Political Geography: Europe / Publication Year: / Topic: Security

301. Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan: Consequences for NATO

Author:: Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan will not change NATO’s overall threat perception, which will be shaped mainly by the military threat from Russia, challenges related to the rise of China, and instability in Europe’s neighbourhood. Criticism of NATO may, however, influence discussions on a new strategy, which should facilitate adaptation of the Alliance to new threat assessment. There will be increased pressure on the development of crisis-response capabilities within the coalition of the willing and the European Union.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Taliban, and European Union
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, China, Europe, and South Asia

302. Georgia After the Second Karabakh War

Author:: Mamuka Tsereteli
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The outcome of the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia significantly transformed the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, with implications for the wider Black Sea‑Caspian region. The unsettled political geography of the South Caucasus and the ethno‑political separatism fueled by external actors since the early 1990s left bleeding wounds on the bodies of the newly re‑emerged sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. These conflicts have determined the trajectory of the geopolitical developments of the region for the last 30 years, including on the foreign policy orientations of these new states. The conflicts in the South Caucasus were the primary challenge for transforming the strategic assets of this region into greater political and economic success. Three major conflict areas in the South Caucasus were former autonomous regions, created in the early Soviet period: Nagorno‑Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Tskhinvali region, what was called South Ossetia. (Briefly: the latter term was introduced by the Soviets in the 1920s as a name for the newly created autonomous area in Georgia, populated by Ossetians alongside ethnic Georgians. The historic homeland of Ossetians is located to the north of the Greater Caucasus mountains. Following the Soviet tradition of planting ethno‑political time bombs, Ossetia proper—located in the Russian Federation—was named North Ossetia, while the Tskhinvali region of Georgia—with the Ossetian population at the time concentrated in the border areas with Russia—was named South Ossetia.) As of today, all three of these areas are self‑proclaimed independent states, are formally ruled by de facto governments, and saw fierce military confrontation in the early 1990s. In 2008, the Tskhinvali region became the battleground between Russian and Georgian forces. In 2020, Azerbaijan regained through a combination of military action and diplomatic brinksmanship all seven regions outside of Nagorno‑ Karabakh that had been occupied by Armenia, as well as one‑third of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh region. In the case of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, as of mid‑2021, these territories remain, in reality, governed by Russian occupational forces. The Russian military influence was inserted into Karabakh after the war that ended on November 10th, 2020, with Russian peacekeepers playing an increasing role in the governance of the region. In terms of geopolitical orientation, Armenia willingly allowed Russian troops onto its territory, seeing them as a security guarantee and deterrent against Azerbaijan. Georgia aligned itself with the Western powers, determined to join NATO and the EU. The conflicts on Georgian territory are seen as punishment from Russia for Georgia’s pro‑Western focus. As a result, there has been a heavy Russian military presence in the separatist areas of Georgia since the Russian invasion to Georgia in 2008.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

303. From Struggle to Permanent Failure Why the Karabakh Attempt at Secession Failed

Author:: Azer Babayev
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: After 44 days of fighting, the Second Karabakh War came to an end on 10 November 2020 as a result of a Russian‑brokered ceasefire agreement. The most important questions here appear to be: what led to this dangerous military escalation, and what does it mean for the conflict, given that it seems to have now entered into a (new) political phase, again? In the declining Soviet Union, what was originally a status dispute over the autonomous Nagorno‑Karabakh region escalated into an international violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Following the end of a bloody war in 1994 (the First Karabakh War, 1992‑ 1994), a fragile situation around the conflict region took root: the “frozen conflict,” as it came to be known, lasted for nearly three decades and led to conditions of neither war nor peace. And during this period, it was feared that the longer the sides had to wait for a peace agreement to be reached, the more likely the conflict would re‑escalate and eventually erupt again into a hot war. As it turned out, this is exactly what happened: an all‑out six‑week war erupted again unexpectedly between the conflict parties in late September 2020, and, as a result, the Armenian side more or less capitulated. But first things first: in the First Karabakh War, Azerbaijan suffered a major defeat, ceding to Armenian forces not only the secessionist region itself but also seven surrounding territories. These other lands were, as a whole, twice the size of Nagorno‑ Karabakh itself and contained five times the old oblast’s population, the entirety of which was expelled by the time an armistice was signed in 1994. And that is why during this war the UN Security Council responded by passing four resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan. However, the UN resolutions failed to have any effect. Since that time, no international protagonists felt a strong, compelling need to try to resolve the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. In addition, all international actors dismissed the idea of “power mediation.” Moreover, although Russia as a key international actor is directly involved in all the conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, its involvement in the Nagorno‑Karabakh dispute has been rather indirect: in the Karabakh case, Moscow has been both a critical and a questionable actor. On the one hand, the Kremlin has taken a central position in mediating a peaceful settlement to the conflict while, on the other hand, it has been delivering weapons to both sides. This last represents perhaps the most striking situation regarding the international dimension of the conflict. Russia is militarily allied with Armenia and has a military presence in the country. It has provided security guarantees to Yerevan, primarily through their shared membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which neutralized to a certain extent the potential effects of Russian arms being sold to financially strong Azerbaijan on a purely commercial basis.
Topic:: Security, War, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

304. Ukraine’s Strategic Relations with the South Caucasus With References to Turkey and Russia

Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: kraine’s relations with the three Southern Caucasian states of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia have been varied during the three decades since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Ukraine has paid greater attention to pro‑Western Georgia and multivectoral Azerbaijan, and the least attention to pro‑Russian Armenia. In Soviet times, the Ukrainian and Georgian dissident and nationalist movements maintained close ties, and this influenced the development of friendly relations between Ukraine and Georgia in the post‑Soviet era. From the late 1990s onwards, Ukraine and Georgia made joining both NATO and the EU priority goals, which also played a role in bringing Kyiv and Tbilisi together. Azerbaijan pursued a multi‑vector foreign policy of integration without membership in these two institutions, managing to be cautiously pro‑Western but at the same time not anti‑Russian. Armenia, on the other hand, has been a member of all Russian‑led regional integration projects since the early 1990s, and therefore Kyiv has had few common interests with Yerevan. Relations with Armenia have deteriorated since 2014 because of Armenia’s support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the presence of Armenian mercenaries fighting against Ukraine in the ranks of Russia’s proxies in the Donbas. During the Second Karabakh War, the Ukrainian media, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and all political parties (except one pro‑Russian one) enthusiastically supported Azerbaijan.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine

305. What role for NATO in the Sahel?

Author:: Chloe Berger
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2011, the Sahel region has gradually gained significance within the NATO environment. The chaos in Lib- ya has accelerated the interconnection of North African and Sahelian dynamics, creating a complex environment with serious implications for both the stability of North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin. The Sahel region suffers from a paradoxical situation. In view of the multiple national (Sahel armed forces), regional (African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) and internation- al actors (United Nations, European Union, and also non-African states) present on the ground, the situation is often dubbed a “security traffic jam”. Some NATO Allies who have traditionally wielded influence in this region, have also invested in regional stabilization and development efforts for a long time. For the first time at the June 2021 NATO Summit, Al- lies have explicitly voiced their concerns over the “dete- riorating situation in the Sahel region”.1 As the “newest addition” in this already “crowded” environment, and at a time of review of its Strategic Concept, the Alli- ance must demonstrate its added value; identify “niche” areas where it can complement and strengthen existing efforts; while considering the Sahelian countries’ aspira- tions and specific needs.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, North America, and Sahel

306. Challenges to NATO's Nuclear Strategy

Author:: Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In 2022, NATO will present its new Strategic Concept. Since 2010, when the previous Strategic Concept was published, NATO and the world have changed significantly. At the time, NATO was primarily engaged in crisis management, including in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Strategic Concept enabled the Alliance to further expand – conceptually and geographically – its out-of-area activities, together with the core tasks of cooperative security. Eleven years later, the dominant paradigm of international politics is great power competition: in other words, countries like Russia and China are competing with the West strategically, economically, militarily, and in terms of values. Many things have remained constant, however: one is the centrality of nuclear weapons for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. Since 2010, Allies have continued to affirm that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, notwithstanding the Alliance’s ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

307. Biden’s nuclear posture review: what's in it for NATO?

Author:: Andrea Chiampan
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The Biden administration has formally start- ed a review of the US nuclear weapons poli- cy known as Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR is a public policy document that each US administration has published since 1994 during the first months in office and that is scheduled to be released in 2022. NPRs are important public statements: they set out the administration’s views on the role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy. NPRs are also crucial signalling documents. They provide insight into an administration’s understanding of the prevailing geo- political environment – including perceived risks and threats – and convey US intentions to allies and adver- saries alike. Given NATO’s significant reliance on US extended deterrence, the elements of continuity and change that the new NPR will propose will inevitably have direct effects on NATO’s defence posture.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

308. The future of NATO

Author:: Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO’s reflection process (NATO 2030), as well as the decision to revisit the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in 2022 pose two sets of questions: the first pertains to the organization’s adap- tation to tomorrow’s security environment; the second is on whether there is agreement inside the Alliance on the kind of organization to be built, and what its prin- ciples and methods should look like. This Policy Brief examines these two levels of ques- tions to identify five possible directions in which the Alliance might move: continuity; refocusing on collec- tive defence; morphing into a security organization; standing up to China; and marginalization.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

309. NATO and the future of arms control

Author:: Dominik P. Jankowski
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The crisis of arms control1 is obvious and broadly discussed among states, within the world’s expert community and to a lesser extent the media. This crisis has at least three building blocks: Russia continues to violate or undermine key arms control treaties and commitments; China rejects to join the existing arms control architecture; and both countries heavily invest in the modernization of their armed forces, including development of the nuclear arsenals. In the current highly competitive environment, arms control is more difficult to achieve and is likely to accomplish less than what was optimistically anticipated a generation ago. The growing pressure to “save arms control at all cost”, often expressed by the Western expert community, further complicates the situation. The excessively aspirational and ideological approach to arms control – in which arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation (ADN) become a silver bullet solution – is as dangerous as security and defence policies which entirely exclude ADN. As James Cameron rightly points out, “history should teach policy-makers to look beyond formulae for strategic stability to other ways in which arms control can help to contain disruptive challenges to the balance of power and minimize the chances of war”.2 This Research Paper analyzes the past, present, and future of arms control in the Euro- Atlantic region, through an examination of what arms control actually does well, and what it does not do. It puts an emphasis on the role of NATO Allies in this regard, based on the Alliance’s past experience and taking into consideration current multilateral and multi- domain environment. The paper is based on three assumptions. First, arms control is not dead and its goals remain valid. Second, arms control is a policy tool, not an end in itself. In practice, for NATO Allies it means that any decisions on arms control must reflect the requirements of the Allies’ strategy of deterrence and defence. Third, in their approach o arms control, NATO Allies should be guided by the principles of security, stability, and verification.3
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

310. NDC@70: more relevant than ever

Author:: Stephen J. Mariano
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The information revolution put brick and mortar academic institutions under pressure to adapt, and the COVID pandemic has increased atten- tion on higher education models – business, intellectu- al, and philosophical. As the NATO Defense College (NDC) turns 70, and the Alliance ponders a new Stra- tegic Concept, it is worth reviewing the NDC model and value of education more broadly. General Dwight D. Eisenhower created the College in 1951 to prepare military and civilian officials for duty in NATO posts or in NATO-related positions in their capitals. War col- leges in France, the United States, and the United King- dom provided the conceptual basis for the NDC, but the NATO equivalent would have two differences: the NATO College would focus on Alliance issues more than national colleges, and consensus-building would be a key part of its education method. Seventy years later, the College still prepares military and civilian officials to assume positions of responsibility within NATO and that preparation has always included acquiring geo-stra- tegic knowledge and building relationships. NDC@70 means reflecting on how senior leaders acquire knowl- edge, develop skills, and strengthen relationships in to- day’s challenging period with rapid rates of technologi- cal change and increasingly segmented societies.
Topic:: Security, NATO, International Cooperation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

311. Partners Across the Globe and NATO’s Strategic Concept

Author:: Gorana Grgic
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO’s history is one of continuous adapta- tion in the aftermath of critical junctures both 1 during and after the Cold War. The most recent push to transform the Alliance is embodied in laying out the groundworks towards the new Strategic Concept and the institutional campaign “NATO 2030” which calls for the Alliance to become more political- ly active and global in reach, along with strengthening its military power.2 Among the issues this effort has spotlighted are NATO’s global partnerships which at the moment include Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan, i.e. NATO’s Partners Across the Globe (PAG). This Policy Brief assesses the value of NATO’s Part- ners Across the Globe in light of the new security challenges and argues that preserving the status quo vis-à-vis global partnerships is not advisable since it is incompatible with the changing strategic goals. In pro- viding the recommendations moving forward, it argues the Alliance has two options. First, the Alliance could overhaul the PAG grouping and distinguish between the types of partners with whom it can establish deeper cooperation. Namely, this would involve elevating the Asia-Pacific Four into an institutionalised grouping, rather than having it remain an informal platform for cooperation. Alternatively, NATO could do away with the existing PAG nomenclature and keep the partner- ships flexible and issue specific. It could thus follow the “NATO 30+n” model, which would include working with a set group of partners on different issues.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

312. European allies and the forthcoming NATO strategic concept

Author:: Barbara Kunz
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept will primarily serve the purpose of adapting the definition of the Alliance’s core tasks to 21st century realities. This includes an updated threat analysis, as well as a widening of priorities to include matters and domains such as cybersecurity and soci- etal resilience. It will, in many ways, also reflect the considerable changes European security underwent since the publication of its preceding Strategic Con- cept in 2010. It will therefore be the first post-Crimea Strategic Concept, and mark the end of a cooperative security approach to Russia. The new text will also be the first post-Trump administration document, one elaborated after a period of profound doubts over US commitment to the Alliance. Finally, the new Strate- gic Concept will be adopted after years of sometimes heated debates on European security, particularly on the notion of European strategic autonomy. While a consensus on this concept and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance has thus far proved elusive, it seems clear that Europeans increasingly understand the need for a stronger, and in many ways more independent Europe. To some, recent events in Afghanistan may also have been a wake-up call. In reality, however, most of these developments are structural in nature, and have persisted for some time.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

313. Promoting China–European Union Cooperation on Green and Sustainable Finance

Author:: Ian Anthony, Jingdong Yuan, and Sun Xia
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: Energy transition is an essential element of the global effort to meet the objectives set out in the 2016 Paris Agreement on climate change. China and the European Union (EU) have agreed to work together to help deliver the financing needed to achieve energy transition, but more is needed. To promote China–EU co-operation, this SIPRI Policy Brief recommends: (a) exploring a dedicated China–EU green finance initiative; (b) presenting a joint China–EU proposal on clear definitions and standards of sustainable green financing to the International Partnership on Sustainable Finance; (c) generating a joint curriculum to train staff in multilateral development banks, private investment banks, insurance companies and green banks; (d) pursuing joint finance for projects that find private capital difficult to attract; and (e) deploying independent evaluation teams to scrutinize how rating systems are applied in energy transition projects.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Finance, Conflict, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Peace
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

314. How to Spend It: New EU Funding for African Peace and Security

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: New financial structures will soon allow the EU to fund African military operations – including the supply of lethal weaponry – directly, instead of through the African Union. To avoid aggravating conflicts, Brussels should undertake robust risk assessments, constantly monitor its assistance, insist that recipient countries subordinate military efforts to political strategies and preserve African Union oversight.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Peace, and Africa Union
Political Geography:: Africa and Europe

315. Give Lisbon a chance: How to improve EU foreign policy

Author:: Fraser Cameron
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: After almost three decades of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a decade since the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), it is high time to assess whether EU foreign policy has indeed become “more visible, more coherent and more effective”, as stated in the Lisbon Treaty. Despite most media and experts having a rather disdainful view, there have been some successes. And the increasingly bleak geopolitical situation has a led to growing recognition in EU member states that they must try and work together if Europe is to become an international actor, defend multilateralism and maximise its influence on the world stage. But that understanding has not always been on display in recent years. Clearly, there remain significant challenges in coordinating the foreign policies of 27 member states, each with their own interests, traditions and capabilities. Fraser Cameron (EPC Senior Adviser), therefore, argues that the EU should have more modest ambitions. Instead of harbouring grand ideas, it could take small yet concrete steps in the direction of a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy. In this Policy Brief, he puts forward ten practical ideas.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe

316. Military cooperation between Serbia and the USA: dynamically under the public radar

Author:: Marija Ignjatijevic
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Military cooperation between Serbia and the United States is the topic of the latest analysis by BCBP researcher Maria Ignjatijevic. Serbia and the United States have had intensive cooperation in the field of security and defense for years, members of the armed forces have participated in over 70 military exercises in the last ten years, and the United States is one of the largest donors to the Serbian defense system. However, if we follow only media reports in Serbia, the intensity of this cooperation will not be so obvious. Defense cooperation with Russia gets far more space in the media than activities with the US and NATO members. Thus, for example, the military exercise “Slavic Shield” completely occupied the public’s attention before and after its organisation in October 2019. Although undeniably a significant activity between the two armed forces, to which Russia brought its S-400 and Pantsir systems, it gained a disproportionately large space in the media compared to other exercises that took place that year with other partner countries. Apart from the image being sent to the public through media and various foreign policy moves, a very dynamic and practical defense cooperation with all partners takes place behind the scenes. The United States is one of Serbia’s important partners in the field of defense, and cooperation with the US Department of Defense has been achieved in various fields. Every year, Serbia and the US conduct about 100 different bilateral activities. In the eyes of the Serbian public, perception of relations with the United States, and especially perception of military cooperation, is burdened by the NATO intervention in 1999. In order to avoid losing political points at home and endangering relations with Russia, the political elite in Serbia avoids talking about cooperation with the United States and other NATO members, and the pro-regime media report accordingly. Regardless of the fact that military cooperation is often used as a foreign or domestic policy tool, it is important to discuss the practical aspects of this cooperation, benefits for Serbia and the US, their defense systems, but also the citizens. At the online discussion “Serbia and the USA: Together we are safer”, specific examples of military cooperation between Serbia and the US and practical benefits for our defense system and its members from this cooperation were discussed. Defense cooperation between Serbia and the United States takes place on several levels, through joint exercises, cooperation with the Ohio National Guard, a student exchange program, as well as donations.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Serbia, North America, and United States of America

317. Don’t Talk to Me about Democracy while I’m Guarding Kosovo – analysis of narratives used to capture the state

Author:: Maja Bjelos and Bojan Elek
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Based on an analysis of top officials’ speeches, this text will show how officially promoted narratives about Kosovo serve to capture the state. This analysis has shown the mechanism by which the Serbian authorities, by controlling and strategically using narratives on resolving the Kosovo dispute, manage to increase their own discretionary powers while simultaneously abolishing control mechanisms. In other words, under the pretext of resolving the Kosovo issue, the separation of powers and democratic decision-making are being abolished, leading to an even greater level of state capture. The analysis is divided into five thematic units. The first chapter shows how the executive power instrumentalises Kosovo and, using the media, creates a false impression in the public that, when it comes to Serbia’s membership in the European Union, Kosovo is more important than the rule of law, thus putting a false premise before the citizens: that their choices are either Kosovo or a future governed by the rule of law. The second part of the analysis shows how the government in Belgrade traded stability for democracy and ensured the tacit consent of the West in preserving political stability in Serbia for the purpose of reaching a final agreement with Pristina. The third and fourth parts point to the absence of real social dialogue on Kosovo, and reveal how the President of Serbia and a narrow circle of his associates strive to increase their discretionary power to decide on Kosovo beyond the Constitution and democratic institutions, all under the pretext of protecting national interests. Finally, in the last part, the authors will provide additional evidence for understanding why citizens of Serbia cannot come to terms with the loss of state control over Kosovo, that is, why the opinion of the majority of Serbian citizens – that Kosovo should not be recognised – is still relevant.
Topic:: Security, Media, Leadership, State Building, and State Capture
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

318. The Crime-Politics Nexus Entrapping The Balkans

Author:: Bojan Elek and Giorgio Fruscione
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: We are presenting you the Dossier on organized crime in the Balkans, produced in cooperation between the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. In some of the countries of the Western Balkans, criminal groups and political elites have grown increasingly interdependent. In particular, Serbia’s and Montenegro’s societies have suffered the most from these links. The two countries have long been considered frontrunners in the EU integration process, whose final completion, however, is difficult to foresee. Similarly, Albania’s EU negotiating process has also been delayed for years, in part because of the country’s role in global drug trafficking schemes. The crime-politics nexus is contributing to the erosion of the rule of law in several Balkan countries, where the risk – or reality – of state capture is increasingly worrisome. In light of recent events, Serbia appears to be the most concerning case as its authoritarian drift currently seems hard to reverse. Which consequences does the situation in Serbia have on other Balkan countries? What impact does state capture have on regional stability? And what is changing for the region’s integration prospects with the EU?
Topic:: Security, Crime, Rule of Law, Organized Crime, and State Capture
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

319. Strategic autonomy in security and defense: The EU geopolitical aspiration that is not being realized/Autonomía estratégica en seguridad y defensa: un anhelo geopolítico que no se hace realidad en la Unión Europea

Author:: María José Molina and Miguel Ángel Benedicto
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: In the troubled and insecure global and regional international systems, the European Union is committed to become an operational, autonomous and credible actor in the present international relations, despite a certain internal erosion of the pillars of integration, the lack of a common strategic culture that prevents a clear identification of political and security priorities, plus the new US approaches towards the European Union, no longer its strategic priority. The US would only provide assistance to the EU when its national interests are affected. Consequently, Europe must modify its approaches to face contemporary geopolitical and strategic changes and perhaps the change of paradigm in world governance. This study tries to explain the current policies and initiatives of the Union in the field of security and defense, questioning its consistency./En el convulso e inseguro contexto global y regional, la Unión Europea apuesta por reivindicarse como un actor operativo, autónomo y creíble en las actuales relaciones internacionales, pese al cierto desgaste interno que acusan los pilares que cimentan la integración, la falta de una cultura estratégica común que impide una clara identificación de prioridades políticas y de seguridad y la nueva actitud de EE.UU. hacia el concierto europeo, que deja de ser una prioridad para sólo aportar asistencia cuando sus intereses nacionales se vean afectados. Consecuentemente, Europa debe modificar sus planteamientos para enfrentarse a las coordenadas geopolíticas y estratégicas contemporáneas, y quizás al cambio de paradigma en la gobernanza mundial. Estas consideraciones encauzan el objeto general de nuestro estudio destinado a comprender y cuestionar cuál es el perfil real y actual de la Unión en el ámbito de la seguridad y defensa regional e internacional.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, International Order, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

320. Implementation of the Law on Operational Technical Agency and the Law on Interception of Communications

Author:: Bijana Karovska Andonovska
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: The analysis reflects the current state from the viewpoint of legal solutions, but also from the viewpoint of real problems seen in practice, which come in part as the result of inconsistent and insufficiently precise legal provisions. Thus, a special emphasis was put on the provisions that do not fully serve the reform priorities and the segments that do not correspond to international documents and the practice of European courts. The analysis offers alternative solutions and concrete recommendations to overcome the evident weaknesses in some of the existing legal provisions. This is especially true for several segments underlined in the text (provisions on interception of communications without the mediation of OTA; provisions on metadata; certain aspect in the interception of communications in the interest of security and defense; security of data; as well as the provisions on oversight and control over the interception of communications). The structure of the document is comprised of an introduction, approach to the reforms, analysis of the legal framework, opportunities and challenges, and conclusions.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Communications, Law, and Reform
Political Geography:: Europe

321. Guidelines for Intelligence Oversight for Parliamentary Committees in the Assembly of the Republic of North Maced

Author:: Teodora Fuior
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: The Guidelines for Intelligence Oversight reviews the Macedonian legislative framework and oversight system, and it provides information on international principles and good practices in intelligence oversight. It is designed to inform and support parliamentary committees in fulfilling their oversight mandate, especially in conceptualizing and planning oversight activities which need to contribute to an uncontested improvement of parliamentary performance in intelligence and security oversight. This revised version of the Guidelines shall respond to the expectations and needs of the new members of the Assembly, continuing to serve as a useful and informative tool for their work.
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Governance, and Oversight
Political Geography:: Europe and North Macedonia

322. Cybersecurity in the Western Balkans: A Guide to Public-Private Partnerships

Author:: Franziska Klopfer and Irina Rizmal
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: This Guide is designed to support Western Balkan governments and non-state actors that are planning to establish cybersecurity Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) as part of their public–private cooperation. Drawing on international best practice, and referencing the region’s distinctive cultural, economic, and social context, it highlights options for establishing suitable cooperation frameworks and methods for overcoming obstacles. Chapter 1 of this Guide defines and sets out the main concepts and principles that underpin the guidance on planning, establishing, and maintaining a cybersecurity PPP. Chapter 2 provides practical, advice on how to plan, set up, and run a cybersecurity PPP in the specific context of the Western Balkans. Chapter 3 presents various types of cybersecurity PPPs and offers concrete examples from the Western Balkans and other parts of the world. A second text entitled “Legal and policy frameworks in Western Balkan economies on PPPs in cybersecurity” provides a succinct overview of the frameworks already in place in the Western Balkan economies.
Topic:: Security, Cybersecurity, Public Sector, Private Sector, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:: Europe and Balkans

323. Cyber Threats During The COVID-19 Outbreak and Activities of National CERTS in the Western Balkans

Author:: Nele Achten
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: This report outlines cyber incidents and response of national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in Western Balkan economies in Spring 2020, during the first months of COVID-19. Through surveys and feedback gained from national Western Balkan CERT teams, this report analyses specific challenges faced and provides insights on how transnational and private sector cooperation could further improve cyber incident response in the region. In a COVID-19 world, where many services have moved online at accelerated speed, there are exponentially more cyber threats to not only individuals and businesses, but also healthcare facilities, educational institutions, critical infrastructure and state organs. This report outlines how in the Western Balkan region, the largest vector of cyber threats during the early months of COVID-19 came from traditional phishing campaigns targeting and exploiting public health and safety concerns during the pandemic. Following survey conducted with Western Balkan national CERTs, the report categorizes activities and joint efforts of the CERTs during the outbreak of COVID-19 into two main categories: 1. Public awareness raising efforts and public security warnings; 2. Extended trainings and educational activities. The report concludes by emphasizing the need and interest for more regional and international cybersecurity co-operation in the Western Balkan region, which was confirmed by several national CERTs during a regional meeting held in preparation for the drafting of this report.
Topic:: Security, Cybersecurity, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Balkans

324. Cybersecurity Policy Dev elopement and Capacity Building - Increasing Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans

Author:: Drazen Maravic
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: Increased cooperation between Western Balkan economies in the face of continuously increasing cyberattacks, cybercrime and hybrid threats present a key goal of numerous recent European declarations and initiatives. The Declaration of the 2020 Zagreb Summit between the European Union and Western Balkan leaders notes that so-called hybrid activities originating from third-state actors, including disinformation around COVID-19, have become increasingly prevalent in the Western Balkans and calls for increased cooperation to address such threats. Additionally, The Digital and Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, the Regional Cooperation Council, the Regional School of Public Administration and other regional initiatives provide a general framework for enhanced cooperation. In addressing these important issues, this paper identifies the ways in which closer regional collaboration is beneficial for building resilience, enhancing regional cybersecurity and enhancing strategic communication, collaboration and partnerships. The cybersecurity workforce shortage, skills gap and slow progress in public administration reforms are significant concerns for economic development and national security in the region, especially given the rapid digitization of global and regional economies.
Topic:: Security, Development, Regional Cooperation, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Europe and Balkans

325. Cybersecurity Capacity Building and Donor Coordination in the Western Balkans

Author:: Fabio Barbero and Nils Berglund
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: As the interwoven threats and opportunities of cybersecurity and digital development grow more complex, and geopolitical tensions rise, both donors and recipients should look towards a more holistic understanding of capacity building in the Western Balkans, while embracing an approach which enables meaningful international engagement on the peace and security of cyberspace. Continued interest and investment in cybersecurity capacity building in the region clearly indicates that the Western Balkans remain strategically important for a number of international actors. Systematic coordination-by-design methodologies and best practices among donors that utilise whole-of-society and multi-stakeholder approaches can improve the legitimacy, ownership and sustainability of outcomes in the context of persistent challenges to human capacity, political will, and resource scarcity. Furthermore, to better define the roles of different capacity building actors, help identify opportunities for strategic partnerships, and clarify donor-recipient relationships, donors should seek to strengthen the links between policy objectives and strategies for capacity building interventions. This discussion paper explores how cyber capacity building actors and initiatives in the Western Balkans could be better coordinated, while considering the barriers to reaching cyber maturity in the region. Firstly, the paper offers a brief overview of projects, donors, and implementing organisations active in the Western Balkans, based on desk research and a series of interviews with relevant stakeholders. Secondly, the paper explores best practices on coordination through the framework implemented by Operational Guidance for the EU’s International Cooperation on Cyber Capacity Building. Based on the above findings, practical insights and recommendations are proposed, with an eye towards enhancing future cybersecurity capacity building investment
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Donors
Political Geography:: Europe and Balkans

326. Armenia Cybersecurity Governance Assessment

Author:: Natalia Spinu
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: This report is a two-factor analysis of cybersecurity, including the legislative framework and key national actors in cybersecurity. The first part of the report presents the main cybersecurity threats in the Republic of Armenia, and the needs arising from national security objectives. It describes the normative and legislative framework of Armenia, which covers the main aspects of information security ensuring a level of national security of the population and mentions the main objectives of the national cybersecurity strategy. This report also identifies the issues and challenges in the Armenian cybersecurity strategy and describes the main actors within the state responsible for the national action plan for cybersecurity. The last part reflects conclusions extracted following the study and elaboration of this report.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Governance, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Europe and Armenia

327. Azerbaijan Cybersecurity Governance Assessment

Author:: Natalia Spinu
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: This report is a two-factor analysis of cybersecurity, including the legislative framework and key national actors in cybersecurity. The first part of the report presents the main cybersecurity threats in Azerbaijan and the needs arising from national security objectives. It describes the normative and legislative framework of Azerbaijan which covers the main aspects of information security in cybersecurity and ensures a level of national security of the population, while mentioning the main objectives of the national cybersecurity strategy. The last part reflects the conclusions that we have extracted following the study and elaboration of this report.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Governance, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Europe and Azerbaijan

328. Georgia Cybersecurity Governance Assessment

Author:: Natalia Spinu
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: This report is a two-factor analysis of cybersecurity: the legislative framework and key national actors in cybersecurity. The first part of the report presents the main cybersecurity threats in Georgia and the needs arising from national security objectives. It describes the normative and legislative framework of Georgia covering the main aspects of information security and ensuring a level of national security of the population, while mentioning the main objectives of the national cybersecurity strategy. The second part of the report analyses the national cybersecurity strategy, the main actors within the state responsible for the national action plan for the national cybersecurity strategy in Georgia. The final part reflects upon the conclusions that have been extracted following the study and elaboration of this report.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Governance, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Europe and Georgia

329. Ukraine Cybersecurity Governance Assessment

Author:: Natalia Spinu
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: This report is a two-factor analysis of cybersecurity: the legislative framework, and key national actors in cybersecurity. It describes the main cybersecurity threats in Ukraine and the needs arising from its national security objectives. The present assessment paper describes the normative and legislative framework of the Ukraine, which covers the main aspects of information security and ensures a level of national security of the population, while mentioning the main objectives of the national cybersecurity strategy as well as the main actors and stakeholders in the national cybersecurity.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Governance, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

330. The Contribution of Parliament's to Sustainable Development Goal 16 Through Security Sector Governance and Reform

Author:: Merle Jasper
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:: The United Nations’ 2030 Agenda is a global action plan for sustainable development and a key priority for the UN and its member states. Within the 2030 Agenda, SDG 16 has a pivotal role highlighting the security-development nexus and emphasizing the need for strong institutions which adhere to good governance principles. The achievement of SDG 16 requires that national security sectors are well governed, subject to civilian oversight, and respectful of human rights and the rule of law. Against this background, this case study compilation circles in on parliaments, as key oversight actors, and questions how they contribute to SDG 16 through their role in security sector governance and reform. It is based on an explorative review of four country studies on Colombian, Georgia, Nigeria and the Philippines, written by regional experts. Their observations form the foundation for a comparative analysis of common challenges and effective practices of parliaments contributing to the achievement of SDG 16.
Topic:: Security, Development, Governance, Reform, Sustainable Development Goals, Sustainability, and Parliamentarism
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Asia, Philippines, Colombia, South America, Georgia, Nigeria, and Oceania

331. Do IT Tools Help Develop Community Policing? Lessons Learned from the Implementation of The National Security Threat Map in Poland

Author:: Robert Gawlowski, Mariusz Kubiak, Juliusz Piwowarski, and Dariusz Minikiewicz
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: In many countries, the police, as a part of public administration, have witnessed many changes during the last few years. This article explores the process of the reform of the Polish police force, which took place between 2015 and 2017. Doing so examines in detail the process of implementing an IT tool – The National Security Threat Map – by paying particular attention to the mechanism of engaging external stakeholders. This study is conceptual but empirically focused. The paper posits that, despite the hierarchical nature of the police administration structure, it is possible to build an engagement of external stakeholders.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Cybersecurity, Police, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

332. Protocooperation as a Model for the Russia-UAE Partnership

Author:: Andrzej Jacuch
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 marked the Russian Federation (RF) return as a key player in the Middle East and North Africa. In this context, the relations between Russia and the UAE are of utmost importance for both entities, for the region, and globally. This article seeks to fill a gap in scholarly knowledge by answering questions about the nature of the emerging cooperation between Russia and the UAE. How Russia seeks to use the UAE to expand its sphere of influence in the MENA region and how the UAE uses this cooperation to achieve its foreign policy goals. The article applies protocooperation (an analogy to the ecological relationship) as a model for the Russia-UAE partnership. The RF is strengthening its position in the MENA regarding the UAE as a key partner for regaining its political, economic, and military influence in the MENA region. Russia-UAE’s partnership aims at achieving conjunctural geopolitical interests benefiting from diminished Western, mainly the US, presence in the region.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Gulf Nations, and UAE

333. Poland's Reason of State in the Creation of a New International Order. Foreign Policy as Poland's Reason of State in the 21st Century

Author:: Piotr Lewandowski
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article analyzes the Polish reason of state in changing international order understood as the loss of hegemon position by the United States. The author defines the reason of state as an analytical operant and relates it to the security and sovereignty of a state in the international environment. The text also outlines possibilities of development of Poland's reason of state in the region and global geopolitics.
Topic:: Security, Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

334. Military Security of Poland – From Theory to Practice

Author:: Grzegorz Sobolewski
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: National and international security remains a fascinating area of scientific research. Studies of phenomena and processes in military security suggest that we are witnessing great and intense changes. In their analyses of the modern security environment, both NATO and the EU wish to accommodate the existing conditions. Poland also has been affected by that process. The security policy should be based on the main assumption that Poland is a sovereign security entity, able to define its national interests and strategic objectives autonomously. However, the foundations of our security are assured by membership in the EU and NATO, good relations in the region, a strategic alliance with the USA, and an internal defense mechanism. The needs of the state and the society for national security arise from a dynamic rate of changes in challenges and hazards. The Author intends to combine theory with practice that is implemented in favor of the military security of Poland. First of all, the essence of military security is presented from theoretical and utilitarian viewpoints. The subsequent parts of the paper present research results related to the identification of contemporary challenges and hazards to the military security of Poland. This approach provided an opportunity to outline assumptions of policy and strategy underlying military security in current international security conditions.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

335. Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union Through the Prism of Polish Experiences and Security Interests

Author:: Teresa Usewicz and Kinga Torbicka
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: In this paper, the authors attempt to prove that the Polish position on developing the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was skeptical, despite entries in political and strategic documents which emphasized its great significance for Polish security policy. It is evidenced by Poland’s low level of involvement in EU missions and operations and other undertakings in the CSDP area. The central hypothesis adopted at the beginning of the research is that Poland has always treated security and defense within the European Union as a kind of complement to the potential and capabilities developed within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance, and the Polish involvement in CSDP has never been adequate to the provisions contained in political and strategic documents. Poland’s stance resulted, on the one hand, from the weakness of the CSDP’s political framework, which was shaped by numerous compromises among its member states, and on the other hand, from the political elite’s conviction that only NATO’s, and de facto the United States’, security guarantees are credible. In this paper, the authors analyze Poland’s previous experience resulting from polish participation in the policy in question and the evolution of Poland’s position toward its development in the context of the Republic of Poland’s security interests formulated in political and strategic documents.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

336. Fake News and the Europeanization of Cyberspace

Author:: Krzysztof Wasilewski
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: As both the European Union and its member states acknowledge that the proliferation of fake news threatens their political stability and – consequently – the general idea of European integration – they have undertaken many steps to confront that problem. Them, the article examines how EU institutions, together with the member states, have tackled the spread of disinformation within the common policy of cybersecurity. The novelty of this study is that it does so concerning the ongoing process of Europeanization of cyberspace, combining the field of information technology with European studies.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Media
Political Geography:: Europe

337. Sea Change? The Impact of the US Presidential Election on Central and South-Eastern European Security and Defence

Author:: Corina Rebegea, Wojciech Michnik, and Ivan Vejvoda
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This LSE IDEAS report assesses the likely impact of the new Biden administration on security and defence in the Black Sea, Balkan and Central European regions. The report finds grounds for optimism but also for managing expectations. President Biden's support for multilateral security approaches is likely to strengthen NATO and regional cooperation, particularly on Russia, but the region cannot expect to be the US' top priority. A return to values-based diplomacy under Biden, too, may put pressure on democratically-backsliding allies to whom his predecessor turned a blind eye.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Elections, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

338. Three Dilemmas Facing the Indo-Pacific’s Regional Order

Author:: Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: For decades, an international order delivered security and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific. The order was based on U.S. military hegemony and alliances that preserved the strategic status quo and multilateral cooperation that enabled economic development and growth. That order is now under strain. The COVID-19 pandemic is challenging the order’s founding principles, prompting some regional states to limit their interdependency in certain sensitive sectors under the guise of supply chain resilience. The pandemic was not the first challenge to test the order; serious threats began to emerge over a decade ago, with the global financial crisis of 2008, and were sharply exacerbated by China’s economic rise and strategic revisionism, which threatens U.S. military and economic primacy and the territorial status quo. The United States, India, and like-minded middle-power partners from the Indo-Pacific and Europe have struggled to respond effectively. The other contributions in this series on navigating U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific show how these states have sought to recover from the pandemic while also answering structural threats of revisionism and economic headwinds from decoupling, protectionism and changing integration patterns. Cutting across those specific policy issues are three overarching dilemmas that each state will be forced to resolve when making policy. How policymakers navigate these dilemmas will define the policy settings of their regional strategy.
Topic:: Security, Economic Growth, Multilateralism, Regional Integration, Economic Development, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Europe, South Asia, India, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

339. The Security Challenges of European Demographics and Politics Caused by the Modern Migration Crisis

Author:: Emilia Alaverdov
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The paper aims to analyze the ongoing situation in the European Union member countries caused by modern migration flows. It shows the real impact of refugees and migrants on European demography. It describes the future scenarios of global demographic and social challenges, which lead to the socio-economic and political crisis, and the failure of European political elites. The study mainly is based on the following research methods: descriptive, statistical, and analysis. The basis of the source represents the books, scientific articles, empirical and press materials, documents published on official websites in the field of migration policy. The essence of the modern migration in Europe became very acute since the current migrants are mostly followers of Islam, which in all its aspects and completeness is currently one of the most urgent topics, and draws the special attention of political circles and international clubs. Muslims in Europe are, first, immigrants whose influx into the European continent has seriously changed its demographic picture and political situation. In this regard, it should be said that the growing number of Muslims in Europe is causing certain demographic challenges that significantly affect the European socio-cultural situation, and lead to the financial and political crisis.
Topic:: Security, Demographics, Migration, Borders, and Identity
Political Geography:: Europe

340. Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America's Allies

Author:: Ivo H. Daalder, Chuck Hagel, Malcolm Rifkind, and Kevin Rudd
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: In recent decades, the threat of nuclear proliferation has emanated primarily from the Middle East and from south and northeast Asia. But the proliferation threat wasn’t always concentrated in these regions. Long before countries like North Korea and Iran topped the list of nuclear threats, leaders in Washington and elsewhere worried about a different group of countries—America’s allies in Europe and Asia. Indeed, in the early 1960s, intelligence officials projected that by the mid-1970s there likely would be 10 to 15 nuclear powers in the world within a decade, as countries like Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey would opt to join a growing nuclear club. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was designed to prevent this, and it did. But it succeeded in large part because of a concerted US effort since the 1960s to reassure its allies around the world that America’s nuclear umbrella would extend to their territory and ensure their security. Rather than developing their own national nuclear capabilities, key allies in Europe and Asia opted to rely on the US nuclear guarantee instead. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, just four countries (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) have acquired nuclear weapons. More recently, however, questions about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee have arisen again in Europe and Asia. Allies in both regions confront growing military threats from a resurgent Russia, a rising China, and a nuclear North Korea. At the same time, successive US administrations have sought to retreat from some longstanding commitments, leaving America’s allies around the world uncertain whether they can still rely on the United States for their defense and security—nuclear and otherwise. So far, the discussions about nuclear deterrence and reassurance have played out largely beyond public view. But the issue is becoming increasingly salient, given growing threats from Russia and China especially, and growing doubts about the United States. America and its allies cannot ignore this new reality. For if we are to prevent new nuclear proliferation among these allies, it is essential to acknowledge that what has long been unthinkable is becoming thinkable once more.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, East Asia, North America, and United States of America

341. Navel Gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence

Author:: Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Seventeen days prior to the accidental blockage of the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 by the super container Ever Given, a French aircraft carrier strike group had passed through the canal on its way to the Indian Ocean (1). It does not take an active imagination to think what could have transpired had these naval forces become trapped in the Suez Canal following a hostile act on their navigation systems. It is only possible to envision such scenarios because maritime security is increasingly beset by geopolitical tensions. We know that the European Union is heavily dependent on maritime trade routes for power projection and its economic prosperity — 75 % of goods entering Europe do so by sea today and Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. However, China’s naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s naval presence in the High North and the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas and Turkey’s hostile maritime acts in the Eastern Mediterranean call into question the relative freedoms Europeans have enjoyed at sea for decades. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the EU can generate a greater maritime presence in such a context. The Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations, undertaking border and coastguard functions, performing maritime safety tasks, countering piracy and conducting maritime surveillance assignments. More recently, the EU has even established new maritime initiatives such as the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, which is designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have also invested in national strategies and guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU will follow suit by the end of 2021 with its own strategy. A new EU Arctic strategy will be released in October 2021. NATO is also about to revise its own Strategic Concept, which will undoubtedly focus on maritime issues too. At the same time, by March 2022, the EU will present a Strategic Compass for security and defence, which is in part supposed to provide clearer guidance on what type of maritime actor the Union should become. This is a challenging task. There is limited political agreement on the Union’s maritime security role, and there is uncertainty about how far the EU should geographically extend itself when it has concerns closer to home. There is also the question of limited European naval capabilities. Tackling these issues, this Brief asks how the Strategic Compass can make a tangible difference to the Union’s role as a maritime security provider. Our first port of call, however, is to better understand the contemporary nature of maritime threats, risks and challenges.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe

342. Russia’s domestic politics have become part of the West’s Russia policy: The stakes are rising when Navalny returns to Russia

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Among the most signifcant events in Russia in 2020 were the Covid-19 pandemic, reactions to the protests in Belarus, and the poisoning of top opposition politician Aleksey Navalny. Te frst two were clearly events of international signifcance, but so was the medical treatment given to Navalny, frst in Omsk and then in Berlin, after he suffered from symptoms of poisoning dur- ing a flight from Tomsk in Siberia to Moscow in August. In December, a joint study by the investigative journalist groups Bellingcat and The Insider, along with CNN, Der Spiegel and Naval- ny’s FBK Foundation, showed that it was difficult to find more con- clusive evidence of the Kremlin’s involvement in the assassination attempt by a chemical weapons- related poisoning group under the FSB that had been following Na- valny for years. This kind of op- eration would hardly have been possible without the blessing of high-level intelligence. Te ques- tion of whether the FSB leader- ship was proactive in resolving the “Navalny problem” or whether the order came from the Kremlin is irrelevant. Te revealed pattern confrms the long-standing trend of the strengthened role of the se- curity services, especially the FSB, in Russian politics. It is consistent with Putin’s approach to political processes being increasingly seen as issues of national security. Navalny’s self-confidence and style in the revelation videos related to the investigation, receiving ap- proximately 45 million views in less than a month, underscore the extent to which the FSB failed. The target did not die or become paralyzed, but recovered relatively quickly and bounced back, playing for higher and more radical stakes than before. Navalny’s role and reputation as the Kremlin’s most prominent critic has been based on the political pressure on the Kremlin generated by expos- ing elite corruption. While the will- ingness of citizens to see Navalny as an alternative to Putin varies consid- erably – with the majority indifer- ent to politics as a whole – Navalny’s numerous revelations have created an alternative to Russia’s ofcial re- ality, the political potential of which the regime obviously fears.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regionalism, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

343. An Abrupt Awaking to the Realities of a Pandemic: Learning Lessons From The Onset of COVID-19 in the EU and Finland

Author:: Mika Aaltola, Johanna Ketola, Aada Peltonen, and Karoliina Vaakanainen
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Although their timing and nature is unexpected and disrupts normality, pandemics are not black swans, but rather an expected feature of a feverishly con- nected and globalizing world. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been several serious cases of and close calls with pandemics, including SARS in 2003, H1N1 infuenza (“swine fu”) in 2009 and Ebola in 2014. By now, we know the usual features of pandemics, how they emerge and the shape of their temporal context: rapid onset leading to a politically compelling impact followed by decreasing attention and lessening restric- tive policies resulting, in some cases, in the return of the disease. Te most serious pandemics, like the 1918 infuenza pandemic (“Spanish fu”), come in waves. Te less restrictive policies are followed by subsequent waves, partially propelled by diminishing attention and wishful policies until a cure or vaccination is found, or immunity achieved. Despite the growing awareness, pandemic diseases nevertheless often catch us of guard and bring about human misery. Te latest form of Severe Acute Res- piratory Syndrome caused by a novel coronavirus, Covid-19, which spread like wildfre around the globe in 2020, came as a surprise even though the point of origin and secrecy surrounding its emergence were similar to that of its predecessor, SARS, in 2003. In other words, pandemics continue to include “un- known” aspects, which have to do with their specifc characteristics, perhaps most notably their timing, but also other features such as infection and fatality rates, patterns of spread, and the outbreak location zone(s). Our starting point in this Working Paper is that se- rious contagious diseases are political as their cascad- ing and nonlinear efects impact people’s livelihoods and disrupt normality. Tis applies to the most recent coronavirus pandemic, as highlighted in this paper. Te key research question concerns how the European Union (EU) and its member states, illustrated through the case of Finland, became aware of the prevailing health crisis, and the kind of political ramifications that the response had, and could have had. Te focus of this paper is on the frst two and a half months of the coronavirus pandemic, from January to mid-March 2020, by which time the pandemic had replaced the prevailing agendas in the EU and in its member states and saturated the public debate, reach- ing a tipping point. Te onset entails a build-up to a clear situational policy necessity, a sentiment that drastic, exceptional actions need to be taken to con- tain or at least to slow down the pandemic outbreak, as well as a remorseful debate and fnger-pointing at actions that should have been taken sooner. Te paper studies this build-up phase while recognizing that the next phase of political reaction to a pandemic tends to include the sentiment that enough has been done or even that the actions that were taken earlier were somewhat excessive and overblown.1 Tis phase may be followed by – and is an important constituent of – yet another phase, the second wave of the pandemic. The timeframe for the Working Paper extends to mid-March 2020 when Covid-19 became the prevail- ing topic of public concern in Europe. We refer to this prevalence as the tipping point. Te term tipping point is used to identify the critical juncture, both nation- ally as well as in the EU, when sudden changes to be- haviour took place at the public and political levels. At such moments, public attention becomes heightened, single-issue focused, and rushed. Te pressure for po- litical action becomes paramount. Te mobilization of resources as well as the introduction of diferent states of emergency suddenly seem possible. Te emergent, situational requirements become the context for pol- icymaking, instead of the requirements of the then prevailing normality; namely, exceptional political acts can prevail when urgency seems to necessitate them. Te situated characteristics of a pandemic include a heightened sense of exceptionality, particularly if there is a sense that prior preparations at national, regional, and global levels were inadequate and the contingency planning insufcient. Any delays and hesitations are easily seen as weaknesses although, in normal times, they are often the keys to stable and rational political deliberation. Tis was the scenario that actualized with Covid-19, as the preparedness planning for pandem- ic security was largely perceived as defcient and the global as well as the European regional coordination in short supply.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Finland

344. EU Strategic Autonomy in the Shadow of Geopolitical Rivalry: A View from Moscow

Author:: Sergey Utkin
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU is determined to maintain the transatlantic bond, while Russia tends to interpret the EU’s strategic autonomy precisely as autonomy from the US. The Western unity effort is significantly strengthened by the poor state of the EU’s relations with Russia. Russia is ready to pay lip service to the idea of a more capable EU, but instead it sees opportunities in areas where bilateral cooperation with member states is possible. The EU-wide consensus is doomed to remain critical vis-à-vis Russia for the foreseeable future. The EU will increasingly focus on gaining autonomy from Russia, primarily in the energy field and in terms of hard security deterrence. The EU-Russia geopolitical tension, centred on the common neighbourhood, is long-term and might cause as yet unseen damage to the relationship if it is not handled carefully.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Conflict, Regionalism, Autonomy, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

345. Transatlantic relations and European strategic autonomy in the Biden era: Neglect, primacy or reform?

Author:: Ville Sinkkonen and Garret Martin
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The relief in Europe following Joe Biden’s election has been tempered by uncertainty as to how the new administration might approach transatlantic relations. This paper lays out three paths that the US could take. The benign neglect model assumes that Washington will be consumed by domestic challenges and competition with Beijing, de facto downgrading Europe as a priority. In the primacy model, the US sees its leadership as indispensable for sustaining the international order and battling authoritarianism. The US would expect Europe to follow its lead, while old reservations about European strategic autonomy would resurface. The major reform model would see a humbler US foreign policy, understanding that it cannot repair the fragile international liberal order alone. Supporting European strategic autonomy would be key in devising a new transatlantic division of labor. Domestic challenges and ingrained policy habits mean that the US will likely gravitate toward neglect or primacy in its dealings with Europe. A major reform of the transatlantic relationship, while desirable, would require significant political will and investment on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Leadership, Transatlantic Relations, Autonomy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

346. The Eastern Mediterranean conflict: From Turkey-Greece confrontation to regional power struggles

Author:: Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: For several decades, the Eastern Mediterranean confict consisted of a three-part struggle over territorial wa- ters, sovereignty and exclusionary national narratives between Turkey, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus. Its origins can be traced as far back as the Greek War of Independence in the 1830s, the Lausanne Peace Trea- ty determining the current borders of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, and the failed bicommunal federal state established in Cyprus in 1960. Regarding the Cyprus confict, the best – but ultimately lost – opportunity to resolve the issue was the 2004 Annan Plan for a bicom- munal federal state. Today, the Eastern Mediterranean confict is a multi-level and multi-actor power strug- gle that is unlikely to wane any time soon. In addition to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, it also includes actors such as France, Italy, Libya, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Tis Briefng Paper frst identifes the main actors involved, and then proceeds to analyze the key de- terminants of the confict. Te paper concludes that tension in the Eastern Mediterranean will continue in the foreseeable future. A full military confrontation is unlikely, however, as NATO can provide a necessary platform for a Greece-Turkey de-escalation. Tis is likely to prevent an actual war, but will not be enough to produce any lasting solution in the increasingly confict-ridden Eastern Mediterranean regional power struggle.
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Regionalism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Greece

347. Ukraine’s Half-Hearted Reforms: What Needs to Change in the West’s Approach?

Author:: Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Comprehensive internal reforms, along with security cooperation, are a key pillar of West-Ukraine interaction. Thus far, however, the Western effort has not sufficed to overcome the resistance of the local elites and make the reforms irreversible. High hopes raised by Volodymyr Zelensky’s election as Ukraine’s president in 2019 were short-lived. In three priority areas – anti-corruption, the judiciary and the economy – reforms have stalled. Instead, Zelensky has started to adapt the same socio-political system that the West aims to transform to his own political purposes. Western support – or even leadership – is once again becoming crucial in keeping Ukraine on the reform track. Ongoing domestic developments seriously challenge Zelensky’s administration, creating a window of opportunity for a more successful application of reform conditionality. In turn, a new US administration may be much more capable of using this emerging opportunity than its predecessor. If they are to promote reforms more efficiently, Western actors should go beyond the technocratic approach and recognize their own “ownership” of the process. Progress with reforms requires direct and high-level political engagement to enforce the implementation of agreements and to empower pro-reform forces inside the country.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Reform, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

348. President Niinistö’s two-track initiative: towards stronger Arctic dialogue and revitalization of the Helsinki Spirit?

Author:: Matti Pesu and Henri Vanhanen
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In his recent op-ed, President Sauli Niinistö reintroduced the idea of an Arctic summit. The timing of the meeting could be favourable. As the 50th anniversary of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act is approaching, Niinistö also hoped for a revitalization of the “Spirit of Helsinki”. The aim is hampered by global tensions, however.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, and Arctic

349. Strategic Autonomy and the Transformation of the EU: New Agendas for Security, Diplomacy, Trade and Technology

Author:: Niklas Helwig
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU is caught up in a debate over whether to increase its autonomy with regard to the wider world. International developments and crises of recent years have raised the question of whether Europeans should be more capable of managing the risks stemming from their exposure to global trade and possible over-reliance on allies for their security. This report analyses how the pursuit of strategic autonomy transforms EU policies in the field of security, diplomacy, trade, and technology. The report makes recommendations on how the EU can advance strategic autonomy, while striking a balance between protectionist tendencies and the need to stay open to international engagement and cooperation. Instead of focusing on the divisive question of strategic autonomy from others, member states should pay attention to more constructive approaches and concrete actions to strengthen strategic autonomy. In each of the policy fields, the right mix of protection of European assets, provision of the economic and political basis, and the projection of European interests and values abroad will be vital.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, European Union, Regionalism, Autonomy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe

350. The EU’s Strategic Approach to CSDP interventions: Building a Tenet from Praxis

Author:: Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Crisis management forms an integral part of the expanding toolbox with which the European Union (EU) reacts to external crises. This FIIA analysis aims at understanding the strategic approach of the EU to crisis management as it develops from the interplay between growing institutional infrastructure and member states’ reactions to crises and conflicts in their neighbourhood. In particular, this analysis investigates the creation of objectives for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) interventions. Drawing on a series of expert interviews, the article challenges a tradition in European studies of analysing EU strategy based on strategic documents alone. Instead, it explores the strategic approach as it has been developed, practised and interpreted by practitioners working in the CSDP framework. The research argues that the development of the EU’s approach is characterized by experimentalism and emergence, which are enabled by repetitive processes of intergovernmentalism and institutional learning in the framework. At the same time, discrepancies in the Integrated Approach and decision- making are found to limit the capabilities of the EU as a strategic actor. Finally, three trends are argued to curtail the EU approach to crisis management at present: a decreasing level of ambition, squeezing between other instruments for foreign and security policy, and a rhetorical shift from external to internal security.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe

351. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:: Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

352. Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it

Author:: Marc Franco
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In many Western chancelleries, there still is a lot of hesitation and bewilderment on how to deal with Russia. A first step in defining a coherent policy vis-a-vis Russia, is trying to understand the motivation and objectives of Russian foreign policy, as well as its weaknesses.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

353. From one master of survival to another: a tardigrade’s plea for NATO2030

Author:: Tania Latici
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: A microscopic creature whose size reaches that of a grain of rice at the utmost could teach NATO more survival lessons than one would think. The tardigrade has survived all five mass extinctions and is over 500 million years old. Like NATO, the tardigrade survived the nuclear challenge and even outer space. It is hard to find a more resilient animal from which NATO can draw inspiration for its ability to adapt to and withstand the most extreme conditions. To remain relevant and powerful in a dynamic threat landscape NATO needs to do what it has always been doing: adapt. Yet by 2030 NATO not only needs to adapt. Just like the tardigrade, it needs to hyper adapt. Four areas are key: redefining defence and deterrence; agreeing on the math; internal renewal; and rebuilding public support. Money, politics and nostalgia are not enough to keep the Alliance alive. It is time to get creative.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

354. For a New NATO-EU Bargain

Author:: Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: NATO and the European Union (EU) are both engaged in a continuous cycle of adaptation, witness in 2021 the NATO 2030 process on the NATO side, and the Strategic Compass on the EU side. These two exercises aim to look forward to how both institutions can better respond to ever-changing risks and threats. One key dimension in this debate is the optimal division of tasks between NATO and the EU, so that what they do together and in a coordinated manner is bigger than what they do separately or in a disorderly way. The issue of NATO-EU cooperation is obviously not new and has been at the heart of the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the late 1990s. This ties into at least three levels of debate that pertain to: the relationship and complementarity between the two organizations; the issue of what European states do within NATO; and the broader transatlantic bond. This said, twenty years of debates and inter- institutional cooperation have fallen short of clarifying what the two institutions must do in relation to each other. Most importantly, the NATO-EU conundrum is hampered by a series of never-met objectives and pledges, as well as by frictions on issues such as duplication, overlap, European strategic autonomy and burden-sharing. Against this background, this paper takes stock of these unmet objectives and offers a broad picture of what a division of tasks between NATO and the EU could possibly look like. The analysis is intentionally bold and puts forward a number of proposals that are undeniably contentious. It nonetheless draws on an observation of long-term and more recent trends, and aims at feeding the debate about the future of the two main European security institutions and the way they can interlock better.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

355. Expanding the Reach of the Special Forces with a Gender-Mixed Deep Development Capability (DDC): Identifying Challenges and Lessons Learned

Author:: Nina Wilen
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Driven by the need to adapt to a changing security environment, the Belgian Special Forces Group has developed a new gender- mixed capability in 2020, including female soldiers in the operational detachment of the unit for the first time. This brief examines the development and implementation of the project and identifies challenges for future similar capacities. It points to the need for clarification of tasks and employment conditions, while attracting male candidates is necessary to maintain the ‘mixed’ character of the capability. In conclusion it argues that overall, efforts to avoid gender instrumentalization have been successful and the creation of the capability is a first step in the direction to diversify the composition of the Special Forces, a step that is necessary to remain relevant in a complex security context.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Gender Issues, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

356. Breaking the Law of Opposite Effects: Europe’s Strategic Autonomy and the Revived Transatlantic Partnership

Author:: Iulian Romanyshyn
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The post-Cold War transatlantic relations have been marked by something akin to the law of opposite effects. When the relationship is vibrant, Europe’s defence cooperation stagnates. When the relationship is in trouble, Europeans pull themselves together to advance their security and defence interests. During the Clinton presidency, Europeans comfortably outsourced military crisis management in the Balkans to Washington. In contrast, a major transatlantic rift over the Iraq war during the Bush administration triggered the adoption of the European Security Strategy and a bulk of EU military operations under the banner of the European Security and Defence Policy. EU-US relations were back on an even keel during the Obama era, the time when Europeans haphazardly reduced their defence budgets and lost a great share of their military capabilities. Enter Donald Trump. During the deepest crisis of confidence among transatlantic allies in decades, Europeans re-energized their defence integration with a set of new initiatives, such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). It is therefore somewhat logical and far from unexpected that when Joe Biden emerged as the winner of the 2020 US presidential elections, there is yet again a heightened risk that Europeans would fall back into a lazy, self-defeating mindset of dependency on the US military shield. Breaking this pattern of reverse effects and avoiding European complacency is crucial for a healthy transatlantic partnership, but it requires concerted efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

357. EU and NATO Strategy: A Compass, a Concept, and a Concordat

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: A concordat is an agreement between the church authorities and the state that regulates the activities of the former on the territory of the latter. Since both European Defence and the Transatlantic Alliance are churches with their zealous high priests and devoted believers, the term seems apt enough for the EU-NATO package deal that I propose in this paper. The coincidence that in 2021-2022 the EU is drafting a Strategic Compass and NATO a new Strategic Concept should be put to use to mend the schism between them. Can a miracle be worked?
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

358. What Belgium Can Do: Proposals for the National Security Strategy

Author:: Sven Biscop and Nina Wilen
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Belgium has never had a National Security Strategy: a single strategic vision outlining how to safeguard its national interests from external threats and challenges and to prevent the exploitation of its internal vulnerabilities. Many in Belgium intuitively feel that none is needed: Are we not shielded by the EU and NATO? And what could the world expect from this small country anyway? But the fact is that the Kingdom of Belgium is not such a small player. The geopolitical heart, and the host, of the EU, it ranks 9th out of 27 in terms of population and GDP; worldwide, it is the 12th exporting country. Hence recurring tensions between Belgium’s own – often low – level of ambition as a security actor and the expectations of its allies and partners.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

359. The EU and China: Sanctions, Signals, and Interests

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Sanctions are much easier to use against your allies than against your enemies. A friend will want to stay in your good books, and is much more likely to modify his behaviour than an adversary, who will probably just harden his resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did not want things to escalate either.1 The US trade war with China, on the other hand, cost both sides dearly, without resolving anything. In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for violating the human rights of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province.2 That is fully legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU has a moral duty to speak up for human rights everywhere. But are sanctions the most effective way of doing so?
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

360. A New Start for EU-US relations?

Author:: Jim Cloos
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The election of President Biden was greeted by sighs of relief across Europe and offered the promise of a renewed relationship. The first hundred days in the office have been impressive. The tone vis-à-vis the EU has changed radically. New perspectives of cooperation are opening up, as set out in the Commission’s December communication on “EU-US: A new transatlantic agenda for global change”. For this to be fruitful two conditions need to be met. The first and most important one is linked to the capacity of the EU to deliver and to do what it takes to be a credible and strong partner. In this sense the future of the transatlantic partnership depends more on the European side than the American one. America is a super power and will remain one. And super powers only listen to other powers that are serious. But there is also a need for changes on the U.S side. The quiet assumption, so prevalent in the U.S, that it is natural for it to lead on all major issues and for the Europeans to follow will not stand up to the requirements of today. A strong partner can and will at times have different views and even different interests and should be allowed to defend them without being accused of jeopardizing the relationship.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

361. How the Strategic Compass can Incubate a European Prototype for Burden Sharing

Author:: Tania Latici
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Much ink has been spilled calling upon Europeans to do more for their defence in the context of the transatlantic relationship. “Everybody talks about the weather but nobody does anything about it”: it used to be a fitting expression for this conundrum – no more. The Strategic Compass process is an opportunity not only to decide what umbrellas to buy but when, how, and where to use them to protect against rain, hail, snow and even sunburn. There is a dissonance, however, between the political rhetoric about a complex and unpredictable security environment requiring a 360° defence and deterrence and the practice of measuring defence and deterrence. There is also a dissonance between advocates for a clear focus on NATO’s core business of territorial defence or for a more comprehensive Alliance contribution to security. This brief makes an argument firmly in favour of the latter with a focus on Europe’s contribution. It argues that the Strategic Compass process can be an incubator for a credible European prototype for burden sharing.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

362. The Strategic Compass: Entering the Fray

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Strategic Compass for the EU’s security and defence policy, to be adopted in 2022, must generate immediate action. The best way of ensuring that is to prepare new capability initiatives and, potentially, new operational engagements now, so that they can be launched simultaneously with the Strategic Compass. In that light, “the development of an initial-entry force as a pool of Member State forces that train and exercise together and are made available to the EU” (as summarised in an EEAS working paper), is one of the most promising ideas on the table. How to make it work?
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe

363. Seven Steps to European Defence, Transatlantic Equilibrium, and Global Europe

Author:: Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Panta rhei – everything flows (Heraclitus). Once again, geopolitics is in transition, and a new crossroads is being approached. While we already knew that global leadership is beyond any single country, now it appears to be beyond even any single continent – beyond an alliance of two continents even. This means that the old strategic truth, that the power that has Europe on its side has the potential to dominate the world, no longer holds. Europe no longer is the kingmaker. And that changes a lot, for the EU, the US, and the world.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

364. Readiness as a Mission: Implications for Belgian Defence

Author:: Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Readiness reflects the ability of the armed forces to accomplish their assigned tasks in time. Like many European counterparts, Belgian Defence disposes of some high readiness assets, but is lacking in readiness overall. This impacts its contribution to collective defence and its wider ability to support societal resilience. This Egmont Security Policy Brief explains the concept of readiness as a question of resource management and applies this to the ongoing defence review. Treating readiness as a meta- mission implies not only balancing the budgetary input parameters – investing in personnel, training, equipment and maintenance simultaneously – but also taking a selective approach towards operational engagement. Doing so will enable the force to regenerate as rapidly as possible, and boost Belgium’s ability to act both at home and abroad.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

365. #NATO2030: Regional Cooperation for a Stronger NATO

Author:: Justyna Gotkowska
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The countries of central and eastern Europe have often worked together politically and militarily to advance their security interests vis-a-vis NATO. They have been most successful when they have had a clear goal, such as joining the Alliance in the late 1990s and early 2000s or ensuring that NATO would adopt robust enhancements to its deterrence posture following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In the seventh of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Justyna Gotkowska of the Centre for Eastern Studies argues that regional cooperation has given way to efforts to enhance bilateral relations with NATO’s larger Allies. But recent developments in Europe’s security environment and security thinking require the central and eastern European countries to step up their cooperation and to make sure that their voice is heard in NATO and the EU.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

366. #NATO2030: NATO’s Force Structure and Posture

Author:: Martin Hurt
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The forces and capabilities that will be available for NATO operations in 2030 have, to a great extent, already been decided through the NATO Defence Planning Process. It is now up to individual Allies to deliver on their commitments. In the third of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Martin Hurt of the ICDS looks at how NATO’s force structure and posture have evolved since the end of the Cold War, and outlines the challenges of the further modernisation necessary if NATO is to keep pace with an evolving security environment.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Modernization
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

367. Advancing the Role of the OSCE in the Field of Climate Security

Author:: Niklas Bremberg and Anniek Barnhoorn
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This SIPRI Policy Brief assesses the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of climate security, in terms of its current and possible future commitments. Despite growing political momentum among most OSCE participating states about the need to address the issue of climate security, there appear to be divergent views on how to move forward on this important issue. Based on an assessment of recent OSCE activities linked to climate-related security risks and interviews with representatives from OSCE participating states, this policy brief suggests four avenues for the OSCE to advance its role in the field of climate security: (a) agree to new commitments; (b) engage in agenda setting; (c) strengthen the mandate of institutions; and (d) develop existing resources.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Development, Risk, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe

368. Strengthening EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Civilian CSDP Compact and Beyond

Author:: Timo Smit
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: The Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Compact has been the most serious attempt to date to strengthen civilian CSDP. However, progress on the commitments to increase secondments to missions and to promote a better representation of women in them has been mixed at best. Secondments have increased in absolute terms, enabled by the expansion of several missions, but the share of seconded personnel has fallen to 62 per cent overall and even lower in some missions. Women’s representation has not increased overall, although it has improved in some missions and among heads of mission. Personnel contributions by European Union member states have not increased enough to prevent a steady rise in contracted personnel in missions, including in operational positions. It is therefore increasingly unlikely that the aim to raise the share of seconded personnel to 70 per cent can be achieved by mid 2023, when the compact ends. This SIPRI Insights paper analyses these trends and recommends, among other things, alternative indicators for demonstrating progress towards the more effective staffing of civilian CSDP missions.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe

369. China–EU Connectivity in an Era of Geopolitical Competition

Author:: Ian Anthony, Jiayi Zhou, Jingdong Yuan, Fei Su, and Jinyung Kim
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: The long-standing relationship between China and the European Union (EU) is being subsumed into a broader geopolitical competition between major power centres. Alongside cooperation, elements of competition and rivalry have been sharpened by a re-evaluation of the bilateral relationship by EU actors. Areas of cooperation have included Chinese involvement in the EU’s internal connectivity projects—specifically in transport and digital networks. This report examines this cooperation and assesses its prospects. Enhancing connectivity within and around the EU to facilitate trade and commercial relations was relatively uncontroversial even if initiatives were never fully aligned. But the space for common projects has been narrowed by political divergence and new sensitivities in the EU regarding the security implications of Chinese investments. China understands that the EU’s scrutiny of its investments and restrictions on its involvement in connectivity projects are affected by EU–US relations. Despite these tensions, the report shows that constructive ways forward in this globally significant relationship are still possible, both within and beyond the connectivity domains.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, European Union, Conflict, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Peace
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

370. A Reassessment of the European Union’s Response to Climate-related Security Risks

Author:: Anniek Barnhoorn and Elise Remling
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights paper examines how climate-related security risks (CRSRs) are framed and responded to within different bodies of the European Union (EU). The paper finds that CRSRs are framed differently across the EU and that the kinds of actions proposed vary. Although this is not necessarily a problem, a key challenge is that across the EU the prescriptions for addressing CRSRs largely focus on long-term prevention in the form of climate mitigation, on the one hand, and reactive crisis responses, on the other. As a result, the substantial climate change that is already locked in and its related security risks are currently not being addressed. Similarly, this focus overlooks the varied and often complex ways in which climate change can increase risks. The paper concludes that the EU needs to broaden its understanding of and response to CRSRs if it wants to take—and inspire—more effective action to reduce such risks.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, European Union, and Risk
Political Geography:: Europe and Arctic

371. A Vanishing West in the Middle East: The Recent History of U.S.-Europe Cooperation in the Region

Author:: Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: To encourage a new multilateralism, Europe will need to gain credibility on hard security matters, the United States will need to reimagine how it deals with allies, and both will need to figure out when to let Middle East countries handle Middle East problems. Since the end of the Cold War, developments in the Middle East have frequently caused tension between the United States and Europe, from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to the Arab uprisings of 2011 and Washington’s 2018 decision to exit the Iran nuclear deal. Today, the Biden administration is reasserting its desire to reduce America’s regional footprint, even as its predecessors struggled to realize a similar goal. At the same time, the United States and Europe share an interest in a stable Middle East where governments keep energy supplies steady and contain threats posed by jihadism and mass refugee flows. In this illuminating book—copublished by The Washington Institute and I.B. Tauris—French diplomat Charles Thépaut examines thirty years of transatlantic cooperation in the region and proposes a more manageable and effective path forward. To encourage a new multilateralism, he explains, Europe will need to gain credibility on hard security matters, the United States will need to reimagine how it deals with allies, and both parties will need to figure out when to step aside and let Middle East countries handle Middle East problems. "After a decade over which the Middle East was profoundly shaken and transformed, over which U.S. foreign policy toward this region went through various revisions, and over which the transatlantic bond risked serious erosion, this book offers serious answers to questions with a bearing on the future: Is there still one ‘West,’ at least in relation to an ‘East’? What remains of the strategic interest the Middle East represents for both America and Europe? Charles Thépaut’s unique position, as a French diplomat working on the Middle East from Washington DC, gives this work irreplaceable value."
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

372. Getting NATO Ready For The Rest Of The 21st Century: Is NATO 2030 The Right Roadmap?

Author:: Jamie Shea
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Visiting Brussels in June, President Biden proclaimed that “America is back”. This also means that NATO is back, as Biden reconfirmed the United States’ solemn commitment to the defense of its European allies and Washington’s willingness to once again lead a transatlantic alliance that was much derided during the Trump years. At first sight, this is all good news for NATO; but could it turn out to be a mixed blessing for the Europeans in the longer run? This article analyses whether the NATO 2030 initiative is up to the task, and whether it provides the right answers.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

373. NATO And Collective Defense in Space: Same Mission, New Domain

Author:: Aurel Sari and Hitoshi Nasu
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The progressive militarization of outer space presents a range of policy and legal challenges for NATO due to its reliance on space assets for operational effectiveness and the increased vulnerabilities of these assets. Indeed, dependence on space-based assets and services in the conduct of military operations has become something of an Achilles heel for NATO as peer and near-peer competitors are honing their counter-space capabilities. Given the vulnerability of space-based assets and services to hostile interference, the question presents itself whether, and under what circumstances, the collective defense commitment, as set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT), arises in space. NATO’s ability and resolve to counter threats in space could be challenged due to the uncertain parameters of the right of self-defense itself when exercised in space and the geographical limits that Article 6 of the NAT imposes on the operation of Article 5 of the NAT.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

374. NATO's China Problem

Author:: Blake Herzinger
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s strategic minds are increasingly occupied with how to handle the People’s Republic of China’s rise as a maritime power in Asia, but this focus is misguided. China is already a maritime power in the North Atlantic, and its influence is rapidly growing. This influence does not represent a crisis for the Alliance but does require addition of China to the Alliance’s strategic considerations within its area of responsibility. Additionally, the Alliance must account for extraregional competition between the U.S. and the PRC which could draw in alliance commitments in the event of escalation between the two powers.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and North America

375. Ukraine Membership Revisited: The Case For NATO's Strategic Adaption

Author:: Iulia-sabina Joja
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Ukraine’s NATO membership has moved over the last decade from unlikely to mission impossible. Thirteen years after the NATO Bucharest Summit promise that Georgia and Ukraine “will join” the Alliance and Russia’s subsequent invasion of Georgia, and seven years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the political willingness of the 30 NATO member states remains insufficient to keep their 2008 promise. Russia’s violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity makes Kiev’s integration into NATO almost impossible. But the strategic rationale for Ukraine joining NATO remains as compelling as ever. Moreover, the arguments for a revised NATO strategy towards the Black Sea region are multiplying. The current Alliance’s Strategic Revision process should be the first step towards a revised NATO policy towards Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and North America

376. NATO And Its Changing Approach To Space

Author:: Victoria Samson
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: While space has been a part of NATO’s interests since the beginning of the Space Age, it is just within the past three years that we have seen an increase in NATO’s efforts to use space to meet its mission needs as an organization. This is due to an increased importance of space for national security globally and concurrent proliferation of counterspace capabilities. While NATO has started evolving its policy framework to meet these new needs, much work needs to be done to ensure that the Alliance has access to space capabilities when it needs them.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Space
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

377. There is No Easy Solution To The Western Balkans' Disinformation Challenge

Author:: Daniel Sunter
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The Western Balkan countries are currently among the most vulnerable to an intentional, Kremlin-supported campaign of disinformation within the European region. The vulnerability of the Western Balkans is exacerbated for several reasons: the countries are not completely integrated into European and EuroAtlantic structures; they harbor the legacy of ethnic and religious tensions from the conflicts of the 1990s; the region continues to experience dysfunctions within its information space; and it is plagued by the unresolved Kosovo issue. Tackling a problem of this magnitude demands a comprehensive approach by governments and media associations supported by the international community
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Disinformation, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Balkans

378. Spotlight Turkey: A Pivotal Swing State in NATO

Author:: Tuba Eldem
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Turkey’s geostrategic location at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and its dual identity as both a European and Asian state is unique in the world. The country safeguards strategic waterways and offers NATO critical staging bases and logistical support to extend its reach in the Middle East. With its dual identity, multiaxial foreign policy and hybrid political regime, Turkey also emerges as a pivotal swing state in shaping the contours of a stronger Transatlantic Alliance in the emerging new global world order marked by growing power competition between Western liberal democracies and Eastern autocratic regimes.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Asia, and North America

379. The EU and the North Korean Conundrum: Supporting Reconciliation and Denuclearization

Author:: Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: While the EU had initially engaged with North Korea through a conciliatory approach, its stance against the authoritarian state has been more critical, manifest in its policy of ‘critical engagement.’ In this commentary, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Professor of International Relations at King's College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance, claims that the EU, among key players, cannot remain idle amid the growing security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula fueled by mutual hostility. The author claims that the EU should adopt a more proactive approach in order to accommodate reconciliation between the two Koreas and address the issue of denuclearization. The author adds that the EU's role in dealing with issues on the Korean peninsula is irreplaceable, given its experience and technical expertise. Specifically, the union and European countries can support security on the Korean Peninsula by hosting track-2 dialogues or pressing Pyongyang on its human rights record.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

380. European defence: Specialisation by capability groups

Author:: Dick Zandee
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: In many professions specialisation is regarded as a virtue. In a hospital the surgeon, the anaesthetist and the nurse have specialised skills. Together they engage in teamwork to cure patients. Yet, when it comes to defence, specialisation has a negative connotation. Contrary to the hospital’s operating theatre, dependency on each other’s armed forces is regarded as a serious, if not unacceptable risk, as a country has to be able to defend itself without relying on capabilities to be provided by other states. In reality, however, interdependence is a fact: European countries have relied on the nuclear deterrent of the United States since the 1950s and with regard to conventional forces, no single European country can provide all necessary capabilities. The question is how European interdependence can be made more effective. The answer must partly lie in specialisation. This Policy Brief addresses specialisation in security and defence from the perspective of the ‘Team Europe’ approach of distributing tasks and operating with varying coalitions of European countries in order to make the EU (and in this case also NATO) more effective. It presents a model of structuring European armed forces in specialised groups – an idea that has been proposed in a Clingendael report published earlier this year. First, the Policy Brief lays out the playing field by explaining the model of European capability groups. Next, several options for European capability groups will be proposed. It concludes with listing the implications for the Netherlands.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Specialization
Political Geography:: Europe

381. Three Scenarios for Europe’s Conflict Landscape in 2030

Author:: Florence Schimmel
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: In September 2020, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) conducted an expert workshop on the future of conflict for Europe. Participants from across the continent were invited to develop forward-looking scenarios for crises impacting European security up until 2030.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

382. Communicating in Tertiary Prevention of Islamist Extremism

Author:: Sofia Koller
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Tertiary prevention of (violent) Islamist extremism includes measures designed to encourage and support (violent) extremists in prison and in liberty in their efforts to leave their milieus, deradicalize, decriminalize, and reintegrate into society. Actors in tertiary prevention thus intervene in a multitude of contexts and work with various stakeholders. The growing understanding of the complexity of radicalization and deradicalization processes as well as practical experiences leave no doubt that multi-agency cooperation and communication is crucial to be able to reach most potential clients. However, one of the main challenges of professionals working in tertiary prevention is to identify potential points of contact, set up effective frameworks for sharing information, and establish long term relationships.
Topic:: Security, Communications, Violent Extremism, and Islamism
Political Geography:: Europe

383. Towards More Effective Deradicalization: Urgent Recommendations for Addressing Violent Islamist Extremism

Author:: Sofia Koller
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Violent Islamist extremism is still one of the biggest threats to internal security as well as societal cohesion in the EU. As a crucial part of any comprehensive counterstrategy, tertiary prevention encompasses measures designed to encourage and support (violent) extremists in prison and in society to leave their milieus, deradicalize, decriminalize, and reintegrate into society.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, European Union, Islamism, and Deradicalization
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

384. Building European Resilience and Capacity to Act: Lessons for 2030

Author:: Roderick Parkes, Anna-Lena Kirch, and Serafine Dinkel
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Containing twelve scenarios for the world in 2030, this report offers insights into how the EU can maintain and build up its capacity to act in the face of the major disruptive changes that are likely to come over this decade. It is being released in the run-up to German elections in September 2021 that will serve as a kind of referendum on ten years of government-heavy crisis management.
Topic:: Security, Migration, Science and Technology, Elections, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

385. Agenda OTAN 2030 y Concepto Estratégico 2022

Author:: Carmen Romero
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: El momento crítico que atraviesa la seguridad europea tras la agresión de Rusia contra Ucrania ha alterado el entorno estratégico y obliga a la Alianza Atlántica a repensar su posición. Sunuevo concepto estratégico a aprobar en 2022 está marcado por este hecho histórico. Si bien, esta nueva estrategia está guiada a su vez por la Agenda OTAN 2030, adoptada en 2019, que establece una serie de principios como guía: unidad, defensa colectiva, resiliencia, salvaguarda de las infraestructuras y superioridad tecnológica. Así, este ensayo estratégico quiere reflexionar sobre este proceso para que la Alianza y la OTAN sean claves en la defensa del orden de seguridad internacional. Con este fin,analiza las claves de dicho entorno y cómo la organización pretende responder a esos desafíos, lo que tiene evidentes y potenciales implicaciones para España.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Spain

386. Política europea de seguridad y defensa y sus efectos en la industria de defensa

Author:: Dalia González Delgado
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: La Defensa no ha sido prioritaria paralas políticas comunitarias, aunqueen los últimos años se hatomado conciencia de la necesidad de impulsarla, con una atención especial al desarrollo industrial. En 2013 se produce un hito significativo cuando el Consejo decide debatir,de forma monográfica,el futuro de la seguridad y defensa. Hasta entonces el Consejo primaba las ópticas nacionales y la Comisión actuabahacia la industria,fundamentalmente como regulador para extenderlas reglas de mercado único alámbitode defensa.La crisis de Libia de 2011 mostróla necesidad de disponer de autonomía estratégica. La crisis se produce en un momento de caída generalizada de los presupuestos de defensa que dificultabaabordar grandes programas de forma individual por las naciones. Cobra valor la necesidad de disponer de una base industrial competitiva que respalde las operaciones autónomassin dependencias externas.Eneste marco se promulga la Estrategia Global de2016,de la que derivan la aplicación a defensa de la iniciativa PESCOy el Plan Europeo de Defensa, en el que se incluye un fondo dirigidoa incentivar la cooperación industrial.La dotación del fondo entre2021 –2026 se ha rebajado, pero se ha mantenido a pesar de las presiones por reducirlo a niveles mínimos o incluso suprimirlo.Las iniciativas de los últimos años para propiciar la cooperación en defensa, con especial atención al componente industrial, están en marcha y será difícil volver atrás,aunque los europeos estén inmersos en el dilema entre proteccionismo y cooperación, y en el debate sobre el papel de la Unión en el escenario global.La crisis COVID 19 ha desviado la atenciónhacia otras políticas, pero no ha relegado la actuación en defensa. El futuro presenta un escenario de mayor inestabilidad, y mayor competencia entre grandes potencias en el que Europa no presenta una voz única. En esas condiciones se enfrenta a la necesidad de decidir entre disponer de capacidades adecuadas a sus objetivos políticos o mantener los modelos actuales.Si el objetivo es contar con autonomía suficiente para abordar acciones independientes, el desarrollo de una política industrial de defensa resultará un elementobásico y estará condicionado por las visiones de los estados, el esfuerzo presupuestario, y lacoordinación entre oferta ydemanda.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Autonomy, Industry, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe

387. Collaboration Between Intelligence Services in the Present-Day World: Challenges and Issues

Author:: Sergey Naryshkin
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: Seeking to ensure their national interests, states have traditionally taken advantage of opportunities offered by what is known as intelli- gence diplomacy, involving official bilateral or multilateral collaboration between foreign intelligence services. Foreign intelligence services have accumulated considerable experi- ence in working together in various areas, and this applies not only to allied countries. this experience conclusively proves that partnership makes it possible to solve many problems – those related to intelligence and those outside the bounds of “classic” intelligence operations. the experience of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, which is cur- rently marking its 100th anniversary, is interesting and instructive. Created on December 20, 1920, the Foreign Department of the Cheka, the original predecessor of Russia’s foreign intelligence services (the Foreign Department-the First Main Directorate-the SVR), established first official contacts with several intelligence services of other countries. Fair partnership agreements at that time were signed on the initiative of other countries’ intelligence services. this clearly shows that right from the start Russia’s intelligence service had a reputation as a strong, useful and reliable partner.
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, International Cooperation, and Spy
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

388. “Securitization from Society” and “Social Acceptance”: Political Party-Based Approaches in Turkey to Syrian Refugees

Author:: M. Murat Erdoğan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The number of refugees in Turkey exceeded 4 million in a short period of time due to the civil war in Syria, and Turkey has become the country hosting the largest number of refugees from 2014 onwards. The concerns of Turkish society, which portrayed an extraordinary solidarity initially, have become apparent in terms of refugees, almost all of whom live side-by-side with Turkish society in urban areas. This paper is based on a comprehensive and representative research data about Turkish citizens’ attitudes towards Syrian refugees. This study critically analyses traditional securitisation studies and instead puts forward the concepts of the “securitization from society” and “social acceptance” to be able to analyse the views of Turkish public towards Syrian refugees .
Topic:: Security, Refugees, Refugee Crisis, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Asia, and Syria

389. The geo-economics and geopolitics of COVID-19: implications for European security

Author:: Bastain Giegerich, Fenella McGerty, and Peter Round
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The pandemic was not an unforeseen event. Foresight reports, policy simulations and national risk assessments had long included a similar challenge among the possibilities. Nevertheless, when the coronavirus pandemic came the world was not prepared and despite the existence of a myriad of international organisations, alliances and friendships, the reactions were mostly national and inward-looking. Governments started to spend vast amounts of resources on fighting the pandemic, looking for preventatives and cures, and propping up their own economies when the primary weapon in the arsenal to fight the pandemic was the so-called ‘lockdown’. Many governments will emerge from the coronavirus pandemic laden with debt and a severely depressed outlook for economic growth. It is conceivable that among the second- and third-order effects of the pandemic is an accelerated rebalancing of power away from the Euro-Atlantic community. This could threaten the ability of NATO and EU member states to shape and defend the rules-based international order. The pandemic itself may be a driver of instability and insecurity at a time when the ability to deliver stabilising measures and crisis-management capacity is weakened. Divergent recoveries could create conditions that see an accelerated rebalancing of global power and the development or disintegration of global alliances. While levels of uncertainty caused by the pandemic remain high, it is now possible to attempt a first assessment of the geo-economic and geopolitical implications of the pandemic. In geo-economic terms, it is useful to take stock of the costs of the pandemic and attempt to evaluate who wins and who loses as a result. In geopolitical terms, there are important questions relating to international order and great-power politics, as well as the ability of multinational institutions to contribute to problem solving in the age of COVID-19, especially in the face of a resurgence of nation-state power. From the perspective of security and defence policy, the pandemic further complicates an already challenging picture, straining resources while adding to a long list of relevant threat vectors and risks. Between September and December 2020, the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened six web-based discussion meetings, bringing together a group of international experts and officials to pursue three parallel strands of debate – economics, international order, and security and defence. This paper, written by IISS staff, draws on these conversations and is informed by them. It does not represent a shared assessment or a consensus view among the participants, but it hopefully serves to provide some orientation and fuel for constructive debate in a world that very much remains in flux.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Geopolitics, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe

390. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:: Julian Cooper
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

391. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

392. Emerging Challenges for European Security and Defence

Author:: Douglas Barrie and Ben Barry
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The challenges of climate change for the military and the security aspects of space are the latest critical issues explored as part of a joint programme between the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. On 23 and 24 June 2021 the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the IISS held the fourth meeting of the High-Level Study Group on the Future Defence of Europe. While earlier sessions of the study group had focused on threat perceptions, military capabilities, the implications of intensifying great-power competition, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European defence, the growing impact of climate change on defence and security was the focus of the first day’s discussion. The second day considered developments in space exploitation, and the challenges and opportunities this raises for defence and security. The following paper draws on these discussions and includes the key themes and topics that were raised.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Europe

393. Unlocking European Defence. In Search of the Long Overdue Paradigm Shift

Author:: Arnout Molenaar
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The European Union’s range of new EU security and defence initiatives are ground-breaking, but they can only deliver on their potential if member states shift the paradigm towards truly thinking, acting and working together as Europeans, based on a strategic consensus regarding the future of European defence in the changing global context. The new Strategic Compass, to be adopted by the Council in early 2022, provides a framework to develop such a shared vision. It should help to operationalise the EU’s strategic autonomy in concrete terms, in mutual reinforcement and coherence with NATO, while seizing the opportunity to strike a new transatlantic bargain with the Biden Administration. In this context, the Union should agree on concrete steps forward to become a more active security provider abroad, reinforce its resilience and protection at home, enhance its operational readiness for different scenarios, and develop new capabilities through deeper cooperation while stepping up its cooperation with partners.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

394. The AUKUS Partnership: A Wake-up Call for Europe

Author:: Gabriele Abbondanza
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Now that some dust has settled over the surprise announcement of AUKUS on 16 September, it is possible to analyse the implications of this partnership not just for its members, but for Europe as well.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Politics, European Union, Partnerships, Maritime, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

395. Thirty years of Visegrád Group

Author:: Ivan Iliev
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: In February 1991, at a meeting of the Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian presidents, the decision to create an alliance of three Central European countries was made. In 1993, the division of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics and the establishment of in 1335, attended by King of Bohemia, King of Hungary and King of Poland. Hundreds of years later, former Communist-bloc countries in Central Europe desired to overcome historical animosities between states and nations in this region, believing that joint efforts of relatively small countries would make their goals more achievable. The V4 was also established because post-Communist countries realized that they the independent Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic transformed the tripartite cooperation into a four-party alliance - V4. The name refers to a meeting, which took place near Budapest (at the castle in Visegrád), Hungary, could together boost the socio-economic transformation and join the European Union. Indeed, the V4 has accelerated cooperation and boosted the friendship among the Central European states throughout the years. Today, V4 is a regional structure of four EU and NATO member states that in general share similar economic, cultural and social values. V4 members recognize it as the alliance that strengthens the coordination mechanism to find similar positions on European policy, foreign policy, economic or cultural cooperation, and regional development. Visegrád Group, or shortly called the V4, marks 30 years of existence this year. This unique sort of cooperation has achieved some crucial goals but also failed in reaching cooperation on some EU topics. In the following lines, we will look at these achievements and failures, but will also explain where Visegrád is today and what should be done in order to make this alliance of Central European countries functioning better.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic

396. The Era of German Chancellor Angela Merkel: What Was and What Remains?

Author:: Thomas Brey
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: After the general election in Germany at the end of September, Angela Merkel will step down as Chancellor at the age of 67. She held this most important political office in Germany for almost exactly 16 years (2005-2021). She will thus equal the record of her former political mentor and Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982- 1998). In 2021, she was named “Most PowerfulForbes for the tenth time in a row. In 2015, the US magazine Time named her “Person of the Year” on its cover. Merkel has received the highest state honors from Italy to Peru, from Portugal to Israel. In 2011, she was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom - one of the two highest state decorations in the USA. The world’s honorary doctorates are legion. Merkel had a picture-perfect professional career, although by today’s standards she became politically active for the first time relatively late, at the age of 35. In the final phase of the GDR, she became involved in the opposition. As “Kohl’s girl” (“Kohls Mädchen”) she became Minister for Women’s Affairs as early as 1989, then Minister for the Environment (1994-1998), CDU General Secretary (1998-2000) and finally Party Chair (until 2018). She completed her studies in East Germany with a highly praised dissertation. When she became Chancellor in 2005, she was the first woman to hold the office and the first Chancellor from East Germany.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Hegemony, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

397. Current State of Ukraine’s Play within the Geopolitical Map of Europe

Author:: Iuliia Osmolovska
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: The beginning on November has been rich on worrysome developments in Eastern Europe and around Ukraine in particular. With reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of continued and evergrowingnumberofceasefireviolationson the frontline in Donetsk and Lugansk regions - climbing to more than 750 daily on 12th and 13th November - satellite data on suspicious build-up of Russian forces near the Ukrainian border and respective US warning its EU allies of Russia’s potential invasion in Ukraine, migrant crisis on Polish-Belarussian border leading to aggressive land and aerial border patrol checks by joint Belarus and Russia military forces - the whole security landscape of Eastern Europe becomes ever more shaky and troublesome. Spiced up with undeclared energy war in Europe and Troyan Horse of Nord Stream 2, muscle stretching in the Black Sea, still-to-be-defined political configuration and policies of the new German government, turbulent presidential run-up France, everything leads to ideal mulled waters for perfect fishing. At first glance, all the mentioned presents rather gloomy picture of unfavorable setting, in which Ukraine has to operate nowadays. Russia seemingly has a tactical upper hand it its confrontation with the West and enjoys this advantage. Yet, this could be true, if we ignore some fundamental systemic changes. They are firmly shaping irreversibility of Ukraine’s pro- Western orientation and ever further steady integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, thus leaving tiny fading prospect for potential return of Ukraine into Russian orbit of influence. Recent poll data demonstrate that 62% of Ukrainians support the country’s integration into the EU, while 58% support Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The number of Ukrainians, who see better guarantees in Ukraine’s membership in NATO has risen to 55% in 2020 (compared to 26% for neutral status and 5% for a military union with Russia and other CIS countries).
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

398. AUKUS Security Pact: Setting the Rivalry with China in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: The announcement of the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known by the acronym AUKUS, intended to enhance cooperation between the three countries in the Indo- Pacific region in defense and security, has sent shockwaves throughout the world, especially the UK for the Royal Navy of Australia. The nuclear fueled submarines will be armed by conventional weapons, the number of acquired vessels will be at least eight, and as a typically Australian request, part of the vessels will be constructed in Australia’s naval shipyards. So far, the US, the UK, Russia, China, France in China and Europe. The key element of the AUKUS pact, signed on 15th September 2021, is the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines from the US and and India are the only six countries that have commissioned nuclear-powered submarines. Furthermore, before signing the AUKUS pact, the UK was the only country in the world with which the US was sharing the nuclear propulsion technology, under the Mutual Defense Agreement signed back in 1958. The supply of Australia with British and American nuclear-powered attack submarines, as the most delicate part of the AUKUS pact, attracted by far the most of media attention and provoked China’s aggressive reaction. Even more, the three nations security pact, which is in principal intended to bring “enhanced trilateral security partnership for the 21st century”, has made Beijing particularly worried as China fears that this triple alliance is pointed directly against it. The three countries intend to step up their cooperation in the security and defense sector, and apart from cooperation in industrial production of new military equipment, AUKUS also envisages a broad cooperation in the fields where the three countries feel particularly threatened by China’s staggering growth, and they include cyber security, quantum computing and artificial intelligence.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Alliance, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: United States, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, Australia, North America, and Indo-Pacific

399. Europeanisation in Non-European Union Countries and the Foreign and Security Policies of Associated States

Author:: Erol Kalkan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:: Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:: This study aims to explore the influence of the European Union (EU) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) on non-EU countries and the foreign and security policies of associated states. It argues that the scope of EU’s transformative impact is not limited to the EU members and their economy, rule of law and democracy. Although it is at a relatively few and new, the EU has an increasing impact on non-EU countries and the security, defence and foreign policies of EU members. The findings of study reveals that the influence of the EU on non-EU members and on the security, defence and foreign policies of EU members occurs in four ways: a) adaptation to the EU/CSDP norms and values through socialisation and experimental learning, b) adaptation to the EU/CSDP requirements, norms and values as an outcome of the EU calls and conditionality, c) adaptation to the EU/CSDP requirements, norms and values to achieve diplomatic and national goal at international level and d) adaptation to the EU/CSDP requirements, norms and values as an outcome of the effect of the EU on the domestic balance of power and the ‘domestic sources’ of external policy.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe

400. Russia or the West – Which Should Jerusalem Choose?

Author:: Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: The Israeli government has not publicly expressed a position regarding the gathering of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border. Still, a renewed war between Russia and Ukraine could make it challenging to choose between its commitment to its Western allies and its important relationship with Russia.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

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