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Begin New Search Political Geography China Publication Year within 10 Years

1651. China’s Response to Sudan’s Political Transition

Author:
Laura Barber
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Sudan's decades-long economic relationship with China has almost always been dominated by oil. Yet this relationship has changed significantly in the past decade—first with the loss of oil reserves when South Sudan became an independent nation in 2011, and more recently due to the ouster of longtime ally President Omar al-Bashir. This report, based on interviews with policy officials, diplomats, industry and security experts, and others, examines China’s evolving commercial and political interests in this vital nation in the Horn of Africa.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Transition
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Sudan, and Asia

1652. China’s Impact on Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea Arena

Author:
USIP China-Red Sea Arena Senior Study Group
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Red Sea arena—which this report defines as the eastern and western shores of the Red Sea, from the Arabian Peninsula to Egypt and the Horn of Africa, and the strategic waterways that run between, including the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal—has long been a center of political turbulence, regional rivalries, and geopolitical interest. Historic political transitions currently underway in Sudan and Ethiopia, burgeoning economic investments amid fragility and debt in the Horn, continued conflict and humanitarian crisis in Yemen, Middle Eastern rivalries and their impact on regional conflict dynamics, and the growing presence of China have further heightened geopolitical interest in this arena. This report focuses on China’s influence and activities in the region and its relationships with twelve Red Sea arena states: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Environment, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Red Sea

1653. Myanmar’s Casino Cities: The Role of China and Transnational Criminal Networks

Author:
Jason Tower and Priscilla Clapp
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Seeking to profit from China's lucrative but illegal gambling market, a shady web of actors has begun building resort cities in Myanmar’s Karen State to cater to Chinese gamblers. This report casts light on the actors behind Myanmar’s illegal gambling sector, their linkages to Chinese government entities and to Myanmar's armed groups and military, and how their actions could upend Myanmar’s prospects for peace.
Topic:
Crime, Economics, Transnational Actors, Gambling, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

1654. A Sea Change?: China’s Role in the Black Sea

Author:
Ivan Safranchuk, Michal Meidan, Gonul Tol, and Michael Gunter
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute’s (MEI) Frontier Europe Initiative has recently launched a report, A Sea Change?: China’s Role in the Black Sea. The report seeks to address China’s policy vis-a-vis the countries of the Black Sea from several angles. What is the nature of China’s presence in the Black Sea? Is China a significant player in the region’s energy scene? What is the state of Chinese-Russian relations?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
China and Black Sea

1655. Beware Chinese Anger

Author:
Tuvia Gering
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The growing friction between China and Australia is a function of Beijing’s swagger and self-confidence. Israel must take note of Beijing’s aggressive behavior, and cautiously navigate its own relations with China.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

1656. China’s Alternative Vision for Gulf Security

Author:
Tuvia Gering
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Trump’s Middle East peace plan and the recent Israel-Arab peace accords limit Chinese influence in the region. Countering this, China is advancing a collective security concept for the region based on the JCPOA. The US and Israel must stymie this Chinese gambit and reinforce the Abraham Accords.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Peace, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1657. China’s View of the Abraham Accords

Author:
Tuvia Gering
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
China aims to play a more proactive role in the Middle East, maintaining cordial relations with all rival countries. Beijing attaches great importance to its ties with Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Egypt, and therefore has welcomed the Abraham Accords (albeit in lukewarm fashion, because of tensions with the Trump administration).
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Peace, and Intervention
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

1658. The China-Iran Agreement is not a Strategic Shift

Author:
Tuvia Gering and Yossi Mansharof
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The long-term agreement between the two countries has not been finalized, and its scope and security implications seem to be limited. It is unlikely to force Israel into a complete reconsideration of its economic ties to China.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Israel, and Asia

1659. Israel Shouldn’t Draw Fixed Lines Between Itself and China

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Jewish state’s relationship with the U.S. is stronger for resting on an informal basis; replacing it with a formal alliance would do no good and only anger the world’s other major power.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Conflict, Peace, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1660. BRICS and Mortar: New Architecture in Education

Author:
Kishore Singh
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
In the beginning of the new century and the millennium, Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China came to be reckoned as the world’s fastest growing economies. Later, these were joined by South Africa, leading to the emergence of BRICS as a political coalition of five countries. The year 2009 was a landmark in this historic development. In that year, the first BRICS Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation. The BRICS summits held annually since then have become an important political platform for the collective voice of BRICS countries in the form of BRICS Declarations. Education is one of the most critical areas addressed in successive BRICS summits. Centrality of education in people’s lives and its catalytic role for human development is widely recognised in today’s world. So it was inevitable that the BRICS countries would come together and create a common plat-forum on education as well. The first meeting of BRICS Education Ministers was held in November 2013 on the margins of the UNESCO General Conference. Since then, the BRICS Education Ministers have been meeting annually and issuing a separate declaration in tandem with the declaration issued at the summits.
Topic:
Development, Education, International Cooperation, and BRICS
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Asia, India, South Africa, and Brazil

1661. The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests?

Author:
Katarzyna Sidlo
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
China is a relative newcomer to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Indeed, as it is not in China’s immediate neighbourhood, for a long time its importance to Beijing remained low. This began to change in the early 2000s. Due to its impressive economic expansion, marked by joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China’s energy consumption growth rate accelerated, making the energy-rich region increasingly crucial to China’s energy security. Thus, the destabilization that came to the MENA with the Global War on Terror declared by the United States as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attack, endangered its interests. At the same time, however, having significant Muslim minorities of its own, China was keen to maintain the security of its Muslim-majority provinces and used the GWOT as justification for curbing the threat of its internal, separatist “Islamic terrorism”. Eventually, then, to accommodate its growing interest in the region, China expanded its “greater neighbourhood” to include the MENA as well (currently, a good part of Europe has also been declared a part of it). Presently, while still not a key partner for Beijing, the region is one of the main suppliers of China’s gas and oil, an increasingly important export destination, a territory of continuous construction activity of Chinese companies under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and an object of a large-scale Chinese charm offensive. Slowly, it is becoming an object of Beijing’s security interests as well.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Influence
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Middle East, Asia, North Africa, and MENA

1662. Panel 2: Islamophobia in Asia: Genocide and Detention

Author:
Audrey Truschke, Asher Ghertner, and Engy Abdelkader
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
This panel was part of the "Global Islamophobia in an Era of Populism" conference.
Topic:
Genocide, Human Rights, Populism, Islamophobia, and Detention
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1663. COVID-19: In Search of Solutions for Maritime Supply Chains

Author:
Chin Yim Leng
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Abstract:
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has had a remarkable impact on maritime supply chains. Since its first case in the capital of China’s Hubei province, Wuhan, Chinese seaborne trading activities were greatly affected – reports of weakening manufacturing confidence, decreasing demand for non-essential goods worldwide, and reduced workforce has surfaced since the massive transmission of COVID-19 in January 2020. Many European and Asian countries, including the United States, have responded to the pandemic in March 2020 by imposing strict containment measures. The implementation of national lockdowns or movement restrictions in pandemic-affected countries has led to rapid contractions in maritime supply chains. The wide-ranging impacts of COVID-19 on manufacturing and trading demands have created the need for different importing speeds based on essentiality, thus deteriorating the maritime supply chains. Governments and relevant authorities, as well as private entities, should take initiatives to ensure that maritime supply chains remain fully functional for national and commercial interests as the COVID-19 pandemic progresses. It could be ideal to adopt digitalisation and blockchains as these digital processes are easy to access and control in optimising the efficiency of maritime supply chains amidst the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Maritime, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1664. Will China’s E-commerce Reshape a Reopening World?

Author:
Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
China’s advances in digital-buying make the nation a harbinger of how a post-lockdown global economy could look.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Digital Economy, COVID-19, and Commerce
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1665. Technology Strategies in China and the United States, and the Challenges for European Companies

Author:
Laurence Nardon
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As international relations are increasingly reorganized around the US-China rivalry, the tensions between these two great powers are shaping a growing number of sectors, and the exchange of sensitive technologies in particular. This is a critical issue for European companies today. Indeed, European companies, as manufacturers, importers and exporters, risk finding themselves at the heart of the deepening technological competition opposing the United States and China (Éric-André Martin). The United States has a long history of using multiple regulatory instruments in managing the export of dual-use technologies, in particular towards China. Even beyond the Trump administration’s aggressive positions, these regulations are expanding and increasingly strict, hinting at a potential protectionist technological warfare (Pierre Girard). Despite China’s progress in innovation (5G, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things), and an expansion of measures meant to protect intellectual property rights both for domestic and foreign firms, Beijing’s predatory industrial practices and the weight of the Chinese Communist Party on the economy and society clearly live on (John Seaman). French and European companies are thus hindered both by the prohibition of re-exporting American technologies and products enacted by Washington and by Beijing’s predatory practices. How much leeway do European companies have? What role should the European Union (EU) play in the face of such challenges? Since 2016, new propositions to reform the EU export-control regime regulating dual-use items are being intensely debated (Sofia Bournou). The three chapters of this report examine the norms currently in place in the United States, China, and Europe, and delve more deeply into specific case studies: the battle between the Trump administration and Huawei (Marion Welles), the problems facing European companies in China (Laurence Nardon and Mathilde Velliet), and the case of the communications satellites (Jean-François Bureau). The conclusion of this report draws up a list – of great interest for decision-makers – of the infrastructures and technologies that will be critical for European strategic autonomy in the years to come (André Loesekrug-Pietri).
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Internet, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

1666. Prospects of a Hydrogen Economy with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Kevin Tu
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This study assesses the prospects of a hydrogen economy with Chinese characteristics. Against the backdrop of an escalating US-China trade war and the ongoing novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, key Chinese stakeholders become increasingly interested in moving the hydrogen economy agenda forward. During the first six months of 2020 alone, 37 policies in support of the hydrogen economy have been published by various level governments, including 7 by central government authorities, and 30 by local governments. Shandong alone issued 6 hydrogen supporting policies, followed with 5 by Guangdong. In sum, hydrogen economy development not only gains traction in China, but also is in great danger of overheating. The ambition in China is to expand hydrogen production and create new end-uses: in the transport segment (e.g. 1 million fuel cell electric vehicles – FCEVs – and 1,000 hydrogen refueling stations by 2030), but possibly also, in other hard-to-abate sectors such as steel and cement manufacturing or in the electricity storage segment (Power to X). Hydrogen production from low carbon electricity could bring many benefits, notably to address curtailments of renewable electricity from wind, solar and hydro. It could also be blended into the nation-wide gas grid especially for low-concentration hydrogen (e.g. 5-10%). Until recently, China’s interest in developing the hydrogen economy has not been primarily triggered by the decarbonization objective. Nevertheless, on September 22, 2020, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak national carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Given the significant amount of carbon emissions reduction implied by the above announcement, hydrogen is now expected to play a much more important role to drastically decrease the country’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) over time. China’s very large hydrogen production from fossil fuels, mainly coal, would make it quite challenging to consider decarbonizing the current uses of hydrogen. What decisively drives the current interest into hydrogen is innovation and technological leadership on the one hand, which China can achieve through industrial clusters and economies of scale, and energy security on the other: reducing dependence on imported oil and gas, with rising importance of air pollution control- and decarbonization-related considerations. It remains to be seen whether China can avoid the shortcomings of its electric vehicles (EV) supporting policies as it aims to boost a hydrogen economy with Chinese characteristics. A simplified SWOT analysis presented in the report identifies the most important strength, weakness, opportunity and threat for hydrogen economy development in China: Strength - ability to significantly bring down unit manufacturing cost through industrial network clustering and economy of scale. Weakness – lag far behind advanced economies in key hydrogen-related technologies. Opportunity – enthusiasm on hydrogen economy by local governments against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. Threat - looming danger of global supply chain decoupling caused by an escalating US-China trade war. In order to move the hydrogen economy agenda forward, a preliminary “to do list” for Chinese decision-makers in this field would include: A coordinated national mechanism should be established at the central government level to lay out principles for moving the hydrogen economy agenda forward in China. Comprehensive and transparent statistical reporting and accounting throughout the Chinese hydrogen value chain should be established. In the hydrogen production segment, renewable hydrogen should be prioritized for intensive Research and Development (R&D) and deployment in the near future, and greening China's existing hydrogen flow should be on the Chinese government's policy radar especially in the longer term. In the hydrogen storage and transport segment, national and local government should continuously direct subsidies towards hydrogen refueling stations, and also consider to encourage low concentration blending of hydrogen into China’s natural gas network. In the hydrogen consumption segment, China should selectively focus on R&D and deployment of advanced hydrogen end-use technologies notably for cement and steel, ideally coupled with expansion of the horizon of national energy planning framework. Opening up the Chinese market to better integrate technology innovations in advanced economies and manufacturing-related competitive advantages of the Chinese economy, aiming to create a win-win situation between China and the international community.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Decarbonization, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1667. GovTech, The New Frontier in Digital Sovereignty

Author:
Clément Tonon
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 crisis has been a catalyst for a surge in the GovTech market, while triggering debate around the use of new technologies in the public health response to the pandemic. More broadly, the health crisis has shed a new light on the strategic importance of some domains relevant to GovTech such as HealthTech, smart cities and EdTech. The French State has developed a comprehensive policy of government digitization but still suffers from a lack of investment in the GovTech sector: so far, it has been unable to nurture a GovTech ecosystem comparable to the French defense technological and industrial base. At the European level, the rise of GovTech solutions could deepen existing divides between member states, as shown by the uncoordinated development of tracing apps by European countries during the crisis. In the long run, the lack of European industrial and political strategy focusing on GovTech could turn Europe into a battleground for Chinese and American actors, which benefit from governmental support at home and abroad. The rise of GovTech companies challenges deeply rooted ideas on the meaning of the public sector and the role of the State. It underlines how technology can affect the values and core principles of democratic societies. In that sense, the growing technological competition between the US, China and Europe means much more than economic rivalry: it is a real threat to European democracy and strategic autonomy.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, COVID-19, Digital Policy, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, France, Estonia, Singapore, and United States of America

1668. Current and Future Trends in Chinese Counterspace Capabilities

Author:
Brian Weeden
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
China is in the midst of a long-term effort to develop a world-class space program with a strong military and national security component. Since 2015, Chinese official and unofficial writings have increasingly emphasized the importance of space warfare, including for offensive and coercive uses. In parallel, China has engaged in a significant and dedicated effort to develop a wide array of destructive and non-destructive offensive counterspace capabilities since the early 2000s, some of which are – or soon will become – operational. This study explores the multiple areas of Chinese counterspace capability developments, from co-orbital rendezvous operations to direct ascent antisatellite interceptors and electronic and cyber warfare. It summarizes what is known about current programs, offers estimates regarding the unique characteristics of each capability area and how advanced Chinese capabilities are in each field. While China’s search for a large array of counterspace capabilities is not unique, it could both directly and indirectly affect U.S. and European strategic interests and thus has vast implications for transatlantic security.
Topic:
National Security, Space, Satellite, and Military
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1669. Towards a More Principled European China Policy?

Author:
Stephan Frühling
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Promoting political values (democracy, human rights and the rule of law) in China is a colossal undertaking, but the EU could be more effective than we think. To do so, it must act strategically, in unity, and in concert with like-minded partners. It must also strengthen its record of upholding political values and reform its procedures for foreign policy decision-making. On 30 June 2020, China adopted a National Security Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region that not only undermines human rights and the rule of law that were promised to its citizens, but also violates international law. A few weeks before, when China’s intention became public, the European Union reacted cautiously, expressing concern but clarifying that the introduction of the law would not adversely affect its relations with China. The EU’s first reaction fell far short of statements released by the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, among others. But the EU’s reaction grew more critical over time. The first EU institution to adopt a tougher approach was the European Parliament. Shortly after, the European Commission and – to a lesser extent – the European Council followed with statements by its presidents after the EU-China summit held on 22 June 2020. This episode could turn out to be exemplary for the role of political values in the European Union’s relations with China. China and Europe have fundamentally divergent political values, even though they often use the same terminology. For a long time, many Europeans believed that China’s definition of democracy, human rights and the rule of law –, the three constitutive values enshrined in the Treaty of the European Union – would ultimately converge with the European understanding. This has not turned out to be the case. China is growing more self-confident, not only defending but starting to spread its own definitions of the triad of political values. This comes at a time when the EU is realigning its China policy more generally. The new European Commission strives to be a “geopolitical” entity strategically engaging to achieve concrete results in its bilateral relations with China. The starting point of this shift is the 2019 “Strategic Outlook” developed by the European External Action Service, which defines China not only as a “partner”, but also a “competitor” and a “systemic rival”. On political values, China clearly is a “systemic rival”. The crucial question is whether “systemic rivalry” in the field of political values carries implications for other policy fields in which the EU and China are partners or competitors. A general consensus that the EU should adopt a more principled China policy and defend and promote its political values spells out very differently across EU institutions. By institutional design, the European Council is a pragmatic rather than principled institution. Compromise resulting from bargaining among member states with different interests shapes its approach. At the other end of the spectrum, the European Parliament serves a principled watchdog function, but has very limited competencies in foreign and security affairs. The European Commission strives to overcome the decades-old challenge of policy silos resulting from its fragmented institutional structure and the more than 60 sectoral dialogues with China. This carries the potential to turn more principled. However, to this day it is not clear whether the European Commission will make the promotion of political values a policy priority even if this comes at the cost of economic cooperation. This paper outlines ongoing debates on the EU’s new China policy and the role of political values in it, and provides 25 concrete policy recommendations for a more principled China policy that defends and promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

1670. Strangers to strategic partners: Thirty years of Sino-Saudi relations

Author:
Jonathan Fulton
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This year marks the thirtieth anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia. Over the past three decades, the bilateral relationship has transitioned from one of marginal importance for both countries to a comprehensive strategic partnership, largely on the back of a trade relationship founded on energy. This report begins with a brief historical overview of Sino-Saudi relations, describing how the two countries transitioned from mutual hostility to diplomatic relations, and then how political and economic cooperation strengthened the relationship to the point that they signed a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2016. It then discusses how the partnership has developed through the 1+2+3 cooperation pattern, especially through projects linking China’s Digital Silk Road with Saudi vision 2030, as well as nascent levels of security cooperation. It ends with an analysis of the bi- lateral relationship within the context of the US-Sino-Saudi triangle: How does it affect each state’s larger strategic interests, and can issues where their interests diverge put a ceiling on future Sino-Saudi ties?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

1671. Mapping China’s Global Future: Playing Ball or Rocking the Boat?

Author:
Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
China’s future role on the global stage hinges upon a mixture of strengths and weaknesses. Beijing’s meteoric rise in economic terms has been coupled by increasing military expenditures and a more assertive foreign policy stance. But the country is also facing a potential backlash, exemplified by protests in Hong Kong, while it remains to be seen whether (and how) the governance of the coronavirus outbreak will affect China's image abroad. This report sets out to explore some of the key aspects of China’s regional and global foreign policy. It analyses the core tenets that motivate and shape China’s preferences, ideals, and actions, and explores how they interact with its partners, allies, and rivals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, Military Spending, COVID-19, and Future
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1672. Latin America and the New Global Order

Author:
Antonella Mori
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Amid the coronavirus pandemic, global geopolitical relations are being shaken to their roots, and Latin America is no different. The region is experiencing new transformations in political, economic, and societal terms. In turn, all these rapid changes are having an impact on how Latin American countries shape their own foreign policies, and on how they adapt to the challenges of an increasingly multipolar world. How are the US, China, and the EU competing in terms of political alliances and economic projection on the Latin American region? And how are some of the main Latin American countries (namely Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela) contributing to shape these new regional dynamics?
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Economy, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
China, Brazil, Latin America, Venezuela, Mexico, and United States of America

1673. Between Politics and Finance: Hong Kong's "Infinity War"?

Author:
Alessia Amighini
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
As the Covid-19 pandemic strikes hard, protests in Hong Kong appear to have abated. Distant seem the days when yellow umbrellas and balaclavas saturated global media. And yet, just like at the start of what has now come to be known as the 2019 “global protest wave”, Hong Kong remains at the frontline of political contestation worldwide. The protests against the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition law unearthed one of the main points of contention between Hong Kong and mainland China. Through the protests, China’s increasingly assertive stance has found a counterweight, revealing how important the city is to Beijing. Apart from Hong Kong’s role as a major global trade and financial area, China’s actions towards Hong Kong might also serve as a litmus test for Beijing’s ability to mediate and pacify its neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the Covid-19 pandemic risks further heightening tensions between the two. What makes Hong Kong special? To what extent have the protests exacerbated or eased over time? How will the city’s role in mainland China’s outward-looking plans change, if the protests continue?
Topic:
Politics, Finance, Protests, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

1674. Mapping the International Presence of the World’s Largest Arms Companies

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Alexandra Marksteiner, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Arms companies have a presence that reaches far beyond the countries in which they are headquartered. This is the result of the international­ization of the arms industry. This paper uses a new data set to examine the results of this internationalization in terms of the international presence of major arms companies. It presents a mapping comprising 400 foreign entities linked to the world’s largest arms companies. The mapping shows that the international presence of major arms companies continues to be influenced by geopolitical divisions and ties, and generally mirrors the geographical locations of the world’s biggest arms import markets. It also reveals that the international presence of major Chinese arms companies and the one Russian company included in the study remains limited.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Global Focus

1675. Recalibrating US-Africa Policy

Author:
James Barnett
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For better or worse, US-Africa policy will not be an urgent priority for the Biden-Harris administration when it takes office in January. Domestic challenges, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic and attendant economic crisis, will dominate the administration’s focus from day one. In the realm of foreign affairs, issues ranging from transatlantic relations to East Asian security are likely to command the attention of administration officials during its first months in office. Nevertheless, the day-to-day demands of the executive branch should hopefully not distract the new administration from the many challenges and opportunities Africa presents to US foreign policy. Some of these challenges are already being discussed in Washington, at least in broad terms. China’s continued efforts to build influence across Africa and the expansion of Salafi-jihadi insurgencies in various parts of the continent have been on the radar of US policymakers for several years. However, an exclusive focus on easily identifiable enemies and competitors misses the situation’s big picture and carries significant risks. Many of the impediments to US foreign policy in Africa are rooted in larger structural and ideological issues that Washington has little ability to affect in the short-term. Similarly, a black-and-white view of international politics elides the many ways external interventions impact Africa. For example, several of Washington’s Middle Eastern partners have waged proxy conflicts in East Africa that are detrimental to regional stability and, by extension, US interests. A better approach to US-Africa relations must begin, first and foremost, with a deeper understanding of the continent’s complex politics and its role within the wider international system.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and United States of America

1676. Artificial Intelligence, Technological Warfare and Changes in the World Order: China, USA and Brazil

Author:
Tatiana Rosito, Gabriel de Barros Torres, Ronaldo Lemos, and Yan Li
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
China is consolidating its leadership position in the development and implementation of global artificial intelligence (AI) and Brazil needs to establish structures that promote domestic science and innovation - including the adoption of 5G - in order to advance from being a great consumer of technology to being a “producer of innovation”. The document points out that the development of AI requires national efforts on different fronts - from data governance to training of human capital, which translates into greater difficulties for emerging countries such as Brazil.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

1677. Conflict and Cooperation in Asia: Geopolitical Issues

Author:
Tatiana Rosito, Andy Mok, James Crabtree, and Rudolph Lohmeyer
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The document produced by CEBRI’s Asia Program analyzes the following issues: 1) a long-term view of China's role in the region; 2) Regional and bilateral agreements in Asia/Eurasia and security policies; 3) The evolution of the role of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The panelists pointed out that "Two questions remain open: China's ability to lead the international system and the United States' ability to build a broader agenda in addition to military issues in the Asian region".
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

1678. The Increasing Role of Asia in Multilateral Development Finance

Author:
Rogerio Studart, Tatiana Rosito, Joachim Von Amsberg, José Pio Borges, Karin Vazquez, Leslie Maasdorp, and Martin Raiser
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
What is the role of Asian Development Banks in the multilateral financial system? This report presents the topics discussed at the XXI China Analysis Group Meeting, coordinated by Anna Jaguaribe, CEBRI Board Member. Specialists such as Leslie Maasdorp, Joachim Von Amsberg, Karin Vazquez and Martin Raiser, who work at multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) discussed the topic “Asia’s Increasing Role in the Multilateral Development Financial System”.
Topic:
Development, Finance, Multilateralism, and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1679. Asian Production Chains and Technological Decoupling: Trends, Uncertainties and Opportunities for Brazil

Author:
Tatiana Rosito, Gabriel de Barros Torres, Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, and Xu Sitao
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
How have multinational companies responded to growing tensions in the trade environment? CEBRI’s China Analysis Group reviews the trends related to global and regional value chains in the context of policy responses to Covid-19, as well as the impacts on Brazil. The panelists emphasized that "Global supply chains face new challenges related to their dependence on China: not only did the initial interruptions prove the need to ensure more resilience, but the spread of the epidemic across the world has raised political and strategic concerns about industrial production being highly concentrated in China, especially pharmaceutical products".
Topic:
Science and Technology, Trade, Resilience, Global Value Chains, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

1680. Brazil-China Post-Covid-19: The Digital City

Author:
Philip Yang, Chen Cai, Gao Changlin, Luciana Gama Muniz, Marcelo Motta, Miguel Pinto Guimarães, Renata Fraga, and Washington Fajardo
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
Bilateral cooperation emerging from post-Covid-19 transformations brings challenges and opportunities, with the strengthening of digital cities standing out. This report presents the topics discussed in the webinar "Brazil-China post-Covid-19: The Digital City", held by CEBRI in partnership with the Embassy of China. Miguel Pinto Guimarães points out that "the future is being built by China over the last two decades at a fantastic growing speed that was made possible by planning, education, and intelligence". Chen Cai states that urban planning in large centers needs to be inclusive. "The objective of the smart cities is to have equality and services for everybody living in these cities, not only for some people."
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Cities, COVID-19, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

1681. Brazil-China Post-Covid-19: Food Security, Food Safety and Sustainability

Author:
Gabriel de Barros Torres
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
China’s agricultural development over the past decades led to incredible results, but soil degradation and lack of arable land are challenges that impact the country’s goal to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. This report presents the ideas discussed at the webinar "Brazil-China post-Covid 19: Food Security, Food Safety and Sustainability". According to participants, "improvements in living standards and consumption patterns in China create a growing demand for higher quality food products, offering opportunities for diversification in Brazilian agri-food exports."
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Food Security, Sustainability, Carbon Emissions, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

1682. Central Europe in the new Millennium: The new Great Game?

Author:
Šárka Waisová
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
After the fall of communism, Central Europe (CE) was a region with relatively high US interest and support. Washington supported the NATO membership of CE countries, provided financial as well as technical assistance to the region and several American high-positioned political representatives visited the region. However, during the last few years, it is evident that CE is a space where the Russian and Chinese presence and influence have been risen. The present article analyses several questions aiming to scrutinize the Russian and Chinese presence and activities in CE, particularly, when and how Russia and China penetrated into CE, what are the consequences of the rising Russian and Chinese influence and who are the supporters and opponents of Moscow and Beijing in CE. The article concludes that, the main competing actors in CE are Washington and Russia, while China profits from the US-Russia clash. While the US and Russian interests are dominat in security and political issues, China aims to penetrate CE economics.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, Politics, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Europe, and United States of America

1683. “Mainlandization” of Hong Kong, A Model of Influence, Resistance and Adjustment

Author:
Lukasz Zamecki
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The aim of this article, based on the author’s field research in Hong Kong and critical analysis of publications, is to conceptualize the process of “mainlandization” of the Hong Kong SAR. “Mainlandization” is understood here as the process of transfer and institutionalization of political visions, policy paradigms, procedures, and norms which originate from the PRC. The model is inspired by various theoretical perspectives (e.g. diffusion of regimes, dependence, political convergence, and processes of “Europeanization”). The article differentiates the “top-down” transfer of values and/or policy standards and the “bottom-up” adjustment. All institutions engaged in intermediation (such as the “one country, two systems” principle) are mentioned, as well as the processes connected to the reaction to PRC activity in Hong Kong and their variations (e.g. accommodation, resistance, resignation). Moreover, the concept of “sinoscepticism” is introduced.
Topic:
Politics, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Institutions, Autonomy, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

1684. The two Koreas´ Relations with China: Vision and Challenge

Author:
EunSook Yang
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The relationship between China and the two Koreas can be considered as a friendship that is not completely reliable. North Korea and China have been considered strong allies by the outside world, but questions arise nowadays about whether that relationship is based on a true friendship. The relationship between South Korea and China is a somewhat ambiguous one. There exists a complex situation and dilemmas in that trilateral relation. This article examines the current trilateral relations between China and the two Koreas in order to draw the position of each other. For this purpose, we explore three different approaches: China´s position toward North Korea and South Korea; the position of the two Koreas toward China and their defence; and the regime survival of North Korea and the political and economic interests of South Korea. The analysis of the relationship between China and the two Koreas is based on the context of a shared history, culture and the rapidly changing international economic and political situation together with the regional security hazards caused by the nuclear weapons essays and missile tests of North Korea.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, History, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

1685. Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response

Author:
Aspen Strategy Group
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
The Aspen Strategy Group recently released Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response bringing together preeminent experts to explore race, democracy, and political divisions on the American home front; the future of U.S.-China relations; the global economy; and U.S. foreign policy priorities for 2021. Contributors include: Madeleine K. Albright, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Zoë Baird, Robert D. Blackwill, Nicholas Burns, Kurt M. Campbell, Diana Farrell, Peter Feaver, Michael J. Green, Naima Green-Riley, Jane Harman, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Wolfgang Ischinger, Aditi Kumar, Anja Manuel, David McCormick, John McLaughlin, Shivshankar Menon, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., David H. Petraeus, Tom Pritzker, Condoleezza Rice, Senator Tim Scott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Torrey Taussig, and Philip Zelikow.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, Race, Military Strategy, Democracy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1686. Exploring India's Strategic Futures

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
The method of major/minor trends developed in this report suggests that the roots of apparently surprising future behavior can be found in a close reading of a target state’s history. Using this method, the report outlines three unlikely but plausible alternative futures of India as a strategic actor. The first scenario envisions India as a Hindu-nationalist revisionist power hostile to Pakistan but accommodating of China; in the second, it is a militarily risk-acceptant state that provokes dangerous crises with China; and in the third scenario, India is a staunch competitor to China that achieves some success through partnerships with other U.S. rivals like Russia and Iran. These scenarios are designed not to predict the future but to sensitize U.S. policymakers to possible strategic disruptions. They also serve to highlight risks and tensions in current policy.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nationalism, Religion, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1687. The Functions and Problems of China’s State-Owned Economy

Author:
Wei-xiao Jia
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
At the national symposium on the reform of state-owned enterprises, General Secretary Xi Jinping gave important instructions that state-owned enterprises are important forces in strengthening the country’s overall strength and safeguarding the common interests of the people. Therefore, the country must make state-owned enterprises „stronger, better, and bigger”. Huge objections arose in the academic field. This article thoroughly analyzes China’s state-owned economy from the perspective of Marx’s historical materialism, national productivity, and social development, and clarifies the historical status and role of China’s state-owned economy. At the same time, this article comprehensively analyzes the economic significance of making state-owned enterprises „stronger, better, and bigger” from the perspective of total factor productivity, and proposes that since the state-owned economy is backed up by the state, investing in technology research and development has its advantages. However, because the state-owned economy is biased toward administrative instructions, it often lacks efficiency, so if the state-owned economy wants to become „stronger, better, and bigger”, it must undergo reforms in terms of management efficiency.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Reform, State Building, State-Owned Enterprises, and Productivity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1688. Dangerous, Yet Not So Unique. Characteristics of the Chinese Social Credit System

Author:
Jan Pabisiak
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Since 2015, the Social Credit System - an initiative of the government of the People’s Republic of China which aims to strengthen trustworthiness of the business entities and citizens, promote obedience to law and customs, and develop the Communist Party of China’s control over social trends and potential threats to the political stability - has been attracting worldwide attention. International media portrays the System as a mechanism which leads China to totalitarianism and destroys hope for development of the Chinese democratic movement. Therefore, interests of both sides, the West and China, are seen as contradictory. Harmful beliefs like the one that Chinese still export products of poor quality and on the Chinese side that the Western ideals lead to demoralization are common thanks to some sort of Occidental and Oriental propaganda. That is why it is necessary to compile and analyze the known facts regarding the Social Credit System, which in contrast to the media narration turns out to be a tool with interesting capabilities, not necessarily contradictory to the other major civilizations’ values.
Topic:
Governance, Business, Surveillance, and Credit
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1689. Illuminating Shanghai: Light, Heritage, Power

Author:
Karolina Pawlik
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
This paper explores the complex connection between heritage, light and power in Shanghai since the late 19th Century, and seeks a new understanding of how mutually coupled legacies of modernity, socialism and cosmopolitanism continue to shape this city’s unique identity and image. It focuses on the recent ideological remake of the skyline along the Huangpu River, achieved largely through the flamboyant illumination designed in 2018. Combining a number of visual and textual sources with fieldwork, it reveals the persistent symbolic role the city has played in a triumphant socialist cause, and assesses how past promises of a new Shanghai and a bright future for China have been sustained in the Reform Era. It forms a preliminary attempt to depict what the author argues should be perceived and studied as the engineering of a new propaganda medium which intersects with urban space governance. The implications of this project are discussed in the context of the threats and opportunities for Shanghai in terms of maintaining the city’s unique character and meaning coming from its own history and culture, rather than in terms of Shanghai simply being a vehicle for China’s modernity.
Topic:
Media, Propaganda, Urban, and Urban Planning
Political Geography:
China, Shanghai, and Asia

1690. Language and Politics in India and China: A Cross-Cultural Comparative Study

Author:
Daniel Komarzyca and Janina Fras
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
This paper provides insights into the relationship between language and politically relevant aspects of culture in India and China which are as follows: attitude toward revolution and tradition, the domination of politics over religion or vice versa, and a concern for the liberty of the individual. The paper introduces a novel approach to the comparative study of civilizations by advancing the political-linguistic explanation. In so doing, it combines Hajime Nakamura’s hypothesis of the strict connection between language and culture (understood as a way of thinking) with Samuel P. Huntington’s emphasis on the impact of cultural differences on the political dimension of society – so that our explanatory model can be expressed as follows: language→culture→politics. As far as language is concerned, the focus is on the basic structure of Sanskrit and Chinese; besides, special attention is given to Indian and Chinese philosophies of language. Culturally, the most relevant schools of Hindu philosophy may be called “ultraconservative” since they tend to ground unchanging meaning firmly in metaphysics and rely on the supreme authority of ancient religious texts. In contrast, the Chinese typically considered language a social mechanism for shaping our behavior (so the relation of language and society is the most crucial); they also expressed clearly divergent views on naming. In short, at least four distinctive perspectives are essential: (1) conservative Confucianism, (2) anti-traditional and highly authoritarian Legalism, (3) egalitarian and linguistically skeptical Laozian Daoism, (4) nonconformist and proto-libertarian Zhuangzian Daoism.
Topic:
Politics, Culture, Philosophy, Language, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

1691. China in the Geopolitical Imaginations of the Polish Pop Music after 1989

Author:
Jaroslaw Macala
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
This paper focuses on the issue of geopolitics in the pop culture interpretation as illustrated by the Polish pop music after the year 1989. Songs selected from various trends of the Polish popular music made the source material of the text. The primary study method involved the analysis of the lyrics discourse. The Polish geopolitical imaginations used to revolve around the basis axis of better West and worse East, symbolized mainly by Russia, but its image was transferred over entire Asia. Asia, including China, was scarcely present in the geopolitical imaginations contained in the pop music, which, at the same time, reflected the irrelevant interest of Polish elites in global problems. The discourses in the musical texts about China frequently adopted the West’s perspective, where Poland made part of as seen by our elites. The rhetoric strategy concerning China in popular music featured two essential views, which references Orientalism as specified by E. Said. It explains the frequent use of the postcolonial discourse by the Polish elites, also the music ones, which promoted the supremacy of the West over the rest of the world and the universal nature of the Western world values which were meant to be implemented into other civilizations and nations for their own sake. China was presented as a growing threat for the dominance of the West, the USA in the first place, as an alternative model of globalization and international deal putting offthe world by its cultural and geopolitical alienation, as well as indicating negative effects for Poland
Topic:
Culture, Geopolitics, Music, and popular culture
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1692. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

1693. Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries

Author:
Matt Schrader
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
“For our friends, we produce fine wine. Jackals, we welcome with shotguns.” – Ambassador Gui Congyou, 2019 This was how a Chinese ambassador warned Sweden of potential consequences after Stockholm decided to honor a Swedish citizen imprisoned in China with a human rights prize. Ambassador Gui Congyou’s turn of phrase has a long history; it is the final line of a famous 1950s propaganda anthem written to eulogize China’s bloody contest with the United States on the Korean Peninsula.2 Gui’s statement would be easy to dismiss as the words of a single ambassador, but his statement is consistent with two patterns in the Chinese Communist Party’s interactions with the outside world.3 The first is China’s growing global assertiveness under Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. Prior to Xi’s ascent there were signs that China’s leadership had concluded it was time to put aside Deng Xiaoping’s mantra that China should “hide its brilliance and bide its time.”4 But since Xi came to power in late 2012, party officials have more frequently noted that China is a large, powerful country, and that smaller, less powerful countries oppose its interests at their own risk.5 The second and more enduring theme is the party’s tendency to divide the world into friends and enemies. Inside China, the party’s friends are those who “uphold the leadership of the [Communist Party] and the socialist cause” through support for its policy agenda.6 Outside China, the party’s friends are “foreigners of influence and/or power who assist China’s interests.”7 The party’s enemies are those who publicly question how it chooses to exercise power. The party has operationalized this mindset by developing a sophisticated set of tools and a well-defined body of doctrine to attempt to maintain unchallenged power by “uniting friends” and “isolating enemies.”8 This divide-and-conquer strategy is predicated not only on rewarding friends for their support, but also on coercing the party’s enemies. Within China, coercive tactics include: extralegal detention, limits on public and private speech by individual citizens, control of all forms of media and key sectors of the economy, and cooption of elites by establishing personal and professional costs for opposing the party. This report describes how the party has increasingly employed many of these domestic tools to unite foreign friends and isolate foreign enemies.9 Ambassador Gui’s remarks are but one example in an expanding universe of cases. The threat of losing business in China means that foreign corporations are routinely pressed to censor themselves and their employees to avoid topics the party considers sensitive. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have built and sold the party’s tools of digital authoritarianism in South America, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Chinese diplomats have also tried to rally other countries in support of greater governmental control over the flow of digital information inside national borders. In Southeast Asia, party-state linked actors have sought to covertly alter the outcome of elections throughout Southeast Asia, combining cyberespionage prowess with the financial firepower of the PRC’s enormous policy banks.10 And the party has used the same vision of triumphant ethnic solidarity it pushes on its own population to justify its attempts to threaten, censor, and co-opt the Chinese diaspora. In so doing, the party hopes to influence democratic politicians and politics by controlling the external narrative presented of China.
Topic:
Politics, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1694. Competitive Strategies for Democracy in the Age of AI

Author:
Andrew Imbrie
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In a 1972 paper for the United States Air Force Project at RAND, the late Andrew Marshall defined what he called a more “efficient, effective U.S. competitive role.”1 His theory of the case was straightforward: The United States needed to sustain a long-term, strategic competition with the Soviet Union; the nature of that competition was poorly specified, but could be shaped in ways favorable to enduring U.S. advantages; and the United States should therefore assess the balance of strategic forces, clarify its goals, and develop competitive strategies to match its strengths against Soviet weaknesses. The competition between the United States and China today is different from and far more complex than the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War, notably in the levels of economic interdependence and the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers seek to achieve strategic advantage through AI-enabled capabilities and systems.2 By one estimate, more than 100 countries purchase surveillance and censorship gear from China and Russia, receive training on these technologies, or simply imitate methods of surveillance and censorship that are designed to control public opinion.3 As the digital and physical environments become intertwined, authoritarian practices in one domain will increasingly encroach upon the other. At stake are the core values of liberty, equality, and justice that underpin free and open societies. The novel coronavirus pandemic will accelerate these trends. Increased U.S.-China tensions, cascading economic crises, and renewed debates over the resilience of supply chains and the future of digital surveillance are all characteristics of a world that demands global cooperation but sorely lacks it. The fault lines between liberal democracies and illiberal, authoritarian regimes are widening at a time of growing turbulence in the international system. Even before the virus, U.S.-China relations faced a heightened risk of conflict. The years ahead are likely to bring greater turmoil, with AI and other emerging technologies at the center of an extended, continuing strategic competition among the major powers. In the long-term contest between the forces of democracy and autocracy, the United States should apply Marshall’s counsel and develop more competitive strategies that play to its strengths. The right U.S. approach starts with its broad network of allies and partners. America has formed security guarantees with 52 countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, compared with Russia’s five (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and China’s one (North Korea).4 The United States benefits from allies that share its values and produce strategic resources in AI, including computer and data science experts; private sectors that are innovative, dominant, and trend-setting; large and diverse pools data on which to train algorithms; governmental research and development (R&D) investments; diplomatic support for initiatives in AI safety and governance; and the clout needed to export norms and best practices internationally. In a world of globalized markets for AI talent and integrated supply chains, an alliance-centric strategy provides a competitive advantage over any single country that attempts to develop a robust AI ecosystem on its own. A competitive strategy in AI will require the United States and its allies to assess their comparative advantages; identify anomalies and patterns in the strategic choices of authoritarian competitors that are deeply rooted; and match relative strengths against specific areas of weakness.5 This paper focuses on the dynamics between the United States and China in AI. Based on an initial assessment of recent advances and long-term potential, it recommends that democratic nations sharpen their edge in five key areas: Hardware edge: exploit hardware chokepoints, leveraging the advantages that democratic nations have in the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced AI chips. Data edge: develop common standards to share, pool, and store non-sensitive data sets around discrete projects, such as health intelligence and biosecurity, predictive maintenance, and maritime domain awareness; invest in privacy-preserving machine learning; and support research into new techniques for making personal data less relevant to AI systems, such as one-shot learning and advanced simulations. Talent edge: develop inter-allied human capital in AI, share best practices, and cultivate democratic networks of AI researchers through exchange programs, joint scholarships, and conference support, while ensuring research security among allies and partners. Innovation edge: harness the estimated two-thirds of global R&D that is conducted by democratic nations to foster collaboration in specific areas of promise, such as human-machine teaming methods and verification techniques for complex controls systems and AI-enabled, safety-critical infrastructure. Rule-setting edge: shape global norms and standards for AI, reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal values; create the conditions for a common AI market among democratic nations; and extend the benefits of AI to fragile democracies by establishing a multilateral digital infrastructure network.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

1695. Masks Off: Chinese Coronavirus Assistance in Europe

Author:
Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus crisis spread across Europe in March, several countries found themselves desperately short of masks, respirators, test kits, and even healthcare staff as they struggled to contain outbreaks. With the EU and the United States initially slow to respond, China stepped into the vacuum. This paper looks at prominent Chinese coronavirus-related donations to Europe between March 12 and April 20, 2020, as well as at the Chinese media coverage and narratives that accompanied them. The prominence of donations was assessed using open-source data on donations from the Chinese authorities or from Fortune 500 or similarly large Chinese companies to European national governments, sister cities, and individual clinics and institutions. Assistance came in many forms and included financial support for the procurement of personal protective equipment, the dispatch of Chinese doctors, free access to cloud-based coronavirus diagnostic tools, and donations of testing kits and ventilators. Three points emerge from this analysis. First, Chinese assistance stretched well beyond the high-profile cases of hard-hit Italy and Spain to countries large and small. During the five-weeks period studied, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and large Chinese companies made 70 prominent donations to 27 countries across Europe. The numbers and distribution of prominent donations of coronavirus-related assistance paint a picture of Beijing’s widespread “mask diplomacy” in which countries’ needs alone were not strictly reflected in the help they received. Coronavirus infection rates alone do not fully explain the variance in Chinese assistance, suggesting that alleviating the health crisis may have been only one of many purposes behind the CCP’s decisions. Second, the donations by Chinese authorities and companies coincided with China’s national and economic interests. China’s state apparatus at the state, province, and city levels made donations, but the majority of prominent ones were from the Chinese private sector and foundations connected to it. However, with the CCP exercising an ever-growing level of control over the private sector, the distinction between public and private donations is not clear-cut and Beijing typically trumpeted both as evidence of its generosity. The perception-shaping potential of the donations is likely to have been one of the main drivers behind Chinese coronavirus assistance in Europe. Finally, Chinese donations were accompanied by a sustained communications and diplomatic push aimed at a global audience. The vast majority of the coronavirus assistance to Europe was promoted via all available channels. On state media, embassy websites, and social-media platforms, the authorities used the Chinese donations to Europe to deliver the CCP’s story. The positive messaging was also a way to pivot discourse about the pandemic away from its own failures in the early months of the outbreak. In parallel to the “shared future for mankind” narratives promoted by embassies every time donated medical supplies arrived in Europe, the CCP also showed a harder edge during the pandemic, much to the irritation of many European countries. Furthermore, since the period covered by this paper, Beijing has been doubling down on its newly assertive public diplomacy in Europe and beyond.
Topic:
Pandemic, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

1696. Five Authoritarian Pandemic Messaging Frames and How to Respond

Author:
Naďa Kovalčíková and Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus pandemic has spread around the world, authoritarian actors have engaged in robust information-manipulation campaigns. China—where the virus originated and spread due to the government’s initial cover up and mismanagement—became the champion of these efforts. Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia, followed its lead, seeking to shift the global conversation from China’s and their own failures to confront the disease head on. They have also tried to place the blame to the United States and Europe, portraying these democracies’ responses as inadequate and highlighting their shortcomings. Their efforts have contributed to a coronavirus infodemic, which the World Health Organization has defined as “an over-abundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.” This infodemic has fueled the ongoing public-health crisis by further undermining trust in democratic institutions, the independent press, and facts and data. The coronavirus infodemic is likely to continue to evolve, given that the fight against the pandemic is far from over, but its contours have already been drawn, making it possible to assess the information-manipulation efforts undertaken by malign actors during the last months. Understanding how and why they have engaged in information manipulation leads to an initial set of recommendations on how to contain the infodemic as well as how to prevent similar efforts that could stymie responses to future public-health pandemics. We identify five messaging frames used by China, Russia, and Iran in the first six months of the pandemic with implications for public health, democracy and governance, and transatlantic relations and offer recommendations to address them. Every crisis goes through several stages, and it is necessary to detect and monitor evolving tactics and frames used by malign actors in the globalizing information space early on. By doing so, democracies can ensure a more effective mitigation, robust preparedness, rapid response, and as painless a recovery as possible when facing public-health emergencies or potential economic, security, or environmental crises.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

1697. Covert Foreign Money: Financial Loopholes Exploited by Authoritarians to Fund Political Interference in Democracies

Author:
Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In addition to more widely studied tools like cyberattacks and disinformation, authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China have spent more than $300 million interfering in democratic processes more than 100 times spanning 33 countries over the past decade. The frequency of these financial attacks has accelerated aggressively from two or three annually before 2014 to 15 to 30 in each year since 2016. We call this tool of foreign interference “malign finance,” defined as “the funding of foreign political parties, candidates, campaigns, well-connected elites, or politically influential groups, often through non-transparent structures designed to obfuscate ties to a nation state or its proxies.” A typical case involves a regime-connected operative funneling $1 million to a favored political party, although buying influence in a major national election costs more like $3 million to $15 million. Rather than start our analysis by focusing on any given policy area, we review open-source reporting in 16 languages to identify malign finance cases credibly attributed to foreign governments. Finding that approximately 83 percent of the activity was enabled by legal loopholes, we catalogue the resulting caseload into the seven most exploited policy gaps. Broader than just money flowing through straw donors, shell companies, non-profits, and other conduits, malign finance includes a range of support mechanisms innovated by authoritarian regimes to interfere in democracies, from intangible gifts to media assistance. As such, policy strategies to address these vulnerabilities are not limited to campaign finance reforms, but also include greater transparency requirements around media funding, corporate ownership, campaign contacts with foreign powers, and other issues. In addition to identifying loopholes, our case study informs the scope of our recommended policy solutions, which are meant close off channels for foreign financial interference without infringing upon the speech rights of domestic political spenders or jeopardizing bipartisan support. Each of our recommendations balances these trade-offs differently based on empirical, legal, political, and administrative considerations vetted in consultation with more than 90 current and former executive branch officials, Congressional staffers from both parties, constitutional law scholars, and civil society experts. This report is organized around each of the seven U.S. legal loopholes that need to be closed, starting with the most urgent priorities, plus an eighth chapter on the need for stronger governmental coordination.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Finance, Foreign Interference, and Dark Money
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

1698. A Future Internet for Democracies: Contesting China’s Push for Dominance in 5G, 6G, and the Internet of Everything

Author:
Lindsay Gorman
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The United States and its democratic allies are engaged in a contest for the soul of the Future Internet. Conceived as a beacon of free expression with the power to tear down communication barriers across free and unfree societies alike, the Internet today faces significant challenges to its status as the world’s ultimate connector. In creating connectivity and space for democratic speech, it has also enabled new means of authoritarian control and the suppression of human rights through censorship and surveillance. As tensions between democracies and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) heat up over Internet technologies, the prospect of a dichotomous Internet comes more sharply into focus: a democratic Internet where information flows freely and an authoritarian Internet where it is tightly controlled—separated not by an Iron Curtain, but a Silicon one. The Future Internet is deeply enmeshed in the dawning information contest between autocracies and democracies. It is the base layer—the foundation—on which communication takes place and the entry point into narrative and societal influence. How the next generation of Internet technologies are created, defined, governed, and ultimately used will have an outsized impact on this information contest—and the larger geopolitical contest—between democracy and authoritarianism. China’s growing presence in the global telecommunications market—and the threat that reality poses to the United States and its allies—has catalyzed both national security and economic policy interest in fifth-generation cellular network infrastructure (5G). Like 2G, 3G, and 4G before it, the next generation of mobile connectivity promises a step-change in Internet capability and a societal transformation—through the explosion of connected devices across cities, vehicles, factories, and homes. The nascent data-fueled economy 5G Internet will spawn represents a new playing field for nation-state competition in both commercial innovation and systems of governance alike. In this new economy, United States leadership is not assured. China has made a targeted push to lead the world in the emerging technologies of the future—built on future networks and extending to the applications their data will enable: from artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous cars to smart grids and advanced manufacturing. Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has by some measures provided the most technical contributions to the 5G standard and last year filed more patents in Europe than any other company. Heavy state subsidies provided by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have increased the competitiveness of Chinese firms in critical technology industries abroad. As the Pentagon’s Innovation Board bluntly put it: “The country that owns 5G will own many of these innovations and set the standards for the rest of the world … That country is currently not likely to be the United States.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Internet, and 5G
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1699. 5G Security: The New Energy Security

Author:
Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

1700. Treasury’s War on Corruption: A U.S. Treasury Department Strategy to Fight Kleptocracy and Root Dirty Money Out of the U.S. Financial System

Author:
Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The incoming Biden administration has signaled through speeches, articles, and interviews that one of its top policy priorities will be combating corruption and kleptocracy.1 With Russia and China’s increasing usage of strategic corruption and malign finance as geopolitical weapons, and with publics around the world—including in the United States—angry about economic inequality and perceived corruption at home, anti-corruption offers a unique opportunity to unify U.S. foreign and domestic policy. Diplomats and lawmakers agree that cracking down on corruption may be the most viable way to restore American leadership by meeting demands for accountability from citizens all over the world.2 Corruption will be the topic of a dedicated special session of the UN General Assembly in June.3 The issue should get support from leaders at a G7 summit in the U.K. around the same time.4 Fighting corruption will also be one of the three areas for new country commitments at the Summit for Democracy that President-elect Joe Biden plans to host during his first year in office.5 At that summit, the U.S. commitment will be a “presidential policy directive that establishes combating corruption as a core national security interest and democratic responsibility.”6 Making this U.S. and international anti-corruption campaign a lasting success will require more than words. In the months ahead, while the administration’s top leadership and the nation’s public health and economic experts are focused on ending the pandemic and rebuilding the economy, the U.S. national security and financial enforcement community should get to work laying the groundwork for a raft of powerful anti-corruption executive actions to be announced in time for the Summit for Democracy. Concurrently, U.S. diplomats should leverage those plans to insist that countries attending the summit make similarly hard commitments, setting a high bar for admission.7 Regulatory rulemaking by the U.S. Treasury Department could usher in several landmark reforms that have been recommended for many years by financial enforcers, multilateral standard-setting bodies, and anti-corruption watchdogs. This policy opportunity is possible because the reforms never overcame opposition by special interests during the period before corruption became a leading national security threat roughly five years ago, and then they were generally not prioritized by the Trump administration. The most potent achievable action available would be for Treasury to set rules requiring several types of professional service providers that enable corruption to institute anti-money laundering controls whereby they would have to identify their ultimate customers and start alerting Treasury of suspicious activity, as is required of U.S. banks.8 Of the industries enabling corruption by helping wealthy clients hide money, ten could be regulated immediately by revoking regulatory exemptions to the Bank Secrecy Act, including real estate agents, private equity and hedge funds, sellers of yachts and airplanes, and seven other types of exempted financial institutions.9 Other key enablers would require new regulatory determinations with strong legal and political backing, such as lawyers, accountants, company formation agents, and art dealers. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which administers the Bank Secrecy Act, must write stringent regulations to implement the newly mandated beneficial ownership registry, resisting pressure by special interests to water it down. Treasury should also leverage concerns about the recently leaked “FinCEN Files” to work with Congress on a major investment in FinCEN, potentially on the scale of the seven-fold jump in budgetary resources needed by Treasury to implement recent reforms to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).10 Treasury should publish its first-ever National Corruption Risk Assessment about the financial networks of kleptocracies and oligarchs, reviewing case studies and methods to assess vulnerabilities and risk. Treasury should create a cross-border payments database and make financial institutions scrutinize politicians’ accounts more closely. Treasury should continue supporting two policy initiatives that have developed strongly to pressure kleptocracies in the past couple years by internationalizing Global Magnitsky sanctions and collaborating with the International Monetary Fund on corruption engagement. The U.S. Treasury Department is uniquely positioned to roll out these and other policy, regulatory, enforcement, and diplomatic actions in the fight against corruption, because it is the only part of the U.S. government with a foothold in each area of domestic and international finance that will be key to rooting dirty money out of the global financial system and applying pressure on kleptocrats and their oligarch proxies. Many of Treasury’s most highly developed capabilities have grown out of past fights against top national security threats, such as terrorist financing. The two months following the September 11 attacks witnessed one of the most energetic and well-coordinated performances in Treasury Department history. With Treasury not yet organized and coordinated around anti-corruption, achieving anything like past feats would require Treasury to start by establishing a small team devoted exclusively to this new mission. Specifically, the Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) should appoint a counselor dedicated to developing and advancing anti-corruption initiatives, from expanding the coverage of the U.S. anti-money laundering regime to prioritizing the threats of strategic corruption and malign finance across Treasury’s policy, intelligence, and enforcement efforts. Some of these projects could bear fruit in 2021, while others need longer-term development of capabilities to find kleptocrats’ money hiding within the financial system and prepare policy options to confiscate, sanction, or reveal it. The TFI anti-corruption counselor, who should be designated as early as possible in the administration, should have a staff of two and a mandate to coordinate with and leverage resources across the four principal TFI offices, while also cooperating with Treasury’s Office of International Affairs. And while the White House National Security Council should lead the overall fight against kleptocracy and corruption, the TFI anti-corruption counselor should serve as Treasury’s senior working-level point of contact for collaboration between Treasury and the rest of the U.S. government, as well as with international partners, civil society, and Congress. Combating corruption and kleptocracy will be one of the top priorities of the Biden administration, and Treasury has the resources to start delivering major results quickly. But to do so it must coordinate throughout the Treasury Department and with external partners to roll out big executive actions in 2021.
Topic:
Corruption, Finance, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America