Political Geography: China / Topic: Economics

151. China in One Country: interdependence or globalisation 'with Chinese characteristics'?

Author:: George Magnus
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Globalisation has faltered, and faces significant political challenges. In both the US and China, voices are calling for a reduction of economic interdependence between the two countries. In the US, this has taken the name of decoupling, in China, self-reliance. At the same time, China’s President, Xi Jinping has vocally championed globalisation in various global fora in recent years. Understanding of China’s systems of government and business, as well as its global interests, is lacking when compared to that of the US. In this Strategic Update, George Magnus investigates what is meant when China’s leadership speaks of globalisation, and what the implications of the answer are for the rest of the world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Globalization, and Leadership
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

152. All Hands on Deck: the Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Need for US Leadership

Author:: Alexandros Zachariades
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Crisis has returned to the Eastern Mediterranean where Greek and Turkish economic interests, legal claims, and armed forces are squaring off. In this Strategic Update, Alexandros Zachariades explores how the two NATO powers arrived at the current confrontation, how the contest intersects with issues ranging from China to Libya, and how the international community can resolve the tension.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, and Leadership
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Greece, Libya, United States of America, and Mediterranean

153. The Future of Chinese Foreign Economic Policy Will Challenge U.S. Interests, Part 1: The Belt-and-Road Initiative and the Middle Income Trap

Author:: Sagatom Saha
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and other senior CCP leaders have prudently planned for the slowing economic growth that China now faces. CCP officials plan to transition China from its current export-led growth model to one driven by indigenous innovation, and one in which China’s rising global prominence confers to it many of the same advantages traditionally enjoyed by the United States (such as low borrowing costs and influence within international institutions). Although U.S.-China relations have become further fraught amid the trade war, many prominent China hands nevertheless assert that Beijing’s long-term economic plans do not run counter to U.S. strategic interests. [1] However, many of China’s planned foreign economic initiatives—to include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), global value chain advancement, and renminbi (RMB) internationalization—will come at U.S. expense. Policymakers in both Washington and Beijing should accordingly expect U.S.-China tensions to persist beyond the Trump administration. China’s need for new growth vehicles is twofold: its economic size has not translated into global influence, and its current economic model is losing steam. First, China’s transformation into the world’s second-largest economy has yet to yield equivalent influence in the international system. Beijing’s sway in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, lag behind China’s status as the largest trade partner and foreign investor for much of the world. The United States, by contrast, has leveraged its economic status to maintain effective control of the Bretton-Woods institutions, to obtain low borrowing costs, and to exercise punishing sanctions programs against unfriendly governments. Second, Chinese growth has seen a secular decline over the last decade (see figure 1). The official projected GDP growth rate for 2020 is 6.1 percent (Xinhua, November 30, 2019), but some Chinese officials have hinted that they expect lower sub-6 percent growth in 2020 (South China Morning Post, November 14, 2019). This is a noteworthy signal, for CCP discourse has previously identified the benchmark of 6 percent GDP growth as necessary to avoid social unrest (China Brief, March 22, 2019).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

154. The Future of Chinese Foreign Economic Policy Will Challenge U.S. Interests, Part 2: Renminbi Internationalization and International Economic Institutions

Author:: Sagatom Saha
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Complications surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the dangers of the “middle-income trap,” are not the only factors impacting the international economic policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, poor capital efficiency is not the only feature of the Chinese economy that frustrates the country’s policymakers. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has roughly doubled in the last decade, but Beijing’s pull in the international monetary and financial system remains lackluster. This lack of progress stems in part from the dollar’s centrality around the world, as well as U.S. dominance in international economic institutions. Beijing’s economic planners have long advocated against the dollar while attempting to increase the global role of the PRC’s own renminbi (RMB) currency. While past efforts stumbled, RMB internationalization and increased Chinese influence will directly confront U.S. economic and geopolitical interests.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

155. China’s Other Viral Crisis: African Swine Fever and the State Effort to Stabilize Pork Prices

Author:: John Dotson
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Since January, much of the international news coverage surrounding the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been dominated by the story of the COVID-19 outbreak—a previously unknown coronavirus that first manifested in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in early December, and which has since rapidly proliferated throughout China and many other countries throughout the world (China Brief, January 29; Johns-Hopkins University, ongoing). The COVID-19 pandemic has largely crowded out international attention to another viral outbreak that Chinese authorities and farmers have been battling for eighteen months: African Swine Fever (非洲猪瘟, Feizhou Zhuwen), which throughout 2018 and 2019 devastated pig populations in both the PRC and surrounding countries. The virus has caused major disruptions to both supplies and the cost of pork, the primary staple meat in Chinese society. As such, it has had a significant impact on the Chinese economy, and has also given senior officials of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reason to fear the potential impacts on “social stability” (社会稳定, shehui wending)—the CCP’s perennial overriding domestic concern.
Topic:: Economics, Food Security, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Animals
Political Geography:: China and Asia

156. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Delays Ahead

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Although no new deals were struck during People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar on January 17 and 18, the visit was significant for several reasons. The visit was the first by a PRC president to Myanmar in 19 years, and the first by Xi to this country in his role as president. The visit was widely touted as marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Myanmar. However, Xi’s first trip abroad this year was aimed at expediting implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (CGTN, January 17). During the visit, the two governments signed 33 agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and letters of exchange relating to railways, industrial and power projects, and trade. Several of these agreements firm up Myanmar’s commitment to the CMEC’s three central components: the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which includes a deep-sea port, an industrial park and other projects; the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (The Irrawaddy, January 18). However, just weeks after Xi’s visit saw the two sides take steps to expedite CMEC projects, Beijing’s plans have run into new problems. CMEC projects are running late, and in an op-ed piece published on the eve of his Myanmar visit, Xi stressed the need for CMEC projects to be moved from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” (New Light of Myanmar, January 16). The coronavirus pandemic has emerged as the latest challenge in the long list of obstacles that have slowed CMEC projects over the years. According to Khriezo Yhome, a New Delhi-based analyst of developments in Myanmar, it “may be too early to assess the impact of the coronavirus crisis on CMEC projects,” given that the pandemic is still only at an “initial phase” in Myanmar; however, there is “no doubt” that it “will slow down the implementation of CMEC projects in the short-term.” [1]
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

157. U.S.-China Economic Relations Under the Trump Administration at the 2-Year Mark

Author:: Peter Harrell
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Since entering office in 2017, President Trump has upended longstanding tenets of U.S. trade policy and launched the most aggressive set of new U.S. tariffs and trade restrictions since at least the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Actions include renegotiating the U.S.-Korea FTA (KORUS) and NAFTA, using “Section 232” of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on most steel and aluminum imports into the U.S. in a bid to support U.S. smelters, using “Section 301” of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose tariffs on approximately half of U.S. imports from China, and threatening to use Section 232 to impose tariffs reportedly up to 25% on U.S. imports of automobiles. The administration’s aggressive stance on trade has upended diplomatic relationships and prompted multinational companies to re-consider aspects of their global supply chains. It has also brought retaliation, including Chinese tariffs on most Chinese imports of U.S. goods. European countries and other U.S. allies affected by Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs have also retaliated with tariffs of their own against imports of U.S. goods, with many of the retaliatory tariffs targeting perceived politically important constituencies in the U.S., such as U.S. whisky distillers, who are heavily concentrated in the home state of Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. But Trump’s aggressive trade policies also began to deliver some successes in 2018, including a successful renegotiation of NAFTA, now renamed the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), a renegotiated Korea-U.S. FTA, and at least some willingness by European and Japanese officials to discuss greater market access for U.S. products. While many major U.S. importers and trade associations have complained about the tariffs, the tariffs continue to draw support from several of the key constituency groups that they are intended to assist, such as the U.S. steel industry. While U.S. tariffs against imports from allies are seemingly driven largely by the Trump administration’s general protectionist bent, Trump’s trade actions against China reflect a broader set of concerns that is more widely supported by members of the United States congress and American experts outside of government. These include both longstanding U.S. concerns over Chinese trade practices and market access barriers, and growing U.S. geopolitical competition with China—what the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, refers to as the return of “great power competition.” These geopolitical concerns have been central to the administration’s recent aggressive efforts to block the deployment of Huawei telecommunications technologies in new “5G” mobile communications networks around the world, and in the administration’s increasingly vociferous opposition to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). And because of increased U.S.-China geopolitical competition, U.S. use of targeted trade controls, investment restrictions, potential targeted sanctions, and other measures against China, will likely continue even if, as is widely expected, Trump and President Xi reach a broad agreement on many trade issues in the coming months and reduce some of the tariffs that are currently in place.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

158. Global E-Commerce Talks Stumble on Data Issues, Privacy, and More

Author:: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Zhiyaou (Lucy) Lu
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In early 2019, several important members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) submitted noteworthy proposals in a realm of international commerce that has evolved faster than rules to govern it: e-commerce or digital trade. While countries agree on less controversial subjects like banning unsolicited commercial electronic messages, the three leading WTO members—China, the European Union, and the United States—have big differences in their approaches to more challenging issues: data flows, data localization, privacy invasions by data collectors, transfer of source code, imposition of customs duties and internet taxes, and internet censorship. Their differing viewpoints lead Hufbauer and Lu to conclude that the prospect of reaching a high-level WTO e-commerce agreement is not promising. To reach an agreement, either most of the contentious issues must be dropped or the number of participating countries must be sharply reduced. A WTO accord, even of low ambition, would have value if only to establish basic digital norms on matters such as banning unsolicited commercial messages and protecting online consumers from fraudulent practices. A more ambitious accord covering the controversial issues should be negotiated in bilateral and/or plurilateral/regional pacts rather than in the WTO.
Topic:: Economics, World Trade Organization, Finance, Privacy, and Data
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and European Union

159. US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World Markets Adjust, Others Gain

Author:: Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The terms of the US-China trade war change often, but the tariff escalations have inflicted documented economic damage on both countries. Expanding the conflict will only increase the damage and reverberate across the world economy. This Policy Brief uses a computable general equilibrium model of the global economy to analyze three scenarios that could unfold in coming months. The first scenario is the current situation (as of June 2019). Two additional scenarios assume implementation of proposed US tariffs and Chinese responses. The models project the situation after the two countries and the rest of the world adjust across a time horizon of three to five years. For the United States, higher tariffs raise prices and reduce demand for consumers and producers. For China, the tariffs raise the prices of consumer goods but have less direct impact on producers, because the Chinese have exempted some intermediate inputs. US exports and imports decline under all three scenarios. But China can successfully divert its exports away from the United States and escape maximum economic damage.
Topic:: Economics, Global Markets, Finance, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

160. Chinese Investments in the US and EU Are Declining—for Similar Reasons

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: For years China has been one of the world’s most rapidly growing sources of outward foreign direct investment. Since peaking in 2016, however, Chinese outward investments, primarily to the United States but also the European Union, have declined dramatically, especially in response to changes in China’s domestic rules on capital outflows and in the face of rising nationalism in the United States. Concerns about growing Chinese influence in other economies, the ascendant role of an authoritarian government in Beijing, and the possible security implications of Chinese dominance in the high-technology sector have put Chinese outward investments under intense international scrutiny. This Policy Brief analyzes the most recent trends in Chinese investments in the United States and the European Union and reviews recent political and regulatory changes both have adopted toward Chinese inward investments. It also explores the emerging transatlantic difference in the regulatory response to the Chinese information technology firm Huawei. Concerned about national security and as part of the ongoing broader trade friction with China, the United States has cracked down far harder on the company than the European Union.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Foreign Direct Investment, and Investment
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

161. The 2018 US-China Trade Conflict after 40 Years of Special Protection

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In 2018, the United States suddenly increased tariffs on nearly 50 percent of its imports from China. China immediately retaliated with tariffs on more than 70 percent of imports from the United States. This paper assesses what happened in 2018 and attempts to explain why. It first constructs a new measure of special tariff protection to put the sheer scope and coverage of the 2018 actions into historical context. It then uses the lens provided by the 2018 special tariffs to explain the key sources of economic and policy friction between the two countries. This includes whether China’s state-owned enterprises and industrial subsidies, as well as China’s development strategy and system of forcibly acquiring foreign technology, were imposing increasingly large costs on trading partners. Finally, it also examines whether the US strategy to provoke a crisis—which may result in a severely weakened World Trade Organization—was deliberate and out of frustration with the institution itself.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization, Bilateral Relations, Trade Wars, Donald Trump, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

162. EU Trade Policy amid the China-US Clash: Caught in the Cross-Fire?

Author:: Felipe González and Nicolas Véron
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: China's rapid rise and unique economic system and the increasingly aggressive and disruptive US trade policy are posing an unprecedented threat to the global rules-based trading and economic system. The European Union has critical interests at stake in the current escalation, even as it has so far been comparatively spared from US trade policy belligerence and China's reactions. In this context, the European Union should adopt an independent and proactive stance, building on recent efforts and going beyond them. The European Union, even more than the United States or China, has a strategic interest in the preservation of the global rules-based order embodied by the World Trade Organization (WTO). It must play a leading role in steering WTO reform and modernization, working closely with broadly aligned third countries such as Japan and other players. It should expand its outreach beyond its immediate negotiating counterparts in both the United States and China, and leading European officials at both the EU and member state levels should work at better understanding China. While strengthening its domestic policy instruments to address new challenges, such as the screening of foreign direct investment for security purposes, the European Union must also resist its own temptations of protectionism and economic nationalism. In support of these objectives, the European Union should prepare itself for difficult decisions, which may involve revising some of its current red lines in international trade negotiations. Conversely, the European Union should stand firm on principles such as refusing one-sided agreements and rejecting abusive recourse to national security arguments in trade policies. The European Parliament, in working with the European Council and the European Commission, will have a critical role to play in steering the European Union through these challenging times.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Trade Wars, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and European Union

163. Protectionism under Trump: The China Shock, Intolerance, and the "First White President"

Author:: Marcus Noland
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In 2016, the United States elected an avowedly protectionist president. This paper uses US county-level electoral data to examine this outcome. The hypothesis that support for protectionism was purely a response to globalization is rejected. Exposure to trade competition encouraged a shift to the Republican candidate, but this effect is mediated by race, diversity, education, and age. If the turn toward protectionism is due to economic dislocation, then public policy interventions could mitigate the impact and support the reestablishment of a political consensus for open trade. If, however, the drivers are identity or cultural values, then the scope for constructive policy intervention is unclear.
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Donald Trump, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

164. The role of Chinese finance in the City of London after Brexit

Author:: Sarah Hall
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham
Abstract:: London is the largest western financial centre for financial transactions denominated in Renminbi (RMB) and has played an important role in shaping the rapid and recent internationalisation of Chinese finance. This policy brief discusses how to maintain this leading role post-Brexit.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, Finance, Brexit, and Financial Institutions
Political Geography:: Britain, China, and United Kingdom

165. The role of Chinese finance in the City of London after Brexit: Background Report

Author:: Sarah Hall
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham
Abstract:: The competitiveness of London’s financial centre is shaped by the UK’s current adoption of EU regulations. The future development of London’s financial services sector is unknown as Britain’s relationship with Europe changes following the vote to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum. This uncertainty arises because even if Theresa May’s Withdrawal Agreement is adopted, the UK will then have to choose whether to converge, seek equivalence with or diverge from EU regulations for financial services. Research by Professor Sarah Hall (University of Nottingham) argues that the implications of these regulatory decisions will impact London’s financial services sector’s relationship with financial markets globally. Her research focuses on how London’s role as the largest western financial centre for financial transactions denominated in China’s currency, the renminbi, could be adversely affected following changes in the regulatory alignment between the UK and the EU following Brexit.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, Finance, and Financial Institutions
Political Geography:: Britain, China, and United Kingdom

166. The United Kingdom's Belt and Road Initiative strategy after Brexit: Background Report

Author:: Benjamin Barton
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham
Abstract:: As China and President Xi Jinping signature foreign policy programme, the BRI has become in a very short space of the time one of the world’s largest and most active international infrastructure development drivers. The BRI is helping, in a significant manner, to meet the increasing demand for infrastructure development and upgrades in emerging markets – a trend that is unlikely to slow anytime time soon, especially given the initiative’s current importance to the Chinese government. For the British government (from here onwards ‘government’), although the UK is unlikely to be a prime destination for BRI projects (for now), the BRI stakes are high. Not only do BRI projects impact the economic wellbeing of a number of countries of strategic importance to the UK, but the government cannot remain passive in the emerging geopolitical context of infrastructure development and financing rivalry. In addition, in light of its relative post-Brexit geopolitical isolation, the government needs to adopt a firm and unequivocal political stance in dealing with its Chinese counterpart should the UK itself become the recipient of BRI projects.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Brexit, Multilateralism, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, and Asia

167. The state of China-European Union economic relations

Author:: Uri Dadush, Marta Dominguez-Jimenez, and Tianlang Gao
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: China and the European Union have an extensive and growing economic relationship. The relationship is problematic because of the distortions caused by China’s state capitalist system and the diversity of interests within the EU’s incomplete federation. More can be done to capture the untapped trade and investment opportunities that exist between the parties. China’s size and dynamism, and its recent shift from an export-led to a domestic demand-led growth model, mean that these opportunities are likely to grow with time. As the Chinese economy matures, provided appropriate policy steps are taken, it is likely to become a less disruptive force in world markets than during its extraordinary breakout period.
Topic:: Economics, Governance, European Union, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

168. How does China fare on the Russian market? Implications for the European Union

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: China’s economic ties with Russia are deepening. Meanwhile, Europe remains Russia’s largest trading partner, lender and investor. An analysis of China’s ties with Russia, indicate that China seems to have become more of a competitor to the European Union on Russia’s market. Competition over investment and lending is more limited, but the situation could change rapidly with China and Russia giving clear signs of a stronger than ever strategic partnership.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Bilateral Relations, Governance, Investment, and Exports
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

169. China’s Future Development: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:: James A. Dorn
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: 1978 has been erratic, with many interruptions along the way. The end result, however, has been eye opening: the Middle Kingdom has become the world’s largest trading nation, the second largest economy, and more than 500 million people have lifted themselves out of poverty as economic liberalization removed barriers to trade. One of the enduring lessons from China’s rise as an economic giant is that once people are given greater economic freedom, more autonomy, and stronger property rights, they will have a better chance of creating a harmonious and prosperous society (see Dorn 2019). Nevertheless, China faces major challenges to its future development. There is still no genuine rule of law that effectively limits the power of government, no independent judiciary to enforce the rights promised in the nation’s constitution, no free market for ideas that is essential for innovation and for avoiding major policy errors, no competitive political system that fosters a diversity of views, and a large state sector that stifles private initiative and breeds corruption. China’s slowing growth rate, its increasing debt burden, environmental problems, and the increasing tension in U.S.-China relations compound the challenges facing Beijing.
Topic:: Development, Economics, History, and Trade Liberalization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

170. Assessing China’s Financial Reform: Changing Roles of the Repressive Financial Policies

Author:: Yiping Huang and Tingting Ge
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: When China began economic reform in 1978, it had only one financial institution, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), which, at that time, served as both the central bank and a commercial bank and accounted for 93 percent of the country’s total financial assets. This was primarily because, in a centrally planned economy, transfer of funds was arranged by the state and there was little demand for financial intermediation. Once economic reform started, the authorities moved very quickly to establish a very large number of financial institutions and to create various financial markets. Forty years later, China is already an important player in the global financial system, including in the banking sector, direct investment, and bond and equity markets. However, government intervention in the financial system remains widespread and serious. The PBOC still guides commercial banks’ setting of deposit and lending rates through “window guidance,” although the final restriction on deposit rates was removed in 2015. Industry and other policies still play important roles influencing allocation of financial resources by banks and capital markets. The PBOC intervenes in the foreign exchange markets from time to time, through directly buying or selling foreign exchanges, setting the central parity, and determining the daily trading band. The regulators tightly manage cross-border capital flows, and the state still controls majority shares of most large financial institutions.
Topic:: Economics, Foreign Exchange, Reform, Financial Markets, and Banks
Political Geography:: China and Asia

171. Insights into China’s Developing Country Status

Author:: Tao Ma
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Abstract:: As the international status of China as a rising power has been growing rapidly in the past 40 years, along with remarkable achievements in economic growth, China’s developing country status has been questioned by some Western developed countries. In January 2019, the US submitted to the WTO General Council the proposal An Undifferentiated WTO: Self-Declared Development Status Risks Institutional Irrelevance (WT/GC/W/757), presenting data arguing that China and some other developing countries had advanced to such an extent that they should be limited from being eligible for special and differential treatment and should give up their developing country status. During the WTO General Council meeting at the end of February, China and other developing countries hotly debated this issue with the US. China insisted that developing countries were confronted with mounting external tensions and their legitimate rights and interests in some international organizations and agreements had been constantly challenged. Against this background, it is critical to clarify China’s ongoing status as a developing country. Only after the real divide between China and developed countries has been clarified can China’s status as a developing country be secured.
Topic:: Development, Economics, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

172. Shooting Oneself in the Foot? Trade War and Global Value Chains

Author:: Cecilia Bellora and Lionel Fontagné
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: Despite the “Phase One Deal” agreed on mid-December 2019, bilateral tariffs between US and China remain at unprecedented high levels, which will have long-lasting effects. US tariffs remain very high on parts, components and other intermediate products; similarly, only the last wave of Chinese retaliatory tariffs has been half cut. We investigate in this paper how such tensions between highly interdependent economies will impact trade, income and jobs. We rely on a set-up featuring General Equilibrium, imperfect competition and importantly differentiating demand of goods according to their use, for final or intermediate consumption. This authorizes tracing the impact of protection along the value chains, on prices, value added and factor income. Additional tariffs from official lists are taken into account at the tariff line level, before being aggregated within sectors. Beyond the direct toll of sanctions, US exports to the world post a sizeable decrease as a result of reduced competitiveness led by vertical linkages along the value chains. Because of the tariffs in place as of February 2020, three quarters of the sectors decrease their value added in the US. Consistent with political economy determinants, these twists of value added are transmitted to production factors, leading to sizeable creation and destruction of jobs, and reallocation of capital to the benefit of protected sectors, mostly at the expense of their clients. Ultimately, this paper sheds light on the economic consequences of policies disrupting global value chains.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:: United States and China

173. Are Your Labor Shares Set in Beijing? The View through the Lens of Global Value Chains

Author:: Ariell Reshef and Gianluca Santoni
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: We study the evolution of labor shares in 1995-2014 while taking into account international trade based on value added concepts. On average, the decline in labor shares (starting around 1980) accelerates in 2001-2007, after which labor shares recover somewhat. In contrast, skilled labor shares consistently increase. The acceleration in the decline in labor shares is associated with increased intensity of intermediate input exporting; this manifests in a sharp increase in the foreign component in upstreamness of industries and countries in global value chains (GVCs). China's global integration accounts for much of this. Declines in the price of investment together with capital-skill complementarity can explain both the consistent increase in skilled labor shares and the reversal of trend in overall labor shares. Compared to shares in GDP, labor shares in gross national product (GNP) are higher in countries with positive net FDI positions; the uneven spread of multinational activity contributes to greater inequality through this channel.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Labor Issues, Trade, Global Value Chains, and Skilled Labor
Political Geography:: China and Global Focus

174. Exchange rate pass-through to import prices: Accounting for changes in the Eurozone trade structure

Author:: Valérie Mignon and Antonia Lopez-Villavicencio
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper assesses whether the emergence of new trading partners (i.e., China and Eastern Europe) as suppliers reduces the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) in Eurozone countries which differ regarding their external exposure. Using bilateral data on import prices at the two-digit sector level, we find that (i) pass-through is complete in many cases, (ii) ERPT from China is higher than from the United States, and (iii) there is no compelling evidence of a generalized link between ERPT and the increasing integration of some emerging markets in European imports. We also show that the launch of the single currency has not provoked a sufficient change in the part of trade exposed to exchange rate fluctuations and, therefore, has not affected the pass-through. Overall, the trend of liberalization in new players' markets has not altered the competitive environment such as to induce exporters of other countries to absorb exchange rate depreciations.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Exchange Rate Policy, Eurozone, Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Eastern Europe

175. China’s Export Success: Due to Unfair Practices or Fair Competition?

Author:: Rolf Langhammer
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Compared with previous ratings, China’s trade policy today is more positively acknowledged. Yet, China can still be criticised in particular because of its non-transparent subsidy policy, the privileged role of state-owned enterprises, the heavy hand of the state in general, the sluggish enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the prevalence of non-tariff barriers. Yet, it cannot be ignored that Chinese entrepreneurship mentality is highly developed outside state interference in world markets. Especially, in the digital economy, high motivation and a large pool of human skills act as drivers of innovations, so far mainly process innovations. The trade war with the US hurts China and is responded by China with asymmetrical retaliation. The more Chinese exports to the US in total are affected, the more costs will have to be borne by US consumers as options to shift to alternative suppliers become weaker. What President Trump would see as a “good” deal for the US is unclear. It can be thus presumed that the trade war will continue into 2020 and that it is in fact a tech war. The EU is affected as EU companies produce in China for the US market and in the US for the Chinese market. While it might gain from trade diversion effects in the short run, the negative effects on investment due to uncertainty weigh more heavily. The EU is tempted to negotiate a free trade agreement with China but rightly refuses to start negotiations before China is prepared to conclude an agreement on investment. The EU should not see China and the US on equidistance. Workable relations with the US are much more important. To conclude, China’s trade policy has improved relative to Western standards but still warrants further steps towards much less state influence. Yet, its global competiveness especially in the state-of-the-art digital economy is high and is owed to a strong entrepreneurial mentality.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Asia, Exports, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

176. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Geo-political Implications, Regional Constraints and Benefits of CPEC

Author:: Umar Farooq and Asma Shakir Khawaja
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The article is intended to find out the geopolitical implications, regional constraints and benefits of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Researcher reviewed both published research articles and books to find out geopolitical implication, regional constraints and benefits of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. For this purpose, researcher also reviewed newspapers articles and published reports by government and non-governmental stakeholders working on CPEC. Review of the articles and reports indicated that CPEC had enormous benefits not only for China and Pakistan but also for the whole region. But different internal and external stakeholders are not in favor of successful completion of this project. Extremism, sense of deprivation, lack of political consensus, political instability are some of the internal constraints. On the other hand, Afghanistan, India, Iran, UAE and USA are posing constraints to halt the successful completion of CPEC.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Violent Extremism, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, India, Asia, Punjab, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

177. China’s Territorial Claim at South China Sea: A Strategic Competition with USA and its Implications

Author:: Kanwal Hayat and Rehana Saeed Hashmi
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China claims South China Sea as its sovereign domain where it possesses the right to intervene militarily and economically. However, USA considers South China Sea as a common global passage where rule of law and freedom of navigation should prevail.These diverging viewpoints coexist in a wobbly peace environment where both US and China want their own version of international law to be applied and have occasionally resorted to minor armed conflicts over this issue. Every state claiming authority over South China Sea is willing to use coercion in order to get what they want, however, the extent of how far they are willing to go is not clear. This is resulting in a show of gunboat diplomacy involving maritime force of influential states that strives to manipulate the policy makers of the relevant nations (Costlow, 2012). The paper will focus on the situation in the South China Sea. South China Sea is not only claimed by China but various other Asian nations. Does this territorial strife possess the power to turn the region into a war zone? Being one of the most active trade routes in the world having complicated geography and the diverging regional and international interests makes it very sensitive area. China being the emerging economic giant gives competition to the USA in many spheres. Although America has no territorial claim in the South China Sea, it has strategic and economic interests. Where China wants a complete hegemonic control of the area, USA wants to find a way where free unchecked trade could be the future for all.Accompanied with numerous other South Asian nations claiming various portions of the region, a constant tension exists in the region.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Sovereignty, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Oceans

178. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): A MultiDimensional Plan 2017-2030 and Its Characteristics

Author:: A. Z. Hilali
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a set of projects under China‟s Belt and Road initiative, marks a new era of economic ties in a bilateral relationship between the two traditional friends. The multi-dimensional project will not only reform Pakistan economy but it will serve for people‟s prosperity and will help to revive the country economy of both countries. The visions of project partners are clear and the goals of the short term, mid-term and long-term plans of CPEC have been identified. So, the CPEC is not just a transit route for China and Pakistan‟s exports but it will transform Pakistan‟s economy and overcome its problems such as unemployment, energy, underdevelopment, and overall external economic dependency by building capacity in all necessary sectors. Therefore, CPEC could promote economic development and growth which will open new avenues and investment to the country which is based on shared partnership of cooperation, mutual benefits and sustainability. Thus, the CPEC is a grand porgramme and will deliver the economic gains to both China-Pakistan and it can be executed more efficiently and in a balanced way to serve the interests of both the countries. The project of CPEC is also important to China‟s energy and strategic security with reference to South China Sea and other regional and global players. Thus, CPEC could bring economic avenues to Pakistan and can improve regional economic and trade activities for greater development and prosperity. It has perceived that the project will not only foster socio-economic development but it will also reduce the level of political humidity and will be source of peace and harmony between the traditional adversaries. It has also assumed that regional economic integration through CPEC could be a harbinger to resolve the political differences by economic cooperation and regional economic connection could make 21st century the Asian century setting aside the perennial political issues to start a new beginning. Thus, in a longer perspective the CPEC can foster an economic community in the entire region of Asia and beyond if its vision is materialized in its true sense. The time will prove that the CPEC reap its fruits and will be advantages for not only Pakistan and China but for the entire region.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Power Politics, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, Asia, and Punjab

179. The Contours of New Regional Alignments in South Asia

Author:: Nazir Hussain and Amna Javed
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: South Asia is an important but complex region. Its manifold complexity is largely ascribed through historical, economic, political and strategic manifestations. The region has witnessed instability in all the given premises and interactions. The entirety happens to be the fact that the structure of alignments is motivated by security complexes which involve cohesion of foreign powers and regional states. The US, Russia, Iran and China now make out to be contemporary stakeholders in South Asian security equation. Their involvement has been seen as a major reorientation in the regional dynamics in terms of political, economic and security characteristics. The manifold possibilities of re-alignments are what the future of the region will look like. The chance of full-fledged strategic alliance in the face of US-India on the basis of similar political, economic and security interests is on the horizon. As a corollary to this alliance pattern, there is China-Russia-Pakistan alliance which is similar in force but opposite in direction. These two systems are one set of opposition forces to each other, which are also natural in form. Another structure which occurs out of the regional dynamics happens to be of India-Iran-Afghanistan which is a trifecta aiming at Pakistan. On the other hand, Russia-China-Pakistan which could turn into a politically motivated and economically driven alliance and can also cover certain aspects of security. Therefore, due to various changes in order there will stem out various patterns of relationships, which could set the order of the region as one marked by various fluctuating alignment patterns.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Realignment
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, China, South Asia, North America, Punjab, and United States of America

180. Chinese investment in Uganda: new impetus for sustainable development?

Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE)
Abstract:: Chinese investment is flowing fast into Uganda, and spreading into the agriculture and forestry sectors. The government needs to keep pace with these developments so the benefits can be shared by Ugandans. A new analysis shows that, while the jobs and new businesses created are well received, the working conditions and environmental practices of Chinese companies are often poor. Many people evicted from their land to make way for new projects have not been compensated. To hold Chinese companies to account, government agencies, with support from NGOs, must share information about these investments and introduce stronger regulation — in particular to uphold community rights. In turn, Chinese companies must be more transparent, responsible and legally compliant. With a proactive and accountable strategy for Chinese investment management, Uganda could make major gains for sustainable development.
Topic:: Development, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, Business, Accountability, Investment, and NGOs
Political Geography:: Uganda, Africa, and China

181. From the EMS to the EMU and...to China

Author:: Joseph Halevi
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: The paper highlights the position of German authorities, showing that they were quite lucid about the fundamental weaknesses inherent in a process that separated monetary from fiscal policies by giving priority to the centralization of the former. Instead of repeating the well known critiques levelled against the EMU – for which readers are referred to the unsurpassed treatment by Stiglitz, the essay highlights the splintering of Europe in the way in which it has unfolded during the 1990s and in the first decade of the present millennium. In particular the early economic and political origins of the terminal crisis of Italy are located between the late 1980s and the 1990s. France is shown to belong increasingly to the so-called European periphery by virtue of a weakening industrial structure and persistent balance of payments deficits. The paper argues that France regains its central role by political means and through its weight as an active nuclear military power centered on maintaining its imperial interests and posture especially in Africa. The first decade of the present millennium is portrayed as the period in which a distinct German economic area had been formed in the midst of Europe with a strong drive to the east with an increasingly powerful gravitational pull towards the People’s Republic of China.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, Political Economy, History, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Europe, Asia, Germany, and Global Focus

182. Nestlé’s Corporate Reputation and the Long History of Infant Formula

Author:: Lola Wilhelm, Oenone Kubie, and Christopher McKenna
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Oxford Centre for Global History
Abstract:: The demand for infant formula in Australia is insatiable. Bare shelves have led supermarkets and chemists to ration sales, limiting the quantity customers can buy in a single transaction. But it’s not Australian parents fuelling the formula shortages. A high proportion, between fifty and ninety percent, of all Australian infant formula is exported to China. The situation has created tensions between the two countries. Australian shoppers complain of Chinese daigou (personal shoppers) buying formula before it is even stacked on shelves and stripping supermarkets in teams of people. In April 2019, eight people were arrested in Australia for stealing over a million dollars of infant formula in Sydney to sell in China. Two months later, Chinese military personnel were photographed loading boxes of formula onto a Chinese warship before departing Sydney Harbour.
Topic:: Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, History, Capitalism, and Multinational Corporations
Political Geography:: China, Australia, and Global Focus

183. East Asia's Decoupling

Author:: Roland Rajah
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: East Asia is no longer reliant on US or Western markets to fuel its growth, giving it more room to manage amid global trade tensions. Heightened global trade tensions and the US desire to ‘decouple’ from the Chinese economy for national security reasons pose significant risks to East Asia’s export-driven growth model. However, the latest data suggests East Asia is no longer so dependent on exporting to the West, with China in particular eclipsing the United States as the leading source of ‘final demand’ for the rest of the region’s exports. This gives East Asia much greater room to manoeuvre, as regional integration is now a more viable platform for growth while US decoupling efforts will likely struggle to find traction in the region.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Global Markets, and Exports
Political Geography:: China, East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

184. Strategic Implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Author:: James Schwemlein
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Great power politics is resurgent in South Asia today. China’s growing military ambition in the region is matched in financial terms by its Belt and Road Initiative, the largest and most advanced component of which is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. What remains unclear is how the United States should navigate the new dynamic. This report, which is based on research and consultations with experts worldwide, addresses the question of how the India-Pakistan rivalry will play into the emerging great power competition.
Topic:: Economics, Power Politics, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

185. China, 5G, and Dominance of the Global “Infosphere”

Author:: WIlliam Schneider
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Modern consumer society has rapidly evolved from domination by “things” to domination by information. Once upon a time, for example, a car was an object for personal transportation in which anything more than basic information about speed and fuel level came from and through the driver. Now, the automobile itself provides and processes information with which drivers interact at a much richer level. Back-up cameras, blind spot and lane drift warning lights, hands-free wireless telephony, and GPS have transformed the driving experience fundamentally, even ahead of the truly revolutionary era of self-driving cars. A large and growing fraction of the world’s day-to-day life of individuals, objects, and institutions will be indelibly stored with an electronic “footprint.” The intelligence value of this information from a national security perspective exclusively accessed through a modern communications system dominated by China – 5G – is immense and profoundly threatening. The new dominance of information is simultaneously bewildering and promising. Moreover, as rapid as the pace of development has been over the past decade, it will soon quicken—with broad implications for almost every aspect of human life. An important aspect of this shift has been the convergence of rapidly developing and mutually reinforcing technologies into an infosphere that will incorporate almost all information-based communications and data services in the global information infrastructure. Not coincidentally, an integrated infosphere meets aspirations held by the People’s Republic of China to dominate and control the global information infrastructure. Beijing’s investments in 5G reflect an understanding that this technology is the gateway to control the world’s information infrastructure and growing realm of 5G-dependent technologies. A Chinese-dominated infosphere is, in fact, the “digital road” component of its Belt-and-Road-Infrastructure (BRI). While U.S. policymakers have yet to fully grasp the implications of this emerging infosphere, the components below reflect the enabling dimensions that support China’s effort to dominate the global information infrastructure.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Internet, 5G, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: China and Asia

186. Grading China's Belt and Road

Author:: Daniel Kliman, Rush Doshi, Kristine Lee, and Zack Cooper
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Since its launch in 2013, what China calls “One Belt, One Road” has emerged as the corner-stone of Beijing’s economic statecraft. Under the umbrella of the Belt and Road, Beijing seeks to promote a more connected world brought together by a web of Chinese-funded physical and digital infrastructure. The infrastructure needs in Asia and beyond are significant, but the Belt and Road is more than just an economic initiative; it is a central tool for advancing China’s geo-political ambitions. Through the economic activities bundled under the Belt and Road, Beijing is pursuing a vision of the 21st century defined by great power spheres of influence, state-directed economic interactions, and creeping authoritarianism. As Beijing prepares to host the second Belt and Road Forum in late April 2019, countries that once welcomed Chinese investment have become increasingly vocal about the downsides. This report is intended to serve as a resource for governments, corporations, journalists, and civil society groups now re-evaluating the costs and benefits of Belt and Road projects. Building on previous research by the Center for a New American Security and other institutions,2 this report provides a high-level overview of the primary challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road. It explores these challenges in the context of 10 cases that have received little high-profile attention and identifies future concerns generated by the Belt and Road’s growing digital focus. Lastly, the report puts forward a checklist for evaluating future infrastructure projects involving China.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Geopolitics, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

187. People’s Republic of the United Nations: China’s Emerging Revisionism in International Organizations

Author:: Kristine Lee and Alexander Sullivan
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China is increasingly using its economic, political, and institutional power to change the global governance system from within. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under President Xi Jinping has become more proactive in injecting its ideological concepts into international statements of consensus and harnessing the programmatic dimensions of global governance to advance its own foreign policy strategies, such as “One Belt, One Road.”1 These efforts demand the attention of the United States, its allies and partners, and civil society. If unchecked, they will hasten the export of some of the most harmful aspects of China’s political system, including corruption, mass surveillance, and the repression of individual and collective rights. This report examines China’s approach to seven organs and functions of the United Nations (U.N.): the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the Human Rights Council, Peacekeeping Operations, Accreditation for Non-Governmental Organizations, the International Telecommunication Union, UNESCO, and the Office of Drugs and Crime.
Topic:: Economics, International Organization, Politics, United Nations, and Governance
Political Geography:: China and Asia

188. China’s 2020 Economic Agenda: Maintaining Stability Amid Flux

Author:: Yun Jiang and Adam Ni
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China’s top annual economic policy gathering, the Central Economic Work Conference (中央经济工作会议, Zhongyang jingji gongzuo huiyi), or CEWC, was held between December 10 and 12 in Beijing. This year’s CEWC focused on the theme of “achieving developmental progress on the basis of first ensuring stability” (稳字当头, 稳中求进 / wen zi dangtou, wen zhong qiu jin) (Xinhua, December 12)—thereby continuing a theme stressed during the meeting of the National People’s Congress in March of this year (China Brief, March 22). Given increasing economic risks and political challenges, both domestic and international, the party-state’s focus on the supremacy of stability is unsurprising. Importantly, the CEWC reiterates that the goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society” (小康社会, xiaokang shehui) by the end of 2020 is “a priority among priorities” (重中之重, zhong zhong zhi zhong). This article examines the key outcomes of the 2019 CEWC, which set the overall direction of China’s economic policy agenda for 2020. In doing so, we highlight a central underlying tension: on the one hand, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants to keep a steady ship at a time of economic and strategic flux; on the other, maintaining strong economic growth requires ambitious developmental goals and economic reform imperatives, which have added pressure for bold policy actions. How well Chinese policymakers can navigate this tension in 2020 has important ramifications for both China’s national development and the CCP’s political legitimacy.
Topic:: Security, Development, Economics, Legitimacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China and Asia

189. CAN ECONOMIC SANCTION ACTIVITY IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES?

Author:: K. Chad Clay
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Governments often use economic sanctions for the expressed reason of curbing poor human rights practices by targeted states. However, previous research on the topic (e.g. Peksen 2009; Wood 2008) has found that the imposition of economic sanctions is regularly followed by increases in the use of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and enforced disappearance (also known as physical integrity rights abuses) by the targeted government, even when the sanctions are imposed over the target’s human rights practices. This raises a question: if sanctions produce worse human rights outcomes in the states targeted with them, why do governments continue to use them to try to improve human rights? There are many possible answers to that question, but in my recent article at the Journal of Global Security Studies, I focus on two in particular. First, while the imposition of economic sanctions may very well lead to increased abuse in targeted states, the threat of human rights-related economic sanctions may lead to improvements in the targeted government’s human rights practices (e.g. Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004). Second, targeted states may not be the only, or even the most important, audience for the signal sent by sanction activity (Baldwin 1985). As such, by showing observing leaders around the world that there is a possible additional cost associated with human rights abuse, rights-related sanction activity may cause some governments that were not targeted with sanctions to think twice before engaging in rights violations.
Topic:: Economics, Human Rights, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: China, Burundi, and Global Focus

190. North Korea’s Economic Strategy, 2018

Author:: William B. Brown
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This chapter takes the perspective of North Korea’s leadership as it confronts difficult economic problems in the remaining months of 2018. The major current and potential issues are listed and prioritized. Short and longer-term remedies are presented, each with trade-offs that affect other economic and policy issues. Given the absence of direct reporting from North Korea, the issues and debates presented are speculative, designed to give the reader a more comprehensive understanding of North Korea’s current problems than is ordinarily presented in western media. Kim Jong-un’s recent diplomatic offensive, reaching out to South Korea, China, and the United States is, in this view, suggestive of these internal economic troubles in addition to the nuclear security issues. The troubles are both short-term—the collapse in trade with China in just the past few months—and long-term, the slow-motion collapse of the communist country’s “command” economy. And much more than in the past, the problems relate to the regime’s unusual and dangerous monetary system, money being a normal issue for most governments but a relatively new one for this still partially rationed, or planned, oriented system. The leadership may have little choice but to let the domestic economy move further from the plan—allowing decentralized market and private activities more sway—than ever before. This would help cushion the central government from losses due to the sanctions and open the door to a much more prosperous future. Without major moves in this direction, inflation and unemployment may cascade into social crisis. It should be noted, that the recent Assembly Meetings, which annually focus on the economy, gave little official indication of policy changes, only a sense of digging in further to protect the regime from outside forces. But just a week later, Kim may have telegraphed an upcoming sea change when, in his address to the Party Central Committee plenum, that he is instituting a new Party Line, socialist economic construction, as the total focus of the Party and the country. Major changes, if they are to occur, will likely come after the upcoming important summits with South Korea and the U.S.1 There is little doubt that the economy in 2018 is in very poor condition, delivering one of the worst productivity rates—productivity in terms of labor and of capital—in the world, but it is important to recognize that this is due not to natural circumstances but to decisions the government has made over the years, and trade-offs it has already made. This suggests that astute government policy can create solutions and restore growth. Remedies of the sort expressed here, for example in liquidating, that is selling or leasing state assets to private buyers, raising fixed prices for state delivered electricity and for water and other utilities, and giving large pay raises to the millions of state workers who now rely on rations, while culling their numbers, would require difficult economic and social trade-offs; one might say there is no free lunch for Kim and his regime although no doubt they are looking for one, even in these summits. The chapter discusses just what kinds of decisions might be made and the likely consequences. Negotiations being set with South Korea and with the United States, and likely more discussions with China, may weigh heavily in how far Pyongyang will be willing to go in these respects. In my view the regime will be looking for: outright aid, payments for pushing back the nuclear weapons program, and premature relief from sanctions, which would only give the regime time to avoid the hard choices needed to permanently fix the broken economic system.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Sanctions, Services, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and Korea

191. The Game for Regional Hegemony: China's OBOR and India's Strategic Response

Author:: Anshuman Rahul
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The OBOR initiative of China often termed as ‘Modern-day Silk Road’ is based on President Xi Jinping’s epic vision to make ‘China Great Again’ by reviving the Silk Route of ancient times. This initiative aims to engage Eurasia economically by creating a network of infrastructure. In this regard, the article attempts to understand the geo-politics behind India’s refusal to join OBOR and strategic response to counter the most appealing economic engagement of the present era but considered to be a debt-trap by India.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, and Silk Road
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

192. Advancing the Regional Trade Order in East Asia with a Less Engaged United States

Author:: Korea Economic Institute of America
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s election and immediate pullout from the TPP, a scramble ensued over how to proceed with constructing a regional trade order centered on East Asia. For China this brought closer scrutiny of its pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the case of Japan, questions followed about what to do with the residue of TPP. Others, notably countries in Southeast Asia, were left contemplating the balance between eastern exclusive regionalism and the western presence in regionalism. In the background were efforts in South Asia aimed at advancing economic integration with East Asia. A kind of free-for-all was in progress without the moorings that had been lost after the paradigm of competition between a U.S.-led TPP and a China hub-and-spokes BRI no longer was guiding the strategic calculations of Asian countries. Then, in March 2018 came Trump’s disruptive tariffs, threatening to set a trade war in motion. Four chapters explore the challenge of advancing a regional trade order in East Asia in the new circumstances of 2017-18. Tu Xinquan in Chapter 10 questions whether BRI is a path toward regionalism, delving deeply into the Chinese strategy for BRI. T.J. Pempel follows in Chapter 11 by exploring Japan’s thinking about TPP and the process of refocusing on TPP- 11 following the U.S. withdrawal. Chapter 12 by Sanchita Basu Das offers a hopeful ASEAN perspective on economic regionalism. Finally, in Chapter 13 Pradumna Bickram Rana traces thinking about re-energizing economic integration between South Asia and East Asia. With no finality to the RCEP talks and the recently concluded TPP-11 pact still taking shape and Trump’s “America First” trade policy casting a dark shadow, we aim to capture signs of a new trade order at a time of flux.
Topic:: Economics, Regional Integration, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, China, East Asia, Asia, and Korea

193. The Benefits of Regional Integration for Pakistan and Central Asian Republics

Author:: Sarwat Rauf
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Regional cooperation can give power to the small states and in order to get economic development, states usually prefer to enter in political and economic alliances. This paper examines the efforts of Pakistan and China to upgrade their regional cooperation through connectivity. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an important branch of Chinese mega project, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which intended to link South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, Europe and Africa by using land and sea routes. The main argument is that CPEC will bring comprehensive changes in the economy of Pakistan and it would be beneficial for neighboring countries particularly CARs. CPEC has steered several other economic projects such as signing of Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) envisages cooperation between two regions. Similarly, groundbreaking ceremony of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India Pipeline (TAPI) reflects revamping of relations between states. The paper is set out in the perspective of available harmonious grounds for Pakistan and CARs. It also examines the various facets of the utility of CPEC for China, Pakistan and CARs
Topic:: Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

194. Political Signals: Why Are Some Countries Abandoning the Dollar in Their Foreign Trade?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Several Middle Eastern countries, such as Turkey and Iran, have been recently shifting into international currencies or local currencies, instead of the US dollar, in their foreign trade. This shift comes amid the US economic sanctions on Iran in tandem with its souring relations with Turkey. What is striking in this regard is that there is an international acceptance of other currencies, especially the Chinese yuan, with the pricing of some oil contracts in the same currency. This move seems to have a particular political significance, namely rejecting the impact of the US dollar on the trade of these countries rather than its economic feasibility, amid the sharp fluctuations in the local currencies of Iran, Turkey, and India in the past period.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Currency, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

195. BRICS Plus: An innovative model for cooperation

Author:: Su Qingyi
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Abstract:: It has been ten years since the BRICS mechanism was established. During this process, BRICS has undergone two significant improvements. The first is the accession of South Africa in 2011, and the second is promoting the formation of BRICS Plus in 2017. This reveals that BRICS cooperation is a continuous development mechanism. BRICS Plus is the perfection and innovation of the current system. The main body comprises the countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. This is conducive to ensuring the stability and efficiency of the organization’s cooperation. However, the cooperation is an open and inclusive platform.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, Trade, and BRICS
Political Geography:: China, India, and South Africa

196. EU, China Have Common Interests to Cope With US Protectionism” - Analyst

Author:: Su Qingyi
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Abstract:: The Chinese government has announced plans to implement retaliatory duties on $34 billion worth of US goods following the introduction of similar measures by Washington. Sputnik has discussed the issue of the looming trade war with Qingyi Su, Senior Research Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).
Topic:: Economics, Tariffs, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

197. Who Can Win the Possible China-US Trade War?

Author:: Li Chunding
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Abstract:: This paper uses a multi-country global general equilibrium (GE) model to numerically simulate the effects of possible China-US trade wars. We introduce an endogenous trade imbalance structure with trade cost into the model which helps to explore both tariff and non-tariff trade war effects. Our simulation results show that China will be significantly hurt by the China-US trade war, but negative impacts are affordable. The US can gain under unilateral sanction measures to China, but will lose if China takes retaliation measures. Comparing the effects under mutual trade war, China will lose more than the US. Introducing non-tariff barrier trade wars will intensify the negative effects, and comparatively negative effects to China are larger than to the US. Mexico’s involvement in trade war with the US will strengthen the negative effects and comparatively hurt the US more. Under non-cooperative and cooperative Nash bargaining equilibrium, the US can gain more than China in trade war negotiation, which means the US has stronger bargaining power than China. Additionally, trade wars between China and the US will hurt most countries and the world especially in GDP and manufacturing employment, but benefit their welfare and trade.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

198. Country-Risk Rating of Overseas Investment from China (2018)

Author:: CROIC-IWEP
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Abstract:: China's outbound direct investment hit a new high in 2016, reaching $196.15 billion, making the country the world's second-largest overseas investor. The volume of its outbound direct investment increased by 34.7% year-on-year in 2016 and accounted for 13.5% of the world's total — the first time it exceeded 10%. Since 2003, when the Ministry of Commerce joined hands with the National Bureau of Statistics and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange to start releasing authoritative investment data annually, China's outbound direct investment has kept increasing for 14 consecutive years. From 2002 to 2016, the annual average growth of its outbound direct investment reached 35.8%. In 2016, China's outbound direct investment once again exceeded the foreign direct investment it received, making it a net capital exporter for two consecutive years. Meanwhile, its outbound direct investment stock hit $1.35739 trillion at the end of 2016, the 6th largest in the world, two notches up compared with in 2015. In 2016, China had the most overseas M&A deals in history in terms of both number and value of M&A deals. In the future, China is expected to bring out more of its investment potentials and build a win-win cooperative relationship with other countries following its economic transition and upgrading, rising competitiveness of Chinese enterprises in overseas markets and steady advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:: Economics, Foreign Direct Investment, and Investment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

199. Inequality dynamics in China: Income growth for the poor, but more for the rich

Author:: Shi Li and Terry Sicular
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: In the late 1970s, China embarked on a major programme of economic transition and reform. Since then, China’s economy has been transformed from a socialist planned economy to a predominately market economy characterized by a combination of state, private, and mixed forms of ownership. Over the past forty years, household incomes have risen six-fold, poverty has declined dramatically, and in recent years a new class of ultra-rich has emerged. These developments have naturally led to questions about inequality trends in China.
Topic:: Economics, Poverty, Reform, Income Inequality, and Welfare
Political Geography:: China and Asia

200. Trade linkages and firm value: evidence from the 2018 US-China "trade war"

Author:: Yi Huang, Chen Lin, Sibo Liu, and Heiwai Tang
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:: On March 22, 2018, Trump proposed to impose tariffs on up to $50 billion of Chinese imports leading to a significant concern over the "Trade War" between the US and China. We evaluate the market responses to this event for firms in both countries, depending on their direct and indirect exposures to US-China trade. US firms that are more dependent on exports to and imports from China have lower stock and bond returns but higher default risks in the short time window around the announcement date. We also find that firms' indirect exposure to US-China trade through domestic input-output linkages affects their responses to the announcement. These findings suggest that the structure of US-China trade is much more complex than the simplistic view of global trade that engendered Trump's "Trade War" against China.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Global Political Economy, Trade Wars, and Exports
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS