Political Geography: Europe / Publication Year: / Topic: International Trade and Finance

51. Can the Biggest Emitters Set Up a Climate Club? A Review of International Carbon Pricing Debates

Author:: Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The world’s largest emitting countries are reconsidering the role of carbon pricing instruments and increasingly looking at carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) to address leakage concerns. This renewed momentum should trigger a broader discussion on how to make trade policies compatible with the climate agenda. With the Glasgow climate conference (COP26) approaching, the concept of putting a price on carbon is generating unprecedented interest in Canada and the United States (US), China and Japan. But the European Union (EU) still stands as an exception; it is the only regional trading bloc that is determined to leverage the full potential of its emissions trading system (ETS). To date, others have lacked the political backing to deploy nation-wide carbon pricing initiatives with a design sturdy enough to drive meaningful emission reductions. Canada has made significant progress with the adoption of a national framework for carbon pricing in 2018. The country’s draft regulations foresee the introduction of a federal ETS as of 2022 and a gradual increase in carbon prices, but its ambitions risk being upset by the lack of consistent efforts in the US, its largest trading partner. Given US political divides, a federal carbon pricing scheme is unlikely to materialize in the short run. In China, the long-delayed national ETS has finally been launched. However, its scope is restricted to the power sector for now, and it is likely to only have a modest impact on coal use with its current design. Several arguments may discourage China from fully extending its ETS as planned and rather argue in favor of introducing a complementary carbon tax. Japan has also engaged an expert debate on the benefits of introducing carbon pricing at the national level, but the government is struggling to find a balance between the risk of worsening competitiveness and the need to mobilize investment in clean technologies. For the EU, the upcoming reform of the EU ETS is an opportunity to introduce a truly demanding cap reduction for the 2023-2030 period and make this flagship instrument more robust, predictable, and fair. To initiate in-depth decarbonization of its industry, the EU will need to phase out free allowances. Therefore, other measures addressing unfair competition will have to be introduced and CBAM could be part of the solution. A unilateral application is however no panacea. The EU should move cautiously and start implementing the CBAM to a small set of sectors. This also means that the challenge of leveling the playing field with non-EU producers will remain largely unresolved. There is little chance that an international alliance on carbon pricing or “climate club” can be set up within a timeframe compatible with the climate emergency. Yet, the EU’s CBAM proposal can encourage trading partners to accelerate decision-making on carbon pricing, at least to obtain partial exemption. In addition, having a concrete anti-leakage proposal on the table leads to a sense of the inevitable mismatches between the global trade and climate agendas. Large emitters are starting to acknowledge the need for a multilateral discussion on how to decarbonize industries while maintaining a level playing field. The next step should be to kickstart an open discussion in all possible multilateral fora (G20, International Energy Agency, global industry associations, etc.) and mandate the World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop guidance on a wide range of instruments (including CBAM, but also eco-design labelling and standards, differentiated tariffs based on CO2 intensity, etc.) and including a common exemption approach for Least Developed Countries. Exploring a set of workable solutions should be more attractive to trade partners than pushing for a uniform solution, but results would still take time to materialize. Hence, establishing a level playing field with imports will likely require the EU – and all countries with an aggressive decarbonization agenda for their industries – to strengthen their financial and regulatory support to the deployment of innovative low-carbon manufacturing processes. Again, this almost-unavoidable resort to State aid would strongly benefit from a multilateral discussion.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, and Canada

52. Hydrocarbon Energy Complexes Central Eurasian Keystone Triangles

Author:: Robert M. Cutler
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The editorial statement of Baku Dialogues posits a certain geographic definition of what is called the “Silk Road Region,” namely “the geographic space looking west past Anatolia to the warm seas beyond; north across the Caspian towards the Great Plain and the Great Steppe; east to the peaks of the Altai and the arid sands of the Taklamakan; and south towards the Hindu Kush and the Indus valley, looping down around in the direction of the Persian Gulf and across the Fertile Crescent.” When I served on the Executive Board of the Central Eurasian Studies Society 20 years ago, its website provided a lengthy but useful geographic definition of “Central Eurasia.” This definition included “Turkic, Mongolian, Iranian, Caucasian, Tibetan, and other peoples in a broad area that geographically extends from the Black Sea region, the Crimea, and the Caucasus in the west, through the Middle Volga region, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and on to Siberia, Mongolia, and Tibet in the east.” To clarify the term “Black Sea region,” which appears in that definition, I adopt the European Union’s characterization of that region as stretching from Romania and Bulgaria, through northern Turkey and on to Georgia, but including only a thin coastal strip some 20‑60 kilometers wide within the EU itself, including the Danube delta. From that definition, it would follow that the Silk Road Region is largely embedded in Central Eurasia. The name “Central Eurasia” was sometimes used in the 1990s as a shorthand for the 15 former Soviet republics together (Russia included), but this usage has faded away. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not assure the eventual geoeconomic consolidation of Central Eurasia, but the conditions for that consolidation have now been established. This has occurred thanks to the confluence of international financial and industrial interest in the region’s energy resources, the political will of the United States (the only remaining superpower), and the freedom and rapidity of networked information exchanges made possible by the internet.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regionalism, and Silk Road
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia

53. The Strategic Benefits of the Southern Gas Corridor

Author:: Vitaliy Baylarbayov
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: At the end of 2020, the Southern Gas Corridor became fully operational. This marked the completion of a journey that began a decade ago when the government of Azerbaijan and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) took a strategic decision to launch a major natural gas export project. The Southern Gas Corridor is one of the largest and the most expensive gas supply projects in the world built to date. In December 2013, SOCAR and its partners signed a Final Investment Decision (FID) to establish a gas pipeline corridor from Azerbaijan through Georgia, Turkey, Greece, and Albania before ending in Italy. A branch pipeline is now under construction to Bulgaria, which is expected to be completed in the second half of 2021. In July 2018, the project supplied its first gas to the Turkish market and went on to change the dynamics of that country’s gas market, whereby Azerbaijan is now one of its top gas suppliers. On December 31st, 2020, inaugural commercial gas supplies arrived from the Caspian into Europe, signaling the commencement of the Southern Gas Corridor’s full operations. For Azerbaijan, the Southern Gas Corridor provides a major source of revenue unlinked to the global oil market; the project also strengthens Baku’s links with its neighbors and Europe. For SOCAR—as operator of components of the project and investor in all its segments—the project’s success represents a major step in the company’s transition from a national to an international energy company. The Southern Gas Corridor provides new gas supplies to Turkey, Georgia, and Europe and is a platform for increased supplies to these markets and also can be extended to reach additional markets in Europe. With the completion of the first stage of the Southern Gas Corridor, Azerbaijan and SOCAR, together with their partners, are examining strategies for the next phase of the corridor’s development.
Topic:: Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, and Gas
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

54. Development or Regression? Eurasia’s Investment Attractiveness

Author:: Stanislav Pritchin
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: In 2021 the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus—some call it Eurasia, other the Silk Road region—will celebrate thirty years of independence. Theoretically, this period should have provided sufficient time for each to have formed a new economic model, set and at least partially attain long‑term development goals, and developed a foreign policy model for optimal interaction with investors, including foreign ones. However, the experience of the post‑Soviet republics under consideration in this essay, which does not aspire to be comprehensive but should rather be considered a preliminary assessment, indicates that independence is neither a prerequisite for successful development nor one that centers of achieving a sustainable increase in popular welfare. Despite the fact that in 1991 standards of living and educational and economic attainment in the Soviet republics that are examined in this essay were approximately similar, after three decades of independent development the countries under consideration have been significantly stratified in terms of national wealth, types of political and social systems, and the specifics of their economic activities.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regionalism, and Silk Road
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia

55. UK Green Growth Index

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: Our UK Green Growth Index, produced on behalf of Lloyds Banking Group, assesses the degree to which each UK nation and region may be impacted by the challenges of the net zero transition, and how well placed they are to capitalise on green growth. The transition to net zero will require substantial investment and adaptation across the UK economy. This will create unique opportunities for British businesses to innovate, produce, and supply the goods and services needed to enable the transition, not only in the UK but globally. At the same time, for many parts of the economy the transition will create challenges due to the need to adapt products, processes, and skills. Our UK Green Growth Index, produced on behalf of Lloyds Banking Group, assesses the degree to which each UK nation and region may be impacted by these challenges, and how well placed they are to capitalise on green growth. Our research suggests that green growth opportunities are especially strong in Scotland, given its existing base of green economy activity and its access to a workforce with relevant skills. Similarly, Wales appears well placed to capitalise on green growth opportunities, although it may face greater disruption in the nearer term due to its reliance on high emitting industries. Northern Ireland is also relatively exposed to disruption and may need to accelerate efforts to put in place the factors needed to fully exploit green economy opportunities. Amongst English regions, the South East and South West appear to be best placed to capitalise on the green economy and are less exposed to disruption from the transition than many other parts of the UK. In contrast, Yorkshire and the Humber may face greater disruption and has further to go to develop some of the factors needed to capitalise on green growth. London is somewhat of an outlier: its status as a city-region with a service-orientated economy means it is much less exposed to the challenges than areas which rely more on industrial activity, but it also has less scope to capitalise on green economy opportunities in fields such as manufacturing and energy (although it is well positioned to develop as a centre for green finance and other professional services).
Topic:: Environment, International Trade and Finance, Economic Growth, and Green Technology
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

56. Learning from Tumultuous Times: An Analysis of Vulnerable Sectors in International Trade in the Context of the Corona Health Crisis

Author:: Oliver Reiter and Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic marks an unprecedented shock to global growth and trade and brought international dependencies into the spotlight. This triggered discussions on resilience and robustness of global value chains. In this paper we assess which products can be considered as vulnerable to trade shocks at the global level – referred to as ‘risky’ products – by constructing a ‘product riskiness indicator’ for 4700 globally traded products based on components such as market concentration, clustering tendencies, network centrality of players, or international substitutability. In a second step the bilateral imports of risky products are matched to multi-country input-output tables enabling the analysis of the importance of internationally sourced risky products by country and using industries. Higher-tech industries are more prone to supply-chain vulnerability given the large share of risky products in high-tech product categories. Third, we apply a ‘partial global extraction method’ to assess the GDP impact of reshoring. Assuming that imports of risky products are re-shored from non-EU27 to EU27 countries suggests an increase in the EU27 GDP of up to 0.5%. The non-EU27 countries lose from such re-shoring activities accordingly. This suggests that it is also in the interest of the supplier countries and industries to assure robust or at least resilient supply chains. Finally, selected policy aspects in the context of the envisaged EU Open Strategic Autonomy are debated.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, European Union, Economic Growth, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe

57. Post-Covid-19 EU-Southern Neighbourhood Trade Relations

Author:: Katarzyna Sidlo, Esmat Mostafa Kamel, Hussein Suleiman, and Guillaume Van der Loo
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) is a key trade partner, both in terms of goods and services, for the countries in its Southern Neighbourhood (SN): Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Palestine,[1] Jordan and Lebanon.[2] The economic (and otherwise) relationship between the two partners is governed by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs), which came into force from the early to mid-2000s. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has, however, affected the trade exchange between the two, just as it has an adverse impact on trade globally. As pointed out in the second chapter of this policy study, one of the sectors of great importance to both the EU and the SN is agri-foods. Despite a general drop in merchandise trade, the agri-food exports from the EU actually increased globally by 0.5% during the first 10 months of the pandemic compared to the same period the year before, up to €151.8 billion. In the case of the SN, exports of agri-foods during the first three quarters of 2020 (year-on-year) grew particularly strongly in the case of Morocco (27.2%) and Algeria (20.3%) and decreased most visibly in the case of Lebanon (-37.9%). As for exports from the EU to the SN, during the same period a particularly impressive growth was witnessed in the case of Tunisia (40.3%) but the value of agri-food imports of Morocco also went up (8.4%). Trade in services, as analysed in chapter three, was hit more severely than trade in goods and declined significantly in all countries in the region during the first months of the pandemic. For Morocco, for instance, during the first three quarters of 2020 it plummeted by almost 60% (year-on-year). Because of lockdowns and travel bans, the tourism sector was among the hardest hit, even though the countries in the SN are mostly visited by travellers from nearby markets: the SN region or Europe – in 2019 the latter constituted between 29.4% (Tunisia) and 68.2% (Morocco) of all arrivals (after excluding nationals of SN countries who live abroad). As a result, tourism revenues plummeted (in Palestine, for instance, by an estimated 68%) and a significant number of people were made redundant; before the pandemic, between just under 6% (Algeria and Israel) and nearly 20% (Lebanon) of all (formally employed) workers were employed in the travel and tourism sector. The disturbances outlined above have adversely impacted food security in the region, as initial data presented in chapter four suggests. While isolating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on food security is difficult, as many other factors – such as bad harvest due to weather conditions in Morocco – were in play in 2020, the pandemic clearly affected both supply of and demand for foodstuffs. Some countries were more affected than others, as has already been mentioned above in the case of agri-food trade with the EU. At the same time, the impact on food security within the countries was also far from homogenous, with refugees (e.g., due to loss of work in informal sector) and poorer households – spending a bigger share of domestic budget on increasingly more expensive food products – more often forced to adopt emergency livelihood coping strategies, such as limitation of daily calory intake. Looking towards the post-COVID-19 trade relations, as outlined in chapter one of this study, the EU’s post-pandemic recovery plans and trade strategy review offer a new momentum for the SN countries to strengthen and modernise their framework for trade relations with the EU, to capitalise on potential re-shoring and near-shoring trends in EU and global value chains, and to promote (intra-) regional economic integration. However, the envisaged Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) currently under negotiation with Tunisia and Morocco may not be the most realistic option at this stage. A more gradual approach based on sectoral agreements could be adopted in the short- to medium-term instead, leading to a DCFTA-like model of trade integration. Moreover, in order to strengthen the (intra-)regional economic and value chain integration, modernisation of the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Convention should remain a priority. Finally, the modernisation of EU-SN trade relations should be linked and integrated into the broader (and longer-term) plans for EU-Africa trade relations, with an eye on the “continent-to-continent Free Trade Area” in the long run. Internally, governments in the SN should prioritise development of high productivity service sectors and work towards curbing their reliance on tourism and transportation. In order to achieve that goal, improving the quality of their institutions is as important as upgrading telecommunications infrastructure or adopting incentives such as tax breaks. More broadly, speeding up digital transformation would both facilitate servicification and reduce costs associated with merchandise trade.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Mediterranean

58. Europe under US Monetary Hegemony: How the COVID-19 Pandemic Will Undermine a 100-Year-Old Relationship

Author:: Brendan Brown
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This policy study is based on the newly released book, Europe’s Century of Crises under Dollar Hegemony: A Dialogue on the Global Tyranny of Unsound Money, by Brendan Brown and Philippe Simonnot, published by Palgrave Macmillan. One hundred years ago, the United States emerged from the First World War and its immediate aftermath, including the Spanish flu pandemic, as the global monetary hegemon, exercising immense power over the Old Continent. This new power quickly became the source of huge instability in Europe, culminating in the collapse of the Weimar Republic. After World War II, the Bretton Woods system set new contours for US monetary hegemony, ultimately resulting in the great economic crisis of 1973–75. This woeful history continues to the present day: Dollar hegemony has not been a force for good. It could have been different. The United States and Europe would both have gained from a US hegemony based on sound money principle. Instead, the guiding characteristic of US monetary power has been inflation, especially around election time. According to the doctrine made notorious by Treasury Secretary John Connally, who served under President Nixon, “the dollar is our currency but your problem.” The US monetary regime’s further lurch toward fundamental unsoundness during the COVID-19 pandemic is not getting the new century of US monetary hegemony off to a new start. The “known unknown” is whether forces will emerge in Europe that will again challenge US inflationary dominance, as occurred under Germany’s leadership in the 1970s. Could high inflation in the post-pandemic US economy cause US monetary hegemony over Europe to crumble?
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, History, Monetary Policy, Hegemony, Transatlantic Relations, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

59. Toward a Robust Architecture for the Regulation of Data and Digital Trade

Author:: Dan Ciuriak and Maria Piashkina
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: The rapid digital transformation occurring worldwide poses significant challenges for policy makers working within a governance framework that evolved over centuries. Domestic policy space needs to be redefined for the digital age, and the interface with international trade governance recalibrated. In this paper, Dan Ciuriak and Maria Ptashkina organize the issues facing policy makers under the broad pillars of “economic value capture,” “sovereignty” in public choice and “national security,” and outline a conceptual framework with which policy makers can start to think about a coherent integration of the many reform efforts now under way, considering how policies adopted in these areas can be reconciled with commitments under a multilateral framework adapted for the digital age.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Reform, Digital Economy, Multilateralism, and Digitization
Political Geography:: United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America

60. The Importance of the Western Balkans in China’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China’s cooperation with the Western Balkans through the “17+1” format and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), among others, is primarily political. In the economic sphere, Chinese investments are to a large extent only declarations, and trade is marginal in comparison to cooperation with the EU or others. China’s goals are to gain political influence in future EU countries and limit their cooperation with the U.S. Competition with China in the region requires more intense EU-U.S. cooperation, made more difficult by the pandemic.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

61. Tariffs and Monetary Policy: A Toxic Mix

Author:: Michael D Bordo and Mickey D. Levy
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: The ratcheting up of tariffs and the Fed’s discretionary conduct of monetary policy are a toxic mix for economic performance. Escalating tariffs and President Trump’s erratic and unpredictable trade policy and threats are harming global economic performance, distorting monetary policy, and undermining the Fed’s credibility and independence. President Trump’s objectives to force China to open access to its markets for international trade, reduce capital controls, modify unfair treatment of intellectual property, and address cybersecurity issues and other U.S. national security issues are laudable goals with sizable benefits. However, the costs of escalating tariffs are mounting, and the tactic of relying exclusively on barriers to trade and protectionism is misguided and potentially dangerous. The economic costs to the United States so far have been relatively modest, dampening exports, industrial production, and business investment. However, the tariffs and policy uncertainties have had a significantly larger impact on China, accentuating its structural economic slowdown, and are disrupting and distorting global supply chains. This is harming other nations that have significant exposure to international trade and investment overseas, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Germany. As a result, global trade volumes and industrial production are falling. Weaker global growth is reflected in a combination of a reduction in aggregate demand and constraints on aggregate supply.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Monetary Policy, Economic Growth, Tariffs, and Industry
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, Germany, North America, and United States of America

62. Work for Others, not Yourself: Globalization, Protectionism and Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

Author:: Fredrik Erixon
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Protectionism and mercantilism are yet again at the centre of global economic policy. “America First” is the guiding ethos in a good part of US international economic policy. Beijing is taking a larger stake in China’s economy and hand out privileges to domestic firms. Europe is increasingly occupied by achieving “strategic autonomy” and to create European champions at the expense of competition. Old and disreputed economic doctrines are getting a new lease on life. Behind this new orientation in international economic policy stands the old idea that a strong economy is an economy not dependent on others. Human prosperity – our story of rags to riches – tells a very different story. Prosperity is generated when people collaborate and improve our collective intelligence. Open economies are much better at creating wealth because they operate by the principle that people should work for others, not themselves. They specialize – and in the process, they get far more dependent on others. Dependency is a factor of success; economic sovereignty is a sure way of depriving people of opportunity and prosperity.
Topic:: International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Global Markets, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Europe

63. Globalization Comes to the Rescue: How Dependency Makes Us More Resilient

Author:: Florian Forsthuber and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: A new consensus is growing across the European Union – and other parts of the world too: that globalization has gone too far. The argument goes as follows: as an exchange for higher efficiency and lower prices, Europe has sacrificed its ability to take care of itself and protect its own citizens. The Covid-19 crisis has revealed how much Europe depends on the rest of the world for products like medical goods and medicines. Therefore, if Europe does not want to live through another shortage of essential supplies, the lesson of the Covid-19 crisis is that the EU has to produce these products itself. This conclusion may sound intuitive but it is fundamentally wrong. Europe is not overly dependent on the rest of the world because most trade in the EU is done within its own borders. New evidence presented in this paper shows that there were only 112 products, making just 1.2% of the value of EU total imports, for which the four largest suppliers were non-EU countries as compared to more than two thousand products for which the four largest suppliers were from EU member states. And while not every product is equally important in the face of a global pandemic, there is not a single Covid-19 related good for which all EU imports only came from non-EU countries. This paper debunks the idea that the EU is too reliant on other countries. Instead, our analysis shows that imports from the rest of the world make every EU member state more resilient by diversifying its sources of supply. Because of their geographical location and economic integration, if there was to be a shock like a pandemic, a plague, or a nuclear disaster, groups of EU countries are likely to be hit simultaneously. Having sources of supply outside the EU is therefore critical to reduce Europe’s vulnerability to these shocks. Europe’s recent experience has shown that international trade is a strength, not a weakness, and the EU was blessed to be able to tap into the manufacturing capacity of the rest of the world to buy urgently needed medical goods from abroad during the hardest months of the pandemic. Preparing for future crisis like Covid-19 is extremely complex. Nobody knows which type of shock will come after Covid-19, which economic activities will be impacted, or what kind of goods will be needed to protect our citizens. Yet, any debate about the merits of re-shoring should be based on figures and not on narratives. This paper analyzes EU imports on more than 9,000 products and concludes that Europe should not build its resilience by the mandatory re-shoring of economic activities. That is the opposite of diversification. Besides, re-shoring will increase costs and hit citizens in the poorest countries the hardest. An economy that is served by multiple firms across multiple locations is more resilient to random shocks than one where goods are produced by fewer firms in the same location. While re-shoring may bring the illusion of control, in reality, the EU will be more vulnerable and dependent on fewer and larger companies. This is why globalization and the EU’s reliance on the rest of the world is what makes the EU more resilient.
Topic:: Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Development
Political Geography:: Europe

64. Discrimination, Exclusion and Environmental Harm: Why EU Lawmakers Need to Ban Freight Transport Restrictions to Save the Single Market

Author:: Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The EU’s Mobility Package 1 legislative proposal was once intended to improve the working conditions of truck and small-van drivers in the EU. Initially, the European Commission also aimed at securing a smooth and non-discriminatory functioning of the Single Market. Some provisions of the current package may indeed have a positive impact on drivers’ working conditions, e.g. limits on working time and obligatory rest periods. However, over the past three years, the legislative procedure towards the current draft of the Mobility Package 1 was hijacked by the protectionist agenda of Western Europe’s haulage and logistics businesses. Spearheaded by the French government, some national governments and Members of the European Parliament called for tighter freight cabotage and return-to-home provisions to shield Western European transport markets against competition from other EU Member States. The proposed restrictions to cross-border trade in the European Single Market are up for a vote in the European Parliament in mid-2020. Learnings from the Covid-19 situation in the Single Market: In its response to Covid-19 border measures, the European Commission called on EU governments “to act immediately to temporarily suspend all types of road access restrictions in place in their territory (weekend bans, night bans, sectoral bans, etc.) for road freight transport and for the necessary free movement of transport workers.” These actions are step in the right direction and should continue even once the Covid-19 crisis is over, yet they are the exception not the rule in the EU. The rise of protectionist measures to Member States’ national transport markets vividly demonstrates the need to abolish freight cabotage restrictions in defence of the Single Market. For the sake of a greener, more inclusive and better functioning of the European Single Market, lawmakers need to abandon all existing restrictions on freight cabotage services in the EU27 and vote against new restrictions such as cooling-off periods and return-to-home policies. Maintaining legal restrictions on the freedom to provide transport services in the EU’s Single Market would increase tensions between economically less-developed countries in Central and Eastern Europe and more developed Western European countries – economically, mentally and politically. Discrimination on the basis of EU passport: Cabotage restrictions infringe upon the fundamental values stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, data on transport flows and employment demonstrate that cabotage regulations disproportionately discriminate against Eastern European companies and citizens. Available data shows that Polish (4,574 enterprises), Romanian (1,864), Lithuanian (519), Hungarian (398), Slovakian (347), and Dutch (309) haulage companies are disproportionately affected by current EU-imposed cabotage restrictions. By contrast, only a very small number of French freight transport companies (an estimated number of 70 enterprises) directly depend on intra-EU cabotage services. In France, only about 800 workers employed in road freight transport services are directly affected by the restrictions. The numbers are substantially higher for other, particularly Central and Eastern European, countries: 20,100 persons in Poland, 9,800 in Romania, 6,300 in Lithuania, 3,400 in the Netherlands, 2,300 in Portugal, 2,200 in Hungary, and 2,100 in Germany. Exclusion from economic opportunity: Freight cabotage restrictions increase the administrative burden for internationally operating haulage companies across the EU. Industry assessments indicate that additional limitations on international freight transport services within Europe’s Single Market would raise the prices of transporting goods in Western Europe. Negative impacts are estimated for employment, wage growth and the process of economic convergence in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to the EU’s existing freight cabotage restrictions, new limits on cross-border freight transport in the EU – such as EU law-imposed return-to-home trips and EU-mandated cooling-off periods – would deprive many Eastern European households of economic opportunities and impede the process of economic convergence and converging standards of living in the EU. Environmental harm: The return-to-home policies proposed in the latest Mobility Package 1 would require companies to send drivers back to operational centres or the driver’s place of residence. Return-to-home provisions would substantially increase the number of empty trailers on European roads. Accordingly, and adding to the adverse environmental impacts caused by existing freight cabotage restrictions, new EU-imposed return-to-home obligations would deteriorate Member States’ carbon emission footprints. The highest increases would take place in the EU’s major transit countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. While this is recognised by the European Commission, the majority of the European Parliament’s Transport Committee is still pushing for such policies to be implemented as the EU law. How to save the EU’s fundamental values and the freedoms of the Single Market – lessons from aviation: In 1993, the EU completed the EU’s internal aviation market for passenger cabotage. Guided by the European Commission, EU lawmakers should follow the same rationale for freight cabotage services to render the Single Market more single and less discriminatory. In the process towards a real, more inclusive Single Market, EU lawmakers must abstain from catering Western European companies’ vested commercial interests, which stifle economic opportunity across the EU and stand in opposition to the EU’s fundamental principles for international trade and a competitive and social market economy.
Topic:: International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Law, European Union, Global Markets, Legislation, Shipping, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: Europe

65. Learning to Love Trade Again

Author:: Frank Lavin and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: We are at the moment, the first in seventy-five years, where there is no international consensus in support of trade. Indeed, trade is unloved, unsupported, and even unwanted. There is no shortage of topics in the rhetoric of trade complaints: from the rapid rise of China to Coronavirus as a metaphor for the evils of greater connectivity. Regardless of the validity of these complaints, none of them negate the central truth of trade: countries that engage in trade move ahead, and those that do not, stagnate. Our political leaders disagree. Anti-trade positions are held by leaders across the political spectrum, from Donald Trump to Bernie Sanders. And yet, the public is increasingly warm to the idea of trade. When Gallup asks Americans, “Do you see foreign trade more as an opportunity for economic growth through increased U.S. exports or a threat to the economy from foreign imports?” a record high of 79% see trade as an opportunity, with 18% viewing it as a threat. How did the world arrive at this moment where the benefits of trade are clearly evidenced while trade has become politically toxic? We identify four main factors: (i) U.S. absenteeism from the leadership role; (ii) detachment between trade and security architecture; (iii) no alternative leadership in Europe or elsewhere; and (iv) the cumbersome WTO process. Against this background we put forward five initiatives that will be big enough to count but unobjectionable enough to be adopted. The Big Three. The U.S., EU, and Japan, should establish a consultative body on trade to forge a new approach that allows trade to move ahead in the absence of universal consensus. No harm, no foul. Each of the Big Three should commit to zero tariffs on any item not produced in each particular market. A de minimis strategy. Tariffs should be eliminated on all products where the current tariff is less than 2%. At that level tariffs are simply a nuisance fee. Mind the social costs. Expand the Nairobi Protocols to include health products and green tech. Scrapping import tariffs on medical and green goods would not only encourage additional trade but will also provide health and environmental benefits. Harmonize down. The Big Three should commit that on every tariff line each of the three will be no worse than the next worse. In other words, each of the Big Three will agree to reduce its tariff on every product where it has the highest tariff of the three. These actions will spur the WTO, not undermine it. The measures we propose can be set up on a plurilateral basis that would allow other trading powers to participate. By breaking away from the tyranny of universal consensus, these actions will encourage the trading community – including the WTO – to get back in forward motion. In some respect, convergence between the Big Three is already happening. The EU and Japan signed an FTA that lowers import tariffs between these two economies, while the U.S. and Japan agreed to negotiate a comprehensive FTA. And if China is willing to step up? China should be welcomed into this group if it supports the four initiatives, changing the Big Three to the Big Four.
Topic:: International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Global Markets, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Europe, and Global Focus

66. The Role of Trade Policy in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture

Author:: Philipp Lamprecht and Fredrik Erixon
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: There is now a long history of countries improving sustainability standards in most parts of the economy while at the same time pursuing the ambitions of rules-based international trade and economic integration with other countries. It is not surprising that countries at the vanguard of sustainability also tend to be the countries that are most open to trade. This Report looks closer at the interplay between the formulation of domestic standards and provisions in Free Trade Agreements that either acknowledge domestic standards or establish standards in a direct way. This interplay is crucial for two reasons: first to establish market access arrangements that help to promote sustainability standards, second to provide the policy basis to make standards and possible market access restrictions conducive to basic trade rules. It lays a focus particularly on the growing importance of sustainability standards in international trade agreements, or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) – in particular for the food sector. Such standards are relevant for all new high-ambition Free Trade Agreements – from the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership between eleven trans-pacific nations. The Report considers especially nine modern FTAs. The purpose of the Report is to investigate how governments with high sustainability ambitions approach the issue of trade and sustainability – in particular how they work with, on the one hand, specific provisions in FTAs and, on the other hand, the development of domestic standards and their linkage to trade. The Report also looks directly at how these standards are designed, and what lessons that can be learned for governments that want to raise sustainability ambitions. It puts the results of the analysis in the context of Norwegian ambitions to improve its sustainability standards for food placed on the Norwegian market. The analysis of how trade and sustainability have been made compatible starts with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These rules are important in their own right, but they also carry political significance. WTO-rules form the basis of the bilateral free trade agreements that countries sign with each other – and that now make up the main plank of international trade negotiations. In the language of the WTO, basic trade rules serve to protect the principles of national treatment and non-discrimination. Sustainability policies that are grounded on solid evidence and that follow international scientific norms will be compatible with WTO rules. Sustainability policies that confer advantages to domestic producers or that are arbitrary will get a harsh treatment. Consequently, the bilateral free trade deals that the European Union or the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) have concluded with other parts of the world are not just compatible with WTO rules, they rely on these rules as the foundation stone. Moreover, these rules inform governments how they should organise their sustainability policy if they also want the opportunity to take part in modern trade agreements. If countries aren’t willing to play by these rules, they should also accept that they won’t be able to enjoy the benefits of trade agreements. What member countries of the WTO have agreed in past multilateral trade accords are not a blockage of sustainability policy, but they bar countries from pursuing such policies in a way that would lead to unequal application of trade rules – between home and foreign producers, or between different foreign producers. In addition, it is of interest – also to the Norwegian policy discussion – to consider how EU policies are likely to change in the forceable future. The analysis provides a discussion of issues that are likely to remain very high on the agenda of the next European Commission. These include possible improvements in the TSD Chapters of trade agreements in particular with regard to enforcement mechanisms, the engagement of civil society, and climate action. Further policy highlights include a possible introduction of a carbon border tax, as well as the discussions related to due diligence of supply chains, and multilateralism. In terms of conclusions, the Report identifies four main observations that should inform future policy development in Norway: First, there is clearly a case to be made for aligning Norwegian trade policy to EU trade policy when it comes to provisions on trade and sustainability in Free Trade Agreements. Second, there is a substantial body of scientific evidence, risk assessments and international experience of standards in areas that are related to sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards and to environmental standards which any government that want to raise sustainability standards can draw on. Third, many countries struggle to formulate their domestic sustainability standards in a structured way. Arguably, this is a critical point for governments that are considering to introduce higher standards with consequence for market access for foreign producers. To avoid confusion or accusation of standards being a disguised trade restrictions, countries like Norway would have to structure and systematise its standards if the ambitions were to be raised and formed part of market access policy. A first step for a policy that seeks to condition import on the compliance with a stand is to make the standard clear and explicit. Fourth, there are direct and indirect relations between domestic standards and provisions in FTAs. FTAs often deal with policies that cannot be directly formulated in a domestic standard, like some aspects of labour laws. They also deal with other forms of standards that need policy convergence in order to guarantee smooth trade between the contracting parties. Generally, it cannot be said that the EU or other entities use FTAs to “regulate” or to establish the standard. That rather happens bottom-up – through domestic regulations that later get reflected in trade agreements.
Topic:: International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Partnerships, Global Markets, Free Trade, Trade, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

67. The Investment Screening Regulation and its screening ground "security or public order": how the WTO law understanding undermines the Regulation's objectives

Author:: Jens Velten
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:: The EU adopted Regulation 2019/452 (Regulation) as part of a more robust Common commercial policy to strengthen and defend its interests in a shifting global order. More concretely, the Regulation has two objectives: protecting domestic assets from harmful foreign investor interests, and equipping the EU with leverage to achieve more favourable treatment of EU investors abroad. Therefore, the Regulation provides Member States with an option to adopt foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanisms on the grounds of “security or public order”. However, the Regulation misses its objectives. The Regulation’s vague screening ground “security or public order” must be interpreted in accordance with WTO law. A detailed analysis finds that the relevant WTO notions of essential security interests and public order are rather narrow. The Regulation’s screening ground “security or public order” therefore only allows the screening of a few, high-profile cases of FDI. Such a narrow scope undermines the Regulation’s objectives.
Topic:: International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, and WTO
Political Geography:: Europe and European Union

68. The US and Russian Resource Rivalry in the Context of the Contemporary Venezuelan Crisis Perils of the Rentier Petro-State

Author:: Anurag Tripathi and Girisanker S.B.
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: Venezuela continues to face rampant inflation, poverty and diseases pilling up in light of the US sanctions against PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela,S.A), the Venezuelan state-owned Oil Company. Despite the crisis, Russia continues to play a key role in supporting the regime of Nicolas Maduro and sustaining oil production in the country. The research focuses on the role played by Russia is helping the current regime to survive against the US sanctions and the vested interest it brings along with it. The outcome of the research is to find out the role played by Russian oil industries in shaping Russia’s Foreign Policy in Venezuela and to know whether Moscow has any leverage over the energy sector in Venezuela. The paper gives prime importance to the Venezuelan economy and the Geopolitics of oil. The research aims to give a whole new outlook in the field of International Relations by exploring the nuances of oil giants in shaping relations between countries.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Oil, Natural Resources, Hegemony, Gas, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

69. The (Re)emergence of the BRICS and the Reorganization of Power in Contemporary Geopolitics

Author:: Charles Pennaforte and Ricardo Luigi
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The two first decades of the 21 st Century were marked by the recrudescence of two powerhouses, Russia and China. Given their important role on global geopolitics, these two countries took advantage of the gaps resulted from yet another crisis on the structure of global capitalism, which influenced the relative decline of the United States capacity to impose its will on the international system as they had been able to do so since the end of World War II. This article’s objective is to analyze the global geopolitical rearrangement due to a weakened United States which opened the possibility for the BRICS nations to emerge as possible sources of power. To reinforce this analysis, the world-systems perspective, (here on referred to as WSP) elaborated mainly by Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi is used, as well as a geopolitical approach to provide a link to international relations theories. Therefore, this paper is divided on to four sections. The first one interrelates the geopolitical theories and those of the WSP. The second section is guided towards understanding the origins and fundamentals of the WSP. On the third section, an approach is made towards the motivations and the effects of the rearrangement of power on the world’s geopolitics. Finally, on the last section, the roles and opportunities that have arisen from the emergence of the BRICS nations on the international system are presented.
Topic:: Development, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, and Capitalism
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, South Africa, Brazil, and South America

70. Non-tariff Trade Policy Analysis: An Ex-post Assessment of the EU-Korea Agreement

Author:: Julia Grübler and Oliver Reiter
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: Many different approaches have developed for the evaluation of non-tariff measures (NTMs) and free trade agreements (FTAs). Moving on from models using simple dummy variables, today a range of databases can capture different aspects of NTMs and FTAs. Some assess the depth of FTAs by extracting information from legal texts. Other data sources are based on surveys, on complaints by trading partners at the World Trade Organization (WTO) or notifications by companies or countries. This paper uses a gravity model to assess the value added of information on FTAs and NTMs by evaluating ex-post their ability to predict the trade effects of the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, the first ‘second-generation’ FTA of the EU, applied since 2011. Our results show that, when accounting for information on the FTA components, no extra trade effect is attributable to the EU-South Korea FTA. The message from the evolution of NTMs differs considerably according to the indicator used, but trade predictions are hardly affected. On the aggregate country level, provisions on investments exhibit a particularly strong positive effect, while regulations on intellectual property rights seem to hamper bilateral trade. Most specifications, furthermore, point to a negative effect of differences in the number of technical barriers to trade (TBT) applied and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) against which trading partners issued complaints at the WTO.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, European Union, Free Trade, WTO, and Non-Tariff Measures
Political Geography:: Europe and South Korea

71. Estimating Demand Spillovers of EU Cohesion Policy Using European Regional Input-Output Tables

Author:: Roman Römisch
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: This paper develops a simple method to consistently break down world input-output tables to regional input-output tables. They are used to estimate Cohesion Policy-induced demand spillovers in the EU, covering the years 2007-2018. Results indicate that Cohesion spillovers from less developed regions to other regions exceed 40% of their initial EU support in some cases. In addition, spillovers from the more developed regions are equivalent to 24% of their initial EU support. This shows that the existing trade and investment linkages across the EU regions are strong and not only run from less developed to more developed regions but also vice versa. Our results are good news for the net paying regions in the EU. Taking into account capacity growth effects, Cohesion Policy spillovers might well be a multiple of the pure demand spillovers estimated in this paper. Thus, for net paying regions, Cohesion Policy is not only an act of European solidarity but also a rational long-run economic growth policy.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Investment, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe

72. Greater than the Sum of its Parts?: How does Austria Profit from a Widening Network of EU Free Trade Agreements?

Author:: Julia Grübler and Oliver Reiter
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: Political debates and economic analyses often focus on single free trade agreements and their potential economic effects on participating trading partners. This study contributes to the literature by shedding light on the significance of trade agreements in the context of countries’ positions in worldwide trade agreement networks, by combining network theory with gravity trade modelling. We illustrate, both numerically and graphically, the evolution of the global web of trade agreements in general, and the network of the European Union specifically, accounting for the geographical and temporal change in the depth of agreements implemented. Gravity estimations for the period 1995-2017 distinguish the direct bilateral effects of trade agreements from indirect effects attributable to the scope of trade networks and countries’ positions therein.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Profit, and Models
Political Geography:: Europe and Austria

73. Does Asymmetric Nonlinear Approach Explain the Relationship Between Exchange Rate and Trade of Iran?

Author:: Mahdi Ghodsi, Mohammad Sharif Karimi, and Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: Until 2012, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) used its policy rate to stabilise the rial’s exchange rate and, given a persistent current-account surplus, had accumulated sizeable currency reserves. In 2012, however, international sanctions against Iran intensified and the value of the rial halved against the US dollar. Since then Iran has followed a dual interest rate policy, with both a market rate and an official rate applied by the CBI to major imports. In recent years, as sanctions have cut access to foreign reserves, the gap between the two rates has widened substantially. Given these important changes in the exchange rate regime, this paper investigates the impact of the real exchange rate on the trade balance in Iran over the period 1997-2017. For this purpose, an asymmetric model is used, as the speed of the effects of changes in the exchange rate can be asymmetric. The results of the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag model (NARDL) indicate that this is indeed the case. Results are generally consistent with the Marshall-Lerner condition: an exchange rate depreciation improves the trade balance, whereas an appreciation worsens it. However, the trade balance reacts more strongly in the short run to depreciations of the rial than to appreciations. Although the government could easily improve the trade balance in the short run through currency depreciation, policymakers should in the longer run promote non-oil exports to reduce dependency on oil and to diversify the economy.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Exchange Rate Policy, Central Bank, and Models
Political Geography:: Europe and Iran

74. Refugees’ Integration into the Austrian Labour Market: Dynamics of Occupational Mobility and Job-Skills Mismatch

Author:: Mahdi Ghodsi and Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: Eight multilateral rounds of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and international agreements under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have contributed significantly to the reduction of tariffs among WTO members. However, over the years legitimate reasons for the imposition of non-tariff measures (NTMs) within regulations have triggered their extensive use. Among these measures, technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures allow countries to impose restrictions on the import of low-quality products suspected of harming domestic consumers’ health, plant life or the environment. Such trade policy instruments may lead to higher standards in the import market, in addition to improving market efficiency through information requirements such as mandatory labelling. This paper analyses two types of regulative and standard-like NTMs – TBTs and SPS measures – and the quality improvement of traded products that is driven by their imposition, which might be a general underlying motive for the adoption of such regulations. Based on a model framework involving both the supply and the demand side of trade and using four types of measures of these NTMs, this paper assesses the impact of TBTs and SPS measures on the quality of traded products. A dummy variable measuring the existence of these NTMs and a count variable indicating their stringency are used in the analysis. Moreover, two other variables indicate flows of NTMs imposed in each year and stocks of these NTMs accumulated over years. The results indicate that TBTs and SPS measures do indeed imply a higher quality of traded products, which is also consistent with the model when NTMs enter as a specific trade cost. Stringent TBTs with more regulations imposed in each year (i.e. flows of count TBTs) have the largest impact on the quality of traded products. However, for SPS measures only the existence of a regulation (i.e. the dummy variable on flows of SPS measures) on a traded product has the strongest impact on its quality.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, WTO, Non-Tariff Measures, and GATT
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

75. Primary Dealer Systems in the European Union

Author:: Jenny Preunkert
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:: States require money to function and therefore every government has to continuously raise new funds. On the financial markets, governments cannot be sure that auctions of their debt will be sufficiently attractive to financial investors, which is why governments usually enter into cooperative agreements with selected banks. The best known and most widespread form of cooperation is the primary dealer system. Primary dealers are banks that agree to participate regularly in government debt auctions and to act as formalized market makers on government debt markets. The article analyzes European primary dealer systems and asks why banks are willing to participate in these systems. I will show that both domestic and foreign banks use their status as primary dealers to build long-term relationships with one or more European governments and to gain an advantage on the global stage. In Bourdieu’s terms, primary dealer banks use their financial capital to accumulate social and symbolic capital.
Topic:: Debt, Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Banks, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe and European Union

76. The Swiss Model vs. Swedish Model in Dealing with China

Author:: Joseph de Weck
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Do you want to know how Beijing would like Europe to act? Take a look at Switzerland. Switzerland and China have been close for decades. It was the first Western nation to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in January 1950. Bern wanted to protect investments in the new People’s Republic from nationalization and hoped Swiss industry could lend a hand in rebuilding China’s infrastructure after the civil war. Being friendly to China paid off, but only 30 years later, once reformer Deng Xiaoping took the reins of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1980, Swiss elevator producer Schindler was the first foreign company to do a joint venture in China. Today, Switzerland is the only continental European country to have a free trade agreement (FTA) with China.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, Switzerland, and Sweden

77. A Saudi-U.S.-Russia Oil Deal Is Not a Good Idea

Author:: Christof Ruhl
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: Oil markets are sending confusing signals at a time when more confusion is the last thing anyone needs. When Russia walked out on OPEC+ rather than contribute to more output cuts, Saudi Arabia turned on the crude taps. Whatever Riyadh’s intention, this “price war” was quickly made meaningless by the impact of the new coronavirus on global oil demand. The price collapse has been beyond anything anyone could have imagined. Now, storage room for crude is becoming scarce. Analysts warn darkly that plunging prices may threaten global economic stability. Equities follow the oil price news. Everyone seems to agree that prices should stop falling; and yet no one seems to argue that a very low oil price is exactly what the world’s economy needs to recover. The combination of price war and pandemic is also creating strange bedfellows. Some American shale producers are advocating that their country blocks Saudi oil imports, others want to talk to OPEC. President Donald Trump’s government has expressed an interest in cooperating on global oil supplies with Saudi Arabia and Russia; it’s nudging OPEC+ to reconvene, or an even wider group of producers to meet. Could we be witnessing the emergence of an unholy alliance of Saudi Arabia, Russia and the U.S., to “manage volatility,” and incidentally shore up the price of oil?
Topic:: Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Oil, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

78. Shifts in Global Sanctions Policy, and What They Mean for the Future

Author:: Richard Nephew
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: The last four years have borne witness to a range of new sanctions, policies, and approaches around the world. Some of these were predicted in November 2016, as Donald Trump took to sanctions far more than his predecessors, using them to tackle virtually every foreign policy problem he encountered. In fact, Trump’s use of sanctions transcended their typical usage in both form and content, as he employed tariffs and other more traditional “trade” tools to try to manage a bevy of nontrade problems. The long-term effects of this decision have yet to be felt or properly understood. It may be that Trump was ahead of the curve in seeing the fracturing of the global liberal economic order and employed the US economy for strategic advantage while it was still ahead. It may also be that Trump undermined the US position in the global economy through his policies, if not actually hastened the demise of this system of managing global economics. Time and the evolution of policy in other global power centers will eventually tell. The shifting approach to sanctions policy by a variety of other states is a manifestation of the potential effects of Trump’s policy choices in using US economic power. From the EU to Russia to China, other countries have changed long-standing policy approaches as they relate to sanctions, either to respond to or perhaps to take advantage of the new paths forged by the United States. The actions that they have taken are not “unprecedented” per se, as each of these countries or organizations has—at times—embraced policies that are consistent with some of these current actions. But, in aggregate, they describe an overall shift in how the world treats sanctions and trade policy, particularly that as practiced by the United States.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

79. The European Union and its model to regulate international trade relations

Author:: Danièle Hervieu-Léger
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The European Union is one of the main promoters of free trade agreements (FTAs). This position is not new: since the mid-2000s, and even more so in the decade now ending, the Commission, supported by the Council and the European Parliament, has constantly sought to negotiate and conclude new trade agreements. This strategy has paid off. In 2018, almost a third of trade between Europe and the rest of the world was covered by the preferential provisions of an FTA, a figure that is expected to increase significantly in 2020, following the entry into force of the agreement with Vietnam, and to rise in the coming years to more than 40% if the agreements currently being negotiated with Mercosur, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and possibly the United Kingdom come into force.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, European Union, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

80. The Impact of Disintegration Dynamics on EU Trade Policy: An Institutional Analysis

Author:: Konstantinos J. Hazakis
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex
Abstract:: Safeguarding access to international markets requires an effective EU international trade policy. Equally important, preserving an open, rules-based world trading system presupposes strong EU capability as well as consensus of EU states on the scope and targets of EU international trade policy. The paper presents a policy oriented analytical framework of EU international trade policy taking into consideration the impact of disintegration dynamics and emerging trade protectionism. Initially, the analysis sets the problem while section two offers the major tenets of the politicization of EU international trade policy. Section three presents the key arguments of the institutional analysis on the issue while section four analyses the content of an alternative policy framework for understanding disintegration - EU trade policy interaction. Section five concludes and reaches useful policy implications. It is suggested that there is a need for more Europe on international trade meaning enhanced, effective and inclusive EU trade institutional action.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, European Union, Global Markets, Rule of Law, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

81. Remolding China’s ‘Empty’ Belt and Road Initiative: An Opportunity for the EU

Author:: Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been subject to ample scrutiny since its inception in 2013. Practical results could be said to be severely lacking in contrast to the project’s ambitious plans. Chinese engagement abroad has irrefutably intensified since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, but whether this can be classified as the fruits of BRI remains unclear. China, in fact, is developing BRI on the go. That gives the EU an opportunity to engage with BRI and remold it into a more desirable form. Because China increasingly sees Europe as BRI’s “final destination”, the EU has a lot more leverage than it commonly assumes.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, European Union, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

82. Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Years of conflict have exacerbated the economic woes of Donbas, once an industrial powerhouse. Authorities in Kyiv should take steps now to aid pensioners and encourage small trade while also planning ahead for the region’s eventual reintegration with the rest of the country.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

83. A Post-Brexit Trade Policy for Development and a More Integrated Africa

Author:: Kimberly Ann Elliott
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Global Development
Abstract:: The United Kingdom will confirm its departure from the European Union on 31st January 2020. As part of its independent trade policy, the government has committed to improve access to UK mar- kets for the poorest countries. This note sets out three ways it can do so: expanding duty-free market access while avoiding piecemeal trade agreements that undermine Africa’s own trade integration ef- forts; using an alternative framework for those trade agreements it does negotiate with developing countries; and supporting a “back-to-basics” multilateral negotiation at the World Trade Organiza- tion that could help to rebuild confidence in that institution and thus protect the interests of small and vulnerable countries. After a brief review of the background and context, it sets out specific pro- posals in each of these areas.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: Africa, United Kingdom, and Europe

84. Enhancing Mediterranean Integration

Author:: Blanca Moreno-Dodson
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Trade liberalization, human capital development, and sectoral reforms can bring Mediterranean countries closer together.
Topic:: Development, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Reform, Human Capital, and Liberalization
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

85. European Parliament President, Antonio Tajani

Author:: Antonio Tajani
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Columbia University World Leaders Forum
Abstract:: This World Leaders Forum program features an address by European Parliament President Antonio Tajani, titled "United States and Europe Must Stand Together to Better Defend our Shared Values", followed by a question and answer session with the audience.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Migration, European Union, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:: New York, Europe, United States of America, and European Union

86. Italy Joins the Belt and Road Initiative: Context, Interests, and Drivers

Author:: Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In March 2019, Italy and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a broad and comprehensive, albeit not legally binding, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Italy to join the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This has triggered a significant debate—in Brussels as well as in Washington—about whether this decision signalled an Italian shift away from its historical pro-European and pro-Atlantic position, to a more nuanced position open to deepening strategic ties with China. The MoU is not definite proof of such a shift, and the Italian government has denied any strategic change. However, Italy is the first major European country, and the first Group of Seven (G7) member, to formalize its participation with the BRI project. As such, this development is particularly remarkable.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

87. Outcomes and future of the Eastern Partnership: a Ukrainian perspective

Author:: Myroslava Lendel
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Issues: Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs
Institution:: Slovak Foreign Policy Association
Abstract:: Since 2009, the main mechanism of Eurointegration in Ukraine, in addition to the bilateral diplomatic efforts and internally driven pro-European reforms, has been the Eastern Partnership (EaP), a multilateral project has that brought Kyiv both new opportunities and additional challenges and uncertainty. Although the positives outcomes have generally been welcomed, these have not detracted from the commonly held view among experts that despite good outcomes in stimulating economic reform, support for the new government and citizen institutions, and a tangible contribution to stability on the EU borders, the current strategy alone will not secure the stable development of the democracy and market economy in Eastern Europe generally, and Ukraine in particular. The commitment of these countries to general European principles has to be supported by the prospect of EU membership and that means revisiting the current format and especially the philosophy behind the Eastern Partnership. One possible scenario could be the formation of EaP+3 within the European Partnership, which would bring together Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – the countries with Association Agreements with the EU – and a commitment to EU membership.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Public Policy
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

88. Ten years of EaP: successes but also new challenges

Author:: Petra Kuchyňková
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Issues: Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs
Institution:: Slovak Foreign Policy Association
Abstract:: According to Petra Kuchyňková, assistant professor at Masaryk University in Brno, the Eastern Partnership has been relatively successful, despite the frequent political instability in EaP countries. However, the EU has not always been consistent in its neighborhood policy. This is easily understood if we look at the heterogeneity of the EaP countries and the differences in the extent of Russian influence in the region. According to Kuchyňková, the EU should not abolish the sanctions on Russia unless there is visible progress in the Minsk process, so as to avoid damaging its reputation as normative actor. Cooperation between the EU and the EEU seems unlikely due the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. EU neighborhood policy could receive new impetus as a result of it being given more attention in the new multiannual financial framework.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Public Policy, and Trade Liberalization
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus

89. Real integration – impact of the DCFTA on trade between Ukraine and the European Union

Author:: Slawomir Matuszak
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Issues: Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs
Institution:: Slovak Foreign Policy Association
Abstract:: The paper analyzes the first years of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, focusing on the economic part: the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement (DCFTA). It describes the causes and results of changes in the flow of goods, and the implications of these for Ukraine’s policy. The DCFTA was one of the key tools that allowed Ukraine to survive the difficult period of economic crisis. The aim of this article is to show to what extent, starting from 2015, Ukraine has begun to integrate with the EU market and at the same time become increasingly independent of the Russian market and more broadly the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. It can be assumed that this process will only accelerate. It is just the first stage on the pathway followed by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. To achieve full integration requires an increase in investment cooperation, currently at a fairly low level.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Free Trade
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus

90. Towards the future in the Three Seas Region

Author:: Izabela Albrycht
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: Launched in 2016, the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is designed to build cooperation and interconnectivity between 12 CEE countries through new cross-border infrastructures. The aim of the region’s political leaders is to leverage the economic growth to the extent in which it Kitarović, President of the Republic of Croatia at the Third 3SI Summit in 2018. She added: “substantial projects, such as energy supply corridors and communications infrastructure, as well as modernization of our economies through an extension of transportation links, will allow for the full integration of Central can contribute to the EU’s greater prosperity and at the same time tighten transatlantic bonds. Let us wish the 3S region yet another good year in which the 3S countries will see the materialisation of hopes”, stated Kolinda Grabar- Europe with the remainder of our continent. It will annul the artificial, but still lingering division between old and new, West and East Europe and it will most definitely contribute to a higher level of prosperity of Europe as a whole.”
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Balkans, Croatia, and Central Europe

91. Great Britain and the European Union Beyond Brexit

Author:: Ana Muhar Blanquart
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: Brexit is a term coined of the words “British exit”, referring to the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. First used in 2012 by the founder of the British Influence think-tank Peter Wilding, it became the most frequently used political term in 2016, the year when the British electorate chose to leave the European Union and thus change the political landscape of the United Kingdom and the European Union.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, England, North Ireland, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales

92. Deeper Regional Integration and Global Value Chains

Author:: Nakgyoon Choi
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Recently, international trade has become regional rather than global. This paper aims to test if deeper regional integration contributes to the organization of global value chains along the regional clusters including Asia, Europe, and America. We estimate the impacts of deep regional integrations on global value chains by region, investigating the implications of mega FTAs for global value chains by scenario. We use not only data on trade in value added but also global value chains participation indexes which reflect the global value chains better than domestic value added in goods and services exports. The estimation results reveal that a deep regional trade agreement has heterogeneous effects on global value chains depending on the regional clusters. In particular, Asia turns out to import more intermediate goods than Europe and America while RTA member countries tend to import more intermediate goods from Europe than Asia and America.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Regional Integration, Economic Policy, and Exports
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, Global Focus, and North America

93. China’s Quest for Gas Supply Security: The Global Implications

Author:: Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The major transformations that are occurring on the Chinese gas market have profound repercussions on the global gas and LNG markets, especially on trade, investment and prices. In just two years, China has become the world’s first gas importer and is on track to become the largest importer of Liquefied natural gas (LNG). China alone explained 63% of the net global LNG demand growth in 2018 and now accounts for 17% of global LNG imports. The pace and scale of China’s LNG imports have reshaped the global LNG market. Over the past two years, fears of an LNG supply glut have largely been replaced by warnings that the lack of investments in new LNG capacity would lead to a supply shortage in the mid-2020s unless more LNG production project commitments are made soon. There is now a bullish outlook for future global LNG demand which has encouraged companies to sanction additional LNG projects, based on the anticipated supply shortage. China’s gas imports can be expected to continue to grow strongly, from 120 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2018 to up to 300 bcm by 2030.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Gas
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, Global Focus, and United States of America

94. Digital Trade at the WTO: The CPTPP and CUSMA Pose Challenges to Canadian Data Regulation

Author:: Patrick Leblond
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: On the margins of the Group of Twenty leaders’ meeting in Osaka, Japan on June 28-29, 2019, Canada and 23 others signed the Osaka Declaration on the Digital Economy. This declaration launched the “Osaka Track,” which reinforces the signatories’ commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations on “trade-related aspects of electronic commerce.” In this context, unlike its main economic partners (China, the European Union and the United States), Canada has yet to decide its position. The purpose of this paper is thus to help Canada define its position in those negotiations. To do so, it offers a detailed analysis of the e-commerce/digital trade chapters found in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), the North American Free Trade Agreement’s replacement, in order to identify the potential constraints that these agreements could impose on the federal government’s ability to regulate data nationally as it seeks to establish a trusting digital environment for consumers and businesses. The analysis leads to the conclusion that Canada’s CPTPP and CUSMA commitments could ultimately negate the effectiveness of future data protection policies that the federal government might want to adopt to create trust in the data-driven economy. As a result, Canada should not follow the United States’ position in the WTO negotiations. Instead, the best thing that Canada could do is to push for a distinct international regime (i.e., separate from the WTO) to govern data and its cross-border flows.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization, European Union, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:: United States, China, Europe, Canada, Asia, and North America

95. The Global Interplay between Trade, Geopolitical and Commodity Shocks

Author:: Idris Ademuyiwa and Pierre Siklos
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: Recent events have the potential to reverse the positive macroeconomic performance of the global economy and trigger a slowdown in both global growth and international trade. In particular, the implications of ongoing trade disputes that have undermined trust in the existing multilateral cooperation system and the incentive for countries to align with ongoing global policy coordination efforts. A compelling case for a mutually beneficial resolution of these tensions can be made by emphasizing the interdependence of the Group of Twenty (G20) economies — the G20 being the premier repository of international cooperation in economic and political matters. This study also considers the state of trade globalization, with an emphasis on the performance of the G20. The emergence of geopolitical risks (GPRs), that is, events that heighten tensions between countries and therefore threaten global economic performance, is an attempt to quantify the potential economic impact of the nexus between politics and economics. In the presence of heightened political risks, negative economic effects become more likely. Nevertheless, there is no empirical evidence investigating the links between the real economy, trade, the state of the financial sector, commodity prices and GPRs. Moreover, there is no evidence on these links that has a sample of countries that make up the G20. This paper begins to fill this gap. Relying on descriptive and statistical evidence, the conclusion is drawn that GPRs represent a significant factor that threatens global economic growth and economic performance, in the G20 countries in particular. Ultimately, however, GPRs reflect other factors, including threats stemming from trade tensions and large swings in commodity prices.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Economic Growth, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South America, North America, and Global Focus

96. Emerging Countries in Global Financial Standard Setting: Explaining Relative Resilience and Its Implications

Author:: Andrew Walter
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: This special report explores the role of emerging-country members in the Basel process, a key aspect of global financial standard setting. It argues that this process has been significantly more politically resilient than adjacent aspects of global economic governance, in part because major emerging countries have perceived continuing “intra-club” benefits from participation within it. Most important among these are learning benefits for key actors within these countries, including incumbent political leaders. Although some emerging countries perceive growing influence over the international financial standard-setting process, many implicitly accept limited influence in return for learning benefits, which are valuable because of the complexity of contemporary financial systems and the sustained policy challenges it creates for advanced and emerging countries alike. The importance of learning benefits also differentiates the Basel process from other international economic organizations in which agenda control and influence over outcomes are more important for emerging-country governments. This helps to explain the relative resilience of the Basel process in the context of continued influence asymmetries and the wider fragmentation of global economic governance. The report also considers some reforms that could further improve the position of emerging countries in the process and bolster its perceived legitimacy among them.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Global Political Economy, and Emerging States
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Asia, South America, Australia, North America, and Global Focus

97. Chinese Investments in the US and EU Are Declining—for Similar Reasons

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: For years China has been one of the world’s most rapidly growing sources of outward foreign direct investment. Since peaking in 2016, however, Chinese outward investments, primarily to the United States but also the European Union, have declined dramatically, especially in response to changes in China’s domestic rules on capital outflows and in the face of rising nationalism in the United States. Concerns about growing Chinese influence in other economies, the ascendant role of an authoritarian government in Beijing, and the possible security implications of Chinese dominance in the high-technology sector have put Chinese outward investments under intense international scrutiny. This Policy Brief analyzes the most recent trends in Chinese investments in the United States and the European Union and reviews recent political and regulatory changes both have adopted toward Chinese inward investments. It also explores the emerging transatlantic difference in the regulatory response to the Chinese information technology firm Huawei. Concerned about national security and as part of the ongoing broader trade friction with China, the United States has cracked down far harder on the company than the European Union.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Foreign Direct Investment, and Investment
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. Implications of Foreign Direct Investment, Capital Formation and its Structure for Global Value Chains

Author:: Amat Adarov and Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: In the age of globalisation, international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have become integral elements of cross-country production sharing. In this paper we empirically assess the impact of FDI, as well as capital dynamics and structure, on the formation of global value chains (GVC) and trade in value added at country and sectoral levels based on a database constructed for a sample of European countries over the period 2000-2014. The analysis reveals that inward FDI is especially conducive to the formation of backward linkages while outward FDI facilitates forward GVC participation, especially in high-tech manufacturing sectors. A particularly robust influence of FDI and capital accumulation on GVC integration is identified in the textile and clothing industry. While capital accumulation in general intensifies GVC linkages for most sectors, ICT capital appears to be especially instrumental for backward integration of electrical and transportation equipment sectors.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, and Global Value Chains
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, and Europe

99. The Economic Losses from Ending the WTO Moratorium on Electronic Transmissions

Author:: Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This paper is co-authored with Badri Narayanan, PhD, Associate Professor at University of Washington, Consultant at McKinsey Global Institute, UN ESCWA, FAO, Commonwealth Secretariat and GTAP Research Centre. Since 1998, the WTO Members have applied a moratorium against tariffs on international electronic transmissions (commonly referred to as the WTO ‘E-Commerce’ Moratorium). However, some WTO Members have recently debated whether the moratorium remains in their economic interest, given the potential revenues that might be generated by imposing tariffs on electronic transmissions. The study examines the impact on India, Indonesia, South Africa and China (and the general case for developing countries) and concludes that imposing such tariffs would be fiscally counter-productive. Putting aside any legal questions, a country that opted out of the moratorium may apply tariffs affecting a wide range of cross-border business activities. Our research shows that if countries ceased to uphold the moratorium and levied import duties on digital goods and services, they would suffer negative economic consequences in the form of higher prices and reduced consumption, which would in turn slow GDP growth and shrink tax revenues. Yet our research indicates that the payoff in tariff revenues would ultimately be minimal relative to the scale of economic damage that would result from import duties on electronic transmissions.
Topic:: Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Digital Economy, Tariffs, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

100. Exchange rate pass-through to import prices: Accounting for changes in the Eurozone trade structure

Author:: Valérie Mignon and Antonia Lopez-Villavicencio
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper assesses whether the emergence of new trading partners (i.e., China and Eastern Europe) as suppliers reduces the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) in Eurozone countries which differ regarding their external exposure. Using bilateral data on import prices at the two-digit sector level, we find that (i) pass-through is complete in many cases, (ii) ERPT from China is higher than from the United States, and (iii) there is no compelling evidence of a generalized link between ERPT and the increasing integration of some emerging markets in European imports. We also show that the launch of the single currency has not provoked a sufficient change in the part of trade exposed to exchange rate fluctuations and, therefore, has not affected the pass-through. Overall, the trend of liberalization in new players' markets has not altered the competitive environment such as to induce exporters of other countries to absorb exchange rate depreciations.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Exchange Rate Policy, Eurozone, Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Eastern Europe

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