Political Geography: China / Publication Year: / Topic: Development

1. ASEAN's medium- to long-term trade strategies and the direction of RoK-ASEAN cooperation

Author:: Sungil Kwak, Seungjin Cho, Jaewan Cheong, Jaeho Lee, Mingeum Shin, Nayoun Park, and So Eun Kim
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: In recent years, the U.S.-China hegemony competition has intensified, dividing the world into two blocs. ASEAN has long culti-vated its position on the international stage by maintaining a certain distance between the United States and China. In that sense, ASEAN is the best partner for Korea to ef-fectively respond to the divided world. Therefore, this study seeks the directions of cooperation with ASEAN in supply chain, digital trade, climate change response, and health and development cooperation in line with changes in the international order.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Economics, International Cooperation, Trade, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Ambiguous Loss Among Left Behind Children in Rural China

Author:: Xiaojin Chen and Yao Lu
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: This lecture explores the effects of rural-to-urban migration on children’s development, including child abuse, victimization, and mental health problems.
Topic:: Development, Migration, Children, Mental Health, Urban, Rural, Abuse, and Victimization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

3. African Media Cultures and Chinese Public Relations Strategies in Kenya and Ethiopia

Author:: Hangwei Li and Yuan Wang
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular. Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Topic:: Development, Media, Public Relations, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Kenya, Africa, China, and Ethiopia

4. How Indonesia Used Chinese Industrial Investments to Turn Nickel into the New Gold

Author:: Angela Tritto
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular. Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Topic:: Development, Industrial Policy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Innovation
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, and Asia

5. Potential and Pitfalls for African Industrialization in Chinese-built Standard Gauge Railways

Author:: Yunnan Chen
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:: Railway development has been a key feature of transport infrastructure investments in several African economies, with several new standard gauge railways (SGR) built in the last ten years in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Kenya. These planned projects have also entailed substantial Chinese involvement through construction contractors, in financing, and in the operations and management, becoming part of the wider Chinese discourse of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). They also have significant potential in supporting the industrialization plans of African states, and in some cases, have been explicitly linked to plans for a green transformation. This brief draws from case studies across Africa with a focus on Ethiopia, to highlight the significant potential of railway investments as a low-cost, low-carbon transport for green industrialization, but also its pitfalls and challenges as an infrastructure for governance, and local technology transfer.
Topic:: Development, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Industrialization, and Railways
Political Geography:: China and Africa

6. China, climate change and the energy transition

Author:: Professor Xu Yi-Chong
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: This report surveys China’s enormous energy transition to renewables. It begins by sketching the energy challenges China faces and its climate-change-related energy policies, in the context of the global geopolitics of the energy transformation. Next the report focuses on conventional energy sources (oil and natural gas), followed by electricity, and energy technologies. Although the report is intended primarily to survey developments to date, it concludes with some brief observations about the considerable energy challenges China faces in the years ahead.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: China and Asia

7. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:: Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

8. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

9. Iraqi Officials Eye a Path for Chinese-Iraqi Development

Author:: Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Mohammed Shia al-Sudani did not become prime minister in Baghdad as smoothly as desired by the powers close to the “axis of resistance.” Nevertheless, several factors facilitated his rise to power. Domestic concerns, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw his bloc from the political process and a push from groups close to Iran to put forward a prime minister with relative acceptance in the regional and international community, played a role. But these considerations compounded with the climate of regional tensions and interests of outside powers—competition between the Gulf and Iran, concerns over the ongoing repercussions of the strained relationship with Washington caused by the Trump administration, and the growing dominance of various armed groups close to Tehran. This precarious reality and confused relationships likewise seem to have driven al-Sudani’s government to attempt to circumvent the traditional binary choice between Washington, the West, and most of the Gulf states on the one hand, and Tehran, Damascus, Lebanon, and their backer Moscow on the other. This new course comes with a distinct and flashy name, the “Development Road” project, and looks to Beijing as a third way forward. Iraq’s political realignment is in large part a response to Iraqis’ shifting views of the United States and the broader geopolitical space: the haphazard American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the political changes in U.S. policy under Biden, the failure to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran, the stagnation in the Syrian issue, Erdogan’s steadfast support of Putin, Russia’s continued attacks on Ukraine, economic movement linked to oil prices, inflation, and financial turmoil in currency rates from Cairo to Tehran, fears of harsh economic sanctions, and, finally and most importantly, the economic rise of China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

10. Contradictions Within The PRC’s Climate Strategy

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The 28th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) drew to a close earlier this week (UNEP, December 13). The COP meetings always produce a mixture of successes and disappointments, and only constitute a portion of the myriad processes that impact the global energy transition and race to stabilize the planetary system. This year’s conference was no different. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was actively engaged throughout, hosting a variety of events at their pavilion reflecting the breadth and depth of the country’s critical engagement with the issues (National Climate Strategy Center, November 28). However, the PRC’s is still appraised as falling far short of what is required to meet the Paris climate goals and is not commensurate with its position in the international system (Climate Action Tracker, November 22). This year, the PRC ranks first in the world for total annual emissions, and second in both cumulative (historical) emissions and GDP. Meanwhile, it has failed to advance its ambitions or provide leadership to match its rhetoric of being—to use Xi Jinping’s words from his Party Congress speech—an “important participant, contributor, and torchbearer” in addressing climate change (Xinhua, November 3, 2017). The PRC delegation constituted the joint-third largest at the conference, and was led by Zhao Yingmin (赵英民), vice-minister at the Ministry of Environment and Ecology (MEE). Also present were minister Huang Runqiu (黄润秋), special climate envoy Xie Zhenhua (解振华), and UN under-secretary-general for economic and social affairs Liu Zhenmin (刘振民), who is expected to replace Xie as he steps down after 25 years as the PRC’s top climate negotiator. Crucially, Executive Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), a Politburo Standing Committee member who holds real power over China’s climate policy (in a way that the MEE officials do not), also attended.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China and Asia

11. The Chinese Debate on Economic Reform

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: A steady drumbeat of ominous data and troubling commentary on the state of China’s economy has punctuated the summer months. Reports from the commentariat in the anglosphere have provided diagnostic analysis and detailed potential policy solutions that the Chinese government might pursue. However, China’s central decision makers in the Politburo or in the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), are more likely to take their cues from internal advisors and domestic experts within the PRC than from those outside. As such, one fruitful exercise is to take the temperature of voices within the system to determine the extent to which their perceptions align or diverge from those in the West, and to ascertain which views carry weight with the final arbiters of economic policy in Beijing. By doing so, analysts outside of China may better comprehend the future (mis)steps that China will take as it struggles to achieve its aim of “basically realizing socialist modernization.” In July, the Chinese government held several meetings and released documents pertaining the economy. On July 24 the Politburo met to discuss the economy as it usually does this time of year. But on the same day, a 17-point plan was issued by the NDRC, following on from a 31-point plan co-issued by the State Council and the Central Committee ten days prior. These send a clear message about the concern in government over China’s straitened circumstances. Indeed, just this week, the NDRC announced a new “private economy development bureau” to further support private industry (NDRC, September 4). The assessment of the situation is put bluntly in the Politburo readout: “the current economic system is facing new challenges… insufficient domestic demand, difficulties in some enterprise’s operations, multiple risks in key areas, and a complex and severe external environment.”
Topic:: Development, Economics, and Reform
Political Geography:: China and Asia

12. China’s Role in the Modernization of Malawi’s Agriculture Sector

Author:: Raphael Mweninguwe
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China has assumed a key role in the modernization of Malawi’s agriculture sector, which has made recent progress in enabling smallholder farmers to produce higher crop yields. The introduction of agricultural technologies used in vegetable, fruit, maize and rice production through the China Aid Project for Agricultural Technical Cooperation has not only created employment opportunities for the local population, but has also strengthened the economic situation of small farmers in Malawi. In February, at the opening of a training for senior agricultural workers, the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Malawi pledged increased support for the development of the country’s agricultural sector “under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and the Global Development Initiative” (Xinhua, February 17). The creation of the FOCAC coincided with the new strategy of the Chinese government in the 2000s, when Beijing sought to utilize development assistance, particularly in the agricultural sector, in order to strengthen overall Sino-African relations. At that time, many African countries were desperately looking for technical assistance in order to achieve a high level of agricultural growth and to solve their persistent food insecurity problems. [1] Malawi is one of the countries on the continent that has suffered longtime food insecurity, where PRC agricultural aid and training has benefited many smallholder farmers, who have expressed their appreciation for the assistance rendered. While some farmers and extension workers express satisfaction with China’s support for Malawi’s agricultural modernization efforts, others are worried about the impacts of climate change, which threaten the full adoption of the technologies offered by the PRC. Already an estimated 3.8 million people, about 20 percent of the country’s population, are facing a food crisis due to drought and floods that hit the country during the last growing season (World Bank, April 7). But China’s technologies aim to mitigate climate change impacts through simple, low-cost, and innovative farming technologies, such as furrow and bucket irrigation.
Topic:: Agriculture, Climate Change, Development, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Modernization
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Malawi

13. Can the Belt and Road Initiative Succeed in Afghanistan?

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At a trilateral meeting in Islamabad on May 9, the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan and reaffirmed their support for multilateral infrastructure projects already underway, including the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) power project and the Trans-Afghan Railways (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], May 9). Earlier on January 5, the Taliban regime signed an agreement with the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC), a subsidiary of the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), for the extraction of oil from the Amu Darya basin, under which China will invest $150 million annually for three years and increase it thereafter to $540 million for the contract’s 25-year duration (Kabul Now, January 5). Then on April 13, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum announced that the Chinese company Gochin had expressed interest in investing $10 billion in Afghanistan’s lithium reserves (Kabul Now, April 13). Meanwhile, China is reported to be in talks with the Taliban regime over renegotiating the terms of a 2008 contract to mine copper from the Mes Aynak reserves in Logar province (The Print, June 8, 2022). The agreements, including plans to extend CPEC—a key leg of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—into Afghanistan, are a significant development. The deal relating to oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin is the Taliban regime’s first major foreign investment deal. However, in the past, major Chinese projects have failed to take off. Will the recent deals remain in limbo as well? China’s growing role in Afghanistan faces formidable challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, and South Asia

14. Ten Years On, How is the Belt and Road Initiative Faring in Indonesia?

Author:: William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: “It is not merely talk, but it is about actually building something. From airports to railways, these are industries we can see and touch. This is exactly the sort of courage and real action the world needs right now.” So said Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo about China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the inaugural Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in 2017 (BRF, May 14, 2017; Jakarta Globe, May 16, 2017). This year marks the tenth anniversary of this ambitious, globe-spanning infrastructure development project. Today, 151 countries and 32 international organizations have joined the initiative, which Foreign Minister Qin Gang recently described as a “global enterprise to build a belt of prosperity and a road to happiness” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [PRC], January 20). A decade ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the BRI with a series of speeches in Kazakhstan and Indonesia calling for a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “Maritime Silk Road,” respectively (Consulate General of the PRC in Toronto, September 7, 2013; China Daily, October 4, 2013). The following year, China announced the creation of a $40 billion Silk Road fund at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing and a $20 billion Maritime Silk Road fund in Indonesia (China Daily, November 9, 2014). From the BRI’s inception, it has been clear that Southeast Asia and its largest economy— Indonesia—are intended to serve as a centerpiece of the megaproject (Global Times, November 16, 2022). Roughly two-thirds of all people of ethnic Chinese ancestry outside of China are in Southeast Asia. [1] The 142-kilometer (88 mile) Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway (HSR) is one of the BRI’s flagship projects (China Brief, December 22, 2022). Indonesia also hosts nearly half of the eight overseas industrial parks that China has established across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states: the China-Indonesia Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, the China-Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, and the China-Indonesia JuLong Agricultural Industry Cooperation Zone (China Development Institute, June 26, 2019). While Beijing has pulled back its overseas BRI lending—and Xi has exhibited some notable reticence toward hosting a third Belt and Road Forum—Indonesia challenges the broader narrative that the BRI is somehow fading away (Green Finance & Development Center, July 24, 2022). In the world’s fourth-most populous country, Chinese investment has continued apace, and both governments continue to champion the BRI’s ability to deliver “mutual benefit” and “win-win results.” Still, understanding Indonesia’s experience with the BRI requires closer examination of the history behind China-Indonesia infrastructure cooperation, major projects beyond the oft-discussed Jakarta-Bandung HSR and their impacts on the Indonesian public, and the extent of economic engagement between Jakarta and Beijing.
Topic:: Development, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

15. Social and Historical Investigation of China’s Ethnic Minorities: Based on Political Stability and National Unity

Author:: Bao Longyuan and Mei Jun
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The social and historical investigation of China’s ethnic minorities was a major national political action in 50s-60s of the 20th Century, and it was of particular significance to the governance of the frontier, the maintenance of ethnic equality, and the long-term stability of China. In the era of underdeveloped information technology, the Communist Party of China (CPC) entered ethnic minorities areas, on the one hand, to understand the living conditions of ethnic minorities, and to facilitate the introduction of relevant supporting policies. On the other hand, the investigation process also publicized the CPC’s thought on governing the country, so that the people can more understand and trust the CPC, so as to promote national unity and political stability. Although this investigation has become a history, its significance, value and effect are still prominent for China’s political stability and national development today.Therefore, it is still of important practical significance to study the social and historical investigation of China’s ethnic minorities.
Topic:: Development, Minorities, Political stability, Ethnicity, and National Unity
Political Geography:: China and Asia

16. Reinventing Soft Power: The Strong Impact of China’s Soft Power “Shortcomings” on the Global South

Author:: Tanina Zappone
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: After being introduced into the Chinese academic debate in the 1990s, the notion of soft power has undergone such a process of “Sinicisation” that some scholars now wonder if the original concept has been gradually “reinvented” in China. Given worsening opinions about the PRC in the US and Europe over the last years, many analysts have stressed the weakness of China’s soft power, pointing to its state-centred approach and lack of an attractive set of values to be emulated as the main shortcomings. However, China’s growing influence in the Global South shows that these analyses have misevaluated the real goals and motivations of China’s soft power. The Russia-Ukraine war provides telling examples of the successful dynamics of China’s “defensive” or “negative” version of soft power and suggests it has significant impact in the least industrialised countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, and Global South

17. China and the Global South: Many Initiatives, One Narrative

Author:: Marina Rudyak
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Since its 2013 launch, the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has stirred heated debates. Despite Beijing framing it as win-win cooperation, concerns mounted over BRI’s risks for involved countries, especially in the Global South. China’s narrative merely signals a search for an effective communication strategy and international discourse power, while its understanding of development remains constant. Developing countries play a crucial role in China’s pursuit of global status. Firstly, it positions itself as the advocate for developing nations, promoting “diverse paths to modernisation” and “true multilateralism”. Secondly, China aims to redefine major power by prioritising development and security over liberal democracy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, Multilateralism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Modernization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Global South

18. Digitalization of Special Economic Zones in China

Author:: Jie (Jeanne) Huang
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: Special Economic Zones (SEZ) have become the forefront in China to test legal and technological reforms for digital trade. This chapter explores three cutting-edge case studies in China’s SEZs: the Beijing blockchain-based Single Window deposit box; newly established big data exchanges in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai SEZs; and pilot projects in financial, medical care and automobile industries to flow data across the border in the Shanghai SEZ. It scrutinizes China's experiments in the context of its applications to join CPTPP and DEPA. It argues that the development of Chinese domestic law for digital trade is shifting away from the traditional paradigm that uses international commitments to push domestic reform or make domestic law according to international law. The development of Chinese domestic law for digital trade relies much more on China’s domestic needs than what FTAs negotiations require. FTAs are increasingly becoming a tool for China to shape international law rather than a benchmark for legislating domestic Chinese law.
Topic:: Development, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

19. A 'Bright Path' Forward or a Grim Dead End? The Political Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan

Author:: Anton Louthan
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: This report assesses the political impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan. Specifically, it examines whether and how the People’s Republic of China can pursue a strategy of economic statecraft to further its foreign policy and political interests in Kazakhstan. Despite Kazakhstan’s importance for the success of the BRI’s overland trade corridors, the report argues that important financial, foreign policy, and political constraints limit Beijing’s potential to influence Nur-Sultan. Beijing’s concerns over upsetting its relationship with the Russian Federation and the fact that the value of bilateral trade, investment, and Kazakhstani indebtedness to China have decreased in recent years suggest that Beijing is less willing to, capable of, or interested in using the BRI to influence Kazakhstan. The perceived closeness in this bilateral relationship has less to do with the influence of the BRI and more to do with the alignment of both countries’ geopolitical interests before the initiative’s creation. The report does not suggest that Chinese influence has decreased, but rather shows how Kazakhstan has been able to maintain a degree of political autonomy. Nur-Sultan has played a proactive role in forming its relationship with Beijing through its pursuit of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s “multi-vector” foreign policy strategy. In diversifying Kazakhstan’s diplomatic, economic, and political ties with Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States, Nur-Sultan has been able to avoid complete dependence on one country. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has been able to shape the size and scope of Chinese economic activity by guiding the initiative’s investments and projects to further the government’s domestic development agenda, Nurly Zhol (translated as “Bright Path”). However, issues related to corruption and deepening ties between Chinese and Kazakhstani elites through the BRI have likely strengthened Kazakhstan’s authoritarian political structure.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Autonomy, and Influence
Political Geography:: China, Kazakhstan, and Asia

20. The Rise of Sino-Russian Biotech Cooperation

Author:: Svitlana Lebedenko
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China’s rise as a global innovation power is rooted in the development of a sovereign innovation infrastructure, one that allows China to compete in high-technology races with the United States. This process is complemented by an intensifying science and technology partnership with the Russian Federation. By decoupling from China and Russia, the United States and its allies are pushing China and Russia closer to each other. The paper discusses recent examples of Sino-Russian biotechnology cooperation projects, offering an early account of the emerging integration of two distinct but complementary innovation infrastructures.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Innovation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

21. China’s Evolving Approach to Foreign Aid

Author:: Jingdong Yuan, Abhishek Andasu, and Xuwan Ouyang
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: China’s role in foreign aid and, more broadly, in development cooperation on the global stage has grown significantly since it began seven decades ago. Particularly in recent years, through such platforms as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s profile and engagement in global governance in foreign aid and related areas have been further enhanced. China’s ambition is to take a more proactive approach in foreign aid and move towards a model of international development cooperation by linking with the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and by including the BRI as a major platform to achieve key development goals. This paper provides a timely analysis of the evolution of China’s foreign aid policy in the past seven decades with a particular focus on the developments since 2000. It discusses China’s development finance to Africa and the major sectors receiving Chinese aid. It also analyses recent trends of Chinese foreign aid and identifies some of the challenges that China faces as it becomes a major player in international development financing.
Topic:: Development, Foreign Aid, Infrastructure, Sustainable Development Goals, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

22. China’s Development Path: Government, Business, and Globalization in an Innovating Economy

Author:: Yin Yi and William Lazonick
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: We employ the “social conditions of innovative enterprise” framework to analyze the key determinants of China’s development path from the economic reforms of 1978 to the present. First, we focus on how government investments in human capabilities and physical infrastructure provided foundational support for the emergence of Chinese enterprises capable of technological learning. Second, we delve into the main modes by which Chinese firms engaged in technological learning from abroad—joint ventures with foreign multinationals, global value chains, and experienced high-tech returnees—that have contributed to industrial development in China. Third, we provide evidence on achievements in indigenous innovation—by which we mean improvements in national productive capabilities that build on learning from abroad and enable the innovating firms to engage in global competition—in the computer, automobile, communication-technology, and semiconductor-fabrication industries. Finally, we sketch out the implications of our approach for current debates on the role of innovation in China’s development path as it continues to unfold.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Globalization, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Innovation
Political Geography:: China and Asia

23. Brazilian Perspectives for BRICS

Author:: Marcos Caramuru, José Mário Antunes, and Tatiana Rosito
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: The project “Brazilian Perspectives for BRICS - 2022”, developed by CEBRI at the invitation of the Chinese Embassy in Brazil, aimed at mapping trends and defining concrete strategies and proposals to, from a Brazilian perspective, inform the agenda and improve the joint action and international projection of the group, whose rotating presidency is held by China in 2022. The development, coordination, and results of the project were the responsibility of CEBRI and, beyond the original objective, constitute a contribution to the debate on BRICS in Brazil. The project brought together about 30 high-level Brazilian specialists from various areas (academia, civil society, private sector, and public sector) in three closed meetings. This Executive Summary presents a synthesis of the discussions.
Topic:: Development, Geopolitics, Trade, and BRICS
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

24. Estados Unidos y África. Historia de una no-política

Author:: Pablo Rey-García and Pedro Rivas Nieto
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: En este artículo se estudian las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y África, desde los puntos de vista económico, político y de seguridad. Son, estos tres campos, interdependientes, pero a la vez enormemente dinámicos, tanto por la inercia política estadounidense, como por los condicionantes propios de África (déficit en desarrollo, pobreza, inseguridad o inestabilidad política) como por el contexto internacional. En este último aspecto, cobra especial relevancia la invasión rusa de Ucrania o la emergencia de la ambición militar China, pues ambos países compiten con Estados Unidos por tener una mejor posición en el continente africano.
Topic:: International Relations, Development, Economics, National Security, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Asia, North America, Sahel, United States of America, and Horn of Africa

25. China en África: Objetivos, instrumentos e implicaciones estratégicas

Author:: Fernando Delage
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Desde el fin de la Guerra Fría, cuatro grandes prioridades definieron la estrategia de la República Popular China hacia África: el acceso a recursos naturales y materias primas; la consecución de mercados para sus exportaciones de manufacturas; la obtención de apoyo a sus objetivos políticos; y la consolidación de un estatus como líder del mundo en desarrollo. A partir de la primera década del siglo XXI China se ha convertido asimismo en un importante socio financiero y en impulsor del desarrollo de infraestructuras en el continente, a la vez que ha adquirido una creciente presencia militar. La relación multidimensional construida por la China de Xi Jinping con África forma parte integral de su estrategia de ascenso global, con implicaciones económicas y geopolíticas que han atraído la atención de las restantes potencias.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Globalization, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Xi Jinping, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa and China

26. The Development Response to Kleptocracy and Strategic Corruption

Author:: Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Kleptocracies do not stop at their own borders. The same actors, networks, tactics, and resources that they wield to prevent democracy and rule of law from sprouting at home are also repurposed for foreign aggression. While cronies, oligarchs, and lesser operatives do get rich in the process, “strategic corruption” is chiefly a geopolitical weapon directed by autocratic regimes to secretly undermine the sovereignty of other countries. The three most common manifestations of strategic corruption vary on a spectrum of how directly and boldly they violate sovereignty and subvert democratic processes. Starting with the most indirect and chronic form of strategic corruption, Russia and China invest “corrosive capital” throughout Eastern Europe and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. They use corrupt patronage networks and opaque business dealings to spread their kleptocratic model of authoritarian governance. Those corrupt investments are usually also supported by tactics of “malign influence,” like when a minister or politician receives bribes or economic threats until they censor their political speech, advance a foreign policy initiative, or otherwise subordinate the legitimate sovereign interests entrusted to them by their own people in favor of the interests of a foreign power. Finally, the most direct and acute form of strategic corruption involves financial methods of election interference and other tactics of corrupting democratic processes. Often funded with the proceeds of kleptocracy, election interference through covert political financing has become the bailiwick of Kremlin-directed oligarchs. Separate from those three manifestations of strategic corruption—corrosive capital, malign influence, and election interference—China and Russia try to hide their dirty money and malign activities by pressuring foreign journalists into silence through surveillance, thuggery, and lawsuits. Western foreign assistance has not yet offered a coherent response to kleptocracy and strategic corruption, but that is starting to change under the Biden administration. Building resilience to this transnational threat through foreign aid will require four new approaches that are more political and coordinated than traditional development assistance. First, aid should be informed by local political analysis. More important and less used than technical reviews of laws and institutions, political analysis should center anti-corruption efforts around known corrupt activity. That starts by asking sensitive questions about which individuals, institutions, and sectors are the most corrupt, how extensively their networks of wealth and power span, and which corrupt figures must be held accountable to thoroughly purge grand corruption. Second, aid should be responsive to political shifts, scaling up and down, respectively, in response to windows of opportunity for anti-corruption reform and times of backsliding toward kleptocracy. Third, aid responses to kleptocracy should be coordinated at the regional and global levels, similarly to how grand corruption operates across borders through transnational networks of actors and tools. Fourth, anti-corruption programming should be deeply integrated across the traditional sectors of assistance, particularly health, infrastructure, energy, climate, and security. Some of these new approaches are already being prioritized under the Biden administration’s new strategy to combat corruption, particularly coordinating across tools and sectors to fight transnational corruption. But operationalizing this mission will be no small endeavor, given that anti-corruption assistance is delivered through a notoriously technocratic and apolitical bureaucracy built during the Cold War to aid socioeconomic development in individual countries steadily over decades. But getting this right offers the key to defending democracies from autocratic aggression, showing how democracy can deliver, and even helping bring foreign policy and domestic politics into alignment for the first time in a generation.
Topic:: Corruption, Development, Finance, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus

27. The Real U.S.-China 5G Contest is Just Getting Started

Author:: Philip Hsu
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On June 6, China declared the three-year anniversary of its business deployment of 5G, with the country having invested nearly 185 billion yuan in related infrastructure in 2021 alone (Xinhua Baoye, June 5). However, China’s 5G ambitions, which continue to form a substantial component of its national and international development policies, began years ago with Huawei. After Apple revolutionized the smartphone, demand for sophisticated computer “chips” and other components skyrocketed. Companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Foxconn capitalized on this shift to become the main pillars of Taiwan’s economy. In addition to supplying Samsung, Apple and HTC, a lesser-known, nominally private Chinese company, Huawei was also starting to make smartphones around this time using Taiwanese hardware (Nikkei Asia, 2016). Although in recent years up to 60 percent of 5G-capable Huawei phone components have been manufactured in China, which is due in large part to U.S. sanctions against it and other Chinese technology companies, a new technological Cold War is unlikely to materialize over 5G. The economic stakes over advanced computing and a new generation of telecommunications infrastructure are too high for the international community to afford any one nation or corporation primacy across the deep and diverse set of software, hardware and human capital requirements this technology will demand.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Strategic Competition, and 5G
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. China and Sri Lanka’s Debt Crisis: Belt and Road Initiative Blowback

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Sri Lanka is in the grip of an unprecedented crisis. For several months, the country has been reeling under a severe foreign exchange crisis. In early May, Foreign Minister Ali Sabry said that its usable forex reserves were just $50 million (Daily News, May 5). As a result, Sri Lanka has been forced to suspend repayment of $51 billion worth of debt owed to China, Japan and other foreign creditors (The Hindu, April 12; The Island, April 13). The country has also been unable to pay for imports of essential commodities, and has experienced serious shortages of food, fuel and medicine (The Island, January 15). The economic crisis has in turn triggered a political crisis. Public anger has boiled over onto the streets. Angry protesters have been calling for the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa (Colombo Telegraph, April 7). The Rajapaksa family has dominated Sri Lankan politics for decades and several members of the family are in positions of power as ministers, legislators or heads of corporations and departments. Sri Lankans want the entire clan out. Some of them, including Mahinda, resigned under public pressure in recent months (Island, April 17). Although Gotabaya remains president and under the country’s executive presidential system, continues to wield enormous power, it is evident that the influence of the Rajapaksas has declined. The unfolding crises in Sri Lanka have implications beyond the island. China is among Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral lenders and has played a big role in the island’s infrastructure development. Sri Lanka is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite China’s pledges that BRI would boost Sri Lanka’s economic and social development by transforming it into “the hub of the Indian Ocean”, Chinese loans are widely believed to have pushed the country into a ‘debt trap’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Sri Lanka, June 16, 2017). How have the crises impacted China’s image in Sri Lanka and will the decline of the Rajapaksas, widely regarded as ‘pro-China,’ impact Sino-Sri Lankan relations? Finally, will the Sri Lankan crises affect the fate of BRI?
Topic:: Debt, Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Asia, and Sri Lanka

29. The Belt and Road Initiative as Ten Policy Commandments: Review of Xi’s Kazakhstan and Indonesia Launch Speeches

Author:: Lauren A. Johnson
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: In 2019 Foreign Policy described China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as “the most talked about and least defined buzzword of this decade”. Given that confusion and the importance of leader political speeches in China, especially those of current President Xi Jinping, it is surprising that the BRI literature has little in-depth analysed the two launch speeches of 2013. This article seeks to fill that gap with study of those speeches and focus on the five cooperationoriented areas announced in each. In comparative context those ten pillars appear not to be descended from New Era Chinese heaven but rather demonstrate substantive thematic overlap with the ten pillars of what was once relatively mainstream macroeconomic development policy, the Washington Consensus. Yet, in the case of the BRI there is a relative implicit implementation emphasis also. In forward context of contemporary global political economy tensions, the need to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, the G7’s Build Back Better and the European Union’s Global Gateway ambitions also, this article may offer a timely fresh and comparative lens on the BRI.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Global Focus

30. Through the Lenses of Morality and Responsibility: BRICS, Climate Change and Sustainable Development

Author:: Goktug Kiprizli
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The aim of this article is to shed a broader light on the social identity of the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) whose growing economic power is the defining motive of their social construct in international relations. In line with this purpose, the article examines the BRICS nations’ positions concerning the moral aspect and the notion of responsibility for the nexus between climate change and sustainable development. This article argues that their statements and discourse on climate change and sustainable development forge the process of constructing a separate group identity for the BRICS partners. The articulation of moral appraisals and the notion of responsibility in the areas of climate change and sustainable development help the BRICS countries build their self-conception and self-categorization corresponding to their identity as emerging powers, so their actions are accomplished accordingly.
Topic:: Development, Sustainability, BRICS, Morality, Identity, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, South Africa, Brazil, and South America

31. Beyond Geopolitics: A Geoeconomic Perspective of China-Iran Belt and Road Initiative Relations

Author:: Seyedashkan Madani
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the largest regional development project in the history of global development. It is estimated that Chinese companies will invest up to $1.2 trillion in infrastructure development in Asia and elsewhere in the coming years. However, there are many obstacles to the successful implementation of this initiative in the host countries, including geographical factors, local culture, geopolitical contestation, public attitudes, institutional capacity, and governance quality. These challenges can substantially diminish the coherence of the BRI and prevent its effective implementation. This study aims to develop an analytical framework for exploring the risks associated with and challenges of executing BRI projects in Iran. To this end, all risks are categorized into three broad groups: operational, financial, and geopolitical. The results show that Iran generally faces many internal and external challenges in attracting foreign investment. The critical question is: Why is Iran receiving substantial investment from Chinese companies despite its unfavorable business environment? A geoeconomic approach is used to develop a theoretical framework to explain Iran-China BRI relations. In this context, Iran’s geoeconomic significance is the main factor encouraging the flow of Chinese investment into the country. The BRI comprises mostly functional cooperation between China and countries along the Silk Road based on a specific geospatial environment. Iran’s geospatial environment encourages Chinese investments in infrastructure, which is the main content of functional cooperation.
Topic:: Development, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

32. China’s Dilemmas in Bailing Out Debt-Ridden Sri Lanka

Author:: Ganeshan Wignaraja
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Ganeshan Wignaraja, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) of the National University of Singapore and a Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London, explains that "Sri Lanka is now stuck in a ‘debt trap’. However, the debt trap is not wholly Chinese."
Topic:: Debt, Development, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Sri Lanka

33. China's Development Assistance to the Western Balkans and Its Impact on Democratic Governance and Decision-Making

Author:: Ana Krstinovska
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: China’s development assistance to the Western Balkans has been little researched and aid-funded projects are often mistermed as Chinese investments. This article aimed to shed light on specific ‘China Aid’ disbursement and management procedures by examining the signed agreements and contracted projects in five countries - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, N. Macedonia, and Serbia during the period 2000-2020. The objective was to determine the impact of China’s development assistance on democratic governance and decision-making. Attride-Stirling’s thematic networks tool was used to analyze the procedures in each project cycle phase and their compliance with the principles of good governance and aid effectiveness. The findings suggest that the assistance, shaped by Chinese rules in combination with Western Balkans domestic agency, is marked by the opacity of the procedures, lack of accountability, disregard for rules in public finance management, and public procurement. Moreover, China could use its grant and loan agreements to influence sovereign decision-making on issues that affect China’s interests. To conclude, although China’s development assistance to the Western Balkans could benefit the recipients’ economic development, it also constrains their democratic governance and decision-making and serves China’s foreign policy interests.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

34. Hidden Defaults

Author:: Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: China’s lending boom to developing countries is morphing into defaults and debt distress. Given the secrecy surrounding China’s loans, also the associated defaults remain “hidden”, as missed payments and restructuring details are not disclosed. We construct an encompassing dataset of sovereign debt restructurings with Chinese lenders and find that these credit events are surprisingly frequent, exceeding the number of sovereign bond or Paris Club restructurings. Chinese lenders follow a resolution approach reminiscent of 1980s Western lenders; they seldom provide deep debt relief with face value reduction. If history is any guide, multi-year debt workouts with serial restructurings lie in store.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Finance, Bonds, and Influence
Political Geography:: China and Asia

35. Can Aid Buy Foreign Public Support? Evidence from Chinese Development Finance

Author:: Lukas Wellner, Brad Parks, Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, and Austin M. Strange
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Bilateral donors use foreign aid to pursue soft power. We test the effectiveness of aid in reaching this goal by leveraging a new dataset on the precise commitment, implementation, and completion dates of Chinese development projects. We use data from the Gallup World Poll for 126 countries over the 2006–2017 period and identify causal effects with (i) an event-study model that includes high-dimensional fixed effects, and (ii) instrumental-variables regressions that rely on exogenous variation in the supply of Chinese government financing over time. Our results are nuanced and depend on whether we focus on subnational jurisdictions, countries, or groupings of countries.
Topic:: Development, Bilateral Relations, Foreign Aid, and Influence
Political Geography:: China and Asia

36. Development Competition is Heating Up: China’s Global Development Initiative and the G7 Partnership for Infrastructure and Global Alliance on Food Security

Author:: Sarah Cliffe and Karina Gerlach
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: Economic development issues are becoming increasingly geopolitical, as the form and importance of today’s agreement in Turkey on grain exports between Russia and Ukraine demonstrates. While today’s crucial agreement and the war of food security narratives between Russia and the West rightly grab the latest headlines, outside of the media spotlight development competition is also heating up between China and the West.
Topic:: Development, Infrastructure, Food Security, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Turkey, and Ukraine

37. Negotiating Local Business Practices With China in Benin

Author:: Folashade Soule
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Commercial negotiations between Benin and China demonstrate how both sides navigate the dynamics of Africa-China business-to-business relationships. In Benin, Chinese and local Beninese officials engaged in drawn-out negotiations on a deal to construct a business center aimed at deepening business links between Chinese and Beninese merchants. Strategically located in Cotonou, Benin’s principal economic city, the center aims to promote investment and wholesale businesses by serving as a hub for China’s business-to-business relations not just in Benin but regionally in West Africa, especially in the large and growing neighboring market of Nigeria. This paper relies on original research and fieldwork conducted in Benin from 2015 to 2021 and the author’s access to draft and final contracts from the negotiations, which allow for a side-by-side comparative textual analysis, as well as initial field interviews and follow-up interviews with key negotiators, Beninese businessmen, and former Beninese students in China. The paper shows how Chinese and Beninese authorities negotiated the establishment of the center and, above all, how Beninese authorities made Chinese negotiators adapt to local Beninese labor, construction, and legal norms and put pressure on their Chinese counterparts. This strategy meant that negotiations took longer than usual to complete. China-Africa cooperation is often characterized by speedy negotiations, an approach that in some cases turns out to be harmful—since this can allow vague and unfair clauses to be featured in final contracts. The negotiations over the Chinese business center in Benin is a good example of how well-coordinated negotiators that take their time and work in coordination with various counterparts throughout the government can help facilitate better outcomes in terms of high-quality infrastructure and compliance with prevailing construction, labor, environmental, and business norms, while also preserving a good bilateral relationship with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, and Business
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Benin

38. How Huawei’s Localization in North Africa Delivered Mixed Returns

Author:: Tin Hinane El Kadi
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Trade between China and North Africa has increased significantly since the early 2000s, but it has largely reproduced patterns of unequal exchange. Since they were unveiled, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Chinese government’s 2016 Arab Policy Paper have signaled the promise of a qualitative shift in China’s engagement with the region. China has committed to increase investments in high-value-added sectors and to boost cooperation in science and technology with countries across North Africa. The digital space is a notable aspect of recent China–North African partnerships. Chinese tech firms are becoming ever more important actors in North Africa through the Digital Silk Road, the digital component of the BRI. North African governments see the Digital Silk Road as an opportunity to help bridge the digital divide and bolster their own national efforts to build digital economies and create high-quality jobs for the millions of unemployed university graduates across the region. In recent years, the region has become home to notable Digital Silk Road projects such as smart cities, satellite navigation centers, data centers, and network infrastructure. Huawei’s localization strategies in Algeria and Egypt show that, far from imposing a one-size-fits-all blueprint on other countries, as Beijing is often depicted as doing in U.S. and European media and policy discussions, Chinese tech players adapt their engagement depending on local development agendas. Flexibility, customization, and services tailored to local demand have been cornerstones of Huawei’s localization strategies in North Africa. Accommodating local development priorities is central to Huawei’s success in globalizing its business ventures. The Chinese firm has responded favorably to Algeria’s and Egypt’s attempts to leverage foreign companies for conducting more value-added activities within their respective economies. Among other things, Huawei opened its first African factory in Algeria, employing Algerians to assemble products for and beyond the Algerian market. It also launched an OpenLab for conducting research and development (R&D) activities in Egypt and established partnerships with several universities in the region to train local students. However, closer scrutiny of Huawei’s localization in both Algeria and Egypt indicates that the company improved its brand image without engaging in meaningful capacity building. For all its success at winning the hearts of government officials across the region, Huawei has engaged in training, manufacturing, and R&D in a way designed to maintain the firm’s technological edge. The Chinese tech giant has managed to localize seemingly developmental activities in North Africa without contributing much to technological upgrading. North African governments should take lessons from China’s playbook of how it became a technological superpower. This means adopting policies that could maximize the benefits of Chinese and non-Chinese investments by ensuring positives spillovers and protecting potential local tech champions. Increasing economic integration across North African countries and moving beyond fragmented bilateral commercial negotiations with China are two steps that may help level the playing field with the Asian giant.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Telecommunications, Huawei, and Digital Space
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Algeria, North Africa, and Egypt

39. WILL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE WORLD BANK AND CHINA LAST?

Author:: Richard Clark
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: International development organizations, which provide concessional loans and grants to help finance developing countries, often overlap with one another, performing similar tasks in similar countries. For instance, dozens of such organizations have offered COVID-19 relief to developing country member states. In one case, the World Bank approved a $95 million package for Uzbekistan to strengthen its medical systems in April 2020. The Asian Development Bank pledged another $1.1 billion to Uzbekistan over the last two years, and the World Health Organization doled out another $10 million in personal protective and laboratory equipment. Overall, 28 international organizations provide development assistance today.
Topic:: Development, International Organization, World Bank, and Finance
Political Geography:: China and Asia

40. Partnerships for Policy Transfer: How Brazil and China Engage in Triangular Cooperation with the United Nations

Author:: Laura Trajber Waisbich and Sebastian Haug
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: This paper offers a comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese partnerships with the United Nations (UN) as a mechanism and channel for policy transfer. In international policy travel flows, China and Brazil currently hold privileged places as hubs from which development-related policies travel and through which they circulate. Both countries have invested in systematising their development experience and transferring development policies within their regions and beyond – often through triangular cooperation, i.e. South–South cooperation supported by third actors such as UN entities. So far, however, this variegated engagement has remained under the radar of scholarly attention. To address this gap, we examine 35 policy transfer partnerships – 17 for Brazil and 18 for China – forged with different parts of the UN system over the last two decades. In order to offer a first systematic account of partnership trajectories, we provide an overview of partnership types (namely projects, programmes and policy centres) and transfer dimensions (including the policies themselves, transfer agents and governance arrangements). Our comparative mapping presents an evolving landscape: while Brazil was first in institutionalising robust policy transfer partnerships with numerous UN entities and then slowed down, China started more cautiously but has significantly expanded its collaboration with the UN system since 2015. The partnerships analysed cover a substantial range of sectors, with a particular focus – for both Brazil and China – on agricultural policies. While Brazilian partnerships with the UN primarily engage with linkages between agriculture and social protection, however, China–UN partnerships focus more on productivity and market linkages. As the first comprehensive mapping and comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese policy transfer partnerships with the UN, this paper contributes to a better understanding of (triangular) cooperation schemes between international organisations and their member states, as well as debates about how policies deemed as successful travel around the globe.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, United Nations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

41. How Does Urban Rail Development in China and India Enable Technological Upgrading?

Author:: Emmanuel Theodore Asimeng and Tilman Altenburg
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The socioeconomic wellbeing of urban areas depends on a well-functioning transportation system that makes it easier for people to access goods and services. Whereas most urban areas in emerging economies are expanding in size and human population, high motorisation and inadequate public transport services have resulted in congestion, traffic accidents and increasing transport-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Urban rail development can help address the current transportation problem because trains can move a large number of people at high speed, provide reliable services, contribute to lower GHGs and have a low accident rate. However, urban rail is expensive and requires many technical and technological capabilities often unavailable in emerging economies because they are technology latecomers. This paper examines how two emerging economies, China and India, have adopted industrial policies to develop local capabilities for urban rail technology. The paper shows how the Chinese government has moved from purchasing urban rail technology from multinational companies (MNCs) to the current situation where it has developed local capabilities, owns rail technology patents and competes with the same MNCs on the international market. The paper also demonstrates how India is gradually improving the local manufacturing of rail subsystems as opposed to importation. Overall, the paper suggests a pathway to industrial policy adoption that demonstrates how emerging economies can catch up with urban rail technology development to address their local transportation needs.
Topic:: Development, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Multinational Corporations, Urban, and Railways
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

42. Understanding Hainan Free Trade Port: China's Efforts to Explore High-level Opening-up

Author:: Wenfeng Wei
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: On 13 April 2018, upon the 30th anniversary of Hainan province, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced to build Hainan into a free trade port. According to the Master Plan for the Construction of the Hainan Free Trade Port released by the State Council on 1 June 2020, China aims to build this southern island province into a high-level free trade port with global influence by the middle of the century. As China's largest special economic zone, Hainan is expected to become the frontline of China's integration into the global economic system. Noting that the world is facing a new round of major development, changes and adjustment, with protectionism and unilateralism on the rise and economic globalization facing greater headwinds, it was also a strategic decision of Chinese authorities based on the domestic and international landscapes. As such, Hainan Free Trade Port (HNFTP) is more than a regional development initiative, and it has a much bigger role to play in China’s reform and opening endeavors.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Special Economic Zones, and Free Trade
Political Geography:: China and Asia

43. The Urbanization of People- The Politics of Development in the Chinese City

Author:: Eli Friedman and Yao Lu
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: The Urbanization of People (May 2022, Columbia University Press) reveals how cities in China have granted public goods to the privileged while condemning poor and working-class migrants to insecurity, constant mobility, and degraded educational opportunities. Using the school as a lens on urban life, Eli Friedman investigates how the state manages flows of people into the city. He demonstrates that urban governments are providing quality public education to those who need it least: school admissions for nonlocals heavily favor families with high levels of economic and cultural capital. Those deemed not useful are left to enroll their children in precarious resource-starved private schools that sometimes are subjected to forced demolition. Over time, these populations are shunted away to smaller locales with inferior public services. Based on extensive ethnographic research and hundreds of in-depth interviews, this interdisciplinary book details the policy framework that produces unequal outcomes as well as providing a fine-grained account of the life experiences of people drawn into the cities as workers but excluded as full citizens.
Topic:: Development, Politics, Urbanization, and Cities
Political Geography:: China and Asia

44. The Future of Xi’s China. Scenarios and Implications for Europe

Author:: Alessia Amighini
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: At the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which opens Sunday in China, Xi Jinping is expected to be confirmed as the country's Secretary General for an unprecedented third term. At a time of international instability caused by the Covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine, as well as rising competition between international superpowers, the Chinese leadership is called to increase the country's international standing, while ensuring economic growth at the domestic level. However, achieving these goals will not be without challenges. This Report analyses China’s hard road to international prestige and development. Which prospects for China's economic growth? Which obstacles to its rise at the global level? To which extent can the Party steer the country’s direction?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Xi Jinping, and Instability
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

45. China’s Infrastructure Projects in the Middle East: Lessons from China’s Engagement Elsewhere

Author:: Dominika Urhová
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In our latest issue of Iqtisadi, Ms. Dominika Urhova discusses the economic strategy and role of China in the Middle East, and analyzes the implications of China's growing influence in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

46. Country, Culture or Competition - What Drives Attitudes Towards Immigrants in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Author:: Malte Becker, Ralf Krüger, and Tobias Heidland
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming an increasingly important destination for international migration. The region hosts immigrants from other African countries and from other parts of the world, such as China. Given high poverty levels and weak social security systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, host populations might fear increasing competition for resources and labor, potentially resulting in negative attitudes towards immigrants. We provide the first systematic study of attitudes towards immigrants in Sub-Saharan African countries that uses a causal framework. Using a survey experiment in Uganda and Senegal, we study both attitudes towards immigrants in general and towards specific immigrant groups. In particular, we focus on Chinese immigrants, whose increasing presence in Africa is seen by many as the most important contemporary geopolitical shift involving the continent. We find that attitudes towards immigrants are mainly driven by sociotropic cultural and sociotropic economic concerns. Furthermore, immigrants from China are perceived less positively and economically more threatening than immigrants in general.
Topic:: Development, Migration, Immigration, Sustainability, and Attitudes
Political Geography:: Africa and China

47. Tracking Chinese Aid through China Customs: Darlings and Orphans after the COVID-19 Outbreak

Author:: Andreas Fuchs, Lennart Kaplan, Krisztina Kis-Katos, Sebastian Schmidt, Felix Turbanisch, and Feicheng Wang
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, China's mask and vaccine diplomacy have been widely discussed, but the debate relies on a few stylized data points. This article introduces a systematic way to measure China's foreign aid in almost real-time through official customs records of exported aid goods. Our results show significant shifts in China's aid after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, medical aid skyrocketed after the outbreak. It was initially dominated by face masks and other protective equipment and later by vaccines. This came at the expense of non-medical aid, which was 16.3 percent below its pre-pandemic level. Second, China's aid became global, clearly extending beyond the Global South. Third, in the aftermath of the initial outbreak in March 2020, China's aid became less responsive to both recipient need and political friendship, which can be mainly attributed to the rise of aid through non-government sources. However, in the vaccine diplomacy period of 2021, economic needs and political factors have regained their original importance.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, Public Health, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China and Asia

48. Treading Lightly: China’s Footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan

Author:: Jiayi Zhou, Fei Su, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of China’s attitudes to and policies on Afghanistan since the August 2021 Taliban takeover. It examines the scope of China’s security, economic and humanitarian interests, and the depth of its engagement so far. It finds that China’s footprint has been minimal due not only to China’s non-interference policy but also to a range of broader challenges: the militant extremist groups that continue to operate on Afghan soil, the risks of investing in a country where the government remains unrecognized by any member of the international community and a fragile stability that is far from conducive to long-term planning. While there may be prospects and opportunities for China to contribute to Afghan peace and development, particularly from a broader regional perspective, current realities mean that China’s overall approach to Afghanistan will remain cautious, pragmatic and limited.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Taliban, and Investment
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, and South Asia

49. Chinese Demographic Signals Bode Ill for Future Development

Author:: Elizabeth Chen
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: A new study published February 8 by the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (MPS, 中华人民共和国公安部, zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongan bu) reported that there were 10.035 million registered births in 2020, down from 11.79 million in 2019. This represents a 15 percent decrease following the coronavirus pandemic (Guancha.cn, February 8). Although the number of registered births—that is, newborns recorded in the household registration hukou (户口) system—is not the same as China’s official birth rate, the decline has concerned analysts that a long-forewarned demographic crisis may be approaching faster than expected.National birth and population figures for the previous year are usually released in January but have been delayed until April this year as China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) compiles its decennial census. In the meantime, data released by some provinces and cities in January has appeared to confirm the implications of the MPS study. Data released from the capital city of Guangdong province—which saw the highest number of births per province in 2019—showed that birth rates in Guangzhou were down by 17 percent year-on-year and mirrored broader trends across the rest of the province. In Zhejiang, China’s wealthiest province, the cities of Wenzhou and Taizhou reported that new births in 2020 fell by 19 percent and 33 percent respectively compared to 2019 (SCMP, February 2).
Topic:: Demographics, Development, Aging, and Population Growth
Political Geography:: China and Asia

50. China’s Techno-Industrial Development: A Case Study of the Semiconductor Industry

Author:: Alex He
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: This paper reviews the strategies and plans, policy-making institutions, process and problems in China’s techno-industrial development. Although it has made noticeable progress in some areas in the past two decades, China still lags behind in most core technology and advanced manufacturing fields, such as high-end chips. There have been several real breakthroughs in the semiconductor sector by private companies such as HiSilicon and rapid advancement in frontier technologies — artificial intelligence, fifth-generation wireless communication network technology, big data, blockchain and the Internet of Things — by private companies such as Huawei, Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu; however, state-sponsored technological innovation and breakthroughs have been crippled by the existing problems in China’s science and technology research system and a campaign-style catch-up strategy that rewards bureaucrats on short-term goals, as well as by weak links between academic research and industry and a swing between the market-oriented approach for technology acquisitions and indigenous innovation for technology breakthroughs. A case study of China’s semiconductor industry demonstrates both the problems and progress in China’s techno-industrial development, as well as the implications for the country's prospects of evolving into a technological powerhouse.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Industry, and 5G
Political Geography:: China and Asia

51. Improving China's participation in resolving developing-country debt problems

Author:: Martin Chorzempa and Adnan Mazarei
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The COVID-19 shock has exacerbated the struggles of many emerging-market and developing economies (EMDEs) to repay their external debt. One of the most urgent challenges relates to debt owed to China, whose lending spree under its Belt and Road Initiative and other programs has played an outsized role in what amounts to a crisis for many countries. The scope of the problem is striking. China is owed more than $100 billion, or 57 percent of all debt owed to official creditors by the countries that need help the most. China is not a member of the Paris Club of official creditors, which coordinates, within a multilateral framework, the resolution of general sovereign illiquidity or unsustainable external debt of EMDEs. There is an urgent need to put in place more effective, long-term solutions to help durably lower the risks of prolonged debt difficulties in EMDEs. These problems could be partly addressed by creating creditor committees to coordinate debt relief with China. The Group of Twenty (G20) has taken some steps to include creditor committees in the context of the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), but only for low-income countries that qualify for the DSSI and only for official creditors. To better address debt distress, it needs to extend the approach, especially to middle-income debtor countries.
Topic:: Debt, Development, Emerging Markets, and G20
Political Geography:: China and Asia

52. China Strengthens Its Economic Security

Author:: Takahiro Tsuchiya
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: "Economic security" has been gathering attention in recent years. The main reasons for this are (1) neo-globalization, (2) the achievement of objectives by major powers using the "economic statecraft"1 approach, and (3) the development of "game-changing" and other emerging technologies. In particular, there has been a heightened sense of international concern about China's attempts to coerce, demand obedience, or persuade other countries by acquiring/securing technologies (resorting to economic espionage if necessary) and human resources and by leveraging its economic power.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Xi Jinping, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China and Asia

53. How difficult is China’s business environment for European and American companies?

Author:: Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Despite tensions over China’s discriminatory business practices, China’s trade continues to thrive, and the country has taken over from the United States as the first destination for foreign investment. American and European businesses continue to be engaged in China’s large and growing market, even amid a trade war between China and the United States. Drawing on surveys of companies and international comparisons, we show that – contrary to the prevailing narrative – China’s business practices have improved significantly in recent years. China’s business environment is today generally more favourable than that in other large countries at similar levels of development and, in some though certainly not all aspects, is in line with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average. Differences over geopolitics and human rights must be addressed, but it is clear that trade and investment agreements conditioned on accelerated reforms in China would yield substantial dividends. The benefits of such deals would accrue not only to foreign investors in China and exporters to China, but also to consumers and importers in the European Union and, especially, in the US, where punitive tariffs on China remain in effect. Critical aspects in the negotiations would include better access for American and European investors to China’s market for services and improved enforcement of rules and regulations in China. As in many middle-income countries, uneven enforcement of the law (rather than the law itself) remains a critical problem in China.
Topic:: Development, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Business, and Investment
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

54. To Beat China On Tech In Emerging Markets, Learn From It: Competing with China on 5G and future technologies

Author:: Luke Patey
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Recommendations: The US, South Korea, Japan, and the EU can pool resources to level the playing field with China and offer new finance options for developing countries seeking to upgrade their communications and technology infrastructure. The US should look to the India and Vietnam model and help other nations develop domestic capacities that lower dependencies on Huawei and other foreign tech providers over time. Open RAN is no silver bullet to compete with China. Its potential will only be fully realized in the mid and long run, after high integration costs, security gaps, and other problems are worked out.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Politics, Science and Technology, Power Politics, Economy, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. Europe’s Capacity to Act in the Global Tech Race: Charting a Path for Europe in Times of Major Technological Disruption

Author:: Kaan Sahin and Tyson Barker
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Technological leadership has become a central dimension of geopolitical power. In this development, the primary front in the emerging tech power rivalry is between the US (United States of America) and China (People’s Republic of China). The European Union (EU) has fallen behind and needs to catch-up. The stakes in this race are high and will have an impact on economic competition, national security and broader values-based notions of political order. This study sheds light on Europe’s approach to technological mastery. This study looks into the progress of the EU and its member states across selected technological fields and their global entanglements with other nations and technology actors.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Science and Technology, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

56. Technological Competition: Can the EU Compete with China?

Author:: Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The debate on technological development and the unfolding fourth technological revolution tends to neglect the role of the EU, relegating it to follower status. The leadership positions are occupied by the US and China, who compete with one another for technological supremacy. Yet, despite lagging behind in some areas, the EU is better placed than is often assumed and still stands a chance of guaranteeing the delivery of a technological revolution that is not only environmentally but also socially sustainable. This is critical in proposing a model of technological development alternative to that of China, in particular, and especially in such sectors as artificial intelligence, supercomputing and digital skills.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, and European Union
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Europe

57. Mapping China’s Participation in Multilateral Development Institutions and Funds

Author:: Scott Morris, Rowan Rockafellow, and Sarah Rose
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Global Development
Abstract:: China has emerged as a leading participant in multilateral development organizations. In many ways, this is a welcome development. Today’s global challenges, including COVID-19 and climate change, require an international response and have prompted renewed calls for increased multilateral engagement by the major economy countries. This, combined with the recognition of multilateral institutions’ high standards for transparency and environmental safeguards, have led the United States at times to encourage China to step up its multilateral contributions. At the same time, countervailing voices focused on strategic competition increasingly view China’s multilateral participation with skepticism. When the People’s Republic of China joined the World Bank in 1980, it was allocated 12,000 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) shares, becoming the Bank’s sixth largest shareholder with 3.47 percent of the of the voting power. By 2013, decades of rapid economic growth had propelled China to its current position as the IBRD’s third largest shareholder, eclipsing France, Germany, and the United Kingdom with 5.03 percent of IBRD voting power. In many ways, China’s rise in stature at the IBRD mirrors its growth in influence across the multilateral development system. This is certainly true of China’s increasing voting share in the World Bank, IMF, and UN system, all of which tie financial contributions to economic size (see Figure 1). But China’s growing importance in the multilateral system is also the product of distinct policy choices made by the Chinese government. These policy choices go beyond the wealth-based financial contributions that dictate IBRD shareholding to include voluntary financing, borrowing, and commercial contracting. In concert, they make China a unique player in the multilateral system by virtue of to its simultaneous roles as a multilateral organization donor, shareholder, aid recipient, and commercial partner.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Participation
Political Geography:: China and Asia

58. Mapping China’s Multilateralism: A Data Survey of China’s Participation in Multilateral Development Institutions and Funds

Author:: Scott Morris, Rowan Rockafellow, and Sarah Rose
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Global Development
Abstract:: A considerable body of recent research attempts to shed light on China’s bilateral aid and finance flows, but there have been fewer efforts focused on China’s participation in multilateral development channels. As a result, China’s role across the landscape of multilateral institutions and funds is poorly understood, even as China has emerged as a leading donor within many of these entities. Part of China’s increased multilateral engagement reflects its economic growth, with shareholding and assessed contributions based largely on economic size. But the government of China’s policy choices are also revealed, in part, through its patterns of voluntary funding, cooperation agreements, and influence through personnel instated in leadership positions. By collating data on China’s financial and non-financial engagement with multilateral development banks and other financial institutions, sector-based vertical funds, and the development entities of the United Nations, among others, this paper seeks to provide a clear picture of China’s role in the multilateral development system and the evolution of that role over the past decade. This assessment brings to light the weight of China’s voting power across the multilateral development banks, the extent to which Chinese firms benefit from procurement opportunities in multilateral institutions, and the degree to which China has achieved a singular position of being a large-scale donor and recipient in the multilateral system.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China and Asia

59. Understanding Quality Energy-Related Infrastructure Development in the Mekong Subregion: Key Drivers and Policy Implications

Author:: Han Phoumin, Sopheak Meas, and Hatda Pich An
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Many players have supported infrastructure development in the Mekong Subregion, bridging the missing links in Southeast Asia. While the influx of energy-related infrastructure development investments to the region has improved the livelihoods of millions of people on the one hand, it has brought about a myriad of challenges to the wider region in guiding investments for quality infrastructure and for promoting a low-carbon economy, and energy access and affordability, on the other hand. Besides reviewing key regional initiatives for infrastructure investment and development, this paper examines energy demand and supply, and forecasts energy consumption in the subregion during 2017–2050 using energy modelling scenario analysis. The study found that to satisfy growing energy demand in the subregion, huge power generation infrastructure investment, estimated at around $190 billion–$220 billion, is necessary between 2017 and 2050 and that such an investment will need to be guided by appropriate policy. We argue that without redesigning energy policy towards high-quality energy infrastructure, it is very likely that the increasing use of coal upon which the region greatly depends will lead to the widespread construction of coal-fired power plants, which could result in increased greenhouse gas and carbon dioxide emissions.
Topic:: Development, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, Renewable Energy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, Southeast Asia, Laos, and Myanmar

60. China's Ties with Southeast Asia : From Green Shoots to Sustained Recovery

Author:: Kensuke Tanaka
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: China's rebound happened relatively quickly owing to a large extent to timely macroeconomic policy responses to the crisis. Lagging somewhat behind China, most Southeast Asian countries have now entered the transition from recession to recovery. Some export-dependent Southeast Asian countries shifted their export destination to China to benefit from its early recovery. This switch of export destination to China illustrates China's important role in leading the recovery of the region. Enhancing regional macroeconomic co-operation would help reduce vulnerability of the region and ensure a sustained recovery. Regional macroeconomic co-operation remains at an early stage in Southeast Asia, but possibilities for further co-operation should be explored.
Topic:: Development, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

61. Manifestations of Chinese Development Aid and Its Hidden Meanings

Author:: Anna Kobierecka
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China is one of the states focusing intensively on building its soft power and shaping its international image. However, China’s image is still negative and primarily based on stereotypes. In recent years, this country is willing to change such perceptions and present itself as an efficient, intensively developing, capable country that is much more than just a global production plant. The article aims to review China’s different manifestations of development aid regarding changing this type of public diplomacy and its meaning to the Chinese government. Is it only motivated by good intentions, or maybe its goal is to only provide an advantage to China? It is evident that owing to significant development, China needs to expand its economic contacts. However, the tested hypothesis states that behind Chinese development aid, political motivation is hidden as well. The research is based on content analysis of official documents and Foreign Ministry’s statements referring to development aid.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Development Aid
Political Geography:: China and Asia

62. China and Geoeconomic Dynamics in Central Asia: Balancing Global Strategies, Local Interests and Multiple Partners

Author:: Aliya Tskhay
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Central Asia is at the core of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which promises to bring connectivity, trade, and improved infrastructure, as well as overall economic development to the states of the region. Yet beyond the official rhetoric, China is promoting its power through geoeconomic means. This paper looks at areas of cooperation (energy, infrastructure, trade, and finance) and identifies the ways in which China is involved with the region. Through a combination of loans, investments, and infrastructure projects, the research shows how China ‘binds’ the region closer to itself and ‘wedges’ out alternative partners. It also shows how Central Asian states utilise the funding within the BRI framework for national development programmes, whilst navigating avenues for mitigating the establishment of a dependent relationship with China. The paper concludes with some policy implications for China, Central Asia, and the wider region.
Topic:: Development, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China and Asia

63. Sustainable Development of Chitral: A CPEC Perspective

Author:: Asif Ali and Khalid Manzoor Butt
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The vision of sustainable growth of any community or region cannot be materialized unless provided with equitable socio-economic opportunities with environmentally friendly conditions. In the mountains of Hindukush, Chitral has remained significantly important from a geographic and strategic perspective. The piece of land in the extreme north of Pakistan is blessed with numerous natural resources and it is also a gateway to Central Asia. This valley is surrounded by rugged mountains, due to neglect and lack of land connection with the main country it has been deprived of the required development. The construction of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an alternative passage through Chitral will bring economic opportunities through investment in different sectors. With the materialization of the CPEC route, the potential in the valley will be explored and utilized for the betterment of the country in the broader spectrum and the local economy will strengthen as well. The opening of this trade route will not only change the economic landscape of the valley but will change the sociology of the area. This mega venture along with economic opportunities will also generate challenges for the indigenous community. Expected opportunities will attract more businessmen and investors from outside. This migration process will open the door to social transformation along with challenges not only from an economic perspective but an indigenous cultural heritage of the society will be endangered. Only an inclusive and integrated development stratagem with the involvement and support of all stakeholders will lead to the sustainable economic growth of the valley. Further, the people-centric development approach will bring economic opportunities for the people, otherwise, there will be more challenges than opportunities. This research work has been conducted to investigate the expected challenges threatening sustainable growth of the community and region. Furthermore, it suggests policy guidelines based on empirical evidence for curtailing those challenges.
Topic:: Development, Energy Policy, Inequality, Green Technology, Renewable Energy, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

64. How Duterte Strong-Armed Chinese Dam-Builders But Weakened Philippine Institutions

Author:: Alvin Almendrala Camba
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Chinese construction contracts and development finance have increased massively in recent years. According to many experts, these projects are largely transplants designed to offshore and export Chinese technology, labor, and policy designs to host countries. However, these views have little regard for important nuances of place, time, and politics, ignoring the degree to which host countries—such as local elites, members of civil society, and norms—shape project design, implementation, and results on the ground. Under the regime of President Rodrigo Duterte, political elites in the Philippines have pressed Chinese firms to adapt to some of their demands for political expediency on key infrastructure projects. This pattern is evident from the Kaliwa Dam and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project—both of which have made substantial progress during Duterte’s rule. In particular, Manila has bypassed local social and environmental regulations and has paved the way for Chinese dam builders to break ground on projects quickly so as to strengthen the Duterte government’s political standing. Around the world, Chinese firms have been highly attentive to the will of local political elites, limiting or sometimes completely avoiding relationships with opposition elites and ties to civil society members. Philippine politics is turbulent. Projects supported by the Duterte regime today might not have the same traction under his successor. So while these Chinese concessions have earned favor with Duterte and his allies, such tactics may prove unsustainable over the long term and could easily spur future resentment against China among local communities marginalized by this decisionmaking. In sum, it is Filipinos, not Chinese actors, who mostly have set the agenda on these major infrastructure projects, except on a few specific contractual terms.
Topic:: Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Rodrigo Duterte, and Construction
Political Geography:: China, Philippines, and Asia-Pacific

65. Chinese Mining and Indigenous Resistance in Ecuador

Author:: Cintia Quiliconi and Pablo Rodriguez Vasco
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources of copper in Latin America. But Chinese mining operations in Ecuador, which could have contributed to Ecuadorian development, soon gained a negative reputation after these activities prompted a great deal of local pushback, especially from affected Indigenous communities. As a result, the major Chinese mining consortium that now controls Ecuador’s two main copper mines has taken adaptive steps to stabilize its mining investment and increase the security of its supply networks, steps that often have not produced the intended results. Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels. This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon. In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities. To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land. In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016. This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced. This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
Topic:: Development, Government, Mining, Indigenous, and Resistance
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South America, and Ecuador

66. China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:: Deep Pal
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: China’s economic and political footprint has expanded so quickly that many countries, even those with relatively strong state and civil society institutions, have struggled to grapple with the implications. There has been growing attention to this issue in the United States and the advanced industrial democracies of Japan and Western Europe. But “vulnerable” countries—those where the gap is greatest between the scope and intensity of Chinese activism, on the one hand, and, on the other, local capacity to manage and mitigate political and economic risks—face special challenges. In these countries, the tools and tactics of China’s activism and influence activities remain poorly understood among local experts and elites. Both within and beyond these countries, meanwhile, policy too often transposes Western solutions and is not well adapted to local realities. This is especially notable in two strategic regions: Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe; and South Asia. China’s economic and political profile has expanded unusually quickly in these two regions, but many countries lack a deep bench of local experts who can match analysis of the domestic implications of Chinese activism to policy recommendations that reflect domestic political and economic ground truth. To address this gap, the Carnegie Endowment initiated a global project to better understand Chinese activities in eight “pivot” countries in these two strategic regions. The project’s first objective was to enhance local awareness of the scope and nature of Chinese activism in states with (1) weak state institutions, (2) fragile civil societies, or (3) countries where “elite capture” is a feature of the political landscape. Second, the project aimed to strengthen capacity by facilitating a sharing of experiences and best practices across national boundaries. Third, the project sought to develop policy prescriptions for the governments of these countries, as well as the United States and its strategic partners, to mitigate and respond to activities inimical to political independence or well-balanced economic growth and development. To establish a comprehensive picture of China’s activities and their impact, this project dug deeply into Chinese activism in four case countries in each region—eight countries in total. We began by holding workshops, so that influencers across countries could share experiences and compare notes. Invited participants included policymakers, experts, journalists, and others—all with deep local knowledge, steeped in their countries’ politics, economies, and civil societies. In Europe, the four countries were Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania, and in South Asia, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Cross-national discussions among these regional participants aimed to raise awareness, discuss the implications of China’s growing activism in their countries, and compare notes on the diverse ways in which these various countries had managed the rapid influx of Chinese capital, programs, people, technology, and other sources of influence.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Engagement, Regionalism, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Bangladesh, China, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldives

67. Developing Countries Can Help Restore the WTO's Dispute Settlement System

Author:: Ana González and Euijin Jung
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: By refusing to fill vacancies in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body—the top body that hears appeals and rules on trade disputes—the Trump administration has paralyzed the key component of the dispute settlement system. No nation or group of nations has more at stake in salvaging this system than the world’s big emerging-market economies: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand, among others. These countries have actively and successfully used the dispute settlement system to defend their commercial interests abroad and resolve inevitable trade conflicts. The authors suggest that even though the developing countries did not create the Appellate Body crisis, they may hold a key to unlock it. The Trump administration has also focused its ire on a longstanding WTO practice of giving these economies latitude to seek “special and differential treatment” in trade negotiations because of their developing-country status. The largest developing economies, which have a significant stake in preserving a two-step, rules-based mechanism for resolving trade disputes, could play a role in driving a potential bargain to save the appeals mechanism. They could unite to give up that special status in return for a US commitment to end its boycott of the nomination of Appellate Body members.
Topic:: Development, Government, World Trade Organization, Developing World, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Brazil, North America, Mexico, Thailand, and United States of America

68. China’s BRI: The Development-Finance Dimension

Author:: David Gordon and Haoyu Tong
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: This report is the first of two synthesising the findings of a major research workshop convened in Washington DC on 26 June 2019, by The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as part of its multi-year project on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The IISS commissioned ten papers that addressed development-finance and security issues in the BRI, prepared by leading scholars and policy practitioners. They were joined at the workshop by more than two dozen other experts on China’s international behaviour. This first report focuses on development-finance issues in the BRI; the second will address security issues broadly cast. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is now six years old. Announced by (then) newly ensconced President Xi Jinping, it has since become the centrepiece of Xi’s ambitious drive to make China a more active global leader, and to break free from the cautious approach set out more than 30 years earlier by then-paramount-leader Deng Xiaoping – that China’s strategic approach should be to ‘hide its capacities and bide its time’. At the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th Congress in 2017, the BRI was integrated into the party’s charter. Much of the early analytical work on the BRI has focused on questions surrounding China’s motivations – economic or geopolitical. Is Xi’s initiative a response to changing domestic economic circumstances? Or does it signal evidence of China’s intent to build a twentyfirst- century imperium modelled on the post-war United States-led experience, more than on European colonial or earlier Asian empires? The emerging consensus on this question is that it has been a bit of both. At the same time, an often overlooked factor is Xi’s constant need to further consolidate his power inside China, as the economics versus geopolitics debate about the motivations for the BRI gives too little attention to the more purely political dimension. The BRI cannot be separated from Xi’s efforts to cast himself domestically as an exceptional leader for an exceptional moment in China’s history.
Topic:: Development, Globalization, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

69. Behind Xi Jinping’s Declaration of Victory Over Poverty

Author:: Elizabeth Chen
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Chinese state news organization Xinhua announced on November 23 that nine provinces in Guizhou had been lifted out of absolute poverty, marking the removal of all counties from China’s national list of most impoverished counties (Xinhua, November 24). About a week later, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping announced that China had achieved the goal of eradicating absolute poverty and becoming a “moderately prosperous society” (小康社会, xiaokang shehui) before the end of 2020 (China Daily, December 2; Xinhua, December 4).[1] This heralded a wave of triumphal propaganda. Xi stressed the “critical importance of continuously advancing global poverty reduction” during his remarks at the G20 Riyadh Leader’s Summit on November 22, and held up China’s imminent achievement of eliminating absolute poverty ten years ahead of the deadline set by the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as a model for global emulation (Xinhua, November 23). Chinese official media frequently cited the praise of foreign experts, who were quoted as saying that China’s achievement “gave a hope to the developing countries” and represented a “great historic accomplishment” amid the COVID-19 pandemic (Xinhua, November 25, Xinhua, December 8) On December 14, Xi sent a letter of congratulations to the International Forum on Sharing Poverty Reduction Experience that said, “China stands ready to work with all countries in promoting the process of international poverty reduction and building a community with a shared future for mankind” (China Daily, December 14).
Topic:: Development, Poverty, Xi Jinping, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: China and Asia

70. China Leverages Tibetan Plateau’s Water Wealth

Author:: Brahma Chellaney
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: While the international attention remains on China’s recidivist activities in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, where it continues to incrementally expand its strategic footprint, Beijing is also quietly focusing its attention on the waters of rivers that originate in the resource-rich, Chinese-controlled territory of Tibet.
Topic:: Development, Environment, Science and Technology, Territorial Disputes, Water, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Tibet

71. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BRICS COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FIELD

Author:: Augusto Leal Rinaldi and Laerte Apolinário Júnior
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: The first decade of the 21st century gave way to a series of international political-economic dynamics with the potential to reorganize global power (IKENBERRY, 2018; KITCHEN; COX, 2019; MAHBUBANI, 2009; MEARSHEIMER, 2018, 2019). Among the changes, one common reference is the rise of the BRICS –Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa –and, consequently, their performance for demanding reforms of the global governance system (COOPER, 2016; HURRELL, 2018; ROBERTS; ARMIJO; KATADA, 2018; STUENKEL, 2017). The emerging economies have invested in consolidating their new status by acting in different branches of global governance, demanding changes and policies to see a reasonable parity between their economic weight and ability to participate as real decision-makers. In this context, international regimes are a crucial dimension to consider.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, International Political Economy, Geopolitics, International Development, Economic Development, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

72. New Developments in China's Financial and Economic System

Author:: Ronald Schramm
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Ronald Schramm, Visiting Associate Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University Moderated by: Shang-Jin Wei, N. T. Wang Professor of Chinese Business and Economy and Professor of Finance and Economics, Columbia Business School Professor Jin Wei will interview Ron Schramm about new and important developments in China’s financial and economic system since the first edition of Schramm's textbook in 2015 (Routledge/Taylor&Francis): China Macro Finance: A US Perspective. Both new reforms and retrenchments in the Chinese economy will be discussed as well as the fraught economic relationship with the United States. Students and scholars of China will benefit by putting their own research in the context of how far China has come and where it is going in terms of economic and financial reform.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, Economics, Reform, Finance, and Business
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

73. New Silk Road – An Opportunity for the Development of Rail Container Transport in Poland?

Author:: Aleksandra Bartosiewicz and Paulina Szterlik
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: Poland, due to its location in the center of Europe, is a key element of the New Silk Road (NSR), an initiative that attempts to create the shortest land connection between China and Western Europe. This article analyzes various industry reports, national development strategies up to 2030, and EU and local projects to see is the further development of NSR an opportunity for container rail transport in Poland. As it turns out, the issue discussed in the article has hitherto been outside the circle of researchers’ interest, thus the analysis is an important supplement to the existing research gap. It indicates that the further participation of Poland in the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative is a great opportunity for the economic growth of the Republic of Poland (RP).
Topic:: Development, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, Transportation, and Railways
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Poland

74. The (Re)emergence of the BRICS and the Reorganization of Power in Contemporary Geopolitics

Author:: Charles Pennaforte and Ricardo Luigi
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The two first decades of the 21 st Century were marked by the recrudescence of two powerhouses, Russia and China. Given their important role on global geopolitics, these two countries took advantage of the gaps resulted from yet another crisis on the structure of global capitalism, which influenced the relative decline of the United States capacity to impose its will on the international system as they had been able to do so since the end of World War II. This article’s objective is to analyze the global geopolitical rearrangement due to a weakened United States which opened the possibility for the BRICS nations to emerge as possible sources of power. To reinforce this analysis, the world-systems perspective, (here on referred to as WSP) elaborated mainly by Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi is used, as well as a geopolitical approach to provide a link to international relations theories. Therefore, this paper is divided on to four sections. The first one interrelates the geopolitical theories and those of the WSP. The second section is guided towards understanding the origins and fundamentals of the WSP. On the third section, an approach is made towards the motivations and the effects of the rearrangement of power on the world’s geopolitics. Finally, on the last section, the roles and opportunities that have arisen from the emergence of the BRICS nations on the international system are presented.
Topic:: Development, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, and Capitalism
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, South Africa, Brazil, and South America

75. Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Daniel R. Russel and Blake Berger
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, is a massive international infrastructure program involving nearly 140 countries with over an estimated $1 trillion in projects related to energy, transportation, digital networks, and trade. Chinese leaders frame the BRI as “win-win” cooperation focused solely on development and connectivity. Beijing has gone to great lengths to minimize BRI’s links to the People’s Liberation Army and to downplay the initiative’s geostrategic overtones. Nevertheless, many governments have become worried about ulterior motives behind BRI projects, many of which have dual-use commercial-military capabilities and are increasingly connected to Chinese digital technologies and networks and satellite systems. The Asia Society Policy Institute’s – Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative – examines key BRI projects in the Indo-Pacific and explores relevant Chinese doctrine, the involvement of the People’s Liberation Army with BRI, and assesses the potential military and geostrategic advantages to China from BRI ports and other projects. This project is led by ASPI Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy Daniel Russel, with support from ASPI Senior Program Officer Blake Berger. The project and the report benefitted from advisement from experts and officials in Singapore, Australia, Japan, Vietnam, China, and the United States as well as to the expert advisory group whose distinguished members generously shared their time and wisdom to support this effort.
Topic:: Development, Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China and Asia

76. China is Not Conducting Debt Trap Diplomacy in the Pacific--At Least Not Yet

Author:: Jonathan Pryke
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: In an atmosphere of heightened geostrategic competition, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has raised questions about the risk of debt problems in less-developed countries. Such risks are especially worrying for the small and fragile economies of the Pacific. A close look at the evidence suggests that China has not been engaged in debt-trap diplomacy in the Pacific, at least not so far. Nonetheless, if future Chinese lending continues on a business-as-usual basis, serious problems of debt sustainability will arise, and concerns about quality and corruption are valid.There have been recent signs that both China and Pacific Island governments recognize the need for reform. China needs to adopt formal lending rules similar to those of the multilateral development banks, providing more favorable terms to countries at greater risk of debt distress. Alternative approaches might include replacing or partially replacing EXIM loans with the interest-free loans and grants that the Chinese Ministry of Commerce already provides.
Topic:: Debt, Development, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

77. No Sanctuary: China’s New Territorial Dispute with Bhutan

Author:: Felix Chang
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Resting at the eastern end of Bhutan is the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary. Spanning some 750 square kilometers, it is spread out across a densely forested area of the Himalayan Mountains. The sanctuary is far better known for its unique flora and fauna (including the red panda and, reputedly, the fabled yeti) than its geographic boundaries. But the latter is precisely what brought it to international attention in June 2020. Early that month, Bhutan sought a grant for the sanctuary from a global environmental organization that funds sustainable development projects. Unexpectedly, China’s representatives to that organization opposed the grant. Their reason: China considers the sanctuary to be “disputed territory.”
Topic:: Development, Environment, Territorial Disputes, and History
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Bhutan

78. China’s role in the Sustainable Development Agenda: Considerations for Norway

Author:: Hans Jørgen Gåsemyr
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China’s role as an international development actor is growing, with real and increasing potential to impact Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). On some issues, Chinese initiatives align well with Norwegian interests, but China’s approach to development also diverges on some key practices and norms. While Chinese international efforts meet mixed reactions, Norway should stake out its own course for when and how to engage with China over SDGs.
Topic:: Development, International Organization, United Nations, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Norway, and Asia

79. Is China Still a Developing Country? And Why It Matters for Energy and Climate

Author:: Philippe Benoit and Kevin Tu
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: China’s dramatic economic growth in the 21st century has made it not only the second largest economy in the world but also a powerhouse in the global energy system. Now, as the top energy consumer and the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, China is being closely watched and judged as its impact on energy markets and climate grows more profound. Looking forward, many issues are expected to shape the evolution of China’s energy sector, not least of which is its development status. While China’s economic might makes it a superpower alongside the United States, it still faces many of the major challenges of a typical developing country, such as widespread energy poverty, including 400 million people without access to clean cooking, significant air pollution, and dependence on increasing energy use to fuel future economic growth. Its modest income per capita qualifies it as a middle-income developing country. Evaluating China’s development status is not just an academic exercise. How China views itself and its challenges and how the international community classifies it carry real-world consequences that can significantly impact how the country manages its energy needs going forward, what fuels it uses, how it interacts with energy and other partners, and the level of its contributions and commitment to climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts worldwide. Understanding the nature and implications of China’s development situation can help in designing energy policies and fostering an international framework that better promote sustainable growth both within the country and globally. This paper examines how the usual criteria employed by international organizations to determine a country’s development standing have become increasingly difficult to apply to China, given the dramatic changes it has undergone over the past several decades, notably from an energy perspective. The paper finds that China combines significant characteristics of both developing and developed countries and examines the energy and environmental implications of this hybrid status.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, and Environment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

80. China and Middle East Security Issues: Challenges, Perceptions and Positions

Author:: Jin Liangxiang
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Middle East and Gulf region face three drivers of tension and instability: those caused by the US’s erratic and unilateral policies, those tied to economic underdevelopment and those linked to growing competition among regional actors. China is and will be facing economic challenges stemming from the Middle East and will face growing calls to assume more active roles in the region, roles which however often go beyond its capabilities or interests. China’s approach to regional security can be categorised as promoting political solutions to disputes, contributing to economic development and providing security resources within the UN framework. China backs regional efforts to achieve peace and security via dialogue, also including extra-regional actors involved in the Middle East. China is sympathetic to Russia’s vision for regional security cooperation, and would support the convening of an international conference on Middle East security issues that includes specific roles for regional and external actors.
Topic:: Security, Development, and Gulf Nations
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and United States of America

81. Determinants of Korean Outward Foreign Direct Investment: How Do Korean Firms Respond to the Labor Costs of Host Countries?

Author:: Hanbyul Ryu and Young Sik Jeong
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Low cost of labor has been one of the major incentives that foreign firms invest in many developing countries. Yet, many developing countries including China and ASEAN have recently experienced a rapid increase in labor costs. Using the wage information provided by JETRO, this study examines how Korean FDI outflow is affected by the increase in labor costs of the manufacturing industry in host countries. The results indicate that the worker’s and engineer’s wages in Asian developing countries, who accumulated at least 3 and 5 years of work experience, have generally a negative impact on Korean FDI outflow. However, there exist positive relationships between the wages and FDI when the wages stay at very low levels. We do not find evidence that labor costs make a significant impact on Korean FDI outflow to European or Developed countries.
Topic:: Development, Foreign Direct Investment, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Korea

82. China-Venezuela Relations in the Twenty-First Century: From Overconfidence to Uncertainty

Author:: Matt Ferchen
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: The outsized ambitions and scale of the China-Venezuela political and financial relationship in the twenty-first century have meant that its failures and disappointments have been correspondingly large. This report explores how the nations came to be involved, how each side has responded to Venezuela’s extended economic and political crisis, and the implications for the future of the bilateral relationship and for China’s aspirations to be a leader and agent of international development.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Development, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South America, and Venezuela

83. America’s Use of Coercive Economic Statecraft

Author:: Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, Paula J. Dobriansky, and Adam Szubin
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: U.S. policymakers will continue to intensively use a growing array of coercive economic tools, including tariffs, sanctions, trade controls, and investment restrictions. The growing use reflects a desire by policymakers to use coercive economic tools in support of a growing range of policy objectives. Diplomacy around these tools has long been challenging and can require hard choices. To use these tools effectively, policymakers should focus on articulating clear objectives and measuring effectiveness and costs. U.S.-China competition raises the stakes for getting the use of coercive economic statecraft right. Policymakers in the next presidential administration and Congress would be well-served to spend at least as much effort focusing on the positive tools of statecraft. These include domestic economic renewal, international finance and development incentives, and positive trade measures, among others.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

84. The Increasing Role of Asia in Multilateral Development Finance

Author:: Rogerio Studart, Tatiana Rosito, Joachim Von Amsberg, José Pio Borges, Karin Vazquez, Leslie Maasdorp, and Martin Raiser
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: What is the role of Asian Development Banks in the multilateral financial system? This report presents the topics discussed at the XXI China Analysis Group Meeting, coordinated by Anna Jaguaribe, CEBRI Board Member. Specialists such as Leslie Maasdorp, Joachim Von Amsberg, Karin Vazquez and Martin Raiser, who work at multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) discussed the topic “Asia’s Increasing Role in the Multilateral Development Financial System”.
Topic:: Development, Finance, Multilateralism, and Banking
Political Geography:: China and Asia

85. China and COVID-19: a shock to its economy, a metaphor for its development

Author:: George Magnus
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: The Chinese government’s draconian actions to control the coronavirus seem to be producing a remarkable economic contraction. As so many are unable to attend or resume work at the moment, the government’s palliative economic measures may gain little traction. Although the demand shock will eventually fade, other longer-term issues will surely endure. The supply shock will be less obvious but more corrosive. The government’s questionable conduct in managing the public health crisis has unveiled significant features about governance in Xi’s China that can be mapped on to China’s development. While this crisis is the biggest challenge Xi has faced, there is little doubt that he will survive it, champion the party’s role in the nation’s rescue, and feel emboldened to continue with his authoritarian governance. Yet it is this that, in the long run, will prove incompatible with China’s economic development ambitions.
Topic:: Development, Economy, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: China and Asia

86. China’s Deepening Diplomatic and Economic Engagement in Afghanistan

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On February 29, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” in Doha, Qatar, which laid out a framework for ending the 18-year old conflict in Afghanistan (U.S. State Department, February 29). Despite skepticism in many quarters regarding the viability of the deal, the negotiations leading to the agreement have been supported by many international actors, to include the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On February 18, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang (耿爽) commented on the U.S.-Taliban negotiations by stating that “China firmly supports the broad and inclusive peace and reconciliation process [and] welcomes the news that the U.S. and the Taliban are expected to reach and sign a deal… China stands ready to step up cooperation with all parties to the Afghan issue and the international community for peace, stability and development in Afghanistan” (PRC Foreign Ministry Briefing, February 18). As the U.S plans to draw down its forces in Afghanistan—a key element of the February 29 deal—China is set to further deepen its involvement in Afghanistan (Nikkei Asian Review, January 14, 2019). Beijing wishes to achieve at least two key objectives. First, it wants once and for all to block any contact between the Taliban and ethnic Uighur Muslim militants seeking independence from China (China Brief, April 24, 2019). Second, the PRC wants long-term stability in Afghanistan in order to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—to the war-wracked country. Beijing sees Afghanistan as a primary link between the Central Asian republics and the CPEC (China Brief, December 10, 2019). To achieve its objectives, Beijing has pursued positive engagement with the Taliban movement that controls more than half of Afghanistan’s territory. These ties have increased over the past couple of years: for example, in 2019 Taliban representatives paid at least two visits to Beijing (in June and September) for talks with PRC officials (CGTN, June 20, 2019; Al-Jazeera, September 23, 2019).
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Middle East, and Asia

87. The domestic risk of Chinese partnerships: cross-conditionality and coalition building

Author:: Alejandro Angel
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: Chinese credits became a viable, and preferred, alternative during the pink tide in part because it lacked traditional conditionality clauses. However, these financial operations, as well as others, often imply the existence of cross-conditionality. In opposition to traditional variants of conditionality, cross-conditionality implies that operations in the realms of trade, finance, or aid for development can be jeopardized as a response to decisions taken by national authorities that change previously agreed conditions in parallel projects. The main objective of this study is to explore the possible consequences of cross-conditionality, particularly the political consequences, in the Brazilian government’s coalition building. The hypothesis is that cross-conditionality represents a similar risk than the one that traditional conditionality represented in terms of national autonomy insofar as national governments would still have their hands tied, although for different reasons. We find that cross-conditionality affects the coalition-building efforts of national governments since it can be used to affect key government partners. In Brazil, agribusiness, a key partner of Bolsonaro’s government, is the sector that could be potentially affected if the Chinese government decides to implement cross-conditionality as a retaliatory measure to hostile policies or declarations of the Brazilian government vis-à-vis Chinese interests.
Topic:: Development, Partnerships, Trade, Coalition, and Cross-conditionality
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

88. China’s Growing Engagement with the UNDS as an Emerging Nation: Changing Rationales, Funding Preferences and Future Trends

Author:: Mao Ruipeng
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: As China deepens its engagement in global governance and development, its strategic motivation and rising influence within the UN and on international rules and norms are attracting the world’s attention. This paper focuses on China’s engagement with the UNDS, specifically Chinese funding and allocation decisions. China’s UNDS funding has risen rapidly since 2008 and even accelerated in 2013. Between 2013 and 2017, Chinese funding (excluding local resources) grew at an annual average rate of 33.8 per cent. In 2017, its total contribution reached USD 325.869 million. China’s shares of core funding and assessed contribution in its total UNDS funding are much higher than traditional donor countries. However, the share of non-core funding has also jumped. While China tends to mostly provide funds for UNDS development projects, in recent years it has also been hiking funding for humanitarian assistance. This paper also examines three cases of China’s earmarked funding – to the UNDP and the WFP, which receive the largest share of its UNDS funds, as well as for UNPDF operations, which count as a voluntary contribution. There are several reasons for China’s growing engagement with the UNDS, from evolving perception of foreign aid and appreciating the UN’s multilateral assets to fostering the reputation of “responsible great nation” and pushing forward the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through cooperation with the UNDS. In general, China continues to integrate into the global development system, and can be expected to maintain its support for the UN and continue to contribute to the UNDS.
Topic:: Development, International Law, United Nations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Norms
Political Geography:: China and Global

89. The Intersection of Investment and Conflict in Myanmar

Author:: Priscilla Clapp
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Developing countries throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America are grappling with how to deal with China's rising economic influence—particularly the multibillion-dollar development projects financed through China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Myanmar, however, appears to be approaching foreign investment proposals with considerable caution. This report examines the framework the country is developing to promote transparency and accountability and to reserve for itself the authority to weigh the economic, social, and environmental impacts of major projects proposed by international investors, including China.
Topic:: Development, Infrastructure, Economy, Conflict, Investment, and Peace
Political Geography:: China, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

90. BRICS and Mortar: New Architecture in Education

Author:: Kishore Singh
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:: In the beginning of the new century and the millennium, Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China came to be reckoned as the world’s fastest growing economies. Later, these were joined by South Africa, leading to the emergence of BRICS as a political coalition of five countries. The year 2009 was a landmark in this historic development. In that year, the first BRICS Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation. The BRICS summits held annually since then have become an important political platform for the collective voice of BRICS countries in the form of BRICS Declarations. Education is one of the most critical areas addressed in successive BRICS summits. Centrality of education in people’s lives and its catalytic role for human development is widely recognised in today’s world. So it was inevitable that the BRICS countries would come together and create a common plat-forum on education as well. The first meeting of BRICS Education Ministers was held in November 2013 on the margins of the UNESCO General Conference. Since then, the BRICS Education Ministers have been meeting annually and issuing a separate declaration in tandem with the declaration issued at the summits.
Topic:: Development, Education, International Cooperation, and BRICS
Political Geography:: Russia, China, South Asia, India, South Africa, and Brazil

91. Chinese Industrial Actors in Global Rule Making: A Preliminary Exploration

Author:: Honzhi Yu and Hongying Wang
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: In contrast to the growing profile of the Chinese government in global governance, the engagement of Chinese industrial actors in global rule making is quite limited and uneven. Some Chinese industrial leaders have shown an ambition to participate in global rule making in their respective realms; most of the others still lack interest or capacity. This policy brief identifies three plausible sources of variation among the Chinese industrial actors. It offers suggestions to Chinese industrial actors and to those concerned about China’s role in global governance, with the purpose of reducing misunderstanding and building trust between Chinese industrial actors and businesses, regulators, non-governmental organizations and stakeholders from other parts of the world in developing global standards for good governance.
Topic:: Development, Industrial Policy, and Governance
Political Geography:: China and Asia

92. The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, Financing, Expansion and Challenges of Xi's Ever-expanding Strategy

Author:: Alex He
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: This paper argues that with more objectives added since its inception in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has evolved into a much more expansive grand strategy that includes a package of themes and goals. It examines the policy-making process of the BRI by exploring the motivations behind the plan President Xi Jinping proposed and how the initial Silk Road projects have developed into China’s package of strategies over the past few years. The priorities and performance of China’s investments in the BRI are discussed from the angle of geographical distribution, routes and projects, priority sectors and the connection between the BRI and the previous “going out” strategy China started at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The model and the specific ways China finances and invests in BRI projects, to a great extent, decided the nature of the China-led global infrastructure investment plan. BRI financing is reviewed in detail. Based on the geopolitical and geo-economic analysis of the BRI in the previous parts, the implications of the BRI for global governance as it goes beyond the ambitious infrastructure investment plan are revealed. The risks and problems facing the BRI and the controversy and criticism it has encountered are also addressed. Finally, the paper summarizes the BRI’s ever-expanding themes and the problems and risks it faces, and their implications for the future of the BRI.
Topic:: Development, Imperialism, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China and Asia

93. Resource Sharing and Joint Development in the South China Sea: Exploring Avenues of Cooperation

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The Philippines and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development, demonstrating their willingness to explore joint development as a pathway to collaboration, notwithstanding their territorial disputes. Recent commentaries on joint development are mostly framed on legal challenges, South China Sea (SCS) rows, geopolitics, and state-centric security issues. However, there have been no extensive discussions on the potential contributions from non-state stakeholders that can make joint development agreements environmentally sound, sustainable, and less political. These stakeholders are the oil companies, fishermen and coastal communities. In this regard, this NTS Insight explores potential roles of these stakeholders in promoting joint initiatives to share and develop resources in the SCS. It argues that the engagement and participation of non-state stakeholders in resource sharing and joint management must be pursued to address key non-traditional security challenges in the SCS. It also examines mechanisms to integrate marine environmental protection and sustainable fishing management into joint development agreements.
Topic:: Security, Development, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:: China, Philippines, Southeast Asia, and South China Sea

94. The United Kingdom's Belt and Road Initiative strategy after Brexit

Author:: Benjamin Barton
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham
Abstract:: As China’s President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy programme, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become one of the world’s most active infrastructure development drivers. The BRI is helping to meet the increasing demand for infrastructure development in emerging markets across the world. This policy is unlikely to change due to the importance that the Chinese government attributes to the BRI, with it now being formally enshrined into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitution. For the UK, the BRI stakes are high; it matters both domestically and internationally. It is impacting the wellbeing of countries that are of strategic importance to the UK. It also contributes to the emerging geopolitical rivalry on infrastructure financing. The government should explore bilateral and multilateral venues to seek to cooperate with China on the BRI by developing a UK BRI strategy post-Brexit.
Topic:: Development, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Brexit, Multilateralism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Britain, China, United Kingdom, and Asia

95. China’s Future Development: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:: James A. Dorn
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: 1978 has been erratic, with many interruptions along the way. The end result, however, has been eye opening: the Middle Kingdom has become the world’s largest trading nation, the second largest economy, and more than 500 million people have lifted themselves out of poverty as economic liberalization removed barriers to trade. One of the enduring lessons from China’s rise as an economic giant is that once people are given greater economic freedom, more autonomy, and stronger property rights, they will have a better chance of creating a harmonious and prosperous society (see Dorn 2019). Nevertheless, China faces major challenges to its future development. There is still no genuine rule of law that effectively limits the power of government, no independent judiciary to enforce the rights promised in the nation’s constitution, no free market for ideas that is essential for innovation and for avoiding major policy errors, no competitive political system that fosters a diversity of views, and a large state sector that stifles private initiative and breeds corruption. China’s slowing growth rate, its increasing debt burden, environmental problems, and the increasing tension in U.S.-China relations compound the challenges facing Beijing.
Topic:: Development, Economics, History, and Trade Liberalization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

96. Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative Recommendations to ensure beneficial and sustainable BRI outcomes

Author:: Daniel R. Russel and Blake Berger
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Launched in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a highly ambitious development effort that would sew together infrastructure projects across more than 70 countries. Estimated to comprise of more than USD $1 trillion in Chinese investment, the BRI is arguably China's broadest economic engagement effort with the rest of the world — enhancing its connectivity through Southeast, South, Central, and West Asia; Africa; Europe; and South America. The Asia Society Policy Institute project – Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative – examines BRI with the aim of setting forth actionable recommendations for how China and partner countries can help ensure that BRI projects yield beneficial and sustainable developmental, economic, environmental, civic, and social outcomes. The project includes a report by the same name, which is available for download below, as well as an interactive visualization of 12 recommended practices and their specific implementation steps, intended outcomes, and relevant Chinese and international precedents. (For interactive content see: https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/belt-and-road-initiative)
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, Soft Power, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Economic Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Europe, South Asia, Central Asia, Asia, South America, Southeast Asia, and West Asia

97. Insights into China’s Developing Country Status

Author:: Tao Ma
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Abstract:: As the international status of China as a rising power has been growing rapidly in the past 40 years, along with remarkable achievements in economic growth, China’s developing country status has been questioned by some Western developed countries. In January 2019, the US submitted to the WTO General Council the proposal An Undifferentiated WTO: Self-Declared Development Status Risks Institutional Irrelevance (WT/GC/W/757), presenting data arguing that China and some other developing countries had advanced to such an extent that they should be limited from being eligible for special and differential treatment and should give up their developing country status. During the WTO General Council meeting at the end of February, China and other developing countries hotly debated this issue with the US. China insisted that developing countries were confronted with mounting external tensions and their legitimate rights and interests in some international organizations and agreements had been constantly challenged. Against this background, it is critical to clarify China’s ongoing status as a developing country. Only after the real divide between China and developed countries has been clarified can China’s status as a developing country be secured.
Topic:: Development, Economics, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

98. Expo promotes high-quality development

Author:: Dong Yan and Wen Jun
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Abstract:: China will promote higher-level opening-up by continuing to expand access to its market, increase imports, foster a world-class business environment, deepen multilateral and bilateral cooperation and jointly build the Belt and Road Initiative. This is the promise President Xi Jinping made in his keynote speech at the second China International Import Expo in Shanghai on Tuesday. ...... China's imports have made important contributions to global trade and economic growth, accounting for 10.67 percent of the global goods imports last year. At the second CIIE, which concludes on Sunday, more than 150 countries, regions and international organizations from across five continents are showcasing their development results while more than 3,000 enterprises are holding talks with purchasing agents both inside and outside China. The CIIE is a platform for not only trading goods and services, but also exchanging ideas and discussing global trade issues.
Topic:: Development, International Trade and Finance, Business, Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:: China and Asia

99. Forty Years Development of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment: Retrospect and the Challenges Ahead

Author:: Tao Wang and Kailin Gao
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Abstract:: Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has increasingly become an importantmethod for China to integrate into the world economy. This paper comprehensivelyreviews and analyses policy development and the changing pattern of China’s OFDIover the past 40 years. We divide the development into “restricted” (1978–1999), “relaxed” (2000–2016) and “regulated” (2017 onwards) stages. This paper alsoreviews literature on the impact of Chinese OFDI on China and host countries. Despite its generally positive ef ects, large-scale and unbalanced OFDI activitieshave alarmed Chinese policy-makers. Both developing and developed host countrieshave expressed their concern over national security and the misbehavior of someChinese overseas enterprises. Therefore, greater supervision and adjustment fromquantity to quality growth is necessary for the future development of China’s OFDI.
Topic:: Development, History, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

100. Opinion: What Is China’s Core Economic Interest in Trade War?

Author:: Qiyuan Xu
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Abstract:: The trade conflict between China and the U.S. has lasted for more than half a year. The two sides have held several rounds of consultations, but agreements were later broken and tensions have only intensified. The spat will likely be protracted, with frictions to continue and possibly escalate for a period of time, given the two countries’ diverging interests, public opinions and historical experiences. A broad range of issues are involved in the trade dispute. For example, the U.S. has pressured China on forced technology transfer, talent strategy and industrial policy issues, as well as issues the two sides have long been at odds over, such as intellectual property rights, labor, environmental protection, stateowned enterprise reform and foreign exchange rates. Meanwhile, the U.S. has targeted products and sectors that go well beyond those in which China has a competitive advantage. The U.S. tariffs also target industries that the country plans to focus on for future development.
Topic:: Development, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS