Political Geography: China / Publication Year: within 3 Years / Topic: International Relations

1. Global IR Research Programme: From Perplexities to Progressions

Author:: Deepshikha Shahi
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Our basic expectations vis-à-vis ‘the international’ have turned our phenomenal existence into two seemingly irreconcilable cognitive prisons: ‘one world’ with homogenizing propensities (dominated by the West) and ‘many worlds’ with heterogenizing predispositions (embodied by the non-West). Every so often, these cognitive prisons—oscillating between the extreme homogenizing propensities of the West and heterogenizing predispositions of the non-West— become obstacles in implementing effective global partnerships that are required to tackle the challenges thrown by global crisis-situations, e.g., the likelihoods of world war, financial crisis, climate change, pandemic, and the like. The agenda of the ‘Global IR research programme’ has emerged to demolish these cognitive prisons. To this end, this agenda finds rational support from multiple auxiliary theories that derive stimulus from hitherto denigrated knowledge-forms thriving in different corners of the world: e.g., Tianxia (all-under-heaven) from China, Advaita (non-duality) from India, and Mu No Basho (place of nothingness) from Japan. Nevertheless, the conditioned reflexes of many IR researchers compel them to receive the emergent knowledge-forms by correlating their ‘source’ and ‘scope’: generally, the knowledge-forms having their source in the West are granted a global scope, whereas the knowledge-forms having their source in the non-West are given a local scope; it is often suspected that the local non-Western knowledge-forms cannot grasp the larger global scenario. Philosophically, these conditioned reflexes emanate from Kantian dualism, which forms disconnected opposites of phenomena-noumena, science-metaphysics, West–non-West etc. This article reveals how the Global IR research programme—inspired by the Chinese, Indian and Japanese cosmovisions—strives to demolish the cognitive prisons of ‘one world versus many worlds’, thereby ensuring the prospective progressions of this research programme.
Topic:: International Relations and Research
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, and Global Focus

2. Western-Centric Moments in Homegrown IR Theories: Dependency, Chinese and African Schools

Author:: Engin Sune
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: The modern international system has been shaped by long-standing historical practices of unequal power relations, which have positioned the Western world at the center of the political universe. Due to the centrality of the Global North in the international system, any IR theory that aims to portray a true picture of the “globe” necessarily situates the West at the center of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the form of universality generated by Western hegemony has been diffused throughout the world over centuries, spreading Western political institutions, economic structures, and ideological norms in an uneven setting. As a result, the social structures of the Global South have developed through an uneven form of relationship and dialectical interaction with the West. Therefore, homegrown IR theories, which uncover local political, philosophical, or cultural motives as sources for theory-making, in fact, concentrate on stratified forms of the universal reality that is diffused through the uneven spread of Western social structures. In this sense, there is a Western-centric moment in any homegrown IR theory. Accordingly, this article develops a scientific realist account of the structure/agent relationship in order to analyze the material grounds of Western-centrism in the field of international politics and to evaluate the role of non-Western actors. Additionally, it critically evaluates distinctive homegrown theories produced on three different continents to reveal the aforementioned Western-centric moments in these theoretical initiatives. Namely, the Dependency School of Latin America, the Chinese School of International Relations, and the African School are respectively scrutinized to disclose the embedded Western-centrism in these theoretical initiatives.
Topic:: International Relations and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Global South

3. PLA Logistics and Sustainment: PLA Conference 2022

Author:: George R. Shatzer, Roger D. Cliff, Kenneth Allen, Joshua Arostegui, and Justin Boggess
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US Army War College People’s Liberation Army Conference (PLA) Conference was held March 31 to April 2, 2022, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference focused on PLA logistics and sustainment. As the PLA continues to build and modernize its combat forces, it is important to examine if the capabilities meant to support combat operations are also being developed. Specific topics included: 1) China’s national-level logistics, including how China mobilizes national resources for the military and how it provides joint logistics support to the PLA Theater Commands; 2) the logistics capabilities of the different PLA services, especially the Army, Navy, and Air Forces; 3) PLA logistics in China’s remote regions, such as airpower projection in the Western Theater Command along the Indian border; and, 4) the PLA’s ability to sustain overseas operations at its base in Djibouti. Despite notable potential shortfalls and points of friction, the PLA has successfully sustained counterpiracy maritime operations for many years and conducted noncombatant evacuation operations well-distant from China. It is increasingly able to move forces across the vast distances of China and conduct large training exercises. Far more must be known about PLA sustainment and logistics before the hard questions about PLA operational reach and endurance can be answered.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, Logistics, Mobilization, Military, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Power Projection
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4. Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia

Author:: Scot Marciel and Ann Marie Murphy
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: This event will discuss U.S.-Southeast Asian relations with Ambassador Scot Marciel, the former United States Ambassador to Indonesia and Myanmar. The talk will be based on his new book which will be released on March 15, 2023 entitled Imperfect Partners: the United States and Southeast Asia. Imperfect Partners is a unique hybrid – part memoir, part foreign policy study of U.S. relations with Southeast Asia, a critically important region that has become the central arena in the global U.S.-China competition. From the People Power revolt in the Philippines to the opening of diplomatic relations with Vietnam, from building a partnership with newly democratic Indonesia to responding to genocide in Myanmar and coups in Thailand, Scot Marciel was present and involved. His direct involvement and deep knowledge of the region, along with his extensive policymaking work in Washington, allows him to bring to life the complexities and realities of key events and U.S. responses, along with rare insights into U.S. foreign policy decision-making and the work of American diplomats in the field.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, and United States of America

5. How the War in Ukraine is Changing the Space Game

Author:: Guilhem Penent and Guillaume Schlumberger
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has become a showcase for the new commercial paradigm emerging in the space sector (New Space). As such, it seems to confirm the relevance of adaptation efforts led by the United States – more specifically the Pentagon – since the mid-2010s. Thus, it highlights ongoing transformations and announces potential disruptions in the exploitation of orbits, particularly in the fields of satellite connectivity and remote sensing. It also shapes future tensions, while the structuring of international relations around the two poles constituted by the United States and China raises questions about the consequences on the safe, sustainable, secure, and stable use of space. With these developments, Europe is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Space, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

6. China’s Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative

Author:: Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Dong Ryul Lee, Chair of the China Research Center at EAI (Professor at Dongduk Women’s University), highlights that although China and North Korea might seem to have a close relationship, Beijing maintains a reserved stance regarding the North’s perspective on its strategic value amid the US-China competition. Professor Lee explains that Xi Jinping prioritizes political stability by boosting the economy and tries to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the US. Accordingly, China seeks to manage the risk spurred on by Pyongyang’s military provocations, given that they legitimize stronger US-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Cold War, Xi Jinping, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

7. Confrontation Muted, Tensions Growing

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan’s offshore islands. At China’s annual National People’s Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker’s expressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan’s offshore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan’s president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with mainland China.
Topic:: International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Coercion, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

8. Abrogating the Visiting Forces Agreement: Its Effects on Philippines’ Security and Stability in Southeast Asia

Author:: Renato Acosta
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: During much of 2022, the defense and security alliance between the United States of America and the Philippines, anchored on and reinforced by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, teetered on the brink of collapse. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte brought relations to the brink through attempts to scuttle the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This move would only embolden Chinese challenges to Manila’s territorial integrity and its aspirations to dominate Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. While the Duterte administration recited parochial reasons to terminate the VFA, pundits from the security and diplomatic sectors viewed Duterte’s attempts as a pretext to steer the Philippines towards China under his own brand and definition of an independent foreign policy. During his term, Duterte reiterated that President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials were his friends. He also publicly declared that the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), a northeastern section of the Spratly Islands, was already in physical control and possession of Beijing due to the unchallenged presence of its military and maritime militia vessels there. Given these statements, Duterte has constantly received criticism over his defeatist stance towards China.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Politics, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:: China, Philippines, Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

9. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

10. Continuismo, contra reacción y triangulación: el desembarco de China en América Latina y la coexistencia de líneas de acción exterior de España hacia la región

Author:: Javier Martín Merchán
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Las relaciones entre España y América Latina siempre han conformado un pilar en la estrategia de integración internacional del país ibérico. No obstante, ante la singular coyuntura que supone el auge exponencial de China en la región latinoamericana, ¿qué riesgos afronta hoy España en América Latina? ¿Ha influido dicha coyuntura en las líneas maestras de acción exterior de España hacia la región? Este artículo arroja algo de luz en torno a tales preguntas, y su conclusión es doble. Por un lado, sugiere que el desembarco chino supone un serio desafío para España. Por otro, se sostiene que la política exterior española ha hecho coexistir tres tipos de actitudes como respuesta: una más continuista, otra que capitaliza esta nueva coyuntura y busca aprovechar sus oportunidades, y una última más reactiva a las amenazas que suscitaría la pujanza china en América Latina.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, and Spain

11. La puerta de Latinoamérica: Las relaciones de Panamá con Estados Unidos y China, oportunidades y desafíos

Author:: Rodrigo Matías Martín and Guillermo Enrique Boscán
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Este articulo analiza las relaciones de Panamá con China y Estados Unidos, las dos mayores potencias mundiales en la actualidad. En primer lugar, se revisan las relaciones que el país latinoamericano ha tenido con China desde la creación de Panamá como país, llegando hasta el cambio de reconocimiento diplomático en el año 2017, así como las nuevas relaciones con la República Popular China. Tras ello se analizan los desafíos que tiene Panamá en el contexto de sus nuevas relaciones diplomáticas. En la siguiente sección se revisan de igual manera las relaciones históricas entre Panamá y Estados Unidos, llegando hasta el día de hoy, y se analizan las oportunidades que ofrecen los Estados Unidos a Panamá.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Panama Canal
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, Panama, and United States of America

12. Despliegue del poder blando chino en América Latina y recepción en los países de la región

Author:: Juan Ignacio Brito Munita and Francisco Javier Tagle Montt
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: El concepto del poder blando ha cobrado relevancia en Relaciones Internacionales. Asociado típicamente a EE.UU., en los últimos años también China ha promovido su poder blando, llegando a América Latina. Tras revisar las dificultades para acordar una definición del término, esta investigación observa el fenómeno desde una doble perspectiva: por un lado, analiza el despliegue del poder blando chino en la región; por otro, evalúa la respuesta de los países latinoamericanos ante él. Postula que, mientras China usa una definición amplia del poder blando que aplica en la región y la vincula prioritariamente a aspectos de su política doméstica, la recepción de los gobiernos latinoamericanos la hace depender de la variable siguiente: aunque todos acogen la ofensiva económica china y se acercan al gigante asiático, la manera en que reaccionan a ella está condicionada a la postura que mantienen hacia EE.UU.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Soft Power, and Hard Power
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, and United States of America

13. The Demise of Diplomatic Ambiguity: Parsing South Korea’s Estrangement From China

Author:: Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In July, the US Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) visited South Korea for the first time since 1981. Not one, but two of the 560-foot-long warships—which carried a payload of 24 long-range Trident ballistic missiles—surfaced in South Korean waters (Korea JoongAn Daily, July 24, 2023). From Washington and Seoul’s perspective, the SSBN deployment was a pointed reminder to the mercurial North Korean regime to exercise restraint, but the symbolism of the SSBN visit was not lost on China—Pyongyang’s closest ally. For all its military modernization efforts, Beijing has no effective defense against the Ohio-class sub. That South Korea would support the deployment of the SSBNs to its territory illustrates both its concern about rising North Korean brinkmanship and newfound willingness to risk Beijing’s ire. Indeed, after three decades of stable ties anchored in economic interdependence, major changes are afoot in the South Korea-China relationship. Compared to Japan, which also counts China as its largest trading partner, South Korea has historically been less willing to stand its ground in the face of political pressure from Beijing. On the one hand, Seoul and Beijing have no major territorial disputes, but more importantly, South Korea had previously calculated that its political deference—especially on China’s “core interests” like Taiwan—would encourage Beijing to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) top foreign policy objective. For many years, South Korea handled Beijing with kid gloves, irrespective of who was in the Blue House. While the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is traditionally more China-friendly, it was the conservative President Park Geun-hye who attended China’s jingoistic September 2015 military parade. After a summit between Xi Jinping and Park, both leaders made a commitment to oppose any unilateral actions that could lead to tension on the Korean Peninsula. The following day, President Park joined Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in China’s military parade. South Korea was the only US ally to attend the event (The Korea Herald, September 3, 2015). Since then, however, the two countries have drifted apart. The catalyst for this change was Seoul’s decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in 2017, which China views as a security threat and South Korea deems essential for self-defense. China has repeatedly demanded that South Korea dismantle its THAAD system (Xinhua, September 21, 2017). When those demands failed to bear fruit, it resorted to sanctions against South Korea (The Korea Herald, March 8, 2017). Furthermore, both China’s imposition of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong and its mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic have hurt its reputation in South Korea (The South China Morning Post, October 20, 2020). It is against this backdrop that the ROK’s anti-China sentiment has surged to an all-time high—a development that will inevitably spill over into Seoul’s foreign policy. According to a 2021 survey conducted by SisaIN, for the first time since the ROK and the PRC normalized relations in 1992, South Koreans view China even more negatively than they do Japan (SisaIN, November 29, 2021). China’s ruling Communist Party seems oblivious to the existential threat that South Korea feels in the face of surging missile tests by North Korea. The JoongAng Daily noted in June that it takes just two minutes for a North Korean missile to hit Seoul. According to the editorial, “South Korea is technically still at war with North Korea. The government and people must not forget that” (Yonhap News Agency, June 1, 2023). Concluding that political appeasement and economic engagement with China have failed to pay off, South Korea is taking two significant steps: strengthening its ties with its top security partner, the US, and mending fences with its former rival, Japan. The implications of Seoul’s estrangement from Beijing could have far-reaching implications for geopolitics in the broader Indo Pacific region.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

14. Party Ties: Vietnam, Cuba and China’s Relations with Other Marxist-Leninist States

Author:: John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Last month, on the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership (中越全面战略合作伙伴关系), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping met with Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Politburo Member and Head of the Central Committee Organization Commission Truong Thi Mai and asked her to convey his greetings to General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], April 26). [1] The visit to Beijing by Mai, who has headed the VCP’s powerful organization commission since 2021 and was appointed to the Secretariat in March, occurred days after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Vietnam (NhanDan, April 15; VN Express, March 6). As the maritime dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea has intensified over the past fifteen years, Washington has deepened its ties with Hanoi based on overlapping geostrategic interests. Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s ability to achieve its goal of upgrading the U.S. relationship with Vietnam to a “strategic partnership” this year to mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the U.S.-Vietnam “comprehensive partnership” remains in question (Fulcrum.sg, April 20). Vietnam undoubtedly perceives the PRC’s drive to consolidate control over the South China Sea as its main geopolitical challenge. Moreover, Vietnam’s relationship with its larger northern neighbor is colored by mistrust derived from historical memories of Chinese occupation and a long legacy of conflict, including the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the subsequent series of border and naval clashes in the 1980s. However, the VCP, particularly the conservative faction, now views the U.S. as posing its primary ideological threat and is fearful that Washington aims to undermine its grip on power (Nikkei Asia, May 11, 2022). As two scholars at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences note in a recent analysis, Hanoi’s reluctance to upgrade ties with the U.S. stems not only from fear of angering China but also from concern with “Washington’s excessive focus on press freedom, religious freedom, and human rights as an internal intrusion and potential threat to Vietnam’s political security.” [2] Hence, Beijing is able to arrest Hanoi from drifting towards closer alignment with Washington by leveraging their shared Communist systems and mutual concerns about Western efforts to facilitate the “peaceful evolution” of communist states into liberal democracies. During his meeting with VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in Beijing last October, Xi spoke to both Party leaderships’ mutual concern with regime security. He stressed that each side “should stay committed to the socialist orientation” and called for increased party-party exchanges to facilitate “mutual learning in party governance and state administration, maintain high-level communication and strategic dialogue between the two militaries, achieve more outcomes in cooperation on law enforcement and security, and safeguard the political security and social stability of respective countries” (FMPRC, October 31). Party-to-party ties are a key element of the PRC’s relationships with the other three states with ruling Communist Parties: Vietnam, Cuba and Laos. [3] As with the CCP, the Vietnamese, Cuban and Laotian Communist Parties have each adapted and modified Marxist-Leninism to suit their national conditions, regional situations and elite political preferences. Despite their considerable differences, these states’ mutual Marxist-Leninist ideological orientations and systems foster shared interests, including maintaining regime security and “stability,” opposing perceived external attempts to define and impose Western conceptions of democracy and human rights, advancing a state-led model of economic development and promoting a more multipolar world.
Topic:: International Relations, Socialism/Marxism, Partnerships, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Vietnam, and Cuba

15. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

16. Shifting Dynamics in the Middle East: Implications for Pakistan

Author:: Zosha Noor, Muhammad Javed, and Shakeel Ahmed
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China's resurgence as a global actor has significantly altered international relations, particularly in the Middle East, particularly with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan's unique geographical location and complex international interactions present an intriguing situation due to these changes. Pakistan's close relations with China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, along with its shared border and cultural ties with Iran, influence its security concerns, domestic politics, economy imperative, and foreign policy. China's growing relationship with Saudi Arabia is driven by its oil needs, global influence, and regional stability. Iran offers China a valuable counterbalance and potential ally in the Middle East due to its geostrategic position and abundant natural resources. The United States' long-standing hegemony in the Middle East has been put to the challenge by China's growing influence and strategic alliances in the region. This qualitative study investigates the issues relating to Middle East with an objective to evaluate the role of great powers‘ politics in the region. The Middle East's shifting geopolitical environment could be advantageous for projects like the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Chabahar Port Development, and Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline.
Topic:: International Relations, Political stability, Rapprochement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

17. China’s Grand Vision and the Persian Gulf

Author:: Anoushiravan Ehteshami
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: China’s engagement with Asian regions beyond its geographical periphery has grown exponentially since the 1990s and this is nowhere more evident than in West Asia and the Persian Gulf subregion. While energy drove China’s early interactions with the Gulf states, within two decades after the Cold War the relationships had evolved into much tighter networks of partnerships. China’s relations with the Gulf states, however, has not been uniform and the case studies of the United Arab Emirates and Iran highlight the complexities of China’s strategy in this subregion and the ways in which it actively pursues its diverse set of interests.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

18. Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Italy is stepping up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, both in the economic and security realms. The cabinet led by Giorgia Meloni – a centre-right coalition often portrayed by commentators as right-wing and nationalist – is rebalancing Rome’s policy in the Far East by scaling down ties with Beijing and by effectively lending support to the United States and its Asian allies vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and self-confident China. Moving away from previous centre-left governments that tended to prioritise commercial relations with Beijing, the conservative coalition in power since September 2022 has been fostering defence-related cooperation with Japan and India and chip-related cooperation and investments with Taiwan. Moreover – and remarkably for a country that has long been absent from Asian security – the Italian government has sent a patrol vessel to the South China Sea and plans to forward the country’s flagship aircraft carrier to the area to conduct joint exercises with the navies of Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The quantity and quality of initiatives being undertaken warrant the label of an Italian ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. By upgrading its presence in the region, Italy joins the other G7 nations in their efforts to uphold the rules-based order and dissuade Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, to consolidate the western anchorage of this pivot, the Meloni government needs to fully align its policy towards Beijing with that of the Euro-Atlantic allies – which includes deciding whether to continue to lend Italy’s official support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or not.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Italy, and Indo-Pacific

19. Understanding and Countering China's Approach to Economic Decoupling from the United States

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Many experts have highlighted American efforts to partially decouple from China. Yet China began pursuing a far more ambitious and comprehensive decoupling strategy vis-à-vis the United States long before Donald Trump entered the White House. This monograph examines China’s evolving approach to economic decoupling from the US. It makes the following arguments and conclusions. First, on the back of a preexisting mercantilist political economic structure, China has been explicitly pursuing economic decoupling from US and allied economies on Chinese terms for at least a decade. Second, while the US seeks to decouple some aspects of its economic activity from China, the latter seeks to dominate vast segments of the Asian economy and to decouple these segments from the US. This is the Chinese strategy and threat that the US vastly underappreciates. Third, the most important segments are the high-tech and high-value sectors. These sectors are where competition is the most consequential and where decoupling on US terms needs to occur. Fourth, China faces increasingly serious problems and obstacles regarding its decoupling strategy. Many of these arise out of structural weaknesses inherent in its political economy. The monograph is written to assist the Biden administration and those who follow it to possess a deeper understanding of: China’s actions and the motives behind them; China’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; and How the US and its allies can craft an evolving approach that better plays to their individual and collective strengths and advantages. China hopes the US and its allies will adopt a cautious, gradualist, and ineffective approach to countering Beijing’s strategy and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party knows the US and other advanced economies still have immense advantages despite clever Chinese messaging to the contrary. The US and its allies continue to enjoy considerable leverage and remain well placed to partially decouple from China on their preferred terms, but they need to act quickly, collectively, and decisively.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, and National Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. Estados Unidos y África. Historia de una no-política

Author:: Pablo Rey-García and Pedro Rivas Nieto
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: En este artículo se estudian las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y África, desde los puntos de vista económico, político y de seguridad. Son, estos tres campos, interdependientes, pero a la vez enormemente dinámicos, tanto por la inercia política estadounidense, como por los condicionantes propios de África (déficit en desarrollo, pobreza, inseguridad o inestabilidad política) como por el contexto internacional. En este último aspecto, cobra especial relevancia la invasión rusa de Ucrania o la emergencia de la ambición militar China, pues ambos países compiten con Estados Unidos por tener una mejor posición en el continente africano.
Topic:: International Relations, Development, Economics, National Security, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Asia, North America, Sahel, United States of America, and Horn of Africa

21. Arctic: Toward the End of the Exception? Strategic, Nuclear and Maritime Issues in the Region

Author:: Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Through multiple international initiatives, including the creation of the Arctic Council at the end of the Cold War in 1996, the Arctic appears to be one of the last areas of peaceful cooperation in the world. This “Arctic exception” is also devoid of any serious territorial dispute between the neighboring countries, some of which are nevertheless great powers: Russia, the United States, Canada, but also Sweden, Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Iceland and Finland. However, this peaceful cooperation is not exempt from strategic rivalries: for some years now, these States in the Arctic have been redefining their strategic postures, notably through the publication of roadmaps and the deployment of new military forces trained to fight in this hostile environment. Russia thus remains the dominant power in the Arctic, in the face of a China with growing ambitions and a Western world – represented in particular by the United States – which is lagging behind after years concentrated on other military conflicts. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine that started in February 2022 also carry the germs of a broader destabilization of the region. Conventional competition is therefore renewed between these great powers, while the nuclear balance is partially maintained. It is indeed worth noticing that the Arctic is an area of direct contact between the Russian Federation and the United States. As such, it had a special significance during the Cold War as the shortest route between both adversaries for a potential ballistic missile and was a privileged position for deploying chains of radars and advanced detection systems. Finally, the shrinkage of the ice pack caused by global warming is also triggering the neighboring or more distant states’ greed, whether through the drilling possibilities for raw materials under the ice floe or the creation of new maritime routes. The latter would notably enable Russia to revitalize its northern flank and offer alternatives to existing transit routes.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and North Pole

22. China Makes a Move in the Middle East: How Far Will Sino-Arab Strategic Rapprochement Go?

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: With a well-planned strategy and a careful exploitation of the gaps opened by U.S. foreign policy shifts, China has successfully increased its role as a strategic actor in the Middle East, including by gaining a foothold in the regional arms market. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s early December visit to Saudi Arabia, upon King Salman’s invitation, exemplifies the recent improvement in Sino-Arab ties (Xinhua, December 8). While in Saudi Arabia, Xi initiated two new multilateral forums intended to strengthen engagement between China and the Arab world: the China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council summit (Xinhua, December 11). In addition to deepening political rapprochement between Beijing and several regional countries, China is simultaneously establishing crucial military-strategic ties with key Middle Eastern states. Chinese-made drones are already present in the arsenals of multiple Arab countries and technological cooperation between Beijing and its regional counterparts is rapidly increasing. The most striking example in this regard was the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) revocation of the F-35 deal that constrained its cooperation with the Chinese tech and telecommunications giant Huawei over 5G technology (Al Arabiya News, December 14, 2021). As many Arab countries’ doubts about Washington’s commitment to regional security grow, more and more countries are increasingly open to entreaties from China.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Rapprochement
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

23. An International Lifeline: Taiwan’s Parliamentary Outreach

Author:: Rup Narayan Das
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: For decades, China has made systematic efforts to internationally isolate Taiwan through a mix of coercion and diplomatic enticement. Taiwan, however, has broken through this isolation by engaging with other nations through robust parliamentary diplomacy in order to expand its international space and legitimacy. It is indeed an irony of contemporary history that although Taiwan fulfills the main requisites for statehood, such as territory, population and an effective governance structure, it is deprived of its rightful place in the community of nations multilaterally and also bilaterally at the behest of China. Most countries’ “One China” policies and state-to-state relationships with China preclude them from engaging in official interaction with Taipei, but the trend of parliamentary outreach between Taiwan and the rest of the world is gaining momentum. Such interactions provide opportunities for Taiwanese parliamentarians to interface with their counterparts from abroad, particularly with fellow democratic countries with which Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic relations. Moreover, these delegations have created something of an informal international parliamentary fraternity in support of Taiwan, which underscores a broader groundswell of goodwill in the international community. This article surveys some notable recent interactions in Taiwan’s expanding parliamentary diplomacy with the U.S. and other fellow democracies.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Parliament
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and United States of America

24. What now for Australia-China relations?

Author:: The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: After the May Federal Election, Labor Party leader Anthony Albanese was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Australia. What could this change in government mean for future Australia-China relations? At the China Studies Centre event on 3 June, four experts and practitioners in Australia-China relations discussed the bilateral relations over the past few years and the prospects for future political, social and economic interactions.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

25. Taking the low road: China's influence in Australian states and territories

Author:: John Fitzgerald
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: In November 2020 a Chinese official passed a list of 14 grievances to Australian journalists, highlighting what Beijing regarded as missteps in the Australian government’s relations with China. A striking feature of the list is that many concern Australian Government attempts to limit Chinese engagement with the states and territories, or state-based institutions such as universities. Why did state and territory relations with China concern Canberra? This study explores the changing nature of China’s engagement with Australian states and territories, local governments, city councils, universities, research organisations and non-government organisations, all nested in Australian civil society. What emerges is the astonishing breadth and depth of China’s engagement, much of it the welcome outcome of Australia’s economic and people-to-people engagement with China over many decades. But it’s equally apparent that China has made covert attempts to influence some politicians and overt attempts to engage states, territories and key institutions in ways that challenge federal government prerogatives and have brought the two levels of government into sharp public dispute. Here we provide a detailed analysis of how China has worked to build its political influence and build dependence through trade and economic ties with each Australian state and territory. In addition, unique cross-cutting chapters review the impact of Chinese engagement with Australian universities and show how Beijing’s ‘United front’ organisation is designed to build influence. We assess the impact on Australian businesses and the constitutional challenges presented by Chinese engagement with the states and territories. The study methods and analytical approaches adopted in this book will be a model for similar research in many parts of the world. Understanding the nature of Chinese engagement with subnational jurisdictions is an important way for national governments to shape their security policies and to resist covert and, indeed, unwanted overt interference. This book provides original insights into the scale of the challenge and distils practical policy recommendations for governments at all levels to consider and adopt.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

26. US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate

Author:: David Santoro
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The study US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate analyzes the mutual vulnerability question in US-China strategic nuclear relations. It asks whether the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China and, if so, how and under what conditions it should do so. The goal is not to give a yes-or-no answer but to provide a comprehensive examination of the issue to better understand the benefits, costs, and risks associated with various options. The study includes chapters by US, Japanese, South Korean, Australian, and Chinese scholars.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. Ukraine: Toward a Prolonged War of Attrition Fuelling Great Power Competition

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Russia and China no longer need to play by the rules of the Euro-American international order. It is therefore likely that in this uncertain period of flux, the major four powers will vie to win friends and allies, giving second-tier powers like Turkey and India more influence if they can ably manage their foreign relations and avoid unnecessary alignment with any of the four major powers.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

28. China’s increased presence in Latin America: Win-win relations or a new dependency? A state of the art

Author:: Daniel Agramont Lechín
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Postgraduate Program on Sustainable Development and Social Inequalities in the Andean Region (trAndeS)
Abstract:: The rise of the Popular Republic of China (PRC) is one of the most significant events in contemporary international relations. However, at the global level, the “reemergence of China as a major global power has led to a considerable debate over the likely consequences for the rest of the world” (Jenkins, 2010: 810). China’s growing power raises questions as to the meaning of its superpower status as a nation, and the impact of its newfound influence in not only the Asia-Pacific region, but also the Global South (Dessein, 2015). In the specific case of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the debate centers on the potential disadvantages that China’s vast supply of financial resources might bring for the region. Accordingly, the current paper is intended to examine the debate that has arisen in recent literature around the impact of China’s increased economic presence on Latin America –with win-win relations on the one hand and new dependency on the other.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Investment, and Dependency
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Latin America

29. Towards Guanxi? Reconciling the “Relational Turn” in Western and Chinese International Relations Scholarship

Author:: Siyang Liu, Jeremy Garlick, and Fangxing Qin
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: In recent years, the “relational turn” in International Relations (IR) theory has attracted extensive attention. However, the limitations of the substantialist ontology of mainstream (Western) IR theory means that it encounters difficulties and dilemmas in interpreting the evolving international system. Against the background of the rapid development of globalization and regional integration, the reality of world politics is constantly changing, and increasingly shows obvious characteristics of interconnection and high interdependence. In this context, there is insufficient research comparing the Western and non-Western versions of the “relational turn”. Relational ontology may be able to provide a bridge between Chinese Confucian philosophy, Western philosophy, Western sociology, and mainstream western IR theories capable of generating productive synergies. However, there are major theoretical and cultural obstacles to be overcome if a reconciliation of the Western and Chinese versions of relationalism is to be achieved.
Topic:: International Relations, International Relations Theory, Academia, Confucianism, Relationality, and Relational Ontology
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Guangxi

30. Cross-Strait and U.S.-Taiwan Relations from the Kuomintang Point of View

Author:: Alexander Huang, Eric Huang, Johnny Chiang, Thomas J. Christensen, and Andrew Nathan
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Speaker Bios: Alexander Huang is the Associate Professor of the Institute of Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, the Chairman & CEO of the Council on Strategic & Wargaming Studies, and Special Advisor to the Chairman & Director of International Affairs at Kuomintang (KMT). Dr. Huang received his BA in Political Science at Soochow University in 1982, earned a MA from the Institute of Strategic Studies at Tamkang University 1984 and a MSFS from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in 1988. In 1994, Dr. Huang received a PhD in Political Science from George Washington University. Eric Yu-Chua Huang is the KMT’s Representative in Washington D.C., and an entrepreneur. Mr. Huang previously served as the party's spokesperson and deputy director of international affairs, a lecturer of International affairs at Tamkang University, and non-residential research fellow at National Policy Foundation. Mr. Huang joined the KMT party headquarters in 2014 after which he served as the international spokesperson for the KMT’s presidential candidate during Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election campaign. Previously, Mr. Huang worked as legislative aide for a KMT legislator representing a constituency in Taiwan’s capital, Taipei City, where his portfolio included national security and foreign relations, as well as constituent services and youth organizing. Mr. Huang graduated from Johns Hopkins University with a Master’s degree in International Relations; he earned his Bachelor’s degree at the University of Virginia majoring in International Relations; in 2018 he was a Visiting Scholar at Fudan University. Johnny C. Chiang was elected the chairman of the KMT to rejuvenate the party in 2020. The KMT ruled Taiwan from 1949 to 2000 and from 2008 to 2016, and is now the main opposition in Taiwan. During August 2018-July 2019, Dr. Chiang was the convener (caucus whip) of KMT Party Caucus in Legislative Yuan. From August in 2016 to January in 2017, he took charge of the secretary of KMT party Caucus in Legislative Yuan. In 2016, he held the post of the convener in Foreign and National Defense Committee; Previously, in 2013 he ever served as the convener in Internal Administration Affair Committee. Besides, as to international inter- parliamentary exchanging activities, he currently serves as the chairmen of R.O.C(Taiwan)-United Kingdom Inter-Parliamentary Amity Association. He is also the chairman of R.O.C(Taiwan)-Singapore Inter-Parliamentary Amity Association. Dr. Chiang received his Ph. D. in International Studies from the University of South Carolina and his master degree of public and international affairs from the University of Pittsburgh. He has previously served as Minister of Government Information Office (GIO) as well as Government Spokesman of Executive Yuan, ROC (2010- 2011); Deputy Executive Director of Chinese Taipei APEC Study Center (2009-2010); Director of International Affairs Department, Taiwan Institute of Economic Research(2005-2010); Deputy Secretary-General, Chinese Taipei National Committee of Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) (2005-2010); Associate professor, department of political science at the Soochow University in Taipei (2003-2010). In 2021, Dr. Johnny Chiang was named by Time magazine to be one of the "100 emerging leaders who are shaping the future." In 2006, Dr. Chiang was selected as the Top 10 rising stars in Taiwan. His research interests widely cover such areas as international political economy, international organizations (especially APEC and WTO), Asia- Pacific studies, cross-Strait relations, globalization and international relations theory. This event is sponsored by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and cosponsored by the China and the World Program.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

31. Russia in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from China, Russia, and the United States

Author:: Gaye Christoffersen, Ying Liu, Artyom Lukin, Elena Feditchkina Tracy, and Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Russia’s role in the Indo-Pacific is an understudied topic—while much of the discussion of Russia in Asia typically focuses on its response to geopolitical rivalries, the volume addresses ideational factors in Russia’s relations with regional and global powers, the domestic drivers of Russia’s Asia-Pacific policy, as well as the complex iteration of regional identities in Asia-Pacific Russia and in the Sino-Russian partnership. Contributors to this volume are based across Russia, China, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the USA, drawing on a range of multinational perspectives and theoretical approaches. Panelists at this event will present views from Beijing, Vladivostok, and the United States.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

32. Analysis of Chinese Response Patterns to Diplomatic Friction and Its Influencing Factors

Author:: Jai Chul Heo
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: As China grows into a global power, it is forming a closer relationship with the international community. In the process, the nation is experiencing increasing levels of diplomatic friction, such as confrontation and conflict with other countries, as well as cooperation. Accordingly, this study analyzes China's response to various forms of diplomatic friction, as Korea seeks an effective response to possible friction with China in the future. More specifically, China's response to diplomatic friction was examined through various cases, with the aim of categorizing China’s response measures based on these examples. In addition, this study aims to prepare for possible friction with China in the future by identifying factors that differ in China's response to diplomatic friction.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Territorial Disputes, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

33. Lessons for Europe from China’s quest for semiconductor self-reliance

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Semiconductors are a critical input to production of information and communication technology and many other goods. The major economies want to be able to produce chips at home to avoid excessive dependence on supply chains in an increasingly unpredictable world, where trade is being compromised because of national security concerns. China was first in terms of timing and scale of funding to support its its semiconductor industry. Since 2015, China has spent $150 billion upgrading its semiconductor industry. Success, however, has been limited. China’s massive industrial policy effort has been most successful in increasing capacity for assembly of chips, though that is also the least value-added part of the semiconductor supply chain. Progress on chip design and fabrication in China remain underwhelming. The United States has also started implementing its $50 billion package to support the production of chips. The European Union, meanwhile, has not yet fully finalised its main semiconductor initiative, the European Chips Act. China’s experience offers a number of lessons. First, chip fabrication requires massive fixed asset investment and, therefore, large subsidies, but with no guarantee of success. Second, one reason for the underwhelming results of China’s semiconductor policy is US containment, through export controls and other measures. In this respect, the EU should find it easier than China to upgrade its chips industry but, given the costs, focusing on the highest-end part of the supply chain would be the best approach. Assembly and production of lower-end semiconductors already face overcapacity, given the financial resources already invested by China.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Economy, Trade Policy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China and Europe

34. Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Work Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and its Implications on Foreign Policy

Author:: Hankwon Kim
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Hankwon Kim, an Associate Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, provides an analysis of Xi Jinping's "Work Report" to the 20th Party Congress which includes an ideological and political framework for understanding the likely direction of Chinese domestic and foreign policy for the next five years. Dr. Kim claims that the chances of China shifting its foreign policy seem to be low as the report contained indirect criticisms towards the United States by opposing all forms of hegemonism, coercive politics, Cold War thinking, interference in domestic affairs, and double standards. In addition, as 2027 marks the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Liberation Army of China and the time Xi Jinping should decide whether to run for a fourth consecutive term, Dr. Kim predicts that Chinese leadership could move toward armed unification by 2027. Accordingly, Dr. Kim suggests that South Korea should investigate possible future scenarios in the Taiwan Strait and prepare for concrete countermeasures.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, North Korea, and United States of America

35. President Yoon's Trip to Madrid: Rethinking Seoul's Policies toward Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, and Pyongyang

Author:: Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: In this Commentary, Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at the East Asia Institute (EAI), explains the objectives behind the U.S.’ invitation of its key allies the Indo-Pacific to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit. He posits that the U.S. aims to establish a highly institutionalized cooperative mechanism that combines the capacities of existing alliances among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, the author stresses the need for South Korea to address the implications of the Russia-Ukraine War, the emerging Chinese threat, and reestablish ROK-Japan relations. Lastly, Dr. Kim proposes that the administration should carefully consider how it might restore international cooperation on the North Korea issue and resume the denuclearization process.
Topic:: International Relations, NATO, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

36. After Hegemony: Japan’s role and dilemma in maintaining the rules-based order

Author:: Yu Inagaki
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The phrase “rules-based order” has recently become a recurring theme in the Japan-US alliance . This is based on the recognition that the liberal international order (LIO)—which the United States built and maintained, and that Japan has significantly benefited from—is now being challenged. While the war in Ukraine has heightened the sense of crisis over global power dynamics, China has been considered the main threat to the LIO. The United States has identified China as not just a security threat but a “ most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge ,” and Japan has come to view the current international environment from a larger perspective, international order. In fact, Japan has expected to play a leading role in maintaining the LIO as US international engagement weakened under the Trump administration. However, is it possible for Japan, a constrained middle power, to maintain the existing order in the face of a declining hegemon and rising challengers? This raises a classic question in international relations: What will happen to the international order after hegemony; and what can and will Japan, occupying a particular place and role in the international system, be able and willing to do regarding international order?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, Hegemony, and International Order
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

37. INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Author:: Chuong Nguyen, Binh Nguyen, Hiep Tran, and Mi Le
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The XXI is considered by major countries in the Asia-Pacific region as ‘the century of sea and ocean’ and is accompanied by fierce competition among the nations to gain interest in the sea regions. On the basis that previously only considered the competition for military objectives, geostrategic bases and traffic channels through the straits, nowadays, countries worldwide have stepped up the competition for economic interests and marine resources. The development of military power and the competitive activities for resources at sea show clear the tendency to use the sea to contain the continent. In that context, the Indian Ocean, as the world’s third largest ocean, has an important geographic location and rich and diverse natural resources; the arterial sea route is gradually becoming the center of new world geopolitics and an important area in the strategic competition between two ‘Asian giants’ - India and China. The competition between these countries in the Indian Ocean is growing and profoundly impacts the region’s stability and security. This article focuses on the position and important role of the Indian Ocean in the policies of India and China, the fierce competition between the two countries in nearly two decades of the XXI century.
Topic:: International Relations, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Indian Ocean

38. A Principled Middle Power Diplomacy Approach For South Korea to Navigate the U.S.-China Rivalry

Author:: Saeme Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In the context of growing US-China tensions, South Korean administrations have opted for degrees of strategic ambiguity, refraining from overt actions that suggest South Korea is taking sides. While strategic ambiguity has been moderately successful, there are limits to this approach which make it unsustainable. This paper will argue that rather, South Korea needs to apply a principled middle power diplomacy, which refers to a middle power carrying out roles expected of it in accordance with a set of rules or values that uphold the liberal international order. The goal of principled middle power diplomacy would be to shape the environment in which the current great power rivalry is unfolding, in order to moderate the fallout of great power competition. After an analysis of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy, this paper will recommend that South Korea double down on its commitment to multilateralism so that it can augment its roles as a facilitator and agenda-setter on the international stage.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

39. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Should South Korea Manage its Relations with the United States and China?

Author:: Zhiqun Zhu
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper deals with one of the most critical issues in contemporary international relations: how China’s rise challenges foreign policies of U.S. allies, with a focus on the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea. South Korea has been carefully hedging between the United States and China, its traditional security patron and largest trade partner, respectively. Strategic rivalry between the two great powers has put South Korea in an awkward position as pressure grows from the two powers to pick a side. Using a modified dual-track economics-security nexus framework, this paper suggests that the United States and China each has a significant impact on South Korea’s security and economic policies, making it important but challenging for South Korea to simultaneously manage relations with the two great powers. So far, South Korea has maintained these two sets of relationships remarkably well, but it may be difficult to continue with business as usual in the years ahead. For its own national interests, South Korea must seek to preserve the status quo under which it can continue to benefit from good relations with both great powers. The paper also proposes that South Korea should form a “middle power coalition” with like-minded nations to deflect pressures and avoid the dilemma of having to choose sides.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

40. The Sino–U.S. National Identity Gap and Bilateral Relations

Author:: Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The national identity gap between China and the United States has become increasingly apparent. Under Xi Jinping, China has sought to reclaim its historical greatness and proclaimed itself to be a responsible great power that offers a credible alternative to Western values, while also promoting increasingly authoritarian policies at home, complete with extensive repression in Xinjiang and renewed state control of the economy. Assertions of U.S. national identity were somewhat muted under Donald Trump, confused by the battle between those who supported the administration’s “America First” policy, its transactional approach to foreign affairs, and its deemphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy, and those who worried about the global repercussions of an isolationist, nativist policy. For a time, the United States seemed more preoccupied with its trade war with China than with claims that the United States should act as the global protector of human rights and democracy. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated already tense Sino–U.S. relations and called both countries’ national identities into question. While China had, as of spring 2021, succeeded in keeping its COVID-19 outbreak remarkably small, the damage caused by its initial suppression of medical reports, along with successful virus mitigation in a number of non-authoritarian states, called into question its claim to be a responsible world power on the basis of its pandemic performance. Meanwhile, the Trump administration failed to protect U.S. citizens from catastrophic death tolls and prevented the United States from taking a leading role in resolving this global crisis. In January 2021, the Biden administration took office with a focus on swiftly ending the pandemic, while also reasserting the traditional U.S. global leadership role. When combined with its assessment of U.S. power after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and of U.S. domestic social and political instability evident throughout 2020-2021, the pandemic has strengthened China’s perceptions of the United States as a country in decline, and of China as a “risen” great power that should now play a major role in shaping the global order. At the same time, although U.S. policy towards China remains firm despite the presidential transition, the underlying rationale has shifted from the “America First” approach of the Trump administration to the democratic values-infused approach of the Biden administration. As the world struggles to move beyond the pandemic, the national identities of China and the United States are increasingly defined in opposition to each other and seem likely to drive an ever more challenging bilateral relationship in the coming years.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

41. China, ASEAN, and the Covid-19 Pandemic

Author:: Joseph Chinyong Liow
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: For Southeast Asia, the COVID-19 pandemic was not only a public health crisis. It also provided an occasion for China to deepen its engagement in the region by dint of its own successful containment of the virus within its borders, and the resources it possessed to extend help to regional countries battling COVID-19 and its consequences, including economic, on their own shores. While Chinese help was welcomed, Southeast Asia also sought to avoid being beholden to any single external power. To that end, Southeast Asian states have actively pursued such diversification not only through efforts at reinforcing cooperation within ASEAN but also by using ASEAN as a vehicle to engage external powers. At the end of 2019, Chinese health authorities reported a cluster of pneumonia cases that had emerged in Wuhan, in the province of Hubei, which eventually led to the confirmation of a novel coronavirus. Several weeks later in January, the pandemic struck Southeast Asian shores when the first case outside of China was detected in Thailand. Within a few months, the world found itself in the grip of a global pandemic. By the end of January 2021, there were more than 100 million recorded cases of the COVID-19 infection, with over two million deaths. While the fatality rates are lower than those of previous pandemics of the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) strain, it has by far been the most infectious, prompting Singapore foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan to opine that with the pandemic “we are facing a global life and death crisis which requires extraordinary measures.” Threats posed by pandemics are not new to Southeast Asia. In the last two decades alone, the region had been beset by several transnational health crises, of which SARS and the H5N1 Avian Flu were arguably the most lethal. What is striking about the current climate, however, is the backdrop against which the pandemic is playing out: the COVID-19 pandemic has hastened the further bifurcation of an international order that was already threatening to come undone because of the intensification of Sino-U.S. rivalry and American withdrawal from multilateralism under Donald J. Trump. Southeast Asian states found themselves increasingly compelled to reassess their relationships with external powers. Taking the present pandemic as a point of entry, this paper considers its impact on Southeast Asia’s relations with China and the U.S. The paper makes three main arguments. First, it contends that Sino-U.S. rivalry has sharpened over the COVID-19 pandemic by dint of the politicization of this public health crisis by both parties. Second, it argues that China has identified and seized upon opportunities presented by the pandemic to enhance its regional and global standing through continued support for multilateralism and economic engagement through initiatives such as the BRI, in turn creating favorable conditions for the advancement of its foreign policy interests. Conversely, because of the severe deficiencies in how the Trump administration handled the pandemic domestically, the Biden administration will have to prioritize its domestic challenges at the expense of greater bandwidth and resources for foreign policy, especially in Southeast Asia, a region that since the end of the Vietnam War has never featured prominently in Washington’s pursuit of its overseas interests. Third, it posits that while Southeast Asia has doubtless benefited from Chinese support during this crisis, the region remains skeptical of Chinese strategic intent and concerned about overreliance. States have tried to diversify relations with regional powers while strengthening cooperation within ASEAN. The paper first looks, by way of background, at how the pandemic emerged as the latest arena of Sino-U.S. rivalry. It then explores how China has handled the pandemic domestically, where its success has allowed it to expand its influence as a putative provider of “global public goods.” In the interest of brevity, the paper then focuses on ASEAN by documenting collective regional efforts and strategies to navigate great power rivalry in the realm of global public health.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, ASEAN, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China and Asia

42. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Gamechanger in the Indo-Pacific: The View from China

Author:: Yun Sun
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: How has the COVID-19 pandemic reshaped or influenced China’s geopolitical outlook and its grand strategy for the years to come? This is a question that will determine China’s relationship with the United States, the Indo-Pacific region, and the rest of the world. In the Chinese strategic community, the pandemic has been regarded as a “watershed” event that has reshaped the structure of the international system and the power equilibrium. Its importance is elevated to the same status as the end of World War II, which determined the bipolar international system between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War which began thirty years of U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world. Although China began as a sheer loser in the pandemic given its culpability in the origin of COVID and its early poor management of the domestic spread of the disease, Beijing believes that it has eventually emerged as a pure winner in the pandemic: the relative gain China has made vis-à-vis the U.S.’s bigger losses in disease control, national power, economic growth, global leadership, and credibility has strengthened Chinese confidence that the tide is turning in China’s favor. The “effectiveness” of the Chinese political system, as manifested in its domestic disease control, has reinforced China’s ideological conviction of its superiority. As China uses COVID diplomacy to demonstrate the superiority and desirability of its political system, the pandemic is perceived as an opportunity for it to shape the new international order and promote China’s desired “Community of Common Destiny.” Challenges remain, as the U.S. revamps its alliance system under the Biden administration and as regional powers and Western countries grow increasingly concerned and anxious about China’s growing confidence and capabilities. However, for China, the pandemic has been a great opportunity, and China has emerged from it as a pure winner. It is an interesting question as to how the pandemic has changed the nature and the dynamics of the great power competition between the U.S. and China. Most would agree that the pandemic exacerbated, accelerated, and aggravated the deterioration of relations that the U.S. and China had already been experiencing before 2020. However, the differences lie in the degree, intensity, velocity, and extensiveness of the damage. Without the pandemic, the downward slope U.S. and China had already been on would not have come to a state of “freefall” in 2020. And that “freefall” period has long-lasting and significant implications for their bilateral relations in the post-COVID world. The damaged trust, confidence, and credibility, and the deeply entrenched sense of hostility, or even antagonism, have made any effort to repair the relations extremely difficult, if not completely impossible. And this reality will affect the regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region for the many years and decades to come.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

43. Xi Jinping’s Evergrande Dilemma

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Evergrande is one of the top-two real estate developers in a still highly fragmented Chinese sector. Its main strategy is to achieve ever-increasing scale (rather than profitability) in order to move ahead of and crowd out commercial competitors. It has also amassed the largest land reserves of all Chinese developers, which were financed through massive borrowings. By 2018, Evergrande held 822 pieces of undeveloped land in 228 cities, with a planned gross floor area of 3.28 billion square feet of new homes—the equivalent of 10 percent of Germany’s entire housing stock. It paid $75 billion just for this undeveloped land. Although Evergrande’s market share is only around 4 percent, its borrowings stand out. Its current balance sheet liabilities amount to an estimated 2 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), while its off-balance-sheet liabilities could be another 1 percent of China’s GDP. This makes Evergrande the most indebted property developer in the world. Burdened by this debt, struggling to meet its debt interest and repayment obligations, and viable only if property asset values and sales continue to increase, Evergrande faces possible financial collapse—an event bound to have flow-on effects for the Chinese economy. However, the unusually high global interest in Evergrande has arisen because its woes are increasingly seen as symptomatic of those faced by the broader Chinese economy, which is struggling with enormous levels of indebtedness and overreliance on the real estate sector. Debt held by nonfinancial institutions in China increased from about 115 percent of GDP in 2010 to around 160 percent of GDP currently. This is the most rapid and largest increase in a 10-year period for any major economy and makes the level of debt held by Chinese nonfinancial institutions one of the highest in the world. The real estate sector accounts for around 15 percent of GDP, while property services account for another 14 percent—the highest in any developing economy. The share of the real estate sector as a proportion of GDP was only about 4 percent in 1997 and 9 percent in 2008. Since 2008, up to a third of all domestic fixed investment has gone into real estate, and up to half of total national debt is linked to the real estate sector.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Debt, Economics, Markets, and Business
Political Geography:: China and Asia

44. Winning the Geo-Tech Battle and Building the Quad Alliance in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Eric B. Brown, John Lee, and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Under Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has established as its paramount geopolitical objective the replacement of the free and open, rules-based order in Asia with an alternative world order, one that is to be dominated by the interests and values of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This decision presents a danger to the entire world, not just to any one state or group of states. For, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at the March 2021 US-PRC meeting in Alaska, the alternative to a rules-based order “is a world in which might makes right and winners take all, and that would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us.” In furtherance of its objectives, the PRC is in the midst of a large military build-up, but there is much more. For today’s CCP, political power grows not only from the “barrel of the gun,” as Mao Zedong once put it, but also from cutting-edge technologies. Thus, while Beijing pours billions into artificial intelligence and surveillance tech to impose its new “digital totalitarianism” inside the PRC, from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, it is also using its growing technological prowess to press its larger geopolitical agenda in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. It is weaponizing technology and connectivity, along with trade, finance, and other policy instruments to try to rule the key technologies and industries of the future, as well as to improve its strategic positioning and acquire political power over other countries—for instance, through its bid to dominate other nations’ most sensitive data networks, or via the export of its suite of “social stability” technologies, i.e., the “techno-tyrant’s toolkit.” In all this, the CCP’s intent is to entrench its power and Leninist norms and practices to the extent it can do so beyond the PRC’s borders, and to make other nations, or at the least their ruling elites, beholden to it. So in addition to the PRC’s militarily destabilizing activities in the West Pacific and incursions into India’s Himalayas, there is also a “geo-technological front.” If Xi’s CCP succeeds at enmeshing other countries in its expanding “PRC sphere of technological influence,” it could unlock and be able to exploit decisive military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological advantages.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Economics, and Alliance
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, East Asia, and Asia-Pacific

45. Regaining the Digital Advantage: A Demand-Focused Strategy for US Microelectronics Competitiveness

Author:: Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Microprocessors are a critical element of US national infrastructure and manage the country’s energy grids, transportation systems, and telecommunications networks. Without a reliable supply of computer chips and microelectronic components, most US economic and societal activity would grind to a halt. The semiconductor manufacturing process is largely concentrated in East Asia, where manufacturers could be subjected to pressure or coercion by the People’s Republic of China. The semiconductor supply chain, and its inherent resilience and security, could be strengthened by US government investment to bring more steps of the microelectronics production and assembly process onto US shores. To guide government policies, this study proposes a four-factor framework measured from the perspective of the US microelectronics customers and industry. These factors include: resilience of continued microelectronics supplies to the US market; assurance that US microelectronics reflect their intended design and are free of security vulnerabilities; the ability of the US microelectronics industry to meet current microelectronics demand, which shapes the ecosystem; and the value added from US firms, which supports future demand.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. China’s Gambit for Total Information Dominance: A US-Australia Response

Author:: Patrick M. Cronin
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This report assesses China’s comprehensive approach to information power and its implications for the U.S.-Australia alliance. The purpose of the report is threefold: to enlarge alliance awareness of China’s whole-of-society information challenge; highlight critical responses to this challenge from Canberra and Washington; and deepen alliance thinking regarding strategy and policy. The scale and scope of China’s information enterprise distinguishes it from other countries. Overt persuasion campaigns and covert influence operations are thoroughly researched, carefully choreographed, and uninhibited by concerns over individual or sovereign rights. Beijing goes beyond the use of information and instead seeks to achieve primacy in discourse power by weaponizing narrative in ways analogous to asymmetric military strategies. China uses a distinctive whole-of-society approach to building a dazzling wealth of data and information. Aided by intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, decades of education training abroad, and other forms of acquiring information, China’s industrial policy goes beyond protectionist measures like subsidies. When Military-Civil Fusion is considered, this development has far more than economic and technological ramifications.
Topic:: International Relations, Science and Technology, Alliance, Data, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

47. Europe's China Chimera

Author:: Peter Rough
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: When Xi Jinping, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), dreams of global domination, he worries about one thing above all else: a hostile United States backed by its allies—and on the Eurasian landmass, the US has no more important ally than Europe. As a result, Xi has worked to weaken the transatlantic alliance through a two-pronged economic stratagem. First, under the guise of globalization, China has insinuated itself into the European economy, creating dependencies. Second, Beijing is manipulating those dependencies to hollow out and supplant Europe’s advanced economies. To give this deception cover, China has built a vast political network across Europe, from basic sympathizers to outright spies. Until recently, barely anyone took notice, but the financial crisis and forever wars of the past two decades, culminating in the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, lured the self-confident Xi out into the open. During the coronavirus pandemic, China revealed an aggressive attitude toward Great Britain’s former colonies that shocked the United Kingdom. In the span of mere months, London shifted from cooperation to confrontation. In July, it became the first country in Europe to block the Chinese telecommunications giant, Huawei, from its next-generation networks. Germany, the continent’s most important country, still sees China as key to post-pandemic recovery and economic growth, however. Xi has exploited this attitude to strike an investment agreement with the European Union (EU), the chief purpose of which is to forestall a transatlantic approach under the new US president, Joe Biden. Together, the United States and Europe have unparalleled advantages against any competitor. Now is the time for cooperation, before Xi’s dreams become our collective nightmare.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

48. A US-India Trade Agenda for the Biden Administration

Author:: Aparna Pande and Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The US ought to counteract the influence of Chinese authoritarianism early and often. One relatively low-cost way is to encourage India to engage more deeply as a competitor with China in the global economy. A democracy since its independence in 1947, with a population about the same as that of China, India is that country’s natural rival in Asia. Beginning with India’s decision in 1990-91 to liberalize its economy, the nation has gradually opened its vast market to global trade. Fueled by fresh access to foreign capital and technology, India’s economy grew over six percent during the first decade of the 21st century. In May 2014, this progress was further advanced by the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For the first time in India’s history, a conservative administration had a clear parliamentary majority, making it possible to legislate foundational, market-positive reform. India has adopted a new insolvency and bankruptcy code and replaced multiple taxation regimes across its states with a federal goods and services tax, which is welcome. But India has done little to end its excessive protectionism. Its distrust of foreign corporations, a legacy of colonial rule, endures. Indian policy makers may believe that the US is so eager for Indian competition with China that Washington will grant them a pass on restrictive trade and investment policies. But there is a better choice. India is nowhere near its full economic potential, and the fix isn’t complicated. The Biden agenda for India should encourage India to lower tariffs, to remove barriers to foreign retail, to roll back unnecessarily restrictive data privacy rules, and to provide economic incentives for foreign investment.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

49. Transforming the Middle East: The Origins, Impact, and Evolution of the Abraham Accords

Author:: Robert Greenway
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Abraham Accords constitute the beginning of a transformation of a region that has confounded many, and that will continue to be a vital battleground astride the security and economic interests of world powers. American leadership was a necessary but alone insufficient condition to the emergence of this agreement. American leadership will remain essential to its growth and evolution. The alignment of our regional partners and allies in both economic and security domains will ensure that the agreement endures. It will also incentivize others to join us in pooling critical capacities to advance and defend mutual interests. This transformation serves to constrain Iran – the threat from which has been recognized as causal – even as it constrains the malign influence and predatory practices of China and Russia. They will continue to manufacture and exploit fissures among the U.S. and its regional partners if we fail to exploit the favorable shift in the region’s security and economic architecture. On the other hand, appropriate support will allow the Abraham Accords to advance and secure America’s interests with the use of significantly fewer resources and with more capable partners integrated as never before.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

50. How China Regards its Future in the World

Author:: Marcos Caramuru and Philip Yang
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: China’s post-Covid plans regarding national investment and foreign policy are ambitious and its success depends on the ability to build trustworthy relations with its Asian neighbors and the great powers. The XXII China Analysis Group meeting gathered experts to discuss China’s positioning and the ways in which it could overcome challenges and aim for a positive bilateral agenda with the USA during the Biden administration.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

51. China’s grand industrial strategy and what it means for Europe

Author:: Frederico Mollet
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In its 14th Five-Year Plan, China has mapped out a grand economic and industrial strategy that upends many of the assumptions that underpin the EU's approach - how can the Union respond? With this new plan, the EU can expect tougher competition and greater protectionism in its economic relations with China. A further blurring of the public-private sector distinction in the country's economic model will make it harder to combat unfair Chinese competition. And while China is actively courting foreign investment, it is also signalling greater protectionism to products not made in China, which will lead to European investors' and exporters' interests diverging. To balance the scales, the EU should adapt its own strategy by: continuing to develop trade instruments to combat unfair competition at home and abroad; ensuring that these instruments and institutions can respond to unfair competition from private companies benefiting from state capital investment; ensuring that the extensive and often opaque government holdings in private firms are reflected in foreign direct investment and export controls; incorporating China's attempts to reconfigure supply chains into its own assessment of strategic dependencies, identifying areas that could become vulnerable; prioritising the improvement of access to the Chinese market for goods and services produced in Europe; developing alternative sources of growth, and boost demand and reduce barriers within the Single Market to offset greater Chinese protectionism; and ensuring that its industrial policy efforts will enable European industry to match China's developments. The present moment may mark a turning point in EU–China relations: in a little over three months, an agreement on an investment treaty was followed by sanctions and countersanctions. Geopolitical conflict ratchets up between China and the US. Beijing's new economic course will reshape its global relationships. China's protectionist turn and growing one-sided dependencies will threaten Europe's long-term strategic autonomy and undercut any attempts to construct a balanced approach to EU–China relations. If the EU's multi-track strategy is to work, a concerted effort is required to preserve economic parity and balance between the two powers.
Topic:: International Relations, Political Economy, European Union, Grand Strategy, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

52. Tangled Threats: Integrating U.S. Strategies toward China and North Korea

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China and North Korea pose intertwined challenges for U.S. and allied policy. The Korean Peninsula constitutes just one area among many in U.S.-China relations. Meanwhile, issues on the peninsula remain central to the future stability and security of Northeast Asia and implicate many broader questions about regional and global order. Dealing with China and North Korea as an interlocking pair requires integrated policies that balance the risks and rewards of various possible approaches. This policy brief explains how to develop such policies and why they are the best option for the current regional landscape. North Korea plays several roles in China’s foreign policy. These include diverting geopolitical attention away from China, providing Beijing with an opportunity to cooperate with other states, creating a point of leverage for China to extract concessions on separate issues, and acting as a flashpoint with the potential for a regional war that directly affects China’s security. At any given time, some roles will be more pronounced than others, but each of them is always present to some degree. Any integrated U.S. strategy toward the pair will have to account for a volatile geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia. Major trends include closer ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, deteriorating U.S.-China relations, and South Korea’s desire, especially under the government of President Moon Jae-in, to engage North Korea while balancing ties with China and the United States. The United States should employ a strategy toward China and North Korea that blends calibrated pressure and results-oriented engagement. The goal of this strategy should be problem-management rather than problem-solving. Washington should implement this approach across four areas: shaping U.S.-China relations regarding the Korean Peninsula; engaging North Korea on political and security issues; promoting stable deterrence in the region; and coordinating a shared inter-Korean and foreign policy with South Korea. Key recommendations for the United States include acknowledging that major breakthroughs are unlikely with either China or North Korea; proposing four-party nuclear and peace talks with South Korea, North Korea, China, and the United States; and standing up a Nuclear Planning Group that includes Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to bolster deterrence and stem nuclear proliferation pressures.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

53. Partners, Competitors, or a Little of Both? Russia and China in the Arctic

Author:: Jim Townsend and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The Arctic’s melting icecaps are changing more than the geography of the region. The diminishing sea ice and declining snow cover have allowed for new shipping lanes and growing access to natural resources, increasing geopolitical competition in the region. A defining feature of this competition is the growing interest and activity of Russia and China in the Arctic. Not only have the two countries increased their presence in the region, but coordination between them is growing. Political observers in Washington and beyond understand well the challenges that Russia and China each pose to the United States. But little thought has been given to how their interests and actions will combine and the challenges that such alignment will pose for the United States and its allies and partners. Previous CNAS research has highlighted the risks that greater Russia-China cooperation creates. This research argues that the growing partnership between Moscow and Beijing is amplifying the challenges that both actors pose. In the Arctic, Russia and China’s interests are converging around resource extraction projects, the expansion of the Northern Sea Route, and the enhancement of operational awareness and security cooperation. The increasing synergy in the Arctic will be most consequential for the United States on two fronts: First, Beijing is working with Moscow to improve its military capabilities. Second, Russia is increasing its economic reliance on China in the Arctic in ways that may raise Moscow’s willingness to back Beijing’s priorities in other regions and on other issues to avoid jeopardizing its economic ties with Beijing. Increasing military cooperation: Through joint research and, to a lesser extent, its joint military exercises with Russia, China is enhancing its military knowledge of and insight into the Arctic. Though China’s actual military presence in the Arctic is minimal, the two countries’ cooperation is enhancing Chinese insight into Russian dual-use technology, which Beijing can use to build its military capabilities. China can learn from Russia’s dual-use and hybrid capability development in the Arctic, accelerating its efforts to erode U.S. military advantages and posing a greater threat in the event of military conflict. Russia and China may also strengthen their military relationship in the Arctic in the future, including expanding the scope of their joint exercises in the region. Ultimately, sustained or deepening Russia-China military cooperation may threaten America’s ability to deter Chinese and Russian aggression in the region.
Topic:: International Relations, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Arctic

54. Is America Really Back?

Author:: Thomas Fingar
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:: Following the 2021 Taihe Civilizations Forum, the Taihe International Communications Center hosted an online discussion on October 8 that captures the candid and profound reflections of senior officials whose actions have shaped the course of ties between China and the United States. Dr. Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and former Assistant Secretary of State, and Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret.), Senior Fellow at Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, China Forum Expert, and former Director of Center for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation of Ministry of National Defense, were invited to join this dialogue. During their conversation, Dr. Fingar and Senior Colonel Zhou exchanged ideas on important topics such as the current state of China-U.S. relations, the future development of the two countries' bilateral ties, the rationale behind the US foreign policy and the American alliance system, as well as the "extreme competition" that China and the U.S. are trapped in.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. Hedging by Default: The Limits of EU “Strategic Autonomy” in a Binary World Order

Author:: Richard Higgott and Simon Reich
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: For some time, international relations has trended in the direction of an American and Chinese dominated binary world order. While the Trump administration has been an accelerator not a cause of this trend between 2016 and 2020, not coincidentally the post 2016 era has also seen key EU figures move to develop a strategy of greater "strategic autonomy". This interest in strategic autonomy was, in no small part, a reflection of growing European distrust in the reliability of both China and, increasingly, the USA. The paper shows, in contrast to the Cold War era during which the EU was unambiguously aligned, how the EU now appears to have embarked on a hedging strategy, albeit implemented more by default than design. In its desire to defend its core interests the EU appears to lean to one side or the other on an issue by issue basis in at least seven key policy domains identified in the paper. This approach is seen to be the outcome of its dual desire to articulate the values of its much touted “Geopolitical Commission" at the same time as it tries to continue its traditional institutional commitment to multilateralism. The paper concludes that the ambiguity present in this endeavour to straddle the realist-liberal fence only serves to expose the limitations of the strategy.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

56. FOCAC at 21: Future Trajectories of China-Africa Relations

Author:: Chris Alden, Stephen Paduano, Mzukisi Qobo, Lukas Fiala, Iginio Gagliardone, Yu-Shan Wu, Gidon Gautel, and Lina Benabdallah
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: The China-Africa relationship has continued to evolve over the last years. In light of the 8th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that will take place later in 2021, the latest report from LSE IDEAS China Foresight brings together an international team of experts to shed light on emerging and consolidated areas of engagement between China and Africa that will likely shape the relationship in the years to come.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Africa and China

57. Shaping the Indo-Pacific? Japan and Europeanisation

Author:: Yee-Kuang Heng
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In this Strategic Update, Professor Yee-Kuang Heng investigates European power projection and presence in the Indo-Pacific, and its converging nature with Japan’s attempt to shape the regional environment in its favour. While UK threat perceptions have converged significantly with Japan’s since former Prime Minister David Cameron’s promulgation of a “golden era” in relations with China, managing expectations of Japan’s attempt to ‘shape’ and encourage Europeanisation remains crucial. But is it fair to conclude that Japan has been successful in encouraging a stronger European presence to help it shape the Indo-Pacific order?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Europeanization, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Indo-Pacific

58. Strategic Foresight in Chin: The other missing dimension

Author:: Paul Charon
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Over the last few decades, analysis of international relations and strategic issues has developed rapidly in China, both within the Chinese Communist Party– state apparatus and in think tanks and universities. However, the richness of this field of study is in stark contrast to the absence of any real open reflection on the question of foresight. If, like other nations, China is committed to understanding the world in which it is evolving and to identifying possible changes, the function of foresight has not been conceptualised or institutionalised to the same degree as in the West. Foresight analysis in China is marked by several salient features: firstly, it remains almost non-existent in Chinese institutional frameworks dedicated to the analysis of international relations; secondly, the concepts of the ‘black swan’ and the ‘grey rhino’ have made a significant breakthrough, particularly in economics, before being cannibalised and politicised by the Party; and thirdly, the reading of the horizon remains essentially informed by the Party’s vision, fears and obsessions.
Topic:: International Relations, Political Parties, Domestic Policy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China and Asia

59. North Korea’s Energy Crisis: What Are the Problems?

Author:: Kyung-sool Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: North Korean businesses run by state-supplied energy have not been properly operated due to a sharp decrease in energy supply. Long-standing energy shortages have paralyzed the state energy supply and demand system, causing further disruptions in statewide functions. In this commentary, Kyung-sool Kim, Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Energy Economics Institute, states that this resulted from a complex accumulation of various problems: the characteristics of the regime, national capacity, state monopoly of production factors, the lack of a market, limitations of policy functions, the absence of capital and technology, and international isolation. The author argues that radical changes such as systemic reform and market opening are necessary to resolve these issues. The author adds that North Korea should be free from international isolation and propagate change in order to utilize external support.
Topic:: International Relations, Energy Crisis, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

60. The China Challenge Prompts Recovery of a Strained ROK-Japan Relations: Analyzing ROK-Japan Relations Through the 9th Joint Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey

Author:: Yul Sohn
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Korea-Japan relations have been strained for the past 3 years as the feelings of fatigue between the two citizens has been steadily increasing due to the Korean Supreme Court’s ruling on the forced wartime labor in October 2018. Bilateral cooperation to reorganize the world order after COVID-19 also remains bleak. The East Asia Institue (EAI, President Yul Sohn) and Genron NPO (President Yasushi Kudo) conducted the “9th Joint Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll.” Based on the results of the survey, this issue briefing examines the differences in public opinion between the two countries on security and economic cooperation. This briefing also analyzes the Korean public’s call to improve ROK-Japan relations and increase cooperation. President Sohn argues that ROK-Japan relations should be re-examined under the intensified U.S.-China strategic competition and the possible post-pandemic global risks. He also states that Japan should abandon its one-track approach and understand the Korean’s preference for “future-oriented” cooperation. Additionally, the next Korean administration should respond to public opinion and strive towards the reconstruction of ROK-Japan relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Regional Cooperation, Public Opinion, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

61. Is Serbia Still a Troublemaker in the Balkans?

Author:: Faruk Ajeti
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: As one of the largest countries of the Balkans, Serbia’s troubled past also poses big dilemmas for the future. Its latest political and military cooperation with Russia and China appears to be an effort to build a strategic neutrality with “Serbian characteristics.” But at what cost?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Neutrality, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

62. More Harm than Good: Why Chinese Sanctions over THAAD have Backfired

Author:: Daniel Mitchum
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In 2017 South Korean Moon Jae-in, in response to North Korean ballistics testing, adopted a resolution to implement the THAAD missile interceptor system. Beijing had long been opposed to the system and as a result initiated a series of unofficial, punitive economic sanctions against South Korea which covered a range of industries. However, Beijing’s actions did little to alter Seoul’s decisions and have instead damaged China-South Korea relations. A similar paradigm has since appeared within China-Australia relations. How nations respond and adapt to such tactics in the future is a question of critical importance.
Topic:: International Relations, Sanctions, Weapons, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

63. The Opportunity is There: South Koreans’ Views of China and the Future of the US-ROK Alliance

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Officially, relations between the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China remain cordial. Because of China’s economic heft and South Korea’s reliance on unmolested trade with the former for its continued economic development, South Korea takes great pains to be as neutral as possible between the United States and China despite its formal alliance with the US. As such, many pejoratively refer to South Korea as “the weak link” in America’s Northeast Asia alliance system. However, on a civil society level, an overwhelming majority of the South Korean public has a negative view of China—a view that has steadily gotten worse over time. Being a democracy that reflects voters’ popular will, growing anti-Chinese sentiment among voters means South Korea’s current policy of placating China will not be sustainable indefinitely. Meanwhile, the Trump administration largely neglected the alliance between South Korea and the United States. That neglect notwithstanding, an overwhelming majority of South Koreans either strongly or somewhat support the alliance with the United States. Conditions are perfect for the Biden administration to seek to repair and strengthen relations with South Korea to empower the alliance to serve as a credible bulwark against Chinese expansionism—this paper offers solutions on how to do so.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economy, Alliance, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

64. Opciones estratégicas de Rusia desde la óptica del neorrealismo ofensivo

Author:: José Gonzálvez Vallés
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: El neorrealismo nos da claves de cómo los Estados -actor principal de las relaciones internacionales-, interactúan entre sí, y, siendo su principal misión la propia supervivencia, desarrolla unas estrategias específicas para asegurarla, las razones de escoger entre ellas, y las acciones que aseguran el objetivo final.Será en este marco teórico en el que se intentará revisitar la relación especial entre Rusia y China. Una vez socios ideológicos, otra adversarios como cabezas de las dos más grandes estructuras de poder bajo el paraguas del socialismo, y en la actualidad, parece que potencias cada vez más cercanas en su común aversión al poderío norteamericano. Y sin embargo....Este trabajo trata de identificar las opciones estratégicas de Rusia, enmarcadas en el paradigma de la escuela realista.
Topic:: International Relations, Ideology, and Neorealism
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

65. Hedging as a Survival Strategy for Small States: The Case of Kuwait

Author:: İsmail Numan Telci
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Strategic hedging has not been studied adequately in Middle Eastern countries. This study is an attempt to include hedging into the analysis of a small state’s foreign policy choices. It contends that the hedging strategy can be applied to small states because of its confrontation at three levels: international, regional and sub-regional. It is argued that Kuwait has pursued a hedging policy by taking possible shifts in the global and regional power distribution and the lasting regional security dilemma into consideration. By strengthening military cooperation with China and Turkey, Kuwait has aimed to hedge the risks that could arise from the rise of China and Turkey in the Gulf, the US’ retrenchment from the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia’s aggressiveness. The main purpose of this strategy is analysed as a move to empower the regional alliance with Turkey, ensuring Kuwait’s security and warding off potential risks from the changing dynamics of the Middle East.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Hedging
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Middle East, Kuwait, and Gulf Nations

66. Tianxia (All-Under-Heaven): An Alternative System or a Rose by another Name?

Author:: Mehmet Şahin
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Tianxia is considered as an alternative institutionalization to govern the international system. It refers to world governance that is regulated by a world institution. Accordingly, a world institution plays the harmonizer role under this system. States, on the other hand, choose their economic models and the leader organizes the relations among different units. This paper thus argues that Tianxia is an alternative framework to Western-oriented IR theories. In that sense, this article aims to explore the similarities between the philosophical idea of Tianxia and Western-oriented IR Theory. More specifically, the article explores the issue from the international system perspective. The epistemological gaps and ontological similarities between the two frameworks will be demonstrated.
Topic:: International Relations, Governance, International Relations Theory, and International System
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Global Focus

67. Leveraging Submarine Cables for Political Gain: U.S. Responses to Chinese Strategy

Author:: Lane Burdette
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Submarine cables are critical infrastructure that carry nearly all internet traffic. However, unclear international governance does not always guarantee their protection, leaving global information networks vulnerable to sabotage and espionage. China’s access to submarine cables for strategic manipulation is greatly expanded through the Digital Silk Road and territorial claims in the South China Sea, posing a clear threat that requires a U.S. response. Current U.S. policy is uncoordinated and can be sorted into the isolationist, cooperative, competitive, and militaristic responses, which each present unique frameworks for future action. The isolationist response would disconnect the United States from insecure cable networks, limiting China’s influence over U.S. assets but reducing international connectivity. The cooperative response emphasizes international norms-setting processes to achieve multilateral agreements protecting cables from state influences. The competitive response advocates U.S. competition with China in the submarine cable market through alternate assistance programs, which would increase the redundancy of a secure network. Finally, the militaristic response explores the role of America’s military in defending submarine cables from foreign exploitation. This article recommends that future policy emphasize a combination of the competitive and militaristic responses in order to most immediately and effectively address China’s threat to information security along submarine cables while minimizing U.S. risk.
Topic:: International Relations, Politics, Governance, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: China, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

68. The Impact of the Repression in Xinjiang on China’s Relations with Other Countries

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The policy of repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has become a significant element of criticism of China in the world. In March this year, the EU, U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on China over the matter. Moreover, the Netherlands, the U.S. and Canada described China’s actions as genocide. For China, however, its actions involving Uyghurs are a key element of domestic politics, which is why it presents accusations as disinformation. It has imposed counter sanctions, including on the EU, and their wide scope indicates that for China, Xinjiang is more important than, for example, the ratification of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CAI) with the EU.
Topic:: International Relations, Genocide, Human Rights, European Union, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, Canada, Asia, Netherlands, United States of America, and Xinjiang

69. The Vision Group on U.S.-ROK Relations: Insights and Recommendations

Author:: KEI
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, organized six “Vision Group” roundtable conversations with leading American scholars and commentators to discuss the United States’ relationship with the Republic of Korea. The first was held in December 2019, the last in November 2020. The intent was to consider the future of relations during a time of change. The Vision Group comprised a wide range of expertise and opinion. This record conveys some of the insights and recommendations that arose during the conversations.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Human Rights
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

70. Limits of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Lessons from the THAAD Dispute for South Korea's Foreign Policy

Author:: Maximilian Ernst
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper examines South Korea’s foreign policy towards China before, during, and after the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense dispute to investigate the limits of South Korea’s public diplomacy and soft power. South Korea’s official public diplomacy has the objective to “gain global support for Korea’s policies,” following Joseph Nye’s narrow definition of soft power. South Korea furthermore ranks high in the most relevant soft power indices. Based on the case of Chinese economic retaliation against South Korea in response to THAAD deployment, this paper argues that public diplomacy and soft power only work in the absence of traditional security contentions, but fail in the presence of such security contentions. The THAAD case also demonstrates the utility of traditional diplomacy, based on high-level summits and negotiations, to solve the very disputes that South Korea’s latent public diplomacy and soft power were unable to alleviate.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Weapons
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

71. The Silence of non-Western International Relations Theory as a Camouflage Strategy: The Trauma of Qing China and the Late Ottoman Empire

Author:: Hayriye Asena Demirer
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: My main argument in this article is that there have been at least three important barriers to the development of non-Western international relations theory (NWIRT): intellectual barriers (traumatizing effects of the imposition of the “standard of civilization”); ideational barriers (dominance of Western concepts and contexts); and scientific barriers (imposition of the standard of science). I argue that the silence of NWIRT is substantially a side effect of the strategy of mimicking the West, which was developed as an intellectual defense mechanism or as a camouflage strategy for the (re)establishment and the survival of non-Western states after their traumatic encounter with the Western states. Therefore, the surfacing of NWIRT discussions in the last decades can be attributed primarily to the maturation of an internal condition that is the revival of self-confidence in the residuals of former empires due to their regaining of rising power status and, thus, can be seen as a new phase of the ‘revolt against the West.’ On the other hand, I argue that the rise of NWIRT discussions are also related to the ripening of an external condition: some European schools of IR have been attempting to intellectually balance against the hegemony of American mainstream IRT, therefore, publication of edited books and special issues on NWIRT can also be read as searching for intellectual alliance with NWIRT.
Topic:: International Relations, Trauma, Civilization, and Ottoman Empire
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

72. Answering Beijing’s Growing Assertiveness beyond the Senkakus: Balancing Japan-China Relations

Author:: Valerie Niquet
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: To Japanese authorities, there is no such thing as the “Senkaku question”. China is pursuing with increased assertiveness a strategy of coercion, using ambiguity and “grey zone” operations to put the onus of potential escalation on Tokyo.1 The vague and ambiguous nature of this strategic power play makes it all the more dangerous and complex. When Tokyo proclaims, with reason, that “the government continues to control and administer the territory by such means as patrolling and law enforcement,” it seeks to answer the permanent pressure that China exerts in the zone.2 However, the maintenance of the status quo, when China exerts an almost continuous pressure in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands and Japanese fishermen do not have access to part of Japan’s own national territory, poses other types of problems that the People’s Republic of China tries to exploit at the service of broader ambitions. It also poses a challenge in crisis management: how can the Japanese government be active and in control of situational developments, and not just reactive, without going as far as sparking a major incident in the East China Sea?
Topic:: International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

73. Strategic Annual Report 2020

Author:: Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: The year 2020 was characterized by the intensification of US-China confrontation and strategic competition, which had been pointed out in the Strategic Annual Report 2019, in all areas from military and security affairs as well as dominance in advanced technologies and supply chains to narratives on coronavirus responses. Amid this confrontation, the rules-based international order faced even more severe challenges; the multilateral framework established after World War II with the United Nations at its core lost its US leadership and fell into serious dysfunction. While the international community is struggling to cope with the rapidly expanding outbreak of the novel coronavirus, China has been moving to expand its influence through increasingly authoritarian and assertive domestic and international policies on the rule of law and territorial issues, as well as through economic initiatives such as the existing “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) and its responses to the pandemic. The confrontation with the United States is becoming more and more pronounced, and the Indo-Pacific region is turning itself into divided and contested oceans. In this transforming strategic environment, expressions of support for the vision of a rulesbased “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) that Japan has been promoting for the past several years, or announcements of similar visions have followed one after the other. The year 2020 also saw significant strengthening of the cooperative framework among four countries – Japan, the United States, Australia, and India (QUAD) – together with the enhancement of bilateral cooperation between countries in this group. At the same time, progress was also made in a regional cooperation framework that includes China with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement in East Asia. The Strategic Annual Report 2020 looks back at major international developments since last year’s Report through the end of 2020, focusing on the transformation of the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region and the response of the international community.
Topic:: International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Multilateralism, COVID-19, and Destabilization
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Middle East, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

74. Can China Practice Major Power Diplomacy in the Middle East?

Author:: Masaaki Yatsuzuka
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: There is no question that China's presence in the Middle East is growing significantly. Will China continue to deepen its involvement in the region and play a role in shaping the regional order, taking the place of the United States? In other words, will China practice major power diplomacy in the Middle East? The view among researchers in China and elsewhere1 over this question is divided. To categorize their arguments into two camps, there is a cautious engagement theory that warns against the risk of getting caught up in the turmoil in the Middle East and recommends (or predicts) that China protect its economic interests while maintaining political neutrality vis-à-vis the Middle East as it has done so far. On the other hand, there is an active engagement theory advocating (or foreseeing) that China deepen its engagement, proactively participate based on the responsibility of a major world power in solving problems in the Middle East, and actively propose its own ideas in order to protect Chinese interests in the Middle East.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

75. U.S. Trade Policy toward China: Learning the Right Lessons

Author:: Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Labor market and cultural disruptions in the United States are real and important, as is China’s current and unfortunate turn toward illiberalism and empire. But pretending today that there was a better trade policy choice in 2000—when Congress granted China “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) status and paved the way for broader engagement—is misguided. It assumes too much, ignores too much, and demands too much. Worse, it could lead to truly bad governance: increasing U.S. protectionism; forgiving the real and important failures of our policymakers, CEOs, and unions over the last two decades; and preventing a political consensus for real policy solutions. Indeed, that is happening now.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Markets, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

76. Catalyzing India’s Climate Ambition

Author:: Patrick Suckling
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China’s recent commitment to reach carbon neutrality before 2060 means that for the first time ever, India is on track to become the world’s largest emitter. At a time that demands urgent action if we are to stay within the goals of the Paris Agreement, this brings into contrast India’s traditionally bifurcated approach that it has used to guard against taking greater action in light of the responsibility of the developed world to lead the way. Nevertheless, in recent decades, a political appetite for climate action has been growing in India, including reinforcing its global leadership credentials at the behest of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Climate-related disasters have also driven public support for more constructive engagement by Delhi. However, this appetite does not yet match growing international expectations for Indian action, as momentum for global climate action and ambition accelerates rapidly around the world in the lead-up to the COP26 Climate Conference in Glasgow in November 2021. The election of U.S. President Joe Biden and recent commitments to net-zero by other Asian economies such as Japan and Korea underscore the weight of growing expectations on India. A sophisticated and holistic strategy to catalyze climate ambition from India is needed if the world is to succeed and help the country navigate a new low-carbon development model. India’s recent establishment of an Apex Committee on the Implementation of the Paris Agreement and its commitment to produce a long-term strategy to reduce emissions provide two particular openings for this even if signals elsewhere are mooted, including the impact of India’s economic response to COVID-19. And at a geopolitical level, India’s relations with China can help reinforce the need for action, and so too can India’s shifting relations with the G77 group of developing nations. This strategy must involve a mix of both greater political and policy engagement and deeper technical and financial support to help accelerate action — including through helping unlock greater private finance domestically. The recently announced U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership is an excellent first step in this regard. This Asia Society Policy Institute issue paper, Catalyzing India's Climate Ambition, authored by Senior Fellow and former Australian High Commissioner to India and Ambassador for the Environment Patrick Suckling, sets out how the wider international community should sensitively, constructively, and intelligently now work with India to catalyze greater climate ambition in the lead-up to COP26 and beyond.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, and India

77. A Rising or Ebbing Tide: Do Chinese Students Still Want to Study in the U.S.?

Author:: Peggy Blumenthal
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: Many U.S. colleges and universities are anxiously wondering if newly admitted Chinese students will accept their admission offers and return to American campuses in fall 2021. Needing to balance a host of issues, will Chinese students decide to remain at home or study in a different host country? This IIENetwork Briefing paper assesses the current situation, explores possible outcomes for fall 2021 enrollments from China’s mainland and Hong Kong, and presents some ways that U.S. campuses are responding to these recruiting challenges during a changing political and health environment in both the host and home countries.
Topic:: International Relations, Higher Education, COVID-19, and Study Abroad
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

78. The New Geo-Economic Environment and the EU’s Capacity to Act

Author:: Claudia Schmucker
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The European Union must position itself in a new geo-economic environment in which the United States and China are increasingly using their economies to shape international relations, as well as regional and global regulatory structures. Although the EU has a good grasp of the challenges that this new environment poses, it does have vulnerabilities in its bilateral and multilateral channels that require attention.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Environment, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

79. Hun Sen's Mistake? The Domestic Political Ramifications of His Chinese Shelter

Author:: Charles Dunst
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s close relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has led scholars and policymakers alike to suggest that Beijing’s backing will keep him in power. While Hun Sen himself seems to believe this to be true, his reliance on China is actually enflaming Cambodian discontent to such an extent that his planned patrimonial succession is at risk. Given the fragility of regimes mid-succession, Hun Sen’s Chinese shelter is augmenting the potential of his clan’s fall. Yet as Hun Sen faces increased domestic opposition, he will only further deepen ties with China in hopes of remaining in power, thereby creating a vicious cycle from which escaping will prove difficult.
Topic:: International Relations, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Cambodia, and Southeast Asia

80. EU-China Engagement in Humanitarian Aid: Different Approaches, Shared Interests?

Author:: Ina Friesen and Leon Janauschek
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Protracted crises and frequent natural disasters have generated an unprecedented number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The international community faces a great challenge in supporting these populations, as the gap between needs and available funding is growing. To close this resource gap, the European Union (EU) aims to step up its engagement with emerging donors, particularly China, to increase their level of funding. Although China has previously been reluctant to engage in the international humanitarian system, its response to the COVID-19 pandemic indicates a change in attitude. Over the past year, China has delivered hundreds of tonnes of personal protective equipment (PPE) to over 150 countries and dispatched medical teams abroad. It has also donated $100 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) and pledged to establish a global humanitarian response depot and hub in China in cooperation with the UN. Amidst increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the EU, China’s growing humanitarian engagement opens an opportunity for the EU to engage with China in the humanitarian sector. However, rather than framing China’s increased engagement in solely financial terms, the EU should develop a long-term strategy as to how to engage with China on humanitarian matters. A dialogue that takes both parties’ different approaches towards humanitarian aid into account and searches for common ground could open the door towards possible cooperation. This would not only help in narrowing the funding gap but carry the potential for greater coordination and consequently more effective assistance provision. China conceptualises humanitarian aid as a subcategory of development aid and provides the majority of its assistance bilaterally. Beijing’s state-centric approach to humanitarian assistance means in practice that it engages mostly in the aftermath of natural disasters rather than conflict settings. The EU, on the other hand, has a separate humanitarian aid policy that guides the allocation of funds and provides its humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This Briefing Paper maps out the characteristics of Chinese humanitarian aid and outlines two areas on which the EU’s tentative steps towards a dialogue with China could focus. • Food security sector: Food insecurity is a key component in existing humanitarian needs, only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Food assistance and nutrition are already a key area of engagement for the EU and China. The EU should advocate for China to scale up its contributions to global food security through the World Food Programme (WFP), with whom China has a good working relationship. This could be combined with a political dialogue on how to foster cooperation on food security assistance. • Anticipatory humanitarian aid: Disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response play an increasingly important role in global humanitarian aid. China has built up its most significant expertise in response to natural disasters. Enhancement of disaster risk reduction is one of the strategic priorities of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) for 2020–2024. In light of both parties’ interest in anticipatory humanitarian aid, knowledge exchange in this area has the potential to open the door for future cooperation.
Topic:: International Relations, Humanitarian Aid, European Union, Food Security, and Engagement
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

81. China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:: Deep Pal
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: China’s economic and political footprint has expanded so quickly that many countries, even those with relatively strong state and civil society institutions, have struggled to grapple with the implications. There has been growing attention to this issue in the United States and the advanced industrial democracies of Japan and Western Europe. But “vulnerable” countries—those where the gap is greatest between the scope and intensity of Chinese activism, on the one hand, and, on the other, local capacity to manage and mitigate political and economic risks—face special challenges. In these countries, the tools and tactics of China’s activism and influence activities remain poorly understood among local experts and elites. Both within and beyond these countries, meanwhile, policy too often transposes Western solutions and is not well adapted to local realities. This is especially notable in two strategic regions: Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe; and South Asia. China’s economic and political profile has expanded unusually quickly in these two regions, but many countries lack a deep bench of local experts who can match analysis of the domestic implications of Chinese activism to policy recommendations that reflect domestic political and economic ground truth. To address this gap, the Carnegie Endowment initiated a global project to better understand Chinese activities in eight “pivot” countries in these two strategic regions. The project’s first objective was to enhance local awareness of the scope and nature of Chinese activism in states with (1) weak state institutions, (2) fragile civil societies, or (3) countries where “elite capture” is a feature of the political landscape. Second, the project aimed to strengthen capacity by facilitating a sharing of experiences and best practices across national boundaries. Third, the project sought to develop policy prescriptions for the governments of these countries, as well as the United States and its strategic partners, to mitigate and respond to activities inimical to political independence or well-balanced economic growth and development. To establish a comprehensive picture of China’s activities and their impact, this project dug deeply into Chinese activism in four case countries in each region—eight countries in total. We began by holding workshops, so that influencers across countries could share experiences and compare notes. Invited participants included policymakers, experts, journalists, and others—all with deep local knowledge, steeped in their countries’ politics, economies, and civil societies. In Europe, the four countries were Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania, and in South Asia, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Cross-national discussions among these regional participants aimed to raise awareness, discuss the implications of China’s growing activism in their countries, and compare notes on the diverse ways in which these various countries had managed the rapid influx of Chinese capital, programs, people, technology, and other sources of influence.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Engagement, Regionalism, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Bangladesh, China, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldives

82. The policy of the People’s Republic of China towards Central and Eastern Europe in 2012-2020

Author:: Adam Kuź
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: In the second decade of the 21st century, the Middle Kingdom, which had huge financial surpluses, became the world’s largest exporter of money capital, which meant that investment policy became the main element of China’s foreign policy. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the 16+1 (17+1) format, containing both investment policy and soft power elements, has become the basic tool of the general policy of Middle Kingdom. This article aims to define the basic principles of China’s policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. For this purpose, the following general hypothesis was formulated: Chinese policy in Central and Eastern Europe consists of presenting the countries of this region with initiatives that do not go beyond the sphere of declarations and serve as a bargaining chip in relations with Germany, the country with the greatest potential in the European Union. The general hypothesis gives rise to detailed hypotheses that were verified in individual parts of the article with the use of the comparative method. The reasons most often mentioned in the literature on the subject, such as economic, cultural, social, and political differentiation of Central and Eastern European countries, legal barriers resulting from EU legislation, insufficient recognition of the region’s needs by the Chinese side and asymmetry of expectations of both parties, undoubtedly largely contribute to the lack of effective Sino-CEE cooperation. However, they cannot be considered decisive because similar problems occur wherever Chinese companies appear. However, in many regions of the world, despite these obstacles, mutual economic relations are more dynamic than in CEE. The reasons why the potential of the 16+1 (17+1) format has not been properly used can be found primarily in the context of German-Chinese relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economy, Investment, and Capital
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

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