Political Geography: China / Topic:

2301. Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: What does it mean for the European Union?

Author:: Nanae Baldauff
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Not so long ago Japan seemed to be left out on the diplomatic stage, notably when it decided not to join China’s newly established Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) in 2015. But while no one can deny China’s impressive global outreach under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Japan has not been sitting idly by. Quite the contrary, Japan is playing a leading role in shaping the concept of free and open Indo-Pacific region, and has positioned itself as an important political actor that upholds the rule of law under its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP). As China becomes more and more assertive economically and militarily, strengthening ties with Japan becomes all the more important for the European Union (EU). As a strategic partner of Japan, the EU more than ever needs to work with Japan in upholding the liberal international order.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

2302. The EU and China: Modest Signs of Convergence?

Author:: Gustaaf Geeraets
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Against a background in which the United States is increasingly drawing into question its commitments to free trade and the global commons, the challenge for the EU and China is to deal with a global governance system that is evolving from a multilateral system centred around the US into a more diffuse system resting on the three strong trading poles: China, the EU and the US.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Governance, European Union, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America

2303. Sending in the Cavalry: The Growing Militarization of Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia

Author:: See Seng Tan
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Philippines, which lasted from May to October 2017, constitutes a watershed moment in the evolution of the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia. Pro–Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants threatened to turn Marawi into “the Mosul of Southeast Asia,” with their astounding ability to operate large groups capable of controlling territory and exposing the inadequacy of the region’s security services. Although member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had pondered the question of possible participation by their armed forces in counterterrorism well before the Battle, it is undeniable that Marawi has become the catalyst behind the regional drive to militarize counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia. Cooperative frameworks furnished by ASEAN have since taken on added significance, especially the defense-oriented arrangements that bring together the defense establishments and armed forces of the ASEAN countries as well as those of external powers including China, India, Japan, and the United States. The growing militarization of counterterrorism efforts will neither be easy nor straightforward, given longstanding regional sensitivities and the potentially diversive ramifications that excessive securitization could have for democratic life within ASEAN countries.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and ASEAN

2304. War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare

Author:: David Carment
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: Today’s geopolitical conflicts, especially among great powers, involve a desire to fundamentally revise the order of alliances as well as solidify new norms of conduct. The purpose of our paper is to delineate two distinct phenomena in international affairs – hybrid warfare, which emphasizes the tactical level and grey-zone conflicts, which incorporates a long-term strategic dimension into international disputes. We argue that hybrid warfare can be a tactical subset of grey-zone conflict deployed under certain conditions and in varying degrees. We examine four case studies: China’s application of ‘unrestricted warfare’, Russia’s strategy of ‘hybrid balancing’, ‘regional hybridism’ practiced by Israel and ‘restricted hybridism’ applied by Canada/NATO globally. We conclude that the solution to challenges from Russia and China is not a military one but a political and collective one based on baseline requirements for building resilience. Israel, on the other hand, is largely uninterested in the revision of order of alliances and will continue to utilize its tactical advantage vis-à-vis regional neighbors to achieve victories in short conflicts. We conclude that NATO (and Canada) should work more closely with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Union to effectively extend security guarantees to its members. In doing so Canada and likeminded countries will involve the costs of engaging in hybrid warfare and the subsequent erosion of democratic accountability.
Topic:: NATO, War, Geopolitics, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Middle East, Canada, Israel, and Asia

2305. The Security Dimension of a China Free Trade Agreement: Balancing Benefits and Risk

Author:: Gordon Houlden
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: In 2017, Canada engaged in several rounds of exploratory discussions for a potential free trade agreement (FTA) with the People’s Republic of China. It seemed probable that this exploratory phase would be followed by the opening of formal rounds of negotiations, to be announced during Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit to China in December 2017. An FTA appeared to be a priority for Trudeau since his government came into office in 2015 (Global Affairs Canada, 2017a; Lu, 2017; PMO, 2017); however, such negotiations were put on hold indefinitely, ostensibly due to irreconcilable differences on gender and labour issues. Despite this setback, it is likely that the Canadian government will continue to explore this option in the coming years, particularly with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in jeopardy. While there are many potential benefits of a Canada-China free trade agreement (CCFTA), there are also significant national security implications that will deserve particular attention. The security dimension will be the focus of this paper. Prospective CCFTA negotiations with China would be both complex and time consuming, in part due to the wide divergences between the Canadian and Chinese economies, as well as differences between Canadian and Chinese administrative and legal systems. Negotiations could therefore take several years to conclude, and might not be finished until well after the 2019 federal election. It took a full decade to sign and ratify the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), although it appears that the most difficult portion of the negotiations was wrapped up in the final two years. It is unlikely that a CCFTA will move as slowly as the Australian FTA did, in part because of the established Australian precedent and because of China’s increasing familiarity with FTA negotiations that involve advanced economies. For this reason, Canada would benefit from approaching a CCFTA after Australia, but before many other Western countries. Chinese and Canadian negotiators will be consumed with elaborating the principles of each side’s responsive FTA approaches, as well as the myriad of details involving thousands of products and services that a CCFTA’s provisions would affect. Canadian negotiators will seek a high-quality FTA that covers a large percentage of our export and import products with China, as well as an agreement that covers all key sectors and industries. There is also likely to be a Canadian focus on addressing China’s use of non-tariff barriers to trade which currently inhibit Canadian firms from taking full advantage of the massive China market. Such measures include the Chinese Ministry of Health’s 2013 changes to food safety standards which required all imported food products to list detailed nutritional components in Chinese. Procedural barriers such as this represent a significant hurdle for Canadian firms, and cause uncertainty among international exporters that want to break into the Chinese domestic market. In theory, the centralized Chinese economy lacks the regional complexity of the Canadian federal state, characterized by sub-national units, but in reality, China’s provinces and municipalities can, and often do, impose barriers to foreign imports, often to protect market share for local substantive industries. To date, China has FTAs with only a handful of developed countries. Australia, Korea, Switzerland, Iceland, Singapore and New Zealand currently have bilateral FTAs with China, and several others, such as Norway and Israel, are in FTA negotiations. China is also floating ideas for FTAs with developing countries, including India. China is far more trade-dependent than the United States, although by comparison China is not nearly as trade-dependent as Canada is.1 The balance of trade is currently in China’s favour: China exports US$46 billion to Canada, versus the US$16 billion that it imports from Canada (MIT, 2016a). However, it is important to note that China’s exports to Canada account for only 2.2 per cent of China’s total merchandise exports (MIT, 2016b).
Topic:: Security, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

2306. The Dragon and Great Power Rivalry at the Top of the World: China’s Hawkish, Revisionist Voices Within Mainstream Discourse on Arctic Affairs

Author:: David Curtis Wright
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: This paper discusses China’s Arctic policy white paper, covers China’s appreciation of the region’s strategic value, and samples scholarly articles across the wide spectrum of opinion and policy recommendation regarding China’s participation in Arctic affairs. It describes the articles, offers translated segments from them, and refers readers who want to read more about the articles and more extensive translated passages from them to the Appendix, where they are included in fuller form. This paper’s main contention and conclusion is that the military and strategic dimensions of China’s interests in the Arctic are part and parcel of mainstream Chinese discourse on the Arctic today. One important motivation behind China’s burgeoning interest and engagement in Arctic affairs is the eventual utilisation of the region as strategic space from which to threaten the security of North America. China’s activities in the Arctic bear close, careful, and continuous scrutiny. It is imperative that Canada not succumb to the siren song of complacency and inaction regarding China’s ambitions in the Arctic region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and Arctic

2307. Finding "Win-Win": China's Arctic Policy and What It Means for Canada

Author:: Adam Lajeunesse
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: China is a “Near Arctic State” with national interests in Arctic resources, shipping lanes, and regional governance. That was the message delivered to the world in China’s new Arctic policy (China 2018). The philosophy espoused in the Chinese White Paper is one of cooperation and mutual profit – what the Chinese have dubbed “win-win” polar partnerships. These partnerships have been expanding in recent years. Tens of billions of dollars in Chinese capital has flowed into oil and gas projects in Siberia and the Russian Arctic offshore, new shipping routes are being tested, and state-owned mining companies have acquired rich mineral deposits in Greenland and – to a lesser extent – Canada. These resources, and the sea lanes that connect them, have been labelled the “Polar Silk Road,” a maritime trade and shipping route supported by Chinese infrastructure spending (theoretically) running through the Northwest Passage and other circumpolar channels. China’s increasingly confident posture in the North represents real opportunities – and challenges – for Canada. Managed properly, Chinese money can support the decades old Canadian dream of developing the Northwest Passage as a useable sea route, decreasing shipping costs, supporting development and improving the quality of life for Arctic residents. Managed incorrectly, Chinese activity might leave the Asian power with a degree of de facto control over the Arctic, damaging Canadian sovereignty and imperiling the country’s ability to manage this increasingly important region on Canadian terms. This new White Paper is as clear a signal as can be sent that China is coming into the Arctic with long-term strategic ambitions. Canada should not fear this development, but it must be prepared for it.
Topic:: Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Canada, Asia, and Arctic

2308. Energy, Trade and Geopolitics In Asia: The Implications for Canada

Author:: Jeff Kucharski
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: Canada’s growing interest in trade with countries in the Indo-Pacific region corresponds with an ominous growth in geopolitical instability and insecurity in that part of the globe. With Indo-Pacific hunger for oil expected to soar – especially in China, where demand will translate to 80 per cent of imports in 10 years – Canada needs to develop policies to deal with the region’s turbulent realities. The Indo-Pacific comprises countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and includes such unstable and unpredictable players as North Korea and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons and long-simmering border tensions. India is an emerging economic and military rival to China. In the next 20 years, China and India are expected to lead the global demand for gas as coal consumption continues to decline, and Canada has a stake in this prosperous future. Along with territorial squabbles in the region, Canada will have to deal with complex issues such as terrorism, human trafficking, transnational crime, piracy and cyber-crime, as well as the struggle for global dominance between China and the U.S. One key area for potential conflict is China’s recent construction and militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea. The Canadian government’s new military strategy, Strong, Secure, Engaged does little more than make a plea for peace and the rule of law in the South China Sea. However, more trade crosses the Pacific Ocean from Canada than crosses the Atlantic. And with Canada signing on to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the region’s troubles will need to be resolved by more than good intentions on paper. Canada must shift more diplomatic, security and military resources to the Indo- Pacific; otherwise, its efforts will be spread too thinly to be effective in the region. Trade, especially through a major route like the Strait of Malacca, could easily be disrupted by any one of a number of disputes, such as a conflict between China and Taiwan or if historic resentments boil over among competing territorial claimants in the region. Thus, Canada needs to step up and reaffirm its security commitments to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a partner in the region. Participating in maritime exercises and Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations would also help to reinforce to countries in the region the importance of abiding by international law. Meanwhile, Canada should set aside for now any intentions to negotiate a free trade agreement with China. China does not share some of Canada’s key trade and security goals and its aggressive behaviour in the South and East China Seas clearly signal that now is not the time to talk about a trade pact. China must demonstrate that it is willing to take a more cooperative approach to resolving trade and security issues in the Indo-Pacific and to support and respect the rule of law in the region. Canada has the potential to become a reliable, stable source of energy for Indo-Pacific countries. There is also an opportunity for provinces such as Alberta to strike their own strategic deals to provide energy resources to countries in that region, in return for trade and investment benefits. However, while investing at home in the necessary infrastructure and export capability to expand its role, Canada must also strive to bring its own unique approach to enhancing regional and energy security in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Canada, Asia, and North America

2309. Canada’s Progressive Trade Agenda and a Free Trade Agreement with China: Are They Incompatible?

Author:: Hugh Stephens
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: The “non-market” clause in the just-concluded update of NAFTA, now known as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) would appear to limit Canada’s options in terms of negotiating a free trade agreement with China at the present time (given the de facto U.S. veto over a Canada-China agreement that it provides), yet Prime Minister Trudeau has already reaffirmed Canada’s intention to pursue closer economic ties with China despite this apparent limitation. If negotiations proceed, negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with China will be very different from negotiating one with a country that shares Canada’s Western values. However, a trade agreement with China makes good economic sense, and while there are some unique obstacles to reaching such an agreement owing to differing views of progressive trade, these are not insurmountable. In fact, Canada can use the same models in negotiating with China that it has used with Western countries. Such an approach combines trade goals with respecting Chinese cultural and political differences, particularly those that fall into the category of progressivism. This category includes labour rights, Indigenous and gender issues, and governance. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government has been focused on progressive elements in trade deals, while China has made it clear it is not interested in including them in any such pact. Concluding an agreement would mean that China and Canada must both recognize the political requirements and dynamics on the opposite side of the negotiating table, while seeking common ground diplomatically. Side agreements such as those that exist in the original NAFTA and in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) are one way to work with the two countries’ differences. Many of the provisions in a side agreement are not binding and thus not subject to the agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism or trade sanctions. Instead, they are more aspirational and sometimes lay out a process for civil society groups to raise issues and help the thinking on those issues evolve, rather than simply holding the parties accountable for breaches. Canada is rightly concerned about Chinese stances on human rights, labour, environmental and gender issues. However, instead of including these issues in the main document on trade, they can be dealt with as shared interests between the two countries. Establishing separate but parallel mechanisms to deal with these issues would be a practical way to make progress. Focusing on micro, small and medium-sized businesses as one Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) did, could be another successful approach. Women own many of these businesses in developing countries, so such a focus would make a substantial contribution to their welfare. None of this means Canada should kowtow to China or look the other way on important values and issues. Side agreements and special focuses have formed parts of agreements with other countries that already share Canada’s Western values. This type of give-and-take is present even when Canada negotiates with countries that are not polar opposites. No country’s interests are exactly the same as those of any other and it’s unrealistic to expect unanimity on every issue. Language and firm commitments on progressive issues are still evolving in many of Canada’s free trade agreements, including the USMCA. It would be unreasonable to hope that everything can be achieved in an agreement with China on the first go-around. Rather, viewing a trade agreement with China as a work-in-progress means controversial elements can be brought into the negotiations and language used that reflects the understanding that these issues are evolving. It will require creative thinking, flexibility and joint commitment to find a solution, but—assuming that the USMCA does not rule out Canada-China negotiations toward a trade agreement— it should be possible to find sufficient common ground without having to resort to obfuscation and “creative ambiguity”.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, NAFTA, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Canada, Asia, and North America

2310. China-Israel Relations: Growing Cooperation Amidst Conflicting Interests

Author:: Omer Dostri
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: In the past decade, relations between Israel and China have become closer, following a decision in Jerusalem to diversify and expand Israel’s ties with emerging powers and countries that do not belong to the European Union and are less identified with the American coalition. The visit to Israel by China’s vice president is evidence of the warming of relations between the two countries.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2311. Not Quite that Close: Israel’s Policy towards China

Author:: Eran Lerman
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel’s strategy toward China doesn’t conflict with American interests; rather, it serves and reinforces them. Partnering with Beijing can help stabilize the Middle East. Partnering with Asian nations threatened by Beijing can help build a counterbalance to Chinese power.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Hegemony, Economic Cooperation, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2312. The Future of Latin America and the Caribbean in the Context of the Rise of China

Author:: Dr. R. Evan Ellis
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There are numerous analyses about China and its future, as well as about Chinese engagement with Latin America. This report examines, in detail, how the growth of China, with its power and role in the global economy, is likely to transform Latin America and the Caribbean through economic, political, and other forms of engagement with the region. The report considers multiple scenarios regarding the future of China, the resolution of its security challenges, and possible departures from its current trajectory. It focuses primarily on the question of what Latin America and the Caribbean will look like if China succeeds in its ongoing economic and political engagement in the region. Compared to scenario-oriented analyses, this report does not attempt to predict the detailed political ebbs and flows of the region. Instead, it examines economic sectors to understand how the region will be transformed through its intimate economic relationship with China and its part in a global process in which Chinese companies continue to expand their presence in the region. While the report also looks at military issues and the likely evolution of Latin America’s relationship with the United States, it finds equally dramatic implications for China’s willingness to use its soft power in the region. While this report does not claim that China has nefarious objectives to politically dominate the region, or usurp the United States as a superpower, it does find evidence that the logical extension of China’s current expansion plans threatens to relegate the region to a future of limited economic opportunity and personal liberty. This is seen in China’s actions to pursue its development interests, dominate the most lucrative parts of global value chains, and expand China’s power with a questionable level of respect for Western concepts of universal laws, rights, and freedoms. As China continues in the pursuit of these goals, compromised elites serve the transfer of wealth and resources from the Latin American region and other "Belt and Road" region to the new imperial center.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Hegemony, Foreign Interference, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Latin America, Caribbean, and North America

2313. Technological Competition and China

Author:: James A. Lewis
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Napoleon’s famous quotation about a sleeping giant moving the world when it awoke seems prescient, but a closer examination presents a more complex story. China’s rise is often accompanied by corresponding predictions of inevitable conflict and U.S. decline. These predictions are simplistic and rest on assumptions of China’s economic and political trajectory that may not be valid. In the near term, competition is unavoidable, and the more important challenge comes from China’s efforts to “return to the center of the world stage” and the means China uses to attain this at a time when the United States is reassessing its global role. The United States and China are in a growing competition, perhaps verging on conflict, but it is not a nineteenth century competition between empires for control of territory and resources. Unlike great power competition in previous centuries, the focal point is not military strength or territorial expansion. This conflict is over control of the modern levers of power—global rules and institutions, standards, trade, and technology. The ability to create new technologies, particularly digital technologies (given their importance for politics, security, and economic growth) have become key factors in the U.S.-China relationship, which is marked by close commercial cooperation and deep governmental distrust. This disparity creates unavoidable tensions. The link between technology, innovation, national security, and international power is now widely recognized. When Vladimir Putin says that the country that leads in artificial intelligence (AI) “will be the ruler of the world,” it is hyperbole, but hyperbole that confirms that political leaders recognize that the ability to innovate is a potent source of national power. In the digital age, national security and national power have different requirements shaped by technological change and cyberspace. Innovation has become a central element of its international influence.1 This is not new—the U.S.-Soviet space race was a contest of the ability of different systems to produce new technologies, but those were unique government programs. Technological competition today is as much between companies as states. A country’s ability to innovate and produce advanced technologies provides economic strength, military power, and an intangible benefit of perceived leadership. Both China and the United States have advantages and disadvantages in this contest, and while it is usual to focus on quantitative aspects—such as the number of engineers or patents and spending on research and development (R&D)—these are not the key determinants of technological competition between states. This competition is a contest of ideas on governance for investment, innovation, and the internet. The internet and global connectivity not only reshape the environment for competition but also create political and market forces that both nations find difficult to control.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Hegemony, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2314. The Article II Mandate: Forging a Stronger Economic Alliance between the United States and Japan

Author:: Matthew P. Goodman, Ann Listerud, and Daniel Remler
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The alliance between the United States and Japan has been a force for peace and prosperity around the world for nearly 60 years. Economics has been at the heart of the U.S.–Japan alliance from the outset: Article II of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security mandates that the two allies “seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and … encourage economic collaboration between them.” Nowhere are U.S. and Japanese strategic interests more closely aligned than in the Indo-Pacific region. Both Washington and Tokyo seek to ensure regional security and stability, expand trade and other economic opportunities, and support universal democratic norms. The two countries have worked constructively together for many decades to shape regional economic rules and norms through institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2315. China and Russia in global governance: Long-term obstacles to cooperation

Author:: Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia and China play dissimilar roles in global governance and define their interests in this sphere in divergent ways. While the two states agree on certain international principles and norms, their engagement with global governance differs significantly. These differences pose the most serious long-term obstacle to closer cooperation between Moscow and Beijing
Topic:: International Affairs and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia and China

2316. Xi Jinping thought and China’s future foreign policy: Multipolarity with Chinese characteristics

Author:: Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Xi Jinping Thought is aimed at guiding China both domestically and internationally. The goal is China’s national rejuvenation, which will break the global dominance of Western civilization. The revival must allegedly be led by a strong ideology guided by a strong and charismatic leader: Xi Jinping. Based on the ancient Chinese ideal of “great unity under Heaven”, Xi’s long-term goal for China is the creation of a “community of a common destiny for Mankind”. So far, this idea has no concrete manifestations on the global scale. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China is building a regional community of common destiny in Central and Southeast Asia. This is both an indirect challenge to the existing “Western” system, and a step in delineating China’s sphere of influence.
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: China

2317. China: Champion of (Which) Globalisation?

Author:: Alessia Amighini
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: This year marks the 40th anniversary of China’s reforms and opening up. In four decades, China has learned how to grasp the benefits of globalisation and has become a world economic champion. As the world’s second-largest economy, today China is no longer the factory of the world but an industrial power aiming at the forefront of major hightech sectors, in direct competition with Europe and the US. In sharp contrast with Trump’s scepticism on multilateralism, President Xi has renewed his commitment to growing an open global economy. But how does globalisation with Chinese characteristic look like? Is Beijing offering more risks or more opportunities to both mature and emerging economies? To what extent is China willing to comply with international rules and standards? Is Beijing trying set its own global rules and institutions? Is the world destined to a new model of economic globalisation detached from political and cultural openness?
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: China

2318. The United States, China, and Southeast Asia: Can ASEAN Find a New Strategic Equilibrium?

Author:: Kevin Rudd
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: U.S.-China relations have now entered into a new structural phase. Officially, the Americans describe this as a change from 40 years of “strategic engagement” to a new period of “strategic competition.” The precise definition of strategic competition, as an operational rather than a declaratory strategy, has yet to fully emerge. But we would be foolish not to recognize that there has been a fundamental systemic shift in U.S. sentiment toward China
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China

2319. China politics: Quick View - Theresa May refuses to back the BRI formally

Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
Political Geography:: China

2320. China/UK politics: Macartney’s heir

Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: China and United Kingdom

2321. US/China politics: Quick View - China begins investigating US sorghum imports

Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
Political Geography:: United States and China

2322. Asia politics: Democracy in Asia: China's rise aids democratic recession

Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Nepal, Australia, Timor-Leste, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Laos, Myanmar, Bhutan, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji

2323. Asia politics: Democracy in Asia: China's rise aids democratic recession

Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Nepal, Australia, Timor-Leste, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Laos, Myanmar, Bhutan, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji

2324. China politics: Quick View - Presidential term limit set to be scrapped

Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Election watch
Political Geography:: China

2325. China politics: Belt and Road Initiative Quarterly: Q1 2018

Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: China

2326. Towards a “New Era” in China’s Great Power Diplomacy

Author:: Justyna Szczudlik
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In his first term, Chinese leader Xi Jinping abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy dictum of “keeping a low profile.” But China’s activism in the middle of Xi’s first term was still more reactive than creative. However, in the last two years a new phase of diplomacy has emerged, in which all actions are subordinated to China’s unchanging strategic foreign policy goal of regaining its superpower status. This means that China strives to enforce change in the global system, which is dominated by the West.[1] The PRC is already trying to introduce new standards for international relations and promotes its values and principles more aggressively worldwide. There are already examples that Xi is effectively implementing his ideas.
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: China

2327. China should address downward pressure in 2018

Author:: Qiyuan Xu
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Abstract:: In 2017, the Chinese economy rebounded more significantly than expected. There is now general anticipation that growth in 2018 will fall slightly compared with that of 2017, but that it will remain stable at 6.5 percent or above. However, there are some factors that could lead to downward pressure on investment and consumption in 2018
Topic:: International Political Economy and International Affairs
Political Geography:: China

2328. From Deng to Xi: Economic Reform, the Silk Road, and the Return of the Middle Kingdom

Author:: LSE Ideas
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This LSE IDEAS Special Report - with senior contributors from politics, journalism, and academia - looks at the internal causes and consequences of the return of the 'Middle Kingdom'. It explores the extent to which Deng's momentous economic reforms in 1978 have shaped modern China, what the country's expanded international role under Xi means, and who really makes Chinese foreign policy.
Topic:: International Affairs and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:: China

2329. China politics: Leaving the THAAD dispute behind

Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: China

2330. Asia politics: Quick View - China restricts crude oil exports to North Korea

Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
Political Geography:: China, South Korea, and North Korea

2331. China/France politics: Quick View - Macron’s China visit fails to clinch deals

Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
Political Geography:: China and France

2332. Asia politics: China and India tussle for influence in the Indian Ocean

Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: China, India, and Sri Lanka

2333. China/Taiwan politics: Hard prong, soft prong

Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: China and Taiwan

2334. China politics: #ChinaToo

Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: China

2335. China politics: Quick View - "Xi Jinping Thought" set to enter national constitution

Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:: China

2336. China politics: Quick View - Wang Qishan looks set for post of vice-president

Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Election watch
Political Geography:: China

2337. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Cold War Era

Author:: Jin Linbo
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This chapter draws a rough sketch of the evolution of Chinese views on Korean history in the Cold War era in three parts. The first focuses on the formulation of Chinese views of the Korean War in 1950 and the mainstream assessment of the war after Sino-South Korean diplomatic normalization in 1992. The second focuses on China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the Cold War years. The third deals with the changes and limits of perceptions on Korean history after diplomatic normalization and their impact on bilateral relations between Beijing and Seoul. For centuries many Chinese have firmly believed that the relationship between China and the Korean Peninsula is like that between lips and teeth, they are not only close to but also dependent upon each other. If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold. From the middle of nineteenth century, the geopolitical proximity and interdependence between the two have become the determining factors in formulating Chinese perceptions towards Korea. Since then the national security concerns symbolized by the sense of lips and teeth had been frequently stressed by some Chinese intellectuals and officials when both China and Korea were exposed to the growing imperialist expansion and geopolitical competition in East Asia. In order to maintain the traditional tributary relationship between China and Korea, China fought the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95. Although it was miserably defeated, and Korea was consequently annexed to the Japanese empire in 1910, the Chinese sense of lips and teeth remained undiminished. Rather, it was further strengthened among ordinary Chinese when the Cold War began and especially when the Korean War broke out in 1950. After the end of World War II, China faced a new situation on the peninsula. Korea was liberated from Japanese rule but soon divided into the Soviet backed socialist North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the U.S. backed capitalist South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK). As a newly established socialist country, China naturally allied itself with the Soviet Union and viewed the DPRK as a close friend while regarding the United States and ROK as hated foes. The intensified Cold War confrontation between the two camps and two Koreas triggered the outbreak of the Korean War. In order to safeguard its own political, ideological, and security interests, China quickly got involved in the war by sending the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) to fight together with its DPRK friend against their common enemies. The war ended with a cease-fire armistice and created a friend and foe Cold War framework, which the new China was compelled to face even beyond the Cold War era. Under these circumstances, the majority of Chinese held the view that it was the capitalist enemy rather than the socialist friend who started the Korean War with a view to overthrowing not only the socialist government in Pyongyang but also the similar one in Beijing. Therefore, it was against this background that China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the post-Korean War era were doomed to be ideologydriven and DPRK sympathetic.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

2338. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Author:: Kirk W. Larsen
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In July 2014, Ambassador Qiu Guohong in preparation for Xi Jinping’s visit to Seoul stated that the “relationship between South Korea and China couldn’t be any better.”1 Among the many reasons for this—economic, geostrategic, cultural—was a shared sense of history. China and Korea, officials and commentators in both nations claimed, were close because of their agreement regarding the significance of their experiences as victims of foreign, particularly Japanese, imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. History, that constellation of memories, stories, and notions about the past, has often been deployed to reinforce conceptions of identity, to support certain courses of action, and to demarcate between the in-group and the other. But history is ever malleable and protean. Not only do individuals, institutions, and ideas change but so does the understanding of them. When one draws on the past, one inevitably focuses on a limited set of events or narratives that best serve one’s interests—to the exclusion of potentially equally valid candidates. Their utility can vary over time; one need only think of how figures such as Zheng He or Confucius have been imagined and re-imagined over the last century. This has been the case with the history of relations between China and Korea from the latenineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. For many Chinese, Korea has served first as a subject of contestation as China’s position in Korea was challenged by both Western and Japanese powers. Then, when it became increasingly clear that China (or the Qing Empire) was losing this contest, Korea became an omen of China’s own fate absent significant course changes. As Japan’s growing empire engulfed Korea and subsequently threatened parts of China, resistance served to bring China and Korea closer; many in China celebrated what they saw as courageous resistance to Japan—such as when An Chunggun assassinated Ito Hirobumi in 1909. Shared status as victims of Japanese imperialism in an age of “humiliation” brought the two closer, and the mutually shared memory of “humiliation” has been deployed by contemporary Chinese and South Korean leaders—Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye—to foster greater levels of cooperation. However, past conceptions of China, Korea, and the Sino-Korean relationship have sometimes ranged far afield from the cherished tropes of humiliation and the struggle for independence. Even seemingly universally agreed upon symbols, such as An’s heroic 1909 assassination, find themselves subject to changing interpretations such as recent emphasis by some on his pan-Asian vision of Sino-Korean-Japanese cooperation rather than his bold anti-Japanese act. As interests and priorities change, so does the utility of any particular historical narrative.
Topic:: International Relations, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

2339. Chinese Views of Korean History to the Late 19th Century

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In the tradition of imperial China and communism, Chinese publications see history as a morality tale. In the case of Korean history to the late decades of the nineteenth century there are essentially three actors: virtuous China, evil Japan, and variable Korea. There are three critical periods which receive the bulk of attention: the 7th century, the late 16th century trailing into the 17th century change of dynasty in China, and the last decades of the 19th century. The narrative advances the notion of competing visions of regional order, contrasting Chinese and Japanese frameworks and examining Korean policies in light of the choices made between these options. Official Chinese narratives couch today’s opportunities in historical context. A battle rages between socialism and capitalism, offering China a unique prospect to tip the balance. This is not only a present-day challenge; it is a struggle over consciousness of history—a campaign against “historical nihilism” that disagrees with orthodoxy in support of communist party legitimacy and the rectitude of Chinese civilization. A speech given by Xi Jinping in July 2010 at the Central Party School and only recently made available leaves no doubt about the tight censorship imposed on publications about history. South Korea’s history is especially sensitive as the poster-child for the benevolence of the imperial Chinese regional order, the battleground for the key war fought by China to maintain its surroundings against capitalist encroachment, and a chief testing grounds for the rejuvenation of China against U.S. hegemonism and Western civilization. Premodern history is an inseparable part of this agenda.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Imperialism, History, and Narrative
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Korea

2340. Chinese Views of Korean History

Author:: KEI
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The way Chinese officials and writers view the history of Korea—from ancient times to the post- Cold War developments in South Korea—matters for at least three reasons. It is a commentary on Chinese national identity since Korea bears importantly on multiple dimensions of how that identity has recently been constructed. It is likewise a window on how Chinese view the order they seek to forge in East Asia, linking it to the earlier Sinocentric order. Finally, Chinese views of Korea’s history offer valuable insight into China’s vision of the future of the Korean Peninsula and its relationship to China. It is commonplace to regard historical narrative as a lens on views of the present and plans for future policies, but this is even more the case for a country with the tradition of Confucian historiography with its extraordinary stress on correct thinking about the past, and communist historiography redolent with socialist realism insistent on a zero-sum understanding of the past. We read in Chinese historical writings on Korea a morality tale with undoubted relevance to how China constructs both its identity and its international relations. The Korean Peninsula has significance for Chinese national identity beyond that of any foreign country except Russia and the United States with the possible exception of Japan. It is where ideology was honed as China sent the PLA to prevent the fall of North Korea after Mao had given his blessing along with Stalin to the North’s attack on the South. As ideology has grown again in importance, the significance of North Korea’s socialist pedigree and shared origins in the crucible of revolution against imperialism has risen. In the historical dimension of national identity, China’s leaders in the 1990s weighed allowing candor about the origins of the Korean War at a time when de-ideologization was fitfully taking place and there was no established narrative on history. Some saw sensitivity to North Korean reactions as the key to why China did not go further, but the resistance inside China proved more tenacious than they assumed. Historical purity toward Japan intensified apart from a short-lived interval with “new thinking” in 2003. With South Korea on the frontlines in China’s quest for demonization of Japan over history, its own history became a test case for the national identity gap between it and China. The history of Korea is so interwoven with that of China and it can reveal much about recent views.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Identity
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Korea

2341. South Korea’s Strategic Approach to China (or Lack of It)

Author:: Chung Jae Ho
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Pertinent literature abounds on how East Asian states have struggled to position themselves vis-à-vis a rising China over the past two decades. Due to its geographical proximity and cultural similarities with China, as well as its strategic importance to both the United States and China, South Korea’s tightrope-walking has been more pronounced than anyone else’s.1 Given the crucial strategic issues regarding U.S.-China relations and the North Korean conundrum, how the Seoul-Beijing relationship is to evolve undoubtedly constitutes a key variable in regional security dynamics. This chapter asks what is Seoul’s recipe for dealing with a China that is becoming more “assertive,” examining its changing strategic and diplomatic stance over the years of the Park Geun-hye administration and the first year of the Moon Jae-in government. Of the six sections, the first offers a brief overview of the complex relationship since diplomatic normalization in 1992. The second outlines key features of an era of overoptimism during the first three years of the Park administration (2013-15). The third delves into the issue of THAAD (terminal high-altitude area defense) deployment and how that utterly shattered the Park-Xi honeymoon in 2016. The fourth offers a discussion on China’s narrowly-focused sanctions during 2016-17. The fifth is devoted to the first year of the Moon administration, focusing on envoy politics, the “three-noes controversy,” and Moon’s state visit to China. The final section provides concluding assessments of the factors critical in shaping Moon’s policy toward China and where the room for mending relations remains.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Strategic Planning, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

2342. Is the Belt and Road Initiative a Chinese-style Regionalism?

Author:: Tu Xinquan
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In the last two decades, bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been considered a primary force to advance the world trading system because the Doha Development Agenda of the WTO has stagnated since its launch in 2001. The continuous expansion of the European Union and the American-led NAFTA and TPP as well as bilateral FTAs between the United States and EU and their partners best exemplified this phenomenon. However, such an approach is facing serious challenges from rising anti-globalization sentiment originating in the EU and United States in recent years. In June 2016, the United Kingdom decided to exit the EU as a result of a referendum. This is the first time a EU member chose to leave. On January 23, 2017, at the start of his presidency, Donald Trump signed as his first executive order the withdrawal from TPP, which his predecessor spent years concluding with 11 partners. These two consecutive dramatic actions of the previous and current world leaders shocked the globe. Next to the WTO, regionalism is seen as the second-best choice in promoting globalization. Now, two regional initiatives led by developed countries are facing a serious backlash. The world is concerned that this means the end and a reversal of globalization. Since its WTO accession in 2001, China has also been actively negotiating FTAs with its neighbors as well as some remote partners such as Iceland and New Zealand. While its WTO accession package was praised for its ambition and courage, it is difficult to defend Chinese FTAs as comparable to those of developed countries in terms of market access and institutional changes. One explanation for that is China has made very high-level multilateral commitments. Another one is China is not in such a comfortable strategic and economic position as the United States in negotiating FTAs with either developed or developing countries. The former want to obtain more market access concessions and institutional reforms from China, while the latter are afraid to expose their domestic industries to China’s overwhelming competitiveness in manufacturing. In addition, the Chinese government seems more confident in its own institutions and unwilling to change them due to outside pressure, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. President Xi Jinping proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during his state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in September and October 2013, which soon was made a top national priority and even included in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. Nadege Rolland labels this China’s Grand Strategy1 and the organizing foreign policy concept in the Xi Jinping era.2 One key feature of BRI in comparison with RTAs is that BRI focuses more on improving physical connectivity rather than reducing institutional barriers. The logic of physical connectivity is undoubtedly powerful, especially for developing countries with poor infrastructure. The impact of more and better international links on the regional landscape could be huge, not only by boosting trade and commerce but also by easing flows of energy and other resources, stimulating technological innovation, influencing culture and politics, and shaping strategic choices. Given the fact that RTAs are facing serious difficulties, the BRI looks like an attractive and feasible alternative to promote regional economic integration and globalization. However, there are also plenty of uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding the BRI, particularly due to China’s centrality as well as its direction of economic and strategic development. Hence, this chapter explores BRI characteristics in promoting regional economic integration and whether it could become an alternative approach to regionalism and globalization for China as well as the world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2343. The Chinese Perception of the U.S.-China-ROK Triangle

Author:: Yun Sun
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Since being applied to U.S.-Soviet-China trilateral relations after the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s, the notion/theory of “strategic triangles” has been widely used to examine many trilateral relations. The model of “U.S.-China plus one” is popular among students of U.S.-China relations and, consequently, the policy community has witnessed an increasing amount of scholarship on triangles among U.S.-China-India, U.S.-China-Japan, U.S.-China-Russia, and even U.S.-China-Taiwan. Unsurprisingly, this begs the question whether a strategic triangle could be construed and constructed among the United States, China, and South Korea. Generally speaking, despite the trilateral nature of U.S.-China-ROK relations, the Chinese policy community rarely subscribes to the existence of a strategic triangle among the U.S., China, and South Korea. This is not necessarily because South Korea does not carry the same strategic weight as the two great powers, but more importantly is because China does not see South Korea as possessing the strategic autonomy to act as an independent player in the trilateral relations. Although arguably such autonomy might exist in economic and trade relations, on key political and security issues, the Chinese see South Korea as invariably constrained by the U.S.-ROK military alliance and unable to form its own independent national security policy. In writing about the post-Cold War period with an emphasis on geopolitics, Chinese authors do not often treat South Korean policy or Sino-ROK relations as autonomous. Given the great weight given to the U.S. role, it is important, therefore, to take a triangular approach in assessing these writings centered on South Korea. I do so first explaining in more detail why the “strategic triangle” framework does not apply, then examining views on how this triangle has evolved in a period of rising Chinese power relative to U.S. power and fluctuating U.S.-ROK relations as the leadership in Seoul changed hands, and finally returning to the triangular theme to grasp how this shapes China’s understanding of Seoul’s policies with emphasis on the ongoing Moon Jae-in era.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

2344. CAN ECONOMIC SANCTION ACTIVITY IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES?

Author:: K. Chad Clay
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Governments often use economic sanctions for the expressed reason of curbing poor human rights practices by targeted states. However, previous research on the topic (e.g. Peksen 2009; Wood 2008) has found that the imposition of economic sanctions is regularly followed by increases in the use of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and enforced disappearance (also known as physical integrity rights abuses) by the targeted government, even when the sanctions are imposed over the target’s human rights practices. This raises a question: if sanctions produce worse human rights outcomes in the states targeted with them, why do governments continue to use them to try to improve human rights? There are many possible answers to that question, but in my recent article at the Journal of Global Security Studies, I focus on two in particular. First, while the imposition of economic sanctions may very well lead to increased abuse in targeted states, the threat of human rights-related economic sanctions may lead to improvements in the targeted government’s human rights practices (e.g. Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004). Second, targeted states may not be the only, or even the most important, audience for the signal sent by sanction activity (Baldwin 1985). As such, by showing observing leaders around the world that there is a possible additional cost associated with human rights abuse, rights-related sanction activity may cause some governments that were not targeted with sanctions to think twice before engaging in rights violations.
Topic:: Economics, Human Rights, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: China, Burundi, and Global Focus

2345. ALL STICK, NO CARROTS: THE SHORTSIGHTED GEOPOLITICS OF THE IRAN SANCTIONS

Author:: Cullen S. Hendrix
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: The Trump administration, having withdrawn the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action last May, is threatening US trading partners over doing business with Iran and attempting to freeze Iran out of global oil markets. The attempted freeze-out began with the re-imposition of US sanctions against Iran and businesses operating there, and the Trump administration set November 4 as the target date for US allies to zero out their purchases of Iranian crude. With some arm-twisting, NATO allies like Turkey and Asian security partners South Korea and India have agreed to curb Iranian imports, though it will be difficult for India to zero out its Iranian imports. Fearful of being caught up by US sanctions, major European firms like Total, Allianz, and Maersk have begun winding down operations in Iran in advance of the November 4 deadline. This whole episode reflects a fundamental misunderstanding, on the part of the Trump administration, of both the conditions under which sanctions can hope to be successful in winning policy concessions and the geopolitical realities of pursuing said course of action.
Topic:: NATO, Oil, Sanctions, Geopolitics, and Barack Obama
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, India, and United States of America

2346. WHO WILL MANAGE THE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN RIGHTS AND SECURITY ON THE INTERNET?

Author:: Deborah Avant
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Despite much focus on China and Russia, the Internet’s future is being shaped by a more varied set of relationships. In a recent example, Microsoft employees issued an open letter asking the company not to bid on the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) contract to build cloud services for the Department of Defense. The employees complain that the JEDI contract may violate Microsoft values: to “empower everyone on the planet to do more”. It is unclear just what Microsoft would be doing (cloud services can refer to everything from infrastructure to platforms to software—and the security to support each), but employees worry that their efforts could be used to harm others.
Topic:: Security, Human Rights, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Internet, and Civil Liberties
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

2347. Rhetoric and Reality of Doklam Incident

Author:: Jigme Phuntsho
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Bhutan Studies
Institution:: Centre for Bhutan & GNH Studies (CBS)
Abstract:: Doklam standoff which took place between the armies of India and China was a major clash between the two Asian giants. The incident lasted from 18 June to 28 August 2017. For the first time, Bhutan was involved in a conflict between its two neighbours. Exchange of fiery rhetoric characterized the incident, besides unprecedented scale of military drills on both sides of the border, and speculations of an imminent war. The standoff was resolved for now, but the issues related to border dispute continue to emerge, raising the concern for a similar face-off at any time. This article discusses the events that unfolded in the course of the Doklam standoff based on online news articles and a few reports posted on the internet.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Bhutan

2348. Complementarity and dependency in the Energy sector and the transition to a low-carbon economy

Author:: Clarissa Lins, Izabella Teixeira, Adilson de Oliveira, Ricardo Besada, and Zhou Xizhou
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: At its sixth meeting, CEBRI’s China Analysis Group Meeting promoted a wide-ranging debate on the opportunities and challenges emerging for China and Brazil by the new geopolitics of carbon and the ongoing energy transition – characterized, among other trends, by falling costs of renewable sources and by the rise of natural gas as a strategic transition fuel. In this context, participants highlighted the merger between the agendas of energy security and sustainable development worldwide, with implications for both policymaking and investment priorities – since the energy sector accounts for approximately a third of total greenhouse gas emissions globally.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, Economy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

2349. Beyond the trade war: Made in China 2025, innovation and the 4.0 industrial revolution

Author:: Tatiana Rosito, Joren Selleslaghs, Margaret Myers, Mariano Laplane, and Yan Li
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: At its seventh meeting, CEBRI’s China Analysis Group Meeting promoted insightful discussions on the characteristics of Chinese policymaking in science and technology, with particular emphasis on the formulation, implementation and global implications of the Made in China 2025 Plan. As such, in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, discussions encompassed the global trend towards digitization and informatization in manufacturing, as reflected in Chinese efforts towards upgrading its industry. Ultimately, this would respond to the Chinese goal of advancing to higher stages in global technological value chains and ensuring self-sufficiency in high-tech sectors.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Trade, and Industry
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2350. China in Latin America

Author:: Tatiana Rosito, Benjamin Creutzfeldt, Chang Yunbo, Enrique Dussel Peters, and Renato Baumann
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: At its eighth meeting, CEBRI’s China Analysis Group Meeting held a constructive dialogue about the different aspects of China’s presence in Latin America, and the risks and benefits involved. Overall, participants noted that Chinese engagement in the region through trade and investments is closely related to the reproduction of a geopolitical model aimed at promoting access to natural resources. Another important stream of activities include infrastructure investments and projects, mostly through engineering and construction services. Although there could be a potential for investments to help diversify the relationship, they have mostly reinforced existing asymmetries in the trade structure between China and Latin America.
Topic:: Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Latin America

2351. The Belt and Road Initiative: views from Brazil and other partners

Author:: Anna Jaguaribe, Benoni Belli, Tatiana Rosito, Carsten Hasbach, and Tobias Dennehy
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: At its ninth meeting, CEBRI’s China Analysis Group promoted insightful exchanges among varied stakeholders concerning the implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Speakers focused on analyzing its strategic significance for China and the opportunities established for different actors involved, including partner countries and multinational companies operating in fields related to infrastructure. In light of the BRI’s impressive figures – encompassing over 90 countries, around 50% of global GDP and 70% of the world's population – participants explored the Initiative’s meaning beyond infrastructure investments and connectivity, stressing its geopolitical nature and the central role in the Chinese ambition to shape the future of globalization and the global order.
Topic:: Globalization, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Brazil, and South America

2352. Good Foreign Policy Makes for Good Domestic Policy//Una Buena Política Exterior Contribuye a Una Buena Política Interior

Author:: COMEXI
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI)
Abstract:: The electoral results of July 1st 2018 bring an extraordinary opportunity to rethink Mexico’s foreign strategy in order to position the country in accordance with its domestic goals and its international reality, considering the means that the country has at its disposal to increase its appeal and competitiveness on the international stage. Mexico has several comparative advantages that can be leveraged—and, at the same time, reinforced—in the international arena. These include the country’s geographic position (bridging the Atlantic and the Pacific), demographics (with an average age of 28 years), language (Spanish is the second-most spoken language in the world), energy resources, 12 trade agreements with 46 countries, economic and political stability, and a denuclearized, interstate Zone of Peace free of religious conflict. The next Mexican administration will face an unusually complex international environment that will force it to give special priority to its foreign policy. Challenges that arise in the international arena could affect national stability, undermine Mexico’s room for maneuver, and impact its development goals. Therefore, having a clear, relevant, and viable strategy that addresses the fundamental interests of the Mexican people and that also has enough clout on the international stage, is crucial. / Ante los resultados electorales del pasado primero de julio, se abre una extraordinaria oportunidad para repensar la estrategia mexicana hacia el exterior que posicione a México en un espacio congruente con sus objetivos internos y su realidad internacional. Todo ello en el contexto de las herramientas que tiene a su disposición para aumentar su atractivo y competitividad en el escenario internacional. México posee diversas ventajas comparativas que pueden ser aprovechadas —y, al mismo tiempo, dinamizadas— en el entorno internacional. Por mencionar algunas: la localización geográfica, puente entre el Atlántico y el Pacífico; la demografía, con una edad de población promedio de 28 años; el idioma, el español es el segundo idioma más hablado en el mundo; los recursos energéticos; una red de 12 tratados comerciales con 46 países; estabilidad económica y política; y una zona de paz interestatal, desnuclearizada, y sin conflictos religiosos. El próximo gobierno de México enfrentará un escenario internacional inusualmente complejo que le obligará a otorgar un grado de prioridad muy destacado a su política exterior. Los desafíos provenientes del ámbito internacional podrían afectar la estabilidad nacional, socavar sus márgenes de maniobra e incidir sobre sus metas de desarrollo, por lo que resulta crucial contar con una estrategia precisa, pertinente, y de ejecución viable, que responda a los intereses esenciales de la nación mexicana, y que alcance la contundencia necesaria en el ámbito internacional.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Development, Elections, European Union, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, North America, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and United States of America

2353. Financing Green Growth

Author:: Gregor Semieniuk and Mariana Mazzucato
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
Abstract:: This paper surveys the current state of financing green growth in the energy sector, based on the insight that there are different qualities of finance. In past transformational changes in other sectors, public monies played a key role across the innovation landscape. Public financing was central also in a number of past national energy transitions, as reviewed here for Iceland (from fossil to geothermal energy), Norway (from mainly non-electricity energy to hydroelectricity), France (from oil to nuclear) and the United States (from conventional to shale gas). In the current transition to low-carbon energy supplies, there is much public activity, most directed and concerted in China, but also reasons to doubt it is enough and applied in the right places to be able to finance the transition to a low carbon sector on time scales consistent with current climate change mitigation targets. A discussion of opportunities and challenges to a more central role for public financing concludes, drawing also on insights from the recent mission-oriented innovation literature.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Finance, Green Technology, and Renewable Energy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, France, North America, Iceland, and United States of America

2354. American Radical Economists in Mao’s China: From Hopes to Disillusionment

Author:: Isabella M. Weber and Gregor Semieniuk
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
Abstract:: American radical economists in the 1960s perceived China under Maoism as an important experiment in creating a new society, aspects of which they hoped could serve as a model for the developing world. But the knowledge of ‘actually existing Maoism’ was very limited due to the mutual isolation between China and the US. This paper analyses the First Friendship Delegation of American Radical Political Economists (FFDARPE) to the People’s Republic of China in 1972, consisting mainly of Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) members, which was the first visit of a group of American economists to China since 1949. Based on interviews with trip participants as well as archival and published material, this paper studies what we can learn about the engagement with Maoism by American radical economists from their dialogues with Chinese hosts, from their on-the-ground observations, and their reflection upon return. We show how the visitors’ own ideas conflicted and intersected with their perception of the Maoist practice on gender relations; workers’ management and life in the communes. We also shed light on the diverging conceptions of the role for economic expertise between URPE and late Maoism. As the first in-depth study on the FFDARPE we provide rich empirical insights into an ice-breaking event in the larger process of normalization in the Sino- U.S relations, that ultimately led to the disillusionment of the Left with China.
Topic:: Radicalization, Capitalism, Economic Theory, Transition, and Socialism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2355. The Mainstream Economics Interpretation of the Local State and Central-Local Relations in Post-Mao China: a Critical Review

Author:: Alexandre De Podesta Gomes
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
Abstract:: Decentralization and the role of local governments have long been touted as key factors in the Chinese economic miracle. This paper intends to critically assess the chief theories advanced by mainstream economics in its attempt to make sense of these aspects of China’s growth story. Firstly the theoretical underpinnings of fiscal federalism, new institutional economics, and market-preserving federalism approaches will be presented, as these theories offer the bedrock for most of the applied insights in which China is framed through the lenses of the central-local relations debate. Secondly, the idea of ‘market-preserving federalism, Chinese-style’ will be critically appraised, highlighting its shortcomings. Thirdly, the paper proceeds by bringing in the mainstream response to these problems, relying on the notion of political incentives and career concerns faced by local cadres. It will be argued that the continual adherence to some core tenets dear to the new institutional economics literature in all previous explanations prevents this broad camp of knowledge to properly grasp the complex dynamics of China’s decentralization drive and the role of local governments in the process. Finally, and in closing, an alternative approach will be offered.
Topic:: Economics, Local, Decentralization, and Federalism
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2356. Endowment Structure, Industry Dynamics and Vertical Production Structure in China-Theory and Evidence

Author:: Jim H. Shen, Leilei Shen, and Jun Zhang
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
Abstract:: This paper proposes a theoretical model and shows that the comparative advantage of China’s factor endowment allows firms specializing in the midstream stage to gain at least as much as firms that specialize in the two ends of the supply chain (capital-intensive stage and labour- intensive stage) in terms of labour productivity and profitability, if and only if they have at least as much viability and use intermediate level of capital intensity. The empirical results are consistent with the theory’s predictions. Our findings on China’s industry supply chain production patterns provide a new angle on the division of gains in the vertical production network driven by the endowment structure. This could have far-reaching implications for the industrial development of other middle-income countries.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Labor Issues, Capital, and Production
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2357. Do Not Fall for the Hype on U.S.-China Natural Gas Trade

Author:: Melanie Hart, Luke Bassett, and Blaine Johnson
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: The Trump administration’s obsession with fossil fuel exports plays into Beijing’s grand strategy to become the next high-tech superpower.
Topic:: Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Hegemony, Gas, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2358. Social Stability and Resource Allocation within Business Groups

Author:: Haikun Zhu
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: Using datasets on transactions within business groups and social sentiment in China, I show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) use internal funds to address social unrest, complying with the government’s political goals. I use plausibly unexpected shocks to regional stability to analyze the response of SOEs to these events. I find that the government, as the controlling shareholder, adopts a carrot-and-stick approach. The government offers a “carrot” by injecting funds into SOEs located in the affected areas, which are then used to generate benefits to the public, such as larger labor payments and additional capital expenditures. However, if there are severe political conflicts that threaten its authority, the government applies a “stick” by withdrawing resources. The SOEs channel seems effective because local sentiment recovers around shocks when SOEs offer more benefits. Additional tests show that the SOEs channel is significant in economic magnitude compared to fiscal redistribution. As a result of the transfer, SOEs lose value after shocks, but firms in the region improve their performance later. This paper provides new evidence on how the intra-group allocation of resources incorporates political objectives, and has socioeconomic impact.
Topic:: Economics, Political Economy, Business, Capital, and Social Stability
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2359. The Red Star and the Crescent: China and the Middle East

Author:: Center for International and Regional Studies
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University in Qatar
Abstract:: The Red Star and the Crescent (Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2018) provides an in-depth and multi-disciplinary analysis of the evolving relationship between China and the Middle East. Despite its increasing importance, very few studies have examined this dynamic, deepening, and multi-faceted nexus. James Reardon-Anderson has sought to fill this critical gap. The volume examines the ‘big picture’ of international relations, then zooms in on case studies and probes the underlying domestic factors on each side. Reardon-Anderson tackles topics as diverse as China’s security strategy in the Middle East, its military relations with the states of the region, its role in the Iran nuclear negotiations, the Uyghur question, and the significance and consequences of the Silk Road strategy.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

2360. Structuring Cooperative Nuclear Risk Reduction Initiatives with China

Author:: Larry Brandt, Jason Reinhardt, and Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:: The Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation engaged several Chinese nuclear organizations in cooperative research that focused on responses to radiological and nuclear terrorism. The objective was to identify joint research initiatives to reduce the global dangers of such threats and to pursue initial technical collaborations in several high priority areas. Initiatives were identified in three primary research areas: 1) detection and interdiction of smuggled nuclear materials; 2) nuclear forensics; and 3) radiological (“dirty bomb”) threats and countermeasures. Initial work emphasized the application of systems and risk analysis tools, which proved effective in structuring the collaborations. The extensive engagements between national security nuclear experts in China and the U.S. during the research strengthened professional relationships between these important communities.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and War on Terror
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Asia

2361. Japan’s Shift in the Nuclear Debate: A Changing Identity?

Author:: Sayuri Romei
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:: Throughout the Cold War, Japanese leaders and policy-makers have generally been careful to reflect the public’s firm opposition to anti-nuclear sentiment. However, the turn of the 21st century has witnessed a remarkable shift in the political debate, with élites alluding to a nuclear option for Japan. This sudden proliferation of nuclear statements among Japanese élites in 2002 has been directly linked by Japan watchers to the break out of the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the rapid buildup of China’s military capabilities. Is the Japanese perception of this double military threat in Northeast Asia really the main factor that triggered this shift in the nuclear debate? This paper argues that Japanese élites’ behavior rather indicates that the new threats in the regional strategic context is merely used as a pretext to solve a more deep-rooted and long-standing anxiety that stems from Japan’s own unsuccessful quest for a less reactive, and more proactive post-Cold War identity.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2362. “The Best Possible Sanction:” Kim Jong-un and the Quest for Credible Nuclear Deterrence

Author:: Gary J. Sampson
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: In 2017, North Korea under Kim Jong-un has made significant strides toward the capabilities needed for a credible nuclear deterrent. This article analyzes the most recent achievements of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, including its September 2017 nuclear test and its three long-range missile tests in the latter half of 2017. Observers should not discount Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. However, other capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and targeting require further development to achieve the full range of capabilities associated with a credible nuclear deterrent. Because of the high costs associated with the development of robust strategic intelligence and targeting capabilities, Pyongyang may be willing to settle for lower levels of capability in these areas, which may still be sufficient to guide nuclear attacks. As a result, policymakers must move to a bargaining strategy that acknowledges the reality of North Korea’s nuclear capability, marking a significant policy shift among regional allies. Pyongyang’s long-held desire to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its regional allies may be coming to fruition. Kim Jong-un has shrewdly played his hand from a position of weakness and succeeded where many others failed—a high-risk path upon which he still walks. China’s minimum credible nuclear deterrent may be a model for Kim Jong-un’s development of North Korean nuclear capability.
Topic:: Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Surveillance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

2363. The North Korean Air Force: A Declining or Evolving Threat?

Author:: Noam Hartoch and Alon Levkowitz
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests during the Kim Jong-un era have strengthened the country’s military power, deterring South Korea, Japan and, in particular, the United States. While North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities are rapidly improving, parallel developments aren’t occurring in the traditionally technical air and air defense forces. Plagued with aging airframes, technical problems, parts shortages and budget shortfalls, the North Korean Air Force no longer challenges the South Korean and American air forces. This paper examines the North Korean Air Force, analyzing its organization and deployment, air defense and early warning capabilities, aircraft acquisition, and aircraft production. Shortfalls in each of these areas caused Pyongyang to develop, test, and operate an increasingly sophisticated drone fleet. While North Korea won’t be able to build a state-of-the-art aircraft industry, it will nonetheless find creative ways to strengthen its air force capabilities.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, Weapons, Drones, Missile Defense, and Air Force
Political Geography:: Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, Poland, Soviet Union, New Zealand, and United States of America

2364. China and the Korean Peninsula: Arming Kim, Gutting Sanctions, Opposing THAAD

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: China is playing a duplicitous game when it comes to North Korea. It proclaims it is enforcing Security Council resolutions when it is in fact not. The Chinese have overwhelming leverage over the North, but they will not use their power to disarm the Kim Family regime, at least in the absence of intense pressure from the United States. Beijing believes Pyongyang furthers important short-term Chinese objectives, and so views it as a weapon against Washington and others. Beijing’s attempts to punish Seoul over its decision to accept deployment of the THAAD missile defense system reveal true intentions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Weapons, Missile Defense, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

2365. Empirical Assessment of Trade Engagements: Africa, China and the Maritime Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Igbinoba Emmanuel
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Recent development economic literatures theorize that South-South trade and foreign investment may have a larger impact on economic growth in devel-oping economies than North-South trade and investment, since investors from the South are more familiar with local developing markets and business practices, which increases their productivity spillovers (Aykut and Goldstein 2007). Amighini and Sanfilippo (2014) provided evidence that South-South trade and investments stimulate product diversification in light manufacturing industries such as agro-processing, plastic, textile and leather production. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013, aims to create economic opportunities as well as improve and establish new trading routes between China and connected regions. This paper attempts to evaluate the degree of trade relations between China and selected African countries along the Mari-time Silk Route (MSR) and further appraise the trade potentials and gains in-herent for African economies through the initiative. To achieve our objective, we apply quantitative techniques in trade evaluation to enable us explore and estimate the degree and intensity of trade engagements amongst selected Si-no-African silk route countries, identify the trade opportunities and potentials, which are critical for increased trade engagements between both parties along the route and to explore some of the channels through which the maritime route can impact on investment, trade and economic growth in Africa. Findings from the analysis indicate that while the degree of trade integration is unbalanced and favourable to China relative to Africa, the trade pattern and structure are observed to be more complementary than competitive, and this provides Africa with ample opportunity to engage in product upgrading and diversification, critical for structural transformation.
Topic:: Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Economic Policy, and Trade
Political Geography:: Africa and China

2366. Incident Prevention and Mitigation In The Asia Pacific Littorals: Framing, Expanding, and Adding to Cues

Author:: Graham Ong-Webb, Collin Koh, and Bernard Miranda
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: This paper explores the possibility of South China Sea claimants and regional countries playing an active role in developing measures to prevent untoward incidents involving government (including naval and maritime law enforcement) and non-government vessels while political negotiations take place with respect to the proposed Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China. It argues that such a comprehensive incident prevention and mitigation plan must be multidimensional and multilevel in its approach, cascading from the political, strategic, operational, to tactical levels. This study breaks down into three main sections. The first examines the framing of the existing Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) and its expansion as well as any new prevention and mitigation initiatives. The center of gravity and theory of success for CUES must be at operational and tactical levels, this paper highlights, while also proposing that CUES should be expanded to include sub- surface and aerial- based actions as other potential triggers for unplanned encounters and unintended escalations at sea. The end-state calls for a comprehensive CUES in light of the multidimensional nature of the SCS maritime landscape. The second section of this paper assesses the prospects for an expanded CUES, focusing on maritime law enforcement and irregular forces. It examines the viability of expanding this mechanism through what this paper terms as “Phased” and “Blanket” Approaches, which is dependent on the regional political climate. The third, final section raises two proposals at the strategic level, and six proposals pegged at the operational and tactical levels of planning and activity to build on and enhance the existing slate of such mechanisms as CUES to promote navigational safety and risk reduction in regional waters.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Maritime, Conflict, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, South China, and Brunei

2367. China’s Belt and Road Initiative Security Needs: The Evolution of Chinese Private Security Companies

Author:: Alessandro Arduino
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The unprecedented amount of Chinese funds funnelled into the Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing’s vision of global connectivity will face a harsh reality that encompasses a wide spectrum of threats. Chinese corporations have just started to acknowledge that the risks associated with outbound foreign direct investments carry higher failure rates due to intertwined factors such as economic crisis, conflict, civil unrest, nationalisation, and currency devaluation, to name a few. In several cases, the Chinese state-owned enterprises’ infrastructural projects add stress to the already unstable socio-political environments because of their size and speed of implementation. Understanding and managing this stress is a challenge that cannot be ignored if benefits of these projects are to be realised. The solution to political and criminal violence requests a broader participation that encompasses the insurance and private security sectors.
Topic:: Globalization, Nationalism, Conflict, Violence, and Private Sector
Political Geography:: China, Beijing, and Asia

2368. A World in Transition: the Rise of Populism and the Fall of Multilateralism? (Full Issue)

Author:: Emily E. Fox, Richard Aidoo, Marten Brienen, Carlos de la Torre, Alexander B. Makulilo, and Joel Martinez
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: For the Journal’s 19th issue, we explore modern populism across the world. Richard Aidoo looks at the landscape of anti-Chinese populism in the context of Africa’s resource scramble, while Alexander B. Makulilo takes an in depth look at the siren song of populism in Tanzania. Marten Brienen and Carlos de la Torre hone in on populism in Latin America, exploring its early 21st Century evolution and its relationship with democracy respectively. Additionally, the Journal is proud to publish an interview with Ron Boquier and Raul Castillo, both of whom are active supporters of human rights in Venezuela, a county was a harbinger of recent global populist sentiment. Outgoing editor Joel Martinez speaks with Boquier and Castillo on the roles of the United Nations and United States in helping to advance democratic reform in the country.
Topic:: International Relations, Human Rights, Politics, Natural Resources, Law, Democracy, Populism, Multilateralism, and Capital Flows
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, Latin America, and Tanzania

2369. Go Global, Meet the Locals: Pragmatism, Plunder, and AntiChinese Populism in Africa

Author:: Richard Aidoo
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: From Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward to Deng Xiaoping’s Opening Up, through Jiang Zemin’s Going Out (also known as the Going Global strategy) to Xi Jinping’s recent Chinese Dream, China has pursued diverse diplomatic engagements with African countries within these broad development visions. These engagements have evolved along with Africa’s changing political and economic circumstances, as well as China’s resurgence as a global economic power. Most significantly, in large parts of the developing world (including Africa), China has shifted away from its support for the struggle for ideological identity to assume geopolitical and geo-economic weight, as anti-imperialism rhetoric and support have given way to its business-is-business mantra, and noninterference diplomacy. In other words, from the late 1970s, Africa encountered Beijing’s gradual shift away from an ideological proselytizer to a global economic adventurer. After the Cold War, Chinese influence in Africa has grown significantly as it has traded, invested, and constructed its way to the most relevant economic partner to African economies. Chinese capital, aid, expertise, and diplomacy have brought increasing numbers of Chinese to the continent to serve as expatriate workers as they heed the call to “go out” and enhance the national ambitions and seek personal fortunes. In the past two decades, it has been remarkably evident that the relationship between China and Africa has entered into a different phase. Contrary to the rather simplistic and unilinear account of China’s scramble of the African continent, current engagements are rather complex with China as a pragmatic economic actor with both complementary and competitive impacts that draw different reactions from African populations – from the often reported embrace to intense local anger in certain parts. Along with a political independent and largely democratically governed Africa, China is also currently engaging mostly empowered African populations who will readily assert and preserve their sovereignties, political rights and civil liberties through public protests, pronouncements and political competitions like elections, and referendums. So, in spite of Beijing’s touted African embrace as the partner-in-development option for African states, some growing popular resentment for “most things Chinese” in some parts of Africa is confronting China as it deals with a continent in transition. Alternatively, though the effectiveness of popular African reactions towards the Chinese in African countries may be shaped by factors such as regime type, and economic status of the state in question,3 sustainability and longterm impacts of these people centered movements depend on more than any visceral efforts. Consequently, how will Beijing’s motives and strategies in Africa be impacted by popular reactions as African populations look to the past and present?
Topic:: Development, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Natural Resources, and Populism
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

2370. Xi Jinping and China’s Role in the Asian and Global Order

Author:: Kerry Brown
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: What can we determine about China’s strategic intent towards the region in which it exists? This question is best answered by looking at the concepts of historic destiny and China’s rejuvenation which Xi partially inherited from his predecessors but has now made into his own orientating idea. For China, the future is mapped out in two centennial goals. The first, in 2021, marks the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party. The second, more remote one in 2049 marks the hundredth anniversary of the existence of the People’s Republic of China. Both of these structure the short to long-term narrative of country development and the Party’s key role in that under Xi. Needless to say, without the Party, the country’s dream, another term that Xi has been keen to use, would not be realisable. The two are therefore vigorously associated with each other as though one entity.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Power Politics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2371. Sino-American Preventive Diplomacy During the Cold War

Author:: Bertrand G. Ramcharan
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: From the advent to power of the Chinese Communist Party on October 1, 1949 to the historic visits of Henry Kissinger and President Nixon in 1971-72, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA) were bitter enemies during the Cold War. China and the U.S. fought a war in Korea from 1950 to 1953, and the two countries nearly came to war again on five different occasions: over Vietnam in 1954 and 1965, and over Taiwan in 1954-55, 1958-59 and 1962. However, the two sides were wary to come to blows again and each side engaged in efforts to help avoid this. However, the dangers of miscalculations, recklessness, or accidents were ever present. During the Korean War there was much talk in American circles about using nuclear weapons. A concerned British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, after consulting his French counterpart, went to see President Truman to help reduce the risks of this happening. The full records on this have never been published, but there is an authoritative account on the outcome from a senior American official.1 In 1959, President Eisenhower, concerned about the danger of continuing PRC provocations over Taiwan, sent a message to Chairman to Premier Mao via Premier Khruschev. The minutes of Premier Khruschev’s discussion with Chairman Mao make for fascinating reading.2 Another situation involving the use of preventive diplomacy occurred during the Polish crisis of 1956 when the CCP made strong representations to the CPSU against the escalation of military forces against the Polish demonstrators. There were thus seven situations (two with Korea, three with Taiwan, one with Vietnam, and one with the USSR) that attracted preventive diplomacy and a notable range of methods of preventive diplomacy applied. Among these one can mention the following: overt and covert communications from one side to the other; diplomatic messages; ambassadorial talks; and third party intercessions. This study will be approached from the perspective of the concept of preventive diplomacy while having regard to the concept of historical analogy.
Topic:: Cold War, Diplomacy, History, and Korean War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2372. Beijing’s Policy Towards President Tsai Ying-wen and the Future of Cross-Strait Relations

Author:: Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: ions through the lens of both asymmetry and (re-)balancing. Beijing-Taipei relations have become more and more asymmetrical. While this structural asymmetry has allowed the former to exert all sorts of pressures on the latter (economic, ideological and military), this very asymmetry has not prevented the latter from keeping some room of maneuver vis-à-vis the former.1 Balancing against China and bandwagoning with the United States has, since 1950, been Taiwan’s security and survival strategy even if after the U.S. de-recognition of the ROC in 1978, Taipei and Washington have not been linked by a formal alliance but a much more narrow and vague security arrangement, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). However, in this paper, I will argue that under the Tsai Administration, Taiwan’s balancing strategy has remained rather “soft,” because of the island’s hard economic dependence upon China. At the same time, Taiwan cannot ignore the U.S. Administration’s “rebalancing” strategy in Asia and the consequences it has on U.S.-China relations and the region. Using this double approach, I will first present Beijing’s new Taiwan policy. Then, I will explore its root-causes and main drivers. Finally, I will venture to speculate on the chances of success of China’s strategy towards the Tsai Administration, particularly after the new U.S. President Donald Trump comes into office and in view of the telephone call that he accepted to have with Ms. Tsai in early December 2016. My tentative conclusion is that for many domestic and international reasons—the KMT’s inability to reform, Taiwan’s consolidated identity and the U.S.’s likely continuing, and perhaps stronger strategic support and overall “rebalancing” under Trump—Beijing will probably not reach its major objectives, at least in 2020. As a result, Taiwan will be able to continue to go its own way; the political gap between both sides will keep widening; and the relations across the Taiwan Strait will probably remain a mixture of political and perhaps military tensions as well as dense exchanges and inevitable interactions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

2373. The Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification Mechanisms for Developing Countries under the UNFCCC: an analysis of the BASIC countries Biennial Update Reports

Author:: Alice Amorim
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:: This Policy Brief has three main objectives: Firstly, to present the basic international policy framework for the MRV for developing country Parties under the UNFCCC; Secondly, to provide a short comparative analysis of the latest version of the BURs presented by the countries that belong to the BASIC bloc, with an emphasis on the national MRV component of the Reports; Thirdly and lastly, to provide a set of policy recommendations for the BASIC countries.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Developing World, Regulation, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

2374. Journal of Public and International Affairs 2017

Author:: Bethany Atkins, Trevor Pierce, Valentina Baiamonte, Chiara Redaelli, Hal Brewster, Vivian Chang, Lindsay Holcomb, Sarah Lohschelder, Nicolas Pose, Stephen Reimer, Namitha Sadanand, and Eustace Uzor
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: From the United States to the Switzerland, this year’s Journal draws on a diverse range of authors’ experiences and studies to analyze a varied—yet timely—set of current issues. By spotlighting topics such as climate change, voting rights, and gender issues, JPIA contributes to the debates that are occurring today. The strong use of quantitative analysis and in-depth study of resources ensures that this year’s Journal adds a select perspective to the debate that hopefully policymakers will find useful and actionable.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Development, Narcotics Trafficking, Law, Prisons/Penal Systems, Elections, Women, Brexit, Multilateralism, Private Sector, Carbon Tax, Carbon Emissions, and Gerrymandering
Political Geography:: Britain, Afghanistan, Africa, China, South Asia, Central Asia, Asia, and Nigeria

2375. China’s Evolving Nuclear Forces: Changes, Rationales and Implications

Author:: Adam MacDonald
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: China is embarking on a comprehensive modernization program to quantitatively and qualitatively improve their nuclear force. These efforts, however, do not reflect or indicate a distinct shift in Chinese views towards or policy governing the purpose and use of nuclear weapons, but to achieve and maintain a secured second strike capability in a changing strategic landscape. Specifically, military developments by the United States including Ballistic Missile Defence and Precision Global Strike are seen as threatening the credibility of their nuclear deterrent, motivating the construction and deployment of a more modern, diverse and capable force. These force reconfigurations, however, create the potential of causing confusing and misunderstandings with the United States, and other nuclear powers, of the rationales informing their improvement. Ensuring the nuclear force balance between Beijing and Washington remains a minor and largely benign matter separated from and not influencing other more divisive matters is critical in the maintenance of their relatively stable, but increasingly complicated and tense, great power relationship and the international system in general. In order to achieve this, both states must clearly signal an understanding of their nuclear relationship as one defined by mutual vulnerability and the necessity of providing guarantees and evidence that their respective military technological developments and force structure changes are not designed to alter this reality.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Modernization
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, and North America

2376. Pragmatic, Not Mad: The Rationality of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Author:: Mark Halchin
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The reasoning behind North Korea’s continued efforts to develop a nuclear deterrent remains puzzling to many, with the heavy costs and behavior of the regime leading to the belief that it is irrational. This paper argues that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is instead a rational strategy for the regime. The perceived threat from South Korean and American military forces, as well as its own ineffective conventional forces, make a North Korean nuclear program a viable and relatively cheap deterrent. Its limited foreign relations and near-total dependence on China largely insulate it from economic punishment. Finally, the nature of the regime allows it to disregard popular opinion while forcing it to accommodate military demands for a nuclear deterrent. The necessity of nuclear weapons for defence and the few downsides of possessing them means that Pyongyang is unlikely to give them up, thus dooming denuclearization efforts to failure.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and North America

2377. China-Africa Trade Developments and Impacts: Case of China-Zambia Relations

Author:: Caesar Cheelo, Pamela Nakamba-Kabaso, and Zhun Che
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:: At a glance, China and Zambia – just like China and Africa – are strikingly different in many ways. They followed markedly different paths to development. They achieved significantly divergent trade and development results. However, they also have many striking commonalities, including a shared long history of developmental cooperation and relations. But, what are the lessons of China-Zambia relations for Zambia’s developmental goals and aspirations, including those in the Vision 2030? This study sought to undertake a critical comparative assessment of the trade (and other underpinning socioeconomic) developments in China, Africa and Zambia, with a view to understanding their impetus as well as their consequences, both positive and negative, for China- Africa and China -Zambia ties. It offers unique perspectives and understanding about China-Africa and China-Zambia relations. It takes a look at the history and present-day China- Africa and China-Zambia relations, considering the social and cultural ties that have defined cooperation as well as the political and diplomatic relations that have been forged over time. It unravels the trade and development implications of these relations for Zambia, Africa and China.
Topic:: International Relations, Development, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Zambia

2378. International Leadership as a Process: The case of China in Southeast Asia

Author:: Truong-Minh Vu
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: Leadership theory in IR still lacks a coherent approach, and it is analytically useful to use eclectic lenses by combining all factors related to power and the usage of power to gain leadership status. I define the term "international leadership" as a process in which a state mobilizes its resources to influence a group of other states (followership) in order to achieve a common goal. In the empirical investigation, I will focus on China's abilities to lead in Southeast Asia. Despite the fact that there are many advantages for China, the mechanism of transforming power resources into regional leadership is still questionable.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Leadership, International Relations Theory, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: China, Brazil, and Latin America

2379. US Foreign Policy Towards Central Asia

Author:: Lance Alred, Sean Michael Kelly, Madina Rubly, Yuliya Shokh, Mariam Tsitsishvili, and Richard Weitz
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: U.S. policy faces numerous challenges in Central Asia, such as the decreasing U.S. military and economic resources in the region; Russian and Chinese hostility to a long-term U.S. military presence in Eurasia; restrictions on religious and other freedoms due partly to counterterrorism concerns; limited U.S. involvement in the region compared to other external players (like Japan as well as Russia and China); an undeveloped U.S. policy regarding regional multinational institutions; and the indifference and ignorance of U.S. business toward regional commercial opportunities beyond the energy sector. However, advocates of “America First” in the Trump administration do not see these threats as sufficiently serious to garner U.S. military intervention beyond occasional training, equipping, and intelligence sharing. Terrorism, drug trafficking, economic isolation, and human rights restrictions in Central Asia do not present an immediate existential threat to the United States, sowing ambivalence over the future of U.S. foreign policy in the region.
Topic:: Terrorism, Cybersecurity, Trafficking, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, and United States of America

2380. Three milestones of Russia’s foreign policy in 2017

Author:: Pavel Koshkin
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Rethinking Russia
Abstract:: 2017 brought both successes and disappointments to Russia on the international arena. Moscow succeeded in establishing dialogue with its rivals in the Middle East — Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It also participated in the Astana peace talks to come up with a compromise with Ankara and Tehran on Syria. Besides, Russia together with its Syrian allies defeated the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS). Afterwards, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced about the partial withdrawal of the Russian troops from Syria. One of the biggest challenges became the strengthening of the American sanctions against Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The Russia dossier probe conducted by Special Counsel Robert Mueller and Congress is also a very important event, because it could deepen the crisis in U.S.-Russia relations. Parliamentary and presidential elections in Europe also matter: They took place amidst the buzz about the Russian cyber threat and hackers, and this indicates that there is not trust toward Russia in European countries today.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Elections, Islamic State, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

2381. Refugees Flee into Yunnan After Renewed Violence Along Myanmar Border

Author:: Peter Wood
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Violence along China’s border with Myanmar is threatening yet again to spill across into Yunnan Province. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more than 20,000 refugees have fled into Yunnan after renewed fighting between the Kachin Independence Army and Myanmar’s Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). These refugees are the second wave after more than 3,000 fled into China in late November 2016. In response, the prefectural government has begun setting up temporary shelters (Guanchazhe, November 22, 2016). It is unclear how it will cope with the much larger, second wave.
Topic:: Refugee Issues, Military Affairs, Border Control, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Myanmar

2382. Himalayan Impasse: How China Would Fight an Indian Border Conflict

Author:: Kevin McCauley
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the end of August, Chinese and Indian troops both pulled back from the Doklam region in Bhutan after weeks of tense posturing. The face off began in June when Chinese construction crews accompanied by soldiers began building a road. The area is sensitive to Indian national interests not only because of its ally Bhutan, but also due to area’s proximity to a narrow corridor connecting eastern India with the rest of the country. Beijing repeatedly ratcheted up the messaging to India, including the release of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs legal justification of China’s territorial claims against India (China Daily, August 3, 2017). If the two sides decide to face off again, forces on both sides will need to contend with the difficult mountain terrain and complex weather conditions. To prepare for such a contingency, both India and China have invested significantly in units capable of mountain and high-altitude warfare. An examination of the Chinese Military’s doctrine and training of such units provides important insights into how such a conflict would be conducted.
Topic:: Environment, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Himalayas

2383. Chinese and Indian Competition in Space Heats Up

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the height of the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union used money and weapons to build satellite states; today China and India are using satellites in space to win influence and secure their geo-political and economic interests. They see each other as competition in the global satellite launch business. So how do the Indian and Chinese space programs compare? In which areas is competition likely to be most intense?
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Space
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Sri Lanka

2384. China’s Overseas Military Base in Djibouti: Features, Motivations, and Policy Implications

Author:: John Fei
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti is near the U.S.’ sole military base in Africa—Camp Lemonnier—and signals China’s interest in protecting its growing economic and security interests in Africa and the Indian Ocean. While the base reflects China’s growing economic and security ambitions, it is unclear at present whether the facility represents just an effort for China to enhance its peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster relief capabilities, or suggests greater ambitions. If, as some reports suggest, China does open more military bases in African and the Indian Ocean region, then the Djibouti base would mark the beginning of a sea-change in Chinese naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean region (Sina, December 19).
Topic:: Development, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Economic Growth, Maritime, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, Djibouti, and United States of America

2385. China’s Relationship with Chile: The Struggle for the Future Regime of the Pacific

Author:: Evan Ellis
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Though superpower diplomacy dominated coverage of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) leaders summit in November, China’s upgrading of a free-trade agreement with Chile served to highlight the strength of an economic and political relationship that it has built with the country, and the influential position Chile currently occupies in shaping Chinese engagement with Latin America.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South America, and Chile

2386. Russia-China Relations and the West

Author:: Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:: This paper is part of CTR's Working Paper Series: "Russia and the West: Reality Check." U.S. domination in global politics provided a powerful incentive for the post-Cold War rapprochement between Russia and China. The worsening of Russia’s relations with the West since 2014 made Moscow even more willing to offer significant concessions to Beijing. However, closer Russian-Chinese cooperation predates the Russian-Western crisis over Ukraine and reaches back to the 2008-2009 global economic crisis. Even the growing power asymmetry has not dissuaded Moscow from deepening its cooperation with China. This challenged widespread Western expectations that Russia would be eager to cooperate with the West in order to compensate for China’s increasing advantage. Hence, a potential improvement of Russian-Western relations is highly unlikely to result in the weakening of Russian-Chinese ties
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Trump, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

2387. China Pakistan Economic Corridor – A geo-economic masterstroke of China

Author:: Inayat Kalim
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Development of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with all its associated projects, favorably influences the geo-strategic and geo-economic prospects of China. Geo-strategic location of Gwadar further facilitates China to capture transit trade with Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East and influence this regional accessibility with a viable and secured corridor for further expansion of regional economic cooperation. Since the emergence of China as an energy importer in late 90s, it has adopted a „go out‟ strategy to secure energy assets through procurement and long term energy investment in the energy rich countries, mostly in the Persian Gulf states and convert historical routes into a modern grid of energy pipelines, roads and railways for its energy supplies. The strategy aims at using financial means such as building new seaports, infrastructure development and military and hydrocarbon cooperation between regional countries to establish an artery for ensuring uninterrupted crude oil supply to its territory. This Chinese approach has been referred by many intellects around the globe as the revitalization of the Silk Road Strategy to link China with surrounding regions to generate immense economic dividends.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Geopolitics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, Asia, and Punjab

2388. India: Policy Implications for the United States

Author:: Jon P. Dorschner
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: India has long been obsessed with its rivalry with Pakistan, and for many years India viewed Pakistan as its principal security threat. Pakistan continues to support terrorist attacks directed against India and India-controlled Kashmir, and is continually increasing its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems for nuclear warheads. Despite this, Indians have come to feel more self-assured and no longer see Pakistan as the country’s principal security threat.China now occupies this position. India no longer views itself simply as the predominant regional power in South Asia, but as an aspiring world power and is gearing up for what many in India believe is an inevitable conflict with its neighbor the Peoples Republic of China. India has embarked on an outreach program to solidify friendly ties to other Asian nations that feel threatened by China, and is devoting a lot of attention to the ASEAN states (particularly Viet Nam), Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. There is increasing speculation that this relationship could develop into a formal alliance, especially if the United States becomes less active in Asia.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Territorial Disputes, Economy, Trump, and Borders
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, India, North Korea, Kashmir, and United States of America

2389. Bird Flu — It’s What’s for Dinner: What Human Population Growth and Climate Change Mean for the Future of Avian Influenza Outbreaks

Author:: Nahid Bhadelia
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: China is currently experiencing its fifth epidemic of “bird flu,” or avian influenza H7N9, since 2013 when it was first noted to cause human infections. The virus, which is mainly transmitted from poultry to humans, is also prone to limited human-to-human transmission. To date, there have been 1,258 human cases, with one-third of those cases (460) occurring during this year’s epidemic alone.[1] There are many “subtypes” of avian influenza circulating in birds around the world and most of these viruses cause limited or no human infections. However, two avian influenzas subtypes causing high human mortality have jumped from birds to humans in the last decade, H5N1 and then H7N9. The significant potential of this class of viruses to cause a human pandemic is a global public health concern, particularly because the conditions leading to the rise of these infections are becoming more favorable — for the viruses.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Health, and Infectious Diseases
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Global Focus

2390. The Future of U.S. Partnerships: A Conversation with Hans Binnendijk

Author:: Robert Pulwer and Hans Binnendijk
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Dr. Hans Binnendijk is Vice Chairman of the Fletcher School Board. He has served in senior positions at the National Security Council, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department. He has directed think tanks at Georgetown University, the National Defense University, and in Europe. He writes frequently on national security policy.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Government, Politics, Partnerships, and Trump
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

2391. China’s New Afghan Diplomacy: Awakening from Inertia or Exception to Old Habits?

Author:: Abdur Rehman Shah
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: For decades, China has pursued a policy of hands-off diplomacy towards regional and international affairs, while narrowly focusing on internal development. Beijing’s recent approach to the Afghanistan conflict, however, has been a major shift. Getting Pakistan’s full support to help end the Afghan insurgency is a possibility given that the U.S. and Afghan governments have utterly failed to bring it to a close. China’s change may signal a shift in China’s “non-interference” approach. However, despite its early activism in the form of outreach to major actors—hosting the Taliban for talks, participation in Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) and now Russia-led talks—China’s Afghan diplomacy has not produced any desirable results to alter Pakistan’s approach towards the Afghan insurgency. One explanation for this lackluster approach is that Pakistan has successfully stemmed the flow of cross-border militants toward China. Furthermore, post-2014 uncertainty in Afghanistan rather than strategic alterations prompted the shift of China’s Afghanistan policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, and Asia

2392. Hamstringing a Hegemon: Examining the Effectiveness of Lawfare in the South China Sea Disputes

Author:: Rodelio Cruz Manacsa
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The South China Sea is the locus of a tense political struggle for territorial control between an increasingly aggressive regional power and a host of small states and their own respective sets of allies. In such a scenario, we can expect that China, the hegemonic state, will attempt to steer the discussions towards bilateral negotiations since its power projection and military capabilities tend to carry greater leverage against weaker states when talks are conducted on a one-on-one basis. In an international system characterized by the absence of a global government, power bends the arc of contention towards the hegemon. On the other hand, small states in the region like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei have a plethora of strategies and tactics for dealing with regional powers.[1] Their menu of options ranges from direct military balancing on one end and appeasing and bandwagoning on the other.[2], [3] This analysis will focus on the strategy that was chosen by the Philippines against China, which will be characterized as “lawfare.” The paper will proceed as follows: First, it will seek to define the concept of “lawfare” as a strategy and then map out the conditions under which it can succeed and fail. Second, it will apply the framework that was developed in the initial section to the conflict between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Finally, the consequences of lawfare use will be assessed, with the end goal of understanding how the Philippines’ victory in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) inexplicably led to reticence and bandwagoning, a case of historic success morphing into strategic retreat...
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Law, Negotiation, and Oceans and Seas
Political Geography:: China, Vietnam, Philippines, South China, and Brunei

2393. Ministers For Foreign Affairs 1960-1972

Author:: Melissa Conley Tyler, John Robbins, and Adrian March
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: he Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) is pleased to present the second book in the Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs series. In February 2013 the AIIA held a one-day forum to examine the achievements of Australia’s foreign ministers between 1960 and 1972. This forum and publication followed on from R.G Casey: Minister for External Affairs 1951-1960, and examined the next decade in Australian foreign policy. This newest volume brings together Australia’s most eminent academics and experts in international relations, former senior diplomats and government officials to explore the major issues that confronted the seven foreign ministers during the period of 1960-1972. The book has been edited by Melissa Conley Tyler, John Robbins and Adrian March.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, Regional Cooperation, United Nations, International Affairs, and Vietnam
Political Geography:: United States, China, Indonesia, Asia, and Australia

2394. Two reform proposals for membership in the UN human rights council

Author:: Gabriel C. Salvia and Matthias Peschke
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL)
Abstract:: The biggest problem the UN is facing when defending Human Rights is that only a minority of its 193 members have a well-institutionalized democracy. Furthermore, unlike many authoritarian regimes and countries with poor democratic systems, which constitute the majority in the General Assembly, they do not coordinate their policy on human rights with each other. What stood out after analyzing the membership of the Human Rights Council (UNHRC) between 2007 and 2017 was that three countries with a poor record on human rights, namely Saudi Arabia, Cuba and China, in fact, served for the longest time possible. Without question, it is rather unlikely that these dictatorships will contribute to the mission of the UNHRC, which consists of promoting human rights in all member states. However, what is even more concerning is that most countries, which Freedom House considers “Not Free” or “Partly Free”, have stagnated in terms of political and civil liberties while serving as members on the Council. This reaffirms the need to introduce reforms that would tackle its membership problem and render it more efficient.
Topic:: Human Rights and United Nations
Political Geography:: China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia

2395. Things Fall Apart: Populism and Foreign Policy

Author:: Frank Lavin
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: Donald Trump confounds political observers. For many, he is defined by his missteps and flamboyance. His foreign policy statements contain sufficient imprecision—if not outright contradictions—to allow observers to conclude a lack of care in dealing with the issues. Is China’s presence in the South China Sea acceptable or not? Is NATO useful or not? Should the United States use force in Syria for humanitarian or geo-political goals? This ambiguity gives rise to further questions regarding his foreign policy architecture: what are the guiding principles?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Geopolitics, and Populism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Syria, North America, South China, and United States of America

2396. Weighing the Consequences of China’s Control over the South China Sea

Author:: Charles Perry and Bobby Andersen
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:: This monograph, completed and published after the September 2017 death of principal investigator Charles Perry, details the findings of an 18-month project to research, analyze, and examine in depth the various consequences for the United States – and, to a somewhat lesser extent, for its regional allies and partner states – of varying degrees of Chinese control over the South China Sea.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, and Navy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, South China, and United States of America

2397. The Trump Factor in Asia and the Into-Pacific

Author:: Juan Manuel López-Nadal
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:: The elected President Donald Trump and his new administration at the White House sewed confusion and alarm in Asian and India-Pacific by broadcasting ambiguous and disconcerting signs about the American new policy towards the region. The later steps taken recently point to a certain return to the traditional parameters of Washington's Asian policy: the alliance with Japan and South Korea, and a firm attitude to China in commitment to dialogue, at the same time confirmation of Asia's strategic importance for the American fundamental interests. Since the campaign trail, Trump had already hinted at abandoning the pivot policy on military, commercial and diplomatic terms. Just three days hereinafter his assumption of power, the ambitious and highly contentious Trans-Pacific Partnership was ditched, which spread great dismay among the Trans-Pacific partner countries. To add, the One-China policy, respected by all the Republicans and Democrats since the historical Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, was threatened due to Trump's phone call to the Taiwanese President, Tsai Ing-wen, during his first days in office. Would Trump presidency actually redraw the geopolitical landscape in Asia?
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2398. The Tactical Utility and Strategic Effects of the Emerging Asian Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System

Author:: Jaganath Sankaran
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: The United States and Japan are jointly developing and deploying an integrated advanced regional missile defense system meant to counter threats from North Korea. North Korea possesses a large and diversified arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles that could strike Japanese cities and military bases in the event of a crisis and cause measurable damage. The missile defense system currently in place provides strong kinematic defensive coverage over Japanese territory. However, in general, the offense enjoys a strong cost advantage. It is impractical to deploy as many defensive interceptors as there are offensive missiles, which, in turn, limits the efficiency of missile defenses. It should be understood that regional missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific are neither capable nor expected to provide 100% defense. Rather, their goal is to provide sufficient capability to bolster deterrence and, should deterrence fail, to provide enough defense in the initial stages of a crisis to protect vital military assets. Additionally, U.S. and Japanese forces apparently also need to develop a better command and control architecture to operate the Asia-Pacific regional missile defense system. Finally, while the system is meant to defend only against regional threats, China has argued that the system might in the future be able to intercept Chinese ICBMs, thereby diluting its strategic deterrent against the United States. Maintaining effective defenses against North Korea while reassuring China will be one of the major challenges the U.S. and Japan face in their missile defense endeavor.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2399. Seeing Missile Defense as U.S. Hostility, North Korea Aims at More and Better Weapons

Author:: Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have spurred Japan and South Korea to develop their own ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and to regenerate their interest in regional missile defense cooperation with the United States. Has North Korea reacted to such developments, and if so, how? This paper looks at North Korea’s missile capacity development as well as its official proclamations and concludes that while Pyongyang likely does not believe that it is the region’s sole target for U.S. and allied BMD, it feels deeply threatened by its deployment. Existing and potential BMD systems have not discouraged Pyongyang from building its own missiles. Rather, North Korea is accelerating its efforts to improve and expand its missile arsenal to develop a survivable force, likely perceiving BMD systems as part of an overall U.S. strategy that is hostile to Pyongyang.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2400. Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat

Author:: Joshua Pollack
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Some of the most enduring disagreements in the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) concern ballistic missile defenses (BMD). At the same time that South Korea has expanded its conventional offensive missile program, it has declined American proposals for a regionally integrated BMD architecture, insisting on developing its own national system in parallel to the defenses operated by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). American appeals for interoperability between U.S. and ROK systems have been received cautiously, as were proposals to enhance its own BMD in Korea by introducing the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Peninsula for several years. A desire for expanded autonomy in national security appears to underpin Seoul’s attitudes on BMD. Rather than rely passively on American protection against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, South Korea’s military leaders have focused on developing precision-strike capabilities to intimidate Pyongyang, and resisted simply accepting an American BMD umbrella. Even more than they desire greater independence from their American patron-ally, South Koreans are suspicious of entanglements with Japan, their former colonial master, whose own defensive systems are already integrated with the American regional BMD architecture. This outlook encourages the pursuit of independent defense capabilities and discourages institutionalizing trilateral security arrangements.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS