The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington.
In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands
During much of 2022, the defense and security alliance between the United States of America and the Philippines, anchored on and reinforced by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, teetered on the brink of collapse. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte brought relations to the brink through attempts to scuttle the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This move would only embolden Chinese challenges to Manila’s territorial integrity and its aspirations to dominate Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. While the Duterte administration recited parochial reasons to terminate the VFA, pundits from the security and diplomatic sectors viewed Duterte’s attempts as a pretext to steer the Philippines towards China under his own brand and definition of an independent foreign policy.
During his term, Duterte reiterated that President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials were his friends. He also publicly declared that the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), a northeastern section of the Spratly Islands, was already in physical control and possession of Beijing due to the unchallenged presence of its military and maritime militia vessels there. Given these statements, Duterte has constantly received criticism over his defeatist stance towards China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Politics, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Las relaciones entre España y América Latina siempre han conformado un pilar en la estrategia
de integración internacional del país ibérico. No obstante, ante la singular coyuntura que supone
el auge exponencial de China en la región latinoamericana, ¿qué riesgos afronta hoy España en
América Latina? ¿Ha influido dicha coyuntura en las líneas maestras de acción exterior de
España hacia la región? Este artículo arroja algo de luz en torno a tales preguntas, y su
conclusión es doble. Por un lado, sugiere que el desembarco chino supone un serio desafío para
España. Por otro, se sostiene que la política exterior española ha hecho coexistir tres tipos de
actitudes como respuesta: una más continuista, otra que capitaliza esta nueva coyuntura y busca
aprovechar sus oportunidades, y una última más reactiva a las amenazas que suscitaría la
pujanza china en América Latina.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade