learning curve. We propose policy recommendations to reduce tension between competition and welfare, including (a) symmetric data sharing between all search engines irrespective of size, and (b) facilitate user real-time search history and profile-data portability to competing search engines. The second part of the paper focuses on the impact of recent generative AI models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), chatbots and answer engines, on competition in search markets. LLMs are pre-trained on very large text datasets, prior to usage. They do not depend on user-driven network effects. That avoids winner-takes-all markets. However, high fixed algorithmic learning costs and input markets bottlenecks (webpage indexes, copyright-protected data and hyperscale cloud infrastructure) make entry more difficult. LLMs produce semantic responses (rather than web pages) in response to a query. That reduces cognitive processing costs for users but may also increase ex-post uncertainty about the quality of the output. User responses to this trade-off will determine the degree of substitution or complementarity between search and chatbots. We conclude that, under certain conditions, a competitive chatbot markets could crowd out a monopolistic search engine market and may make DMA-style regulatory intervention in search engines redundant.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

244. What would Europeans want a European defence union to look like?

Author:: Francesco Nicoli, Brian Burgoon, and David Van der Duin
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a new momentum for EU defence integration, the political feasibility of such integration remains disputed, as it may entail both additional financial costs and a loss of sovereignty. Furthermore, design of defence integration is inherently multidimensional, differing in terms of scope and level, governance and sources of financing, among other dimensions. To determine the extent of public support for European security cooperation, we conducted the first conjoint experiment ever fielded on public support for alternative defence union designs. We carried out a pre-registered, randomised conjoint experiment on a highly representative sample of the French, German, Italian, Dutch and Spanish populations in November 2022. This multidimensional conjoint experiment allows us to determine the causal link between policy features of potential defence pacts, and public support or opposition to such policy. Our results show that policy packages receiving the most support require joint EU-level governance, joint purchases of military equipment through joint procurement, and repurposing of existing national expenditure as the preferred form of financing. All in all, our results show not only that there is considerable cross-border support for defence integration in Western Europe, but also that citizens in different Western European countries have generally aligned preferences regarding the actual design of such policy, indicating that a compromise policy is feasible and publicly supported. Furthermore, our results support ongoing research on the nature of European solidarity at times of crisis, suggesting that European citizens are willing to support the creation of joint institutions and policies to face issues of common concern, and therefore indicating that major crises open important windows of opportunity to re-shape EU-level policies and institutions.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Governance, European Union, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Europe

245. China’s quest for innovation: progress and bottlenecks

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: As the Chinese economy continues to decelerate, the central government is investing heavily in innovation, doubling down on research and development (R&D) spending and STEM-oriented human capital. In this paper, we assess China’s progress so far, looking at the inputs to innovation (R&D and human capital) as well as intermediate targets, such as scientific research and patents. We then evaluate how China has fared with respect to the ultimate goal of commercialising this progress, by looking at the value-added of Chinese exports and the overall productivity of the economy. We identify three potential bottlenecks that might be hindering the translation of China’s innovation efforts into productivity growth.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, Innovation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

246. Antitrust issues raised by answer engines

Author:: Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Rapid development of generative artificial intelligence chatbots like ChatGPT is leading search engine providers to move from search to answer engines. Unlike search engines, which provide search results in the form of blue links to content creators, answer engines generate personalised answers through a conversation with end users. This revolution impacts the internet ecosystem of content creators and the digital advertising market. This paper outlines some early antitrust issues related to answer engines, from the transition from search to answer engines (sections 2 and 3) and the response competition authorities should adopt (section 4). It finds that search and answer engines complement and compete with each other. While the answer-engine market is still at an early stage of development, it already raises some competition issues in relation to data scraping, vertical integration and unfair terms and conditions. Intervention by competition authorities is more likely than not to prevent market power in this new market. In this regard, competition authorities should act to preserve dynamic competition and minimise adverse effects on content creators. Finally, the paper concludes with several research questions for future research (section 5).
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

247. Global trends in countries‘ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Drawing on global media reports, we conduct a sentiment analysis of the image of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the evolution of its image over time. Our main finding is that perceptions of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many geographies from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is in sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past. This is notwithstanding increases in debt levels with China, much of which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant inter- and intra-regional differences in the average sentiment towards China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative in countries which, until today, are not part of the BRI. Finally, we focus on the European Union, Africa and China’s immediate neighbourhood to better understand the complexities behind the perceived benefits and challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

248. The hidden inequalities of digitalisation in the post-pandemic context

Author:: Cristiano Cadagnone and Maria Savona
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Digitalisation has a ‘hidden’ impact on employment, particularly on the invisible conditions of some jobs, as perceived by workers, that are relatively less explored in the literature and that could represent a substantial social cost, particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. We start by summarising a few main challenges of digitalisation, with a focus on the additional challenges brought about by the pandemic, the rise of platforms and alternative work arrangements, and the current attempts to regulate these. We then discuss the hidden aspects of inequality linked to the unmeasured side effects of digitalisation. Mental health in particular should be taken into account, particularly in the post-pandemic context, which has led to a significant amount of working from home. Also, the reduction of tasks previously done in the workplace in favour of remote working might limit social interactions, creativity and innovation potential. We conclude by suggesting areas for policy interventions.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Economy, Automation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

249. Pro- and anti-competitive provisions in the proposed European Union Data Act

Author:: Bertin Martens
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The proposed European Union Data Act gives users access and portability rights to the data generated by their use of tangible digital products and devices. This pro-competitive measure weakens the de-facto monopolistic control product manufacturers have over product data. However, the Data Act would also grant manufacturers a de-jure right to monopolistic pricing of data transfers to third-party service providers, restoring their control over data markets. Other anti-competitive provisions include restrictions on the use of data for competition purposes and a prohibition on transfering data to platforms identified as gatekeepers under the EU Digital Markets Act. Unnecessarily fuzzy definitions of products and data that fall under the Data Act would create uncertainty in implementation and incoherence with other EU data regulations. The Data Act should be simplified by dropping anti-competitive provisions and granting users and third-parties selected by users free access to all data generated by the use of a product or a service. This would increase competition in data-driven services and prevent users paying twice for their data. It would not disincentivise producers from investing in data-driven products and services. A further step could be the creation of a level playing field between producers and users in data-access rights. This can be achieved by introducing the principle of mutual exhaustion of data rights at point of sale. This would put all data co-generating parties in a position to generate economies of scale and scope in data aggregation, or data-driven externalities, to maximise innovation.
Topic:: Markets, Governance, European Union, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:: Europe

250. The EU can manage without Russian liquified natural gas

Author:: Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union has committed to eliminate all Russian fossil-fuel imports by 2027. Progress has been made, with sanctions on oil and coal already introduced. The glaring exception is natural gas, on which the EU has so far refrained from imposing limitations, owing to greater dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, pipeline gas imports have fallen by four-fifths following Russia’s weaponisation of gas supplies. However, Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the EU have increased since the invasion of Ukraine. The EU needs a coherent strategy for these LNG imports. Our analysis shows that the EU can manage without Russian LNG. Anticipated impacts are not comparable to those felt in 2022 as Russian pipeline gas dried up. The regional impact would be most significant for the Iberian Peninsula, which has the highest share of Russian LNG in total gas supply. Meanwhile, the global LNG market is tight, and we anticipate that Russia would find new buyers for cargos that no longer enter Europe. We discuss the options available to the EU. Wait-and-see implies delaying any action until 2027, while soft sanctions would discourage additional purchases but not break long-term contracts. We argue instead for an EU embargo on Russian LNG, to reduce exposure to an unreliable and adversarial entity, and to limit the extent to which EU consumers fund the Russian state. The embargo may be designed to allow purchases only if they are coordinated via the EU’s Energy Platform, with limited volumes and below market prices. This could be accompanied by the implementation of a price cap on Russian LNG cargos that use EU or G7 trans-shipment, insurance or shipping services.
Topic:: European Union, Gas, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

251. Rebooting the European Union’s Net Zero Industry Act

Author:: Simone Tagliapietra, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: In March 2023, the European Commission published a legislative proposal for an EU response to the US Inflation Reduction Act: the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA). It is an unconvincing policy proposal, both for what is in it and for what is not in it. The proposal has five problematic aspects. First, it takes a top-down approach, in which specific technologies are selected for preferential treatment. Preferable would be a technology-neutral approach open to all current and future technologies that help tackle the net-zero challenge. Second, its blanket 40 percent self-sufficiency benchmark for EU domestic cleantech manufacturing by 2030 sends a protectionist signal, is poorly defined and does not reflect the differences in EU capacity in the cleantech sector. Third, it relies on the acceleration of permitting procedures as the main policy instrument, although this is not the main obstacle to cleantech investment in the EU. Fourth, it proposes more strategic use of public procurement. While this is an objective to be supported, the specific proposals are likely to be ineffective because of the way they are designed. Fifth and not least, the NZIA would lack a governance structure that would ensure effective implementation. In addition, the NZIA does not tackle three critical issues. It does not address investment obstacles related to failures of the single market. It does not tackle the coordination problem at the core of developing an EU green industrial policy. Finally, it does not develop an EU-level funding strategy, but rather relies on state aid, with the related risk of fragmentation. The European Parliament and EU countries in the Council of the EU should reboot the proposal and refocus its objectives, sharpening its limited instruments, improving its governance, and adding financial incentives to ensure implementation. In parallel, the EU should develop a broader green industrial policy strategy that leverages the single market in a credible manner, building a solid new governance framework and a new EU-level funding approach.
Topic:: Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Trade Policy, and Industry
Political Geography:: Europe

252. Can Chinese growth defy gravity?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Chinese growth, astounding since the beginning of the reform era, has slowed in the last decade. We offer a baseline estimate (based on the current trend) of China’s medium-term growth rate, which we project to fall to 2.4 percent by 2035. Several factors create uncertainty around this baseline. China’s rapid aging is already incorporated into our long-term growth scenario, but its impact on growth will depend on how China’s remaining urbanisation process spreads over time, how the shrinking labour supply affects labour productivity and whether the decline in total factor productivity growth, reflecting the lack of reform during the last decade and possibly the rising role of the state, can be reversed. Investment in China, for decades the largest factor in China’s growth, is expected to contribute less to growth given the increasingly low return on assets, particularly on state-led investment. The rapid piling up of public debt is also becoming a heavy burden for the Chinese economy. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic may have left significant scarring effects, such as structurally high youth unemployment and low investment confidence. On the upside for China, the rise in human capital and research and development expenditure may support innovation and growth, but the magnitude of this effect is uncertain, because it is unclear if higher innovation will translate into higher total factor productivity, and because of the United States’s push to contain China technologically.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

253. The value added of central bank digital currencies: a view from the euro area

Author:: Maria Demertzis and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Different jurisdictions have set out different reasons for creating central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Some countries, particularly those with already-operational CBDCs for retail purposes, aim to to promote financial inclusion. But in countries where most citizens have access to financial services, central banks are interested in CBDCs as an aspect of the increasing digitalisation of finance. Central banks could also choose to use CBDCs to guarantee in full citizen’s holdings (currently, deposits in commercial bank are only partially guaranteed), but this would trigger major changes in the financial system in terms of the role of commercial banks in intermediation and the role of fiat money. So far, central banks have not opted to go this way. In the euro area, consumers have multiple payment options and a very efficient retail payments system. The currency enjoys high levels of trust and is not challenged by the emergence of private currencies, such as Bitcoin, or by the risk that cash, a monetary system’s anchor, will disappear. Therefore, creating a CBDC for retail purposes in the euro area offers little obvious value added, at least for the foreseeable future. However, there is a strong case for building a CBDC that banks could use for cross-border wholesale purposes (ie with other currencies). Wholesale CBDCs could revolutionise the way that cross-border, cross-currency payments are made for two reasons. Cross-border payments are currently slow and inefficient. Pilot projects have shown that wholesale payments with CBDCs can generate substantial time and cost savings. Any two central banks that have operational wholesale CBDCs could settle transactions between themselves. This would be very different from the current system, as most settlements today are done via the dollar (and then the euro) infrastructure and use correspondent banks. The euro area and the United States would have to consider carefully from a geopolitical perspective how wholesale CBDCs might affect their global economic standing. By developing a CBDC for wholesale purposes, the European Union would be able to contribute to developing the global standard.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Governance, Regulation, Central Bank, Digital Currency, and Euro
Political Geography:: Europe

254. The rising cost of European Union borrowing and what to do about it

Author:: Gregory Claeys and Conor McCaffrey
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Debt issuance by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union has increased massively. Of the approximately €400 billion in outstanding EU debt as of May 2023, 85 percent has arisen from borrowing since 2020. Large-scale borrowing is expected to continue until 2026 to fund the remainder of NextGenerationEU, and concessional loans to support Ukraine. When these programmes were launched, interest rates were at historic lows – even negative for maturities below 10 years. However, interest rates rose sharply in 2022. Beyond the widespread rise in euro-denominated interest rates due to monetary tightening by the European Central Bank in response to the inflation surge, the EU has also faced a widening of the spread between its yields and those of major European issuers, including France and Germany. This widening is driven by a combination of market features, circumstantial factors and institutional features. The EU cannot affect the overall cyclical movement of interest rates and will have to learn to live with it, like sovereigns do. However, the European Commission should continue to try to narrow the spread with major European sovereigns by further developing the relevant market infrastructure and improving its issuance strategy. The Commission will not be able to do this alone. Institutional developments, including progress on the development of new own resources and a long-term substantial presence in the bond market, will be necessary to fully reap the benefits of EU borrowing. A large share of EU borrowing (around €421 billion in total by the end of 2026, in current prices) is intended to finance unprecedented non-repayable support: Recovery and Resilience Fund grants and additional funding for existing EU programmes under the EU budget. The interest costs associated with this part of the debt lie with the EU budget. Our estimates suggest that, because of the high current and expected levels of interest rates, this cost could be twice as high as what was initially estimated at the start of the EU’s 2021-27 budget cycle. As a result, because interest costs for the borrowing of the non-repayable support are accounted for under the EU budget’s ‘expenditure ceiling’, this will exert further pressure on the funding of important EU programmes, which are already affected by inflation. The EU should thus quickly review how interest costs are accounted for in its budget and financial framework.
Topic:: Debt, Budget, European Union, and European Commission
Political Geography:: Europe

255. Adjusting to the energy shock: the right policies for European industry

Author:: Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: In 2022, overall European Union industrial employment and output increased above 2021 levels, despite rocketing energy prices. However, output declined from energy-intensive industries including basic metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and paper, for which energy costs represent a much bigger share of production costs than for less energy-intensive manufacturing. Energy prices are likely to remain above historic levels for the foreseeable future. In its industrial strategy response to this context, the EU must ask first whether the energy-intensive parts of the value chain should be outsourced permanently. Conditional on the answer being no, the second question is how to reduce energy prices to ensure the competitiveness of the energy-intensive productions stages that remain in the EU. First, the EU could bridge the high energy price period with unconditional subsidies, which seems to be the preferred strategy currently. This will avoid irreversible large-scale relocation abroad but is expensive, does not help to drive down energy prices and poses risks of fragmentation within the EU. It will only succeed if internationally competitive energy supplies are made available quickly. Second, the EU could support decarbonised production processes built on large-scale deployment of domestic renewables, grid interconnectors and storage. This would accelerate the green transition and reduce clean-tech prices worldwide. However, EU taxpayers would bear the cost of new technologies, without any guarantee of solving the current cost-competitiveness issue. Third, the EU could facilitate imports of energy-intensive products, while helping EU industry move to higher value-added parts of the value chain. Subsidies could be given directly to industrial sectors that have not become structurally uncompetitive, while bringing down energy demand and thus energy prices. However, this strategy would result in temporarily higher unemployment and factory closures in energy-intensive industries, would need to accommodate concerns over excessive reliance on imports and would need to be engineered to address carbon leakage. Policymakers should implement a mix of these policies. The EU should subsidise existing energy-intensive industries only in clearly justified cases, while deciding which energy-intensive products can be left to international market forces. By choosing which decarbonisation investments should be supported in Europe, the EU can combine industrial competitiveness and environmental sustainability.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, European Union, Value Chains, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Europe

256. The longer-term fiscal challenges facing the European Union

Author:: Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Gregory Claeys, Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Stavros Zenios
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The pandemic and subsequent price shocks triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have increased longer-term fiscal pressures in the European Union through higher debt, higher expected real interest rates and higher public investment needs. This Policy Brief makes some simple quantitative assessments of those effects and discusses policy implications, with the following results. First, long-term increases in primary fiscal balances required to offset higher debt and higher expected real interest rates are in the range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP for most EU countries. However, because of pre-existing differences in fiscal space, not all countries will need to undertake that adjustment, while some countries may need to adjust by substantially more. Among the 21 EU countries for which we have data to undertake this analysis, 14 will need to adjust by more than they were planning to do by 2025. Second, the required additional fiscal adjustment looks manageable, although it is substantial in some cases. To achieve medium-term debt-reducing primary balances, several EU countries will need to raise primary balances by more than 2 percent of GDP above their 2025 target, but no country will need additional fiscal adjustment of more than 3 percent of GDP. Third, market data suggests that the future path of real interest rates is very uncertain. Compared to the period immediately preceding the pandemic, longer-term expected real interest rates have increased by about 2 percentage points but remain low on average, at about 1 percent in real terms. Future developments depend on whether the structural factors that led to low interest rates in the first place persist or unwind. While interest rates might decline again, fiscal policymakers should not make plans that assume such a decline. Fourth, public spending needs for additional defence and climate spending run well above 1 percent of GDP per year. These needs do not appear to have been incorporated into current fiscal baselines, and hence will come on top of the adjustment described above. To ensure that fiscal adjustment does not defeat its purpose by slowing growth, it is essential that it is conducted gradually. In countries that require such adjustment, it should start as soon as cyclical conditions allow.
Topic:: Governance, European Union, Finance, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

257. The potential of sovereign sustainability-linked bonds in the drive for net-zero

Author:: Alexander Lehmann and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: European Union governments have for some years issued green bonds that raise funds for climate-related spending. These bonds have been received well in capital markets but because they promise a certain use of proceeds, they complicate budget management and may not match investors’ claims of having an impact on national climate policies. Public commitments made by major investors and asset owners suggest that limiting climate transition risks and the assessment of the alignment of sovereigns with net-zero targets will now become key determinants of portfolio allocation. Yield differentials in bond markets are already beginning to reflect transition risks that arise from the inadequate pursuit by issuers of climate targets. Unlike standard green bonds, sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs) create a link between performance (outcome) indicators and the financial terms of the bonds. SLBs have grown rapidly in importance in private markets and are now being assessed by sovereign issuers. We show that sovereign SLBs could help incentivise climate policies in EU countries, and accelerate emission reductions. They would be an effective tool for signalling commitment. A common EU framework for issuance by EU countries would enhance capital market integration and the transparency of national policies, and would limit climate transition risks in EU capital markets more broadly.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Finance, Carbon Emissions, and Sovereign Bonds
Political Geography:: Europe

258. Phased European Union electricity market reform

Author:: Georg Zachmann and Conall Heussaff
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: In an environment of record-breaking electricity prices driven by a gas supply shock and below-average electricity generation, reforming the design of the European electricity market is seen as a means to delink consumer costs from volatility in short-term power markets. Electricity markets should meet three objectives: fairness, optimal investment and optimal operation. The current market design has achieved these objectives to varying degrees. Faced with the unprecedented shock, the electricity system has operated well, but electricity markets have struggled to achieve fair outcomes and investments have not been driven by market-based cashflows. Further complicating market reform, the power system is being changed radically by decarbonisation. The electricity system is becoming more decentralised and digitalised, with an active demand side. These transformations will have consequences for the optimal electricity market design in the later stages of the energy transition. Reform proposals have focused on increasing the share of long-term contracts in the remuneration of generation technologies. Different long-term contracting regimes have structural implications for the functioning of electricity markets, especially in relation to the roles of the state and the market, and the responsibilities of national governments and European Union institutions. A phased approach should be taken to EU electricity market design reform. In the near-term, reform should seek to protect consumers and drive investment. An assessment should also be made of what market design will best meet the fairness, investment and operational objectives in a decarbonised system, and what the conceptual role of electricity markets should be during the transition. This process should start as soon as possible so well thought-through proposals are available when the next European Commission takes office.
Topic:: Markets, Reform, European Union, Electricity, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Europe

259. How Europe should answer the US Inflation Reduction Act

Author:: David Kleimann, Niclas Poitiers, André Sapir, Simone Tagliapietra, Nicolas Veron, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The 2022 United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a significant and welcome climate law. It also includes trade-distortive subsidies, including local-content requirements prohibited under World Trade Organisation rules – the first time the US has done this and a blow to the international trading system that could trigger protectionism in other countries. The expected IRA green subsidies are of similar size to those available in the European Union, except in renewable energy production, where EU subsidies remain far larger. However, there are important qualitative differences. Some IRA subsidies discriminate against foreign producers while EU subsidies do not. IRA clean-tech subsidies are simpler and less fragmented, and they focus mainly on mass deployment of green technologies rather than innovation. The IRA will likely harm Europe through its competitiveness effect, while it will likely benefit climate transition in Europe and most of the rest of the world. However, the magnitude of both effects is very uncertain, partly because the IRA will induce substitution away from Chinese inputs. By forcing the reorganisation of supply chains, the IRA may make the EU and other economies more competitive relative to China. It may also initially slow the green transition. But in the longer run, this effect should be outweighed by the reduction in the cost of clean tech driven by the IRA. In responding to the IRA, the EU should not just seek to protect its competitiveness relative to the US but to pursue broader aims, including competitiveness in general, speedy decarbonisation and broad foreign policy and development policy goals. These aims imply that the EU should not impose local-content requirements of its own, should not loosen state-aid rules and should not mimic the IRA’s approach to manufacturing subsidies. Rather, it should focus on boosting its structural competitiveness, formulate a trade policy response that includes reform of the international subsidies regime, and develop an instrument for EU-level subsidies that focuses on early-stage development and increasing EU resilience to trade disruptions.
Topic:: Governance, European Union, Inflation, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

260. Preparing for the next winter: Europe’s gas outlook for 2023

Author:: Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann, and Thierry Deschuyteneer
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union has so far weathered the energy crisis brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and will manage winter 2022/23 even if Russia abruptly halts all pipeline gas flows. However, preparations must be made for winter 2023-24. In particular, gas storage facilities should be 90 percent full by 1 October 2023. We assess the demand reduction needed if the 90 percent storage target is to be achieved. Our assessment takes into account EU imports, exports to refill gas storage facilities in Ukraine and Moldova, the weather and the situation in power markets, where gas demand is highly dependent on non-gas energy sources. Assuming limited Russian exports continue, and weather conditions are typical, demand up to 1 October 2023 must remain 13 percent lower than the previous five-year average. The EU should therefore extend its demand-reduction target, which is currently set to expire on 31 March 2023. Two variables will determine how easily the target can be met: 1) liquified natural gas (LNG) supply, and 2) the nature of demand reductions. Plans for rapid deployment of regasification units will alleviate concerns over LNG import infrastructure capacity. However, the EU will continue to compete internationally for LNG cargoes, and will remain vulnerable to global dynamics. Strong economic growth in China, for example, could further tighten markets. The way demand is reduced will determine the economic consequences. So far, large reductions in industrial gas demand have not been accompanied by dramatic drops in industrial output, suggesting good substitution options. However, hardly any gas was saved in the power sector last year, because of weak nuclear and hydro output. The return of French nuclear output will therefore be a huge positive. Finally, households have reduced gas demand, partly driven by warmer than usual weather. Record numbers of heat pumps were deployed in 2022, suggesting the start of a structural shift away from gas demand for heating. Policy should support a continued structural shift away from gas. This involves enabling rapid deployment of renewables and the accompanying grid infrastructure, energy-efficiency measures, help for households that want to switch to cleaner heating, and collaboration with industry to accelerate adoption of new low-carbon production methods.
Topic:: Security, Gas, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Europe

261. The Long‐Run Effects of Immigration: Evidence across a Barrier to Refugee Settlement

Author:: Antonio Ciccone and Jan Nimczik
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Some 280 million people around the world are first‐generation immigrants; in Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries, first‐generation immigrants make up around 14 percent of the population. The economic effects of immigration have become better understood in recent decades. A new focus of research on the effects of immigration is its long‐run impact on productivity, wages, and income. We contribute to this research by examining the long‐run economic effects of the arrival of refugees in what would become West Germany after the end of World War II (WWII) in 1945. This period was characterized by one of the largest population movements in modern times. Between 1945 and 1949, millions of people from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and eastern parts of prewar Germany were displaced westward. When the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was founded in 1949, these refugees made up around 15 percent of the country’s population.
Topic:: History, Immigration, Refugees, Resettlement, and World War II
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Germany, and United States of America

262. The Economic Effects of the English Parliamentary Enclosures

Author:: Leander Heldring, James A. Robinson, and Sebastian Vollmer
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: In 1808, the English agriculturist Arthur Young stumbled on something interesting. He noticed that the adjacent Cambridgeshire parishes of Childersley and Hardwicke in England had startlingly different economic outcomes, even though they were divided only by a hedgerow. In Hardwicke, wheat yields were 16 bushels per acre, whereas in Childersley, on the other side of the hedgerow, they were 24 bushels per acre—50 percent higher. What could explain the difference? It wasn’t economic fundamentals, because Childersley consisted of similar soil. Rather, Young attributed the difference to the fact that the land in Hardwicke remained in “common field” while the land in Childersley was enclosed.
Topic:: Agriculture, History, Economy, Enclosure, and Parliament
Political Geography:: Europe and England

263. The Vagaries of the Sea: Evidence on the Real Effects of Money from Maritime Disasters in the Spanish Empire

Author:: Adam Brzezinski, Yao Chen, Felix Ward, and Nuno Palma
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: The Columbian voyage of 1492 marked the beginning of three centuries in which vast amounts of monetary silver were shipped from America to Spain. During that time, Spain’s money supply was subjected to the vagaries of the sea. Maritime disasters that resulted in the loss of silver‐laden ships gave rise to random contractions in the amount of money that arrived in Spain. We studied these maritime disasters to obtain estimates of the causal effects of changes in the money supply on economic output and prices.
Topic:: Imperialism, History, Economy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe and Spain

264. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and Americas

265. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and Americas

266. Two Peripheries: The Ukraine War's Effect on North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:: Anthony V. Rinna
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Spanning the Eurasian landmass, Russia’s actions in adjacent Ukraine invariably affect the geopolitical state of play on the similarly adjacent Korean Peninsula. Although ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia have been of largely secondary importance for both countries since their veritable rupture in the early- and mid-1990s, Moscow-Pyongyang relations became more mutually beneficial in 2022. Whereas most countries have outright condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or taken up an ambiguous position, the DPRK has been vocal in its support for Russia. From the DPRK perspective, the Kremlin’s post-2022 diplomatic and economic estrangement from much of the world has provided Pyongyang with an opening to leverage ties with Russia to push for an easing of its own diplomatic and economic isolation. Meanwhile, strengthening its DPRK ties allows Russia to undermine US influence on its Asian periphery. In supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea appears to be aiming toward obtaining economic benefits from closer ties with Russia, a country whose economy has managed to stay afloat despite heavy Western sanctions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided the impetus for Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow. However, the roots of the current upswing in Moscow-Pyongyang relations go back to the April 2019 summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Kim received an invitation to meet with Putin in May 2018 yet waited eleven months to meet with the Russian leader, even as Kim regularly met with the leaders of other major players on the Korean Peninsula. Kim may have decided after the February 2019 Hanoi summit yielded few results that strengthening ties with Russia, which was more reluctant than China to support UN sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017, was a more viable option for sanctions relief. Aside from the fact that Russia has demonstrated a clear unwillingness to impose new sanctions against the DPRK, North Korean citizens are reported to still be working in Russia in contravention of UN Resolution 2397. North Korean workers’ earnings are said to have suffered because of Russia’s reduced access to hard currency. Yet, the ruble’s continued resilience may mean that earning currency in Russia is still worthwhile for laborers dispatched at Pyongyang’s behest.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

267. United Kingdom Engagement with North Korea

Author:: Alastair Morgan
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: As one of the Allied Powers, The United Kingdom was involved in Post-World War II planning for the Korean peninsula, including the November 1943 Cairo Conference declaration that “… in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.” However, US President Roosevelt’s proposal at the February 1945 Yalta Conference did not establish a formal role for the UK in the trusteeship of Korea. Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula at the 38th parallel in August 1945, and direct British involvement in the peninsula was limited prior to the Korean War. The United Kingdom’s Korean War contribution to the United Nations Command was second only to the United States, with significant deployments of maritime and air assets in addition to the provision of ground troops. Almost 60,000 British troops saw action, with nearly 5,000 killed, wounded, missing in action, or taken prisoner. Following the armistice, the United Kingdom has continued to send representation to the United Nations Command. The armistice agreement includes an obligation on so-called “Sending States” to respond to renewed hostility. Although there is no automatic UK commitment to send forces, the armistice agreement remains a consideration in engagement with North Korea.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Education, Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

268. North Korea-Germany Relations: An Ambassador's Perspective of Diplomacy with Pyongyang

Author:: Armin Schäfer
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in 2001 at the request of the South Korean government, which hoped that Germany and the European Union (EU) would play a more active role in supporting the “Sunshine Policy.” Since then, Germany, together with the other EU states, has sought to moderate North Korea through a “Policy of Critical Engagement” to convince it of the benefits of international cooperation, respect for the rule of law, and improving the political and economic situation of its people. In doing so, Germany could build on the long relationship between North Korea and the former East Germany. “Critical engagement” means being willing to talk and get involved, but without holding back on criticism—and, if need be, imposing sanctions. It also implies that comprehensive engagement is not (yet) possible because of the circumstances. There is ample cause for a constrained approach from North Korea’s aggressive foreign policy and systematic human rights violations to the absence of suitable economic and fiscal conditions for business and development cooperation. Moreover, the lack of will on the part of considerable segments of the North Korean regime to engage with other countries also hampers broader engagement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Education, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Germany

269. From Coy to Cold Shoulder - The European Union and North Korea

Author:: Glyn Ford
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The European Union (EU)—then 15 member states prior to its 2004 enlargement to 25—formally established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang in 2001 after a high-level visit to Pyongyang by Göran Persson, Swedish Prime Minister and then President in office of the European Council of Ministers. There, accompanied by EU security affairs chief Javier Solana and EU foreign affairs commissioner Chris Patten, he met with Kim Jong Il. Less than five years before, Commission officials were under orders not to even speak to officials from North Korea, officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, at this meeting, the two parties agreed to establish both Political and Human Rights Dialogues; the latter modeled on the EU’s ongoing Human Rights Dialogue with Beijing. This move by the EU followed pressure from President Kim Dae-Jung in Seoul for allies to normalize relations as part of his ‘Sunshine’ policy. Some of the EU’s peripheral member states had long-standing relations with Pyongyang, in some cases dating back to before they had even joined the EU, with Finland, Sweden, and Denmark establishing relations in 1973, Austria in 1974, and Portugal in 1975. However, only Sweden had chosen to establish an Embassy, with the rest represented from Beijing. At the turn of the century, that pressure from Seoul resulted into most of the remaining dominoes falling in place. Italy and the UK jumped the gun in 2000, with Tony Blair and UK Foreign Minister Robin Cook agreeing to extend diplomatic recognition and establish an embassy en route to the Seoul Asia-Europe Summit.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and North Korea

270. Structural Change, Income Distribution and Unemployment Related to COVID-19: An Agent-based Model

Author:: Branimir Jovanovic, Michael Landesmann, Oliver Reiter, and Torben Schütz
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: We study the distributional consequences of COVID-19 by using a stock-flow consistent agent-based model that captures some of the aspects of pandemic-related lockdowns. In particular, the model distinguishes between ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ industries, between jobs that can be done from home and jobs that must be carried out on site, and takes into account that firms need to hire a certain amount of overhead labour. Allowing for government-financed short-time working schemes and loan guarantees, we find that these policies significantly reduce the rise in firm liquidations and income inequality (the ‘Keynesian’ result). However, we also find that the absence of government policies leads to higher levels of productivity and GDP in the aftermath of the crisis, as it means that more of the less productive firms face liquidation during lockdowns (the ‘Schumpeterian’ result). The last finding must be taken with adequate caution as our model is designed to describe the short run, while statements about the long run would require the inclusion of additional features such as technological progress and the entry of new firms.
Topic:: Income Inequality, Macroeconomics, Unemployment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Austria

271. Who Learns More from Afar? Spatial Empirical Evidence on Manufacturing and Services

Author:: Nina Vujanović
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: This paper investigates spatial dependence of FDI knowledge spillovers in manufacturing and services using spatial panel techniques applied to the 2006-2014 Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus firm-level dataset for Croatia and Slovenia. The paper finds diverse results across the two sectors. The distance between regions does not hinder the absorption of foreign knowledge in manufacturing despite the strong market-stealing effects operating within regions as well as spatially. On the other hand, FDI knowledge spillovers decrease service productivity within regions, because of market-stealing effects operating strongly across a smaller geographical scale. However, its impact is lost as knowledge spillovers from more distant neighbours are accounted for, because the poaching of local labour is impeded by distance due to rising costs of labour mobility. The research indicates that for knowledge absorption, geographic distance plays differing roles in manufacturing and services, due to the different nature of the production process.
Topic:: Development, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, Manufacturing, Econometrics, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe, Croatia, and Slovenia

272. Assessing Digital Leadership: Is the EU Losing out to the US?

Author:: Dario Guarascio and Roman Stöllinger
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: Since Leontief’s (1953) seminal work on the factor content of trade, the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin-model has been judged not only on the basis of formal tests of the theory but also tested against prior expectation. In this vein, this paper uses the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) approach to investigate whether supposed US leadership in the digital domain can be traced back to digital task endowments embodied in labour services. In a comparison between EU member states and the US, we find that the latter is more intensive in digital tasks than the EU and that this difference is explained by both an intensity-effect (US occupations being more digital-task intensive) and a structural component (relatively more digital-task intensive occupations). Viewed through the lens of the HOV theorem we find that the US is abundant in digital tasks relative to non-digital tasks, while the opposite is true for the EU. The standard tests for the predictive power of the HOV theorem are high and in line with the results for labour in previous literature.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Digitalization, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

273. Employment Effects of Offshoring, Technological Change and Migration in a Group of Western European Economies: Impact on Different Occupations

Author:: Michael Landesmann and Sandra Leitner
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: This paper estimates conditional demand models to examine the impact of offshoring, technological change, and migration on the labour demand of native workers differentiated by four different types of occupational groups: managers/professionals, clerical workers, craft (skilled) workers and manual workers. The analysis is conducted for an unbalanced panel of five economies Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, and Switzerland covering the period 2005-2018. Our results point to important and occupation-specific effects: offshoring seems to have beneficial employment effects for native craft workers in this set of economies, while negative effects for native manual workers across a wide set of industries (including manufacturing and services industries) and managers/professionals in manufacturing. Furthermore, there are important distinctions whether offshoring occurs in other advanced economies, in the EU13 or in developing countries. The analysis of the impact of technological change shows the strong positive impact which the additional IT equipment has on most occupational groups of native workers (with the exception of manual workers), while robotisation in manufacturing showed strongly negative impacts on the employment of all groups of workers and especially of craft workers. Increasing immigrant shares in the work forces showed strongly negative impacts on native workers – however, considering only the partial substitution effects and not including the potential for productivity and demand effects – and this is mostly accounted for by immigration from low- to medium-income source countries.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Migration, Labor Issues, Immigration, Foreign Direct Investment, Employment, Competition, Income Distribution, and Offshoring
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, and Austria

274. Functional Specialisation and Working Conditions in Europe

Author:: Sandra Leitner, Roman Stöllinger, and Zuzana Zavarská
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: Specialisation in value-chain functions is one of the new phenomena introduced by global value chains (GVCs). This report investigates the effects of functional specialisation on labour markets in fabrication and R&D activities as the two polar cases of value-chain functions, whereby the former is associated with factory economies, while the latter is characteristic of headquarter economies. More precisely, a metric similar to revealed comparative advantage is used to study the effect of relative functional specialisation on wages and non-wage working conditions. In line with the GVC literature emphasising power relations and organisational aspects of production networks, we are able to identify differentiated effects for functional specialisation patterns on wages in EU member states at the industry level across time. While relative functional specialisation in fabrication tends to hold back wages, functional specialisation in R&D has a positive effect on wage progression, controlling for labour productivity, GVC participation and numerous labour supply- and labour demand-side factors. The use of a constructed ‘sharp’ instrument allows giving these results a causal interpretation. Conversely, both functional specialisation measures are found to improve some non-wage working conditions, namely workers’ physical environment and their work intensity, which is evidence against a potential ‘race to the bottom’ effect of functional specialisation along GVCs. The effect is stronger for relative specialisation in fabrication than for relative specialisation in R&D.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Labor Issues, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Labor Market, Value Chains, and Wages
Political Geography:: Europe

275. Determinants of Functional Specialisation in EU Countries

Author:: Aleksandra Kordalska and Magdalena Olczyk
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: This paper aims to identify factors that determine functional specialisation (FS) in global value chains (GVCs) in European Union countries. We focus on fabrication and R&D as two opposite business functions in terms of their character and their potential of creating value-added. To make our results robust two different approaches to measuring functional specialisation are used – an FDI-based approach and a trade-based approach. To assemble a relative functional specialisation index, for each approach we use the same metric – a revealed comparative advantages index. Our results suggest a positive effect of wages on specialisation in an R&D function, and a negative impact on FS in fabrication. Increasing labour productivity boosts both specialisation in fabrication and in R&D. The results are robust to different model specifications and different time intervals. The instrumental variables method allows us to interpret the results as causal relationships. Additionally, human capital and labour skills foster FS in R&D (only in FDI data), and growing employment makes FS in fabrication increase. The growth of GDP per capita positively affects functional specialisation in R&D activities. Among GVC participation measures, we confirm the importance of increasing backward linkages to explain the boost in fabrication activities. Dividing a full sample into a group of EU15 countries and a group of Central Eastern European countries we observe that patterns for the EU15 are similar to those for the full sample, while for CEE countries wages are insignificant and labour productivity affects FS in fabrication only.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Economy, Value Chains, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

276. The Emissions Reduction Potential for Freight Transport on a High-speed Rail Line Along the ‘European Silk Road’

Author:: Erica Angers, Aleksandr Arsenev, and Mario Holzner
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: This report estimates the CO2 emissions of freight transport on a hypothetical high-speed rail (HSR) line along the northern route, from Lyon to Warsaw, of a ‘European Silk Road’ (ESR). Using a methodology consisting of predictions regarding the freight-carrying capacity of the future HSR, and the commodity-level switchover, our results indicate that a best-case scenario, at a project lifecycle of 60 years, in which all trains run with 257 tonnes of load, provides for a reduction of 176.2 Mt of net CO2 emissions compared with current levels. These lifespan savings are comparable to a reduction of net emissions by close to 24% of the overall EU transport sector emissions (excluding air transport) of one year (as measured by the net emissions in 2018). The net negative emissions in the optimistic full-capacity scenario will compensate for the construction costs in 13 years. Thus, the potential for emission reduction along the northern route of the ESR is quite substantial, given that this is just one line, with limited capacity. This hints at the importance that bold missions, such as the construction of a pan-European HSR network, could have for the definition of a European Green Industrial Policy that is capable of supporting the fulfilment of the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change.
Topic:: Climate Change, Infrastructure, European Union, Economic Growth, Transportation, Logistics, Ecology, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Europe

277. The Euro Area’s Achilles Heel: Reassessing Italy’s Long Decline in the Context of European Integration and Globalisation

Author:: Dario Guarascio, Philipp Heimberger, and Francesco Zezza
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: This paper analyses how Italy’s decades-long decline turned the country into the euro area’s Achilles heel, the most vulnerable spot in the common currency. We use a structuralist framework to synthesise different (competing) supply-side and demand-side explanations, accounting for long-term processes and sectoral interdependencies. We argue that structural domestic factors that were already present in the decades after World War II (‘original sins’) – low-cost competition and labour fragmentation, many small firms linked to low innovation, and a deep territorial divide – interacted with the policy constraints brought about by globalisation and European integration to exacerbate Italy’s decline vis-à-vis its euro area peers.
Topic:: Globalization, European Union, Regional Integration, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

278. Trade Balances and International Competitiveness in Cyber-physical, Digital Task-intensive, ICT Capital-intensive and Traditional Industries

Author:: Alexandra Bykova and Roman Stöllinger
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: In this report, we analyse the international competitiveness of the EU in four industry groups over the period 1995-2018. The groups are delineated by specific factor intensities, where these intensities are assessed from digital tasks performed by labour services and ICT capital stocks. The EU’s positions relating to trade balances, revealed comparative advantages and unit value ratios are assessed relative to its main competitors, such as the US, China, Japan and South Korea. The trade specialisation patterns confirm EU advantages in traditional industries, which still represent the largest part of global trade, and in the group of digital task-intensive industries. In the cyber-physical group of industries, which are characterised by both high digital task and ICT capital intensities, the EU records a trade deficit, although this has been receding in recent years. Competitiveness indicators depict heterogeneity among EU countries. The loss of international competitiveness for some technology front-runners is a worrying sign. On the positive side, however, a reduction in trade deficits or an improvement in product quality and market shares is evident for certain EU countries, especially in the Central European region.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, European Union, Trade, Digitalization, and International Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

279. The Future of EU Cohesion - Effects of the Twin Transition on Disparities across European Regions

Author:: Ambre Maucorps, Roman Römisch, Thomas Schwab, and Nina Vujanović
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: Closing the prosperity gap between regions has always been a key political aspiration of the European Union – and cohesion policy is the primary means to achieve that goal. Europe is currently undergoing a digital and green transition that is drastically changing the way its economy works. How well prepared are regions to capitalise on the twin transition? And what impact will it have on regional cohesion in Europe? Our study finds that greening and digitalising the economy will likely widen the gap between rich and poor regions in Europe.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Regional Integration, Digitalization, Green Transition, and Regional Development
Political Geography:: Europe

280. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:: Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

281. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:: Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

282. The Future of European Security

Author:: Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
Topic:: European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

283. One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The geopolitical struggle is not where you think it is

Author:: Roshni Menon and Faiza Shaheen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: When Russia invaded Ukraine one year ago, there were immediate concerns about the effects on food and energy security, and on geopolitical alignment in other countries. The world was right to be concerned, but the repercussions have been much wider and deeper than many predicted. There are two main ways in which conflict dynamics have shifted, neither of them solely caused by the war but both exacerbated by it: Russian’s war on Ukraine has shone the lens on inter-state conflict and proxy war Compounding the pandemic and climate change, a war started in one corner of the world has resulted in a global cost-of-living crisis and increasing debt for almost every country worldwide—countries that had no hand in Russia’s invasion or in the failure to respond to public health and socio-economic crisis. This analysis looks at the multiple and cascading crises (increasingly referred to as the polycrisis), and how we can take action in the face of polycrisis,
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

284. Cost of Violence Study – Switzerland: A Halving Global Violence Report

Author:: Li Li, Anke Hoeffler, and Teresa Artho
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: The aim of this report is to document the prevalence of interpersonal violence and its associated costs in Switzerland, and to identify policies, programs, and recommendations to address the economic impact of violence in the country. Interpersonal violence is understood to be homicide, physical assault, and sexual assault, since much of these are perpetrated in the domestic sphere. In this report, the authors provide separate numbers for domestic violence, which includes intimate partner violence (IPV). Additionally, this research will contribute to the forthcoming Flagship Report of the Halving Global Violence Task Force, and aims to inform national and global discussions about the business case for investments in violence prevention. While assigning monetary values to injuries and death may be seen as morally questionable, it is essential for understanding the magnitude of the issue and informing policy decisions. By quantifying these costs, we can better comprehend the burden of violence. In addition, the cost distribution of different forms of violence can help guide policymakers in allocating resources to tackle the most pressing issues, as well as devising effective violence reduction measures.
Topic:: Economics, Violence, and Intimate Partner Violence
Political Geography:: Europe and Switzerland

285. Women's Security in Local Communities

Author:: Lajla Leko and Sabahudin Harčević
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:: With the project "Improvement of Women's Safety and Security in Local Communities - AwareBiH", CSS aims to point out the state of security from the point of view of women, therefore it is necessary that some of the biggest cities, namely Mostar, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, are bearers of positive changes in the implementation of the project's results. In addition, the project aims to show the ability of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to influence changes that would make their environment safer. This topic is not discussed in BiH as much as it should be, while the security sector is still perceived as a sector dominated by men. Therefore, this project will help society and decisionmakers to better understand the needs and feelings of women in BiH about their own security.
Topic:: Security, Law Enforcement, Women, Violence, and Survey
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

286. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part I

Author:: Erdin Halimić, Dajana Bašić, and Aleksandar Maletić
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:: Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 13 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
Topic:: Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

287. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part II

Author:: Erdin Halimić, Ajla Popović, Haris Vejezović, Aleksandar Maletić, and Dajana Bašić
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:: Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 12 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
Topic:: Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

288. The Return of the Foreign Fighters and Their Families to Their Homeland: Existing Practices and Considerations Regarding Security and Human Rights

Author:: Katerina Christoforaki
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:: The creation of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has attracted an unprecedented flow of thousands of people from more than 100 countries all over the world to join their cause. After the fall of the so-called caliphate, the countries involved have to deal with the aftermath of the conflict and the future threat of the resurgence of ISIS or other terrorist groups. The people who volunteered and joined ISIS might pose a security threat in the future. This paper aims to examine the different approaches that countries have taken regarding the return of foreign fighters (FFs) and their families who joined ISIS to their homeland. This is a multidimensional and complex matter since it has legal, moral, and political implications, and therefore the decisions in this regard are never unanimous, nor do they come without criticism and opposition. On the one hand, it would be easier to just leave the FFs and their families there, prosecute them there and incarcerate them there. It would also be easier to collect evidence and to have testimonies of the witnesses and the survivors, and also it would keep the potential security threat away from their homeland. However, this would only be beneficial for the countries of origin and in the short term as it wouldn‘t solve the problem of radicalization. In fact, it might fuel it even more, and the proximity of the ISIS member in prisons or in camps could benefit them to rebuild their network and plan future attacks. Moreover, leaving them there would be against all human rights norms regarding the death penalty, fair trial, torture, rights of the child, and more. On the other hand, the return of the fighters and their families could indeed pose a danger to the security of the homeland. Not all of the returnees have committed punishable crimes and for those who have, very often there is not enough admissible evidence to the national courts. In fact, in the case of women and children, the countries are more reluctant to their return because they might have not taken part in the atrocities but that does not mean that they are innocent and bear no responsibility. Complicated is also the case of children and teenagers, some of whom have taken part in the atrocities willingly or unwillingly, some were brought by their families, some traveled alone in order to join ISIS, and some were born under ISIS control and risk statelessness.
Topic:: Security, Human Rights, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters, and Repatriation
Political Geography:: Iraq, United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Syria, United States of America, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

289. La “Ceguera Marítima”: características, consecuencias y alternativas.Alemania, Brasil y la Organización Marítima Internacionalen comparación

Author:: Herminio Sánchez de la Barquera y Arroyo
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: El presente texto parte de tres puntos importantes que darán paso al análisis de la ceguera marítima, sus características y consecuencias desde laperspectiva de las acciones emprendidas por Alemania, Brasil y laOrganización Marítima Internacional(OMI). El enfoque principal de esta investigación es conocer cómo estos tres actores, mediante distintos recursos, tratande contribuir a reducir la ceguera marítimapropia (en el caso de las dos naciones analizadas) y lade países en desarrollo(en el caso de laOMI). Posteriormente determinaremos sus características, medios y objetivos.
Topic:: Security, Maritime, Seapower, and Dependency
Political Geography:: Europe, Brazil, South America, and Germany

290. El océano azulde la política común de seguridad y defensa

Author:: Xavier Torrens
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: El océano azul de la política común de seguridad y defensa (PCSD)de la Unión Europea es el objeto de estudio de esta investigación, desde una aproximaciónbásicamente de policy-making, centrada en el policy design. Como punto de partida, toma contenidos de la geopolítica y las teorías del realismo que analizan por qué es tan problemática la política común de defensa europea.El estudio explica la herramienta del océano azul con el caso práctico de la aeronave F-35. A partir de su comprensión, se describe la estrategia del océano rojo frente a la estrategia del océano azul, contraponiendo unaEuropa en el seno de la OTAN y con dependencia de EEUU ante una Europa como A²E (actor estratégico y autonomía estratégica).Posteriormente, se elabora el esquema de cuatro accionesen la construcción de una política común de defensa en Europa. Se estructura la matriz del océano azul, donde se analiza la construcción de una política común de defensa en Europa, presentando aquello que debería eliminarse de la política de defensa, lo que debería reducirse, lo que se debería incrementar y, finalmente, lo que se crearía para alcanzar una política común de seguridad y defensa de la Unión Europea (UE). Luego, se plantean las cuatro barreras organizacionales para alcanzar unas Fuerzas Armadas Europeasy los tres componentes clave del cambio a las Fuerzas Armadas Europeas.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

291. Incivility in Diplomacy as a Reflection of the Crisis in Foreign Policy Culture

Author:: V. Chumakov
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The 2020s have been characterized by a profound crisis of confidence in international relations and world politics manifested in the use of political, psychological, and rhetorical methods and techniques that are atypical of traditional diplomatic practices and do not correspond to generally recognized norms of diplomatic protocol. Such manifestations include, for example, the use of unverified information and disinformation, the dissemination of deliberately false information (“fake news”), the unilateral disclosure of confidential face-to-face or telephone conversations to the media, and the publication of diplomatic correspondence not only as an unofficial translation but also as direct copies of informational documents (notes, letters, telegrams, and attachments to them). We also see the use of undiplomatic expressions (accusations, insults, namecalling, threats, blackmail, jokes) against counterpart or senior foreign or international officials, albeit primarily behind their backs, as well personal correspondence between such individuals on publicly available electronic mail services, instant messengers, and social networks.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, OSCE, New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

292. Prescription for Military Paralysis: Wartime Reactor Meltdowns (Occasional Paper 2305)

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: More than 15 months into the war, Russian attacks against Ukraine’s nuclear plants have yet to release any radiation. As the likelihood of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant reopening quickly declines and Putin’s desire to distract the world from his declining political and military standing increases, some experts fear he may want to induce a radiological release from the plant. In any case, Putin’s military assaults against the Zaporizhzhia plant have already set a worrying precedent. Last December, NPEC held a wargame, the results of which The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists just published, to examine what might happen in a future Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this reinvasion in 2037, Russia targets power reactors in Ukraine, Poland, and Romania. The United States plans to build scores of new reactors in these countries. What if Russian missiles targeted them in a future war? NPEC tapped the expertise of Ukrainians, Romanians, NATO officials, Poles, US security experts, and Hill staff to find out. It hosted five sessions over two weeks and ran a three-move wargame. The game’s play revealed how the uncertainties and dangers of military attacks against nuclear power plants can paralyze decision-making and fundamentally alter the course of wars. The military disruptions these uncertainties introduce may far outstrip the safety issues any reactor radiological release might otherwise present. The game’s play revealed three reasons why.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, War Games, Nuclear Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

293. FACTORING THE SMART POWER IN THE INDIA-EUROPEAN UNION ENGAGEMENTS: A SCOPING REVIEW

Author:: Nippun Gupta, Bawa Singh, Aslam Khan, and Jaspal Kaur
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Power is a critical factor in several types of diplomacy. India-EU relations are a classic case of how changing geopolitics prompted diplomatic acumen. This scoping review assesses the changing relations of both partners as a manifestation of Smart Power. The dynamic relations from normative-based to pragmatic and inclusive interests based are evaluated. Their value-based relations are put under international relations theories. Their changing factors of cooperation are used to justify their smart diplomacy, where contemporary relations are less likely to be affected by multilateral interests. To solidify claims of smart power in their relations, the recent TRIPS waiver schism illuminated health diplomacy between the two regions. This health diplomacy discourse promotes smart power diplomacy between India and the EU, where new avenues of cooperation emerge despite pandemic disagreements. The article explores how hybrid power is better than soft and hard power in silos by systematically searching and selecting the existing knowledge in the contemporary context.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Health, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Soft Power, Hard Power, and Smart Power
Political Geography:: Europe, South Asia, and India

294. RETHINKING STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN TIMES OF NEXT GENERATION EU: NEW DIGITAL AGENDA

Author:: Miguel Angel Solsona and Marcin Roman Czubala Ostapiuk
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The digital transformation of the global economy and society has accelerated after the Covid-19 pandemic. The European Union (EU), compared to China and the United States, is losing its capacity for innovation and control over data and fundamental raw materials and could even lose ground in the regulatory power it has in the digital realm. This paper pays special attention to the situation and progress toward a new European policy to achieve digital strategic autonomy. It also briefly outlines the Recovery Plan for Europe as a possible incentive for its promotion. Both descriptive and analytical methods were employed to gather the data from secondary sources and provide reliable research results. The major findings of this article are that strategic autonomy is an imperative requirement for sustaining and encouraging European integration, forcing the EU to advance faster toward developing critical digital technologies. There is also an urgent need to secure critical parts of supply chains and data protection, intellectual property, and defense against disinformation. Finally, the European Union must improve its resilience to face new crises and lead the digitalization of its economy.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, Autonomy, Digital Policy, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Europe

295. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF CORRUPTION RISKS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN THE LIGHT OF DECENTRALIZATION

Author:: Yevheniy Haydanka
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The article elucidates the relationship between decentralization and corruption risks in the Czech Republic. Economic inequality in the regions inevitably leads to corruption risks. The unemployment rate and the wage level determined the fragmentation of the Czech regions. Most Czech regions (8 out of 14) have an average unemployment rate (of 3-5%). The capital Prague (44 thousand korunas), as well as the Central Bohemian Region (35 thousand korunas), significantly differ from the rest of the Czech regions in wage level (within 31-32 thousand korunas). If the Czech regions are similar in the unemployment rate, there is a noticeable stratification between the capital and other regions. The findings of an expert survey among civil servants and deputies of regional Assemblies identified corruption and anti-corruption measures in the regions. The sphere of public administration is the most corrupt. Partially corrupt is the provision of administrative services. The greatest corruption risks result from the employees’ influence on funding sources (grants, subsidies and grants). On a 10-point scale, the average corruption in the regions is 5,8. More research prospects derive from studying corruption risks at the regional rather than national levels and expanding the geographical framework of the transition countries under research.
Topic:: Corruption, Risk, Unemployment, Decentralization, Wages, and Regionalization
Political Geography:: Europe and Czech Republic

296. A New Horizon in U.S. Trade Policy: Key Developments and Questions for the Biden Administration

Author:: Trevor Sutton and Mike Williams
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: This issue brief examines some of the key trade initiatives pursued by the Biden administration to date. It then sets out key questions facing U.S. trade policy in a global environment defined by volatility and renewed ambition to tackle the great challenges of the 21st century, such as climate change, inequality, and great power competition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Inequality, Economy, Trade Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Americas

297. Protecting Democracy Online in 2024 and Beyond

Author:: Megan Shahi
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: This new report specifically anticipates risks to and from the major social media platforms in the 2024 elections, continuing CAP’s work to promote election integrity online and ensure free and fair elections globally. The report’s recommendations incorporate learnings from past elections and introduce new ideas to encourage technology platforms to safeguard democratic processes and mitigate election threats. In a world without standardized global social media regulation, ensuring elections are safe, accessible, and protected online and offline will require key actions to be taken ahead of any votes being cast—both in 2024 and beyond.
Topic:: Politics, Science and Technology, Elections, Democracy, Social Media, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: Europe, India, Global Focus, and United States of America

298. Striking evidence: The impact of railway strikes on competition from intercity bus services in Germany

Author:: Matthias Beestermöller, Levke Jessen-Thiesen, and Alexander Sandkamp
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper investigates the impact of the largest rail strikes in German history on intercity buses – a then newly liberalised market. Using unique booking data of bus services, we exploit variation in rail service cancellations across routes to show that the disruption in rail transport increases bus ticket sales. Crucially, the effect persists beyond the strike, indicating that travellers do not return to their originally preferred mode of transport. It is particularly pronounced for passengers travelling on weekends. The findings suggest that customers were previously under-experimenting. Beyond transportation, our results highlight the importance of service reliability, as temporary disruptions can cause customers to permanently switch to competitors.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Business, Transportation, and Labor Strike
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

299. Carbon Capture and Storage - Publics in five countries around the North Sea prefer to do it on their own territory

Author:: Christine Merk, Gisle Andersen, Åsta Dyrnes Nordø, and Torben Helfrich
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) has been identified as an essential part of the lowest-cost path toward reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement. In Europe, an accelerated pace of CCS development indicates that a CO2 transport and storage system could be established by 2030. However, we know little about how the public views the market for transport and storage of CO2 currently under development in Europe. In early 2023, we conducted an experimental comparative survey to study public opinions on cross-border CO2 trade for storage in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. The share of respondents that perceive CCS as somewhat positive or very positive varies considerably between the countries; we find the highest share in Denmark (69%), followed by the UK (68%), Norway (67%), the Netherlands (57%) and the lowest share in Germany (49%). Especially concerns about environmental risks and costs lead to more negative views, while perceptions of job creation and economic opportunities lead to more positive evaluations. The experimental results show that importing CO2 for storage is among the least preferred options in all countries, while the storage of CO2 that has been captured in the own country is the most preferred option; the gap in the share of positive evaluations is substantial and amounts to up to 20 percentage points in the UK. Respondents who feel that countries are responsible for reducing national greenhouse gas emissions and storing their own captured CO2 drive the pattern of a more positive evaluation of a domestic CCS value chain and a more negative evaluation of importing CO2.
Topic:: Climate Change, Trade, Carbon Emissions, and Perception
Political Geography:: Europe and North Sea

300. Spatial Wage Inequality in North America and Western Europe: Changes Between and Within Local Labour Markets 1975-2019

Author:: L. Baluz, P. Bukowski, M. Fransham, A. Lee, and M. López Forero
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: The rise of economic inequalities in advanced economies has been often linked with the growth of spatial inequalities within countries, yet there is limited comparative research that studies the relationship between national and subnational economic inequality. This paper presents the first systematic attempt to create internationally comparable evidence showing how different countries perform in terms of geographic wage inequalities. We create cross-country comparable measures of spatial wage disparities between and within similarly-defined local labour market areas (LLMAs) for Canada, France, (West) Germany, the UK and the US since the 1970s, and assess their contribution to national inequality. By the end of the 2010s, spatial inequalities in LLMA mean wages are similar in Canada, France, Germany and the UK; the US exhibits the highest degree of spatial inequality. Over the study period, spatial inequalities have nearly doubled in all countries, except for France where spatial inequalities have fallen back to 1970s levels. Due to a concomitant increase in within-place inequality, the contribution of places in explaining national wage inequality has remained fairly constant over the 40-year study period, except in the UK where we document a significant increase. Whilst common global social, economic and technological shocks are important drivers of spatial inequality, this variation in levels and trends of spatial inequality opens the way to comparative research exploring the role of national institutions in mediating how global shocks translate into economic disparities between places.
Topic:: Inequality, Labor Market, and Wages
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS