Political Geography: Europe / Publication Year: and within 10 Years

51. Gender equality in Europe: a still imperfect model in the world

Author:: Stefanie Buzmaniuk
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: In a world where women's rights are once again being challenged from all quarters, Europe remains the place where women live best. Within the Union, however, there have been some setbacks, difficulties persist, and progress is still required in the political, economic and social fields to achieve true gender equality.
Topic:: Human Rights, European Union, Women, Inequality, and Gender
Political Geography:: Europe

52. Rule of law: the uncertain gamble on conditionality

Author:: Eric Maurice
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Will 2023 be the year when Hungary and Poland join the ranks of Member States that respect the values of the European Union? Nothing is less certain because, in Budapest as in Warsaw, the reforms demanded by the Union have not yet been implemented. In early February Polish president Andrzej Duda, referred a law which was supposed to bring an end to disciplinary abuses against judges to the Constitutional Court. The Hungarian government has still not completed reforms to make public procurement more transparent and to strengthen the fight against corruption. The fact that these measures are being discussed indicates however that the balance of power has changed. 2022 was a pivotal year in the European Union's efforts to combat breaches of the rule of law in its Member States. For the first time, a range of new and old tools, specific or not, structural or conjunctural, were used to try to reverse the trend that has been developing for several years, mainly in Hungary and Poland, of undermining the independence of the judiciary, systems of checks and balances, and certain rights that are considered fundamental.
Topic:: European Union, Rule of Law, Judiciary, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Poland, Romania, and Hungary

53. A return to grace for nuclear power in European public opinion? Some elements of a rapid paradigm shift

Author:: Mathieu Brugidou and Jérémy Bouillet
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The health crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, and perhaps above all the war in Ukraine, together with increasingly outspoken Chinese and/or American interventionism, have largely contributed to "breaking European energy taboos"[1] towards more collective and coordinated approaches. This is undeniable in the field of energy: if certain mechanisms such as the general cap on gas prices have not been adopted, some measures, which were hard to imagine at European level until recently, have now been ratified, such as joint gas purchases, shared objectives for reducing energy demand, the obligation to store energy, etc.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Nuclear Power, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

54. Judging Putin

Author:: Arnaud De Nanteuil
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The publication of an international arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin on 17 March 2023 by the Second Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has caused a stir. Although the institution is far from immune from criticism (it has long been accused of being "strong with the weak and weak with the strong"), this is a major change in the Court's policy as it is the first warrant ever issued against the sitting leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council; a member who, moreover, in a chilling irony of history, played a key role in the Nuremberg Trial. In some respects, this is a gamble, given the many obstacles that stand between this historic event and a possible conviction of Vladimir Putin. But this arrest warrant is also a way to put the ICC back in the centre of the game, even though until now it seems to have been largely denied the possibility of judging the main perpetrator of the war of aggression against Ukraine and its disastrous humanitarian consequences.
Topic:: International Law, War Crimes, International Criminal Court (ICC), Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: the liberal power and its limits

Author:: Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. There was talk of a "paradigm shift" in France, of a "Zeitenwende" ("change of era") in Germany, of an "end to naivety". Across Europe, a surge of sympathy and solidarity for Ukraine and its suffering has gripped public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colours of the EU and Ukrainian flags being ostensibly displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has given massive economic aid to Ukraine (€20 billion already paid out, €20 billion planned for 2023) and has taken in 4 million Ukrainian refugees. At the June European Council, it accepted Ukraine's membership application, as well as that of Moldova, and a prospect of accession for Georgia. By adopting sanctions against Russia that were unprecedented since those taken against Serbia at the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has also demonstrated its capacity for "hard power". In the wake of its common defence policy, it delivered arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3 billion "peace facility". By almost completely depriving itself of Russian fossil fuels, it is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the enormous change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is undergoing a new existential crisis after the repeated shocks of the last few years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy that Europe would be built through crises and would be the sum of the solutions brought to these challenges. By defending its values against Russia, the European Union is asserting itself as a "liberal power". But it remains no less fragile beyond its response.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Liberalism, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

56. Digital Sovereignty: For a Schuman Data Plan

Author:: Arno Pons
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: On 9 January, the European Commission launched the first cooperation and monitoring cycle for the achievement of the European Union’s digital decade by 2030. If, in the digital field, Europe faces issues of sovereignty, it is because it has left the sector open for over twenty years to the American Tech giants, who have imposed a game whose rules that have never been understood here. Either because these rules were inaccessible to the European Union (Moore and Metcalfe laws), or because we accepted that there were no rules of the game (code is law).
Topic:: Markets, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Law, European Union, Data, European Commission, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:: Europe

57. The Élysée Treaty, FrancoGerman reconciliation and European integration: myth and reality

Author:: Hartmut Marhold
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: “During General de Gaulle's visit last week, I thought often of you, the man who, with his proposal to create the European Coal and Steel Community, laid the foundations of the friendship which would henceforth bind our two countries so closely together. I always think of our cooperation with great appreciation. I feel the need, especially in the present circumstances, to express this gratitude to you[1],” wrote the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, on 10 September 1962 to former French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman. Konrad Adenauer was anxious to set things straight and avoid the creation of a myth. For him, Franco-German reconciliation, at the service of European integration, began on 9 May 1950 with the “Schuman Declaration”. It was not going to start with the Treaty in progress, the future Elysée Treaty. Robert Schuman, in his "Testimony on Adenauer", confirms this: "When in May 1950, the French government offered to the European nations to sit down, without discrimination between victorious and defeated countries, with equal rights and obligations, for a work of joint cooperation guaranteed by mutual control, this truly political revolution required Franco-German reconciliation. Even before consulting our friends and allies, we asked Chancellor Adenauer. If he had said no, Europe and European integration could not have existed. Our expectations were not disappointed[2].” Three years earlier, at a solemn ceremony, Konrad Adenauer had already had the opportunity to address Robert Schuman in front of a Franco-German audience, emphasising that it was he, Schuman, who had "definitively put an end to the Franco-German history full of atrocities thereby creating a lasting friendship between the two peoples". He said: "You, Mr Schuman, took the initiative for this great work and began to build it. That is why we are deeply grateful to you.” The Chancellor concluded by insisting that "it was Monsieur Schuman who laid the foundations for a good and lasting understanding between France and Germany and for a European future, that Europe owed its survival to his action[3].”
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, History, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Germany

58. WHY DEMOCRACIES AREN’T MORE RELIABLE ALLIANCE PARTNERS

Author:: Mark Nieman and Doug Gibler
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: ussia’s invasion of Ukraine set off a security spiral in Europe. Despite US President Biden’s pledge to “defend every inch of NATO territory,” Poland increased its military budget by a whopping 60 percent and asked to have US nuclear weapons based on its territory. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia also announced sizable defense increases, with Latvia re-instating compulsory military training. Why didn’t Biden’s pledge reassure these NATO members? Is the alliance’s famed Article 5 promise—that an attack on one member is an attack on all—a less than ironclad guarantee?
Topic:: NATO, Democracy, Alliance, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

59. Russia’s Ukraine Revanchism: Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism, and the Emerging World Order

Author:: Mohammad Ali Zafar
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: The Ukrainian conflict has paved the way to re-examine the geopolitical implications of Russian Neo-Eurasianism, which has challenged the Liberal International Order. The implications of such a development will have global implications for Russia. Indications of Putin's renewed mission, infused by restrategising the Russian position in Eurasia coupled with cultural exceptionalism based on messianic identity, are observable in recognition of Donbas and Luhansk as separate territories and the invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has allowed the US to lead as an Atlanticist player and regain its slipping position in the international system. Therefore, following exploratory research methodology, the paper examines Dugin’s geopolitical model based on neo-Eurasianism. The paper concludes that the model will observe major setbacks in the post-Ukrainian conflict order as the proposed alliances by Dugin’s model with Moscow, Tokyo, and Tehran face several challenges. Consequently, the invasion has pushed Atlanticist pre-eminence back on track across Eurasia.
Topic:: Conflict, Regionalism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

60. The Strategic Repositioning of LNG: Implications for Key Trade Routes and Choke Points

Author:: Leslie Palti-Guzman and Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: 2022 saw the climax so far of the weaponization of energy. Following its geopolitical demise, Russia has undertaken its own gas amputation, moving from a super energy power status to a diminished role with uncertain prospects and only hard options left. Russia has cut off almost entirely pipeline gas supplies to the European Union (EU), first inflicting huge financial pain and collecting record high revenues, but then simply losing out its largest and best market with no realistic alternative, and no prospect of any significant return. However, the Kremlin could still further reduce some of the remaining pipeline gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and thus cause some tensions in the markets. Russia also retains leverage on oil markets, where the Kremlin managed to cope with the embargo as well as the price cap and maintain the relationship with Saudi Arabia which drives OPEC+ decisions. Meanwhile, in 2022, the European energy system has managed to surprisingly adapt on the supply and demand side to the three shocks: the decoupling from Russian energy supplies, the hydropower generation crisis, and the French nuclear electricity crisis. Liquefied natural gas has made a comeback in Europe and has been a savior of industries, governments, and populations. The LNG corridor between the EU and the United States (U.S.) has become the most dominant LNG trade route in 2022. This came at a huge cost though – EU’s gas import bill soared ten times from 2020 and three times from 2021 levels. For 2023, the European gas balance is much more fragile, as the demand reduction potential has reached its limits, same for the ability to attract additional non-Russian exports to Europe, at a time when missing Russian volumes will probably reach 120 billion cubic meters (bcm), instead of about 77 bcm in 2022. More moderate price levels since November 2022 have clearly overshadowed this fundamental mismatch, especially as the weather has been mild and China was still struggling with the pandemic. With an additional 30-40 bcm of missing Russian gas to offset in 2023 compared to 2022, Europeans can be expected to benefit from an extra gas of around 20-25 bcm left in storages thanks to mild weather and available LNG. They have no choice but to continue saving energy in a hurry, that is both on gas and electricity. Gas demand in power generation had increased in the first nine months of 2022 before falling in Q4 2022, and well over 15 bcm can be saved here in 2023 as more nuclear is available altogether, alongside more renewables, and some coal. It will be critical to reduce peak loads though. The key improvement is in terms of logistics, with the massive new LNG import capacity deployed across Europe. Overall, EU’s import situation will be very tensed and fragile for the next winter. The key challenge is that EU’s gas supply security ultimately depends on the weather in Europe, China’s and Japan’s LNG demand, and weather or technical outages in the Gulf of Mexico or in other producers. Any slight disruptions in supplies can have major impacts. As a last resort, bringing back some Groningen supplies, no matter how politically sensitive this would be, must be considered and prepared. Large financial compensations and effective governmental action would notably be required to offset the hardships.
Topic:: European Union, Gas, Exports, Trade, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Europe

61. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:: Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

62. Higher Renewable Energy Targets in Germany: How Will the Industry Benefit?

Author:: Gilles Lepesant
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: “Deutschland – Einstieg in die Deindustrialisierung?” – “Germany, the beginning of deindustrialisation?” asked the German economic newspaper Handelsblatt in the context of the spike in energy prices that has put at risk thousands of companies across Germany in 2022. Whereas some sectors such as steel, glass and chemicals have been seriously hit, the manufacturing industries operating in the areas linked to the energy transition (such as renewable energies and hydrogen production) should benefit from decisions taken to reach climate neutrality. Will the German industry benefit from the ambitious commitments agreed by the new coalition? The boom and bust of the solar sector in 2011 are a reminder that a strong internal demand does not necessarily translate into strong and resilient supply chains on the national territory. In the context of generous support schemes, several companies emerged in the 2000s benefiting from the strong demand for solar panels before being overwhelmed by Asian competitors. Nowadays, more than 90% of solar panels are imported from China. The level of ambition of the Federal government for the Energiewende has dramatically increased with the new coalition elected in 2021, the share of renewables to be reached in the power mix by 2030 being set at 80% (against 47% in 2022). The German wind industry has however been affected by a slowdown of the expansion of capacities, several rounds of onshore wind and solar auctions being in 2022 undersubscribed. The added value of the Energiewende in terms of job creation has been ambivalent so far. The country’s current industrial geography might be partly reshaped with the efforts made by northern and eastern States to deploy renewables and green hydrogen at large scale. Stakes are high for southern Germany since new spatial patterns are emerging in the automotive sector too. While Chinese competition in the solar and wind manufacturing sectors is tough, the Inflation Reduction Act has reinvigorated discussions around a stronger industrial policy.
Topic:: European Union, Electricity, Renewable Energy, Wind Power, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

63. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation

Author:: Alice Billon-Galland and Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The Franco-British Summit on March 10th, 2023, will mark a much-needed reset in bilateral cooperation, following years of strained relations. With a recently re-elected French president and a new British Prime minister, both sides are committed to making this summit a success and re-launching a positive agenda for bilateral cooperation. The summit, the first since Sandhurst in 2018, will focus on three key topics: migration, energy, and foreign policy. Defense cooperation will also be addressed, as it remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, though it may take a less prominent part than on previous occasions. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation Download 1.38 Mo Several concrete topics for joint work should therefore be discussed and agreed, from strategic discussions on European security frameworks to joint operational deployments and capability projects. It is crucial to ensure that the symbolic reset of the bilateral relationship at the summit leads to a realistic yet ambitious defense roadmap, with concrete commitments and deliverables. As the Franco-British Summit approaches, defense cooperation remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. As the war in Ukraine continues, it increases the rationale for resuming closer UK-France defense cooperation. Lessons needs to be drawn from the Lancaster House Treaties : overly ambitious and structuring plans are less likely to succeed than pragmatic, budget-conscious and ready-to-use projects. The need to prepare for high-intensity warfare opens new perspectives for capability development in all domains and for operational cooperation across the globe. This Briefing is part of a joint Chatham House-IFRI research project, the "Cross-Channel Strategic Dialogue", investigating prospects for UK-France defence and security cooperation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and High Intensity Warfare
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, and France

64. Food Systems in the Pacific: Addressing Challenges in Cooperation with Europe

Author:: Celine Pajon
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: More frequent climate disasters, rising sea levels, the economic fallout of Covid-19 lockdowns, border closures, supply chain constraints, and the global impact of the war in Ukraine have aggravated the challenge of maintaining sustainable and resilient food systems for Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Food systems in PICs are of great importance due to their impact on the health and well-being of Pacific peoples, local livelihoods, and national economies. Between 50 and 70% of Pacific people depend on agriculture and fishing activities for their livelihoods. The Pacific is home to extensive crop biodiversity, and Pacific countries are developing unique value chains for markets and international supply. However, they also face unique challenges in realizing equitable benefits in the global food system. Additionally, the Pacific needs to tackle issues like malnutrition and non-communicable diseases. Urgent global and local action is needed to manage climate change and other risks and ensure resilient food systems. Europeans are also confronted with the global food crisis and are actively working with their Pacific partners to find and fund solutions to address current and future risks by investing in local sustainable food systems. This Briefing explains the complex issues at stake regarding food systems in PICs and explores ways to address these challenges, both at the local level and in cooperation with Europeans. This Briefing is based on discussions that took place during the webinar "Food Security in Times of Crisis: Connecting the Pacific and Europe," organized by the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri)'s Pacific Islands Program in partnership with the Pacific Community (SPC) on December 8, 2022. Contributions from panelists will, therefore, be highlighted.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Food, and Industry
Political Geography:: Europe, European Union, Oceania, and Pacific Islands

65. Imagining Beyond the Imaginary. The Use of Red Teaming and Serious Games in Anticipation and Foresight

Author:: Héloïse Fayet and Amélie Ferey
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The Red Team Defence demonstrates the Ministry of the Armed Forces' desire to appropriate new foresight tools. Thus, brain games or serious games aim to bypass the weight of the military hierarchy, the standardisation of thoughts and cognitive biases in order to avoid strategic unthinking. In September 2022, The New York Times revealed that the successful Ukrainian offensive on Kharkiv had been prepared in a series of wargames conducted that summer. Given this success, further wargames have been undertaken with a view to a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring. This rise in the popularity of wargames, which come in various forms, is due to their ability to immerse participants in a situation, helping them to become aware of their strategic and tactical blind spots and to identify their own vulnerabilities by putting themselves in the enemy’s position. The ability to anticipate crises and foresee conflicts is essential in order to maintain the initiative and ultimately win out. Thus, the aim of defense foresight is to understand the different forms future wars might take (asymmetric, hybrid, high intensity), the weapons systems that may be employed (drones, high-velocity missiles), and the factors that could trigger them. The use of wargames or scenario analyses to facilitate anticipation and foresight goes hand in hand with changes in the relationship between military and political leaders and civilians, who no longer hesitate to hold the former to account when they have failed to foresee a crisis. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck thus refers to the paradox of a society that is keen to predict the future because of its aversion to risk and the fact that it is now much more difficult to foresee what might happen in the short term due to very rapid technological developments. The modern world generates both risks and progress, and the inability to foresee strategic ruptures carries significant political costs, which explains why politicians set so much store in anticipation and foresight. The initiatives launched by Florence Parly after being appointed French minister of the armed forces in 2017 included promoting experimentation in new cognitive tools. Beyond the issue of technology, the aim was to rethink information management within the ministry in order to make it more agile and cross-cutting. In addition to a significant budget allocated to innovation in the 2019–2025 Military Programming Law, the Ministry of the Armed Forces has drawn inspiration from methods often originating in other organizational cultures, such as start-ups and the private sector, in order to improve its creativity and accelerate its adoption of digital technology.
Topic:: War Games, Military, and Anticipation
Political Geography:: Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

66. Digital Sovereignty: European Policies, American Dilemmas

Author:: Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: European digital sovereignty has been made a priority by Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission. Due to the privileged position of American companies in the European market, Brussels’ efforts towards digital sovereignty (on privacy, antitrust, data sovereignty, etc.) are closely scrutinized by American policymakers. They often view European initiatives as “protectionist” and unfairly targeting U.S. companies. However, the American vision of European digital sovereignty has evolved in recent years under the influence of two main factors. On the one hand, awareness of the problematic effects and practices of platforms has led to a consensus on the need for reform in the digital sector. On the other hand, technological competition with China has been elevated to a priority. This vision remains fraught with contradictions, along inter-party, intra-party, inter-agency, state-federal, and issue-based fault lines. Washington’s position on anti-monopolistic practices is an illuminating example, characterized by a double discourse between a desire to reform the U.S. digital sector domestically and active diplomacy to dilute these efforts at the European level. Nonetheless, several American actors – particularly in the legislative branch – are seeking to learn from the successes and flaws of European regulations for American reform projects, such as on platform regulation or privacy. The China factor reinforces the ambiguity of the U.S.’ position. It creates new opportunities for cooperation in the face of perceived common vulnerabilities (infrastructure security, inbound investments, etc.) and autocratic definitions of digital sovereignty. However, it also raises tension and misunderstanding on the American side towards European reforms that often target American companies more than Chinese ones. Lastly, while American and European companies have adapted to the need for digital sovereignty through a range of technical and commercial solutions, the temptation of a maximalist definition of European sovereignty continues to create major stumbling blocks, particularly on the cloud.
Topic:: European Union, Regulation, Cloud Computing, Digital Sovereignty, and Data Governance
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

67. How the War in Ukraine is Changing the Space Game

Author:: Guilhem Penent and Guillaume Schlumberger
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has become a showcase for the new commercial paradigm emerging in the space sector (New Space). As such, it seems to confirm the relevance of adaptation efforts led by the United States – more specifically the Pentagon – since the mid-2010s. Thus, it highlights ongoing transformations and announces potential disruptions in the exploitation of orbits, particularly in the fields of satellite connectivity and remote sensing. It also shapes future tensions, while the structuring of international relations around the two poles constituted by the United States and China raises questions about the consequences on the safe, sustainable, secure, and stable use of space. With these developments, Europe is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Space, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

68. The Europeanisation of the Energy Transition in Central and Eastern EU Countries: An Uphill Battle that Can Be Won

Author:: Diana-Paula Gherasim
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the brutal decoupling from Russian fossil fuels, is a game changer for the Central and Eastern Europe region which was still heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supply. There are still a few oil, gas, and nuclear fuel supplies, but the sharp decline, and search for alternatives, lead to a shift in paradigm: deploying low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency is now a matter of national security and economic security. Hence, following the 2022 energy crisis, the understanding that the European Union’s (EU) energy security of supply means an acceleration in phasing out fossil fuels and deploying clean energies has become the newest European acquis in energy policy, increasing the importance of the Green Deal at EU, national and local levels. The risk that a carbon wall would be erected within Europe between the West and the Central and Eastern European Member States (CEECs) is no more valid. The concept of Europeanization is at the core of the analysis of the energy transition in the CEECs. The progress on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction observed in these Member States (MS) can be considered as a success of the Europeanization process in this region, as its timing coincides with the implementation of the 2020 agenda for climate and energy, to the establishment of which these countries were part of. Moreover, the Clean Energy Package and the Green Deal seem to have been successful in putting in place a mechanism of cognitive framing pertaining to the Europeanization toolbox, by setting a framework for all Europeans to move in the same direction, of a cleaner and healthier way of living, independently of their starting point. Given the status quo in the ten CEECs, the new ambitious objectives regarding transport decarbonization will translate into important transformation costs for the region, which in turn could increase the risk of renegotiation attempts, as the circular Europeanization theory predicts. The acknowledgment at the EU level that the transition must be just to succeed is one instance of bottom-up Europeanization, where the challenges brought forward by specific Member States shaped the European energy transition agenda and discourse. Large financial support for this end was a first condition for CEECs to support the climate neutrality agenda. The second condition is that CEECs plan to replace their coal fleet at least partially with nuclear power, be they reactor capacity expansions, lifetime extensions, large new reactors, or small modular reactors (SMRs). The third condition has been securing a role for the use of natural gas for the transition, which in 2022 turned out to be a costly choice. With the crisis, CEECs have all taken on board the necessity to boost renewables as a tool to rapidly decrease dependence on imported fossil fuels, to meet the 2030 targets, prepare for the progressive phase-out of free emission allowances while awaiting the new nuclear generation capacities due from 2035 onwards. This strategy is also supported by public opinion, while it remains to be seen how public acceptance of SMRs will be. This gives the CEE region a strong joint interest to push for the inclusion of nuclear energy in EU legislations, alongside France. On gas, countries have switched to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and diversified their pipeline supplies, and where possible, try to boost the domestic supply of natural gas and soon, biomethane. Although being relatively far from alternative gas entry points means that for some CEECs Russia remains, to a certain extent, a necessity, this cannot be used as an excuse for undermining EU unity and should push towards harder EU-level reflections on energy solidarity on which some progress was done during the 2022 energy crisis. It remains to be seen if a new line of fragmentation will not appear between Germany and Austria on the one hand and the CEEs on the other: following the Nord Stream betrayal and denial by Germany of Polish energy security concerns for example, CEECs are concerned about the extraterritorial outreach of Germany’s nuclear phase-out policies, and of Austria’s continued systemic opposition to nuclear. This plays in the hand of the United States, which is the ultimate gatekeeper to pressure Germany and secure the energy technology choices of CEECs through the export of US technologies. Of note is also the shared concern now over the dependence on Russian nuclear fuels and equipment, and efforts to reduce this. A last source of possible tensions comes from some new gas infrastructure investments which can strengthen resilience but risk locking in gas much longer than the EU trajectory allows for. Beyond nuclear energy, however, the interest in accelerating the deployment of renewables, and the concern over a just transition, the note shows that there is little in common between the CEECs which have all their specificities. Last but not least, this note argues that a new risk of fragmentation may emerge, related to the localization of innovation and the volume of state aids and subsidies to industries. While some CEECs appear to be a frontrunner in the deployment of battery cell gigafactories, their financial and budgetary capacities are much more limited compared to Western MSs, and their ability to develop comprehensive, coherent climate plans, and to mobilize EU tools and funding, is also limited. Without an EU Sovereignty Fund, the region will find it hard to keep pace with EU’s objectives in the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act due to limited fiscal space to be leveraged for state aid purposes, despite more favorable conditions.
Topic:: European Union, Renewable Energy, Fossil Fuels, Transition, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

69. European Democracy Support Annual Review 2022

Author:: Richard Youngs, Elena Ventura, Ken Godfrey, Erin Jones, and Zselyke Csaky
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The need to defend democratic values from violent attack was the dominant theme of 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February made democracy’s defense a priority of the highest geopolitical as well as normative order. It propelled commitments to protect democracy to the top of the agenda for Europe, internally as well as in foreign and security policy. European powers responded and a common line gained currency that the war had pulled them through a watershed conversion in their strategic outlook. However, in a year dominated by the imperative of defending democracy, European policies specifically aimed at supporting democracy evolved in only understated fashion. While these policies were adjusted in important ways to the new context, Europe shifted gear much less in this area than in others. In 2021, the European Democracy Hub published the first annual review of European democracy support.1 This second review aims to provide an empirical overview of European democracy support policies in 2022. The review covers policies, strategies, and initiatives at the level of the European Union (EU) as well as those of its member states and of non-EU European countries active in democracy support (Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). It presents information on European efforts to defend and strengthen democracy around the world while highlighting their shortcomings. The aim is to inform debates about policies geared toward upholding democracy internationally. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dominated European policy debates in 2022 in many ways. This review examines the democracy-related consequences of the invasion and of the geopolitical changes it unleashed. Western leaders framed the invasion as a threat not only to Ukraine but also to democratic norms and the rules-based order more widely, and as such it galvanized EU institutions and European governments into new commitments to defend democracy. However, these commitments were far from being the main policy responses; for all the rhetoric about a new struggle to defend democratic values, many elements of European democracy policy were second-order priorities. And, in some ways, the security aspects of the strategic landscape diluted European democracy commitments. The invasion did not alter all aspects of European democracy policy, which in many countries was shaped by domestic political developments. In a year of notable protests and other forms of civic activism around the world, the EU and some member states improved the ways in which they engage with local actors in support of political reform. The EU began to roll out many new programs in its democracy toolbox. Though low-profile, this began to add more tactical sophistication to EU policies. Yet the degree of European support for democratic openings remained modest and, in some places, negligible. And, while much attention was on the global consequences of the war in Ukraine, the EU’s democracy activities moved up a gear to a greater extent internally than externally. This review offers a summary of the main changes to the context conditioning European democracy policies before outlining their evolution at the EU and national levels during the year. It then looks at the war in Ukraine and the democracy-related aspects of the European response to it. The review then delves into more specific aspects of democracy support that were pursued, such as democracy funding, the use of sanctions and conditionality, and democracy considerations in conflict interventions. In line with the previous review, we frame democracy support in a broad sense. The concept lacks a firm definition and this review reflects an elastic understanding of it. Broadly, the analysis considers quantitative and qualitative aspects of European strategies relevant to strengthening democratic practices, norms, and institutions. Democracy support in this sense includes the use of funding for democracy projects, decisions over sanctions, the use of political conditionality, and the incorporation of democracy factors into conflict-related policies. The review looks not only at examples of such democracy support but also instances where democratic considerations were absent from EU policy. Democracy support is understood here as including EU and European action around the world, including within Europe, but not the actions of governments in their country’s domestic affairs.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

70. Leveraging Lives: Serbia and Illegal Tunisian Migration to Europe

Author:: Hamza Meddeb
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: In 2020–2022, Tunisian illegal migrants traveled through Serbia to reach Western Europe, as an alternative to the hazardous, more monitored Mediterranean route. This was driven by push factors in Tunisia, including deteriorating economic conditions and government acquiescence, and pull factors in Europe, namely smuggling networks and Serbian authorities looking the other way. While the route was sealed for Tunisians in November 2022, as long as transit states can use illegal migration to secure geopolitical leverage, such actions will continue.
Topic:: Migration, European Union, Economy, and Smuggling
Political Geography:: Europe, Serbia, North Africa, and Tunisia

71. Rethinking the EU’s Approach to Women’s Rights in Iran

Author:: Barbara Mittelhammer, Tara Sepehri Far, and Sussan Tahmasebi
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: After the death of twenty-two-year-old Mahsa (Jina) Amini in the custody of Iran’s morality police on September 16, 2022, protests quickly spread throughout the country under the slogan of “Woman, Life, Freedom.” Amini’s death galvanized a movement that connects women’s individual freedom to choose their dress code to the systemic social, political, and economic grievances of a larger population that is demanding fundamental change. In claiming the realization of their basic rights, Iranians are revolting against a system that not only oppresses women and peaceful dissent but also continues to fail to meet citizens’ needs. This fight, which has attracted global solidarity, highlights the core message that when women’s rights are marginalized to nonexistence, human rights for all are at risk. The protests have taken place amid mounting repression of organized peaceful activism, a continuing deterioration of Iranians’ basic rights, and a host of economic ills, including rising inequality, increasing poverty, worsening living conditions, skyrocketing food prices, raging inflation, and rising unemployment. Three years of the coronavirus pandemic as well as decades-long comprehensive economic and financial sanctions have gravely added to the socioeconomic calamity. On top of this economic insecurity, precarious and perilous working conditions had already sparked increasing protests in Iran in recent years, resulting in the government’s harsh crackdown on human rights activists and civil society as well as further infringements on rights, including internet shutdowns, even before current events. Repression and the deterioration of Iran’s socioeconomic conditions have aggravated the situation for women in particular. Especially in recent years leading up to the current protests, this trend has hindered Iranian women’s ability to mobilize, protest, and achieve the full realization of their rights. Those who experience intersecting discrimination because of their minority background or social status are impacted even more if they live in rural areas, which are less developed than urban ones, or in areas on Iran’s border, which the state views predominantly through a security lens. The international response to Iran’s very poor human rights record and current protests, however, has lacked a holistic approach that considers women’s key role as agents of change and encompasses civil and political as well as social and economic rights as integral components of women’s rights. In fact, women’s rights and gender equality are not only goals in themselves but also enable the realization of fundamental rights of other marginalized groups, such as children and minorities. Moreover, women’s rights and gender equality are the strongest indicators of and preconditions for sustainable and peaceful societies, both internally and externally. Yet, the European Union’s (EU’s) current approach to Iran does not account for this reality. Over the past years, the EU’s policy toward the country has focused on negotiations to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) after Washington’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018. The current situation in Iran urgently highlights the need for a policy framework that responds to the government’s repression and gross human rights violations and, equally, considers the disastrous socioeconomic situation in the country, which is a key obstacle to the public’s ability to organize to realize its rights. Given the importance of economic precarity and socioeconomic inequality in the current revolt, the EU should adopt policies that can support the protesters’ rights and demands in the short term while considering a revised long-term approach centered on empowering Iranians in their efforts to create long-lasting democratic change.
Topic:: Human Rights, European Union, Women, and Protests
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, and Middle East

72. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:: Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

73. War in Ukraine: One Year On, Nowhere Safe

Author:: Nichita Gurcov
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ACLED records nearly 40,000 political violence events across the country. Three-quarters of these events are shelling, artillery, and missile strikes mostly affecting the northeastern, eastern, and southern regions of Ukraine. Quantifying the civilian toll of the conflict presents a challenge – especially in areas continuously engulfed by violence, like eastern Ukraine. In areas under Russian occupation, reports of abductions, forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial executions have been widespread, though the scale of violence against civilians becomes known only upon the liberation of territories, evidenced in the case of northern Ukraine and especially the Kyiv suburbs. Meanwhile, long-range strikes, including those deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, pose a permanent threat and continue to induce extreme hardship for communities even farther afield from the frontline.
Topic:: War Crimes, Conflict, Civilians, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

74. The Normalization of Political Violence and the 2023 Legislative Elections in Greece

Author:: Niki Papadogiannaki and Vicky Yiagopoulou
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: Elections in Greece come less than three months after the deadly head-on train collision at Tempe in the north of the country that killed 57 passengers. The incident on 28 February triggered demonstrations against the government of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, chastising him for initially blaming the collision on “tragic human error.”1 The unrest that followed caused the government to delay announcing the election date, which had been anticipated in April. Due to a new voting law, the elections will be held under a proportional representation system, wherein the leading party needs to secure at least 46% to have a chance to win absolute majority in parliament. However, this percentage has not been reached in the last three decades,2 making a clear victory on 21 May unlikely.
Topic:: Political Violence, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Protests
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

75. Why the proposed Brussels buyers club to procure critical minerals is a bad idea

Author:: Cullen Hendrix
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Concerned about critical mineral supply chains and its own strategic vulnerabilities, the European Union is advancing a buyers club to procure minerals critical to the clean energy transition, such as bauxite, cobalt, lithium, and nickel. The European Union is deeply dependent on imports of both raw and processed critical minerals and materials and thus highly exposed to global price volatility. The door appears to be open for the United States or other EU trading partners and like-minded countries to join this club. Decarbonization is not the only impetus behind the proposed Brussels buyers club. Both the European Union and United States view China’s dominance of critical mineral supply chains as a national security issue, because these minerals are key inputs to modern military technology. Hendrix agrees that supply chains for critical minerals desperately need widening to meet projected global demand and tackle climate change mitigation, but he warns that a purchasers club would not be a step in the right direction. A buyers club would be prone to free riding, set up distributive conflicts within the European Union, and reduce the share of climate mitigation benefits accruing to critical mineral–producing countries, many of which are developing and middle-income economies.
Topic:: Economics, National Security, European Union, Supply Chains, and Minerals
Political Geography:: China and Europe

76. The international tax agreement of 2021: Why it’s needed, what it does, and what comes next?

Author:: Kimberly Clausing
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In 2021, more than 135 jurisdictions agreed on transformative new international tax rules that would establish a minimum tax rate of 15 percent on multinational corporate income regardless of where it was reported. In December 2022, the European Union unanimously moved forward to implement this minimum tax, and other countries, including South Korea, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, are also either implementing the tax or taking substantial steps toward implementation. In tandem, the United States should also reform its international tax system and adopt a stronger minimum tax. While the future of the international agreement is uncertain, it has important implications for the ability of governments worldwide to create tax systems that are administrable, fair, and efficient. The agreement also demonstrates important guiding principles for the future of multilateral cooperation on global collective action problems, including efforts to protect public health from future pandemics, address nuclear proliferation, and resolve territorial conflicts. US progress on international tax reform would enhance much needed international cooperation on these issues.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Reform, European Union, and Tax Systems
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

77. Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?

Author:: Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Economic sanctions by Western democracies against Russia have not stopped the war and attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Together with continued economic and military support for Ukraine, however, sanctions are blocking Russian president Vladimir Putin from achieving his territorial objectives. Sanctions have contributed to a sharp compression of Russian imports; forced Russia’s military and industry to source from more costly and inefficient suppliers at home and abroad; and slowly begun to squeeze Russian government finances. The G7 countries must sustain and augment their efforts, including by confiscating frozen reserves of the Central Bank of Russia to help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. G7 policymakers need to derive lessons from the current crisis about the utility of sanctions in conflicts between major powers. Maintaining coherent and coordinated sanctions against large and powerful target countries is critical for the effectiveness and durability of the policy. Deploying sanctions against such rivals also requires a long-term commitment to the implementation and enforcement of the trade and finance restrictions. Sanctions impose costs on both the target country and those imposing the sanctions, so Western policymakers need to offset those costs via domestic support or tax relief to sustain political support over time for sanctions in big power conflicts.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

78. Industrial policy for electric vehicle supply chains and the US-EU fight over the Inflation Reduction Act

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 provoked a transatlantic trade spat. After the law was passed, the Biden administration addressed some of the concerns raised by the European Union by writing controversial rules to implement the legislation. These regulations are expected to have complex effects that, in some instances, may offset the intended impact of other provisions in the original legislation. This paper examines how the law, its implementing regulations, policy decisions on leasing, as well as potential critical minerals agreements all have the potential to affect the electric vehicle (EV) supply chain. The EV case study showcases the political-economic complications involved in US and EU attempts to cooperate over clean energy transition policy to address the global externality of carbon dioxide emissions. EVs are but one example of the challenge facing partners with integrated supply chains and similar levels of economic development that share concerns about climate change, rising inequality, workers, other social issues, and democracy itself. The EV conflict laid bare the differing US and EU prioritization of these issues relative to economic efficiency, World Trade Organization rules, the approach to nonmarket economies, and national security vulnerabilities that arise from depending on an authoritarian regime such as China for import sourcing of critical inputs.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Supply Chains, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

79. Rallying Around the Flag: War Challenges and Civic Mobilization in UkraineRallying Around the Flag: War Challenges and Civic Mobilization in Ukraine

Author:: Mykola Riabhuk
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: Ukraine’s resilience in the first months of Russian aggression came as a great surprise to both its Moscow adversaries and Western partners. Very few experts expected Ukraine to withstand the all-out military assault of the alleged second-best army in the world, and virtually no one believed that it would be able to fight back. An overblown image of Russian strength and military prowess may be one reason for this, but probably more significant was a protracted neglect and depreciation of Ukraine in both Western media and political circles. All of a sudden, it appeared that neither the state—broadly described as weak, corrupt, and dysfunctional—collapsed under the tremendous military assault, nor the society—broadly stereotyped as divided, conflicted, and arguably balancing at the verge of a civil war—broke down for the proverbial two parts. One may presume either that some negative features and tendencies of Ukraine’s development were exaggerated or that some positive tendencies were neglected, undermined, or both. To elucidate the issue, I proceed in three steps. First, I outline briefly the real curses that plagued the Ukrainian state and society after the fall of communism and provide some reasons for international skepticism in regard to the newborn country. Second, I argue that very important and mostly positive (although incoherent and sluggish) changes had occurred in Ukraine in the past 30 years, so that the Russian aggression neither established any new patterns for Ukraine’s development, nor shifted the country into a new direction, but rather accelerated the prior processes and solidified the existing tendencies. Third, I examine the ongoing civic mobilization in Ukraine as a way of accumulating social capital that may play a crucial role in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction and modernization.
Topic:: Nationalism, Reconciliation, Mobilization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

80. Europe: Country fact sheet

Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Summary, Economy, Background, and Fact sheet
Political Geography:: Europe

81. Forced migration, aid effectiveness, and the humanitarian–development nexus: The case of Germany’s P4P programme

Author:: Stefan Leiderer and Helge Roxin
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: Bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation has been a contentious issue in academia and development practice for decades. Drawing on an evaluation of Germany’s ‘Partnership for Prospects’ initiative, this paper argues that, whilst the supplement of ‘peacebuilding’ to the nexus (humanitarian–development–peacebuilding [HDP] nexus) brought an important context factor into the discussion in an environment of conflict, it is only of marginal help in a context of forced migration to neighbouring countries of a given conflict. For the context of host countries of refugees in a protracted crisis, it is more relevant that host countries show ownership and reliability in their policies to create long-term perspectives for refugees. These policies in turn need to be embedded in reliable rules (polity) and negotiation processes (politics) in host countries. Consequently, the paper suggests that a ‘HD–Triple-P’ nexus would take the necessary political dimension into account more adequately. However, it might also mark the boundary as to what development politics can achieve.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, Refugees, Conflict, and Forced Migration
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

82. Welfare losses, preferences for redistribution, and political participation: Evidence from the United Kingdom’s age of austerity

Author:: Patricia Justino, Bruno Martorano, and Laura Metzger
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: This paper studies the effect of austerity on forms of political participation—including voting, appealing for reform, and peaceful protesting—and the role of preferences for redistribution in shaping the relationship between individual exposure to austerity and political participation. The paper focuses on the case of the United Kingdom (UK) where, between 2011 and 2019, wide-ranging austerity policies were introduced to deal with high public debt in the aftermath of the 2007–08 financial crisis. Cuts to government spending on public investment, services, and social protection, especially during the initial fiscal consolidation phase of 2011–15, led to significant welfare losses for the population. We provide evidence from observational microeconomic data and a large-scale online experiment in the UK showing that individual exposure to welfare losses from austerity increases political participation and strengthens preferences for government redistribution. The experimental data suggests that changes in individual preferences for redistribution significantly shape the effect of austerity on political participation.
Topic:: Austerity, Welfare, Redistribution, and Political Participation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

83. European aid to the MENA region after the Arab uprisings: A window of opportunity missed

Author:: Thilo Bodenstein and Mark Furness
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: European official development assistance to Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries increased sharply after 2011, ostensibly in support of the social, economic, and above all political changes demanded by the Arab uprisings. The subsequent turn to development policies driven by security and anti-migration agendas, especially following the Syria refugee crisis in the autumn of 2015, raises the question whether initial expressions of support for democratic transformation expressed by European donors were ever backed by concrete measures. This paper discusses this question with an exploratory review of the policy and practice dimensions of four European MENA aid programmes between 2011 and 2016. The policy dimension is explored via an analysis of available documents from the EU, France, Germany, and the UK. The practice dimension is discussed with reference to OECD-DAC aid data on bilateral aid to MENA countries, focusing on aid in the social infrastructure and services sector, and in particular on the government and civil society sub-category. Our analysis reveals that, while all donors promised to support democracy in MENA countries, none had a clear strategy for doing so via their development cooperation. At the practice level, while programmes and projects were aimed at supporting change in specific contexts, increases in aid were mostly unrelated to political change. This indicates a preference for avoiding risks, which served to underpin the region’s political and socio-economic status quo. Accordingly, European donors missed an opportunity to test whether their aid could make a difference in supporting democratic transformation in the MENA. The social, economic, and political tensions behind the Arab uprisings remain unresolved more than a decade on, meaning that there is likely a need to learn lessons from the period following 2011.
Topic:: Development, Democracy, Arab Spring, and Development Assistance
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

84. The violent legacy of fascism: Neofascist political violence in Italy, 1969–88

Author:: Stefano Costalli, Daniele Guariso, Patricia Justino, and Andrea Ruggeri
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: We still have limited knowledge about the long-term effects of fascism on European democracies. European countries experienced cycles of violence between the 1960s and 1980s. Can such violence be explained by legacies of mobilization during fascism? We study whether and how the Italian fascist experience of the 1920s affected political violence during the 1970s and 1980s. We created an original dataset of conflictual events at a subnational level in Italy. Using zero-inflated negative binomial regressions, we find that local membership of the fascist party in 1922—before the institutionalization of the fascist regime—predicts neofascist political violence at the provincial level more than 40 years later. New windows of opportunity facilitate the resurfacing of local fascist legacies: in the months when a new Minister of Interior is appointed, we observe higher levels of neofascist violence in provinces where the early presence of the fascist party was stronger.
Topic:: Terrorism, History, Fascism, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

85. ‘Ten pound touts’: post-conflict trust and the legacy of counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland

Author:: Kristin M. Bakke and Kit Rickard
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: This paper explores the legacies of wartime rebel governance and counterinsurgency tactics. Insurgents rely on civilian support for resources, information, and cover. To defeat insurgents, the state attempts to extract information from communities where support for insurgents is highest. We argue that strong norms against civilian collaboration emerge in these areas, which may have long legacies for local community trust. To explore these legacies, we conduct a case study of post-conflict Northern Ireland. While both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups established wartime institutions, the counterinsurgency targeted Republican groups in urban areas with the use of informants. Drawing on secondary literature and a survey, we show that strong norms against informers—‘touts’—persist long after the end of the conflict in Republican strongholds. These areas show lower levels of local community trust than their Loyalist counterparts. The Northern Irish case demonstrates the detrimental effects of dynamics likely to shape other post-conflict states.
Topic:: Counterinsurgency, Governance, Civilians, Survey, and Trust
Political Geography:: Europe and Northern Ireland

86. Harnessing allied space capabilities

Author:: Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

87. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:: Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

88. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:: Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

89. Kazakhstan could lead Central Asia in mitigating the world’s energy and food shortages

Author:: Margarita Assenova, Ariel Cohen, and Wesley Hill
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has had significant economic and political repercussions across the globe, including energy shortages and growing food insecurity. The war has forced Central Asian states to emphasize their independence from Moscow and accelerate their economic diversification. Central Asia—comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—has the potential to mitigate global shortages of energy, food, and fertilizers, caused by Russia’s war of aggression. The primary challenges for Central Asia and its Western partners remain diversifying export routes and expanding the capacity of alternative transportation corridors, especially the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Corridor, or the “Middle Corridor.” Kazakhstan is the leading producer of uranium ore in the world, grows 2 percent of the world’s wheat, and has major hydrocarbon reserves. Kazakhstan has the opportunity to lead Central Asia forward on the path to becoming an important supplier of energy, grain, fertilizers, and nuclear fuel to world markets. The energy crisis in Europe spurred renewed interest in the long-planned Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline. A potential United States and European Union ban on uranium civilian-reactor fuel exports from Russia could ensure Kazakhstan’s importance as a nuclear fuel exporter to Europe. To do this, Kazakhstan first needs to build its own conversion and enrichment facilities. This would allow it to double its share in the European market while utilizing the Middle Corridor. By encouraging Western investment, the states of Central Asia can become an important force in global commodity markets. To this end, they should implement the recently signed far-reaching regional agreements on cooperation and integration, so that they are less susceptible to “divide and conquer” strategies from predatory foreign powers and can exercise greater leverage when negotiating as a bloc. The US and the EU should also recognize that Central Asia’s energy and agricultural potential and resources make the region an area of strategic interest with promising business opportunities. The Central Asian states need to intensify their Western-oriented diplomatic outreach to attract support from state and private actors for investment and technological partnerships. Geographic proximity to Russia and China means Central Asian countries will always have economic relationships with Moscow and Beijing. But greater Western engagement in the region can diminish the chances for Russo-Sino cooperation in Central Asia. Russia’s war against Ukraine has weakened its geopolitical position and the Western sanctions on its economy have opened up new opportunities for Central Asia to supply critical energy and food commodities to world markets. Kazakhstan, as the region’s largest economy and its largest producer of oil, uranium, and grain, is well-positioned to lead this transition.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Food Security, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Kazakhstan

90. Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Author:: Roman Osadchuk and Andy Carvin
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In the lead-up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin and its proxies perpetrated information operations to justify military action against Ukraine, mask its operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the war. DOWNLOAD PDF Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America. Building upon daily monitoring by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), this report synthesizes Kremlin attempts to undermine Ukraine by targeting local, regional, and global audiences over the course of 2022 since the start of the war on February 24 of that year.
Topic:: Media, News Analysis, Conflict, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

91. Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China

Author:: Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Set against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the June 2022 Madrid NATO Summit set the tone for the next decade of the Alliance’s shared future. Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Allies laid out actions to be taken across the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Now the Alliance must implement those responses. Beijing will be watching closely.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

92. China and the new globalization

Author:: Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined. Many of the causal factors for this very significant change revolve around China and the consequent responses to its actions by the United States, other democracies of the transatlantic alliance, and the advanced democratic economies of the Indo-Pacific. There are other important factors generating this new globalization including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war both on energy markets and on trade and investment with Russia generally, as well as the global requirements for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, China has been a critical element in what might be described as the “maximum trade-centered globalization,” which has dominated trade and investment policy in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. This issue brief describes the still-developing new globalization focusing on the issues surrounding China. A fundamental challenge that China presents arises because its actions have generated significant security and economic challenges, yet it nonetheless is a massive trade and investment partner for the “advanced democratic economies” (ADEs),1 which for purposes of this analysis include the Group of Seven (G7) countries,2 plus Australia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. Adapting to a new globalization requires establishing a strategic approach that resolves the inherent contradictions between those conflicting considerations.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

93. Authoritarian kleptocrats are thriving on the West’s failures. Can they be stopped?

Author:: Francis Shin and Ben Judah
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: A hidden web of power revealed itself to Internet users in early 2022. Following a brutal government crackdown in Kazakhstan in January, anyone using open-source flight-tracking websites could watch kleptocratic elites flee the country on private jets. A little more than a month later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought a new spectacle: social media users were able to track various oligarchs’ superyachts as they jumped from port to port to evade Western sanctions. These feeds captured a national security problem in near real time: In Eurasia and beyond, kleptocratic elites with deep ties to the West were able to move themselves and their assets freely despite a host of speeches by senior officials, sanctions, and structures designed to stop them. Kleptocratic regimes—kleptocracy means “rule by thieves”—have exploited the lax and uneven regulatory environments of the global financial system to hide their ill-gotten gains and interfere in politics abroad, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. They are aided in this task by a large cast of professional enablers within these jurisdictions. The stronger these forces get, the more they erode the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the international sanctions regime imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine has little hope of long-term success if the global financial system itself continues to weaken. The West still has a long way to go to rein in the authoritarian kleptocrats who have thrived on the institutional dysfunction, regulatory failure, and bureaucratic weakness of the transatlantic community for far too long. We need to rethink not just how we combat kleptocracy, but also how we define it. Policy makers need to understand that authoritarian regimes that threaten transatlantic security are closely linked to illicit financial systems. As it stands, our thinking about how foreign corruption spreads is too constrained by stereotypes about kleptocratic goals and actions.
Topic:: Corruption, Diplomacy, Intelligence, Politics, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Rule of Law, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, and United States of America

94. Impact of economic sanctions on net commodity-producing and net commodity-consuming countries

Author:: Sergio R. Vale and Eduardo Viola
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has had a marked economic impact. However, since Russia is a net producer of important commodities, the impact of sanctions on its economy was less than expected. But what would happen if there was a war involving a country that was a net importer of commodities? In the case of a possible China-US conflict over Taiwan, the impact on the world economy would be different, with a deeper recession around the world, but the impact on the Brazilian economy would still be positive on account of the possibility that would remain of agricultural exports to China.
Topic:: Agriculture, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Commodities, and Exports
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

95. Strategic Survival in Syria

Author:: Omar Abu Layla
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: How Russia and Iran maintain their grip in Syria under the shadows of the Ukraine war
Topic:: Defense Policy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria

96. Building Resilience? The Cybersecurity, Economic & Trade Impacts of Cloud Immunity Requirements

Author:: Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: EU Member States should call on the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and the European Commission to abandon immunity requirements in the proposed EU Cloud Certification Scheme (EUCS). With immunity requirements in the EUCS, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box, paving the way for data localisation, foreign ownership restrictions, and local establishment requirements in digital industries globally leading to rising trade tensions. ENISA’s current proposal could increase policymakers’ appetite for data localisation in the EU. It would empower the European Commission and Member State authorities to exclude foreign businesses from domestic cloud services markets and set a dangerous precedent for any data-intensive sector. The list of “sectors of high criticality” could be logically extended to both existing services (e.g., financial services) and to new technologies and business models, such as IoT in the energy and healthcare sectors, and autonomous driving in the transport sector. Non-EU jurisdictions would be pressured to respond in kind. EUCS immunity requirements would increase cloud adopters’ exposure to cybersecurity risks. Data localisation often creates obstacles to an integrated management approach towards cybersecurity risks. Country of headquarter and foreign ownership restrictions in the proposed EUCS risk removing global frontier cybersecurity technologies from Member State markets. Excluding these and other EU and non-EU companies from EU Member States could result in a long-lasting security deficit of EU cloud adopters vis-à-vis organisations that are still able to use reliable and often best-practice cloud services offered by providers from outside EU Member States. Immunity requirements in the EUCS are discriminatory by design. They could provoke retaliatory measures by EU trading partners, either unilaterally or through WTO or bilateral FTA (e.g., UK-EU) Dispute Settlement. Local establishment requirements and foreign ownership restrictions would by design discriminate against foreign cloud providers. US-headquartered companies, which currently serve more than 75% of the EU market, would be most affected by EU immunity requirements.[1] Depending on US preferences and the scope of the proposed EUCS, the EU could be subject to retaliatory tariffs of up to USD 12 billion worth of EU goods exports or equivalent restrictions for EU services exports to the US. Other governments could lodge complaints via the WTO as well (e.g., Singapore, Japan, Canada and others, where cloud development is advancing rapidly). EU suppliers are currently in no position to manage a broad-based transition to cloud, and thus such requirements would delay significant efficiency and security gains that current foreign suppliers could offer. A blanket exclusion of non-EU cloud vendors would also likely undermine Europe’s objective to achieve a 75% cloud adoption rate for EU enterprises. Sensitive European businesses and public sector organisations would have to delay migration and make do with legacy systems for a very long time. Contrary to large countries, these negative impacts would be much more pronounced for smaller EU Member States, which lack the presence of large domestic incumbents and generally rely much more on an open international trading regime for digital services. ENISA’s cloud certification scheme should be limited to technical and transparency requirements. Immunity requirements for non-personal data should be addressed in bilateral initiatives such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) or agreements requiring a company that sought to offer services of the highest level of sensitivity to be headquartered in a country granted adequacy with EU data protection rules, or a country that is an adherent to the OECD’s Trusted Government Access principles, or (concerning the US) a participant in the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework. Excluding foreign companies from operating in the EU would have far-reaching consequences. If that is the intent, it should require a sound legal analysis and the decision should be taken through a formal legislative procedure at the EU level.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Europe

97. The Economic Dividend of Competitiveness

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Elena Sisto, and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: In a world of technological and economic rivalry, the EU must devote increased attention to its competitiveness. Higher levels of competitiveness will help the EU build a more prosperous economy which will in turn produce innovation and resources to address the great challenges of our time. ECIPE published a study presenting a competitiveness compass with concrete policy recommendations that will improve EU’s competitiveness. These policy recommendations, once implemented, will bring tangible benefits to the EU economy in the form of higher levels of trade and productivity. This report presents five scenarios in which the EU pursues competitiveness policies that lead to higher economic growth.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Growth, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

98. Building a Mature UK Trade Policy

Author:: David Henig
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Global Britain has not delivered according to the hopes expressed by supporters of leaving the EU. Trade with the rest of the world has not grown to make up for leaving a bloc with seamless trade, early Free Trade Agreements with Australia and New Zealand are of minor economic significance, and it is hard to discern much of a strategy beyond completing a few more similar deals. Meanwhile the world of trade policy is transformed since 2016, negatively. The US has essentially declared its national interests to be more important than global rules, while the EU wants to act unilaterally as the global regulator. In both, the climate crisis is being used as an excuse to reintroduce protectionist measures threatening economic damage and global stability. Expectations of what a UK outside of the EU could achieve were exaggerated, but nonetheless the country could be doing a lot better in its trade policy. There is no good reason for such tensions as exist with a broad range of frustrated stakeholders, the absence of clear purpose on UK strengths such as services, or the defensiveness that seemingly takes pride in secrecy and resistance to proper scrutiny. Adjustment time was inevitable, but six years should have been enough.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Free Trade, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

99. In Support of Market-Driven Standards

Author:: Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The EU published its new Standardisation Strategy in 2022. The strategy contains some good ideas to improve the way European standards are set. However, in its attempt to gain more control over technical standards, the EU risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The primary motivation behind the strategy is the belief that the process governing the way CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI – the three European Standardisation Organisations – take decisions over EU standards favours non-EU multinationals. To address this perceived imbalance, EU National Standardisation Bodies will have the exclusive power to accept standardisation requests, and adopt, revise and withdraw European technical standards. These changes are particularly significant for ETSI, Europe’s Standardisation Body in charge of telecommunication standards and one of Europe’s most successful organisations. ETSI is a prime example of EU normative power since it hosts companies from more than 60 countries, while retaining a large membership of EU firms. The regulatory changes included in the strategy are not risk-free. There could be unintended consequences that may undermine a standardisation system that has delivered significant economic benefits for the EU and the world. First, giving more responsibility to EU’s National Standardisation Organisations will turn a European discussion into 30 (EU and EEA) national debates. As a consequence, small companies will not be able to contribute to each and every one of the National Standardisation Organisations, diluting their contribution, while multinational companies, with the resources needed to cooperate with a larger number of bodies, will benefit from an expanding role in the EU standard setting process. Second, if standards are fragmented along national borders and companies must multiply their efforts to take part in several Standardisation Development Organisations, there will be less resources for Research and Development spending. Finally, if each and every National Standardisation Organisation needs to have a position with regards to the acceptance of a standardisation request, or adoption, revision and withdrawal of European technical standards, the time period required to adopt a technical standard may be extended rather than shortened, which is the exact opposite of what the European Commission wants to achieve. The regulatory changes included in the EU Standardisation Strategy are akin to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. If the European Commission is concerned about the influence of non-EU companies in European Standardisation Bodies, it does not need to overhaul their governance systems. Supporting greater participation of European firms in the European standard system will ease EU’s concerns without the downside risks associated with changing the rules of the game that govern Europe’s Standardisation Bodies. The success of the European standardisation system, which is market-driven and based on consensus, has had significant economic benefits in the development of specific industries, like the European Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Technical standards in ICT have shaped a European industry that is not only dynamic and international but also enjoys some of the highest levels of wages and Research and Development spending. Moreover, if technical standards are not developed through an open, consensus-based, and industry-led voluntary process, they will be developed in different ways. For instance, governments and private companies can develop standards by themselves. Both solutions are inferior to the current market-driven approach that governs European standards. However, the European market-driven approach to set standards is voluntary, and its success and continuation must not be assumed. European policymakers should be worried about tinkering with a European standardisation system which has produced economic specialisation and innovation to the benefits of EU firms and consumers.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, and Standardization
Political Geography:: Europe

100. What is Wrong with Europe’s Shattered Single Market? – Lessons from Policy Fragmentation and Misdirected Approaches to EU Competition Policy

Author:: Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: What is wrong with Europe’s Single Market? The brief answer to that question is that it does not really exist – it is unsingle. The Single Market is in many ways a political illusion. It exists only nominally. Any company doing business in Europe faces significant barriers to cross-border exchanges within the EU, and it is these barriers that hamper companies’ ability to scale and compete internationally on the back of innovation and economic integration. We outline that Brussels and national governments need to beat the drum for eliminating policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market and at the same time change course in competition policy to sufficiently support investments in innovation, business growth, and the adoption of advanced technologies across industries. Major economic indicators show that Europe is caught in a protracted corporate and technology crisis. The EU has for a very long time now been tailing US corporate and innovation leadership. At the same time, competition with technology-intensive imports from China is getting increasingly intense. Europe’s underperformance is rooted in a legally fragmented internal market which is disincentivising business growth and innovation. On top of that, an outdated approach to competition policy is discouraging businesses from adopting innovation and scaling across national borders, risking that EU companies continue to lose clout and international competitiveness. 30 years have passed since the formal establishment of Europe’s Single Market. Data reveals that regulatory convergence has reversed or come to a halt in most policy areas. Recent policies for technologies and digital business models, which are key sources of cross-industry competitiveness, created new layers of regulation and legal uncertainty in EU and Member State law. Overall, EU policies have not significantly helped European companies, large and small, to do business in another Member State or use advanced technology-enabled services. EU competition policy does not live up to its promise to “enable the proper functioning of the EU’s internal market”. Europe’s competition policy is still fragmented along national borders and largely ignorant to dynamic effects of competition, especially investments in innovation. Due to mixed legal competences, competition rules are often enforced differently by Member States’ national authorities and can be appropriated to support protectionist industrial policy ambitions. The recently enacted Digital Market Act (DMA) demonstrates that the European Commission and Member State authorities favour protection and discretionary enforcement over innovation and economic disruption, without providing solid evidence of abusive business behaviour and consumer harm. With the DMA, the EU introduced legislation with serious ambiguities in objectives, concepts, and rules, and explicitly allows national Member States to regulate competition at their own discretion. A recent attempt by Germany’s competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, to enforce its own rulebook for large digital companies (Section 19a of the German Competition Act) risks creating a patchwork of competition rules for large providers of advanced digital services across the EU. Local adopters of advanced digital services, particularly small businesses, that use advanced technology services to compete in their markets would be confronted with less choice and quality. Recently imposed policies under the umbrella of European Strategic Autonomy will hardly help policymakers in their ambition to achieve “innovation and technology leadership”. The paramount task for the EU and national governments is to eliminate policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market, accompanied by an approach to competition policy that embraces investments in innovation and business growth while accounting for the substantial value created through the adoption of innovative technologies and disruptive business models across industries in the EU.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Economy, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS