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42. China: Political forces at a glance
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Summary, Background, and Political forces at a glance
- Political Geography:
- China
43. China: Political and institutional effectiveness
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Background, Forecast, and Political and institutional effectiveness
- Political Geography:
- China
44. China: Political forces at a glance
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Summary, Background, and Political forces at a glance
- Political Geography:
- China
45. Climate Action, Geopolitical Risks and Strategic Policy: The Western Race to Secure Critical Raw Materials
- Author:
- Salvatore Finizio
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Climate action, economic competition and geopolitical shifts are more intertwined than ever. In the wake of the skyrocketing inflation and deteriorating China relations, United States President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law on 16 August 2022. Conceived as the foundation of the new US industrial policy, the IRA aims to rebuild the country’s industrial capacity, including 500 billion US dollars in new spending and tax breaks, among which almost 400 billion aimed at boosting clean energy.[1] Across the Atlantic, the European Union expressed concerns about the potential loss of industrial competitiveness resulting from the IRA. In response, the EU unveiled its own Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) in February 2023.[2] The objective of this plan is to promote the enhancement of net-zero manufacturing capacities in order to meet the EU’s climate targets. Both the IRA and the GDIP have a common goal of reducing dependence on China, especially in clean technology, although through different approaches. The US focuses on bringing high-value production back to its shores, while the EU aims to develop and diversify supply chains.[3] This divergence is also reflected in the debate between “decoupling” and “derisking”, with the latter recently gaining prominence as policymakers recognise the challenges of completely reshoring supply chains domestically.[4] The US and the EU share industrial and geoeconomic objectives, but will also encounter similar challenges, in particular concerning the first stages of green supply chains. Despite their heterogeneous approaches, Western policymakers will in fact have to secure critical raw materials for clean technology manufacturing, with the aim of resourcing the energy transition.
- Topic:
- Security, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Raw Materials
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
46. China: Political and institutional effectiveness
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Background, Forecast, and Political and institutional effectiveness
- Political Geography:
- China
47. China: Political forces at a glance
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Summary, Background, and Political forces at a glance
- Political Geography:
- China
48. PRC Foreign and Military Policy, 1977-81: Shades of Mao, the Imprint of Deng
- Author:
- Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Conventional wisdom pictures the period up to the December 1978 Third Plenum as a struggle between Hua and Deng, reflecting neo-Maoist v. reformist tendencies, and won by Deng at the plenum. In fact, there was broad consensus between them, Hua was more proactive in key areas, and there is no evidence of anything approaching a power struggle. This paper, however, deals with an area where elements of accepted views of Deng hold up. In essence, Deng held both the foreign policy and particularly PLA portfolios, notably where they concerned the crucial relationships with the US, Soviet Union, Japan, and Vietnam. In external relations Deng was broadly regarded to have performed brilliantly, while Hua was thought a mere cypher. Overall, Hua was clearly secondary in external relations, but he took the bold step of initiating relations with revisionist Yugoslavia, made the most telling proposal in the high-level negotiations with the US, and deeply impressed dominant European leaders Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Schmidt. Deng’s foreign policy outlook was deeply influenced by Mao, he could push Mao’s “horizontal line” concept to counterproductive extremes, almost losing the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and rather than brilliantly negotiating US normalization, the Chinese side was slow to grasp the outcome that was always there. Most significant, and revealing of the underlying dynamic of CCP politics, was the war against Vietnam. This was truly Deng’s war, opposed by not only Hua, but also by a broad array of senior civilian and PLA officials, including surviving marshals. This was essentially the first time since his return to work in 1977, in contrast to persuading his colleagues through intense effort, that Deng simply asserted his authority. Neither here or elsewhere, was argument decisive as it had generally been under Hua’s leadership to that point. What was decisive was Deng’s enormous prestige as the most outstanding of the surviving “old revolutionaries” who achieved the success of 1949. It was the same factor that allowed Deng’s quiet coup against Hua at the turn of 1979-80, with no significant resistance from Hua or anyone else, and with no explanation being made in any official forum until well after the fact.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Politics, Governance, Leadership, and Normalization
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
49. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?
- Author:
- Chris Miller
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia
50. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence
- Author:
- Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia